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Employment Law
Second Edition
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Titles in the series:
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Company Law
Constitutional and Administrative Law
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Criminal Law
Employment Law
Equity and Trusts
European Community Law
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Briefcase on
Employment Law
Second Edition
Cavendish
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Second edition first published in Great Britain 2000 by Cavendish Publishing
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Barrow, Charles
Briefcase on employment law—2nd ed
1 Labour laws and legislation—Great Britain
I Title II Duddington, John G III Employment law
344.4'1'01
The success of the Briefcase Series has shown that there is a need for books
which give greater detail about cases than are found in textbooks, yet, at the
same time, are more succinct than casebooks. We hope that we have achieved
this aim with this particular addition to the Briefcase Series.
Employment law is very largely a creation of both statute and, increasingly,
EC legislation; accordingly, it has been necessary to give greater extracts
from legislative provisions than are found in some other books in this series.
A collection of cases on employment law with nothing more would give a
very misleading picture. We have also included some questions at various
points, which are designed to stimulate thought and discussion.
Every preface to a book on employment law points out how quickly the
subject is changing and we must do so here, both to protect ourselves against
any charge of being dated and also to stimulate students into keeping up to
date with new developments. For example, the preface to the first edition
referred to the imminent publication of the White Paper, Fairness at Work,
which has now resulted in the Employment Relations Act 1999. In addition,
since the publication of the first edition in 1998, employment case law has
developed considerably in virtually all of the areas covered by this book.
The great joy when writing a preface is the opportunity it gives to thank
those without whose help a book would never have been written. John
Duddington would like to thank his two children, Mary and Christopher,
who have provided constant stimulation and necessary distraction and,
above all, his wife, Anne, for her help and encouragement in this as well as
in so many other projects over many years. Charles Barrow would like to
thank Alan Robertshaw for his assistance in compiling Chapter 5.
It is finally necessary to add that, as is the case with all books written by
co-authors, although we have each been responsible for separate chapters,
we accept liability for the whole.
Charles Barrow
John Duddington
1 March 2000
v
Contents
Preface v
Table of Cases xi
Table of Statutes xxxiii
Table of Statutory Instruments xxxvii
Table of European Legislation xxxix
1 Employee Status
1.1 Statutory definitions 1
1.2 Tests applied by the courts to determine
whether a person is an employee or an
independent contractor 4
1.3 Rights of employees to be provided with a
statement of initial employment particulars 11
5 Unfair Dismissal
5.1 Establishing the reasons for dismissal 93
5.2 Fairness of the dismissal 97
5.3 Time limits 114
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6 Redundancy
6.1 Definition of redundancy 119
6.2 Right to claim a redundancy payment 127
6.3 Offer of alternative employment 129
6.4 Redundancy procedures 131
8 Equal Pay
8.1 Equal Pay Act 1970 161
8.2 European Community law 163
8.3 Meaning of ‘like work’, ‘work rated as equivalent’
and ‘work of equal value’ 165
8.4 Genuine material differences 170
8.5 Area of comparison 178
8.6 Meaning of ‘pay’ for the purpose of the
Equal Pay Act 1970 180
8.7 Remedies 181
9 Discrimination
9.1 Direct discrimination 183
9.2 Indirect discrimination 187
9.3 Discrimination in employment 192
9.4 Exceptions 193
9.5 Vicarious liability and liability for the actions
of a third party 195
9.6 Procedure and proof 197
9.7 Remedies 200
9.8 Discrimination and European Community law 202
9.9 Discrimination on grounds of sexual orientation 207
9.10 Disability Discrimination Act 1995 209
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Contents
11 Industrial Action
11.1 Civil liability—the economic torts 229
11.2 Inducing breach of contract 229
11.3 Interference with contract, trade or business 233
11.4 Intimidation 235
11.5 Conspiracy 236
11.6 Inducing breach of a statutory duty 238
11.7 Economic duress 240
11.8 Inducing breach of an equitable obligation 241
11.9 Trade union immunities—the Trade Union
and Labour Relations (Consolidation) Act 1992 241
11.10 Loss of immunity—the Trade Union and
Labour Relations (Consolidation) Act 1992 246
Glossary 257
Index 277
ix
Table of Cases
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xii
Table of Cases
xiii
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Table of Cases
xv
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Table of Cases
xvii
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Table of Cases
xix
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Table of Cases
xxi
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xxii
Table of Cases
xxiii
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xxiv
Table of Cases
xxv
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xxvi
Table of Cases
xxvii
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xxviii
Table of Cases
xxix
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xxx
Table of Cases
Whitehouse v Chas A Blatchford & Sons Ltd [1999] IRLR 492 152
Williams and Clyde Coal Co Ltd v English [1938] AC 57 53
Williams v Compair Maxam Ltd
[1982] IRLR 83; [1982] ICR 156 109, 131
Williams v Watsons Coaches [1990] IRLR 164 76
Wilson v Racher [1974] ICR 428; [1974] IRLR 114 89
Wilson v Ethicon [2000] IRLR 4 100, 101, 114
Wilson and Others v St Helens Borough Council
[1998] IRLR 706; [1998] 4 All ER 609 158
Wiltshire County Council v NATFHE and Guy
[1980] IRLR 198 82
Wiluszynski v London Borough of
Tower Hamlets [1989] IRLR 259 22
Withers v Flackwell Heath Football
Supporters Club [1981] IRLR 307 5
Withers v Perry Chain Co Ltd
[1961] 3 All ER 676 56, 57
Woodhouse v Peter Brotherhood Ltd
[1972] 3 All ER 91 142, 145
Wood v William Ball Ltd [1999] IRLR 773 170
Woods v WM Car Services (Peterborough) Ltd
[1981] IRLR 347; [1982] IRLR 413 25, 87
Wren v Eastbourne Borough Council [1993] ICR 955 156, 157
xxxi
Table of Statutes
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Table of Statutes
xxxv
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xxxvi
Table of Statutory Instruments
xxxvii
Table of European Legislation
Directives
Acquired Rights Directive (77/187/EEC) 4, 144, 147,
149, 154, 157
Art 4 150
Art 3(1) 148
Equal Pay Directive (75/117/EEC) 164, 169, 172, 208
Arts 1–3 163
Arts 4–6 164
Art 119 207, 208
Equal Treatment Directive (76/207/EEC) 181, 189, 204–08
Art 1 202
Art 2 202, 207
Art 2(1) 204
Arts 3, 5 203
Art 5(1) 208
Art 6 202
Health and Safety Framework Directive (89/391/EEC) 4
Pregnant Workers Directive (92/85/EEC) 207
Redundancy Consultation Directive (75/129/EEC) 135
Social Security Directive (79/7/EEC) 204
Working Time Directive (93/104/EEC) 65
Art 7 65
Recommendations
On the Protection of the Dignity of Women and
Men at Work (91/131/EEC) 184
xxxix
1 Employee Status
Section 230(1)
In this Act, ‘employee’ means an individual who has entered into or works
under (or, where the employment has ceased, worked under) a contract of
employment.
Section 230(2)
In this Act, ‘contract of employment’ means a contract of service or appren-
ticeship, whether express or implied, and (if it is express) whether oral or
in writing.
Section 230(3)
In this Act, ‘worker’ (except in the phrases ‘shop worker’ and ‘betting
worker’) means an individual who has entered into and works under (or
where the employment has ceased, worked under):
Note ______________________________________________________
The width of the definition of a worker in s 230(3) is greater than that in s
230(1) of an employee. The essence of the definition in s 230(3) is the under-
taking to personally perform work or services for another party.
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Employee Status
Statutes have been increasingly using the term ‘worker’ rather than ‘em-
ployee’, and have also extended protection to groups of workers not previ-
ously covered by employment protection legislation.
Section 54 of the National Minimum Wage Act 1998 defines an
‘employee’ as someone who works under a contract of employment and
gives the term ‘worker’ the same meaning as in s 230(3)(b) of the ERA 1996
(see above). However, the Act also applies to agency workers and
homeworkers. Section 34 provides that the Act applies as if there is a
worker’s contract between the agency worker and whichever of the client
or the agency is responsible for paying the worker; if neither of them is
responsible, then whichever of them actually does pay the worker. Section
35 provides that a ‘homeworker’ is a person who contracts to do work for
the purposes of another person’s business, but the work is to be done in a
place not under the control or management of that other person. A
homeworker is treated by the Act as a worker. Moreover, s 41 contains
power to extend the scope of the Act even further.
The Public Interest Disclosure Act 1998 expressly states that the term
‘worker’ includes persons who are not covered by this term as defined by
s 230(3) of the ERA 1996; it then goes on to specify four groups that are
within the definition of the term ‘worker’ for the purposes of this Act: agency
workers; homeworkers; NHS doctors, dentists, ophthalmologists and
pharmacists; and trainees on vocational or work experience schemes. The
definitions are slightly different than in the National Minimum Wage Act
1998; for instance, an agency worker is defined as someone who works for
a person to whom they were introduced by a third person, and their terms
of work were determined by the person for whom they work, or the third
person, or by both of these persons. On the other hand, the Working Time
Regulations 1998 use the same provisions in relation to agency workers as
s 34 of the National Minimum Wage Act (see above).
The most significant development is contained in s 23 of the
Employment Rights Act 1999, which gives the Secretary of State power to
extend the scope of employment legislation to groups not already covered
by it. Accordingly, orders can be made, providing that individuals can be
treated as parties to workers’ contracts or contracts of employment and
can make provision as to who are to be regarded as the employers of
individuals.
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The Acquired Rights Directive refers to rights and obligations arising from a
contract of employment or from an employment relationship. However, the
Framework Directive of 1989 on Health and Safety refers to ‘workers’, who
are defined as persons ‘employed by the employer’.
Note ______________________________________________________
Although the organisation test, as with the control test, is no longer applied
on its own today in order to determine employee status, it can still be
useful, especially in relation to skilled employees. See, for example, Cassidy
v Minister of Health (1951), where a resident hospital surgeon was held to be
4
Employee Status
Note ______________________________________________________
See, also, Warner Holidays Ltd v Secretary of State for Social Services (1983) and
Withers v Flackwell Heath Football Supporters Club (1981).
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Ready Mixed Concrete (South East) Ltd v Minister of Pensions and National
Insurance (1968) HC
The plaintiff company employed a driver, Latimer, under a contract where he
bought the lorry from the plaintiff on hire purchase. He had to wear the
plaintiff company’s uniform and the lorry had to be painted in the
company’s colours and with its insignia. He had to drive the lorry only on
the business of the company and he agreed to obey all reasonable orders
‘as if he was an employee’. However, he was not required to drive the lorry
personally; instead, he was allowed to use a substitute driver.
Held, by the High Court (QBD), that he was self-employed, one of the
deciding factors being that he was not contracting to necessarily drive the
lorry personally.
MacKenna J said:
In this case, MacKenna J said that the ‘obligations are more consistent, I
think, with a contract of carriage than one of service’.
Note ______________________________________________________
This case is not authority for the proposition that the presence or absence of
the obligation to render personal service decides whether a person is an
employee or not. The significance of the case is the emphasis placed by
MacKenna J on the three factors outlined in his judgment. In fact, the
multiple test is very similar to the economic reality test in seeking to avoid
one all-embracing phase, such as a ‘control’ or ‘integration’. Hall (Inspector
of Taxes) v Lorimer (see 1.2.3, above) is really an example of the multiple test.
Note ______________________________________________________
The Court of Appeal’s decision in Express & Echo Publications Ltd v Tanton
(1999) that a right to provide a substitute is inherently inconsistent with the
existence of a contract of employment.
6
Employee Status
There was a regular course of dealing between the parties for years, under
which garments were supplied daily to the outworkers, worked on, col-
lected and paid for. If it is permissible on the evidence to find that by such
conduct, a contract had been established between each applicant and the
company, I see no necessity to conclude that that contract must have been a
contract for services and not a contract of service.
Kerr LJ, however, dissented and observed:
A course of dealing can be used as a basis for implying terms into individual
contracts which are concluded pursuant thereto, but I can find no authority
for the proposition that even a lengthy course of dealing can somehow
convert itself into a contractually binding obligation—subject only to
reasonable notice—to continue to enter into individual contracts, or to be
subject to some ‘umbrella’ contract.
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8
Employee Status
that ‘I did inform him that there were no cards; we were purely working as a
lump labour force’.
Held, by the Court of Appeal, that the plaintiff was an employee. Megaw
LJ held that, on the evidence, this was clearly so; any declaration by the
parties that he was self-employed would be disregarded:
I find difficulty in accepting that the parties, by a mere expression of intention
as to what the legal relationship should be, can in any way influence the
conclusion of law as to what the relationship is. I think that it would be
contrary to the public interest if that were so, for it would mean that the
parties, by their own whim, by the use of verbal formula, unrelated to the
reality of the relationship, could influence the decision on whom the
responsibility for the safety of workmen, as imposed by statutory
regulations, should rest.
Q Do you consider that the decision of the Court of Appeal was influ-
enced by the fact that this was a claim for injury at work and, if
Ferguson had not been held to be an employee, he may not have
received any compensation?
Note ______________________________________________________
Megaw LJ said that he had found the reasoning in both the Market
Investigations (see 1.2.3, above) and Ready Mixed Concrete cases (see 1.2.4,
above) useful, which indicates, as said above, that the ‘economic reality’
test and the ‘multiple’ test have similarities. See, also, Davis v New England
College of Arundel (1977). Note, also, the statement by Lord Denning MR in
Massey v Crown Life Assurance Co (1978): ‘…if the parties deliberately arrange
to be self-employed to obtain tax benefits, that is strong evidence that that
is the real relationship.’
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Note ______________________________________________________
The judgment of Mummery J in this case can be seen as, to some extent, a
retreat from the principle in Lee that the question of employee status is one
of the fact and not law, although Mummery J confined his remarks to cases
where the contract of employment is in writing.
The Court of Appeal agreed with the EAT that McMeechan was an em-
ployee but, instead of Mummery J’s general reasoning, it distinguished
between the status of agency workers in two situations:
10
Employee Status
Section 1
(1) Where an employee begins employment with an employer, the em-
ployer shall give to the employee a written statement of particulars of
employment.
(2) The statement may (subject to s 2(4)) be given in instalments and
(whether or not given in instalments) shall be given not later than two
months after the beginning of the employment.
(3) The statement shall contain particulars of:
(a) the names of the employer and employee;
(b) the date when the employment began; and
(c) the date on which the employee’s period of continuous employ-
ment began (taking into account any employment with a previ-
ous employer which counts towards that period).
(4) The statement shall also contain particulars, as at a specified date not
more than seven days before the statement (or the instalment contain-
ing them) is given, of:
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(e) the length of notice which the employee is obliged to give and
entitled to receive to terminate his contract of employment;
(f) the title of the job which the employee is employed to do or a
brief description of the work for which he is employed;
(g) where the employment is not intended to be permanent, the pe-
riod for which it is expected to continue or, if it is for a fixed
term, the date when it is to end;
(h) either the place of work or, where the employee is required or
permitted to work at various places, an indication of that and of
the address of the employer;
(i) any collective agreements which directly affect the terms
and conditions of the employment including, where the
employer is not a party, the persons by whom they were
made; and
(j) where the employee is required to work outside the UK
for a period of more than one month:
(i) the period for which he is to work outside the UK;
(ii) the currency in which remuneration is to be paid while he
is working outside the UK;
(iii) any additional remuneration payable to him, and any ben-
efits to be provided to or in respect of him, by reason of his
being required to work outside the UK; and
(iv) any terms and conditions relating to his return to the UK.
(5) Sub-section (4)(d)(iii) does not apply to an employee of a body or au-
thority if:
(a) the employee’s pension rights depend on the terms of a pension
scheme established under any provision contained in or having
effect under any Act; and
(b) any such provision requires the body or authority to give to
a new employee information concerning the employee’s pen-
sion rights or the determination of questions affecting those
rights.
Section 2
(1) If, in the case of a statement under s 1, there are no particulars to be
entered under any of the heads of para (d) or (k) of sub-s (4) of that
section, or under any of the other paragraphs of sub-s (3) or (4) of that
section, that fact shall be stated.
(2) A statement under s 1 may refer the employee for particulars of any of
the matters specified in sub-s (4)(d)(ii) and (iii) of that section to the
provisions of some other document which is reasonably accessible to
the employee.
12
Employee Status
(3) A statement under s 1 may refer the employee for particulars of either
of the matters specified in sub-s (4)(e) of that section to the law or to
the provisions of any collective agreement directly affecting the terms
and conditions of the employment which is reasonably accessible to
the employee.
(4) The particulars required by s 1(3) and (4)(a)-(c), (d)(i), (f) and (h) shall
be included in a single document.
(5) Where before the end of the period of two months after the beginning
of an employee’s employment, the employee is to begin to work out-
side the UK for a period of more than one month, the statement under
s 1 shall be given to him no later then the time when he leaves the UK
in order to begin so to work.
(6) A statement shall be given to a person under s 1, even if this employ-
ment ends before the end of the period within which the statement is
required to be given.
Section 3
(1) A statement under s 1 shall include a note:
(a) specifying any disciplinary rules applicable to the employee or
referring the employee to the provisions of a document specify-
ing such rules which is reasonably accessible to the employee;
(b) specifying (by description or otherwise):
(i) a person to whom the employee can apply if dissatisfied
with any disciplinary decision relating to him; and
(ii) a person to whom the employee can apply for the purpose
of seeking redress of any grievance relating to his employ-
ment, and the manner in which any such application
should be made; and
(c) where there are further steps consequent on any such applica-
tion, explaining those steps or referring to the provisions of a
document explaining them which is reasonably accessible to the
employee.
Note ______________________________________________________
Section 3(2) provides that the requirements in s 3(1) do not apply to rules,
procedures, etc, relating to health and safety at work. Section 3(3) exempts
small firms (where, on the date when the employee’s employment began,
the number of employees was less than 20) from most of the requirements
set out in s 3(1). Section 3(5) requires the note which is given under s 3(4) to
state whether there is in force a contracting-out certificate (issued in
accordance with Pt III of the Pension Schemes Act 1993), stating that the
employment is contracted-out employment for the purpose of Pt III.
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Section 4(1)
If, after the material date, there is a change in any of the matters particulars
of which are required by ss 1 and 3 to be included or referred to in a statement
under s 1, the employer shall give to the employee a written statement
containing particulars of the change.
Note ______________________________________________________
Section 4 also provides that any statement of changes may refer the em-
ployee to some reasonably accessible document, the general law or a col-
lective agreement for the details of those changes in cases where the origi-
nal written statement would have allowed such a reference. In addition, it
provides that, where the name and the identity of the employee changes,
the employee does not have to be issued with a statement under s 1, unless
continuity of employment is broken by the change of identity or there are
changes in any of the matters (other than the names of the parties) which
are required to be included in the written statement.
Note ______________________________________________________
The following are excluded from the right to receive a written statement of
employment particulars (see s 5):
(a) self-employed persons (s 230);
(b) employees working wholly or mainly outside Great Britain (s 196);
(c) employees who are employed for less than one month (s 198);
(d) mariners (s 199).
Section 6
In ss 2–4, references to a document or collective agreement which is
reasonably accessible to an employee are references to a document or
collective agreement which:
(a) the employee has reasonable opportunities of reading in the
course of his employment; or
(b) is made reasonably accessible to the employee in some other way.
14
Employee Status
included in the particulars required by that section; and, for that purpose,
the order may include such provisions amending that section as appear to
the Secretary of State to be expedient.
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In the present case, all that the employee did was to sign an acknowledg-
ment that he had received the statement. In no sense did he sign it as a
contract or acknowledge the accuracy of the terms in it. We therefore think
that the industrial tribunal erred in law in treating the date of commence-
ment mentioned in the statement as decisive, because it was a contractual
term. In our view, the statement is no more than persuasive, though not
conclusive, evidence of the date of commencement.
Note ______________________________________________________
See, also, Robertson v British Gas Corp (1983) (which confirmed the approach
in Systems Floors v Daniel) and Jones v Associated Tunnelling Co Ltd (1981)
(dealing with the situation where an employer changes the terms of a state-
ment and the employee works under the changed terms). It seems that,
where the statement favours the employee, it is more likely to be felt to
represent strong evidence of the terms of the contract. (See Ackner LJ in
Robertson v British Gas Corp.)
Section 11(1) of the ERA 1996 gives an employee the right to complain to
an employment tribunal on the grounds that either he has not been given
a statement or that the statement given did not contain the particulars re-
quired by s 1(1). He may also complain on the grounds that proper notice
has not been given of a change in the particulars.
The employment tribunal may determine what matters should have
been included in the particulars, or whether any particulars which were
included are to be confirmed, amended or substituted.
Note ______________________________________________________
The powers of industrial tribunals under s 11 are simply to find out what has
been agreed between the parties and, if required, to amend the statement
so that it reflects that agreement. In Cuthbertson v AML Distributors (1975),
the industrial tribunal was held to have acted correctly in refusing to decide
what length of notice would have been reasonable as this would have
meant interpreting the contract. See, also, on the same point, Construction
Industry Training Board v Leighton (1978).
16