Cambridge International AS & A Level: History 9489/42
Cambridge International AS & A Level: History 9489/42
HISTORY 9489/42
Paper 4 Depth Study October/November 2023
MARK SCHEME
Maximum Mark: 60
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not be awarded with grade thresholds or grade descriptors in mind.
This mark scheme assesses the quality of analysis demonstrated in addressing the
question.
Level 5 Answers demonstrate a full understanding of the question, are balanced 13–15
and analytical.
Answers:
• establish valid and wide-ranging criteria for assessing the question
• are consistently analytical of the key features and characteristics of the
period
• provide a focused, balanced argument with a sustained line of reasoning
throughout
• reach a clear and sustained judgement.
Level 4 Answers demonstrate a good understanding of the question, and are 10–12
mostly analytical.
Answers:
• establish valid criteria for assessing the question
• are analytical of the key features and characteristics of the period, but
treatment of points may be uneven
• attempt to provide a balanced argument, but may lack coherence and
precision in some places
• reach a supported judgement, although some of the evaluations may be
only partly substantiated.
Level 3 Answers demonstrate an understanding of the question and contain some 7–9
analysis. Argument lacks balance.
Answers:
• show attempts at establishing criteria for assessing the question
• show some analysis of the key features and characteristics of the period,
but may also contain descriptive passages
• provide an argument but lacks balance, coherence and precision
• begin to form a judgement although with weak substantiation.
Level 2 Answers demonstrate some understanding of the question and are 4–6
descriptive.
Answers:
• attempt to establish criteria for assessing the question but these may be
implicit
• show limited analysis of the key features and characteristics of the period,
and contain descriptive passages that are not always clearly related to the
focus of the question
• make an attempt at proving an argument, but this is done inconsistently
and/or may be unrelated to the focus of the question
• make an assertion rather than a judgement.
Level 1 Answers address the topic, but not the question. 1–3
Answers:
• focus on the topic rather than the question
• lack analysis or an argument
• lack a relevant judgement.
AO1 – Recall, select and deploy historical knowledge appropriately and effectively.
This mark scheme assesses the quality and depth of knowledge deployed to support the
argument made.
Annotation symbols
? Unclear
AN Analysis
^ Unsupported assertion
K Knowledge
EVAL Evaluation
• Annotate using the symbols above as you read through the script.
1 Assess the view that Mussolini’s political skill was the most important 30
reason for his rise to power by 1922.
Mussolini showed great skill in adapting his political programme in the years
between 1919–22 and was able to gain the support of Italy’s elites as a result:
his skills were a crucial part of making fascism acceptable. Having begun with
a left-wing programme, he quickly began to distance himself from many of the
policies in the 1919 programme and exploited the fear of the upper and
middle classes about the threat from socialism. He set out to reassure the
Catholic Church, having previously promised to confiscate all property
belonging to it. By 1921, he was declaring fascism to be opposed to divorce in
a bid win support from Catholics. Policies on nationalisation were dropped
and deliberate appeals to the conservative elites were made, particularly
through Mussolini’s increasingly anti-socialist rhetoric and the actions of
fascist squads. Although violence was a key part of the increased appeal of
fascism, Mussolini was also careful to disassociate himself from its worst
excesses and to suggest that only he could harness it.
Other factors which might be considered include the political and economic
context in which Mussolini was operating, the impact of the First World War,
both economically and politically, the perceived threat of socialism and the
apparent failure of liberal democracy to deal with the problems facing Italy.
Responses may also consider the mistakes and weaknesses of the king
which also help to explain Mussolini’s appointment in 1922. Like many others
in the elite, he overestimated the strength of fascism and provided weak
leadership. Mussolini also possessed other political skills other than
pragmatism and was a highly able figurehead and propagandist.
2 ‘Stalin’s fear of being overthrown was the main reason for the purges.’ 30
Assess this view.
It can be argued that Stalin’s personality was the driving force behind the
terror and responses may discuss his suspicion of others and paranoia which
led him to believe that he was surrounded by enemies. He was vindictive and
vengeful, desiring to take revenge on those who had belittled him in the past.
He had an inferiority complex about his intellectual capabilities compared to
some of his rivals and former colleagues. These factors might explain why he
had to dispose of Old Bolsheviks, who knew his limitations and had belittled
him as mediocre and dull before he rose to power. He believed that any
deviation from his policies would prove to be disastrous for the Soviet Union
and so he wanted control of the party and the people in order to crush any
opposition.
In common with many other countries, political extremism from both right- and
left-wings grew in Britain during and after the Great Depression as some
became convinced that liberal democracy was unable to meet its challenges.
However, neither attained the level of support in Britain as elsewhere.
6 Assess the political impact of the mass media in the 1960s and 1970s. 30
Many will focus on the greater accessibility of television and its impact on the
way that politics was conducted and the appeal of political leaders with a key
example being the confrontations between Kennedy and Nixon. The reporting
of news had a significant impact on the electorate and the immediacy of the
reporting, for example, on the war in Vietnam or the Cuban Missile crisis
meant that public opinion had more impact on foreign policy decisions.
Television became more immediate as more Americans had colour and the
impact and popularity of TV journalists and presented such as Walter Cronkite
grew. Some may consider the implications of developments in the media that
were not on the face of it political but had political implications. The rise of the
counterculture and its music played on radio which had more diversity in the
1970s. But also, the use of the media by social and religious conservatives.
Christian broadcasting made use of developments in television spreading
messages hitherto confined to Southern states. AM radio stations or ultrahigh
frequency (UHF) television channels were bought by Christian groups and
conservatives gained new outlets. The Washington Times was bought by
conservative Rev. Sun Myung Moon. After 1978 conservatives would become
increasingly influential in American politics, significantly contributing to the
victory of Reagan in 1980 and the swing to more conservative policies.
However, it could be argued that the impact can be overstated with traditional
politics and long-term concerns rather than immediate reactions to events
remaining important. The role of the media and public opinion in political
decisions in Vietnam has been challenged and was often used by military and
political leaders as a cover for their own failures. The question does not invite
a sustained consideration of other factors independent of the main issue in
the question, but it would be legitimate to examine other influences compared
with the media.
8 ‘The US was more responsible than the USSR for the Cuban Missile 30
Crisis.’ Assess this view.
The case for US responsibility rests on the ongoing hostility to Castro and the
way that this drove the Cuban regime into the arms of the USSR and created
a situation where because of CIA plots and the Bay of Pigs, the security of
Cuba was genuinely threatened. The US saw Castro’s acceptance of Russian
missiles as part of an aggressive move, but the regime was being threatened.
It has been argued that the Bay of Pigs gave Khrushchev the opportunity for
intervention when previous policy making in the USSR had discounted
possible intervention in Latin America.
The offensive purpose of the missiles could be challenged – and in any case
the US had its own missiles in Turkey which were an obvious threat to the
USSR. In practical terms the threat of nuclear destruction was not much
increased by having missiles on Cuba and the most important effect was to
create agitation and fear in the US and a political threat to Kennedy –
something that US actions against Cuba had caused. Kennedy had
exaggerated the threat and stoked fears. It has been argued that Kennedy
thought he could wage a war out of sight of the American people, for the
people’s good; but when the Cubans responded in open ways, he could not
explain their effrontery, and had to ride the wave of public fear. However,
some may find this analysis less convincing. The failures of US plots to
remove Castro did open up opportunities, but given the situation in the US, to
install missiles in Cuba, so close to the US homeland was a very high-risk
strategy. Certainly, US hostility gave the USSR traction over a Cuban regime
that was not in 1959 overtly communist but this particular action, given the
Monroe Doctrine, previous US policies and residual ears of Soviet expansion
and issues over Berlin could be seen as adventurism, particularly given
Castro’s volatile personality. Answers should not rely on a description of the
crisis, but key elements might feature in a discussion. For example, July 1962
the meeting between Castro and Khrushchev in which it was agreed that
missiles would be placed in Cuba and missile launch sites built. The decision
by Kennedy to reject advice that a preemptive strike and an invasion be
launched. The decision to impose a quarantine on 22 October rather than a
more aggressive blockade – a possible act of war. The willingness to
compromise and remove Jupiter missiles from Turkey, Kennedy chose the
less abrasive reactions – something that Khrushchev could not know would
be the case.
9 ‘The USSR’s involvement in Afghanistan was the main reason for the 30
collapse of the Soviet system.’ Assess this view.
However, it was Gorbachev who created the circumstances that enabled the
collapse to happen so rapidly. Gorbachev came to power in 1985 during a
period of economic stagnation; he saw the inefficiency of the communist
system. He wanted moderate change with perestroika and glasnost to restore
the legitimacy of the Communist Party; instead, the public became aware of
its shortcomings. The USSR was also losing its grip on its satellite states and
ethnic groups sought to free themselves from Soviet control. Gorbachev did
not realise that communism would be destroyed once factors like nationalism
took hold. By the summer of 1989, East Europeans had more freedom and
they rejected communism. By November 1989, the Berlin Wall had fallen.
Gorbachev was responsible for the loosening of governmental power which
created a domino effect in which Eastern European alliances began to
crumble, inspiring countries such as Estonia, Lithuania and Latvia to declare
their independence. His reforms caused a revolution driven from below which,
because of his refusal to use force, destroyed the communist system and
ended the Soviet Empire. Gorbachev wanted to demilitarise Soviet foreign
policy so that he could divert resources to fixing a broken economy.
Gorbachev was convinced that Reagan did not intend to make a first strike
against the USSR. Finally, in December 1987, they agreed the INF Treaty, the
first agreement on actually reducing nuclear weapons. He believed in co-
operation and in holding only a minimal number of nuclear weapons for
protection.
On 25 June 1950 the North Korean army led by Kim Il Sung, launched an
offensive against South Korea. By entering and fighting in the Korean War,
The PRC achieved its original goal to keep North Korea from falling to the UN
forces. The fact that PRC forces held their own against United Nations’ forces
boosted the PRC’s standing as a world power. The PRC wanted to preserve a
North Korean Communist State, but not to dominate it. Instead, it wanted
North Korea to serve as a buffer between Manchuria and the US-dominated
South Korea. Ideological reasons helped to account for the PRC’s
intervention. The PRC stressed the inevitability of the communist-capitalist
confrontation and the need to support the communist revolution to justify its
intervention and prove that its decision was made from a moral standpoint. It
also explains why the PRC decided to intervene and not to choose to rely on
the alliance treaty with the USSR. It would promote the PRC’s international
status as a supporter of world communist revolution.
The PRC was also interested in its own security fearing a possible US
invasion. On 27 June, the US Seventh Fleet was sent to the Taiwan Strait to
‘neutralise’ the situation. On the same day, President Truman announced air
and naval support for South Korea. These movements led to a reassessment
of US intentions towards the PRC who redeployed some troops to the
Northern border. The Inchon landings on 15 September and the US troops’
crossing of the 38th parallel on 25 September led to the first troops entering
North Korea on 14 October. The PRC was concerned that if US troops were
stationed in the border region, it would be forced to focus most of its troops on
the North-eastern border region; this would be expensive and politically
dangerous. The region contained the main economic resources for its
economic reconstruction and recovery. The PRC leaders hoped that the
troops could defeat the United States and the reactionary forces at home. As
the tension in Korea escalated, Stalin became more cautious in avoiding
direct confrontation with the United States and refused to send troops to
Korea. Instead, he encouraged the PRC to send their armies to assist the
North and promised to support it with military equipment and air force cover
and to defend its borders. Mao Zedong wanted to enhance the Sino-Soviet
alliance, so as to consolidate the PRC’s new regime.
The economy of the PRC was shattered, with high inflation, tight budget and
lack of material resources and the authority of the regime was under threat by
remaining Kuomintang agents. The PRC was also preparing for battles in
Taiwan to unify the whole of China. However, while the alliance treaty could
provide Soviet support to protect the PRC when its territory was invaded, it
could not remove pressure on economic reconstruction, on troop deployments
for ‘freeing’ Taiwan and on stopping internal opposition forces posed by the
US presence near the border. Beijing had to opt for an armed intervention to
eliminate US presence near its border if the North Koreans were defeated.
PRC leaders decided that if they were going to fight the USA, the initial attack
would have to be as efficient as possible. For this reason, they planned a
surprise attack, secretly moving troops across the Yalu River. The PRC, using
the element of surprise, did not declare war. Furthermore, so that it could
officially disavow responsibility, the PRC troops claimed to be ‘volunteers’.
The European countries that colonised Africa grudgingly granted the colonies
independence due to internal and external pressures. However, these
European countries still wanted to influence the politics, economy, and culture
of their former colonies, often in alliance with the rulers. When colonialism
ended, the new African states who were weak both politically and
economically were vulnerable to interference from the West. Under
colonialism their economic systems were tied to a narrow export base with a
weak industrial sector. In Africa industry was not developed outside of
agriculture and extraction, and workers were restricted to the lowest-paid,
most unskilled work which continued after independence. In 1967, 90% of
Africa’s exports were comprised of raw materials such as oil, copper, cotton,
coffee, and cocoa. The growth of cash crops meant that food had to be
imported, while industrial development was held back because manufacturing
and the processing of raw materials happened exclusively overseas. Africans’
wages were kept very low, and the profits from the exploitation of African
labourers went directly to European bankers and trading companies. Most
West African countries continued to concentrate on the production and
marketing of one or two cash crops: groundnuts in Senegal and Gambia;
cocoa and palm kernels in Sierra Leone; palm oil and cocoa in Guinea, Côte
d’Ivoire and Ghana; and palm oil and kernels and cotton in Nigeria. West
African economies were also structured to be permanently dependent on
Western nations. They were consigned the role of primary producers for
processing in the West. The terms of trade in the Western-controlled
international market discriminated against African nations who were unable to
earn enough to develop their economies after independence.
12 Assess how far Yasser Arafat’s tactics for achieving a Palestinian state
changed in the period up to 1979.