SECTION 2: BATTLING FOR OVERSEAS HEARTS

AND MINDS: CHINA’S UNITED FRONT AND

PROPAGANDA WORK
Abstract
Over the past ten years, General Secretary of the Chinese Com-
munist Party (CCP) Xi Jinping has directed a wide-ranging effort
to enhance the potency and reach of China’s overseas influence ac-
tivities. Aiming to discredit the CCP’s critics while inducing others
to advance its strategic goals, these activities involve a variety of
agencies within the Party-state as well as proxies who further its
initiatives in foreign countries, often—but not always—unwittingly.
Foreign countries’ media, politicians, businesses, academic institu-
tions, and ethnically Chinese citizens and residents are all major
targets of Beijing’s harmful, aggressive, and at times illegal overseas
influence efforts. Operating with flagrant disregard for sovereignty
and the laws of foreign nations, these activities go well beyond “soft
power” and persuasion to include bribery and threats of violence
against officeholders and candidates for public office; harassment of
the press, including allegedly framing individual reporters for crimi-
nal activity; and intimidation of the Chinese diaspora on foreign soil
through the use of informants and threats against family in China.
Key Findings
• For CCP leaders, influencing how the outside world views and
engages with China is a matter of regime survival and a means
of advancing national interests. The Party-state recognizes that
the success of certain objectives—such as the CCP’s unques-
tioned rule over China, the absence of criticism regarding CCP
policies, the Party’s unequivocal claim to speak for the Chinese
diaspora in a way the outside world acknowledges, and the uni-
fication of Taiwan with the Mainland—depends partly on the
behavior of foreign leaders and publics. In the same vein, CCP
leaders understand that foreign parties’ reactions to their ef-
forts may impact the effectiveness of China’s signature foreign
policy initiatives, foreign investment, and technology transfer as
well as the attractiveness of its global image.
• Under Xi’s rule, China’s overseas influence activities are now
more prevalent, institutionalized, technologically sophisticated,
and aggressive than under his predecessors. China’s overseas
influence activities involve many actors within the Party-state
and can be found in countries around the world, regardless of
their form of government or level of development.
• The Chinese Party-state exhibits a growing and increasingly
brazen tendency to employ coercion in tandem with persuasion
(223)
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to conduct overseas influence activities, often in ways that chal-

lenge other countries’ sovereignty or threaten the rights of per-
sons living within their borders. Beijing seeks to sow discord in
other countries, including the United States, where the uptick
in China’s influence activities has inflamed rhetoric and con-
tributed to a troubling rise in violence against Asian Americans.
• Certain factors make countries more or less resilient to China’s
overseas influence activities. These include the presence of lib-
eral democratic institutions, such as a free press and an inde-
pendent judiciary, the extent of economic dependence on China,
the prevalence of domestic corruption, and a foreign society’s
familiarity with China.
• In the media sphere, China’s Party-state aims to bolster its
global image by encouraging positive coverage, manipulating
local media environments, and silencing critical voices. Content
sharing agreements between Chinese state media and foreign
media outlets, CCP-sponsored media training programs, invest-
ments in local media, disinformation propagated through so-
cial media, and intimidation of media figures are all avenues
through which the Party-state seeks to control foreign coverage
of China.
• In the political sphere, Beijing seeks to empower foreign politi-
cal figures who will pursue policies it regards as favorable while
deterring, threatening, or punishing those who pursue policies it
regards as disadvantageous. Covert efforts to influence electoral
processes, to violate the civil liberties of people within another
country’s borders, to curry favor with sitting officials, and to
harass unfriendly political figures are all hallmarks of China’s
overseas political influence activities.
• In the economic sphere, Beijing attempts to align the commer-
cial interests of other countries with its own strategic goals and
to distort domestic policymaking. In countries with weak insti-
tutions, China often employs outright corruption, enriching rul-
ing elites who advance its objectives. In democracies, industry
associations and business councils may serve as proxies for CCP
interests. The CCP may also leverage business partnerships in
strategic sectors to advocate for policies favorable to China.
• In the academic sphere, the Chinese government endeavors to
control access to knowledge about China and, by extension, to
influence public opinion regarding the policy choices based on
that knowledge. China’s influence activities can result in cen-
sorship, intimidation, and harassment that shape critical dis-
course about China in universities around the world.
Recommendations
The Commission recommends:
• Congress address China’s state-sponsored influence and inter-
ference in the United States by amending the Higher Education
Act of 1965 as follows:
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○ To require the U.S. Department of Education to share data

on U.S. universities and colleges’ foreign gifts and contract
disclosures, required under section 117 of the act, with U.S.
federal law enforcement, intelligence agencies, and other rele-
vant agencies, including but not limited to the Federal Bureau
of Investigations and the Office of the Director of National
Intelligence (ODNI). Such information sharing should encom-
pass gifts and contracts extending back at least ten years, or
a period of time determined by Congress, as well as all future
gifts and contracts as they are disclosed to the department.
○ To direct an interagency review, led by ODNI, to assess the
section 117 data to identify risks posed by China- and Hong
Kong- origin money received by U.S. universities and colleges.
The interagency findings should be reported to Congress and
inform steps, including potential suspension of federal funds,
to mitigate risks associated with continued receipt of Chi-
na-origin money by U.S. universities and colleges.
○ To require universities and colleges to include in their section
117 reporting when a foreign gift or contract disclosure has
been added retroactively or when a past entry has been re-
vised, and to establish penalties for late reporting. Penalties
may include loss of federal financial assistance within three
consecutive or non-consecutive years of failing to disclose gifts
or contracts above the current threshold of $250,000.
○ To direct the Department of Education to evaluate the ade-
quacy of the current reporting threshold of $250,000 by con-
ducting a study on the average amount of foreign gifts and
contracts received or signed by U.S. universities and colleges
in a variety of academic disciplines and to determine whether
the threshold needs to be adjusted for programs in disciplines
that Congress deems critical to U.S. national security. The
study should also include an analysis of the amount, focus,
and potential impact of China- and Hong Kong-origin gifts
and contracts received by U.S. universities and colleges over
the last ten years.
• Congress pass legislation to amend the Foreign Investment
Risk Review Modernization Act (FIRRMA) to expand the defi-
nition of “covered transaction” to include “research contracts.”
Under the expanded definition, the Committee on Foreign
Investment in the United States (CFIUS) should have the
authority to review investments made by Chinese entities in
the U.S. education system in the form of contracts. All parties
to the transaction, including the foreign contracting organi-
zations and U.S. institutions, should file a joint declaration
to CFIUS ahead of their contract start date. Upon passage
of this legislation, reporting requirements under section 117
of the Higher Education Act should be adjusted through reg-
ulation to include foreign gifts to U.S. universities and col-
leges, effectively transferring the administrative authority to
receive and oversee the collection of foreign research contract
reporting to CFIUS.
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• Congress amend the Lobbying Disclosure Act (LDA) to require

domestic associations, such as industry or trade associations,
who employ an individual registered as a lobbyist to publicly
disclose any donations or member contributions from entities
based in China and other countries of concern, as well as their
U.S. affiliates.
• Congress support the establishment of a new entity under the
U.S. Agency for Global Media (USAGM) to coordinate and dis-
seminate news content internationally in Chinese, English, and
other languages to promote fact-based information on China
and counter CCP global information manipulation. The entity
could facilitate partnerships with international journalists and
media, and provide independent content, particularly where
Chinese state and state-sponsored entities seek to discredit the
United States and the values of liberal democracy and promote
false narratives about China. This digital service will:
○ Curate and repackage the best of USAGM entities’ daily con-
tent to provide uncensored China-related news in Mandarin
and English for countries around the world where China is
making inroads promoting its values and attempting to dis-
credit the United States; and
○ Engage audiences and partners through multiple platforms
and multilateral means to promote responsible and fact-based
journalism.
• Congress establish an interagency group, led by the Office of the
Director of National Intelligence, to create a public database to
assist U.S. companies, universities, and individuals in conduct-
ing due diligence on potential business or academic partners in
China. The database should enable users to identify how Chi-
na’s military, United Front Work Department, intelligence agen-
cies, and security agencies may be linked to Chinese companies,
investment firms and other financial institutions, research in-
stitutes, and universities.
• Congress direct the U.S. Department of State, in coordination
with the U.S. Department of Commerce and U.S. Trade and De-
velopment Agency, to prepare a public biennial assessment of
the impact of China’s lending and other financial practices on
Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) participant countries and recom-
mend best practices for addressing the impacts of China’s activ-
ities through U.S. diplomatic and programmatic engagements.
○ The assessment should consider the impact of these practices
on corruption and social stability within recipient countries,
among other issues.
○ Based on the findings of the report, Congress request the
Department of State, in coordination with the Development
Finance Corporation, United States Trade and Development
Agency, and other relevant agencies, to work with the EU to
develop a unified approach to addressing the impact of Chi-
na’s activities under BRI in third countries.
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• Congress should consider legislative restrictions to address the

national security and systemic risks raised by Chinese social
media applications.
• Congress should require the U.S. Department of State to es-
tablish as grounds for student visa revocation any instance
where a foreign student surveils on behalf of or reports to any
foreign-state intelligence, security, law enforcement, or political
party authority the civil or political speech of any other student,
or threatens to do so. The Department of State shall develop
appropriate evidentiary sources and standards for revocation.
Introduction
This year, China’s government continued to aggressively seek to
influence foreign policymakers and interfere with civic life overseas.
To advance its goals, Beijing relies on a variety of covert and overt
influence tactics, some of which clearly violate U.S. law and under-
mine the protections afforded to U.S. persons. One such case was
publicly revealed in April 2023, when the Federal Bureau of Inves-
tigation announced that it had arrested and charged two defendants
in connection with opening and operating an illegal overseas “police
station” in lower Manhattan, New York, for a provincial branch of
China’s Ministry of Public Security (MPS).1 The defendants alleged-
ly helped the Chinese government find Chinese nationals living in
the United States, harass them, and in some cases threaten them
with consequences if they did not return to China.2 Notably, one of
the defendants was introduced to the MPS by an official of China’s
United Front Work Department, the agency responsible for China’s
overseas influence operations.3 “The PRC [People’s Republic of Chi-
na], through its repressive security apparatus, established a secret
physical presence in New York City to monitor and intimidate dissi-
dents and those critical of its government,” Assistant Attorney Gen-
eral Matthew G. Olsen of the U.S. Department of Justice’s (DOJ)
National Security Division said.4 “The PRC’s actions go far beyond
the bounds of acceptable nation-state conduct. We will resolutely de-
fend the freedoms of all those living in our country from the threat
of authoritarian repression,” he added.5
The actions described in the April 2023 complaint offer a window
into the Chinese Party-state’s overseas influence activities, which
have long sought to advance China’s priorities at the expense of
and with blatant disregard for foreign countries’ interests, laws, in-
stitutions, and residents.6 This section explores how China’s over-
seas influence activities have evolved from the early days of the
communist revolution to suit the opportunities and demands of the
modern era. This section first assesses the Party-state’s efforts to
influence foreign societies in covert, harmful, and sometimes illegal
ways through two characteristic forms of Leninist political activities
known as united front work and external propaganda work. Then,
the section surveys the Party-state’s influence tactics and their ap-
plication in a variety of media, political, economic, and academic
contexts around the world. The section concludes by considering the
implications of China’s overseas influence activities for the United
States. The section draws on the Commission’s March 2023 hearing,
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“China’s Global Influence and Interference Activities,” consultations

with experts, and open source research and analysis.

Defining China’s Overseas Influence Activities and a

Theory of Harm
This section defines “overseas influence activities” as the wide
range of actions the CCP leadership undertakes to shape other
countries’ perceptions and their policy choices in ways that ad-
vance Chinese national interests. Furthermore, this section re-
stricts its focus to only those influence activities that plausibly
cause harm to the targeted country.* Harm to a country can be
construed in a variety of overlapping ways:
• Compromising political processes and institutions: This in-
cludes corrupting the integrity of political deliberation and
its associated processes as well as manipulating political or
social activity to disguise actions that advance China’s inter-
ests as the efforts of domestic constituencies.7
• Manipulating the information environment: This includes un-
dermining the ability of media or other civil society actors
to hold domestic and foreign actors accountable for choices
contrary to the public interest; it also includes restricting the
availability of knowledge that domestic policymakers require
as the basis for sound decision-making.8
• Encroaching on civil liberties: This includes preventing citi-
zens in democratic countries from exercising the freedoms to
which they are entitled (such as freedom of speech, freedom
of assembly, freedom of religion, and freedom of the press)
and may take the form of state-sponsored transnational re-
pression schemes carried out by China’s security services.9
• Undermining the commercial environment: This may involve
elite capture and other forms of corruption to create com-
mercial conditions that advance Chinese objectives, including
awarding contracts to Chinese firms, deepening dependence
on China, and achieving preferential access to resources or
export markets. Dependence on China as an export market
or as a supplier of critical goods and technology can then be
leveraged for coercive purposes.10
Some of China’s harmful overseas influence activities may be
illegal in the targeted country, but others may be entirely legal or
occupy a legal gray zone that makes them difficult to mitigate ef-
fectively. Some of these activities may exploit differences between
federal, state, and local regulations.11 In some cases, a discrete
instance of the influence activity may not be problematic, but the
cumulative impact of China’s activities may cause harm to the
targeted society.

* In contrast to activities that could be understood as beneficial and purely intended to build
“soft power,” which refers to the ability of a country to persuade others to do what it wants with-
out force or coercion. Joseph S. Nye, Jr., “Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics,”
Foreign Affairs, May/June 2004.
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Influencing Hearts and Minds Abroad: China’s United

Front and External Propaganda Activities
CCP leaders believe they must influence the outside world in order
to protect themselves from threats to their regime and to advance
China’s national interests, including its “national rejuvenation.” * 12
Since the Tiananmen Square massacre in 1989, the Party-state has
assessed that it faces a hostile Western bloc bent on undermining
China’s political stability by spreading “subversive” ideas within
China as well as among the Chinese diaspora.13 At the same time,
it maintains that Western countries unfairly smear China’s interna-
tional image and aim to constrain its emergence as a global power.14
As a result, the Party-state seeks to influence the world in which
it operates and shape how China is perceived by foreign audiences
in ways observers often label “influence operations” or “foreign in-
terference.” 15 Drawing from the ideology developed by Russian po-
litical theorist and Marxist revolutionary Vladimir Lenin, the Par-
ty-state structures its efforts to influence foreign perceptions around
two longstanding Leninist † approaches to foreign policy: “united
front work” and “external propaganda work.” 16 United front work
involves rallying support for the CCP and neutralizing opposition
to its policies and authority, while external propaganda work aims
to control international perceptions of China and increase the CCP’s
sway over global narratives.17
The Party-state conducts united front and external propaganda
work against a variety of overseas populations ‡ to rally them in
support of its agenda or counter threats to the success of that agen-
da.18 The CCP’s targets include foreign government officials, busi-
nesspersons, human rights advocates, and other influential figures
the Party-state believes have the clout needed to advance or impede
policies aligned with its goals.19 Another major target is the Chinese
diaspora, whom the Party-state views as resources for advancing its
* The CCP’s narrative of “national rejuvenation” promises to increase China’s material power
and redress grievances from what Chinese leaders call the “century of humiliation,” which Beijing
believes robbed it of its rightful place as a global leader. Xi has repeatedly stated that unification
with Taiwan is an important part of national rejuvenation. For more on the national rejuvenation
concept, see U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, Chapter 1, Section 2, “The
China Model: Return of the Middle Kingdom,” in 2020 Annual Report to Congress, December
2020, 89.
† Developed by Lenin in the early 1900s and deployed by the Communist Party of the Soviet
Union, Leninism is typically understood as an action-oriented ideology that builds upon the intel-
lectual groundwork laid by Marxism. Leninism builds on Marxism in holding that there exists a
singular, collective, utopian goal that polity and society should be organized and mobilized toward
reaching. Leninism supplements Marxism, however, in holding that a vanguard Party, operating
under the pretense of representing the working class or the “proletariat,” is both uniquely qual-
ified and necessary for achieving Marxism’s prophesied communist future. The core legacy of
Leninism is a blueprint for creating an “organizational weapon,” namely a set of organizational
tactics for achieving, maintaining, and enacting societal control and influence. The organizational
weapon in Lenin’s framework is the Communist Party, which, operating under regimented hierar-
chical control of “democratic centralism,” is meant to thoroughly penetrate every sphere of society
and implement plans from the top down. Philip Selznick, “The Organizational Weapon,” McGraw
Hill (RAND series), 1952, 3–8; U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, The China
Rising Leaders Project, Part 1: The Chinese Communist Party and Its Emerging Next-Genera-
tion Leaders, March 23, 2012, 55; Vladimir Lenin, “What Is to Be Done?: Burning Questions for
Our Movement,” in Lenin’s Collected Works, 1902; Daniel Tobin, written testimony for U.S.-China
Economic and Security Review Commission, Hearing on a ‘China Model?’ Beijing’s Promotion of
Alternative Global Norms and Standards, March 13, 2020.
‡ While this chapter focuses on the Party-state’s overseas united front work and propaganda
work, it is important to note that China also conducts these activities within its borders toward
its own population. Ryan Fedasiuk, “How China’s United Front System Works Overseas,” Austra-
lian Strategic Policy Institute, April 13, 2022.
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overseas interests and consolidating its global influence.20 Beijing

lays claim to all “sons and daughters of the Chinese nation in China
and abroad,” including PRC nationals overseas as well as ethnically
Chinese citizens and residents of foreign countries in its expansive
definition of what it means to be “Chinese.” 21 A third target is per-
secuted ethnic and religious minorities whom the CCP perceives as
threats to territorial integrity and social cohesion, such as but not
limited to Tibetans, Uyghurs, Mongolians, and members of the out-
lawed Falun Gong movement.22 A fourth target is citizens of Hong
Kong who have resisted Beijing’s imposition of the National Secu-
rity Law and other encroachments on the formerly free territory.23
A fifth category is citizens of Taiwan, where the Party-state’s goals
include cultivating support for unification with the Mainland and
opposing de jure independence.24
Making Friends and Isolating Enemies: China’s United Front
Work
United front work is a way of managing relationships with im-
portant groups and individuals outside of the CCP that is based on
Russian revolutionary Vladimir Lenin’s concept of forming a “united
front,” or a temporary alliance with one’s friends and lesser ene-
mies,* to defeat greater enemies.25 Contemporary united front work
encapsulates the various activities of CCP organs, Chinese govern-
ment agencies, and their affiliates to coopt or coerce groups outside
of the CCP—including but certainly not limited to foreigners—into
comporting with the Party’s demands and advancing Chinese na-
tional interests as the CCP defines them.26 Chinese leaders from
Mao Zedong onward have affirmed the importance of united front
work, describing it as a “magic weapon” for defeating the CCP’s en-
emies.27
Shortly after ascending to power, General Secretary Xi reempha-
sized the role of united front work as an increasingly important tool
and a “magic weapon” † for achieving China’s national interests in a
dangerous and dynamic world.28 In a speech at the Central United
Front Work Conference ‡ in July 2022, Xi observed that the interna-
tional environment was in flux and argued that united front work
was now more important than before to safeguard China’s nation-
al sovereignty, security, and development interests.29 United front
work will be crucial to the Party-state’s efforts to become a “modern
socialist country” and realize “the great rejuvenation of the Chinese
* The CCP has long divided the world into “friends” and “enemies.” Friends are those inside of
China who uphold the Party’s rule and policy agenda and those outside of China who use their
power and influence to advance China’s interests. The CCP’s enemies are defined as those who
question its legitimacy or exercise of power. Mareike Ohlberg, written testimony for U.S.-China
Economic and Security Review Commission, Hearing on China’s Global Influence and Interference
Activities, March 23, 2023, 6; Matt Schrader, “Friends and Enemies: A Framework for Under-
standing Chinese Political Interference in Democratic Countries,” German Marshall Fund, April
22, 2022, 1–2.
† The term “magic weapon” was first coined by Mao Zedong but has been used by every Chinese
leader since to describe three “weapons” or efforts necessary for the Party’s success: united front
work, Party building, and the armed struggle (or military activities). Peter Mattis and Alex Joske,
“The Third Magic Weapon: Reforming China’s United Front,” War on the Rocks, June 24, 2019.
‡ The Central United Front Work Conference gathers together the country’s top leadership to
discuss the state of united front work and set future priorities. Xinhua, “At the Central United
Front Work Conference, Xi Jinping Emphasized Promoting the Unity and Struggle of Chinese
Sons and Daughters at Home and Abroad to Gather Great Power for the Great Rejuvenation of
the Chinese Nation” (习近平在中央统战工作会议上强调 促进海内外中华儿女团结奋斗 为中华民族伟
大复兴汇聚伟力), July 30, 2022. Translation.
 231

nation,” Xi argued, calling on officials below him to carry out united

front work with “a high sense of mission and responsibility.” 30
The CCP has signaled that united front work is a major priori-
ty and has reformed the bureaucratic structures that implement it
over the past ten years. Xi has called for strengthening united front
work under the banner of his “Great United Front” concept.31 He
has also emphasized that all CCP officials must participate in unit-
ed front work and touted united front work’s importance in speeches
at the last two Party congresses and national work conferences on
the subject.32 Current united front regulations state that the CCP
must lead united front work and that Party committees at all levels
of government must play a role in united front work.33 Major bu-
reaucratic changes since Xi came to power include reviving a lead-
ing small group to coordinate Party activities on united front work,
elevating the status of the Central United Front Work Conference,
issuing two sets of regulations for united front work, and reorganiz-
ing the United Front Work Department (UFWD).34
China’s System for United Front Work: A Party-State-Wide
Endeavor
The “united front system” encompasses dozens of Party bodies,
ministries, military organizations, and civic entities that bring differ-
ent platforms, capabilities, and personnel to bear in China’s foreign
influence activities.35 United front work is inherent in many of the
Party-state’s global activities, from its funding of Chinese-language
study centers, to its diplomats’ engagement with foreign elites, to
its espionage services’ collection of intelligence, to its national po-
lice force’s perpetration of transnational repression.36 United front
work is also carried out by a wide range of quasi-official and civil
society groups that are based abroad but may nonetheless respond
to CCP and ministry guidance, underscoring the fact that China’s
overseas influence activities frequently involve proxies and benefit
from plausible deniability.37 The involvement of so many actors in-
side and outside of the Party-state makes the united front system a
flexible and effective vehicle of influence.38 Important actors within
the united front system include but are not limited to the following:
• The United Front Work Department (UFWD), the CCP
Central Committee department that coordinates united
front work toward the Chinese diaspora, Taiwan, Hong
Kong, ethnic minorities, and religious groups.39 Accord-
ing to Alex Joske, a senior risk advisor at McGrathNicol who
testified before the Commission, the UFWD contributes sig-
nificantly to covert overseas operations involving political in-
fluence, intelligence collection, and technology transfer.40 The
UFWD does not exist at just the central level of China’s polit-
ical system; rather, there are smaller, identical versions of the
UFWD embedded within Party committees down to the local
level that carry out united front work inside and outside of
China.41 Provincial or even municipal UFWDs often supervise
the quasi-governmental and civil society groups that lobby for
Party-state interests overseas.42 Most Chinese embassies and
consulates include UFWD personnel among their staff.43
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• The Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference

(CPPCC), which is an “advisory” body the Party-state
uses to coordinate between itself and important social
groups—such as leaders in business, academia, and re-
ligious organizations outside of the Party—to carry out
united front work.* 44 CPPCC delegates attend a high-profile
annual meeting to receive direction from the CCP regarding the
ways its policies should be characterized to both domestic and
foreign audiences.45 Delegates to the CPPCC serve as proxies
for CCP interests by virtue of their participation in this forum,
and they frequently act as interlocuters with foreign govern-
ment officials, businesses, and academic institutions.46
• The International Liaison Department, another CCP
Central Committee department that engages with more
than 600 foreign political parties in 160 countries or re-
gions to facilitate united front work.† 47 This “party-to-par-
ty diplomacy” frequently involves conducting political training,
promoting China’s governance model, reinforcing China’s global
narratives, and increasing the number of China-friendly figures
across the political spectrum in foreign countries.48
• Quasi-official organizations subordinate to the UFWD
and related organs, which advocate for Party-state inter-
ests while appearing to be nongovernmental entities.49
Some of these quasi-official organizations, such as the China
Council for the Promotion of Peaceful National Reunification
(CCPPNR), advocate for the “peaceful reunification” of Taiwan
and mainland China.50 Others, such as the Chinese People’s
Association for Friendship with Foreign Countries (CPAFFC),
advocate for closer bilateral ties with China and oversee major
elements of China’s subnational diplomacy, such as sister-city
partnerships.51 Still others, such as the Western Returned
Scholars Association (WRSA), encourage Chinese students and
scholars who have been educated abroad to contribute scientific
knowledge and technology to the cause of China’s moderniza-
tion.52
• Overseas Chinese community organizations whose lead-
ers may at times be engaged by the UFWD or related
organs and who may express the positions of the Par-
ty-state as the views of the communities they serve.53
Peter Mattis, then director for intelligence at the Special Com-
petitive Studies Project, wrote in testimony before the Com-
mission that the united front system may co-opt the leaders
of some ethnic community organizations, such as chambers of
commerce, hometown associations, and cultural promotion cen-
ters.54 Notably, ordinary members of these community organiza-
tions may be unaware of the leadership’s engagement with the
* Both the elevation of fourth-ranking Politburo Standing Committee member Wang Huning to
chairman of the CPPCC and reports that Xi has tasked him to develop a “theoretical unification
strategy fit for the Xi era” indicate that united front work will likely play a greater role in China’s
future approach to Taiwan. Katsuji Nakazawa, “Analysis: Xi Puts Top Brain in Charge of Taiwan
Unification Strategy,” Nikkei Asia, January 26, 2023.
† The CCP engages with ruling, opposition, and fringe parties across the ideological spectrum
in its party-to-party diplomacy. Lina Benabdallah, “Ties That Bind: China’s Party-to-Party Diplo-
macy in Africa,” Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung, October 2021, 8.
 233

united front system, and the organizations themselves may not

be directly under the command of any united front-related or-
gan.55 Community organizations with links to the united front
might receive support in the form of funding, logistical support,
and advice, and they likely have varying degrees of autonomy.56

China Leverages United Front Work for Intelligence

Collection, Repression
United front work builds relationships that facilitate intelli-
gence collection and/or repressive activities by China’s Ministry
of State Security (MSS) and MPS.* 57 Mr. Joske testified before
the Commission that China’s intelligence services have recruited
united front figures in foreign countries as clandestine assets or
even posed as UFWD officials themselves to facilitate intelligence
operations.58
One recent case illustrates this entanglement between united
front work and China’s security services. In May 2023, DOJ in-
dicted a Massachusetts man for allegedly acting as an unregis-
tered foreign agent of the Chinese government and accused him
of providing information about Chinese dissidents and others to
China’s MPS and the UFWD.59 According to DOJ, Liang Litang
allegedly “provided PRC government officials with information
regarding members and leaders of Boston-area, Chinese family
associations and community organizations with pro-Taiwan lean-
ings.” 60 DOJ also alleged that the information Mr. Liang provided
to the UFWD and MPS included the identification of an individual
he believed had “sabotaged” PRC flags in Boston’s Chinatown in
October 2018, a video of a dissident attending the “Boston Stands
with Hong Kong” march in August 2019, and photographs of an-
ti-PRC dissidents in front of the Boston Public Library in Sep-
tember 2019.61 The fact pattern described by DOJ demonstrates
that the UFWD and China’s security services may indeed rely
on the same human source to accomplish their varied objectives.

“Telling China’s Story Well”: CCP External Propaganda Work

External propaganda work refers to the Party-state’s efforts to
shape the attitudes of foreign audiences through propaganda.† 62
Like united front work, external propaganda work is also based on
Leninist principles of information control and has been practiced by
the CCP since the 1920s.63 The CCP leaders of the past and present
have viewed external propaganda work as a means of cultivating
* The MSS maintains two front organizations, the China International Cultural Exchange Cen-
ter (CICEC) and the China Institutes of Contemporary International Relations (CICIR), that
engage with foreign scholars of China and think tank experts to influence foreign policy debates
in a manner consistent with united front work. Alex Joske, Spies and Lies: How China’s Great-
est Covert Operations Fooled the World, Hardie Grant Books, 2022, 26; Alex Joske, “The Party
Speaks for You: Foreign Interference and the Chinese Communist Party’s United Front System,”
Australian Strategic Policy Institute, 2020, 15; Peter Mattis and Matthew Brazil, Chinese Commu-
nist Espionage: An Intelligence Primer, Naval Institute Press, 2019, 56; Larry Diamond and Or-
ville Schell, eds., “China’s Influence and American Interests: Promoting Constructive Vigilance,”
Hoover Institution, 2019, 79–80.
† Propaganda is information, especially of a biased or misleading nature, used to promote or
publicize a particular political cause or point of view. European Parliament, Understanding Pro-
paganda and Disinformation, November 15, 2015.
 234

positive global attitudes toward China, countering what they view

as hostile foreign propaganda about China, publicizing the CCP’s
stance on important issues, promoting Chinese culture abroad, and
enhancing China’s ability to set the global agenda.64 External pro-
paganda work reinforces united front work by influencing the atti-
tudes of key overseas constituencies and is sometimes implemented
by the same organizations within the Party-state bureaucracy.65
Since coming to power in 2013, Xi has repeatedly spoken about
the importance of improving China’s image by breaking what he
alleges is a Western, biased monopoly on international informa-
tion about China.66 Frequently, he describes the work of improving
China’s image through external propaganda in terms of “strength-
en[ing] China’s international communication capabilities” or “telling
China’s story well.” 67 In a 2015 speech, Xi underscored the global
reach of propaganda work by stating, “Wherever the readers are,
wherever the viewers are, that is where propaganda reports must
extend their feelers, and where the focus and foothold of propaganda
and ideological work must be placed.” 68 In 2022 at the 20th Party
Congress, Xi made clear that the priority remains to “better tell
China’s stories, make China’s voice heard, and present a China that
is credible, appealing, and respectable.” 69 He vowed to make China’s
external propaganda work more effective and “to strengthen China’s
voice in international affairs so it is commensurate with our com-
posite national strength and international status.” 70
Xi has also intensified the external propaganda drive that began
under his predecessor Hu Jintao by directing changes to the way
China’s propaganda apparatus produces and disseminates content
to foreigners.71 Since highlighting external propaganda work during
a 2016 visit to the headquarters of People’s Daily, Xinhua News
Agency, and China Central Television (CCTV), Xi has spoken repeat-
edly about the need for China to improve the precision, salience, and
efficacy of its global propaganda efforts.72 He also oversaw the 2018
consolidation of three state television and radio broadcasters aimed
at overseas audiences—China Global Television Network (CGTN),
China Radio International, and China National Radio—into a me-
ga-broadcaster supervised by the CCP Central Propaganda Depart-
ment and referred to as the “Voice of China” in media intended for
foreigners.73 In line with Xi’s exhortations to improve external pro-
paganda work, state media-affiliated newspapers and broadcasting
platforms have increased their production of content for foreign au-
diences, launched new overseas bureaus,* hired large numbers of
foreign journalists, and increased their social media presence.74
* As of 2021, Xinhua has 181 overseas bureaus, while CGTN has offices in more than 70 coun-
tries. China Radio International also has a presence in at least 14 countries. By contrast, the
Associated Press has around 250 bureaus worldwide. Both Xinhua and China Daily also pay for
online and print inserts in U.S. news outlets. Between 2019 and 2021, China Daily spent more
than $7 million buying ad space in both print and online publications. Additionally, it claims to
have 300 thousand copies in circulation daily in the United States and 600 thousand overseas.
As a state-owned company, China Daily provides Beijing with a direct platform to spread propa-
ganda in the United States, primarily reaching an older generation of readers. Alternatively, an
increasing number of Americans rely on new media, like TikTok, for their news. TikTok, which
is privately owned by a Chinese company but ultimately must be responsive to the demands
of the Party-state, provides Beijing with a potential avenue to reach its more than 150 million
users in the United Sates. Catherine Thorbecke, “TikTok Says It Has 150 Million US Users amid
Renewed Calls for a Ban,” CNN Business, March 21, 2023; Christopher Paul, “How China Plays
by Different Rules—at Everyone Else’s Expense,” RAND Corporation, February 7, 2022; Joshua
Kurlantzick, “China Wants Your Attention, Please,” Council of Foreign Relations, December 28,
 235

China’s System for External Propaganda Work

China’s external propaganda system encompasses many agencies
that work to influence the international media environment on the
CCP’s behalf or in ways that advance its interests.75 The govern-
ment and nongovernment actors within China’s propaganda system
listed below engage in a mixture of propaganda, censorship, and
disinformation * to shape foreign media discourse.76 The CCP’s Pro-
paganda Department issues guidance regarding specific messages
to be conveyed to foreign audiences that are then implemented by
state media outlets, ministries, and Party bodies.77 As with unit-
ed front work, the top CCP leadership expects organizations at all
levels within China’s Party-state—and increasingly within Hong
Kong—to contribute to external propaganda work.78 Entities con-
tributing to China’s external propaganda work, officially directed or
not, include:
• Chinese state-owned media outlets, such as Xinhua News
Agency, China Daily, China Global Television Network
(CGTN), and China Radio International, which dissemi-
nate news and other programming around the world in
dozens of local languages.79 Joshua Kurlantzick, a senior
fellow for Southeast Asia at the Council on Foreign Relations,
observes that CGTN, China Radio International, and most other
Chinese state media outlets have struggled to grow their audi-
ence share in many regions of the world despite their efforts to
replicate the sleek and professional appearance of international
media counterparts.80 An important exception is Xinhua, which
maintains cooperation and content-sharing agreements with
numerous foreign news outlets and wire services that distribute
its stories or advertisements directly to local audiences.† 81 Mr.
Kurlantzick notes that in places where it has relatively more
reporters, such as Africa and Southeast Asia, Xinhua is beating
competitor wire services to stories and is not under the same
pressure as its competitors to turn a profit.82
• The Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which oversees the ac-
tivities of China’s diplomatic corps, training programs
for journalists from other countries, and the accredi-
tation of foreign journalists working in China.83 Sarah
Cook, the senior advisor for China, Hong Kong, and Taiwan at
Freedom House, observed in testimony before the Commission
that Chinese diplomats frequently promote falsehoods, such as
conspiracies regarding the origins of COVID-19, the source of
2022; Hadas Gold, “State Department Asks Americans Working for Chinese Media to Share Per-
sonal Details,” CNN Business, May 22, 2020.
* Censorship is the suppression of ideas and information that some individuals, groups, or gov-
ernment officials find objectionable or dangerous. Disinformation refers to politically motivated
messaging designed to engender public cynicism, uncertainty, apathy, distrust, and paranoia for
the purpose of depressing citizen engagement. American Library Association, “First Amendment
and Censorship,” October 2021; National Endowment for Democracy, “Issue Brief: Distinguishing
Disinformation from Propaganda, Misinformation, and ‘Fake News,’ ” October 17, 2017.
† While some major U.S. news outlets, like the New York Times, Washington Post, and Wall
Street Journal discontinued their content-sharing agreements with Xinhua, as of at least 2021,
others such as USA Today, the Los Angeles Times, and the Financial Times continue to permit in-
serts from Xinhua News Agency or China Daily. The paid inserts are sometimes labeled as being
from China Daily, but they often fail to note their ties to the Chinese government. In 2022, CNN
also published an advertisement for Xinhua advertising the Beijing Winter Olympics. Freedom
House, “Beijing’s Global Media Influence 2022,” 2022.
 236

prodemocracy protests in Hong Kong, and the atrocities commit-

ted against Uyghurs in Xinjiang.84 Chinese diplomats have also
pressured foreign media executives and journalists in private
and public settings to censor critical coverage about China.85
For example, in 2021, the Chinese embassy in Sweden sent a
threatening email to Swedish journalist Jojje Olsson demanding
that he stop his critical coverage of Beijing.86
• The Ministry of Education, which oversees the promo-
tion of officially approved versions of Chinese history
and state-sponsored educational initiatives.87 The Minis-
try of Education oversees the parent body funding Confucius
Institutes, which have come under fire in the United States
over concerns they facilitate censorship and promote China’s
worldview as well as sovereignty claims over Taiwan.88 In fact,
Politburo member Li Changchun openly described Confucius
Institutes as “an important part of our country’s external pro-
paganda layout” as early as 2007, leaving no doubt as to Con-
fucius Institutes’ supportive role in China’s global propaganda
activities.89 Since June 2022, 104 of 118 U.S.-based Confucius
Institutes have closed, but some new programs and initiatives
have already emerged to replace the closed institutes.90 Accord-
ing to Ian Oxnevad, a senior fellow at the National Association
of Scholars, some U.S. universities have transferred language
instruction previously held at Confucius Institutes to extant
partnerships with Chinese universities, while others are estab-
lishing new partnerships with the Chinese government agency
responsible for administering the Confucius Institutes (previ-
ously known as the Hanban, but now called the Ministry of
Education Center for Language Exchange and Cooperation).* 91
• The Ministry of Culture and Tourism, which oversees the
promotion of officially approved versions of Chinese art
and culture abroad.92 The Ministry of Culture and Tourism
oversees multi-channel networks (MCNs), which are agencies
that manage online influencers and help them produce content
approved and, in some cases, directly commissioned by the Par-
ty-state.93 Some of these influencers produce propaganda spe-
cifically designed for overseas audiences and post their videos
on foreign platforms, such as YouTube.94 A report by the Aus-
tralian Strategic Policy Institute highlighted one set of MCN-
backed YouTube accounts that publish content depicting the
supposedly joyous lifestyles of residents in Xinjiang, Tibet, and
Inner Mongolia, a clear effort to counter media reporting of Chi-
nese atrocities in these regions.95
• The People’s Liberation Army (PLA), the MSS, and oth-
er state-linked actors that conduct disinformation cam-
paigns targeting foreign audiences.96 While the PLA is most
likely behind many disinformation campaigns targeting Taiwan,

* The Center for Language Exchange and Cooperation in turn oversees an organization called
the Chinese International Education Foundation, which funds Confucius Institutes and their re-
placement programs. Rachelle Peterson, Flora Yan, and Ian Oxnevad, “After Confucius Institutes:
China’s Enduring Influence on American Higher Education,” National Association of Scholars,
June 2022, 8; Zhuang Pinghui, “China’s Confucius Institutes rebrand after overseas propaganda
rows,” South China Morning Post, July 4, 2020.
 237

others, such as the coordinated DRAGONBRIDGE * campaign

that propagated divisive content ahead of the U.S. midterms in
November 2022, are likely state-linked but difficult to attribute
to a particular Chinese government agency or military unit.97
• Chinese law enforcement agencies, which have been
linked to a massive online influence campaign target-
ing more than 50 platforms, including Meta, X (formerly
Twitter), TikTok, YouTube, and others.98 In August 2023,
Meta announced that it had removed 7,704 accounts, 954 pag-
es, and 15 groups linked to a larger influence effort by Chi-
nese law enforcement that sought to promote pro-China talking
points and attack CCP critics.99 Content included criticisms of
the United States and positive commentary on China’s gover-
nance of Xinjiang, among other issues related to Beijing’s global
interests.100
• The Hong Kong government, which has jailed local jour-
nalists, barred foreign journalists from permission to
cover certain events, and forced the closure of free me-
dia in the territory.101 Once a bastion of press freedom in
Asia, Hong Kong plummeted from 18th place to 148th place
in Reporters Without Borders’ annual index on press freedom
between 2002 and 2022.102
• Local media owners and political elites in foreign coun-
tries, who may favor closer ties with Beijing.103 Ms. Cook
argues these local media owners and political elites have often
“taken action—either at the direct behest of Chinese officials
or for their own pre-emptive business interests—to suppress
critical reporting or amplify pro-Beijing propaganda and false-
hoods.” 104

CCP Propaganda Pushes Tailored Messages to Global

Audiences
China’s external propaganda features both positive stories
about China and negative stories about the United States.105
Rebecca Fair, vice president of information advantage at the
technology services firm Two Six Technologies, testified before
the Commission that “almost 30 percent of PRC tweets in the
last 12 months use cultural content to promote a positive image
of China” and speculated that this positive messaging over the
past year by official Chinese government accounts was intend-
ed to counter perceived bad publicity in international media.106
During the same period, Ms. Fair noted, official and pro-Beijing
social media accounts also spread negative narratives portraying
the United States as a “global destabilizer” with severe internal
problems.107 Prominent topics included the United States’ alleged
escalation of the war in Ukraine, U.S. support for Japan’s defense,

* DRAGONBRIDGE is a cyber threat group linked to China that uses an expansive network of
inauthentic social media accounts to influence Hong Kong, Taiwan, and the United States. Man-
diant Intelligence, “Pro-PRC DRAGONBRIDGE Influence Campaign Leverages New TTPs to Ag-
gressively Target U.S. Interests, Including Midterm Elections,” October 26, 2022; Andy Greenberg,
“A Pro-China Disinfo Campaign Is Targeting US Elections—Badly,” WIRED, October 26, 2022.
 238

CCP Propaganda Pushes Tailored Messages to Global

Audiences—Continued
and parallels between the January 8, 2023, insurrection in Brazil
and the January 6, 2021, attack on the U.S. Capitol.108
Chinese propaganda on social media is often tailored to audi-
ences in different geographic regions in a variety of languages.109
According to Ms. Fair, between 2022 and 2023, official Chinese
government-affiliated tweets as well as inauthentic tweets likely
linked to the Chinese government targeting audiences in East
Asia, Southeast Asia, the Middle East, and North Africa tended
to emphasize negative depictions of the United States.110 By con-
trast, Chinese government-sponsored tweets targeting audienc-
es in Australia and Oceania, Latin America and the Caribbean,
Sub-Saharan Africa, and South and Central Asia focused on Chi-
nese infrastructure and investment.111
More broadly, Chinese media outlets frequently amplify the
Russian media’s messages, a phenomenon that Caitlin Dearing
Scott, a technical and team lead at the International Republican
Institute’s Center for Global Impact, described in her testimony
before the Commission as “narrative collusion.” 112 Chinese cover-
age of Russia’s war in Ukraine is a clear recent example of this
collusion.113 Chinese officials and state media have adopted the
Kremlin’s sanitized language about the war, propagated claims
that the United States and NATO are to blame for tensions,
and provided vastly more air time to Russian perspectives than
Ukrainian ones.114 Chinese state media outlets have also con-
sistently reposted social media content promoting the Kremlin’s
claim that the United States is running more than 30 bioweapons
labs in Ukraine.115

China’s Overseas Influence by Domain

China attempts to shape foreign media, political, economic, and
academic systems abroad through a mixture of persuasive and co-
ercive tactics inherent in united front and propaganda work. Ac-
cording to Ms. Cook and Mareike Ohlberg, a senior fellow in the
Indo-Pacific Program at the German Marshall Fund, China’s coer-
cive tactics have become more obvious—and more prevalent—in its
global activities over the past ten years, reflecting Chinese leaders’
belief that a strong country cannot be seen to tolerate criticism of
any kind.116
While it is clear that China’s overseas influence activities ag-
gressively target countries around the world, they appear to have
varying degrees of success.117 Moreover, determining whether these
efforts decisively impacted the outcome, even in particular cases,
remains challenging. Nevertheless, several witnesses testified before
the Commission that specific characteristics of the target country
may make it more or less resistant to China’s overseas influence
activities. These include:
• The presence of liberal democratic institutions. Countries
with a free press, political opposition, elections, an active civil
 239

society, and an independent legal system are better positioned

than countries without those institutions to identify and root
out undue foreign influence and interference.118
• The extent of economic dependence on China as well
as domestic corruption. Economic ties such as trade, infra-
structure investment, and lending are often “the entry point for
broader PRC political influence and interference,” Ms. Dearing
Scott observed.119 She noted that Beijing routinely exploits cor-
ruption among local elites to “capture” their support, arguing
that countries with medium to high levels of corruption are
most susceptible to Chinese influence based on BRI deals or
other economic inducements.120
• Knowledge of China within the foreign government and
population. Countries with low levels of local China expertise
may struggle to identify the potential pitfalls of engagement
with China, determine what types of cooperation facilitate CCP
influence efforts, or implement appropriate responses to miti-
gate and counter the most nefarious aspects of that influence.121
According to Ms. Cook, low levels of “China literacy” were com-
mon among all of the countries Freedom House described as
“vulnerable” to Chinese media influence in a recent study.122
China’s Harmful Media Influence Activities
The CCP is intensifying its global campaign to shape the media
environments of foreign countries, relying on more sophisticated
and coercive tactics than in the past.123 These efforts occur in all
regions of the world but appear especially vigorous in developing
countries.124 Content sharing, media training programs, invest-
ments in local media, disinformation propagated through social me-
dia, and intimidation of media figures are five tactics that exempli-
fy China’s efforts to influence foreign media systems.125 Beijing’s
efforts to influence global media discourse have been challenged by
the resistance of local media establishments—especially in demo-
cratic countries—and the rigidity of its official messaging system,
but they may become more effective if the Party-state continues to
deploy narratives that resonate with local audiences and adapt to
emerging social media platforms.126
Content-Sharing Agreements Inject CCP Narratives into
Mainstream Media
Content-sharing agreements and other partnerships with main-
stream media are the most important way official Chinese messag-
ing reaches large local audiences.127 Under such agreements, Chi-
nese state media organizations such as Xinhua and China News
Service typically provide paid-for or free news stories, photos, or
videos to foreign media outlets, disguising CCP propaganda as legit-
imate coverage for local audiences.128 According to a 2022 Freedom
House report, at least 130 news outlets in the 30 countries surveyed
published Chinese state-produced content in print, on television, or
on the radio between 2019 and 2021.129 Chinese state media or oth-
er state-backed entities may also cooperate with foreign media to
coproduce film and television content, sometimes presenting them-
selves as private media groups even as they expose foreign audienc-
 240

es to official programming.130 Examples of Chinese content-sharing

agreements include:
• China Daily’s previous deals with at least 30 foreign newspa-
pers—including the New York Times, the Wall Street Journal,
the Washington Post, the UK Telegraph, and the Sydney Morn-
ing Herald—to carry four- or eight-page propaganda inserts
called China Watch.131 A number of media outlets later dropped
China Watch amid the pandemic and public scrutiny.132 Several
U.S. newspapers, such as the Los Angeles Times, continue to
publish China Watch.133
• Content-sharing agreements between Xinhua and three influen-
tial state-run media outlets in Ghana: Ghana News Agency, the
Ghanaian Times, and Daily Graphic.134
• CGTN’s regular slot on public broadcaster Kenya Broadcasting
Corporation’s Channel 1 from 11:00 p.m. to midnight, Monday
to Friday, as well as China Radio International’s use of a fre-
quency provided by the same public broadcaster to broadcast
programming for 19 hours a day in English, Chinese, and Swa-
hili.135
• Agreements between the China International Communication
Center * and media groups in the United States and Southeast
Asia over the past seven years to co-produce or distribute doc-
umentaries favorably portraying China. For instance, Discovery
Channel aired a documentary series called “China: Time of Xi,”
which presented a one-sided, positive overview of Xi Jinping’s
tenure.136 In Southeast Asia, the National Television of Cambo-
dia co-produced a documentary that discussed China-Cambodia
relations and praised the CCP’s response to the COVID-19 vi-
rus.137 The Chinese Embassy in Cambodia promoted the docu-
mentary, noting that the production deal had been led by the
Central Propaganda Department’s Overseas Promotion office.138
CCP Media Training Programs Encourage Foreign Journalists
to “Tell China’s Story Well”
The Party-state also brings foreign journalists to China for all-ex-
penses-paid “trainings” and “exchanges” that expose them to official
talking points, cultivate goodwill toward China, and promote the
CCP’s state-controlled model of journalism.† 139 Media training and
exchange programs are managed jointly by China’s Foreign Minis-
try and the China Public Diplomacy Association and coordinated
by press centers for journalists from the Asia Pacific, Africa, Latin
America, and the Caribbean, aligning with Beijing’s efforts to ex-
pand its presence in developing countries.‡ 140 Generally speaking,
the programs prioritize journalists from developing or middle-in-
* The China International Communication Center is a company operated by the State Council
Information Office (SCIO) that shares an address with the Central Propaganda Department’s
Office of Foreign Propaganda. David Bandurksi, “Co-Producing with the CCP,” China Media Proj-
ect, February 17, 2023.
† China’s model of state-controlled journalism views information as a resource to be controlled
by the state rather than a public good grounded in journalistic standards. Journalists are trained
to cover events without criticizing domestic or Chinese officials and to portray a positive image
of China. Africa Center for Strategic Studies, “China’s Influence on African Media,” May 12, 2023.
‡ Similar programs exist for journalists from Europe and Central Asia. Reporters Without Bor-
ders, “China’s Pursuit of a New World Media Order,” 2019, 33.
 241

come countries and range from four days to ten months long.141 For-
eign journalists receive housing and a stipend for living expenses;
visit or intern with Chinese media organizations; interview Chinese
officials; take classes in China’s politics, approach to development,
and media practices; and participate in trips to popular tourist at-
tractions.142 Anecdotal evidence suggests the programs do not give
foreign journalists opportunities to ask critical questions of Chinese
interlocuters, tend to restrict participants’ freedom of movement
within China, and sometimes provide participants with instructions
on how they should report on China when they return home.143
Interviews with former participants suggest the trips successfully
influence some journalists’ perceptions of China but fail with oth-
ers.144 More broadly, the participation of foreign journalists in these
programs confers legitimacy on the Chinese media and creates the
impression of widespread approval for CCP policies.145
While the COVID-19 pandemic disrupted in-person international
media trainings and exchanges for several years, recent evidence
suggests China restarted these programs in late 2022 and that they
remain global in scope.146
• Prior to the pandemic, a 2019 Reporters Without Borders report
estimated that about 3,400 journalists from at least 146 coun-
tries had come to China for some sort of training or exchange
program, though this figure was likely an underestimate.147
• In June 2022, 73 journalists from 54 countries arrived in Bei-
jing for a six-month fellowship program during which they were
told there would be ample opportunity to study and cover the
upcoming 20th Party Congress.148
• In early 2023, journalists from 51 countries in Africa, South-
east Asia, and Central Europe began a four-month exchange
program that promised opportunities to extensively cover the
meetings of China’s National People’s Congress and the CPPCC
in March.149
Ownership of Media Outlets, Digital Platforms Threatens
Editorial Independence
China’s Party-state also influences media coverage abroad through
Chinese companies’ shares in or complete ownership of media out-
lets.* 150 Even when privately owned, Chinese media and technology
companies maintain close ties with the CCP and may act as “gate-
keepers” that veto or otherwise influence editorial coverage of China
at the outlets in which they invest.151 Chinese companies are also at
the forefront of digital television broadcasting on the African conti-
nent and are expanding the reach of Chinese social media platforms
around the world, creating new avenues through which the CCP can
influence news distribution outside of China.152 There is already ev-
idence that Chinese companies have used their control over foreign
media outlets and digital platforms to suppress reporting critical
of China, ensure coverage reflects CCP preferences, or crowd out
* Section 310 (a) (b) of the 1934 Communications Act prohibits the Federal Communications
Commission from granting broadcast, aeronautical radio, or common carrier licenses to any U.S.
entity that has more than a 25 percent investment by a foreign corporation, government, or indi-
vidual. Federal Communications Commission, Foreign Ownership Rules and Policies for Common
Carrier, Aeronautical En Route and Aeronautical Fixed Radio Station Licensees.
 242

coverage by other international broadcasters with content produced

by Chinese state media.153 Examples of Party-state-affiliated enti-
ties seeking to influence the coverage or distribution of content in
foreign media include the following:
• Journalist Azad Essa was fired by South African news outlet
Independent Online in 2018, hours after one of his columns crit-
icized China’s persecution of Uyghurs.154 Chinese investors had
a 20 percent stake in Independent Online at the time.155
• Journalists working at the Taiwan-based China Times and
CtiTV, both owned by the pro-Beijing Want Want media group,*
told the Financial Times in 2019 that their editors take instruc-
tions regarding coverage on cross-Strait relations directly from
the Taiwan Affairs Office, the body in the Chinese government
that handles Taiwan affairs.156
• StarTimes, a Chinese satellite company with close ties to the
CCP, provides digital television infrastructure services to Gha-
na, Mozambique, Nigeria, Senegal, and South Africa.157 Accord-
ing to Freedom House, StarTimes offers access to inexpensive
subscription television packages that favor Chinese state media
channels over those of other international broadcasters.158
• WeChat suspended several prominent U.S. accounts run by
Chinese immigrants or Chinese-Americans between 2021 and
2023 for posting content that praised life in the United States
or did not take an overtly pro-Beijing position on issues like
the U.S.-China trade war.159 WeChat is owned by the Chinese
technology giant Tencent.160
• TikTok, the Chinese-owned social media platform, suspended ac-
counts and blocked content that showed or mentioned religious
activities banned in China, the Tiananmen Square massacre,
Tibetan independence, and other topics that Beijing regards as
sensitive.161 (For more on TikTok’s most recent efforts to block
content on prodemocracy activities in Hong Kong, see Chapter
5, Section 3, “Hong Kong.”)
Social Media Posts Spread CCP Propaganda and
Disinformation
China’s Party-state increasingly relies on social media platforms
to spread propaganda and disinformation in foreign media environ-
ments.162 Chinese embassies, consulates, diplomats, and state me-
dia outlets have created hundreds of new accounts on Facebook and
Twitter † since 2019, disseminating China’s official views on interna-
tional events in a variety of languages to millions of followers world-
wide.163 Networks of fake accounts linked to the CCP ‡ frequently
* Want Want Holdings Limited is a Taiwan food and beverage manufacturer headquartered in
Shanghai, China. The company makes about 90 percent of its revenue by selling its products in
China, giving rise to longstanding rumors that it is closely aligned with mainland Chinese au-
thorities. Lisa Wang, “China Times Group Is Sold to Want Want,” Taipei Times, November 5, 2008;
Nick Aspinwall, “Taiwan Shaken by Concerns over Chinese Influence in Media, Press Freedom,”
Diplomat, July 27, 2019.
† In July 2023, Twitter was rebranded as X. Wes Davis, “Twitter is being rebranded as X,” The
Verge, July 23, 2023.
‡ Such as those run by OneSight Technology, which held a contract with state-owned China
News Service. Jeff Kao and Mia Shuang, “How China Built a Twitter Propaganda Machine Then
Let It Loose on Coronavirus,” ProPublica, March 26, 2020.
 243

and rapidly share posts from official Chinese accounts as well as ar-
ticles containing disinformation on Facebook, Twitter, and YouTube,
artificially inflating the statistics measuring engagement with these
official accounts and accelerating the spread of falsehoods across
the internet.164 The kinds of content shared by Chinese state-affil-
iated media has grown more creative over time, with outlets such
as the Global Times and People’s Daily posting videos set to music
on YouTube or posting memes that convey anti-U.S. messages with
references to popular culture in a comical fashion.165 State media
organizations also pay Chinese and foreign social media personal-
ities to serve as “influencers” on YouTube, Twitter, Facebook, and
TikTok, promoting views sympathetic to the CCP without disclosing
their state affiliation.166 In 2022, the Digital Threat Analysis Center
(formerly the research firm Miburo) catalogued at least 200 influ-
encers with connections to the Chinese government or state media
operating in 38 different languages.167 Examples of China’s manip-
ulation of social media include:
• Researchers’ discovery in August 2023 of networks of Chinese
state-linked social media accounts spreading disinformation
about the Maui wildfires, including content claiming the fires
were the result of a “weather weapon” allegedly created by the
U.S. government.168 Reports on these disinformation activities,
including from the cybersecurity firm Recorded Future and Mic-
rosoft, note that the social media networks posted in more than
25 languages and used AI-generated images to sow discord in
the United States and elsewhere.169
• Xinhua’s posting on Twitter of a “Tetris”-themed meme criti-
cizing the United States’ handling of the COVID-19 virus in
2021.170
• Chinese state media collaboration with an Israeli social media
influencer who contradicted international reporting on China’s
atrocities in Xinjiang through trips to the province in which he
interviewed local cotton farmers and claimed, “It’s totally nor-
mal here.” 171 In an interview conducted with CGTN during the
visit, the influencer asserted that there was “true harmony” be-
tween the Uyghurs and Han Chinese in Xinjiang.172
• U.S. cybersecurity firms’ discovery in 2022 of a Chinese state-
linked online influence campaign called DRAGONBRIDGE,
which has used massive networks of inauthentic accounts to
spread false or divisive content about alleged environmental
degradation by U.S. and Canadian rare earth companies, Chi-
na’s COVID-19 response, the war in Ukraine, and the explosion
of the Nord Stream 2 gas pipeline.173
China’s Diplomats Pressure Foreign Journalists to Avoid
Critical Coverage
Chinese diplomats routinely pressure media executives and jour-
nalists outside of China to alter coverage they view as unfavorable—
behavior that Freedom House observes has become more aggressive
in recent years.174 This pressure typically involves demands to edit
or delete unfavorable content as well as threats to pursue defama-
tion lawsuits or withdraw advertising if the offending media outlet
 244

or journalist does not comply.175 Chinese diplomats may castigate

the media outlet or journalist publicly, but Freedom House observes
that more often, pressure is exerted privately in phone calls urging
a retraction or apology.176 Online harassment or cyberattacks by ac-
tors linked to Beijing may occur in tandem with Chinese diplomats’
complaints about critical coverage.177 Chinese authorities may also
harass or detain the China-based relatives of foreign journalists to
punish them for critical coverage.* 178 Examples of Chinese diplo-
matic pressure on foreign media include:
• Kuwaiti newspaper Arab Times’ decision to delete an interview
with Taiwan’s foreign minister from its website following public
condemnation by the Chinese Embassy in Kuwait in August
2021.179 Arab Times replaced the online interview with a state-
ment from the embassy titled “There is only one China in the
world and Taiwan is an inalienable part of China’s territory.” 180
• The Chinese Embassy in Sweden’s aggressive treatment of
Swedish journalists during the tenure of Ambassador Gui Con-
gyou (2017–2021), who gained notoriety as one of China’s best-
known “wolf warrior” diplomats.† 181 This included threats the
embassy sent to Swedish freelance journalist Jojje Olsson in
2018 and in 2021 following stories critical of the Chinese gov-
ernment.182
• The intense online harassment and apparent framing of De
Volkskrant reporter Marije Vlaskamp for fake bomb threats
against the Chinese embassies in Oslo and The Hague follow-
ing her coverage of sensitive topics, including the activities of
Chinese dissidents in the Netherlands.183 The Netherlands’
Ministry of Foreign Affairs subsequently demanded clarification
from the Chinese Embassy about the origins of the intimidation
campaign against Ms. Vlaskamp.184
According to Ms. Cook, a recent Freedom House study of Chinese
influence on foreign media between 2019 and 2022 found at least
one incident of censorship or intimidation aimed at suppressing re-
porting or viewpoints critical of the Chinese government and com-
panies in 24 of the 30 countries assessed.185 About half of these
incidents involved Chinese diplomats or state-owned enterprises,
Ms. Cook noted, but the other half involved “local officials or media
executives from outside China who attempted to suppress the criti-
cal reporting because of their own interest[s] related to the Chinese
government.” 186
China’s Harmful Political Influence Activities
The CCP attempts to shape the political ecosystems and choic-
es of foreign countries, exploiting the porous nature of democratic
systems and making use of cyber operations as well as coercion to
achieve its goals.187 Ms. Dearing Scott testified before the Commis-
* For instance, in 2018 Chinese authorities detained relatives of at least five U.S.-based report-
ers who covered the CCP’s crackdown in Xinjiang for Radio Free Asia’s Uyghur service. Austin
Ramzy, “After U.S.-Based Reporters Exposed Abuses, China Seized Their Relatives,” New York
Times, March 1, 2018.
† Between 2017 and 2020, Ambassador Gui was reportedly summoned by Sweden’s foreign
ministry more than 40 times to protest his remarks. Lai Fu, “Growling Back at the West,” China
Media Project, August 8, 2021.
 245

sion that her organization, the International Republican Institute,

had “noted robust attempts by the PRC at pure political influence
and interference.” 188 She argued that the type of political influence
activity employed depends on the country China is targeting.189 Ms.
Dearing Scott observed that while China often prefers to “identi-
fy, empower, and occasionally fund proxies, candidates, and parties
that favor cooperation with the PRC and who will not push the
envelope on any of the PRC’s red lines,” it has also attempted to
directly steer elections in Taiwan, Australia, and Canada.190 The al-
legations and evidence of CCP-linked political influence efforts that
do exist publicly are limited, complicating any effort to quantify the
scale of these activities or to assess their efficacy on average, even
if they appear to show that Beijing has generally failed to achieve
its aims.191
Influencing Foreign Electoral Processes
There is a small but growing amount of evidence that actors as-
sociated with China’s Party-state have sought to influence electoral
processes in the United States as well as in allied and partner coun-
tries, though the operations that have been exposed do not appear
to have impacted the outcomes.192 Efforts to fund candidates per-
ceived as friendly to Beijing during elections or to bombard the pub-
lic with disinformation that undermines confidence in certain can-
didates, the government, or the integrity of the election at large are
all consistent with the U.S. National Intelligence Council’s definition
of election influence.* 193 Recent examples in which actors linked
to China’s Party-state have attempted to influence other countries’
elections include the following:
• Prior to the November 2022 U.S. midterm elections, cybersecu-
rity researchers discovered multiple coordinated social media
campaigns in which fake online accounts potentially linked to
China’s Party-state propagated content containing anti-U.S.
messages, criticisms of U.S. politicians, and highly divisive po-
litical topics across a variety of social media platforms.194 One
social media influence campaign dubbed DRAGONBRIDGE by
U.S. cybersecurity firm Mandiant aggressively sought to dis-
credit the U.S. democratic process by posting English-language
videos discouraging Americans from voting, impugning the
productivity of U.S. lawmakers, and highlighting instances of
politically motivated violence as evidence that U.S. democracy
had purportedly failed.195 Another series of campaigns discov-
ered by Twitter spanned more than 2,000 inauthentic accounts
and propagated claims that the 2020 election had been rigged,
narratives favored by the U.S. political right and U.S. political
left, and messages echoing the Chinese government’s rhetoric
on issues like then Speaker of the U.S. House of Representa-
tives Nancy Pelosi’s 2022 trip to Taiwan.196 Yet another cam-
paign discovered by Meta involved a series of fake accounts on
Facebook and Instagram that posed as conservative and liberal
* The National Intelligence Council considers “election interference” to be a subset of election
influence activities that specifically target the technical elements of an election, such as voter reg-
istration, casting and counting ballots, or reporting results. National Intelligence Council, Foreign
Threats to the 2020 US Federal Elections, March 21, 2021.
 246

Americans sharing content related to gun ownership and abor-

tion access in sometimes mangled English.* 197 There is no evi-
dence that these social media campaigns had any impact on the
2022 midterms’ outcome, but experts assess these efforts reflect
China’s maturing cyber operations tradecraft and the adoption
of tactics generally associated with Russian and Iranian influ-
ence campaigns.198
• In March 2022, DOJ arrested a Chinese national for allegedly
working on behalf of the MSS on charges related to a conspir-
acy to surveil and harass a candidate for U.S. Congress in New
York.199 The Chinese national, Lin Qiming, allegedly hired a
private investigator to discover and manufacture compromising
information about the candidate, whom media reporting re-
vealed to be Yan Xiong, a military veteran and former leader of
the 1989 prodemocracy protests.200 According to the DOJ com-
plaint, Mr. Lin also suggested the private investigator physical-
ly attack Mr. Yan and “beat him until he cannot run for election”
or arrange a car crash ahead of the election.201 While there is
no evidence the scheme had any impact on the election’s out-
come, Mr. Yan claims the scheme “successfully” sank his race.202
• Between November 2022 and May 2023, Canadian media pub-
lished a series of reports based on leaked intelligence from the
Canadian Security Intelligence Service that detailed allega-
tions of Chinese state-sponsored influence operations during
the country’s 2019 and 2021 federal elections.203 The reports
included claims that China funneled money through its Toronto
consulate to 11 candidates who ran in the 2019 federal elec-
tion and that Chinese diplomats and their united front proxies
made undeclared donations to political campaigns and hired in-
ternational Chinese students to volunteer for certain candidates
ahead of the 2021 federal election.204 The leaked Canadian Se-
curity Intelligence Service documents reportedly detail efforts
by several Chinese consular officials to encourage members of
Chinese-Canadian organizations to rally votes for the Liberal
Party and defeat Conservative Party candidates because they
viewed the latter as hostile to China.205 There is no evidence
China’s state-sponsored influence operations changed either
election’s outcome.206
• In February 2022, Australian media reported that the Austra-
lian Security Intelligence Organization (ASIO), Australia’s do-
mestic counterintelligence agency, had disrupted a plot in which
China-linked figures allegedly sought to fund parliamentary
candidates in the New South Wales branch of the Labor Party in
an upcoming federal election.207 ASIO chief Mike Burgess said
in a speech that the plot was arranged by a wealthy individual
with connections to a foreign government—a country Australian
media subsequently determined was China based on interviews
with multiple sources in the intelligence establishment unau-
* According to Meta’s 2022 report, in at least one instance, an inauthentic account shifted from
posting pro-choice content to anti-Biden content while maintaining the same user information.
Ben Nimmo and Mike Torrey, “Taking Down Coordinated Inauthentic Behavior from Russia and
China,” Meta, September 2022, 9.
 247

thorized to speak publicly.208 The wealthy individual allegedly

hired a subordinate to identify “candidates likely to run in the
election who either supported the interests of the foreign gov-
ernment or who were assessed as vulnerable to inducements
and cultivation” and provided to that subordinate an offshore
bank account with hundreds of thousands of dollars for operat-
ing expenses.209 Mr. Burgess said ASIO successfully prevented
the wealthy individual and the subordinate from getting specific
candidates preselected to stand for Labor seats, and there is no
evidence the plot affected the outcome of the election.210
Attempted Infiltration of U.S. Institutions to Violate Rights of
Diaspora Communities
China’s Party-state has deployed a number of schemes to violate
the rights of ethnically Chinese people and other minorities living in
the United States, at times attempting to infiltrate U.S. government
and civic institutions to provide cover for its egregious and illegal
activities.211 Andrew Chubb, a senior lecturer at Lancaster Univer-
sity, argued in testimony before the Commission that “the most de-
monstrable overseas impact of Beijing’s interference has been on
civil liberties and human rights, particularly inside diaspora com-
munities.” 212 He observed that Beijing’s influence activity “against
dissidents and persecuted ethnic groups has severely impacted on
freedoms of speech, political association and social trust in émigré
communities,” an observation borne out by recent nongovernmental
organization (NGO) reporting and law enforcement charges related
to China’s transnational repression practices.213 Recent examples in
which actors linked to China’s Party-state have allegedly deployed
harmful tactics and attempted to undermine civil liberties such as
religious freedom, freedom of speech, and freedom of assembly by
infiltrating U.S. government or civic society institutions include the
following:
• In May 2023, DOJ unsealed a complaint charging a Chinese
citizen and a U.S. resident with participating in a scheme to
revoke a New York-based Falun Gong organization’s tax-exempt
status and paying bribes to an undercover U.S. law enforcement
officer posing as an Internal Revenue Service (IRS) agent.214
DOJ’s complaint alleged that the two men filed a false com-
plaint against a Falun Gong entity using the IRS’s Whistleblow-
er Program at the direction of Chinese officials and then paid
$5,000 in cash bribes to the undercover law enforcement officer
in order to initiate an audit of the Falun Gong entity.215 “John
Chen and Lin Feng allegedly waged a campaign at the behest
of the Government of the People’s Republic of China to influence
a U.S. Government official in order to further the PRC Govern-
ment’s repression of practitioners of Falun Gong,” U.S. Attorney
Damian Williams for the Southern District of New York said of
the foiled plot.216 He noted that Beijing’s use of illegal methods
to achieve its autocratic aims are “as shocking as they are in-
sidious.” 217
• In March 2022, DOJ charged three individuals with conspir-
ing to act as agents of the Chinese government, commit inter-
state harassment, and bribe a federal official for the purpose
 248

of discrediting Chinese prodemocracy activists residing in the

United States.218 According to DOJ, two of the defendants—Fan
“Frank” Liu, the president of a purported media company, and
Matthew Ziburis, a former correctional officer for the state of
Florida—acted at the direction of Qiang “Jason” Sun, a PRC-
based employee of an international tech company, to spy on and
spread negative information about multiple Chinese dissidents
living in California, Indiana, and New York City.219 In one case,
the defendants allegedly paid a private investigator to bribe an
IRS employee to access the federal tax returns of a Chinese
dissident, hoping to discredit him by publicly disclosing his tax
liabilities.220 The private investigator cooperated with law en-
forcement, and no IRS employee received a bribe payment.221
• In March 2022, DOJ charged a New York man with acting as
an agent of China’s government and accused him of using his
status within the Chinese dissident community to collect in-
formation about activists on behalf of the MSS.222 According
to DOJ, Wang Shujun—a former leader within the Chinese
dissident community and founder of a prodemocracy organiza-
tion serving Chinese dissidents in Queens, New York—collected
information about prominent activists, dissidents, and human
rights leaders made available to him in confidence as the leader
of the civil society organization at the direction of MSS han-
dlers from at least 2016 onward.223 Mr. Wang’s alleged victims
included Hong Kong prodemocracy activists, advocates for Tai-
wan independence, Uyghur activists, Mongolian activists, and
Tibetan activists in New York City as well as abroad.224 DOJ’s
complaint stated that one Hong Kong democracy activist whom
Mr. Wang reported was arrested in Hong Kong and jailed on
political charges as a result.225
Intimidation of Political Figures Who Pursue Policies
Unfavorable to China
China’s Party-state pressures sitting officials and other political
figures in foreign countries to avoid policies it regards as unfavor-
able to its interests. This pressure may take the form of attack-
ing foreign political figures’ reputations, threatening their family
members, or retaliating for moves it disapproves of by cutting off
exchanges with China. Examples in which China’s Party-state has
pressured foreign political figures to change policies or positions it
dislikes include the following:
• In May 2023, Canadian press reported that the Canadian Secu-
rity Intelligence Service had produced an assessment two years
prior finding that the MSS had targeted the family of Michael
Chong, a Conservative Member of Parliament [MP] who spon-
sored a parliamentary measure to recognize China’s atrocities
in Xinjiang as genocide.226 Suspected MSS officer Zhao Wei re-
portedly sought information on Mr. Chong’s relatives in Hong
Kong while posted as a diplomat at the Toronto consulate.227
Canadian intelligence assessed this was “almost certainly meant
to make an example of this MP and deter others from taking
anti-PRC positions.” 228
 249

• In March 2023, outgoing President of the Federated States of

Micronesia (FSM) David Panuelo described an instance of in-
timidation by Chinese officials in a public letter to fellow Pacific
Islands leaders warning of Beijing’s covert and coercive efforts
to align the region with China instead of the United States.* 229
“You can imagine my surprise when I was followed this past
July in Fiji during the Pacific Islands Forum by two Chinese
men; my further surprise when it was determined that they
worked for the Chinese Embassy in Suva,” then President Pan-
uelo wrote, recalling the incident.230 “To be clear: I have had
direct threats against my personal safety from PRC officials act-
ing in an official capacity.” 231
Incentivizing Sitting Officials to Support Policies Favorable
to China
The Party-state also aggressively seeks to access and incentiv-
ize sitting officials in foreign countries to support policies that fa-
vor China, frequently relying on financial contributions distribut-
ed by its proxies to further these goals.232 According to Mr. Mattis,
wealthy individuals are a common type of proxy that work on the
Party-state’s behalf to “move money quickly outside of China and . . .
spend that money legitimately without generating the alarm that
comes with more direct state activity.” 233 He notes that these funds
can buy “access to the major political parties” and fund “platforms
for pro-China voices.” 234 Examples in which individuals linked to
the Party-state have attempted to cultivate sitting politicians’ sup-
port for China-friendly policies through financial contributions in-
clude the following:
• In 2023, Canadian media reported that the Canadian Security
Intelligence Service had uncovered evidence a decade prior of a
Chinese state-backed plot to improperly influence then Liberal
Party leader Justin Trudeau by directing a wealthy individu-
al to donate to organizations affiliated with his father, former
Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau.235 According to the Globe and
Mail, the intelligence service intercepted a 2014 conversation
between a Chinese consular official and Canada-based billion-
aire Zhang Bin in which the official instructed Mr. Zhang to
donate $1 million to the Trudeau Foundation and told him
the Chinese government would reimburse him for the entire
amount.236 Mr. Zhang, who is a member of several major united
front organizations, subsequently joined with another wealthy
Chinese businessman to donate $1 million to the Trudeau Foun-
dation and the University of Montreal in 2015, where the elder
Trudeau had studied and later taught.237 The office of current
Prime Minister Justin Trudeau stated that he was unaware
of Mr. Zhang’s donation and had ceased involvement with the
Trudeau Foundation upon becoming leader of the Liberal Party
in 2013, two years prior to the donation.238
• In 2022, UK intelligence service MI5 issued a rare “interference
alert” alleging that British-Chinese lawyer Christine Ching Kui
* During his presidency, Panuelo authored several letters critical of Beijing. Cleo Paskal, “Mi-
cronesia’s President Writes Bombshell Letter on China’s ‘Political Warfare,’ ” Diplomat, March
10, 2023.
 250

Lee was “knowingly engaged in political interference activities

on behalf of the United Front Work Department (UFWD) of the
Chinese Communist party.” 239 The alert stated that Ms. Lee
was “engaged in the facilitation of financial donations to polit-
ical parties, Parliamentarians, aspiring Parliamentarians and
individuals seeking political office in the UK” on behalf of indi-
viduals based in China and Hong Kong in “covert coordination
with the UFWD.” 240 It warned anyone in contact with Ms. Lee
to be “mindful of her affiliation with the Chinese state and re-
mit to advance the CCP’s agenda in UK politics.” 241 A Guard-
ian report found that Ms. Lee’s law firm had made donations
to UK political figures totaling $926,349 (£675,586), $801,011
(£584,177) of which were “donations in kind” to the office of
Labor member of Parliament and former shadow cabinet mem-
ber Barry Gardiner.242 Ms. Lee is known to be a member of the
China Overseas Friendship Association * and the CPPCC, both
of which are involved in united front work.243
China’s Harmful Economic Influence Activities
There are two key features of the Party-state’s united front strat-
egy discussed below: the use of influence operations to advance Chi-
na’s economic interests in other countries and the use of economic
actors to exert influence over foreign countries in order to shape
policies that suit Beijing.244 Chinese firms’ pervasive and system-
atic efforts to “capture” elites † for the purpose of achieving China’s
foreign investment objectives degrade the international business
environment, making it harder for firms not aligned with Beijing’s
agenda to compete. These economic influence activities also deepen
other countries’ dependence on China, create debt sustainability con-
cerns, and cause harm to local populations and environments. More
broadly, Beijing attempts to co-opt local organizations or establish
organizations it presents as being local or joint but that actually
represent its views. While such activities may not be as harmful to
the international business environment and local economies as Chi-
na’s elite capture, they nonetheless present a challenge for officials
to identify the presence and extent of China’s foreign influence on
economic policymaking.
Elite Capture Fuels Corruption and Builds Market Share for
Chinese Companies
A major aspect of China’s overseas economic influence activities
involves capturing foreign elites through bribery or other forms of
* The China Overseas Friendship Association is an important platform through which the
UFWD co-opts and interacts with overseas united front figures. According to Mr. Joske, the as-
sociation operates “like bureau-level organs of the UFWD” and has chapters around the world.
Alex Joske, “The Party Speaks for You: Foreign Interference and the Chinese Communist Party’s
United Front System,” Australian Strategic Policy Institute, 2020, 7, 12, 44; Xinhua, “CCP Central
Committee Issues Regulations on CCP United Front Work” (中共中央印发中国共产党统一战线工作
条例), September 22, 2015. Translation.
† Elite capture is a form of corruption in which public officials and national elites manage or
direct government projects in a manner that enables them to misdirect resources for their own
personal financial gain to the detriment of the public. Chinese influence creates a system of incen-
tives whereby those in positions of power choose and implement policy outcomes advantageous to
China but likely detrimental to public welfare because the elites will also be enriched through the
outcome. International Republican Institute, “A World Safe for the Party China’s Authoritarian
Influence and the Democratic Response: Country Case Studies from Nepal, Kenya, Montenegro,
Panama, Georgia and Greece,” 2021, iii.
 251

personal enrichment. These actions often aim to secure contracts

for national projects for Chinese companies, even when the exces-
sive cost of those contracts, the companies’ poor credentials, stated
rationale for those projects, or overall impact of those projects on a
country’s finances clearly contravene the public interest.245 As Ms.
Dearing Scott noted in her testimony, BRI-related infrastructure fi-
nancing and domestic plans for large public infrastructure projects
frequently create opportunities for corruption as well as lucrative
deals and greater market access for Chinese companies.246 Beijing’s
BRI projects take particular advantage of countries in which corrup-
tion is rampant and democratic institutions are weak, effectively fu-
eling greater corruption and crony capitalism.247 (for more informa-
tion on the status of BRI implementation, see U.S.-China Economic
and Security Review Commission, Chapter 1, Section 1, “U.S.-Chi-
na Bilateral and China’s External Economic and Trade Relations.”)
Cases of elite capture are individually egregious but also are part of
a larger pattern of China’s economic influence.248 While examples of
China’s efforts to foster corruption in foreign countries to benefit the
Party-state’s interests are extensive, select examples demonstrating
the Party’s tactics include the following:
• Sinohydro, a Chinese state-owned hydropower engineering and
construction company, allegedly paid $76 million in bribes to
Ecuadorian government officials during the bidding process and
construction of the Coca Codo Sinclair hydroelectric plant, the
largest hydroelectric dam project in Ecuadorian history.249 This
infusion of bribes undermined Ecuador’s government institu-
tions and resulted in a deal that made China money but has not
proven environmentally or economically fruitful for Ecuador.250
The dam cost more than $2.2 billion, was built near an active
volcano despite warnings by geologists that it could collapse,
and now only operates at half capacity due to the strain it puts
on the country’s electrical grid.251 In March 2023, Ecuadorian
prosecutors charged 37 people—including a former president
and a former Chinese ambassador to Ecuador—with accepting
bribes between 2009 and 2018.252 Ecuador’s former electricity
minister and the former anticorruption official monitoring the
project were also sentenced on bribery charges.253
• Patrick Ho, the former head of an NGO backed by Chinese
energy conglomerate CEFC China, attempted to bribe top
officials in Chad and Uganda in exchange for business ad-
vantages, including valuable oil rights.* 254 The NGO Mr. Ho
oversaw was partly based in Arlington, Virginia, was regis-
tered as a charitable entity in the United States, and held
“Special Consultative Status” with the UN Economic and So-
cial Council.255 Mr. Ho was convicted in 2018 of violations
under the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA), sentenced
to 36 months in prison, fined $400,000, and deported to Hong
Kong upon his release.256
* According to the U.S. Department of Justice, “CEFC China is a Shanghai-based multibil-
lion-dollar conglomerate that operates internationally in multiple sectors, including oil, gas, and
banking.” U.S. Department of Justice, Former Head of Organization Backed by Chinese Energy
Conglomerate Sentenced to Three Years in Prison for International Bribery and Money Laundering
Offenses, March 25, 2019.
 252

• In 2018, the son of a Nepali political adviser reportedly pushed

for a contract to be awarded to Huawei subsidiary China Com-
munications Services (CCS) to build a videoconferencing fa-
cility within the prime minister’s office in return for financial
compensation.257 The project was ultimately canceled after it
attracted the scrutiny of Nepal’s anticorruption commission,
which found that the son of the president’s chief political ad-
visor had received payment and visited Huawei’s headquarters
while in China.258 While the project was eventually canceled,
initial concerns from security experts regarding the cybersecuri-
ty risks of embedding Huawei technology into government com-
munications systems were ignored, as were concerns about the
government favoring a Chinese company over Nepal Telecom,
which could have also built the facility.259 Despite the failure
of the project, Beijing continues to seek advantageous relations
with the Nepali government and empower pro-China political
parties in the country.260
China Cultivates Foreign Constituencies to Support Favorable
Economic Policies
A distinctive aspect of China’s approach to overseas influence ac-
tivities is the fact that the CCP and its united front proxies cul-
tivate constituencies in foreign countries who lobby for Beijing’s
preferred economic policies even as they represent their private in-
terests. The reliance of particular groups or industries on trade or
exchanges with China, and their ability to advocate for their inter-
ests to national-level policymakers, represents a point of leverage
that Chinese leaders recognize as a means of influencing economic
policies.261 United front-linked industry associations and fora facil-
itating outreach to government officials work to establish coalitions
of local businesses that can advocate for China’s policy preferenc-
es.262 The Chinese organizations’ role in the process may distort
policymaking, as they often try to disguise their activities as organ-
ic, grassroots initiatives.263 In fact, these united front activities are
sanctioned by the Chinese government and conducted via organi-
zations with ties to key economic agencies that may seek to steer
both Chinese business engagement in the country and local busi-
ness toward fulfilling Chinese policy objectives.264 These objectives
may include decisions to remove tariffs or to boost imports China
depends on for food security, such as soybeans and beef.265 Exam-
ples of Chinese entities’ efforts to cultivate domestic constituencies
that further Beijing’s economic agenda include:
• Chinese companies’ efforts to increase trade in agricultural and
mineral commodities with Brazil through engagement in the
China-Brazil Business Council (CEBC), an organization with
ties to China’s united front that describes itself as committed
to “improving the trade and investment environment between
the countries.” 266 The CEBC has branches in Brazil and in
China—with the latter supervised by China’s Ministry of Com-
merce, ensuring the organization is representing the official
views and policies of the government—and is part of the united
front-linked China Council for the Promotion of International
Investment (CCIIP).267 CCIIP is one of the oldest of the gov-
 253

ernment-approved “civil society organizations,” often referred to

as “people’s organizations,” administered by China’s Ministry of
Civil Affairs.268 These organizations are specifically tasked with
carrying out elements of government policy. Ms. Dearing Scott
testified before the Commission that the CEBC “has become an
important tool for defending Chinese interests in Brazil” and
noted that the organization advocates for views held by the
CCP and policies favorable to China.269 For example, in a 2020
report, the CEBC suggested that China has implemented most
of the commitments it made at the time it acceded to the WTO,
a claim the Commission determined to be false in its 2022
Annual Report to Congress.270 The CEBC report also warns
against limiting Huawei’s participation in 5G and suggests this
would hamper critical partnerships with other high-technology
Chinese companies.271 Instead, the CEBC report recommends
Brazil pursue a long-term strategy toward China that deepens
engagement between the two countries and avoids the supposed
missteps of U.S. economic policy toward China.* 272 The CEBC
also hosts fora that bring Chinese and Brazilian government of-
ficials together to discuss expanded trade and investment, such
as a November 2021 virtual forum on China-Brazil cooperation
in agricultural biotechnology geared toward increasing Brazil-
ian agricultural exports to China, which included Ambassador
Yang Wanming and president of the Chinese Academy of Agri-
cultural Sciences Wu Kongming.273
• CCP-linked entities’ engagement with the United States Heart-
land China Association (USHCA), a U.S. nonprofit organization
focused on agriculture that describes itself as “committed to
building bridges and promoting opportunities between the peo-
ples of the Heartland region [of the United States] . . . and the
People’s Republic of China.” 274 USHCA has partnered with the
Chinese Embassy, the united front-linked Chinese People’s As-
sociation for Friendship with Foreign Countries (CPAFFC), and
the united front-linked China-United States Exchange Founda-
tion (CUSEF) to hold various gatherings and events, often pro-
viding a platform for the promotion of official Chinese views on
agricultural trade and exchange.† 275 USHCA also engages with
subnational leaders who can influence agricultural trade policy
in key U.S. states.276
• CCP-linked entities’ engagement with U.S. governors to facil-
itate trade and investment through the U.S.-China Governors
Forum, which was established in 2011 but became defunct after
the U.S. Department of State withdrew in 2021, citing foreign
influence concerns.277 CPAFFC, a key organization in China’s
* The author of the CEBC’s 2020 report became Brazil’s secretary for international affairs at
the Ministry of Finance in 2023, demonstrating the organization’s ties to influential members
of Brazil’s government. Wilson Center, “U.S.-Brazil Economic Relations: New Opportunities for
Trade and Investment,” March 22, 2023.
† In 2023, Luan Richeng, the CEO of state-owned grain company COFCO, delivered remarks at
USCHA’s third annual Agriculture Roundtable in which he thanked Chinese government entities,
including CPAFFC, for their help in facilitating the event and U.S.-China agricultural cooperation
more broadly. In his remarks, Mr. Luan insinuated that U.S. policies, which he described as “an-
ti-globalization policies,” have created greater vulnerabilities in global food supply chains. United
States Heartland China Association, “Luan Richeng Remarks @USHCA 3rd Annual Agriculture
Roundtable 2023,” YouTube, May 9, 2023.
 254

united front network, co-organized the forum with the U.S. Na-
tional Governors Association and together hosted Xi at the 2015
gathering as well as other high-ranking Chinese government
officials in the following years.278 Addressing an audience gath-
ered in Kentucky at the 2019 U.S.-China Governors Forum, then
Chinese Ambassador to the United States Cui Tiankai noted
the impact of the Trump Administration’s tariffs on U.S. states
and urged attendees “to pay serious attention to this, and not
let some ill-informed, ill-intentioned people incite a ‘new Cold
War’ at the expense of the people’s interests.” 279 The warning
was clearly intended to rally U.S officials against the tariffs and
echoed a 2018 remark by the spokesperson of the Chinese Min-
istry of Commerce, who called on U.S. companies importing Chi-
nese goods to “do more to lobby the U.S. government and work
hard to safeguard their own interests.” 280 Ambassador Cui also
praised Kentucky, saying he always finds “true friendship, not
groundless suspicions” there, and thanked the state’s governor
and CPAFFC for hosting the event.281
China’s Harmful Academic Influence Activities
The CCP seeks to aggressively influence research at foreign uni-
versities and think tanks.282 Glenn Tiffert, a research fellow at the
Hoover Institution, testified before the Commission that the CCP
and affiliated actors “employ a range of overt and covert methods
to manipulate the ecosystem of knowledge, the flows of information,
and the source bases that inform decisionmakers and public opinion
around the globe,” heavily targeting academia in these efforts.283
The surveillance and intimidation of campus community members,
the censorship of China-related publications and databases, and the
encouragement of financial- and human capital-related dependen-
cies on China within foreign universities and think tanks are three
tactics that exemplify Beijing’s efforts to take advantage of and con-
trol foreign academic discourse.
CCP Surveillance and Intimidation Undermine Academic
Freedom, Student Safety
The CCP uses a variety of coercive measures to influence how
members of the campus community discuss China-related issues
and to deter potential critics from freely expressing themselves.284
One of these measures is the surveillance of Chinese students and
others by Chinese diplomats and networks of informants on cam-
pus, which induces self-censorship.285 Campus informants are some-
times, but not always, linked to student groups that receive funding
from the Chinese government, such as the Chinese Students and
Scholars Association (CSSA).286 Another type of coercive activity
involves Chinese diplomats and individual Chinese students who
employ intimidating modes of conversation, make explicit threats, or
otherwise harass faculty, other students, or university administra-
tors for a view they hold or activity they undertake that contradicts
Party orthodoxy.287 According to Dr. Tiffert, state-sponsored surveil-
lance and intimidation “creates an atmosphere of fear, impairs the
ability of PRC students to enjoy equal access to the privileges and
benefits of the US education for which they are generally paying
 255

full freight, and starves our campuses of the full range of ideas and
perspectives that Chinese students can contribute to our classrooms,
affecting the education that everyone receives.” 288 A third type of
coercive measure involves efforts to heckle, disrupt, or cancel speak-
ers or events on campus that criticize or diverge from the Party’s
orthodoxy—activities that clearly undermine academic freedom.289
Examples of campus intimidation or disruptions intended to deter
or punish criticism of the CCP include the following:
• In 2022, the CSSA at George Washington University complained
to university leadership about the appearance of posters on
campus designed by Chinese-Australian artist Badiucao criti-
cizing China’s human rights abuses ahead of the 2022 Olympics
in Beijing.290 The CSSA’s complaint alleged that the posters re-
flected racism toward Chinese students, constituted a “naked
attack on the Chinese nation,” and called for those who had put
up the posters to be “severely” punished, prompting the univer-
sity to announce that it would remove the posters.291 The uni-
versity president ultimately reversed the decision after learning
that the posters in question were a critique of Chinese govern-
ment policies, citing the need to protect freedom of speech on
campus and promising that the students who originally put up
the posters would not be punished.292
• A 2021 investigation by Human Rights Watch found that pro-
democracy students from mainland China and Hong Kong at
Australian universities were threatened by some of their class-
mates with physical violence, claims they would be reported to
Chinese authorities, or doxxing * online.293
• In 2020, an online panel at Brandeis University discussing Chi-
na’s treatment of Muslim Uyghurs was “Zoombombed” by online
participants who scrawled profanities on one of the presenter’s
slides and played China’s national anthem to drown out her
voice.294 Prior to the event, the Brandeis CSSA organized a
campaign on WeChat calling for the cancelation of the panel,
an entreaty that university administrators ignored.295
Manipulating the “Source Base” of Foreign Knowledge about
China
The CCP regularly censors authoritative sources of China-relat-
ed knowledge in order to distort the types of conclusions foreigners
can draw about the country from publicly available information.296
This practice is evident in the systematic deletion from Chinese ac-
ademic databases of articles touching on topics the CCP regards as
sensitive or as challenging Party orthodoxy; it is also evident in the
reduction of foreigners’ access to such databases.297 Similarly, arti-
cles published jointly by Western and Chinese academic presses are
often unilaterally edited by the PRC side to comport with the CCP’s
political preferences, and they may revise map and place names to
confer legitimacy on Chinese territorial claims.298 The CCP has also
* “Doxxing” is the intentional revelation of a person’s private information online without their
consent, often with malicious intent. This includes sharing phone numbers, home addresses, iden-
tification numbers, and any sensitive and previously private information such as personal pho-
tos that could make the victim identifiable and potentially exposed to further harassment. Sen
Nguyen, “What Is Doxxing and What Can You Do If You Are Doxxed?” CNN, February 7, 2023.
 256

considerably restricted the participation of Chinese academics and

scientists in international conferences, depriving foreign audiences
of access to a diversity of perspectives and providing grounds for
the Party to dismiss academic assessments that challenge its official
positions as “ill-informed” attacks on China.299 “By tampering with
the source base we use in ways that are invisible to the end user or
difficult to detect,” Dr. Tiffert observes, “these measures corrupt our
scholarship and hijack our tongues with the aim of enlisting them to
inadvertently propagate official narratives.” 300 Examples of China’s
censorship of the “source base” include the following:
• In July 2023, regulations on China’s genetic databases went
into effect, providing the government with additional oversight
of the country’s vast biobanks * while restricting foreign coun-
tries’ access.301 While the United States and other countries
maintain an open environment for sharing scientific discoveries
and data, China continues to resist reciprocity in this area.302
As Anna Puglisi, director of biotechnology programs at George-
town’s Center for Security and Emerging Technology, noted in
testimony before the Commission, the Chinese government is
“not adhering to the global norms of collaboration” by restrict-
ing the export of its own genomic data.303
• In March 2023, the Chinese government announced new restric-
tions on international access to the China National Knowledge
Infrastructure Database (CNKI),† the academic database most
heavily used by foreign scholars of China.304 According to no-
tices sent to foreign universities and libraries that subscribe to
CNKI, access to four databases containing PhD dissertations
and masters theses, conference proceedings, the National Pop-
ulation Census of China, and statistical yearbooks was tempo-
rarily suspended as of April 1 pending “regulatory review” of
CNKI’s cross-border services.305 The move followed a June 2022
announcement by the Cyberspace Administration of China that
CNKI would undergo a “cybersecurity review” for the stated
purpose of “preventing national data security risks, maintaining
national security and protecting the public interest,” a measure
foreign observers assessed would lead to the removal of many
valuable sources from CNKI.306
• In March 2022, Chinese security services prevented at least five
Chinese scholars based in the PRC from virtually attending the
annual gathering of the Association for Asian Studies, one of
the most important international conferences for scholars in the
Asian studies field.307
* Biobanks are collections of human biological samples linked to personal genetic and health
information. Laura Annaratone et al., “Basic Principles of Biobanking: From Biological Samples
to Precision Medicine for Patients,” Virchows Archiv: An International Journal of Pathology 479:2
(2021): 233–246.
† CNKI is a multidisciplinary database of over 8,500 periodic titles published in China that
hosts about 95 percent of all academic literature written in Chinese as well as government re-
ports and yearbooks with key statistical datasets such as yearly census numbers by city and
province, economic data, and health data. As Ruby MacDougall, an analyst at Ithaka S+R, ob-
serves, “Scholars from across disciplines who work on China regularly turn to CNKI journals and
datasets for research, and unrestricted access to information contained in CNKI is widely viewed
as a crucial tool for sustaining a deep understanding of China.” Ruby MacDougall, “Reflecting on
Restricted Access to a Chinese Research Lifeline,” Ithaka S+R, April 25, 2023.
 257

• In late 2020 or early 2021, verdicts and other judicial decisions

began disappearing from China Judgments Online, a web por-
tal-based database run by China’s Supreme People’s Court that
had provided foreign legal scholars with some insight into the
country’s judicial system since 2013.308
• In 2019, two professors at the University of Otago in New Zea-
land discovered that their Chinese press partner had censored
one of the essays in the special issue submitted to the journal
Frontiers of Literary Studies in China, which is jointly pub-
lished by the Netherlands-based company Brill and Higher Ed-
ucation Press, an organization subordinate to China’s Ministry
of Education.309
Chinese Funding of Foreign Universities and Think Tanks
May Influence Research Activities
Foreign universities and think tanks’ dependence on Chinese
sources for funds may undermine the academic freedom, integrity,
and activities of these institutions.310 For example, funding provid-
ed by China-based partners in the form of donations, grants, re-
search partnerships, and agreements to establish Confucius Insti-
tutes with universities and think tanks has raised concerns in the
United States * and elsewhere that the arrangements could disin-
centivize rigorous or critical research about China, especially when
the Chinese partners are companies or universities with close ties
to the CCP.311 U.S. institutions of higher education frequently ac-
cept gifts, donations, and contracts from China, and despite feder-
al requirements to disclose † to the U.S. Department of Education
any foreign gifts or contracts that exceed $250,000, noncompliance
is widespread.312 A 2020 report by the Department of Education
found that in 2020 alone, colleges and universities retroactively re-
ported more than $6.5 billion in foreign funding, including from Chi-
na.313 The fact that universities often retroactively disclose foreign
funding complicates efforts to ascertain the full amount of funding
received from China in a given year, meaning the total number of
China-origin gifts and contracts U.S. universities receive likely ex-
ceeds that reflected in publicly available data. For example, between
January and halfway through October 2022, U.S. universities and
colleges reported $31.8 million from China, but this number may
increase as additional gifts and contracts are retroactively reported
in the coming months and years.314 Examples in which foreign ac-
ademic institutions’ acceptance of Chinese funding either plausibly
* Policymakers and analysts in the United States have expressed concerns about the lack of
transparency surrounding these donations, the dependencies on China they create, and the fact
that some of the Chinese entities that have provided funding are on the U.S. Department of
Defense’s Communist Chinese Military Companies (CCMC) List or the U.S. Department of Com-
merce’s Military End-User List. A Bloomberg analysis of data collected by the U.S. Department
of Education between 2013 and 2020 concluded that 115 U.S. colleges received almost a billion
dollars in gifts and contracts from Chinese sources during this period. Daniel Currell, “Foreign
Money in U.S. Universities, Part VI — A Guided Tour of Chinese Money in U.S. Universities,” Na-
tional Security Institute, October 6, 2021; Janet Lorin and Brandon Kochkodin, “Harvard Leads
U.S. Colleges That Received $1 Billion from China,” Bloomberg, February 6, 2020.
† Section 117 of the Higher Education Act of 1965 requires universities and colleges that re-
ceive federal financial assistance to disclose to the U.S. Department of Education contracts with
or gifts from a foreign entity. The threshold for reporting is currently $250,000 or more in one
calendar year. U.S. Department of Education Office of Federal Student Aid, Section 117 Foreign
Gift and Contract Reporting, 2023.
 258

influenced their operations or created the risk of improper influence

in the future include the following:
• In 2023, University of California Berkeley failed to report a
$220 million investment from the Chinese city of Shenzhen’s
municipal government.315 The money was intended to finance a
research campus in China.316 Berkeley’s partnership with the
Shenzhen municipal government was announced in 2018 but
was not reported despite the Department of Education’s require-
ment to disclose foreign gifts or contracts within six months of
signing a deal and the university’s own policy of protecting aca-
demic freedom and U.S. national security.317 According to media
reporting, after the contract was signed, “Berkeley researchers
granted Chinese officials private tours of their cutting-edge U.S.
semiconductor facilities and gave ‘priority commercialization
rights’ for intellectual properties they produced to Chinese gov-
ernment-backed funds.” 318
• In 2021, a professor at the University of Cambridge who di-
rects one of its colleges’ China-focused research centers report-
edly advised colleagues to avoid discussing contentious issues
on China’s human rights record so as not to be seen as “cam-
paigning . . . for freedom for Hong Kong, [or] freedom for the Ui-
ghurs.” 319 According to the British newspaper Sunday Times,
this professor’s position was funded by a £3.7 million ($4.6 mil-
lion) donation to the university from the Chong Hua foundation,
a trust allegedly controlled by the daughter of former Chinese
Premier Wen Jiabao.320 The professor also reportedly sat on the
board of China International Capital Corporation, a Chinese in-
vestment bank that is partially state owned.321
• In 2020, media reports revealed that Vrije Universiteit, the
Netherlands’ fourth-largest university, had accepted hun-
dreds of millions of euros’ worth of funding from a Chinese
university to support its Cross Cultural Human Rights Cen-
ter, which espoused views on China’s treatment of Uyghurs
and human rights record effectively echoing those of the
Chinese government.322 One post on the center’s website, for
example, stated that several of its Dutch academics had vis-
ited Xinjiang and concluded that there was “definitely no dis-
crimination of Uyghurs or other minorities in the region.” 323
Following a public outcry and a statement from the Nether-
lands’ education minister expressing concerns about academ-
ic freedom, Vrije Universiteit announced that it would refuse
further funding from the Chinese university and repay any
money it had received.324
Some universities have decided to forgo Chinese funding to protect
academic freedom, however. In 2023, Friedrich Alexander University
of Erlangen Nuremberg (FAU), one of Germany’s largest universi-
ties, suspended its collaboration with students funded by the China
Scholarship Council (CSC), a Chinese-government backed organiza-
tion that administers study abroad programs for Chinese nationals,
including students sponsored by institutions tied to China’s military,
defense industry conglomerates, and other government agencies to
 259

study scientific disciplines relevant to defense modernization.* 325

The FAU executive committee expressed concerns with the contract
CSC students are required by the Chinese government to sign prior
to their studies in Germany, which includes a pledge to remain in
communication with the Chinese embassy, maintain allegiance to
the Party, and return to China after completing their scholarship.326
The executive committee explained that “under these contracts CSC
scholarship holders will be unable to fully exercise their academic
freedom and freedom of expression as stipulated under the Germa-
ny Basic Law.” 327
Implications for the United States
China’s brazen, egregious, and increasingly aggressive overseas
influence activities present a diverse set of risks to the United
States and fellow liberal democracies.328 At the same time, they cre-
ate opportunities for Congress to strengthen U.S. institutions, work
closely with other countries that face similar challenges, and devel-
op mitigation efforts that other democracies around the world can
emulate.329 Many of the Party-state’s attempts to influence political
and social life in the United States as well as allied and partner
countries have been exposed by media reporting or disrupted by
law enforcement, suggesting that democratic countries have the ca-
pacity to cope with many of these challenges, even if further public
scrutiny, new laws, and more robust safeguards against coercion are
required.330
First, China’s overseas influence activities challenge U.S. national
security as well as international conventions and norms. The Par-
ty-state’s efforts to unduly influence elections by flooding social me-
dia with divisive and false content threaten the integrity of the U.S.
political system and its decision-making processes.331 There is no
public evidence that Beijing has funded networks of candidates to
win races in the United States, but recent allegations of such activ-
ity in Canada suggest that heightened vigilance around future U.S.
elections is warranted.332 Similarly, the Party-state’s attempts to in-
fluence every level of government raise legitimate questions about
* The China Scholarship Council (CSC) describes itself as a nonprofit organization affiliated with
China’s Ministry of Education that administers a variety of study abroad funds and programs for
Chinese nationals, including some designed to cultivate human talent for China’s industrial and
defense aims. The CSC’s website indicates that its advisory board includes ten ministries and
academies, at least eight of which are known to be involved in talent recruitment or technology
transfer activities. One of its programs, the National Study Abroad Fund, requires recipients to
study scientific fields prioritized by the state, support the CCP’s leadership, and return to China
for a two-year work commitment. Another CSC scholarship, the National Government-Sponsored
Graduate Student Program for the Building of Top Universities, targets doctoral students who
are already affiliated with universities belonging to China’s military-industrial complex. Like the
National Study Abroad Fund, this scholarship requires political loyalty and a two-year service
commitment upon returning to China but also emphasizes that applicants must secure admission
to well-known universities in technologically advanced countries. The list of “accepting units”
approved to solicit and sponsor applications on the scholarship’s behalf includes a host of institu-
tions tied to China’s military, defense industry conglomerates, state-owned enterprises, and other
government agencies. A final CSC scholarship, the National Government-Sponsored Program for
Senior Research Scholars, Visiting Scholars, and Postdoctoral Students, targets S&T researchers
who are advanced in their careers and already work for an employer linked to the Chinese gov-
ernment, like state-owned enterprises. This scholarship’s 2020 selection guidelines indicate that
recipients must follow the study plan agreed upon with their employer, regularly submit “training
reports” on their progress to the Chinese consulate while abroad, and communicate the results
of their study upon returning home. For more, see Anastasya Lloyd-Damnjanovic and Alexander
Bowe, “Overseas Chinese Students and Scholars in China’s Drive for Innovation,” U.S.-China
Economic and Security Review Commission, October 7, 2020, 12–13.
 260

whether state and local leaders have the knowledge, support, and
resources they need to properly evaluate outreach from China. Chi-
na’s deliberate integration of united front work with the activities of
its security services also means united front activities may conceal
dangerous espionage and harassment.333
Second, China’s overseas influence activities often violate U.S. law
and threaten the civil liberties of U.S. persons * and others wishing
to exercise their rights freely within the United States. The Par-
ty-state’s surveillance and intimidation of U.S. persons and others
has impacted freedom of speech, freedom of political association, and
social trust.334 At the same time, the Party-state frames U.S. gov-
ernment and law enforcement responses to its overseas influence
activities as racist. Given the Party-state’s weaponization of race,
an effective policy approach should avoid alarmist rhetoric, clearly
establish the involvement of the Party-state in harmful activities,
and take steps to protect people of Asian descent from unwarranted
political suspicion and violence.335
Third, China’s economic influence undermines the integrity of
global markets and U.S. policymaking. Elite capture and other in-
fluence activities in foreign markets could create a tilted playing
field, encouraging foreign governments and businesses to favor Chi-
nese companies in awarding contracts, for instance. In cultivating
deep ties to state and municipal governments, Chinese united front
organizations may also effectively build constituencies that advocate
for policy choices favored by the CCP, without a clear connection
to China. Additionally, Chinese companies may seek to establish
deals with key U.S. firms that align the commercial objectives of
U.S. industry with the strategic objectives of the CCP. This places
U.S. policymakers in the difficult position of evaluating whether U.S.
firms are making investment decisions and supporting policies that
privilege their short-term business interests at the expense of U.S.
competitiveness, supply chain security, and national security more
broadly.
Finally, China’s overseas influence activities endanger the in-
dependence of media and academic institutions that U.S. policy-
makers rely on to make sound foreign policy decisions. The Par-
ty-state’s efforts to covertly manipulate research and publications
by universities, think tanks, and media organizations is prompt-
ing self-censorship by institutions meant to provide transparen-
cy and fora for public debate.336 In addition to grappling with
Beijing’s assault on the “knowledge base,” U.S. policymakers face
substantial limitations in the data available to establish the ex-
tent of some institutions’ dependencies on entities connected with
the Party-state. For example, it remains difficult to grasp the full
extent of China-origin donations to U.S. universities even though
such disclosures are required under section 117 of the Higher
Education Act, partly because universities’ compliance with the
law is uneven, partly because entities’ ties to the Party-state are
not always obvious, and partly because the Federal Government
does not make this information public in an accessible format.337
* U.S. Code defines a “United States person” as “any U.S. citizen or alien admitted for perma-
nent residence in the United States, and any corporation, partnership, or other organization or-
ganized under the laws of the United States,” Cornell Law School, “22 U.S. Code § 6010—‘United
States person’ defined.”
 261

Without greater transparency, U.S. policymakers will struggle

to formulate policies that appropriately gauge and mitigate the
risks stemming from China’s overseas influence activities in the
academic and media spheres.
 262
ENDNOTES FOR SECTION 2
1. U.S. Department of Justice, Two Arrested for Operating Illegal Overseas Police
Station of the Chinese Government, April 17, 2023.
2. United States Attorney’s Office, Eastern District of New York, “Complaint and
Affidavit in Support of Arrest Warrants,” 18 U.S.C §§ 371, 1512(c)(1).
3. United States Attorney’s Office, Eastern District of New York, “Complaint and
Affidavit in Support of Arrest Warrants,” 18 U.S.C §§ 371, 1512(c)(1).
4. U.S. Department of Justice, Two Arrested for Operating Illegal Overseas Police
Station of the Chinese Government, April 17, 2023.
5. U.S. Department of Justice, Two Arrested for Operating Illegal Overseas Police
Station of the Chinese Government, April 17, 2023.
6. Jordan Link, “The Expanding International Reach of China’s Police,” Center for
American Progress, October 17, 2022; U.S. Department of State, The Chinese Com-
munist Party: Threatening Global Peace and Security; Jordan Link, Nina Palmer, and
Laura Edwards, “Beijing’s Strategy for Asserting Its ‘Party Rule by Law’ Abroad,”
United States Institute of Peace, September 29, 2022.
7. Hedvig Ördén and James Pamment, “What Is So Foreign about Foreign Influ-
ence Operations?” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, January 26, 2021;
Peter Mattis, “An American Lens on China’s Interference and Influence-Building
Abroad,” Asan Forum, April 30, 2018.
8. Sarah Cook, written testimony for U.S.-China Economic and Security Review
Commission, Hearing on China’s Global Influence and Interference Activities, March
23, 2023, 10; Glenn Tiffert, written testimony before the U.S.-China Economic and
Security Review Commission, Hearing on China’s Global Influence and Interference
Activities, March 23, 2023, 1–4.
9. U.S. Department of Justice, 40 Officers of China’s National Police Charged in Trans-
national Repression Schemes Targeting U.S. Residents, April 17, 2023; Andrew Chubb,
written testimony for U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, Hearing
on China’s Global Influence and Interference Activities, March 23, 2023, 2; U.S. Customs
and Border Protection, What Are Civil Rights and Civil Liberties, May 24, 2022.
10. Emily de La Bruyère, written testimony for U.S.-China Economic and Security
Review Commission, Hearing on China’s Global Influence and Interference Activities,
March 23, 2023, 2; Caitlin Dearing Scott, written testimony for U.S.-China Economic
and Security Review Commission, Hearing on China’s Global Influence and Interfer-
ence Activities, 3–4; U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, Chapter
2, Section 4, “U.S. Supply Chain Vulnerabilities and Resilience,” in 2022 Annual Re-
port to Congress, November 2022.
11. U.S. Department of Justice, written testimony of John C. Demers for the Sen-
ate Judiciary Committee, Hearing on China’s Non-Traditional Espionage against the
United States: The Threat and Potential Policy Responses, December 12, 2018.
12. Mareike Ohlberg, written testimony for U.S.-China Economic and Security
Review Commission, Hearing on China’s Global Influence and Interference Activi-
ties, March 23, 2023; Peter Mattis, written testimony for U.S.-China Economic and
Security Review Commission, Hearing on China’s Global Influence and Interference
Activities, March 23, 2023, 4.
13. Peter Mattis, written testimony for the House Permanent Select Committee
on Intelligence, Hearing on China’s Digital Authoritarianism: Surveillance, Influence,
and Political Control, May 16, 2019, 5; Thomas G. Mahnken, Ross Babbage, and Toshi
Yoshihara, “Countering Comprehensive Coercion: Competitive Strategies against Au-
thoritarian Political Warfare,” Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, May
2018, 47; Central Committee of the Communist Party of China’s General Office, Com-
muniqué on the Current State of the Ideological Sphere (Document No. 9) (关于当前
意识形态领域情况的通报), April 22, 2013. Translation; Anne-Marie Brady, Marketing
Dictatorship: Propaganda and Thought Work in Contemporary China, Rowman &
Littlefield, 2008, 151.
14. Zhai Jiaqi, “Telling Good Stories and Molding Images—Centennial History of
the Communist Party of China’s External Propaganda” (讲好故事塑形象—中国共产
党对外宣传的百年历程), Party Construction, January 1, 2023. Translation; Xu Shan-
na, “Strengthen Agenda-Setting and Tell China’s Story Well” (加强议题设置 讲好中国
故事), People’s Daily, July 21, 2020. Translation; Matt Schrader, “Friends and Ene-
mies: A Framework for Understanding Chinese Political Interference in Democratic
Countries,” German Marshall Fund, April 22, 2020, 12; Anne-Marie Brady, “Magic
Weapons: China’s Political Influence Activities under Xi Jinping,” Wilson Center, Sep-
tember 18, 2017, 6.
15. Peter Mattis, written testimony for U.S.-China Economic and Security Review
Commission, Hearing on China’s Global Influence and Interference Activities, March
 263
23, 2023, 4; Mareike Ohlberg, written testimony for U.S.-China Economic and Secu-
rity Review Commission, Hearing on China’s Global Influence and Interference Activ-
ities, March 23, 2023, 1–2.
16. Mareike Ohlberg, written testimony for U.S.-China Economic and Security Re-
view Commission, Hearing on China’s Global Influence and Interference Activities,
March 23, 2023, 1–2; Jichang Lulu, “Repurposing Democracy: The European Parlia-
ment China Friendship Cluster,” Sinopsis, November 26, 2019, 3; Timothy Heath,
“Beijing’s Influence Operations Target Chinese Diaspora,” War on the Rocks, March
1, 2018.
17. Alex Joske, “The Party Speaks for You: Foreign Interference and the Chinese
Communist Party’s United Front System,” Australian Strategic Policy Institute, June
9, 2020, 16; China Media Project, “Telling China’s Story Well,” April 16, 2021.
18. People’s Daily, “CCP Central Committee Issues Regulations on CCP United
Front Work” (中共中央印发中国共产党统一战线工作条例), January 6, 2021. Transla-
tion; Alex Joske, “The Party Speaks for You: Foreign Interference and the Chinese
Communist Party’s United Front System,” Australian Strategic Policy Institute, 2020,
16.
19. People’s Daily, “CCP Central Committee Issues Regulations on CCP United
Front Work” (中共中央印发中国共产党统一战线工作条例), January 6, 2021. Translation.
20. Audrye Wong, “The Diaspora and China’s Foreign Influence Activities,” Wilson
Center, May 31, 2022, 614.
21. Mareike Ohlberg, written testimony for U.S.-China Economic and Security Re-
view Commission, Hearing on China’s Global Influence and Interference Activities,
March 23, 2023, 4; Audrye Wong, “The Diaspora and China’s Foreign Influence Activ-
ities,” Wilson Center, May 31, 2022, 608, 611–614.
22. Aaron Glasserman, “Touting ‘Ethnic Fusion,’ China’s New Top Official for Mi-
nority Affairs Envisions a Country Free of Cultural Difference,” China File, February
24, 2023; Liza Lin, Eva Xiao, and Jonathan Cheng, “China Targets Another Region
in Ethnic Assimilation Campaign: Tibet,” Wall Street Journal, July 16, 2021; People’s
Daily, “CCP Central Committee Issues Regulations on CCP United Front Work” (中
共中央印发中国共产党统一战线工作条例), January 6, 2021. Translation; Thomas Lum,
“China and Falun Gong,” Congressional Research Service, May 25, 2006, 1.
23. People’s Daily, “CCP Central Committee Issues Regulations on CCP United
Front Work” (中共中央印发中国共产党统一战线工作条例), January 6, 2021. Transla-
tion; Samson Yuen, “Deepening the State: The Dynamics of China’s United Front
Work in Post-Handover Hong Kong,” Communist and Post-Communist Studies 53:4
(December 2020).
24. Russell Hsiao, “Political Warfare Alert: CCP Updates United Front Regulations
Expanding Foreign Influence Mission,” Global Taiwan Institute, February 10, 2021;
People’s Daily, “CCP Central Committee Issues Regulations on CCP United Front
Work” (中共中央印发中国共产党统一战线工作条例), January 6, 2021. Translation.
25. Alex Bowe, “China’s Overseas United Front Work: Background and Implica-
tions for the United States,” U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission,
August 24, 2018, 4; Thomas G. Mahnken, Ross Babbage, and Toshi Yoshihara, “Coun-
tering Comprehensive Coercion: Competitive Strategies against Authoritarian Politi-
cal Warfare,” Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, May 2018, 5; Anne-Ma-
rie Brady, “Magic Weapons: China’s Political Influence Activities under Xi Jinping,”
Wilson Center, September 2017, 2–3.
26. Alex Joske, written testimony for U.S.-China Economic and Security Review
Commission, Hearing on China’s Global Influence and Interference Activities, March
23, 2023, 2; Peter Mattis, written testimony for U.S.-China Economic and Security
Review Commission, Hearing on China’s Global Influence and Interference Activities,
March 23, 2023, 2–4; Xinhua, “At the Central United Front Work Conference, Xi Jin-
ping Emphasized Promoting the Unity and Struggle of Chinese Sons and Daughters
at Home and Abroad to Gather Great Power for the Great Rejuvenation of the Chi-
nese Nation” (习近平在中央统战工作会议上强调 促进海内外中华儿女团结奋斗 为中华民
族伟大复兴汇聚伟力), July 30, 2022. Translation; Xinhua, “CCP Central Committee Is-
sued the ‘Regulations on the Work of the CCP’s United Front’ ” (中共中央印发(中国共
产党统一战线工作条例)), January 5, 2021. Translation; Alex Bowe, “China’s Overseas
United Front Work: Background and Implications for the United States,” U.S.-China
Economic and Security Review Commission, August 24, 2018, 3.
27. Xinhua, “Xi Jinping Attends the Central United Front Work Conference and
Delivers an Important Speech” (习近平出席中央统战工作会议并发表重要讲话), July 30,
2022. Translation; Erkenjiang Tulahong, “Give Full Play to the Role of the Unit-
ed Front ‘Magic Weapon’ in the Process of the Great Rejuvenation of the Chinese
Nation” (在中华民族伟大复兴进程中发挥统一战线法宝作用), Seeking Truth, December
10, 2021. Translation; CCP Central Committee United Front Work Department, Fully
 264
Understand the Important Position and Role of the United Front (充 分认 识 统一 战
线的重 要地位 和作用), January 7, 2009. Translation; CCP Central Committee Unit-
ed Front Work Department, “Mao Zedong on the United Front” (毛泽东论统一战线),
Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference, 2005. Translation; People’s Daily,
“President Jiang Zemin on CPC’s United Front Work,” December 5, 2000.
28. Xinhua, “At the Central United Front Work Conference, Xi Jinping Emphasized
Promoting the Unity and Struggle of Chinese Sons and Daughters at Home and
Abroad to Gather Great Power for the Great Rejuvenation of the Chinese Nation” (习
近平在中央统战工作会议上强调 促进海内外中华儿女团结奋斗 为中华民族伟大复兴汇聚伟
力), July 30, 2022. Translation; Anne-Marie Brady, “Magic Weapons: China’s Political
Influence Activities under Xi Jinping,” Wilson Center, September 18, 2017.
29. Xinhua, “At the Central United Front Work Conference, Xi Jinping Emphasized
Promoting the Unity and Struggle of Chinese Sons and Daughters at Home and
Abroad to Gather Great Power for the Great Rejuvenation of the Chinese Nation”
(习近平在中央统战工作会议上强调 促进海内外中华儿女团结奋斗 为中华民族伟大复兴汇
聚伟力), July 30, 2022. Translation.
30. Xinhua, “At the Central United Front Work Conference, Xi Jinping Empha-
sized Promoting the Unity and Struggle of Chinese Sons and Daughters at Home and
Abroad to Gather Great Power for the Great Rejuvenation of the Chinese Nation”
(习近平在中央统战工作会议上强调 促进海内外中华儿女团结奋斗 为中华民族伟大复兴汇
聚伟力), July 30, 2022. Translation.
31. Alex Joske, “The Central United Front Work Leading Small Group: Institution-
alizing United Front Work,” Sinopsis, July 23, 2019.
32. Xinhua, “Xi Jinping: Hold High the Great Banner of Socialism with Chinese
Characteristics and Work Together to Build a Modern Socialist Country in an All-
Round Way—Report at the Twentieth National Congress of the Communist Party of
China” (习近平：高举中国特色社会主义伟大旗帜 为全面建设社会主义现代化国家而团结
奋斗——在中国共产党第二十次全国代表大会上的报告), October 25, 2022. Translation;
Xinhua, “At the Central United Front Work Conference, Xi Jinping Emphasized Pro-
moting the Unity and Struggle of Chinese Sons and Daughters at Home and Abroad
to Gather Great Power for the Great Rejuvenation of the Chinese Nation” (习近平在中
央统战工作会议上强调 促进海内外中华儿女团结奋斗 为中华民族伟大复兴汇聚伟力), July
30, 2022. Translation; Alex Joske, “The Central United Front Work Leading Small
Group: Institutionalizing United Front Work,” Sinopsis, July 23, 2019; Xinhua, “Xi
Jinping: Achieve Decisive Victory in Building a Moderately Prosperous Society in an
All-Round Way and Winning the Great Victory of Socialism with Chinese Character-
istics in the New Era——Report at the Nineteenth National Congress of the Commu-
nist Party of China” (习近平：决胜全面建成小康社会 夺取新时代中国特色社会主义伟大
胜利——在中国共产党第十九次全国代表大会上的报告), October 27, 2017. Translation;
Party Cadre Online, “At the Central United Front Work Conference, Xi Jinping Em-
phasized Consolidating and Developing the Broad Patriotic United Front to Provide
Support to Realizing the Chinese Dream” (习近平在中央统战工作会议上强调 巩固发
展最广泛的爱国统一战线 为实现中国梦提供广泛力量支持), May 20, 2015. Translation.
33. People’s Daily, “CCP Central Committee Issues Regulations on CCP United
Front Work” (中共中央印发中国共产党统一战线工作条例), January 6, 2021. Transla-
tion; Alex Joske, “The Party Speaks for You: Foreign Interference and the Chinese
Communist Party’s United Front System,” Australian Strategic Policy Institute, 2020,
13.
34. People’s Daily, “CCP Central Committee Issues Regulations on CCP United
Front Work” (中共中央印发中国共产党统一战线工作条例), January 6, 2021. Transla-
tion; Alex Joske, “The Party Speaks for You: Foreign Interference and the Chinese
Communist Party’s United Front System,” Australian Strategic Policy Institute, 2020,
8; Gerry Groot, “The CCP’s Grand United Front Abroad,” Sinopsis, September 24,
2019; Alex Joske, “The Central United Front Work Leading Small Group: Institution-
alizing United Front Work,” Sinopsis, July 23, 2019; Alex Joske, “Reorganizing the
United Front Work Department: New Structures for a New Era of Diaspora and Re-
ligious Affairs Work,” Jamestown Foundation, May 9, 2019; Feng Haibao, “Xi Jinping
Has Enriched and Developed the Theory of United Front Work since the 18th Party
Congress” (十八大以来习近平对统一战线理论的丰富和发展), October 9, 2017. Transla-
tion; People’s Daily, “Regulations on the Work of the United Front of the Communist
Party of China (Trial Implementation)” (中国共产党统一战线工作条例 (试行)), Septem-
ber 23, 2015. Translation.
35. Alex Joske, “The Party Speaks for You: Foreign Interference and the Chinese
Communist Party’s United Front System,” Australian Strategic Policy Institute, 2020,
9, 13; Peter Mattis, written testimony for the House Permanent Select Committee
on Intelligence, Hearing on China’s Digital Authoritarianism: Surveillance, Influence,
and Political Control, May 16, 2019, 8.
 265
36. U.S. Department of Justice, Massachusetts Man Indicted for Acting as an Il-
legal Agent of the People’s Republic of China, May 15, 2023; Ryan Fedasiuk, “How
China’s United Front System Works Overseas,” Strategist, April 13, 2022; Alex Joske,
“The Party Speaks for You: Foreign Interference and the Chinese Communist Party’s
United Front System,” Australian Strategic Policy Institute, 2020, 14–15, 28.
37. Alex Joske, “The Party Speaks for You: Foreign Interference and the Chinese
Communist Party’s United Front System,” Australian Strategic Policy Institute, 2020,
25, 36–39; Peter Mattis, written testimony for the House Permanent Select Com-
mittee on Intelligence, Hearing on China’s Digital Authoritarianism: Surveillance,
Influence, and Political Control, May 16, 2019, 9–10.
38. Gerry Groot, “The Long Reach of China’s United Front Work,” Interpreter, No-
vember 6, 2017; Peter Mattis, written testimony for House Foreign Affairs Subcom-
mittee on Asia, the Pacific, and Nonproliferation, Hearing on China’s Growing Influ-
ence in Asia and the United States, March 8, 2019.
39. Alex Joske, written testimony for U.S.-China Economic and Security Review
Commission, Hearing on China’s Global Influence and Interference Activities, March
23, 2023, 2; Alex Joske, “The Party Speaks for You: Foreign Interference and the Chi-
nese Communist Party’s United Front System,” Australian Strategic Policy Institute,
2020, 11.
40. Alex Joske, written testimony for U.S.-China Economic and Security Review
Commission, Hearing on China’s Global Influence and Interference Activities, March
23, 2023, 2, 3–6.
41. Peter Mattis, oral testimony for U.S.-China Economic and Security Review
Commission, Hearing on China’s Global Influence and Interference Activities, March
23, 2023, 105–106; Peter Mattis, written testimony for U.S.-China Economic and Se-
curity Review Commission, Hearing on China’s Global Influence and Interference Ac-
tivities, March 23, 2023, 2.
42. Alex Joske, “The Party Speaks for You: Foreign Interference and the Chinese
Communist Party’s United Front System,” Australian Strategic Policy Institute, 2020,
25.
43. James Kynge, Lucy Hornby, and Jamil Anderlini, “Inside China’s Secret ‘Magic
Weapon’ for Worldwide Influence,” Financial Times, October 26, 2017.
44. Shannon Tiezzi, “What Is the CPPCC Anyway?” Diplomat, March 4, 2021; Peter
Mattis, written testimony for the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence,
Hearing on China’s Digital Authoritarianism: Surveillance, Influence, and Political
Control, May 16, 2019, 7.
45. Peter Mattis, written testimony for the House Permanent Select Committee
on Intelligence, Hearing on China’s Digital Authoritarianism: Surveillance, Influence,
and Political Control, May 16, 2019, 7; Helen Davidson, “Explainer: What Is China’s
‘Two Session’ Gathering, and Why Does It Matter?” Guardian, March 1, 2023.
46. Alex Joske, “The Party Speaks for You: Foreign Interference and the Chinese
Communist Party’s United Front System,” Australian Strategic Policy Institute, 2020,
18, 22, 26, 30.
47. Paul Charon and Jean-Baptiste Jeangene Vilmer, “Chinese Influence Opera-
tions: A Machiavellian Moment,” Institute for Strategic Research, October 2021, 70–71.
48. Mareike Ohlberg, written testimony for U.S.-China Economic and Security
Review Commission, Hearing on China’s Global Influence and Interference Activi-
ties, March 23, 2023, 4, 8; Wang Zheng, “How China Uses Party Diplomacy to Win
Influence in Southeast Asia,” South China Morning Post, June 25, 2022; Lina Ben-
abdallah, “Ties That Bind: China’s Party-to-Party Diplomacy in Africa,” Konrad-Ade-
nauer-Stiftung, October 2021, 2–3; Paul Charon and Jean-Baptiste Jeangene Vilmer,
“Chinese Influence Operations: A Machiavellian Moment,” Institute for Strategic Re-
search, October 2021, 70.
49. U.S. National Counterintelligence and Security Center, Safeguarding Our Fu-
ture: Protecting Government and Business Leaders at the U.S. State and Local Level
from the People’s Republic of China (PRC) Influence Operations, July 2022, 2; Larry
Diamond and Orville Schell, eds., China’s Influence and American Interests: Promot-
ing Constructive Vigilance, Hoover Institution, 2019, 54; United Kingdom House of
Commons Foreign Affairs Committee, A Cautious Embrace: Defending Democracy in
an Age of Autocracies, 2019, 41.
50. John Dotson, “The United Front Work Department Goes Global: The Worldwide
Expansion of the Council for the Promotion of the Peaceful Reunification of China,”
Jamestown Foundation, May 9, 2019; John Dotson, “The United Front Work Depart-
ment in Action Abroad: A Profile of the Council for the Promotion of the Peaceful
Reunification of China,” Jamestown Foundation, February 13, 2018.
51. Toshi Yoshihara and Jack Bianchi, “Uncovering China’s Influence in Europe:
How Friendship Groups Co-opt European Elites,” Center for Strategic and Budgetary
 266
Assessments, 2020, 11–12; Sister Cities International, “Sister Cities International and
the Chinese People’s Association for Friendship with Foreign Countries Sign Memo-
randum of Understanding,” 2012.
52. Western Returned Scholars Association, “A Brief Introduction” (欧美同学会（中
国留学人员联谊会）简介), January 2, 2018. Translation.
53. Peter Mattis, written testimony for U.S.-China Economic and Security Review
Commission, Hearing on China’s Global Influence and Interference Activities, March
23, 2023, 6–7.
54. Peter Mattis, written testimony for U.S.-China Economic and Security Review
Commission, Hearing on China’s Global Influence and Interference Activities, March
23, 2023, 6.
55. Paul Nantulya, “China’s United Front Strategy in Africa,” Africa Center for
Strategic Studies, September 5, 2023; Peter Mattis, written testimony for U.S.-China
Economic and Security Review Commission, Hearing on China’s Global Influence and
Interference Activities, March 23, 2023, 6.
56. Chris Taylor, Eva Xia and Hwang Chun-mei, “Soft Power Billions Seek ‘Con-
sent,’ ” Radio Free Asia, October 5, 2023; Alex Joske, “The Party Speaks for You: For-
eign Interference and the Chinese Communist Party’s United Front System,” Austra-
lian Strategic Policy Institute, 2020, 30.
57. U.S. Department of Justice, Massachusetts Man Indicted for Acting as an Ille-
gal Agent of the People’s Republic of China, May 15, 2023; Alex Joske, written testi-
mony for U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, Hearing on China’s
Global Influence and Interference Activities, March 23, 2023, 5–6; U.S. Department of
Justice, Five Individuals Charged Variously with Stalking, Harassing and Spying on
U.S. Residents on Behalf of the PRC Secret Police, March 16, 2023; Alex Joske, “The
Party Speaks for You: Foreign Interference and the Chinese Communist Party’s Unit-
ed Front System,” Australian Strategic Policy Institute, 2020, 14–15.
58. Alex Joske, written testimony for U.S.-China Economic and Security Review
Commission, Hearing on China’s Global Influence and Interference Activities, March
23, 2023, 5.
59. U.S. Department of Justice, Massachusetts Man Indicted for Acting as an Ille-
gal Agent of the People’s Republic of China, May 15, 2023; U.S. Department of Justice,
United States of America v. Litang Liang, Defendant, May 2023.
60. U.S. Department of Justice, Massachusetts Man Indicted for Acting as an Ille-
gal Agent of the People’s Republic of China, May 15, 2023; U.S. Department of Justice,
United States of America v. Litang Liang, Defendant, May 2023.
61. U.S. Department of Justice, Massachusetts Man Indicted for Acting as an Ille-
gal Agent of the People’s Republic of China, May 15, 2023; U.S. Department of Justice,
United States of America v. Litang Liang, Defendant, May 2023.
62. David Shambaugh, “China’s External Propaganda Work: Missions, Messengers,
and Mediums,” Party Watch Annual Report 2018, 2018, 26.
63. Zhai Jiaqi, “Telling Good Stories and Molding Images—Centennial History of
the Communist Party of China’s External Propaganda” (讲好故事塑形象—中国共产党
对外宣传的百年历程), Party Construction, January 1, 2023. Translation; Nick Frisch,
“Leninism 2.0,” Logic, May 1, 2019; Nick Frisch, “The Bolsheviks in Beijing: What the
Chinese Communist Party Learned from Lenin,” Foreign Affairs, October 18, 2017;
David Shambaugh, “China’s Propaganda System: Institutions, Processes and Effica-
cy,” China Journal 57 (2007): 26.
64. Xinhua, “The National Conference of Propaganda Ministers Was Held in Bei-
jing, Cai Qi Attended and Gave a Speech” (全国宣传部长会议在京召开 蔡奇出席并讲
话), January 4, 2023. Translation; Zhai Jiaqi, “Telling Good Stories and Molding Im-
ages—Centennial History of the Communist Party of China’s External Propagan-
da” (讲好故事塑形象—中国共产党对外宣传的百年历程), Party Construction, January 1,
2023. Translation; Low De Wei, “Full Text of Xi Jinping’s Speech at China’s Party
Congress,” Bloomberg, October 18, 2022; Party Construction, “Xi Jinping Talks about
Vigorously Strengthening News and Public Opinion Work” (习近平谈大力加强新闻舆论
工作), December 10, 2021. Translation; Xu Shanna, “Strengthen Agenda-Setting and
Tell China’s Story Well” (加强议题设置 讲好中国故事), People’s Daily, July 21, 2020.
Translation; David Shambaugh, “China’s External Propaganda Work: Missions, Mes-
sengers, and Mediums,” Party Watch Annual Report 2018, 2018, 30.
65. Mareike Ohlberg, written testimony for U.S.-China Economic and Security Re-
view Commission, Hearing on China’s Global Influence and Interference Activities,
March 23, 2023, 5.
66. Party Construction, “Xi Jinping Talks about Vigorously Strengthening News
and Public Opinion Work” (习近平谈大力加强新闻舆论工作), December 10, 2021.
Translation; China Media Project, “Telling China’s Story Well,” April 16, 2021; David
 267
Shambaugh, “China’s External Propaganda Work: Missions, Messengers, and Medi-
ums,” Party Watch Annual Report 2018, 2018, 30.
67. Xinhua, “During the 30th Collective Study of the Political Bureau of the Cen-
tral Committee of the Communist Party of China, Xi Jinping Emphasized Strength-
ening and Improving International Communication Work to Show a True, Three-Di-
mensional and Comprehensive China” (习近平在中共中央政治局第三十次集体学习时强
调 加强和改进国际传播工作 展示真实立体全面的中国), June 1, 2021. Translation; Peo-
ple’s Daily, “Xi Jinping’s Views on News and Public Opinion” (习近平的新闻舆论观),
February 25, 2016. Translation.
68. People’s Daily, “Xi Jinping’s Views on News and Public Opinion” (习近平的新闻
舆论观), February 25, 2016. Translation.
69. Low De Wei, “Full Text of Xi Jinping’s Speech at China’s Party Congress,”
Bloomberg, October 18, 2022.
70. Low De Wei, “Full Text of Xi Jinping’s Speech at China’s Party Congress,”
Bloomberg, October 18, 2022.
71. Hilton Yip, “China’s $6 Billion Propaganda Blitz Is a Snooze,” Foreign Policy,
April 23, 2018; David Shambaugh, “China’s External Propaganda Work: Missions,
Messengers, and Mediums,” Party Watch Annual Report 2018, 2018, 25; Emma Gra-
ham-Harrison, “China Plans Media Splurge to Win Global Voice,” Reuters, January
13, 2009.
72. James Arredy, “New Ways to Tell China’s Story,” Wall Street Journal, October
23, 2022; Threat Analysis China, “1 Key for 1 Lock: The Chinese Communist Party’s
Strategy for Targeted Propaganda,” Recorded Future, September 28, 2022, 3; People’s
Daily, “During the 30th Collective Study Session of the Politburo, Xi Jinping Empha-
sized Strengthening and Improving International Communication Work to Present
a True, Three-Dimensional and Comprehensive China” (习近平在中共中央政治局第三
十次集体学习时强调加强和改进国际传播工作 展示真实立体全面的中国), June 2, 2021.
Translation; David Shambaugh, “China’s External Propaganda Work: Missions, Mes-
sengers, and Mediums,” Party Watch Annual Report 2018, 2018, 25–26; Xinhua, “Xi
Completes Media Tour, Stresses Party’s Leadership,” February 20, 2016.
73. Steven Jiang, “Beijing Has a New Propaganda Weapon: Voice of China,” CNN,
March 21, 2018.
74. Hilton Yip, “China’s $6 Billion Propaganda Blitz Is a Snooze,” Foreign Policy,
April 23, 2018.
75. Sarah Cook, written testimony for U.S.-China Economic and Security Review
Commission, Hearing on on China’s Global Influence and Interference Activities,
March 23, 2023, 5.
76. Sarah Cook, written testimony for U.S.-China Economic and Security Review
Commission, Hearing on China’s Global Influence and Interference Activities, March
23, 2023, 5.
77. Mareike Ohlberg, written testimony for U.S.-China Economic and Security Re-
view Commission, Hearing on China’s Global Influence and Interference Activities,
March 23, 2023, 5.
78. Mareike Ohlberg, written testimony for U.S.-China Economic and Security Re-
view Commission, Hearing on China’s Global Influence and Interference Activities,
March 23, 2023, 5; Raphael Chan, “In Hong Kong, Learning to Speak Like the CCP,”
China Media Project, April 6, 2023; Almond Li, “Hong Kong’s John Lee ‘Welcomes and
Supports’ Beijing’s White Paper on Taiwan,” Hong Kong Free Press, August 11, 2022.
79. Sarah Cook, written testimony for U.S.-China Economic and Security Review
Commission, Hearing on China’s Global Influence and Interference Activities, March
23, 2023, 4–6.
80. Joshua Kurlantzick, “China Wants Your Attention, Please,” Foreign Policy, De-
cember 5, 2022.
81. Joshua Kurlantzick, “China Wants Your Attention, Please,” Foreign Policy, De-
cember 5, 2022.
82. Joshua Kurlantzick, “China Wants Your Attention, Please,” Foreign Policy, De-
cember 5, 2022.
83. Sarah Cook, written testimony for U.S.-China Economic and Security Review
Commission, Hearing on China’s Global Influence and Interference Activities, March
23, 2023, 5–6.
84. Sarah Cook, written testimony for U.S.-China Economic and Security Review
Commission, Hearing on China’s Global Influence and Interference Activities, March
23, 2023, 4.
85. Sarah Cook, written testimony for U.S.-China Economic and Security Review
Commission, Hearing on China’s Global Influence and Interference Activities, March
23, 2023, 3–5; Lin Chia-nan, “China’s ‘Arab Times’ Bullying Condemned,” Taipei
Times, August 4, 2021; People’s Republic of China Embassy in Kuwait, Statement of
 268
the Chinese Embassy in the State of Kuwait, August 2, 2021; International Federation
of Journalists, “Sweden: Chinese Embassy Threatens Swedish Journalist,” April 15,
2021; Reporters Without Borders, “Chinese Embassy Attacks Swedish Reporter Based
in Taiwan,” December 8, 2018.
86. International Federation of Journalists, “Sweden: Chinese Embassy Threatens
Swedish Journalist,” April 15, 2021.
87. Mareike Ohlberg, written testimony for U.S.-China Economic and Security Re-
view Commission, Hearing on China’s Global Influence and Interference Activities,
March 23, 2023, 5; Tracy Qu, “China’s Top Propaganda Agencies Want to Limit the
Role of Algorithms in Distributing Online Content,” South China Morning Post, Au-
gust 3, 2021.
88. Congressional Research Service, Confucius Institutes in the United States: Se-
lected Issues, May 2, 2023, 2; Ethan Epstein, “How China Infiltrated U.S. Classrooms,”
Politico, January 16, 2018.
89. Xinhua, “Li Changchun: Do a Good Job in Promoting Chinese to Enhance Un-
derstanding and Friendship with the World” (李长春:做好汉语推广工作 增进同世界了
解和友谊), April 24, 2007. Translation.
90. Ian Oxnevad, statement for the record, Hearing on China’s Global Influence
and Interference Activities, U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission,
March 23, 2023, 4; Rachelle Peterson, Flora Yan, and Ian Oxnevad, “After Confucius
Institutes: China’s Enduring Influence on American Higher Education,” National As-
sociation of Scholars, June 2022, 37.
91. Ian Oxnevad, statement for the record, Hearing on China’s Global Influence
and Interference Activities, U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission,
March 23, 2023, 4–6.
92. Fergus Ryan, Daria Impiombato, and Hsi-Ting Pai, “Frontier Influencers, The
New Face of China’s Propaganda,” Australian Strategic Policy Institute, October 19,
2022, 3; Tracy Qu, “China’s Top Propaganda Agencies Want to Limit the Role of Algo-
rithms in Distributing Online Content,” South China Morning Post, August 3, 2021;
China Culture.org, “Bureau of International Exchange and Cooperation,” February
2, 2015.
93. Fergus Ryan, Daria Impiombato, and Hsi-Ting Pai, “Frontier Influencers, The
New Face of China’s Propaganda,” Australian Strategic Policy Institute, October 19,
2022, 36–41.
94. Fergus Ryan, Daria Impiombato, and Hsi-Ting Pai, “Frontier Influencers, The
New Face of China’s Propaganda,” Australian Strategic Policy Institute, October 19,
2022, 3.
95. Fergus Ryan, Daria Impiombato, and Hsi-Ting Pai, “Frontier Influencers, The
New Face of China’s Propaganda,” Australian Strategic Policy Institute, October 19,
2022, 19–23.
96. Sarah Cook, written testimony for U.S.-China Economic and Security Review
Commission, Hearing on China’s Global Influence and Interference Activities, March
23, 2023, 6.
97. Sarah Cook, written testimony for U.S.-China Economic and Security Review
Commission, Hearing on China’s Global Influence and Interference Activities, March
23, 2023, 6; Nicole Sganga, “China-Linked Influence Campaign Targeting U.S. Mid-
terms, Security Firm Says,” CBS News, October 22, 2022.
98. Vera Bergengruen, “Meta Takes Down ‘Largest Ever’ Chinese Influence Opera-
tion,” Time Magazine, August 31, 2023; Guy Rosen, “Raising Online Defenses through
Transparency and Collaboration,” Meta, August 29, 2023.
99. Vera Bergengruen, “Meta Takes Down ‘Largest Ever’ Chinese Influence Opera-
tion,” Time Magazine, August 31, 2023; Guy Rosen, “Raising Online Defenses through
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100. Ben Ninmo et al., “Second Quarter Adversarial Threat Report,” Meta, August
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101. Sarah Cook, written testimony for U.S.-China Economic and Security Review
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23, 2023, 6.
102. Sarah Cook, written testimony for U.S.-China Economic and Security Review
Commission, Hearing on China’s Global Influence and Interference Activities, March
23, 2023, 6.
103. Sarah Cook, written testimony for U.S.-China Economic and Security Review
Commission, Hearing on China’s Global Influence and Interference Activities, March
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 269
104. Sarah Cook, written testimony for U.S.-China Economic and Security Review
Commission, Hearing on China’s Global Influence and Interference Activities, March
23, 2023, 6.
105. Rebecca Fair, written testimony for U.S.-China Economic and Security Review
Commission, Hearing on China’s Global Influence and Interference Activities, March
23, 2023, 2–3.
106. Rebecca Fair, oral testimony for U.S.-China Economic and Security Review
Commission, Hearing on China’s Global Influence and Interference Activities, March
23, 2023, 237–238; Rebecca Fair, written testimony for U.S.-China Economic and Se-
curity Review Commission, Hearing on China’s Global Influence and Interference Ac-
tivities, March 23, 2023, 2.
107. Rebecca Fair, written testimony for U.S.-China Economic and Security Review
Commission, Hearing on China’s Global Influence and Interference Activities, March
23, 2023, 3.
108. China Xinhua Espanol, “Sectors of #EEUU would be behind the violence in
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7:05 p.m.; China Xinhua Espanol, “The acts of violence, carried out by the supporters
of former President Jair Bolsonaro against the headquarters of the Executive Branch,
Congress, and the Supreme Federal Court of Brazil, are the representation of a ‘script
written by former US President Donald Trump,” X, formerly known as Twitter, Janu-
ary 9, 2023, 1:12 a.m.; Rebecca Fair, written testimony for U.S.-China Economic and
Security Review Commission, Hearing on China’s Global Influence and Interference
Activities, March 23, 2023, 3; Wang Qi, “Capitol Hill Riot Repeated in Brazil, Embar-
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109. Rebecca Fair, written testimony for U.S.-China Economic and Security Review
Commission, Hearing on China’s Global Influence and Interference Activities, March
23, 2023, 4–5.
110. Rebecca Fair, written testimony for U.S.-China Economic and Security Review
Commission, Hearing on China’s Global Influence and Interference Activities, March
23, 2023, 4–5.
111. Rebecca Fair, written testimony for U.S.-China Economic and Security Review
Commission, Hearing on China’s Global Influence and Interference Activities, March
23, 2023, 4–5.
112. Caitlin Dearing Scott, oral testimony for U.S.-China Economic and Security
Review Commission, Hearing on China’s Global Influence and Interference Activities,
March 23, 2023, 79–80.
113. Joseph Bodnar, Bret Schafer, and Etienne Soula, “A Year of Disinformation:
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114. Joseph Bodnar, Bret Schafer, and Etienne Soula, “A Year of Disinformation:
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115. Joseph Bodnar, Bret Schafer, and Etienne Soula, “A Year of Disinformation:
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116. Sarah Cook, oral testimony for U.S.-China Economic and Security Review
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Activities, March 23, 2023, 218.
117. Caitlin Dearing Scott, written testimony before the U.S.-China Economic and
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Activities, March 23, 2023, 3.
118. Sarah Cook, written testimony before the U.S.-China Economic and Security
Review Commission, Hearing on China’s Global Influence and Interference Activities,
March 23, 2023, 8–9; Caitlin Dearing Scott, written testimony for the U.S.-China
Economic and Security Review Commission, Hearing on China’s Global Influence and
Interference Activities, March 23, 2023, 7.
119. Caitlin Dearing Scott, written testimony for the U.S.-China Economic and
Security Review Commission, Hearing on China’s Global Influence and Interference
Activities, March 23, 2023, 3.
120. Caitlin Dearing Scott, written testimony for the U.S.-China Economic and
Security Review Commission, Hearing on China’s Global Influence and Interference
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Interference Activities, March 23, 2023, 2.
 270
121. Sarah Cook, written testimony before the U.S.-China Economic and Security
Review Commission, Hearing on China’s Global Influence and Interference Activities,
March 23, 2023, 9; Caitlin Dearing Scott, written testimony for the U.S.-China Eco-
nomic and Security Review Commission, Hearing on China’s Global Influence and
Interference Activities, March 23, 2023, 7–8.
122. Sarah Cook, written testimony before the U.S.-China Economic and Security
Review Commission, Hearing on China’s Global Influence and Interference Activities,
March 23, 2023, 9.
123. Sarah Cook, written testimony before the U.S.-China Economic and Security
Review Commission, Hearing on China’s Global Influence and Interference Activities,
March 23, 2023, 2.
124. Caitlin Dearing Scott, written testimony before the U.S.-China Economic and
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125. Sarah Cook, “Beijing’s Global Megaphone,” Freedom House, 2020; David Ban-
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126. Sarah Cook, oral testimony before the U.S.-China Economic and Security Re-
view Commission, Hearing on China’s Global Influence and Interference Activities,
March 23, 2023, 125; Sarah Cook, written testimony before the U.S.-China Economic
and Security Review Commission, Hearing on China’s Global Influence and Inter-
ference Activities, March 23, 2023, 8–9, 11; Caitlin Dearing Scott, oral testimony be-
fore the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, Hearing on China’s
Global Influence and Interference Activities, March 23, 2023, 82–83; Puma Shen, oral
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127. Sarah Cook, written testimony before the U.S.-China Economic and Security
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128. Sarah Cook, “Beijing’s Global Megaphone,” Freedom House, 2020.
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130. David Bandurksi, “Co-Producing with the CCP,” China Media Project, Febru-
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132. Amanda Meade, “Nine Entertainment Newspapers Quit Carrying China
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133. China Watch, China Daily, paid supplement, L.A. Times, June 25, 2023. Sarah
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135. Sarah Cook et al., “Beijing’s Global Media Influence: Authoritarian Expansion
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136. David Bandurski, “Documenting China’s Influence,” Made in China, October
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137. David Bandurksi, “Co-Producing with the CCP,” China Media Project, Febru-
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138. David Bandurksi, “Co-Producing with the CCP,” China Media Project, Febru-
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139. Sarah Cook et al., “Beijing’s Global Media Influence: Authoritarian Expan-
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China Has a Big Relationship with You’ ” Columbia Journalism Review, June 20,
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2019, 32; Louisa Lim and Julia Bergin, “Inside China’s Audacious Global Propaganda
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140. Liza Agoot, “More than 60 Journos Join China’s Exchange Program,” Phil-
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 271
dia Cooperation to Fight Post-Truth Narratives,” China Daily, July 27, 2022; China
Public Diplomacy Association, “Journalists from China Asia Pacific Press Center and
China Latin America Press Center Visited Shaanxi Province,” July 16, 2019; Report-
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141. Joshua Kurlantzick, “Books: How Beijing Targets Media in Global Influence
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142. Joshua Kurlantzick, “Books: How Beijing Targets Media in Global Influence
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143. Joshua Kurlantzick, “Books: How Beijing Targets Media in Global Influence
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144. Andrew McCormick, “ ‘Even If You Don’t Think You Have a Relationship with
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145. Reporters Without Borders, “China’s Pursuit of a New World Media Order,”
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146. Liza Agoot, “More than 60 Journos Join China’s Exchange Program,” Philip-
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Analyst Liberia, “2022 CIPCC Program Opens in Beijing - China Hosts 73 Journalists
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147. Joshua Kurlantzick, “Books: How Beijing Targets Media in Global Influence
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148. Analyst Liberia, “2022 CIPCC Program Opens in Beijing - China Hosts 73
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149. Liza Agoot, “More than 60 Journos Join China’s Exchange Program,” Philip-
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150. Sarah Cook, “Beijing’s Global Megaphone,” Freedom House, 2020, 16; Report-
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151. Sarah Cook, “Beijing’s Global Megaphone,” Freedom House, 2020, 16–17; Lou-
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152. Sarah Cook, oral testimony before the U.S.-China Economic and Security Re-
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153. Sarah Cook, “Beijing’s Global Megaphone,” Freedom House, 2020, 16.
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155. Reporters Without Borders, “China’s Pursuit of a New World Media Order,”
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156. Kathrin Hille, “Taiwan Primaries Highlight Fears over China’s Political Influ-
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157. Sarah Cook et al., “Beijing’s Global Media Influence: Authoritarian Expan-
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158. Sarah Cook et al., “Beijing’s Global Media Influence: Authoritarian Expansion
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159. Seth Kaplan, “China’s Censorship Reaches Globally through WeChat,” Foreign
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160. Seth Kaplan, “China’s Censorship Reaches Globally through WeChat,” Foreign
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161. Alex Hern, “Revealed: How TikTok Censors Videos That Do Not Please Bei-
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162. Sarah Cook et al., “Beijing’s Global Media Influence: Authoritarian Expansion
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163. Threat Analysis China, “1 Key for 1 Lock: The Chinese Communist Party’s
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 272
forms,” Freedom House, 2022; Marcel Schliebs et al., “China’s Public Diplomacy Oper-
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164. Sarah Cook, “Harnessing Social Media Amplification and Deception on Pop-
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Diplomacy Operations Understanding Engagement and Inauthentic Amplification of
PRC Diplomats on Facebook and Twitter,” Oxford Internet Institute, May 11, 2021, 5;
Scott Neuman, “YouTube Channels Suspended for ‘Coordinated’ Influence Campaign
against Hong Kong,” National Public Radio, August 23, 2019; Jeff Kao, “How China
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165. Threat Analysis China, “1 Key for 1 Lock: The Chinese Communist Party’s
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166. Sarah Cook et al., “Beijing’s Global Media Influence: Authoritarian Expansion
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Seitz, Eric Tucker, and Mike Catalini, “How China’s TikTok, Facebook Influencers Push
Propaganda,” Associated Press, March 30, 2022; Paul Mozur et al., “How Beijing Influ-
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167. Lili Turner and Nirit Hinkis, “Chinese State Media’s Global Influencer Oper-
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168. David E. Sanger and Steven Lee Myers, “China Sows Disinformation about
Hawaii Fires Using New Techniques,” New York Times, September 11, 2023; Insikt
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169. Insikt Group, “Converging Narratives on Wildfires Advance Different Influ-
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170. China Xinhua News (@XHNews), “The U.S. boasts the world’s richest medical
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171. Paul Mozur et al., “How Beijing Influences the Influencers,” New York Times,
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172. Kerry Allen and Sophie Williams, “The Foreigners in China’s Disinformation
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173. Zak Butler and Jonas Taege, “Over 50,000 Instances of DRAGONBRIDGE
Activity Disrupted in 2022,” Google’s Threat Analysis Group, January 26, 2023; Ni-
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Firm Says,” CBS News, October 26, 2022; Mandiant, “Pro-PRC DRAGONBRIDGE
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174. Sarah Cook et al., “Beijing’s Global Media Influence: Authoritarian Expansion
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178. Sarah Cook et al., “Beijing’s Global Media Influence: Authoritarian Expan-
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179. Lin Chia-nan, “China’s ‘Arab Times’ Bullying Condemned,” Taipei Times, Au-
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180. Arab Times, “There Is Only One China in the World and Taiwan Is an Inalien-
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181. Suisheng Zhao, The Dragon Roars Back: Transformational Leaders and
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182. International Federation of Journalists, “Sweden: Chinese Embassy Threatens
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183. NL Times, “Dutch Journalist Who Writes Critically on China Targeted in “Bi-
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184. NL Times, “Dutch Journalist Who Writes Critically on China Targeted in ‘Bi-
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185. Sarah Cook, oral testimony before the U.S.-China Economic and Security Re-
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March 23, 2023, 117.
186. Sarah Cook, oral testimony before the U.S.-China Economic and Security Re-
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March 23, 2023, 117.
187. Caitlin Dearing Scott, oral testimony for the U.S.-China Economic and Secu-
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and Security Review Commission, Hearing on China’s Global Influence and Inter-
ference Activities, March 23, 2023, 190–191; Peter Mattis, written testimony for the
U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, Hearing on China’s Global
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188. Caitlin Dearing Scott, oral testimony for the U.S.-China Economic and Secu-
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189. Caitlin Dearing Scott, oral testimony for the U.S.-China Economic and Secu-
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190. Caitlin Dearing Scott, oral testimony for the U.S.-China Economic and Secu-
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Chinese Strategy to Influence Canada’s 2021 Election,” Globe and Mail, February 17,
2023; Sam Cooper, “Canadian Intelligence Warned PM Trudeau That China Covertly
Funded 2019 Election Candidates: Sources,” Global News, November 7, 2022; Rod Mc-
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191. Joshua Kurlantzick, “Chinese Interference Is Dangerous—But Also Often In-
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192. Andrew Chubb, oral testimony for the U.S.-China Economic and Security Re-
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nomic and Security Review Commission, Hearing on China’s Global Influence and
Interference Activities, March 23, 2023, 39; Nadine Yousif, “What to Know about Can-
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193. National Intelligence Council, “Foreign Threats to the 2020 US Federal Elec-
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194. Naomi Nix, Jeremy B. Merill, and Joseph Menn, “MAGA Porn, Hate for
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Aggressively Target U.S. Interests, Including Midterm Elections,” October 26, 2022;
Dustin Volz, “China-Linked Internet Trolls Try Fueling Divisions in U.S. Midterms,
Researchers Say,” Wall Street Journal, October 26, 2022; Insikt Group, “Malign In-
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Steven Lee Myers, “Meta Removes Chinese Effort to Influence U.S. Elections,” New
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195. Mandiant, “Pro-PRC DRAGONBRIDGE Influence Campaign Leverages New
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196. Naomi Nix, Jeremy B. Merill, and Joseph Menn, “MAGA Porn, Hate for
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197. Steven Lee Myers, “Meta Removes Chinese Effort to Influence U.S. Elections,”
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198. Dustin Volz, “China-Linked Internet Trolls Try Fueling Divisions in U.S. Mid-
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199. U.S. Department of Justice, Five Individuals Charged Variously with Stalking,
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200. Jimmy Quinn, “Main Justice v. the CCP,” National Review, December 19, 2022.
201. U.S. Department of Justice, Five Individuals Charged Variously with Stalking,
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202. Jimmy Quinn, “Main Justice v. the CCP,” National Review, December 19, 2022;
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203. Nadine Yousef, “What to Know about Canada and China’s Foreign Interfer-
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Accused in Chinese Interference Probe: Sources,” Global News, February 25, 2023;
Robert Fife and Steven Chase, “CSIS Documents Reveal Chinese Strategy to Influ-
ence Canada’s 2021 Election,” Globe and Mail, February 17, 2023; Sam Cooper, “Ca-
nadian Intelligence Warned PM Trudeau That China Covertly Funded 2019 Election
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204. Robert Fife and Steven Chase, “CSIS Documents Reveal Chinese Strategy to
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“Canadian Intelligence Warned PM Trudeau That China Covertly Funded 2019 Elec-
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205. Robert Fife and Steven Chase, “CSIS Documents Reveal Chinese Strategy to
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206. Nadine Yousef, “Canada Inquiry into China Election Meddling Claims Ruled
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207. Reuters, “Australia Thwarts Chinese Plot to Fund Election Candidates—Me-
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208. Anthony Galloway, “Chinese Spies Attempted to Install Labor Candidates in
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209. Anthony Galloway, “Chinese Spies Attempted to Install Labor Candidates in
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210. Australian Security Intelligence Organization, Director-General’s Annual
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211. Andrew Chubb, written testimony for the U.S.-China Economic and Security
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March 23, 2023, 1.
212. Andrew Chubb, written testimony for the U.S.-China Economic and Security
Review Commission, Hearing on China’s Global Influence and Interference Activities,
March 23, 2023, 1.
213. U.S. Department of Justice, 40 Officers of China’s National Police Charged in
Transnational Repression Schemes Targeting U.S. Residents, April 17, 2023; Andrew
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214. U.S. Department of Justice, Illegal Agents of the PRC Government Charged for
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215. U.S. Department of Justice, UNITED STATES OF AMERICA - v. - JOHN
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ment of Justice, Illegal Agents of the PRC Government Charged for the PRC-Directed
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216. U.S. Department of Justice, Illegal Agents of the PRC Government Charged for
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 275
217. U.S. Department of Justice, Illegal Agents of the PRC Government Charged for
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218. U.S. Department of Justice, Five Individuals Charged Variously with Stalking,
Harassing and Spying on U.S. Residents on Behalf of the PRC Secret Police, March 16,
2023; U.S. Department of Justice, UNITED STATES OF AMERICA—against—FAN
‘FRANK’ LIU, MATTHEW ZIBURIS, and QIANG ‘JASON’ SUN, March 16, 2023.
219. U.S. Department of Justice, Five Individuals Charged Variously with Stalking,
Harassing and Spying on U.S. Residents on Behalf of the PRC Secret Police, March
16, 2023.
220. U.S. Department of Justice, Five Individuals Charged Variously with Stalking,
Harassing and Spying on U.S. Residents on Behalf of the PRC Secret Police, March
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221. U.S. Department of Justice, Five Individuals Charged Variously with Stalking,
Harassing and Spying on U.S. Residents on Behalf of the PRC Secret Police, March
16, 2023.
222. Reuters, “U.S. Charges One American, Four Chinese Officials with Spying,”
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Secret Police, March 16, 2023.
223. U.S. Department of Justice, Five Individuals Charged Variously with Stalking,
Harassing and Spying on U.S. Residents on Behalf of the PRC Secret Police, March
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224. U.S. Department of Justice, Five Individuals Charged Variously with Stalking,
Harassing and Spying on U.S. Residents on Behalf of the PRC Secret Police, March
16, 2023; Ellen Nakashima, “Indictment Describes Alleged Chinese Spying on Dissi-
dents,” Washington Post, May 18, 2022.
225. U.S. Department of Justice, Five Individuals Charged Variously with Stalking,
Harassing and Spying on U.S. Residents on Behalf of the PRC Secret Police, March
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226. Carl Duggan, “Canadian Lawmaker Speaks Out on Being Targeted by China,”
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227. Carl Duggan, “Canadian Lawmaker Speaks Out on Being Targeted by China,”
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228. Steven Chase and Robert Fife, “Trudeau Asks for Probe into CSIS Report
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229. Nick Perry, “Micronesia’s President Accuses China of ‘Political Warfare,’ ” Asso-
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230. Cleo Paskal, “Micronesia’s President Writes Bombshell Letter on China’s ‘Po-
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231. Cleo Paskal, “Micronesia’s President Writes Bombshell Letter on China’s ‘Po-
litical Warfare,’ ” Diplomat, March 10, 2023.
232. Peter Mattis, written testimony for the U.S.-China Economic and Security
Review Commission, Hearing on China’s Global Influence and Interference Activities,
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233. Peter Mattis, written testimony for the U.S.-China Economic and Security
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March 23, 2023, 6.
234. Peter Mattis, written testimony for the U.S.-China Economic and Security
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235. Robert Fife and Steven Chase, “CSIS Uncovered Chinese Plan to Donate to
Pierre Elliott Trudeau Foundation,” Globe and Mail, March 2, 2023.
236. Robert Fife and Steven Chase, “CSIS Uncovered Chinese Plan to Donate to
Pierre Elliott Trudeau Foundation,” Globe and Mail, March 2, 2023.
237. James Griffiths, “Meet the Chinese Billionaire Who Donated to the Trudeau
Foundation,” Globe and Mail, April 18, 2023; Robert Fife and Steven Chase, “CSIS
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238. Robert Fife and Steven Chase, “CSIS Uncovered Chinese Plan to Donate to
Pierre Elliott Trudeau Foundation,” Globe and Mail, March 2, 2023.
239. Laura Hughes and Helen Warrell, “MI5 Warns UK MPs against ‘Political
Interference’ by Chinese Agent,” Financial Times, January 14, 2022; Dan Sabbagh,
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 276
ian, January 13, 2022; Rohit Kachroo, “MI5 Warn MPs of Active Chinese Government
‘Agent’ in UK Parliament,” ITV News, January 13, 2022.
240. Rohit Kachroo, “MI5 Warn MPs of Active Chinese Government ‘Agent’ in UK
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241. Rohit Kachroo, “MI5 Warn MPs of Active Chinese Government ‘Agent’ in UK
Parliament,” ITV News, January 13, 2022.
242. Dan Sabbagh, “MI5 Accuses Lawyer of Trying to Influence Politicians on Be-
half of China,” Guardian, January 13, 2022.
243. Alex Joske, “The Party Speaks for You: Foreign Interference and the Chinese
Communist Party’s United Front System,” Australian Strategic Policy Institute, 2020, 26.
244. Caitlin Dearing Scott, written testimony for the U.S.-China Economic and
Security Review Commission, Hearing on China’s Global Influence and Interference
Activities, March 23, 2023, 3–5; Emily de La Bruyère, written testimony for the
U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, Hearing on China’s Global
Influence and Interference Activities, March 23, 2023, 2–3.
245. International Republican Institute, “A World Safe for the Party China’s Au-
thoritarian Influence and the Democratic Response: Country Case Studies from Ne-
pal, Kenya, Montenegro, Panama, Georgia and Greece,” 2021.
246. Caitlin Dearing Scott, written testimony for the U.S.-China Economic and Se-
curity Review Commission, Hearing on China’s Global Influence and Interference Ac-
tivities, March 23, 2023, 4–5; International Republican Institute, “A World Safe for the
Party China’s Authoritarian Influence and the Democratic Response: Country Case
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247. Jacob J. Lew et al., “China’s Belt and Road, Implications for the United States,”
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248. Caitlin Dearing Scott, written testimony for the U.S.-China Economic and
Security Review Commission, Hearing on China’s Global Influence and Interference
Activities, March 23, 2023, 3.
249. Cuenca Dispatch, “Sinohydro Used Five-Country Network to Transfer $76
Million in Bribes to Group That Included Moreno,” March 6, 2023; Reuters, “Ecua-
dor’s Ex-President Lenin Moreno Facing Charges over Chinese Dam Contract,” South
China Morning Post, March 6, 2023.
250. Nicholas Casey and Clifford Kraus, “It Doesn’t Matter If Ecuador Can Afford
This Dam. China Still Gets Paid,” New York Times, December 24, 2018; Mauro Eche-
verria, “The Smell of Chinese Funding in Ecuador’s Institutions,” Impunity Observer,
January 30, 2023.
251. Nestor Aguilera, “Controversy in Ecuador’s Largest China-Built Infrastruc-
ture Project,” Voice of America, February 28, 2023; Nicholas Casey and Clifford Kraus,
“It Doesn’t Matter If Ecuador Can Afford This Dam. China Still Gets Paid.” New
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252. Reuters, “Ecuador’s Ex-President Lenin Moreno Facing Charges over Chinese
Dam Contract,” South China Morning Post, March 6, 2023; teleSUR, “Ecuador: Pros-
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253. Nicholas Casey and Clifford Kraus, “It Doesn’t Matter If Ecuador Can Afford
This Dam. China Still Gets Paid.” New York Times, December 24, 2018.
254. U.S. Department of Justice, Former Head of Organization Backed by Chinese
Energy Conglomerate Sentenced to Three Years in Prison for International Bribery
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255. U.S. Department of Justice, Former Head of Organization Backed by Chinese
Energy Conglomerate Sentenced to Three Years in Prison for International Bribery
and Money Laundering Offenses, March 25, 2019.
256. U.S. Department of Justice, Former Head of Organization Backed by Chinese
Energy Conglomerate Sentenced to Three Years in Prison for International Bribery
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257. Roland Jacquard, “Nepal: The Sulfurous Chinese Connections of Prime Minis-
ter KP Sharma Oli,” Global Watch Analysis, July 12, 2020.
258. Roland Jacquard, “Nepal: The Sulfurous Chinese Connections of Prime Minis-
ter KP Sharma Oli,” Global Watch Analysis, July 12, 2020.
259. International Republican Institute, “A World Safe for the Party China’s Au-
thoritarian Influence and the Democratic Response: Country Case Studies from Ne-
pal, Kenya, Montenegro, Panama, Georgia and Greece,” 2021, 11; Anil Giri, “Experts
Warn of Security Risk as Chinese Firm Is Chosen to Equip PM’s Office,” Kathmandu
Post, January 1, 2019.
260. Marcus Andreopoulos, “Is Nepal under China’s Thumb?” Foreign Policy, No-
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 277
261. Emily de La Bruyère, written testimony for the U.S.-China Economic and
Security Review Commission, Hearing on China’s Global Influence and Interference
Activities, March 23, 2023, 2.
262. Emily de La Bruyère, written testimony for the U.S.-China Economic and
Security Review Commission, Hearing on China’s Global Influence and Interference
Activities, March 23, 2023, 8–9.
263. Emily de La Bruyère, written testimony for the U.S.-China Economic and
Security Review Commission, Hearing on China’s Global Influence and Interference
Activities, March 23, 2023.
264. Emily de La Bruyère, written testimony for the U.S.-China Economic and
Security Review Commission, Hearing on China’s Global Influence and Interference
Activities, March 23, 2023; Caitlin Dearing Scott, written testimony for the U.S.-Chi-
na Economic and Security Review Commission, Hearing on China’s Global Influence
and Interference Activities, March 23, 2023.
265. Emily de La Bruyère, written testimony for the U.S.-China Economic and Se-
curity Review Commission, Hearing on China’s Global Influence and Interference Ac-
tivities, March 23, 2023, 9; Caitlin Dearing Scott, written testimony for the U.S.-Chi-
na Economic and Security Review Commission, Hearing on China’s Global Influence
and Interference Activities, March 23, 2023, 9.
266. China-Brazil Business Council, “Who We Are” (Quem Somos), 2023. Trans-
lation; Caitlin Dearing Scott, written testimony for the U.S.-China Economic and
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267. China-Brazil Business Council, “Who We Are” (Quem Somos), 2023. Transla-
tion; Central Intelligence Agency, The United Front in Communist China, May 1957
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States via United Front Entities,” Jamestown Foundation, June 26, 2019.
268. Xinhua, “Major Social Groups” (主要社会团体), 2013. Translation; China Daily,
“China Council for International Investment Promotion,” May 8, 2021.
269. Caitlin Dearing Scott, written testimony for the U.S.-China Economic and Secu-
rity Review Commission, Hearing on China’s Global Influence and Interference Activities,
March 23, 2023, 10; International Republican Institute, “Coercion, Capture, and Censor-
ship: Case Studies on the CCP’s Quest for Global Influence,” September 28, 2022, 15.
270. U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, Chapter 2, Section 2,
“Challenging China’s Trade Practices,” in 2022 Annual Report to Congress, November
2022, 180–183; Tatiana Rosito, “Foundations for Brazil’s Long-Term Strategy toward
China,” China-Brazil Business Council, October 2020, 31, 62, 115.
271. Tatiana Rosito, “Foundations for Brazil’s Long-Term Strategy toward China,”
China-Brazil Business Council, October 2020, 31, 62, 115.
272. Tatiana Rosito, “Foundations for Brazil’s Long-Term Strategy toward China,”
China-Brazil Business Council, October 2020, 27–51.
273. Chinese Academy of Agricultural Sciences, “CAAS President Wu Kongming Ad-
dresses 1st Brazil-China Forum on Biotechnology, Agriculture, and Sustainability,” Minis-
try of Agriculture and Rural Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, December 1, 2021.
274. United States Heartland China Association, “About USHCA” 2022; China-Bra-
zil Business Council, “Brazil-China Forum on Biotechnology, Agriculture and Sustain-
ability,” November 22, 2021.
275. Emily de La Bruyère, written testimony for the U.S.-China Economic and
Security Review Commission, Hearing on China’s Global Influence and Interference
Activities, March 23, 2023, 9–10; Liu Yue, “Vice President Lu Yanli Attended the
‘Restarting US-China Education Exchange’ Seminar and Delivered a Speech” (卢
艳丽副校长出席“重启美中教育交流”研讨会并发言), Sichuan University, August 22,
2022. Translation; People’s Daily, “The 2022 Sino-US Agricultural Roundtable Forum
Opens” (2022年中美农业圆桌论坛开幕), March 24, 2022. Translation; Global Times,
“China, US Explore Agricultural Trade at Online Roundtable,” March 25, 2021; John
Dotson, “The China-U.S. Exchange Foundation and United Front ‘Lobbying Launder-
ing’ in American Politics,” Jamestown Foundation, September 16, 2020; China-United
States Exchange Foundation, “The Inaugural U.S. Heartland Mayor Delegation Trip
to China: 2019—2019.”
276. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, Keynote Speech
by Chinese Ambassador to the US Qin Gang at the China General Chamber of Com-
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277. Cheng Li and Xiyue Zhao, “America’s Governors and Mayors Have a Stake in
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278. Emily de La Bruyère and Nathan Picarsic, “All Over the Map,” Foundation for
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 278
279. National Counterintelligence and Security Center, Safeguarding Our Fu-
ture: Protecting Government and Business Leaders at the U.S. State and Local Level
from People’s Republic of China (PRC) Influence Operations, July 2022; Embassy of
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280. Joe McDonald and Youkyung Lee, “China Says US Companies Should Lobby
Washington over Trade,” Columbus Dispatch, July 12, 2018.
281. National Counterintelligence and Security Center, Safeguarding Our Fu-
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from People’s Republic of China (PRC) Influence Operations, July 2022; Embassy of
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Tiankai at the Fifth China-US Governors Forum, May 24, 2019.
282. Glenn Tiffert, written testimony before the U.S.-China Economic and Security
Review Commission, Hearing on China’s Global Influence and Interference Activities,
March 23, 2023, 1–4.
283. Glenn Tiffert, written testimony before the U.S.-China Economic and Security
Review Commission, Hearing on China’s Global Influence and Interference Activities,
March 23, 2023, 1; Glenn Tiffert, oral testimony before the U.S.-China Economic and
Security Review Commission, Hearing on China’s Global Influence and Interference
Activities, March 23, 2023, 130.
284. Wenhao Ma and Mo Yu, “Chinese Students in DC Establish Safe Space for Dis-
sent to Counter Beijing,” Voice of America, May 8, 2023; Sebastien Rotella, “Even on U.S.
Campuses, China Cracks Down on Students Who Speak Out,” Pro Publica, November
30, 2021; Anastasya Lloyd-Damnjanovic, “A Preliminary Study of PRC Political Influence
and Interference Activities in American Higher Education,” Wilson Center, 2018, 1–2.
285. Human Rights Watch, “China: Government Threats to Academic Freedom Abroad:
New 12-Point Code of Conduct to Help Educational Institutions Respond,” March 21,
2019; Anastasya Lloyd-Damnjanovic, “A Preliminary Study of PRC Political Influence
and Interference Activities in American Higher Education,” Wilson Center, 2018, 51–57,
99–105; Bethany Allen-Ebrahimian, “The Chinese Communist Party Is Setting Up Cells
at Universities across America,” Foreign Policy, April 18, 2018; John Garnaut, “Chinese
Spies at Sydney University,” Sydney Morning Herald, April 21, 2014.
286. Glenn Tiffert, written testimony before the U.S.-China Economic and Security
Review Commission, Hearing on China’s Global Influence and Interference Activities,
March 23, 2023, 3–4; Anastasya Lloyd-Damnjanovic, “A Preliminary Study of PRC
Political Influence and Interference Activities in American Higher Education,” Wilson
Center, 2018, 23–26.
287. Anastasya Lloyd-Damnjanovic, “A Preliminary Study of PRC Political Influ-
ence and Interference Activities in American Higher Education,” Wilson Center, 2018,
1–2, 107–112.
288. Glenn Tiffert, written testimony before the U.S.-China Economic and Security
Review Commission, Hearing on China’s Global Influence and Interference Activities,
March 23, 2023, 3.
289. John Metz and Rory O’Connor, statement for the record submitted to the
U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, Hearing on China’s Glob-
al Influence and Interference Activities, March 23, 2023, 3; Anastasya Lloyd-Damn-
janovic, “A Preliminary Study of PRC Political Influence and Interference Activities
in American Higher Education,” Wilson Center, 2018, 85–90.
290. Abby Kennedy and Zach Blackburn, “Removal of Posters Criticizing Chinese
Government Gains National Attention,” GW Hatchet, February 10, 2022; Bethany
Allen-Ebrahimian, “U.S. University Reverses Decision to Remove Olympic Protest
Posters,” Axios, February 7, 2022; Josh Rogin, “Another University Learns the Hard
Way about Chinese Censorship on Campus,” Washington Post, February 9, 2022.
291. Abby Kennedy and Zach Blackburn, “Removal of Posters Criticizing Chinese
Government Gains National Attention,” GW Hatchet, February 10, 2022; Bethany
Allen-Ebrahimian, “U.S. University Reverses Decision to Remove Olympic Protest
Posters,” Axios, February 7, 2022; Josh Rogin, “Another University Learns the Hard
Way about Chinese Censorship on Campus,” Washington Post, February 9, 2022; Ba-
diucao (@Badiucao), “@GWtweets George Washington University Chinese Students
and Scholars Association (GWUCSSA) is launching a witch-hunt to the student ac-
tivists putting my boycott #beijing2022 posters in campus. A classic smear campaign
to cancel criticism against CCP via calling it ‘racism,’ ” X, formerly known as Twitter,
February 4, 2022, 10:44 p.m.
292. Mark S. Wrighton, “Message Regarding Posters Displayed on Campus,” George
Washington University, February 8, 2020.
293. Human Rights Watch, “ ‘They Don’t Understand the Fear We Have’: How Chi-
na’s Long Reach of Repression Undermines Academic Freedom at Australia’s Univer-
 279
sities,” June 30, 2021, 2–3; Daniel Hurst, “ ‘They’re Being Watched’: Chinese Pro-De-
mocracy Students in Australia Face Threats and Insults,” Guardian, June 29, 2021.
294. Victoria Morrongiello, “Panel on Uyghurs in Xinjiang, China Zoombombed,”
Brandeis Hoot, November 20, 2020; Sarah McLaughlin, “Brandeis Panel on Uyghur
Muslims Faces Calls for Cancellation, Zoombombing,” FIRE, November 4, 2020.
295. Victoria Morrongiello, “Panel on Uyghurs in Xinjiang, China Zoombombed,”
Brandeis Hoot, November 20, 2020; Sarah McLaughlin, “Brandeis Panel on Uyghur
Muslims Faces Calls for Cancellation, Zoombombing,” FIRE, November 4, 2020.
296. Glenn Tiffert, written testimony before the U.S.-China Economic and Security
Review Commission, Hearing on China’s Global Influence and Interference Activities,
March 23, 2023, 2–3.
297. Glenn Tiffert, written testimony before the U.S.-China Economic and Security
Review Commission, Hearing on China’s Global Influence and Interference Activities,
March 23, 2023, 3.
298. Glenn Tiffert, written testimony before the U.S.-China Economic and Security
Review Commission, Hearing on China’s Global Influence and Interference Activities,
March 23, 2023, 2–3.
299. Glenn Tiffert, written testimony before the U.S.-China Economic and Security
Review Commission, Hearing on China’s Global Influence and Interference Activities,
March 23, 2023, 3.
300. Glenn Tiffert, written testimony before the U.S.-China Economic and Security
Review Commission, Hearing on China’s Global Influence and Interference Activities,
March 23, 2023, 3.
301. Jessie Yeung, “China’s Sitting on a Goldmine of Genetic Data—and It Doesn’t
Want to Share,” CNN, August 12, 2023.
302. Anna Puglisi, oral testimony before the U.S.-China Economic and Security
Review Commission, Hearing on China’s Challenges and Capabilities in Educating
and Training the Next Generation Workforce, February 24, 2023, 131.
303. Anna Puglisi, oral testimony before the U.S.-China Economic and Security
Review Commission, Hearing on China’s Challenges and Capabilities in Educating
and Training the Next Generation Workforce, February 24, 2023. 131.
304. Ruby MacDougall, “Reflecting on Restricted Access to a Chinese Research
Lifeline,” Ithaka S+R, April 25, 2023; Pak Yiu, “China Slashing Foreign Subscriber
Access to Key Research Database,” Nikkei Asia, March 23, 2023.
305. Yojana Sharma, “Database Shuts Out Foreign Researchers in ‘Security’ Move,”
University World News, March 30, 2023; Pak Yiu, “China Slashing Foreign Subscriber
Access to Key Research Database,” Nikkei Asia, March 23, 2023.
306. Yojana Sharma, “Database Shuts Out Foreign Researchers in ‘Security’ Move,”
University World News, March 30, 2023.
307. Emily Feng, “China Tightens Restrictions and Bars Scholars from Interna-
tional Conferences,” National Public Radio, March 30, 2022.
308. Safeguard Defenders, “China’s Missing Verdicts: The Demise of CJO and Chi-
na’s Judicial Transparency,” June 21, 2022; Luo Jiajun and Thomas Kellog, “Verdicts
from China’s Courts Used to Be Accessible Online. Now They’re Disappearing,” Chi-
naFile, February 1, 2022.
309. Elizabeth Redden, “Censorship in a China Studies Journal,” Inside Higher
Ed, April 18, 2019; Jacob Edmonds, “Three New Essays on the Chinese Script and
a New Twist to the Old Problem of Censorship in Chinese Studies,” MCLC Resource
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310. Glenn Tiffert, oral testimony before the U.S.-China Economic and Security
Review Commission, Hearing on China’s Global Influence and Interference Activities,
March 23, 2023, 2–3.
311. Christian Schneider, “Nearly $170M in Contracts and Gifts Flowed to U.S.
Universities from China in 2021,” College Fix, April 26, 2022; Freddie Hayward, “How
the Chinese Government Is Buying Its Way into UK Universities,” New Statesman,
July 13, 2021; Daniel Flatley, David McLaughlin, and Janet Lorin, “College Foreign
Cash at Risk as Senate Targets China’s Clout,” Bloomberg, April 20, 2021.
312. Yuichiro Kakutani, “Berkeley’s $220M Mistake Exposed in Massive Deal with
China,” Daily Beast, May 26, 2023; Dan Currell, statement for the record before the
U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, Hearing on China’s Global
Influence and Interference Activities, March 23, 2023, 4, 8.
313. Rachelle Peterson, “We Can’t Let Foreign Influence Compromise Our Uni-
versities,” National Review, September 7, 2021; U.S. Department of Education, Insti-
tutional Compliance with Section 117 of the Higher Education Act of 1965, October
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314. U.S. Department of Education, Section-117 Public Records Complete October
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 280
315. Ana Swanson, “House Committee Targets U.C. Berkeley Program for China
Ties,” New York Times, July 17, 2023; Yuichiro Kakutani, “Berkeley’s $220M Mistake
Exposed in Massive Deal with China,” Daily Beast, May 26, 2023.
316. Yuichiro Kakutani, “Berkeley’s $220M Mistake Exposed in Massive Deal with
China,” Daily Beast, May 26, 2023.
317. University of California, Berkeley, “International Collaboration, Research In-
tegrity, & Foreign Influence,” 2023; Yuichiro Kakutani, “Berkeley’s $220M Mistake
Exposed in Massive Deal with China,” Daily Beast, May 26, 2023.
318. Yuichiro Kakutani, “Berkeley’s $220M Mistake Exposed in Massive Deal with
China,” Daily Beast, May 26, 2023.
319. Freddie Hayward, “How the Chinese Government Is Buying Its Way into UK
Universities,” New Statesman, July 13, 2021.
320. Freddie Hayward, “How the Chinese Government Is Buying Its Way into UK
Universities,” New Statesman, July 13, 2021; Simon Montlake and Peter Foster, “Is China
Buying Influence at Cambridge University?” Sydney Morning Herald, June 12, 2014.
321. Freddie Hayward, “How the Chinese Government Is Buying Its Way into UK
Universities,” New Statesman, July 13, 2021.
322. Jon Henley, “Dutch University Gives Up Chinese Funding Due to Impartiality
Concerns,” Guardian, January 25, 2022; Sophie Richardson, “Dutch University Hit
by Chinese Government Funding Scandal,” Human Rights Watch, January 20, 2022.
323. Jon Henley, “Dutch University Gives Up Chinese Funding Due to Impartiality
Concerns,” Guardian, January 25, 2022.
324. Jon Henley, “Dutch University Gives Up Chinese Funding Due to Impartiality
Concerns,” Guardian, January 25, 2022.
325. Yojana Sharma, “German University Ends Ties with China Scholarship
Scheme,” University World News, July 20, 2023.
326. Yojana Sharma, “German University Ends Ties with China Scholarship
Scheme,” University World News, July 20, 2023; Anastasya Lloyd-Damnjanovic and
Alexander Bowe, “Overseas Chinese Students and Scholars in China’s Drive for Inno-
vation,” U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, October 7, 2020, 12.
327. Yojana Sharma, “German University Ends Ties with China Scholarship
Scheme,” University World News, July 20, 2023.
328. Andrew Chubb, written testimony for U.S.-China Economic and Security Re-
view Commission, Hearing on China’s Global Influence and Interference Activities,
March 23, 2023, 1.
329. Andrew Chubb, written testimony for U.S.-China Economic and Security Review
Commission, Hearing on China’s Global Influence and Interference Activities, March 23,
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330. Andrew Chubb, written testimony for U.S.-China Economic and Security Review
Commission, Hearing on China’s Global Influence and Interference Activities, March 23,
2023, 1, 5.
331. Economist, “China Is Flooding Taiwan with Disinformation,” September 26,
2023; Bethany Allen-Ebrahimian, “How China Trolls Flooded Twitter,” Foreign Policy,
July 30, 2023.
332. Robert Fife and Steven Chase, “CSIS Uncovered Chinese Plan to Donate to
Pierre Elliott Trudeau Foundation,” Globe and Mail, March 2, 2023.
333. Alex Joske, written testimony for U.S.-China Economic and Security Review
Commission, Hearing on China’s Global Influence and Interference Activities, March
23, 2023, 6.
334. Andrew Chubb, written testimony for U.S.-China Economic and Security Re-
view Commission, Hearing on China’s Global Influence and Interference Activities,
March 23, 2023, 2.
335. Andrew Chubb, written testimony for U.S.-China Economic and Security Re-
view Commission, Hearing on China’s Global Influence and Interference Activities,
March 23, 2023, 4; Nate Raymond, “U.S. Drops Criminal Case against MIT Professor
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