4/17/2019 Kirby v.
State :: 1991 :: Court of Appeals of Georgia Decisions :: Georgia Case Law :: Georgia Law :: US Law :: Justia
Kirby v. State
201 Ga. App. 116 (1991)
410 S.E.2d 333
KIRBY v. THE STATE.
A91A0934.
Court of Appeals of Georgia.
Decided September 5, 1991.
Bates, Kelehear & Starr, Harlan M. Starr, for appellant.
Jack O. Partain III, District Attorney, David T. Blackburn, Assistant District Attorney, for
appellee.
SOGNIER, Chief Judge.
Following a bench trial in Whitfield County Superior Court, William Kirby was found guilty
but mentally ill of 12 felony offenses and 18 misdemeanor offenses. He was sentenced to
ten years to serve concurrent on all counts. He appeals from the judgment entered on the
verdict.
In his sole enumeration, appellant contends the trial court erred by finding him guilty but
mentally ill instead of not guilty by reason of insanity. The evidence adduced at trial
revealed that for a period of approximately 18 months beginning in December 1987,
appellant defrauded several people of nearly $300,000. The victims included several
customers of appellant's used car lot, as well as investors in the same business. Appellant
accepted cars on consignment, but kept *117 the money after the cars were sold. On several
occasions investors advanced funds to appellant with the understanding that the money
would be used as working capital. One investor testified that soon after he inquired when
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4/17/2019 Kirby v. State :: 1991 :: Court of Appeals of Georgia Decisions :: Georgia Case Law :: Georgia Law :: US Law :: Justia
he would begin to realize a return on his investment, appellant misled him into believing
that appellant had been arrested because some of the cars which he had been selling were
stolen. The investor further testified that appellant claimed to be participating in a court-
sanctioned sting operation, and that appellant told him that his money could not be
returned until the sting operation was completed because the court had frozen appellant's
bank accounts. When another investor arrived at the car lot to collect money which
appellant had promised to repay, he was told by appellant that "everything's gone." Soon
after he admitted to his investors that he had defrauded them, appellant became suicidal
and was admitted to a psychiatric hospital.
Evidence was also adduced that appellant suffers from a multiple personality disorder.
Appellant's private psychiatrist, Dr. Weatherly, testified that during the period during
which the crimes were committed, appellant actually had two personalities. The "bad"
personality which committed the crimes was known as Kirby, and the "good" personality,
which was largely repressed by Kirby during the period of criminal activity, was known as
Bill. Dr. Weatherly further testified that "Bill certainly knows the difference in right and
wrong and certainly feels guilty about what happened. Kirby, I think, knew the difference in
right and wrong but probably didn't care." Dr. Perri, a psychologist appointed by the trial
court to assess appellant's competence to stand trial, confirmed Dr. Weatherly's diagnosis
that appellant suffered from a multiple personality disorder, and stated that he believed
that Kirby was the personality that committed the crimes. At trial, Dr. Perri also testified
that there was no indication that either personality was suffering from a delusional
compulsion, nor was there any indication that either personality could not distinguish right
from wrong. Neither Bill nor Kirby has ever offered an explanation as to what happened to
the money taken from the victims, and appellant testified at trial that he does not
remember what happened to the money.
In his brief, appellant acknowledges that Kirkland v. State, 166 Ga. App. 478 (304 SE2d
561) (1983) is controlling authority for the case sub judice, but argues that Kirkland should
be overruled because recent advances in the study of multiple personality disorders have
rendered the Kirkland decision obsolete. However, appellant merely points out that
multiple personality disorders are more widely recognized as a form of psychosis today
than in 1983 when this court decided Kirkland. Appellant fails to put forth any sound
argument to support the proposition that a person suffering from a multiple personality
*118 disorder should be absolved of criminal responsibility. "The law adjudges criminal
liability of the person according to the person's state of mind at the time of the act; we will
not begin to parcel criminal accountability out among the various inhabitants of the mind."
Kirkland, supra at 480. The reasoning behind this policy remains as valid today as it was
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4/17/2019 Kirby v. State :: 1991 :: Court of Appeals of Georgia Decisions :: Georgia Case Law :: Georgia Law :: US Law :: Justia
when the Kirkland decision was handed down. "`There was only one person (committing
the criminal act) ... and only one person accused (of it). It is immaterial whether [he] was in
one state of consciousness or another, so long as in the personality then controlling [his]
behavior, [he] was conscious and [his] actions were a product of [his] own volition.' ...
[Cit.]" (Emphasis omitted.) Kirkland, supra at 480. In the case at bar, it is undisputed that
appellant was conscious and acting under his own volition. Moreover, appellant was able to
recognize right from wrong and was not suffering from delusional compulsions. See OCGA
§§ 16-3-2; 16-3-3. Therefore, we must conclude that the trial court did not err by finding
appellant guilty but mentally ill.
Judgment affirmed. McMurray, P. J., and Andrews, J., concur.
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