Operational Risk Management - Chapter 2 - Operational Risk - Identification and Assessment
Operational Risk Management - Chapter 2 - Operational Risk - Identification and Assessment
‣ Identifying the operational risk profile and the use of a structured approach
‣ Operational risk management starts with identifying the opportunities for failure
‣ Residual risks are risks that remain once a control has been implemented.
‣ Secondary risks are a direct result of implementing a control to mitigate the risk.
‣ A bank should identify the true underlying risks within a business, the inherent risks.
‣ Unless the inherent risk is identified a bank can not understand the effectiveness of
its controls.
‣ There are two main approaches to building an enterprise-wide operational risk profile:
• Top-down: first establish a general enterprise-level risk assessment and then refine it by assessing the key
processes identified during the first stage
• Bottom-up: assess all processes within each business unit and combine the information produced to
generate an enterprise-wide risk profile
‣ A risk register or risk log is a repository of all risks identified within the bank
‣ It is used throughout the risk management process
‣ It provides a dynamic tool update on an on-going basis
‣ Assessment involves rating the risk and the control using some system of scoring.
Which should identify:
• Likelihood: frequency of occurrence if no controls
• Impact: potential financial losses, regulatory sanctions, impact on shareholder value, and impact on the
bank’s reputation
• Risk Score: the product of likelihood and impact
• Current Exposure Level: the quality of the current controls and mitigation
‣ Basel II
• … a bank’s firm-wide risk assessment methodology must capture key business environment and internal
control factors that can change its operational risk profile. These factors will make a bank’s risk
assessments more forward-looking, more directly reflect the quality of the bank’s control and operating
environments, help align capital assessments with risk management objectives, and recognize both
improvements and deterioration in operational risk profiles in a more immediate fashion.
‣ Control assessments
• Tests a control’s effectiveness against set criteria
• Issues a pass/fail or level of effectiveness score
• Done to the department by a third party
• Audit, Compliance or the Sarbanes-Oxley team
‣ Disadvantages
• If a firm does not have standard branches or repeated processes then a standard RCSA might be more frustrating
than useful
• The outcome of this subjective process is dependent on the individual managing the process
• The design might be missing a key risk or control, and participants might not have an opportunity, or may be reluctant, to
raise new items
• The “check all” mentality, where the participants simply check the boxes that are likely to result in the least follow up
work, or that express an average score or the middle ground.
• Supporting training and facilitation needs can be sizable
‣ JP Morgan Chase describes its risk assessment approach in its annual report as follows:
• Risk identification and measurement
• “Risk identification is the recognition of the operational risk events that management believes may give rise to
operational losses. All businesses utilize the Firm’s standard self-assessment process and supporting architecture as a
dynamic risk management tool. The goal of the self-assessment process is for each business to identify the key
operational risks specific to its environment and assess the degree to which it maintains appropriate controls. Action
plans are developed for control issues identified, and businesses are held accountable for tracking and resolving these
issues on a timely basis.”
H M H H
Design
M L M H
L L L M
L M H
Performance
Financial Less than USD 100,000 Between USD 100,000 and USD 1 million Over USD 1 million
Length of Time
Greater than 5 years Between 1 and 5 years Less than 1 year
Between Events
H M H H
Impact
M L M H
L L L M
L M H
Frequency
‣ After the 1998 acquisition by Norwest Bancorporation, the Norwest CEO, Richard Kovacevich, became the CEO
of Wells Fargo, where he continued the strategy of organic growth through cross selling of retail financial
products. In the first decade of the 2000s Wells avoided moving into securities trading and when the 2008
crisis happened, the bank was left comparatively unscathed.
‣ During the 2008 crisis, Wells Fargo acquired Wachovia Corporation for USD 14.8 billion, about 7 times more
than a rival offer from Citigroup. This acquisition made Wells Fargo the third largest bank in the United States,
a position it has enjoyed since.
‣ The CEO of Wells made way for his successor, John Stumpf, in 2007 and retired as Chairman at the end of
2009. The new CEO continued the cross selling strategy of his predecessor, but changed the incentive
structure for retail branch managers, as well as the style of sales target reporting, where public humiliation
awaited branch staff that failed to open a satisfactory number of new accounts.
‣ The fine came as a result of an investigation and subsequent consent order no. 2016-CFPB-0015 finding that
Wells Fargo Bank engaged in the following activities during the period from January 1, 2011 to September 4,
2016:
• Opened unauthorized deposit accounts for existing customers and transferred funds to those accounts from their owners’
other accounts, all without their customers’ knowledge or consent
• Submitted applications for credit cards in consumers’ names using consumers’ information without their knowledge or
consent
• Enrolled consumers in online banking services that they did not request
• Ordered and activated debit cards using consumers’ information without their knowledge or consent
‣ The activities were found to have been conducted against 2 million Wells Fargo customers
‣ The Wells Fargo case illustrates an element of operational risk, which is rarely seen at this scale. The Office of
the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) referred to the actions of staff, managers and directors at Wells Fargo
as “reckless, unsafe or unsound practices and resulted in violations of the unfair acts or practices provision of
Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act”.
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