Chapter 2

Kamhau-Sukte Chins and Manipur

Manipur's southern frontier marched with the most northerly tribes of the Chin

hills over whom neither Manipur nor the Burmese authorities had exercised any

control. Until the British arrived on the scene after the First Anglo-Burmese War

(1824-26) Manipur's southern limits were never clearly defined.' There had been,

however, a north and north-west movement of tribes into Manipur and the Lushai hills

decades before that. What impelled this movement is not clear. Some spoke of the

exhaustion of jhum lands, others said that Shindu pressure from the south had been

responsible.^ The movement of these tribal people remained a recurring feature of the

' Manipur's boundaries in fact took long to settle. In 1832 the river Jiri and the branch of the river
Barak was made her western limits towards Cachar, in the north, towards the Naga hills some
understanding was arrived at in 1842, but the exact limits of the state was never settled and the problem
remained unresolved till the early seventees. The Kabaw valley in the east was handed over to Burma
(see below) in 1834-35, but here too the correct boundary was never indentified. For the Cachar-
Manipur boundary, H K Barpujari, Assam in the Days of the Company, (Reprint Shillong 1996) pp.lOff;
Jayanta Bhusan Bhattacharjee, Cachar Under British Rule in North East India, New Delhi 1977,
pp.58ff; for Manipur's extension towards the Naga hills, H K Barpujari, Problem of the Hill Tribes:
North East Frontier, Vol I, Guwahati 1970, Reprint Shillong 1996, pp.146-148; S K Barpujari, The
Nagas: The Evolution of their History and Administration(l 832-1939) A Documentary Study, Guwahati
2003, p.98; 188-89; see also by the same author, "Naga Hills Boundary Disputes 1842-72", in Journal
of Indian History, August 1973, SI. No. 152, pp.271-80.
-FPAP August 1872 No.70; Edgar to Commissioner, Chittagong, 3 April 1872, p.31 See also R H
Snyed Hutchinson, Chittagong Hill Tracts, Delhi 1916, passim.
 54

history of the region; an official report, written as late as in the 1890's, describes what

this was all about:

Nothing does more to establish a chief and bring him followers and influence
than success in raids upon weaker chiefs, upon the villages of Manipur, Hill
Tipperah, and upper Burma, or upon our villages and outposts and tea gardens.
In addition to the constant changes in the relative position of individual chiefs,
a general movement would seem to take place from time to time amongst the
people, apparently as if swarms were thrown off fi-om the more crowded
forming new communities all round the outer fringe of the tract, and in doing
so driving before them the villages which had previously inhabited this fringe.
The inhabitants of them are compelled, in consequence of the pressure, to
take refiige in our territory or in Tiperrah or Manipur, where they are often
followed, themselves or killed or taken captive and their villages plundered by
the new-comers.'

The result was that vast tracts of land in southern Manipur were occupied by

cognate tribe broadly referred as Kukis. The Manipuris called them Khongsais,'* a term

' Quoted in Birendra Chandra Chakraborty, British Relations with the Hill Tribes of Assam since 1858,
Calcutta, 1964, p.49 This was first noticed by Colonel Frederick Lister, who led an expedition into the
Lushai hills in 1850-5land wrote in his report:
"It would appear that the tribes to the south have been gradually driving one another in a
northerly direction; for, first, some Nagas that were located in the Boobun Hills in southern Cachar
were obliged by the Tangune Kookies to flit and to take up their abode in the hills north of the Borak,
when the Tangunes took possession of their ground, and they having in their turn been driven up by the
Chansen and Tadoe tribes, the Tangunes were also afterwards obliged to vacate and to move on into the
northern hills, and after them the Changsens were obliged to do so likewise; and the Thadoes, who had
been driven up by the Luchyes, a very powerful tribe, first settled about seven years since within eight
and ten miles south of this station, and became Company's ryots, and made themselves usefiil by
cutting timber, bamboos, canes, & c , which they used to bring to market, but after having been located
there for some four years, the Luchye Kookies in November 1849 attacked them, burnt three of their
villages, killed several of the inhabitants, and took away several of them into slavery, and then the
whole of the Tadoe tribe flitted, left the south and settled down in the northern hills.
"About the same time the Luchye Kookies attacked the villages in Cachar, they committed
other atrocities in Sylhet and in Manipur. It was the first that had ever been heard here of the Luchyes,
and from the inquiries I made, it appeared that they were a very powerfiil, warlike, set of people,
consisting of the Luchyes, Chillings, and Gattaes, and who were said to be also well armed and
independent, and residing from eighth to ten days' journey south of this. And to the south of them again
there are the Poe Kookies, who are said to be still more powerful than the Luchyes, and who it is said
exact a kind of tribute from them", in Alexander Mackenzie, History of the Relations of the Government
with the Hill Tribes of the North East Frontier of Bengal, Calcutta 1884, pp.287ff
•* William McCulloch in his Account of the Valley of Manipur, Calcutta 1859, recorded these tribes as
Khongjais. On this basis Carey and Tuck in The Chin Hills, Vol.1 op.cit. p. 140, referred to the Zous,
Thados and Guite as Khongjais.
 55

that only later was recognised to indicate several groups or clans. In February 1831

Captain George Gordon, an officer appointed to organise the defence of the state,

reported that these new comers had been raiding some southern villages and carrying

their depredation upto the valley of Manipur itself. As he wrote:

These aggressors are said to be powerful Kookies who for several years past
have been gradually advancing from the southwards amongst the vast maps of
mountains, which to the south of Manipur, occupy, without any intervening
valley, the whole space between Bengal and Ava. Their present headquarters is
said to be about five days in a south-westerly direction fi-om the valley of
Munnipore; from which as a centre they are now carrying on their depredations
against all the surrounding villages and have with the aid of a few muskets
they have by some means acquired in addition to their poisoned arrows,
destroyed several not only in the immediate vicinity of Munnipore but also
have extended their savages amongst the Baungshes in the direction of Cachar
several of whom I have just heard have fled for protection to that coimtry.^

The British at this time was concerned with the defence of Bengal's Eastern

Frontier. Manipur had been turned into a buffer state against the Burmese after the

First Anglo-Burmese War. Gambhir Singh, who the Burmese were obliged to

recognise as Raja by the Treaty of Yandaboo, was given a free hand to establish his

authority over the surrounding hill tribes. This he was in a large measure able to do.

Just before Gambhir Singh's death in January 1834, however, it had been realized

largely as a result of the surveys of Captain Francis Jenkins and Captain Robert

Boileau Pemberton made during 1831-32, that Manipur's rather small population and

absence of an economic development made her an ineffective buffer against the

Burmese. As the Governor General Lord William Bentinck observed in a minute dated

25 March 1833: "The result of our late enquiries have clearly shown that, after an

^ FPC February 1831, No. 108; Captain George Gordon to Swinton, Chief Secretary to Government of
India, Calcutta, 18 February.
 56

uninterrupted tranquility of seven years, this small State is still considered as totally

incompetent to defend itself against a Burmese invasion."^ A new treaty was

concluded with Manipur in 1833, by which inter alia, the state was obliged: "In the

event of war with the Burmese, if troops be sent to Manipur, either to protect that

country or to advance beyond the Ningthee, the Rajah, at the requisition of the British

Government, will provide hill porters to assist in transporting the ammunition and

baggage of such troops," and again "In the event anything happening in the Eastern

Frontier of the British Territories, the Rajah will, when required, assist the British

Government with a portion of his troops." In terms of a treaty concluded in 1834, the

disputed Kabaw valley was transferred to Burma, Manipur being compensated by an

annual grant of Rs.6000.^ By this the two small chiefships in the north under the Shan

Sawbwa or chief, Kale and Sumjok remained under Burmese rule.

* Quoted in Mackenzie, op.cit., pp.150-151, "Its entire population," Bentinck continued, "is supposed
not to amount to more than 30 or 40,000 souls and its available revenue to 4 or 5,000 rupees a year. Its
situation- surrounded by mountains- excluded it from any great participation in the advantages of
traffic, and the whole tenor of the several communications made to Government by the Officers most
intimately acquainted with the country proves that at this moment it is without the means of efficiency
extending its agriculture.
"The Levy, consisting, as we are told, of 3,000 men, is shown to be but very imperfectly
disciplined and very little under the control of the Officers specially appointed for the purpose of
ensuring its efficiency. And although we may fairly assume that, armed as they now are, they would be
a match for an equal number of Burmese, we could hardly place any great reliance upon their
undisciplined efforts when opposed to the vastly superior force, which, in-thcevent of war, would
inevitably be brought against them." Pemberton later remarked in his Report on the Eastern Frontier of
British India, Calcutta, 1835, p.48, "Their country is to be regarded principally as an advanced military
position for defence of the eastern frontier and its utility must of course entirely depend upon its natural
resources, and the efficiency of its military force.
' For details, D G E Hall's Henry Burney op.cit see also, Anthony Kaba, "The Manipur Political
Agency with special Reference to the Frontier Problem, 1836-1892", unpublished Ph.D dissertation,
Department of History, North Eastern Hill University, Shillong, 2001.
 57

On 7 February 1835, just before his imminent departure from India, Bentinck

recorded another Minute on Manipur, in which he created a Political Agency at

Imphal, its capital. British objectives were thus spelt out clearly:

The preservation of a fiiendly intercourse, and as a medium of communication

with the Manipur Government, and, as occasion may require, with the
Burmese Authorities on that frontier, and more especially to prevent border
feuds and disturbances which might lead to hostilities between the Manipuris
and the Burmese, it may be necessary to retain an Officer in the character of
Political Agent in that quarter. Lieutenant Gordon, whose ability, intelligence,
and local knowledge have more than once brought favourably to the notice of
Government, seems to be well qualified for this situation, and I beg to propose
that he may be appointed to it on a consolidated salary of Rs. 1,000 per
mensem.^

Rise of Kam Hau

The establishment of a Political Agency coincided with the rise to power of the

Suktes under Kam Hau in the hills south of Manipur. Suktes tradition traces their

power to Khan Thuam of Mualbem village. Khan Thuam's initial success, however,

provoked a combination against him, and he was soon obliged to flee to Falam

country and take shelter under the protection of Rallang Chief Khuang Ceu by giving

tribute to him.

With the help of Khuang Ceu, Khan Thuam and his eldest son Kam Hau, were

able to overcome all opposition. After his position became relatively secure Khan

Thuam returned to Mualbem where he assumed all the trappings of a Chief After he

Mackenzie, op.cit. p.l53

' .Sukte Laibu Bawl Committee Sukte Beh leh Tedim Gam Tangthu, Chin State 1996, p.30; Nine Chiefs
who conspired to kill Khan Thuam were : Vungh Vial of Saizang, Mang Song of Lamzang, Tun Kam of
Vangteh, Do Mang of Lophei, Ciang Phut of Kaalzang, Suan Thuk of Thuklai, Go Mang of Khuasak,
Han Kam of Buanman, and Kaih Mang of Mualbem.
 58

consolidated his position at Mualbem he embarked upon territorial expansion in the

now well known Tedim region, pushing in the process less powerful tribes towards the

border of Manipur. The principal among these were the Thados, Guite and Zou.

William McCuUoch Political Agent in Manipur, who studied these tribes and wrote

about them, found them in the 1840's scattered around the valley of Manipur."^ From

here some were moved on through the hills to north and south. The Guite and Zou

tribes also moved to the eastern border of the Lushai Hills." What remained of these

tribes in their original home were assimilated into the Sukte fold. Bertram Carey and

Henry Newman Tuck, two officers who obtained a first hand knowledge of the region

after its annexation in 18^6, best described the impact of the Sukte expansion:

The Thados offered a good resistance to Kantum and most of their villages
were committed to the flames before they submitted; the Yos either migrated
north out of the Soktes' reach or quietly submitted, and the Nwites did not
offer any resistance whatever.*^

After bringing the entire northern hill tract upto the border of Manipur in the

north and Falam in the south under his control, Khan Thuam established a compact

and strong Sukte domain. He levied all forms of customary duesfi-omhis subordinate

villages. A popular folk song thus described the extent of the Sukte kingdom:

Siahtaang kaihna sak ciang Teimei, ka hialna Lamtui hi e.

Sak ciang Teimei sang ciang Lamtui, a lai ah kamkei hi 'ng e.
(What I rule extends to Manipur in the north, and ends at Falam in the south;
Manipur to the north and Falam to the south, I am the tiger in the middle.)'^

'" McCuUoch, op «?, p55

'' Carey & Tuck, op at p 140 (A number of Guite clans migrated to northeastern Lushailand and
southern Manipur.)
^-Ibid.^\\9
'^ Sing Khaw Khai, Zo People and their Culture, Churachandpur 1995, p 26
 59

After his death in about 1848 Khan Thuam was succeeded by his youngest son

Za Pau at Mualbem according to Sukte tradition of ultimogeniture.* Kam Hau, the

eldest and more capable son, established the village of Tedim during his father's life

time. He was temporarily repulsed from there by certain Zous and Thados, but years

later, sometime in the early part of the century, he regained Tedim. The village soon

attracted a large number of warriors from neighbouring areas and in a short span of

time it became one of the largest villages in these hills and the seat of Kam Hau's

power.

Following in his father's footsteps, Kam Hau succeeded in subduing the

remaining subordinate tribes and villages of the northern hills. The acquisition of

firearms from Burma is said to be the major factor in his and his father's success.

Within a few years Kam Hau was recognized as the most powerful Sukte Chief and

ruled the entire region east of the river Manipur, or the Nankathe as it is known in its

lower reaches in the Sukte country, comprising over 135 villages.'"* He had become

more popular than his brother Za Pau who controlled the region west of that river. The

villages which belonged to Kam Hau were distinguished from the existing Sukte tract

as the Kamhau and the people were often, if erroneously, called Kamhaus. Early

writers and official reports had thus gone asfray in describing the Sukte and Kamhau

*According to the custom of the Sukte the elder sons go out into the world and found their own
villages, whilst the youngest son inherited almost all the father's property and the chieftainship of the
tribe or clan, his elder brothers becoming subordinate to and paying him the tribute which is due to the
head of the tribe...
'* Sukte Laibu Bawl Committee, op.cit. p.44
 60

as two distinct tribes.'^ Of the Kamhau-Sukte power Sir Alexander Mackenzie rightly

observed in 1883:

The Manipuris consider this tribe to be a much more formidable one than the
Lushai. They are a constant source of trouble to them, and have at times
rendered the southern portion of Manipur uninhabitable.. .The Lushais hold the
Sookties in great dread, and are falling back before them. They are well
supplied with fire-arms, supposed to be procured from Burma, whence they
also obtain their ammunition. They have never had any dealings whatever with
the British government.'^

Kam Hau's power was also felt in the Kale-Kabaw valley. There were reports

of his raids into the villages in Kale, though some of these were said to have been

avenged by the Sawbwa, or Shan chief, in 1850. Raids were directed towards

Yazagyo, known as the main market for the hill people. This state of affairs had

considerably strained the relations between the Kamhaus and the Shans of the valley."

For some years the Kamhaus, and to a lesser extent the Suktes, kept Manipur's

southern frontier in a state of alarm. This had led to the scattering of the Khongsais,

mainly of the Thado Kuki clans, which like the depredation of the Kamhau-Suktes,

equally threatened the peace of the valley. It was only after the arrival of Colonel

William McCulloch as Political Agent in Manipur in 1844 that an effort was made to

establish peace in the region.'^ There was one important consideration with which this

'* The term Sukte and Kamhau will hereafter be used when referring to chiefs and men with respect to
the location of their villages either west or east of the Manipur or Nankathe river. Today, these groups
of people are commonly known as Tedim Chin or rather Zomi as they preferred to be called so.
'^ Mackenzie, op.cit. p. 163
'^ Carey & Tuck, op.cit. p. 120
'* James Johnstone in his My Experience in Manipur and the Naga Hills. London, 1896, Reprint New
Delhi 2002, p.45 writes: "Colonel McCulloch's policy of planting Kuki settlements on exposed
frontiers, induced the Government of Bengal to try a similar experiment, and a large colony of Kukis
were settled in 1855 in the neighbourhood of Langting, to act as a barrier for North Cachar against the
raids of the Angami Nagas."
 61

question was linked. The Sylhet-Manipur road, which was then under construction,

passed through the Kabul Naga territory. The upkeep of this road greatly depended on

the Kabuis who felt constantly threatened by the northward movement of the Thados.

Lushai disturbances in both Cachar and Manipur, which had become intense from the

middle of the 1840's, too had acted upon the fears of the defenceless Kabuis.

McCuUoch's solution was to plant a line of Thado colonies as a buffer to the Kabul

villages. He thus wrote to E R Lyon, Superintendent of Cachar, on 26 November

1846:

There is ample space for such Kookies as might wish to settle under
Munnipore and a strong body of that tribe will be affected to Munnipore settled
to the south of the Koupooees would force a bulwark to the latter and
consequently tend to the efficiency of the Munnipore road; whilst from the
similarity of the languages of all the Kookis tribes there would be in every
likelihood that such Kookies would hear of any projected attack of the wild
savages of the south and by giving notice to the authorities here they would be
unable to prevent it or at least moderate its violence.'^

Towards the close of the 1840's McCulloch with the help of Raja Nur Singh

carried out the settlement of the Khongsais. Large tracts were made available to them

for cultivation. Some of them were used as irregulars; arms were freely supplied to

them and these settlements often came to be called 'sepoy village.'^^

Manipur's Abortive Expedition and After

The settlement of the Thados, however, did not end the problem of Manipur's

southern frontier. Disturbances continued. In the 1850's the Kamhaus under Go Khaw

" FPC 19 December 1846, Nos.164-165

"° Mackenzie, op.cit. pp. 157-164
 62

Thang raided the Thado Kuki villages of Mombee (Lawmpi)* and Heeroway in

southern Manipur. In 1855 another Manipur village, Namfow, was burnt, again by the

Suktes. The following year an even more serious outrage occurred. An exasperated

Chandrakirti Singh who had in the meanwhile succeeded to the Manipur Raj decided

upon strong military action.

In January 1857, he led 1500 strong punitive expedition against the Kamhau-

Suktes. "He was so impressed with the importance of the operations of the expedition

being brought to a successfiil issue" wrote Mackenzie, "that, with the object of

encouraging his force, he accompanied in person." When he arrived near Tedim, the

Kamhau stronghold, he found himself opposed by a combined force of the Kamhau,

Sukte, and Sihzang. What happened then is best described by Mackenzie:

It nevertheless ended in disgracefiil flight of the Manipur troops. They

neglected to secure the line of communications, provisions consequently
became short and, instead of falling back on their line of advance, they, after
some skirmishing with the enemy, fled in confusion by another and unknown
route, along which it must have been known that they could not possibly obtain
provisions Colonel McCuUoch who was then Political Agent, believed sheer
cowardice to have been the cause of the failure of the expedition. The troops
barely left their Rajah, who with some twenty followers, arrived some days
after they had reached the valley.^^

It was said that the Manipuris on that occasion lost altogether 287 guns.

Shortly after Chandrakirti Singh returned to Imphal the Suktes made overtures

of peace with Manipur. That these tribes, who had so recently worsted the troops of a

* Mombee or Lawmpi located in Manipur. There is another village of the same name which the
Kamhau people called Mualpi in northern Chin hills, hi all probability the Thados who were the
original inhabitants of the village in the Chin hills called the new village in Manipur of the same name.
-' Ibid
"Ibid
-'Ibid
 63

more powerful state, should so quickly change their attitude is to be explained by the

emergence of a new power to the east of the Kamhau-Sukte territory. In the late

1840's as Kam Hau was consolidating his position around Tedim, another tribe was

establishing its hold at Champhai, on the western border of the Sukte country driving

out the Thados from there. This tribe, soon to be known as the Lushais, established its

control over the fertile region under two brothers Poiboia and Vanhnuailiana. Of the

latter John Ware Edgar, the legendary Deputy Commissioner of Cachar who knew

these tribes at firsthand wrote:

(He was) undoubtedly the ablest and most powerful chief...In his youth he
seems to have been constantly fighting, and always apparently more or less
successful. He fought various tribes to his south known to the Kookies by the
general name of Poi and carried off, or induced to accompany him, numerous
families of those villages, whom he settled down either in separate villages or
in the villages of his own Kookies.^'*

Vanhnuailiana, Edgar further adds:

Followed the same policy towards the Soktes another family of Kookies,
whose head is Kamhow, the powerful chief of Molbhem, and we found
hundreds of Sokte families settled among this Lushais in whose villages we
have lately been.^^

Edgar wrote that in the aftermath of the Lushai Expedition of 1872, and what he was

describing actually took place some twenty-years earlier. This eastward expansion of

Vanhnuailiana other members of the Lushai family had already established themselves

in the west began after 1850, with a drive towards the south-west of Manipur. But he

could make no headway because of Colonel William McCuIloch's effective

management of that part of the frontier. Consequently the Lushais began to exact

•'' FPAP August 1872, No.70; Edgar to Commissioner, Chittagong, 3 April

-^ Ibid
 64

pressure on the region near the salt springs of Chivu and the south of the Manipur

frontier.

The preoccupation of the Kamhau-Suktes with the Lushais on their western

border as a result gave a freehand to smaller and subordinate tribes to indulge in their

own petty raids into Manipur. In April 1859 Guite warriors who had quarreled with a

Haokip clan of Thados fell upon one of the villages near Sugnu. This was followed by

another though less serious raid on Saitol which was burnt and cattle driven away.

These events were sufficient for the Maharaja^^ to raise a line of stockades on his

southern frontier. Not until the Lushai Expeditions of 1869-72 would the Kamhau-

Suktes again emerge as an important factor in the politics of the frontier. Until then the

relations between the Lushais and Manipur were not a cause for concern. In 1867

Edgar on a visit to Manipur found out how the Lushais and the Thados had got along

with each other:

Messengers were sent from time to time to the Lushai chiefs nominally from
the Rajah, but really from the Political Agent, and presents were sometimes
sent down. These messengers were always Kookies in which Colonel
McCuUoch could put trust.. ..The Munipore Kookies used at that time to shoot
over the hunting grounds of the Lushais near the great salt spring called
Chiboo, and when they killed anything, they left a hind leg at the spring for the
Lushais, who in their turn, when lucky, used to leave a leg for the Thadoes.^^

All this tribal camaraderie suddenly came to an end when that some Thados fell upon

and killed seven of Poiboi's men near Chivu, four of whom were hunting while three

"* The Treaty of Yandaboo between the Burmese and the British referred to Gambhir Singh as Raja, and
this term continued to be in use throughout East India Company's days, after which for reasons not
found in any document or report, the ruler was referred to as Maharaja.
-^ FPAP August 1872 ,op.cit.
 65

were making salt. During 1868-69 widespread disturbances took place in Manipur-

Cachar border.* In November the Naga village of Mentha in Manipur territory was

attacked and burned by Vanpuilala and Poiboia, and several captives carried off. On 2

February in the following year a great attack was made on a stockade in the Kala Naga

region, which was strongly garrisoned by Manipuri's sepoys, by several chiefs among

whom one Lenkon was said to be the most prominent. The stockade was taken, and a

Manipuri officer and several sepoys were killed. At about the same time some Naga

villages were attacked and destroyed. Later in the year, in November a Naga village

near Manipur's Khopum valley was laid waste by the Lushais. In fact the extent of the

disturbances was unprecedented; from Manipur in the east to Cachar and Tripura in

the west and even south in the Chittagong Hill Tracts.

The result was the Expedition of 1869.'^* Two military columns armed with

mountain guns moved up into the Lushai hills, one under Assam's General Officer in

Command Brigadier General Nuthall advancing along the course of the river

Dhaleswar to the western chief Suakpuilala's village, and the other under the

Commissioner of Dacca Division along the Sonai to eastern villages of Vanpuilala. A

third, police column, also moved up from Sylhet to effect a junction with the

*How Httle was known of the reasons behind these can be seen in the Government of India letter to the
Secretary of State, on 12 February 1869 which said: "We have not yet been informed of the real origin
of these disturbances, but it is not uiPlikely that they are in some measure connected with the
movements of Kunhye Sing, one of the Muimiporee Princes, who is opposed to the present Raja of
Murmipur, and has gone into outlawing..." quoted in Birendra Chandra Chakravorty, op.cit. p. 55. One
of the principal reasons was, however, the extension of tea garden deep into tribal territory. This
accounts for the tea garden becoming the main targets of Lushai raids. See H K Barpujari Problem of
the Hill Tribes Vol.11 op.cit.^.U9.
"* For details Mackenzie, op.cit.; H S Lalsangpuia, "Frontier Policy under Lord Mayo with Special
Reference to the Lushais in the North East Frontier 1868-1872", unpublished M Phil thesis, Department
of History, North Eastern Hill University, Shillong 1983, p.22ff
 66

General's forces. The expedition failed, beaten by the weather. However, success

attended a Manipur force, consisting of 110 Thados or Khongsais, of whom about

ninety were armed with muskets, who had been ordered to cooperate from the

Manipur side. A portion of it was able to move up the Sonai river, to one of

Vanpuilala's villages, and within sight of the mother village, the headman of which as

well as those of Vanpuilala's villages had offered them submission.

The failure of the 1869 punitive measures led to a lengthy correspondence in

the middle of 1869 between the Lieutenant Governor of Bengal, Sir William Grey and

the Viceroy Lord Mayo on the future policy. On these discussions further and more

intense Lushai raids on the British, and Manipuri, territory had a powerful impact.

Mayo, despite his aversion to military measures finally sanctioned another punitive

expedition into the Lushai hills.^^ The details of the proposed expedition he left t o j ' ^

Commander in Chief, Lord Napier of Magdala, who turned into a huge military

expedition. Napier organised two large columns, one, the Left Column, under

Brigadier General Sir Charles Brownlow to move against the western Lushai, and the

other under Assam new General Officer in Command Brigadier General Sir George

"' FPAP December 1869, No.245; Secretary Bengal to Secretary Foreign Department, Government of
India, 17 August 1869. The Lieutenant Governor thus remarked on the failure of the Expedition, "The
organization and management of the whole expedition was a more decidedly military character than
suitable for expedition of this sort. A small force of picked troops under a select officer and supported
by a body of well drilled and well armed police....would be likely to be more successful in such a
country against such an enemy or the Looshais than a force having a military organization commanded
by an officer of high rank hampered by impeditions inseparable from a force of that character". These
observations, it will soon be seen, was totally cast in the military authorities.
For Lord Mayo's policy see Sir William Hunter, Life of the Earl of Mayo: the Fourth Viceroy of
India, Vol. I, London 1875, pp.235-237.
 67

Bourchier from Cachar against the eastern Lushais, principally the group of villages in

and around the Champhai valley.31

The Lushai Expedition: Kamhau-Manipur Relations

Manipur was once again required to cooperate, this time with Brigadier-

General Bourchier's column with a small contingent of troops. It was believed, largely

on account of the views of John Edgar, Cachar's highly regarded Deputy

Commissioner, that Manipur was in a better position than the military in Cachar to

exert pressure on the Lushais east of the Tuivai river. Bourchier's idea was to have

Manipur's troops occupy positions along its southern frontier towards the Lushai hills,

with a force stationed at Moirang to operate from that side if necessary. On 19 October

1871 he thus wrote to Major-General William Frost Nuthall, the officiating Political

Agent in Manipur:

1 have to request that you will take steps for occupying strongly a land of posts
along the southern frontier of Munnipoor and keeping in the valley near
Moirang a small compact force capable of supporting itself to act against the
most eastern tribes should information reach you that they have been tempted
to join Lalboorah, Tangdong and others against whom the column I command
with advance.

The selection of posts was left to Nuthall, but he was advised, "the summits of the

ridges are the natural highways, and seem the most desirable positions extending a far

^' The literature on the Lushai Expedition is fairly extensive: Lord Roberts, Forty One Years in India, 2
Vols. London 1897; A S Reid Chin-Lushai Land, Calcutta 1893; R G Woodthorpe, The Lushai
Expedition, 1871-72, London, 1873; also see appendices in Mackenzie, op.ci7.pp.562-583
 68

eastward (as possible)." Nuthall was to judge for himself the necessity of any advance

beyond Moirang.

Nuthall did not consider Moirang sufficiently advanced to the south to obtain

any information of the Kamhaus, much less controlling them or of rendering prompt

cooperation to Bourchier should this be required. Bourchier accordingly allowed him

to move down to Tseklapi, and spelt out the task for the Manipur contingent:

It is obvious that the eastern tribes will require watching, and this will be the
special duty of the Contingent, and will be of a delicate nature. Kamhaus
present attitude towards the other tribes might be termed by us to maximum
advantage and it is to be hoped that the state of things will continue, but on the
other hand, should he undoubtedly have cast in his lot with the other tribes you
will be in a position to attack him.

In accordance with these instructions Nuthall got Maharaja Chandrakirti Singh

to strengthen the frontier defences in the south, four of the twelve military posts he

established being located in the east north of Kamhau. By 15 December 1871 over

eighteen hundred Manipuri troops and two hundred and fifty Thado auxiliaries,

accompanied by two majors and General Nuthall, who was in virtual command,

occupied Tseklapi.

Before the Contingent left Imphal a Kamhau deputation waited upon the

Political Agent offering themselves for the Lushai expedition and seeking permission

to be allowed to proceed forthwith to attack the eastern Lushai villages. This Nuthall

forbade. But on being told by the Manipuris that the Kamhau men had on his refiisal

were overheard to say that they would do as they pleased, ordered them to send in

hostages by 15 December, to "enable us to curb their warlike proclivities". Nuthall

^- FPAP August 1872, No. 83, Nuthall to Aitchison, 12 April 1872, submitting final report on the
Manipur Contingent.
 69

seems to have been influenced on this by the two majors. When the hostages did not

make their appearance, they expressed to Nuthall their apprehension of Kamhau's

intentions that he had always been a doubtful ally, had never come in himself or

rendered implicit submission. They urged upon him the need to move the force further

south to make its influence felt by the Kamhaus and prevent any hostile design on

their part.^^

General Nuthall accordingly began to survey the southern frontier and on 24

December reached Chivu. "The superiority of this position", he later reported, "from

the object we had in view, viz, to watch and restrain Kanhow, was so apparent that I

alone resolved to remain here". And remain the Contingent did for the next two

months, anxiously awaiting developments as Bourchier's column advanced on to the

eastern Lushai hills and inflicted heavy punishment in villages implicated in raids into

Cachar. By February 1872 sickness appeared in the Manipuri camp and provisions

were running short. By the close of February 1872 the Lushai Expedition was over and

Bourchier had returned to Silchar.^'* On 6 March Nuthall received a communication

from him that the expedition having been brought to a successful conclusion the

services of the Contingent was no longer required. The next day the Nuthall and the

Manipur troops began their march back to Imphal.

On the 7 the Contingent met with what Nuthall called an "unexpected

adventure". That morning several hundred Kamhaus, of whom more than a hundred

were armed with muskets suddenly appeared in the Manipuri camp. Among them was

" Ibid
^^ A S Reid, Chin-Lushai Land, Calcutta 1893, Reprint Aizawl 1976, pp.26-28
 70

Go Khaw Thang, instantly recognised by one of the Thados as the chief responsible

for a raid into Manipur a year ago. The two Manipuri majors, after some queries told

Go Khaw Thang that since he had violated the Political Agent's orders and moved into

Lushai territory and raided their villages he should at once proceed and meet Nuthall

who was several miles ahead towards Moirang. After failing to persuade the Kamhau

chief to meet Nuthall the two majors decided to apprehend him. How this done, is thus

described by Nuthall:

The Majors then...got the Chiefs into familiar conversation, handed them a
percussion marked to try, and asked to try theirs, and having on their way
discharged the three muskets of the three Chiefs at once had their seized,
whereupon Kokatung, putting his forefinger in his mouth, gave a war alarm (a
whistle), and his force stood to arms, and a momentary struggle ensued; the
sepoys however overpowered and made prisoners of 56, and took 52 muskets,
with injury to themselves of only four men wounded, all of whom are doing
well.^^

The prisoners were then marched off to Imphal and were placed in irons in jail.

Chandrakirti Singh expected to use them in the event of future troubles with the

Kamhaus. Nuthall was elated that the "loss of so many arms to the tribe will tend to

break its power and restrain its preying upon the Lushais at this time of their

weakness", and hoped that the Commander-in-Chief and the Viceroy would

acknowledge "the judicious and resolute conduct" of the two majors. Both Bourchier

and Edgar condemned their conduct as treachery.

The apprehension of Go Khaw Thang and the two chiefs who had

accompanied him along with their followers and the refugees brings out the

'^ FPAP August 1872, No.79; From Political Agent, Manipur to Officer Commanding Cachar Column,
13 March 1872.
 71

complicated nature of the relations of the Kamhau-Sukte with Manipur on one hand

and with the eastern Lushais on the other. Manipur had been smarting under the failure

of the expedition in 1855 against the raids two years earlier by the very same Go

Khaw Thang. The peace that Colonel McCulloch patched between Manipur and the

Kamhaus after the expedition proved short lived. In the ten years since then there

were as many as six raids into Manipur, and after Kam Hau's death in 1868 another

three, all attributed to the late chief and his successors. In all these raids large numbers

of Manipuri subjects mainly Kukis of the Thado group, were carried off Thus

Manipur used the Lushai Expedition and the military movement south to deal with

their bitter enemies, the Kamhaus, the apprehension of Go Khaw Thang being an

unexpected bonus. General Nuthall who stood in for Dr Robert Brown on the latter's

furlough, had little experience of the politics of the Manipur fi"ontiers and failed to

understand the motives of the Manipuri majors. He was at any rate more concerned

with the Lushais.

Feuds between the Kamhaus and the Lushais, as shown earlier, had been long

standing. Many Kamhau villages had been established near Lushai areas; Bourchier's

column encountered one, Engo situated at 6,700 feet above sea level near the

Champhai valley, composed enlist of Kamhaus. Some Suktes had of course migrated

after Kam Hau had established his authority and had settled under the Lushai chief

Vanhuailiana. From 1869 onwards when the attention of the Lushais were diverted

towards Cachar, whose tea gardens they constantly plundered, "Kanhow and other

tribes" as Edgar reported, "were getting more daring in their aggression on their
 72

villages".^^ There were reports, for instance, in early February 1872 that "Shindoos

and Kanhows" had attacked and cut up two villages, one belonging to Vanhnuailiana's

brother and the other to his son, killing many and carrying off captives. ^ Even as

Bourchier was on his way towards Lushai chief Lalbura's village it was sacked by the

Kamhaus.^* After the defeat of the Lushais by Bourchier the Sukte-Kamhaus who

were under the protection of the former decided to return to their old homes; a

thousand immediately sought the protection of the Kamhaus.^^ It was these refugees

escorted by Go Khaw Thang and his warriors whom the Manipur majors had

encountered and apprehended. This was Edgar's version, and from the available

evidence appears to have been the truth:

They evidently went into the midst of the camp in perfect reliance (Edgar said
of the chief and his men) on the friendlies of the Murmipoorees, for, as the
result showed, they put within reach of the latter the women and children as
well as the property of the refugees. Their suspicion was not even aroused
when the Muimipooree officers fired off the muskets of the chiefs, and when
each armed man was surrounded by a group of three sepoys. I do not believe
that the Soktes had the slightest intention of attacking the Munnipooree camp.
The charge was in all probably afterwards invented by the Majors to excuse
their own conduct. This evident that the latter could not resist the temptation of
getting possession of the refugee, for the Munnipoorees are even more eager
than the hill chiefs themselves to get hold of Kookie and Naga subjects.'*'*

36
Ibid, No. 70; Edgar to Commissioner Dacca Division, 3 April 1872.
^'' FPAP March 1871, No.548; Telegram, Political Agent Manipur (Dr Brown) to Foreign Secretary,
Government of India.
^* The Pioneer of 7 May 1872 thus reported what Bourchier's column saw on 17 February when they
reached the village: "Other invaders had been there before them; and signs of war and slaughter greeted
on everyside. The (temporary) withdrawal of the Manipur contingent from the frontier owing to
sickness, had set free the Soktes Kookies- old enemies of the Lushai, who, seizing the opportunity and
knowing the panic caused by the advance of the British column made fierce onslaught on Lalboorah
under the guidance of Kamhau, their chief. Mackenzie, op.cit, vide Appendix K, p.580.
^' The punishment of the Lushai villages had in fact led to migration of the captive Thados and Suktes
in large numbers into Manipur.
•*" FPAP August 1872, Nos.70, Appendix C; From Edgar to Brigadier-General Bourchier, 21 March
1872.
 73

A month later a Kamhau embassy led by one Kai Khual but sent in by Chief

Za Tual was in Manipur to plead for the release of their chief He was informed that so

long as a single subject of Manipur remained in their hands no proposition of any kind

would be entertained."*^ In October 1872 a second embassy consisting once again Kai

Khual and others arrived in Manipur bringing with them four women captured a year

earlier and an elephant tusk for the Maharaja. From one of the four women. Colonel

Mowbray Thompson, Nuthall's successor as Political Agent, learnt that the object of

the first embassy was to ascertain if whether Manipur intended to release Go Khaw

Thang, if not they would attack and destroy all Manipuri villages in their frontier hills.

That summer rumours spread in the frontier villages of the possibility of a Kamhau

invasion of Manipur. In September a thousand Thados had actually migrated to

territories under Burmese control to avoid getting involved in the Manipur-Kamhau

conflict."*^ Kai Khual denied this saying that they could never hope to cope with

Manipur in arms. He was told by Thompson that:

It is my wish that peace should be made between your tribe and Muimipoor
without further bloodshed. As you appear to have been the aggressor in
attacking Murmipoorie villages, it is your duty to make the first fiiendly
advance, and Munnipoor as the more powerfiil state has a right to demand you
shall do so. On your part you should promise by a certain date the captives will
be returned, and that you will keep peace towards Munnipoor and her
tributaries for the future. If on going back to your Chief he will promise to do
the above, I will arrange with the Murmipoor authorities for meeting your good
intentions halfway, if on the other hand he will not consent, I fear the
Munnipoor authorities will not rest contented until they have taken their
Sepoys to Yatole's village and punished your tribe for their misconduct, by

41
FPAP January 1873, Nos.441-447; Political Agent Manipur to Secretary Foreign Department,
Government of India, 2 October 1872; see also General Nuthall letter of 25 April.
"*- Ibid. See Office Note, January 1873.
 74

burning their homes, destroying their stores of grains and driving off their
cattle.

The Manipuri officials, however, took the Kamhau threat seriously and began

military preparations with the object of sending an expedition into the Kamhau

country in the winter. John Edgar, who was asked for his comments on the situation on

account of his unrivalled knowledge of the frontier and the tribes, was convinced that

"the Munnipoori officials, and possibly the chief himself, are determined to avoid a

peaceful settlement of their dispute with Kanhow" and that:

If they try honestly to make term with the Sooktees, they might be successful,
for the latter had shown a desire to avoid fighting, which could scarcely have
been expected after the way in which were treated by the Munnipooris during
the Looshai Expedition.'*'*

Edgar sounded a note of warning that Manipur should not be allowed to attack the

Kamhaus who would "certainly make reprisal on the hill people and so give the

Munnipoori officials an excuse for attacking Kamhow".

The Government of hidia anxious to avoid any complications on this part of

the frontier particularly in view of the proposed topographical survey south of

Cachar accordingly directed the Political Agent to sort out Manipuris relations with

the Kamhau-Sukte. ^ The Maharaja was to be given to understand that any

improvoked hostilities with tribes beyond his boundary may involve him in difficulties

with Burma and will not receive the approval of the Government of India.

••^/Wc?. 2 October 1872.

•*"* Ibid, Note by Edgar on "Kamhow and Munnipoor", 20 December 1872.
''^ Ibid, see note by Charles Aitchison, 18 January 1873.
*' ^ Ibid, Secretary, Foreign Department, Government of India, to Political Agent, Manipur, 30 January
1873.
 75

Fortunately, Thompson was able, so it seemed, to win the confidence of the

Kamhaus. Before the communication of the Government of India reached Manipur,

Kai Khual had returned with twenty-six captives. Thompson was able to prevail upon

the Maharaja to reciprocate by liberating an equal number of Kamhau captives. He

thus reported to the Government of India:

I have been more successful with them than I anticipated. I thought

from the sullen manner in which they left me that there was trouble in store for
Munnipore, but two days ago I was pleasantly surprised by seeing the same
deputation return, accompanied by some 26 captives they made from the
Munnipoor Naga tributaries as far back as two years ago. They acted on the
advice I gave them.
I have suggested the Raja of Munnipore to at once liberate 26 of the
captives, which he so treacherously made last March.
The Munnipoorie authorities are pleased at my success, and say they
have never known the Kamhow tribe to restore captives before.

Evidently the success of the Political Agent in setting the border problems on

the path of peace removed the imminent danger^ another confrontation on Manipur's
.^''"'^
southern border. A (third) Kamhau deputation, once again under Kai Khual, again

returned to Manipur during the latter part of January 1873 bringing with him 14 other

captives. Go Khaw Thang had in the meanwhile succumbed to the rigours of prison

life in Imphal, but this did not prevent a settlement. On 16 March 1873 under the aegis

of the Political Agent, the Kamhau deputation and the Maharaja of Manipur signed a

peace treaty on the banks of river at Imphal. On the following day Thompson

informed the Government of India what he had achieved and how:

I then told him (Kai Khual) I would arrange with the Raja for the restoration of
ten of his clansmen, that being at the rate of one adult for every two children,
and also, that if his tribe was prepared to swear allegiance and fealty to

'*' Ibid, From Political Agent to Secretary, Foreign Department, 15 December 1872.
 76

Munnipore, I should not insist on their leaving Munnipore territory, but would
use my endeavours with the Raja to persuade him to acknowledge them as his
subjects, and advise him to release the son of their late Chief Kokatung, who
was in jail, and with him swear peace and friendship for the future. To this,
Kikoul agreed, and said, we want peace with Munnipore, and shall be done as
you say if Kokatung's son is released, and his dead father's skull and bones
made over to us. I did not like this latter part of the arrangement at all, but on
referring the matter to the Munnipore authorities, they, after wasting some time
in considering how they should act, decided in following my advice, and said,
unless we give up Kokatung's skull and bones, there will be no use in swearing
peace at all, for the Sooktees or Kamhows will never be satisfied without the
remains of their dead are given up to them. I have therefore complied with both
their wishes, and peace was sworn yesterday on the banks of the river
Eemphal, when, after the oath was repeated, first by a Munnipooris, and then
Kokatung's son, a live dog was cut in halves by the latter, and then all of the
ten captives, and Kikoul the chief, drank gun-powder water, which completed
the ceremony, and in the evening the whole of those released took their
departure for their native hills.

According to the agreement, both parties restored captives to each other. Kai

Khual also secured the release of the son of their late chief Go Khaw Thang and, what

he persistently insisted, the bones of his dead father. However, there were eight more

Kamhau captives in the possession of the Maharaja, which was agreed, would be

restored after the release of the ten captives still supposed to be with the Kamhaus.

Though the Manipur Durbar was very anxious to get Za Tual to come and take oath of

allegiance to the Maharaja before they would release Go Khaw Thang's sons, the

Political Agent dissuaded them from ftirther insisting as such a proceeding might lead

to complications with Burma. Neither the Political Agent nor the Manipuris realised

that the Kamhaus were merely temporising, only to obtain the release of their chiefs

and the remains of their great leader. Memories of their treatment by the Manipuris

"* FPAP April 1873 No.226; From Political Agent to Secretary, Foreign Department, Government of
India, 17 March 1873.
 77

during the Lushai Expedition were too strong to be so easily and quickly to be

forgotten.

Recurrence of Hostilities: The Mualpi Expedition

Eighteen months later there were reportsfi-omManipur that the Kamhaus were

once again on the rampage on its southern frontier. On 11 October 1874 two Anal

Kuki villages, Mukoong and Kumsol, were attacked and a large number of captives

carried away.**^ Dr Robert Brown who had resumed charge as Political Agent after his

fiirlough, visited the villages and found them burnt and abandoned. From eye witness

accounts Dr Brown came to the conclusion that the raids were committed by a section

of the Kamhau tribe, most possibly the Go Khaw Thang group, residing at Mualpi.

This village, according to Captain Robert Pemberton who wrote about it in the 1830's

and Thomson who confirmed it only recently, was encroached by the Kamhaus but

was formerly within Manipur territory. Dr Brown was for strong measures:

I am of opinion that should the Munnipoori desire it, permission (for an

expedition) should be granted. I would recommend, however, that Government
should not identify itself with the expedition further than limiting the
Murmipoori advance to Mombee. From all the information I can glean, and
that it is meager, the tribe of Kokatung who inhabit Mombee, and whose
villages contain some five hundred houses, will fight, and will most likely be
backed up by the tribes further south.^*'

49
Mackenzie, op.d/.pp.168-169
'" FPAP, February 1875, Nos. 101-113; Brown to Luttman Johnson, 12 October and 26 November
1874.
Deposition of Erabunt : "I was stationed with eight other sepoys at an outpost at Setiang (Sehang) a
village on the slope of the hills south east of Moirang, our order were to protect the villages and guard a
magazine placed there about twelve days ago (from ..Oct) I was awoke in the early morning by the
sound of musketry in the direction of the village of Mushoong about one and half hours journey south. I
being incharge of the guard assembled and with the armed villagers mustered fifty men. We started
about half an hour after the alarm was given.... In about 4 hours we reached the Sombee river...after
 78

Brown's letter was addressed to Colonel Richard Harte Keatinge, the Chief

Commissioner of Assam, through whom Manipur was to send their reports after the

constitution of the Chief commissionership in early 1874. Keatinge approved of

Brown's suggestion, "for a state situated as Manipur is, a policy of retaliation is the

only safe one".^' With the backing thus of the Chief Commissioner Brown held a

Durbar in his Residency on 5 December 1874, in which the following plan was

adopted:

1. Any force sent to confine its operation to the group of villages named Mombee,
which group it appears pretty clearly furnished the raiders.
2. Mombee, if resistance is offered to be destroyed. If opportunity offers
prisoners to be taken who can be afterwards exchanged for captives, now in the
hands of t h e j ?
Sooktie clan. Should any negotiation take place after attacking Mombee, the
chief object should be to arrange the return of captives.
3. Should the Mombee villagers make no resistance, the Manipuris should insist
upon hostages from these villages being given up to be held until the captives
are returned.
4. Manipur authorities to report careftiUy on the progress of the expedition. ^^

crossing we saw the Kamhaus in dense jungle about two to three hundred strong they werer eating...
The Kamhaus by this time did not observed us. We shot up a fire on them...after which they retreated
slowly to the south. We followed and found five dead bodies on the way their heads had been cut off
and taken away by the Kamhaus...Mukoong had lost 6 me killed and 7 house were burnt in the attack."
Statement of Mukoong Inhabitants: "In the night we were attacked by Lamyang Kookies, who live to
the south and haad a chief Kokatung (who was formerly a prisoner in Manipur and died there). We
turned out and several fled, the others who were armed resisted, we had to retreat, we lost 6 killed and
some women wounded. The Kamhaus also seized 23 villagers in all, men women and children... There
were we think about 30 muskets amongst them, the rest armed with spears, bows and arrows."
Statement of Kumsol Inhabitants: "My village is situated quite close to Mukoong and contains 37
houses; on the morning of the same day and about the same time our village was attacked. On being
attacked the women fled at once, the men attempted to defend the village, each man his own houses.
We lost llmen killed, one wounded. The Kamhaus had six killed....they carried off men, women, and
children and 5 muskets. We had 25 muskets. The Kamhaus had about 300 men and 30 muskets."
^' FPBP February 1875, Nos.46-57; Luttman Johnson to Secretary, Foreign Department, Government of
India, 5 November 1874.
^' Ibid, Brown to Luttmann Johnson, 7 December.
 79

The Chief Commissioner approved of the plan but made it clear that Brown

was not to accompany the expeditionary force since it would be contrary to precedents

for British officers or their agents to identify themselves with or join warlike

expeditions, which a native prince may undertake. ^^ Brown was to impress the

Maharaja the importance of not permitting any cruelty or treachery. The Chief

Commissioner of Assam through several communications laid down the conditions to

be strictly maintained during the expedition. These were that:

1. The group of villages named Mombee only to be attacked.

2. The Manipuris to send a sufficient force to obviate all chances of
defeat.
3. Reprisals on women and children to be strictly avoided.

The Maharaja accordingly organized an expeditionary force of 2000 Manipuri

soldiers and 400 Thado auxiliaries under the command of majors Sawai Tomba and

Thangal.^^ The force left Imphal on 19 February 1875. Two days of marching brought

them to Sugnu where they set up a base to attack the Kamhau villages. Shortly

afterwards they started for Mualpi and on 20 March, a minor encounter took place

near Diloom river. A group headed by Za Tual's brother made a determined attack on

the advance guard of 300 Manipuris but after one and half-hours encounter gave in

and retreated to the jungles. Early next morning, while preparation for a major assault

was underway, two Kamhau men, Kumteh and Lhungjeelun, came to the Manipuri

camp, pleading with them not to advance into their country. They acknowledge

Ibid, Luttman Johnson to Brown, 6 January 1875.

''' Ibid, Luttmann Johnson to Brown, 29 December 1874.
^^ FPBP June 1875, Nos 1-4; Brown to Luttman, 25 April 1875, Johnson forwarding " Narrative of
Expedition by Thangal Major and Tomba Major in charge of the Kamhow Expeditionary force".
 80

themselves to be the Maharajah's ryots and promised to pay tribute. As a mark of their

sincerity, they placed the Chief Za Tual's sword before the majors who in their turn

demanded all the captives taken from Kumsol be released. The majors decided not to

continue their operations when the two deputationists promised to return all the

captives taken from Kumsol village.

True to their word the wife and child of the Kumsol chief were handed over to

two Manipur subadars who had been sent to the Kamhau villages for the purpose. On

4 April, Kai Khual, emissary of Kamhau Chief Za Tual, and four other chiefs from the

Mualpi group of villages came into the camp bringing with them the chief of Kumsool

and six other captives and a mithun. The chiefs also promised to get back the

remaining captives, which they said had taken into the interior villages. On 9 April,

the Manipuri force, accompanied by some of the Kamhau chiefs returned to Sugnu.

Five days later they were at Imphal, the capital.^^

The expedition was directed against the Mualpi group of villages. What it

achieved Brown reported to the Chief Commissioner:

They (the Mualpi group) appear to have given in thoroughly surrendering all
captives they had retained, declaring themselves subject to Manipur and
agreeing to pay tribute, besides this they promise to do what they can to get
back the remaining captives. I had an interview with the deputation from
Mombi and the messengers from the chief Yatole, and assured them that the
only way to show their sincerity was to speedily return the captives. A good
road having been made from the south of the villages to Mombi, I have urged
on the Manipuris the policy of keeping it open and encouraging
communication and trade as much as possible with the Mombi group.^^

^* Annual Administrative Report of the Manipur Political Agency, 1874-75

" FPBP June 1875, Nos. 1-4; Brown to Luttmann, 25 April 1875.
 81

This was an assessment based on the report of the Manipuri majors commanding the

expedition. In a subsequent communication Browne expressed considerable doubts on

the so called success of Manipuri arms, having over the years some experience of

"Murmipoori accounts of their valiant doings when engaged in (such) operations". He

made discreet enquiries from those accompanying the Manipuris and found the official

report of the expedition much exaggerated: "not a shot was fired at Mombee" the

Political Agent discovered, "and its party seemed to be afraid of the other". This being

so.

What the result of the expedition will be it is impossible to say, but I should
conclude that matters are as much as they were, and should the Sooties feel
inclined to commit further raids upon Murmipoor territory, they are not likely
to be deterred by any fear of the Murmipoor Troops. The authorities
themselves seem quite apathetic in the matter.^*

Kamhau-Sukte Country: Annexation Proposed

Dr Brown was right. It did not take long to show how fragile Manipur-Kamhau

relations were. The expedition apparently had little effect and did not bring peace to

the frontier. When Guybon Heiuy Damant, later to be killed in the Naga Hills, was

briefly in Imphal in 1876 in succession to Brown, he found the Kamhaus had become

more aggressive and arrogant than before. Even the establishment of additional police

outposts on the frontier by Manipur had not been able to keep them under resfraint.^'

That year and the two succeeding years saw a recurrence of Kamhau aggression on

Manipur's frontier villages, leading the Political Agent to remark that the relations

58
Quoted in Anthony Kaba, op.cit.
' ' Mackenzie, op.cit. pp. 170-71
 82

between the two was in a "most unsatisfactory state". But as Sir Alexander Mackenzie

pointed out that although the Manipur political diaries for 1877 £ind 1878 contained

frequent references to Kamhau raids it was doubtful if they were entirely to be

blamed.^" The May 1877 raid by the Kamhaus was, for instance, in retaliation for a

Manipuri Kuki attack on one of their villages which left twenty two dead. These Kukis

were also said to have brought in about the same time five Kamhau heads for ritual

purposes. Damant's successor Captain James Johnstone's attempt at the exchange of

visits between Manipuri Kuki and Kamhau villages could never take off. No Manipuri

subject dared visit the Kamhau country.

These disturbances were in fact the result of the extremely unsettled conditions

in these hills. Inter-village and inter-tribal warfare, often the result of competition over

jhum fields or merely of extortion by powerful villages on their weaker neighbours,

had led to displacement of villages and kept some of the tribes in virtually perpetual

notion. During 1877-78 there was thus a report of an "exceptionally large

immigration", of over two thousand souls, from the Kamhau hills into Manipur. These

were settled by the Manipur authorities near Moirang. Johnstone who met them was

quite taken in by their appearances.^' These immigrants had brought with them a large

numbers of muskets and Johnstone felt that the Durbar should encourage the migration

''Ibid
*' Annual Administration Report of the Manipur Political Agency, 1877-78. "The men who come to see
were splendid specimens of the human races", wrote Johnstone, "late with very powerfiil frames,
altogether the first Kookies, I had ever seen. They told me I was the first European they had ever seen,
but showed no unseemly curiosity.."
 83

so that the Kamhaus will be "less formidable than before and Manipur will be relieved

of the constant dread of an attack from them".

From here Johnstone moved on to recommend the absorption of the Kamhau-

Sukte country into Manipur:

Whatever may be the defects of the Maharaja's Government, it is for better

than the fearful state of anarchy and barbarism in which these people live, and
the subjection of the Sootes to his rule would not only seem the valleys of
Manipur, Kubo and Kule from their outrages but in time would have allowed
us to join hands with the Chittagong Hill Tracts, and would have thus shut in
the Lushai tribes on all sides, and enabled us to take them in flank, thus
conducing much to the peace of all the tract of country lying between Cachar
and Chittagong. ^^

The Lushai chiefs were said to be willing to see their sworn enemies brought

under British control. So was Manipuri's Maharaja. And if his opinion that even

Burma would welcome such a proposition was true Johnstone was prepared to

recommend the Maharaja undertaking it. "The cost to us would be small, and through

him we should be able more effectually to coerce the Eastern Lushais, if at any time

necessary, as they with their Western brethren would then be completely hemmed in

between us and our feudatories". The Sukte-Kamhaus were then not in direct contact

with the British, but Johnstone said with remarkable prescience, "we may be twenty

years hence and timely, and to us inexpensive, action now may save trouble and

money in the future". There were good reasons for Johnstone's concern. As he pointed

out:

^" Ibid, In the following year when another hundred Kamhaus made their appearance in Manipur
Johnstone found them "in no wise inferior to their countrymen" and noted "The dignified air of these
noble savages, for noble they certainly are in appearance and demeanour".
^^ Administration Report, op.cit, 1878-79.
 84

The Sookti Kukis seem to be gradually pushing their way up towards the north
and even now are unpleasantly near the Ngnasana route to Burmah, and it is
probable unless checked they will eventually at no distant date, occupy the
whole of the Yomadoung range which divides Manipur from the Kubo valley.
I cannot but think that this move, whenever it takes place, will be to the
advantage of Manipur, as it will enable Durbar more thoroughly to control
these troublesome people, though it will be necessary to hold them in check, as
otherwise they will be making constant raids on the Kubo valley, and thus lead
the way to frequent disputes between the Burmese and Manipuris. Even now I
hear that the Sootis are a great nuisance to the people of the valley of Kule
(south of Kubo), to whom they appear to pillage at pleasure.^"*

A similar movement of tribes was taking place in the Chittagong Hill tracts and was

being brought under control of the local officers. There was no reason why the same

methods should not be followed towards the Kamhau-Sukte: "If this policy is carefully

pursued, we may hope during the next twenty five years to acquire without bloodshed,

such an influence as may result at no distant date in the substitution of peaceful acts

for war and rapine in these vast and unknown wilds", Johnstone concluded his rather

long report. ^^

In the event it was not from Burma that ^ British established their control

over these Chin tribes. When during the Anglo-Burmese War (1885-86) James

Johnstone, now a retired Major-General living in England learnt how difficult it was to

move Indian regiments, from Manipur, the base of operations, into the Chin hills, he

revived his old proposal: "the total subjugation of all the northern Chins through and

by means of Manipur, the resources of the state being properly organized under the

control of the Political Agent, or I should say, frontier commissioner, as far such as

big work you require a big man". Johnstone even sketched out a plan:

''Ibid
" Ibid
 85

To organize the Manipur levy under efficient European Officers, and form two
regiments; in addition to the force I should, for the first few years, have a
battalion of frontier police in Manipur. This force, with perhaps a little extra
help, to begin with, should gradually effect the entire subjugation of the Chin
country, which, as it was annexed, should be handed over to the Darbar
nominally, to be really administered by the frontier Commissioner. Roads
would be cut throughout the country, and in a few years a complete
transformation would be effected.*^

The "big man" for Manipur was not available. At any rate Manipur's frontier

problem ceased with the annexation of Upper Burma. The subjugation of the Kamhau-

Sukte as of the other Chins became the responsibility of the British forces in Burma

and formed part of the pacification process.

*^ FEAP July 1889, Nos.353-354; Johnstone to Sir Henry Durand, 27 December 1889. Johnstone had
further said, "When I talk of subjugating the Chins, I contemplate political and pacific measures to
begin with, and force only as a last resort. In fact I propose the same course of treatment as we pursued
in the Naga Hills, this time only more consistently. I have no doubt of the result. It is always to be
remembered that we made many mistakes in the Naga Hills which might have been foreseen-indeed
were foreseen by me- and might have guarded against. These we should not make a second time".