THE ROOTS OF MODERN AMERICAN OPERATIONAL ART

By Colonel Michael R. Matheny

The Napoleonic Wars changed the nature of warfare. The

nation states of Europe summoned all their potential to field
massive armies. The increasing industrialization of Europe helped
to make this possible and in later years further changed the face
of war by providing more lethal technology. Theorists such as
Jomini and Clausewitz sought to explain this new nature of
Warfare and mark out new doctrines and truths about war. The
emerging professional armies of Europe took from the theorists
that which suited them and prepared for the next major clash of
arms, World War I.

In the 100 years, which passed between the end of the

Napoleonic wars and the next general European war, things had
changed considerably. A major lesson drawn from the Napoleonic
Wars was the importance of the decisive battle, but the generals
of World War I were unable to achieve it. Indecisive fighting
led to prolonged static warfare. Jomini’s definition of strategy
as the “art of making war upon the map,” seemed woefully
inadequate.i The armies were so large it was impossible for
tactics alone to crush the enemy and achieve strategic aims. On
the field of Waterloo some 140,000 men faced each other. By 1914
a combined total of 3.3 million men struggled in the Battle of
the Frontiers in France. As soon as the Great War came to an end
military thinkers began to ponder the new lessons of warfare.

In the aftermath of World War I the professionals began to

understand more completely the impact of the expanded
battlefield, industrialization, and mass armies.ii The old
framework of strategy and tactics was inadequate to comprehend
the new changes. This was the genesis of operational art in the
industrial age.

The Germans were among the first to grasp the need for a
new concept to link national strategy with tactics. As early as
1920 Baron Von Freytag-Loringhoven mentioned that the General
Staff increasingly used the term operative (pertaining to
operations) and thereby defined more simply and clearly the
difference from everything that is referred to as taktisch.iii
The term strategy was confined “to the most important measures of
high command.”iv By the end of the interwar period this new
conceptual framework was well in place. In 1940 Colonel H.
Foertsch of the General Staff, described the German concept of
operations with a diagram. The diagram (see figure 1) emphasized
operations as the link between tactics and strategy.

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 The Soviet army also struggled not only with the lessons
of World War I but also with those of the Russian Civil War.
The Soviet concepts of operational art were the product of
several men, Svechin and Tukhachevsky foremost among them.
In 1923 Svechin proposed that operational art was “the totality
of maneuvers and battles in a given part of a theater of military
action directed toward the achievement of the common goal, set as
final in the given period of the campaign.”v Further, he
established the relationship between operations, tactics, and
strategy, “tactics makes the steps from which operational leaps
are assembled; strategy points the way.”vi

Tukhachevsky’s analysis of World War I also led him to

many key operational concepts. He recognized that technology had
expanded the battlefield requiring successive and deep
operations.vii In fact, the concept of deep operations was the
greatest achievement of Soviet interwar operational art. With the
onset of Stalin’s purges, however, innovative military thinking
came to an abrupt halt.viii

Since the emergence of operational art in our doctrinal

manuals in the early eighties, writers have been quick to point
to the Soviet and German development of the operational art
following the Great War. We must remember, however, that the
United States also participated in World War I. In little more
than a year a regular force of 100,000 officers and men forged a
four million man army. Of that great host, two million men were
sent overseas to the American Expeditionary Force. By the close
of the war the Americans had two armies in France and were on the
verge of forming their very first army group.

As in other armies, the American officers pondered the

lessons of that Great War. The changes in warfare and the
requirement to move massive armies to achieve strategic aims were
no less apparent to competent American officers. Was there,
then, no comparable development of American operational art?

There was, in fact, a good deal of operational thought and

synthesis going on in the American armed forces during the
interwar period. At Ft. Leavenworth and the Army War College the
curriculum, lecture notes, and even the doctrine indicated an
increasing sophistication of American military thought. The key
operational concepts such as phased operations, culminating
point, center of gravity, and lines of operation were becoming
imbedded in our institutions and doctrine. The sophistication of
American interwar thought can be judged by the emphasis placed on
logistics, joint and combined warfare. Operational art as taught
and understood during the interwar years would help prepare the

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American armed forces for the great challenge which loomed just
over the horizon, World War II.

THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE THEORY OF OPERATIONAL ART

Most of the key concepts of operational art were developed in

the nineteenth century by the two great interpreters of the
Napoleonic experience, Jomini and Clausewitz. Both men were
interested in the application of military force to achieve
political goals. The method of determining how this force was to
be applied was strategy. The key mechanism of strategy was the
campaign plan. For Clausewitz, strategy was “the use of the
engagement for the purpose of the war.”ix The strategist devised
the campaign and decided how to use battles to achieve his aims.
Clausewitz discussed at great length the elements of strategy but
did not dwell on the practical art of formulating a campaign
plan.

Jomini left a much greater mark on the details of strategic

planning. For almost all of the nineteenth century strategy and
by extension, campaign planning, amounted to the selection of the
theater of operation, the base of operation, the line of
operation, and decisive points. At the end of this process of
selection was the final deployment for the decisive battle.
Jomini’s major contribution, then, was to provide the geometry of
the battlespace. Although he borrowed some of the ideas, it was
Jomini who put them together and popularized them.”x

Another important contribution from Jomini was his

attention to logistics. In fact, if he did not coin the phrase,
he gave it widespread use and new meaning. For Jomini logistics
“was the practical art of moving armies.”xi This art embraced
not only moving armies, but also their sustainment, which
required the establishment of lines of communication. Jomini
recognized the significance of logistics in campaign planning.
He insisted that one of the fundamental principles of war was the
importance of throwing the mass of your army upon the enemy’s
lines of communication without compromising your own.”xii

Clausewitz generally ignored logistics, preferring instead

to focus upon the very nature of war. In his investigation of
the nature of war, however, he developed several key operational
concepts. Clausewitz believed that the first task in planning
was to identify the enemy’s center of gravity. He defined the
center of gravity as “the hub of all power and movement, on which
everything depends.”xiii Once identified, “all energies” were to
be directed against it.”xiv When the center of gravity was
destroyed, the enemy was powerless, defeated.

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 Another key operational concept, which Clausewitz
introduced, was the culminating point. Both Jomini and
Clausewitz recognized that strategy involved offensive and
defensive operations. The essential question was when to do
what. Clausewitz observed that every offensive inherently lost
force as it continued to pursue the attack. The point at which
the attacker has only sufficient strength to conduct a successful
defense, he labeled the culminating point.xv Every commander
must be aware of his culminating point and plan accordingly. In
the offense decisive operations must occur before this point.
For the defender, the time at which the attacker passes his
culminating point may be the best moment to begin a counter
offensive.

For the remainder of the century the military theorists

generally fell into two camps, the followers of Jomini or
Clausewitz. Jomini’s work was the first to be published and
translated into different languages. Initially, the Jominian
influence was predominant. General Henry Halleck, American
chief of staff in the Civil War, was greatly impressed by
Jomini’s The Art of War. In l846 he wrote Military Art and
Science which drew heavily from Jomini. Lines of operations,
bases of operations, theaters of operation all found there
way into American strategy. This influence was continued in
works such as James Mercur, Elements of the Art of War, 1889,
(a West Point text) and CPT John Bigelow, The Principles of
Strategy, 1894 (a Leavenworth text).

Jomini’s influence also extended to England. In 1856

Patrick MacDougall, first commandant of the British Staff
College, wrote The Theory of War. This work derived from Jomini.
The text, which replaced MacDougall’s book at the Staff College,
E.B. Hamley’s, The Operation of War, also derived from Jomini.xvi
These books were influential in the United States because they
were available in English. Hamley’s book was also used as a text
in the first class at the School of Application for Infantry and
Cavalry at Ft. Leavenworth.xvii

All these works adopted Jominian terminology and geometry.

They also mentioned the importance of logistics. For Hamley,
logistics “...is absolutely essential as a foundation to any
solid superstructure of military theory.”xviii Just as
importantly, the vision of war in these works was that of only
two opposing armies maneuvering to a decisive battle.

Clausewitz’s concepts became more popular with the rise of

German military prestige. Moltke, chief of the Prussian general
staff from 1857 to 1888, was greatly impressed with On War. All
the same Moltke believed strategy to be “a system of
expedients.”xix There was little use in planning beyond the first

4
encounter with the enemy. Moltke’s victories in the wars of
German unification seemed classic examples of nineteenth century
strategy—base of operation, lines of operation, and concentration
for the decisive battle.

Later theorists who drew upon Clausewitz for inspiration

also adopted many of his key concepts. Baron Von der Goltz’s The
Conduct of War translated into English in 1896, was very
influential. This book also served as a text in the General
Staff School at Ft. Leavenworth.xx Von der Goltz accepted that a
campaign is a series of events which leads to the decisive
battle. He identified the center of gravity as the main hostile
army. This is the “objective against which all our efforts must
be directed.”xxi The author also emphasized the culminating point
of offensive operations. “It is the business of the commander to
recognize the arrival of this culminating point at once, in order
to utilize it.”xxii

The theorists of the nineteenth century who followed Jomini

and Clausewitz added very little. The theorists addressed
strategy and tactics. In the early part of the century national
strategy was usually synonymous with the deployment of the main
army. Once in contact with the enemy main army, tactics decided
the outcome. Since there was only one main army, its defeat
could be decisive. This, then, was how strategic alms were
achieved.

As the century wore on, armies and their battlefields

became larger. Several armies operating over a vast expanse,
possibly in different theaters, meant that the defeat of any one
of them might not be decisive. Strategic aims were necessary to
coordinate their employment. Yet the armies operating in
different theaters required their own objectives and plans which
would contribute to the strategic aims. World War I demonstrated
these deficiencies. If a single battle could not be decisive,
successive operations needed to be planned. If a single battle
could not be decisive, tactics alone could not achieve strategic
aims. A new activity, linking tactics and strategy, needed to be
formulated. This activity provided a framework for the design of
campaigns within a theater of operations.

In addition to the old operational concepts which had

served nineteenth century strategy, new considerations had to be
added. Joint warfare by the end of the century included not only
army and navy but air forces as well. Combined operations between
allies within a theater of war took on new importance. New forms
of industrial warfare, which involved mechanization, massive
armies, and vast expanses, raised logistics to a new vital
Concern in operations. Logistics, joint, and combined warfare

5
were all measures of the need for increasing sophistication in
planning.

The new operational art developed after World War I

contained many of the concepts of nineteenth century strategy.
These concepts needed not only a new framework to become useful
in this art, they needed sophistication. As we look over our
shoulders at the operational art which developed in Europe during
this period, we often overlook the development of this art on our
own shores. Revulsion at the cost and horror of the great
struggle of 1914-1918 turned the public’s mind away from war to a
new hopeful era of peace. It is curious that in a period in
which major conflict seemed impossible, indeed, was even
internationally outlawed, American theoretical and doctrinal
synthesis and innovation was very much alive. Those officers and
institutions, which thought about the unthinkable, helped prepare
the nation for the greatest war in history.

THE TWENTIES

The experience of World War I greatly influenced the

officer education system established in the United States in the
postwar period. The school system was reestablished in 1919 to
address many of the specific problems, which emerged during the
war. Foremost among these problems were handling large armies in
the field and preparing the nation for war. The School of the
Line and the General Staff School at Ft. Leavenworth prepared
officers to staff and command large units. The Army War College
reemerged in 1919 as the General Staff College in Washington,
D.C. This institution was to prepare officers for duty with the
General Staff of the Army. At the core of this program was the
single problem of preparing the army for war. In 1919 this meant
mobilization and war plans.xxiii

At Ft. Leavenworth officers of appropriate rank attended

the School of the Line. This course devoted one year to the
study of brigade and division operations. Selected officers then
went on to the General Staff School, also of one-year duration.
In the second year, students focused on corps and armies.
Beginning in 1922 the General Staff School added the study of
army groups to its program of instruction.

The scope of these studies was impressive. In 1922 a course

in strategy was included, but by far the bulk of program was
devoted to the operations of large units. The course entitled
“Tactical and Strategical Studies of Corps, Armies, and Army
Groups” absorbed more than 25% of the curriculum. This included
conferences on plans of campaign. A substantial portion, 24 out
of 209 conferences, were devoted to the logistics of larger

6
units. These classes dealt with organization of supply and the
communication zone in a theater of operation.xxiv

The two-year program at Ft. Leavenworth was, however,

short-lived. In July of 1922 a board recommended that the two
schools be combined into a one-year course. The primary reason
for this action was the need to provide more officers to the army
at large. The schools were consolidated into the Command and
General Staff School. The new program focused on brigade,
division, and corps operations. The General Staff College was
redesignated the Army War College and became responsible for
instruction on echelons above corps. Not until 1928 was the two-
year program reestablished at Ft. Leavenworth. From 1928 until
1935 the second year students concentrated on corps and army
operations.

Most of the doctrinal thought related to operational art in

the twenties occurred at Ft. Leavenworth. In 1920 COL William K.
Naylor, the director of the newly established General Staff
School, wrote The Principles of Strategy. His purpose was to
provide his students with an American text to replace Von der
Goltz’s Conduct of War. The colonel was well read; the
bibliography as well as the text indicates he was much influenced
by Jomini, Von der Goltz, and Clausewitz.

Naylor included the usual discussion of Jominian lines

of operations, bases, and geometry. More significantly,
Clausewitz’s concepts were directly injected into the mainstream
of American officer education. Naylor accepted Von der Goltz’s
assertion that the main army was the source of the enemy’s power,
i.e. center of gravity.xxv He devoted a whole chapteron the
question of when to change from the offense to the defense.
Central to this discussion was the concept of the culminating
point, “Although originally superior to the enemy and victorious
in the past, troops may finally arrive, through an inevitable
process of weakening, at a point which does not assure any future
success, or, in other words, the point of culmination.”xxvi With
regard to campaign planning, Naylor insisted on linkage between
the political aims and the campaign plan.xxvii His concept of
planning also suggested successive operations.

In military affairs there will be certain groups of

actions, in the same theater of war, consisting of
concentrations, marches, assumptions of positions, and
combats that follow each other in logical order, each
successive one inseparably growing out of the preceding one.
This group then would be called an operation and the plan
would be called the plan of operation.xxviii

7
 Several plans of operation then made up the plan of
campaign. Despite this growing horizon of American thought,
Naylor still talked about maneuvering to achieve the decisive
battle. The method of instruction at the General Staff School
provided both the doctrine and the means to exercise it. Every
class was divided into two committees usually of 12 officers
each. The committee selected a spokesman to render reports on
the assigned subjects, which were then followed by general
discussion. The texts provided the latest doctrine and required
the students to demonstrate their knowledge of it through
frequent map exercises.

The texts, which dealt with large unit operations,

reflected much of Naylor’s thinking on key concepts and campaign
planning. The text on army groups written in 1921, set out the
structure of operations. The zone of the interior, construed to
be the continental United States, provided the resources to fight
the war. The theater of operations where military action
occurred, was divided into the communication zone and the combat
zone. In map exercises students were required to present
solutions to problems of the army group in offensive, defensive,
and counter offensive operations. The solution for the army
group in the defense used the term center of gravity to describe
the heaviest concentration of force within the army group.xxix
Although not using the phrase culminating point, the concept was
present in the discussion on when to begin the
counteroffensive.xxx

The 1922 text on the operations of corps and armies was even
more explicit in expressing concepts of operational design. Going
beyond Naylor, this text clearly established three levels of
planning: project of operations, plan of campaign, and plan of
operation. Projects of operations involved national strategy,
which might include several campaigns. The plan of campaign:
.
...relates to the general conduct of forces in a single
theater of operations and is the plan prepared by the
commander thereof for the accomplishment of the mission
assigned. It includes successive tactical operations.xxxi

The plan of operation related to the tactical phase of a

campaign and might involve several tactical operations.xxxii

The text stated that the plan of campaign must determine:

-The objective
-The course of action
-What the hostile decisive element is
-Statement of decisive and secondary strokes
-Method and location of concentration

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 -Supply arrangements
-Lines of retreatxxxiii

The objective of the campaign varied with the level of

planning. At the national and strategic level the objective of
operations might be an enemy locality or the enemy army.

The objective of tactical operations was always the enemy armed

forces.xxxiv In later manuals “enemy locality” was explained as
the capital, vital industrial areas, or disputed territory.xxxv
With this exception, for the rest of the interwar period the
enemy center of gravity, the key to his defeat, remained as
described in 1922.

Finally, the map exercises included in this text required

the students to integrate air and logistics into their plans.
There was, however, no mention of combined or joint operations.
There was great emphasis placed on concentration of forces. This
concern with concentrating forces continued throughout the
interwar period.

Concentrating combat power within the theater of operation

was a major concern. The text insisted that the plan of
concentration must be based on the plan of campaign. Further the
bulk of the forces in the concentration must be secured from
enemy interference and knowledge. The concentration should cover
the base of supplies and the line of retreat. Students were
required to plan concentrations and then defend their
solutions.xxxvi

This text entitled Tactical and Strategical Studies, Corps

and Army, went through five editions. The 1925 edition refined
some of the earlier concepts and reflected a greater influence of
Clausewitzian ideas. The plan of campaign consisted of a
“detailed study of the theater, a plan of concentration, and a
plan of operation.”xxxvii The plan of campaign sought to determine
the time, location, and nature of the first decisive battle. The
campaign plan:

… may also contemplate probable successive operation

phases to continue the success of the primary operations,
and consider steps to be taken contingent upon results being
different from those expected.xxxviii

This suggested not only phased operations, but branches and

sequels to the plan as well. In the discussion of strategic
maneuver, although the term did not appear, the importance of the
culminating point clearly emerged.xxxix This course continued to
require the students to integrate air and logistics into their
plans. Specifically, they were required to develop a plan for

9
the campaign, concentration, scheme of maneuver, and supply for
an army.xl In reviewing the solutions to the map exercises it
becomes clear that the concept and role of the decisive battle in
campaign planning was changing. The first decisive battle, as
described in the 1925 edition of Tactical and Strategical
Studies, is very similar to the current operational concept of
major operations. Doctrinal thought on campaign planning and
operational design made good progress at Ft. Leavenworth during
the twenties. The Jominian concepts of lines of operation, bases
of operation, and importance of logistics were confirmed in
Naylor’s Principles of Strategy. These concepts became a
permanent part of higher level planning. Just as significantly,
Naylor introduced Clausewitz into the officer education system.
Clausewitzian concepts were reflected in the doctrine and
increasingly exercised a greater influence on American military
thinking. These concepts became the basis for the American
response to the changing nature of warfare.

The primary concern of the Army War College was not

doctrine but preparing the army for war. The early program of
instruction reflected this central concern. At the beginning of
the school year the students were formed into committees to study
current international relations and the balance of power. The
committees then decided on the most probable war scenario, which
would involve the United States. The remaining courses of
instruction took various committees through operations,
personnel, supply, and training to both prepare and conduct the
war.xli

This program took the students through mobilization, war

planning, and operations. The method of instruction was the same
as at Leavenworth. The committees were assigned aspects of the
problem or subject and presented their solutions and observations
to the class as a whole. When the General Staff School at Ft.
Leavenworth was combined with the School of the Line there was a
readjustment of curriculum. The Army War College was directed to
pick up the instruction on the strategy, tactics, and logistics
of the field army.xlii

The shift in responsibility for this instruction did not

result in any great changes in doctrine. Throughout the interwar
period the texts from the General Staff School were used to teach
the doctrine of large unit operations. In 1924 a Command Course
was set up to present the instruction on strategy, campaign
planning, and operations of the field army. Command Course
Document #29 which was used as a text consisted of six chapters
reprinted from the 1924 edition of Tactical And Strategical
Studies, Corps and Army.xliii Also in the command course were many
historical studies of campaigns. Again, the campaigns were

10
critically studied according to the Leavenworth doctrine. The
Army War College did not write doctrine, it used it.

Additional changes in the curriculum of the War College

occurred when the General Staff School at Leavenworth returned to
the two-year program. In 1928 the War Department directed the
War College to instruct officers not only in the operations of
echelons above corps but also in the joint operations of the army
and navy.xliv In keeping with Clausewitz’s analysis of war, the
entire curriculum was divided into two major parts, preparation
for war and conduct of war. This organization of the program
lasted throughout interwar period.

The major contributions of the War College to campaign

planning and operational design was in war planning and joint
operations. During their studies the students developed and
studied many plans. Formats for these plans were hammered out in
the twenties. The integration of joint planning into operational
design was continuous throughout the twenties.

By 1925 the college taught that there were four types of

plans: the joint plan, army strategical plan, GHQ plan, and the
theater of operation plan. The Joint Planning Committee of the
Joint Board developed the joint plan. It stated the national
objectives, summarized the situation, and prescribed missions to
the army and navy. The General Staff developed the army
strategic plan. It was essentially a directive from the
secretary of war, which allocated forces and directed
mobilization. The GHQ (General Headquarters) plan was developed
by the War Plans Division (WPD) of the General Staff. In theory
the WPD would form the staff of the general headquarters
established in a theater of war. This plan organized the
theaters of operation, allocated forces, and gave broad missions
to subordinate commands. Finally, the theater commander
developed the theater of operation plan. xlv

The joint plan was the capstone plan, all others were
supporting plans. The plans were linked in their support of
objectives to the higher plan. The War College settled on the
five-paragraph field order as the format for all the plans.xlvi
The college recognized the requirement for phasing these plans.
In an orientation lecture to the class of 1925 COL C.M. Bundel,
director of the War Plans Division, advised the students:

It is becoming apparent that the whole of the war

effort is not a rigid, indivisible affair that must be
handled as such. In fact, an analysis shows quite clearly
that it is divided into several distinct steps or phases
which, while inherently distinct, nevertheless are
interdependent and in some cases overlapping. It is believed

11
 that the differentiation of these phases is essential to
clear understanding and correct solution of the many
problems involved ... xlvii

The students developed plans involving many scenarios.

Each enemy was color-coded, for example, Japan-orange,
Mexico-green, Soviet Union-pink, etc. In their plans they
generally took COL Bundel’s advice and phased their operations.
In addition to developing a system and formats for plans,
which linked national aims to military objectives in a theater of
operations, the college developed joint operational planning. As
early as 1920 the commandant of the War College suggested an
exchange of students with the Naval War College. By 1927 the
number of naval officers attending the War College increased to
six with an additional three marines. The War College also added
two naval officers to its faculty. Both as faculty and students
these officers contributed to improvements in joint planning.

Joint war games between the Army and Naval War Colleges
began in 1923. The exercise involved the defense of the
Philippine Islands. The joint games were held again the next
year. By 1925 the majority of the War College class was
participating. Communications between Washington Barracks (AWC)
and Newport, Rhode Island (NWC) were maintained by telegram.xlviii

Joint exercises were not confined to the map. In 1925 the

Chief of Staff, MG John L. Hines, lectured the class on the
recent Army-Navy exercises in Hawaii. He noted that 50,000
officers and men participated. He raised the issue of joint
staffs instead of liaison officers. Finally, he noted that the
only real problem was lack of coordination between army and navy
air forces.xlix

As the decade of the twenties came to a close, American

officers recognized some of the features of the new face of war.
The need for phased operations in a formalized system of planning
which linked national aims to military objectives right down to
the theater of operations, was a major step forward. This plus
the integration of joint operations in planning was the
contribution of the Army War College. These trends continued
into the thirties.

THE THIRTIES

In 1935 the need for more officers again caused the General
Staff School at Leavenworth to cancel the second year program.
While it continued there was overlap between the Staff School and
the War College.l The students of both schools planned campaigns
and conducted numerous map exercises. The main difference was
that the General Staff College continued to provide the doctrine.

12
 In the discussion of problems for the second year course in
1934, the text mentioned specific factors that influenced
planning in a theater of operations. These factors were
military, geographical, political, and economic. Among the
military considerations were relative strength, time and space,
mobility, communication, and transportation. The geographic
factors concerned the structure of the theater, railways, roads,
and waterways.li

This text was much more definitive than the doctrinal

literature of the twenties regarding successive operations.
Previous doctrine stated that the theater plan may consider
probable successive operations. This text stated that the
“theater plan should contemplate probable successive operations
contingent upon the results to be expected.lii The discussion of
the scope of the plan, lines, and bases of operation reflected
the earlier texts. Interestingly, the references listed
Clausewitz, On War, Book I /Chapter I “What is War”, Book
V/Chapter II “The Army, The Theater of Operation, The Campaign,”
and Book VIII /Chapter VI, IX “Political Aim on Military Object,”
“Plan of War.”

By far the most remarkable document to come out of the

Leavenworth in the thirties was Principles of Strategy for an
Independent Corps or Army in a Theater of Operations. Written in
1936 this text was remarkable because of the obvious influence of
Clausewitz, the clarity in expression of operational concepts,
and the analysis of the impact of modern warfare on operations
within a theater. The influence of Clausewitz was evident
throughout the text. In a statement perhaps aimed at Jomini, the
introduction asserted:

It is futile to analyze and theorize about strategy in

terms of geometry alone. The physical and psychological
influence are too intimately, bound up in it to say that any
one element is ever paramount in any situation.liii

The text stressed the importance of history in the study

of campaigns. The role of chance meant that “the issue of battle
is always uncertain.”liv To overcome this uncertainty the
commander needed special qualities of character and
determination. All these observations can be found in On War,
where Clausewitz discussed them at great length.

Clausewitz’s influence was even more evident in the text’s

discussion of mass and the strategy of annihilation. All other
things being equal mass, numerical superiority, decided the
issue. In fact, the fundamental law of strategy is, “BE STRONGER
AT THE DECISIVE POINT.”lv The text strongly embraced the battle

13
of annihilation and concluded that only the wide envelopment
could achieve it.lvi

The operational concepts present in earlier Leavenworth

texts are presented more clearly and forcefully in 1936. The
three types of military art were reaffirmed as the conduct of
war, strategy, and tactics. The conduct of war related to not
only the armed forces but also political and economic measures as
well in achieving the national aims in war. Strategy was defined
as “the art of concentrating superior combat power in a theater
of war” which would defeat the enemy in battle.”lvii Combat power
consisted of “numbers, weapons, tactical skill, fighting ability,
resolution, discipline, morale, and leadership.”lviii Finally,
tactics was defined as “the art of executing strategic movement
prior to batt1e.”lix

This framework of military art allowed for other

operational concepts included from earlier texts. In regards to
successive or phased operations, it was noted that the commander
“must look further into the future and must see beyond the battle
itself.”lx Indeed, modern conditions meant that, “Final victory
will be achieved only through a succession of operations or
phases.”lxi The notion of culminating point was also discussed.lxii

Principles of Strategy also included a new analysis of the

changing nature of warfare and its impact on operations within a
theater. In a section entitled Future Wars the text announced
that modern war is a succession of phases. Extensive road and
rail networks had expanded bases of operation and lines of
communication into areas of communication. The text acknowledged
the increasing importance of supply in modern armies.lxiii

Perhaps of greater interest is the analysis of the impact

of technology. The text claimed that modern weapons made frontal
assaults less attractive. By the same token mechanization and
aviation made wide envelopments more feasible. Since wide
envelopments were the only strategic maneuver, which might result
in a decisive battle (campaign) of annihilation, it was the
preferred maneuver.lxiv

The manual asserted that complete motorization would not be

effected for some time. This implicitly recognized the mobility
differential of various elements of the force. Mechanized units
were to attack the flanks and rear of the enemy to prevent his
withdrawal. Combat aviation and tanks would disrupt the lines of
communication far in the rear and isolate enemy forces.lxv
Although frontal attacks were discouraged, if a penetration was
to be conducted it was done:

By massing a preponderance of force while

14
 economizing elsewhere, the commander plans to
achieve an advance deep into the hostile formation.
If this operation is successful, it is frequently
decisive. It has for its object the separation of
the enemy’s forces into two parts and then the
envelopment of the separated flanks in detail.lxvi

This analysis certainly compares favorably with the most

prominent theorists of the day. In fact, Guderian or
Tukhachevsky could have written it. Curiously, in the same year
many of Tukhachevsky’s ideas were officially sanctioned when
published as the Field Service Regulations of the Soviet Union,
1936. The main difference lay in the fact that Tukhachevsky saw
mechanization providing the means of deep operations, which made
it the preferred maneuver. While the Russians preferred
penetration leading to envelopment; the Americans leaned toward
the German solution of wide envelopment.

The 1936 Principles of Strategy went beyond this

analysis to consider new approaches to strategy. A key
assumption was, “strategy is concerned with making an
indirect approach accompanied by movements intended to
mystify, mislead, and surprise the enemy.lxvii The text went so
far as to assert that if two armies confronted each other with
their lines of communication secure, all their combat power
present, and without being surprised, no strategy had been used
at all.lxviii This logically led to the emphasis on the enemy
flanks and rear using wide envelopments.

The great British theorist, Liddell Hart, first proposed

his thesis of the indirect approach in The Decisive Wars of
History published in 1929. Liddell Hart’s The Strategy Of the
Indirect Approach was not published until 1941. Original or not,
Principles of Strategy for an Independent Corps or Army in a
Theater of Operations, 1936 was remarkable for its synthesis of
modern thought combining Clausewitz, the indirect approach, and
modern technology. It was a bold statement of operational
doctrine. If one substitutes operational for the word strategy,
this work was comparable, perhaps better, than any then existing
on the nature of combat. How influential was Principles of
Strategy? The Command and General Staff School hammered home the
doctrine to such an extent the War Department took issue with the
emphasis on wide envelopments. The objections of the War
Department were hotly debated in the War College.lxix Regardless
of the debate, the text was quoted in lectures given at both the
Navy and Army War Colleges by senior faculty.lxx

As in the twenties, the War College used the doctrine from

Leavenworth for instruction and war planning. As in the previous
decade, its major contribution was integrating joint and to some

15
extent combined planning into operational design. Both war
planning and technology pushed the War College in this direction.
As the war clouds gathered after 1935, it was impossible to
conceive realistic planning either in Europe or the Pacific
without the navy. At the same time, technology allowed the air
arm to mature and grow into a powerful force that could not be
ignored. Both the navy and the air corps became partners in the
design of operational campaigns.

At the outset of the decade in 1931, CAPT W.D. Puleston, a

naval officer on the Army War College faculty, impressed upon the
class the importance of joint operations. He declared that in
our entire military history, “scarcely an important campaign from
Louisburg to the Argonne was not in the broad sense a joint
operation.”lxxi As he looked into the future he saw that the air
force would become a major factor in joint army-navy operations.

Students at the War College examined the impact of aviation

on theater operations. In 1930 they envisioned an aviation duel
for control of the air before ground contact was gained. They
recognized that aviation deepened the combat zone and required
the dispersal of supplies within the communication zone.
Finally, they concluded that the air force must be kept under the
control of the theater of operation commander.lxxii

During the thirties the air corps organization reflected

air doctrine. The air corps was organized into heavy
Bombardment, light bombardment, and pursuit squadrons. The heavy
bombardment units were the strategic arm of the air corps at the
national level. Light bombardment units were the basic air
support forces allotted to the army. Pursuit units were the
fighters, used for both counterair and direct support of the
ground forces. Air Corps General Headquarters (GHQ) fought the
counterair and strategic bombing battles. Aviation units
assigned to armies or army groups provided direct support.

By the end of the decade the army’s concept for the

employment of aviation within the theater was well developed. In
1939 MAJ J. Lawton Collins, an instructor at the War College,
informed the class that, “combat aviation is the (army) group
commander’s fire support element.”lxxiii Air forces with an army
group were to be used to have a direct effect on the success of
the army group. Combat aviation operated beyond artillery range
but usually no more than 150 miles beyond the front lines.lxxiv

The air corps had definite views on how it assisted the

theater commander. The primary tasks of aviation units in
support of ground forces were observation and isolation. The air
corps wanted, “Isolation of hostile troops in the combat zone
from their sources of supply and disruption of critical enemy

16
troop movements.”lxxv This was done by attacking the structure of
the battlefield. The air corps targeted defiles in roads and
railways, and supply concentrations. In map exercises exactly
like those at Leavenworth and the War College, students at the
Air Corps Tactical School practiced this doctrine.lxxvi

One area in which theater planning at the War College

remained weak was coalition warfare. It was not, however,
completely ignored. During the war plans period of the
preparation for war course the students were divided into
committees. Each committee prepared plans for war with various
countries and coalitions. Subcommittees were formed to deal with
specific aspects of the plans or requirements. Presentation was
then made to the class and faculty. From 1934 to at least 1936
one of the committees prepared detailed plans which involved the
United States in a coalition against a common enemy.

Two of these coalition scenarios were of particular

interest. In 1936 the coalition scenario pitted the U.S., Great
Britain, France, Greece, and Turkey against Germany, Italy,
Austria, and Hungary. The requirement called for the students to
develop war aims, extent of U.S. participation, and the joint
Army and Navy basic plan. No theater plans, however, were
made.lxxvii Of greater interest was the 1934 coalition scenario
pitting the U.S., Great Britain, Soviet Union, and China against
Japan.

The plans generated by this committee included much of the

operational design developed in earlier years. In the scenario
Japan was involved in major ground operations against the
Russians in Manchuria and threatened U.S. and British possessions
in the Pacific. The center of gravity of the campaign was
determined to be the Japanese army and fleet. The Soviets were
to remain on the defensive until the combined British and U.S.
campaign provided an opportunity for a crushing allied
counteroffensive.

The plan envisioned four phases which brought the allied

(British and American) main effort up from the south. In the
first phase British and Chinese land and air forces from Hong
Kong operated against the Japanese forces in the Fukien province.
In the second phase the allied fleet with a U.S. corps penetrated
the Japanese Pacific defense line and conducted joint operations
against the Shantung province. In the third phase the air forces
isolated the Japanese in Korea by bombing their lines of
communication. Joint operations then secured Korea and allied
forces marched on toward Mukden. At this time the Soviets began
their counteroffensive which resulted in a massive allied
envelopment of enemy forces on the mainland. The final phase
called for operations against the Japanese home islands to end

17
the war.lxxviii (Note: CPT William F. Halsey, future Admiral of the
Fleet, served on this committee).

The plan was impressive in its detail for joint and

combined warfare. The plan, however, made no allowance for
operational pauses or a culminating point. The committee was,
however, interested in the requirements for coalition warfare. In
fact, a section of the report dealt with the requirements of
planning for coalition warfare. The report detailed a list of
proposed allied agencies, their composition and function. The
committee was, obviously, concerned with the problems,
organization, and command of combined operations.lxxix

The War College continued to make progress in the process

and format of campaign plans. The basic format remained the
five-paragraph field order. In 1926 the format for theater
operations plans did not include phasing. By 1936 phasing was
included in the theater of operations plan. By 1938 theater
planning was decentralized. The GHQ plan was discarded; theater
commanders, the men on the spot, made their own plans. There
were now three basic plans: the joint plan, the Army strategic
plan, and the theater of operations plan. It should be noted
that the Army strategic plan consisted of two parts, the
concentration plan and an operations plan. The latter plan
established the strategic concept of the war, the objective to be
obtained, the general plan of operation, and instructions for
carrying out those operations.lxxx

Planning in general became more sophisticated. Each of the

plans, joint, strategic, and theater, required a logistics plan
to go with them. In 1933 a group of students at the War College
studied the contemporary war plans of Great Britain, France, and
Germany and perceived several weaknesses. They criticized the
plans because they did not look far enough into the future and
lacked flexibility. Importantly, they also noted that the plan
of supply was not a part of the strategic plan.lxxxi

The world moved quickly toward war at the end of the

thirties. The planners packed their bags, implemented their
plans, and made new ones. As the interwar period came to a close
American military thought had matured significantly. The officer
education system had ingested Clausewitz, analyzed the impact of
technology, and created a doctrine. Within the framework of the
national military, strategic, and tactical art of war, they
fashioned a planning system, which tied them all together.
Furthermore, the plans were sophisticated in their appreciation
of logistics and joint warfare. If there was a weakness in
integrating combined operations into campaign planning, it was
rectified quickly under the press of the war that was just around
the corner.

18
 AND SO…

Operational art did exist in the American army during the

interwar period. Moreover, in comparison to military thinking in
Europe at that time, it was certainly as sophisticated.
Operational art was labeled strategy, but studied and analyzed
nonetheless. World War II helped to define the distinction
between national and military strategy. It was not, however,
until 1982 that operational art as a term found its way into the
American military lexicon.

American operational art was developed in the officer

education system. The Command and General Staff School at Ft.
Leavenworth provided a doctrine increasingly influenced by the
operational concepts of Clausewitz. This doctrine accepted
phased operations and the importance of logistics. By 1936 this
doctrine embraced the strategy of the indirect approach and
correctly identified the impact of technology on modern warfare.
The Army War College exercised joint planning and established a
formal system of plans, which linked strategic aims all the way
down to tactical objectives. From doctrine to planning the
American Army recognized. The new face of warfare. The
successful conduct of joint and combined campaigns in World War
II is testament to the American operational art developed during
the interwar years. We emerged from that war with a greater
understanding of the practical art of campaigning.

Unfortunately, military thought in the post war world was

dominated by the atomic bomb. Large unit operations no longer
seemed possible in the face of atomic deterrence or destruction.
Operational art faded in the light of the “new look” army of the
fifties. Only the bitter experience of Vietnam helped to launch a
doctrinal renaissance, which led in 1982 to the rediscovery of
operational art. Now firmly embedded in American joint and
service doctrine, modern American operational art is, however,
rooted in an earlier renaissance, which occurred in the interwar
years.

i
Baron de Jomini, The Art of War, trans. By CPT G.H.Mendell and LT W.P.
Craighill, (Philadelphia, PA, J.B. Lippincott, 1862), p.62.
ii
See James Schneider, “The Theory of the Empty Battlefield.” RUSI,
September, 1987).
iii
LTG Baron Von Freytag-Loringhoven, Generalship in the World War, Vol.I,
originally published 1920, republished in the Art of War Colloquium Series,
(Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, 1984), p.15
iv
Ibid.
v
Dr. Jacob Kipp, Mass, Mobility, and the Red Army’s Road to Operational Art,
1918-1936, (Ft. Leavenworth, KS: Command and General Staff College, 1987), p.
17.

19
vi
COL David Glantz, “Deep Attack: The Soviet Conduct of Operational
Maneuver,” Foundations of Military Theory, (Ft. Leavenworth, KS: Command and
General Staff College, 1987), 8.
vii
For Tuchachevsky’s views on successive and deep operations see New Problems
in Warfare, Art of War Colloquium, (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War
College, 1983.) pp.4-6, 16,17, 42-44.
viii
Glantz, “The Nature of Soviet Operational Art,” Parameters, (Spring,
1985), p. 63.
ix
Carl von Clausewitz, On War, trans. By Michael Howard and Peter Paret,
(Princeton, NJ: University of Princeton Press, 1976), p.177.
x
An Englishman Henry Lloyd first wrote of the importance of the line of
operations in 1781. Heinrich V. Bulow wrote about the necessity of a base of
operations in 1799. Fretag-Loringhoven, Generalship, pp. 12, 15.
xi
Jomini, The Art of War, p.230.
xii
Ibid. , p. 63.
xiii
Clausewitz, On War, pp. 595, 619.
xiv
Ibid., p. 596.
xv
Ibid., p. 528.
xvi
Hew Strachan, European Armies and the Conduct of War, London: George Allen
& Unwin, 1983), p. 67.
xvii
A Military History of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College
1881-1963. Combined Arms Research Library, Ft. Leavenworth, KS, p. 3.
xviii
E.B. Hamley, The Operations of War, (London: William Blackwood & Sons,
1866), p. 37.
xix
Strachan, Conduct of War, p. 98.
xx
COL william Naylor, The Principles of Strategy, (Ft. Leavenworth, KS: The
General Service Schools Press, 1920), p. iii.
xxi
Baron von der Goltz, The Conduct of War, A Brief Study of Its Most
Important Principles and Forms, trans. By Joseph T. Dickman, (Kansas City, MO:
Franklin Hudson Co., 1896), p.20.
xxii
Ibid., p. 42.
xxiii
Harry P. Ball, Of Responsible Command, A History of the U.S. Army War
College, (Carlisle Barracks, PA: Alumni Associatin of the U.S. Army War
College, 1983), p. 155.
xxiv
Schedule for 1922-1923, (Ft. Leavenworth, KS: Combined Arms Research
Library Archives),
xxv
Naylor, Principles of Strategy, p. 49.
xxvi
Ibid., p. 106.
xxvii
Ibid., pp. 158-160.
xxviii
Ibid., p. 18.
xxix
Tactical and Strategical Studies, Group of Armies, (Ft. Leavenworth, KS:
General Service Schools Press, 1922), p. 13.
xxx
Ibid., p. 34.
xxxi
Tactical and Strategical Studies, Corps, and Armies, (Ft. Leavenworth, KS
General Service School Press, 1922), p. 13
xxxii
Ibid.
xxxiii
Ibid., p. 15.
xxxiv
Ibid., p. 14.
xxxv
The Principles of Strategy for An Independent Corps or Army in a Theater
of Operations, (Ft. Leavenworth, KS: The Command and General Staff College,
1936), pp. 14, 24.
xxxvi
Tactical and Strategical Studies, Corps and Army, (Ft. Leavenworth, KS:
General Service School Press, 1925). Pp. 18, 19.
xxxvii
Ibid., p. 452.
xxxviii
Ibid., p. 1.
xxxix
“…When the attack is pushed so far that the attacking forces are
incapable of further effective effort, while the enemy is still in condition

20
to strike back, the attacker runs grave risks of disaster in case the enemy
passes to the offensive or strognly counterattacks.” Ibid., p. 196.
xl
Ibid., p. 10.
xli
Ball, Responsible Command, p. 156.
xlii
Ibid., p. 185.
xliii
AWC Course 1924-25, “Command,” 2 March 1925, AWC file 293A-29.
xliv
Ball, Responsible Command., p. 211.

xlv
AWC Course 1925-26, Report of WPD Committee #8, “Joint Plans, Army Plans,
GHQ Plans.” 26 Sept 1925, AWC file 310-11.
xlvi
AWC Course 1926-27, Report of Committee #11, “War Plans Division,” 18 Sept
1926, AWC file 336-11.
xlvii
AWC Course 1925-26, COL C.M. Bundel, “Orientation & Outline of War Plan
Course,” 2 Sept 1925, AWC file WPD DOCs Nos. 1-29, Vol. X.
xlviii
Ball, Responsible Command, p. 202.
xlix
AWC Course 1924-25, MG John L. Hines, “Grand Joint Army and Navy Exercise
No. 3,” Lecture to AWC, 26 June 1925, AWC file 294-7.
l
In 1933 COL Merritt from the war Department IG office criticized both
schools for duplication of effort. Ball, Responsible Command, p. 244.
li
The Command and General Staff School Second Year Class command Course
Discussion of Problems, 1934-35, (Ft. Leavenworth, KS: command and General
Staff School Press, 1934), p. 3.
lii
Ibid.
liii
Principles for Independent Corps or Army, p. 8.
liv
Ibid., p. 22.
lv
Ibid., p. 37.
lvi
Ibid., p. 70.
lvii
Ibid., p. 7.
lviii
Ibid., p. 10. Note this is still a very modern notion about what
constitutes combat power. See Huba Wass De Czege, “Underatanding and
Developing Combat Power,” SAMS monograph, 10 Feb 1984.
lix
Ibid., p. 7.
lx
Ibid., p.28,
lxi
Ibid., p. 16.
lxii
Ibid., p. 62.
lxiii
Ibid., pp. 17, 18.
lxiv
Ibid., pp. 16, 70.
lxv
Ibid., pp. 46, 47.
lxvi
Ibid., p. 42.
lxvii
Ibid., p. 7.
lxviii
Ibid., pp.7, 8.
lxix
This was brought out in a question and answer period from a lecture given
by MAJ J. Lawton Collins, “The Army and Large Units in Offensive Combat,” AWC
file CMND #8 1939. “Lightening Joe” of WWII fame was already contemplating
fast movement matched with large unit maneuver.
lxx
The AWC Presentation to NWC, COL C.H. Wright, “Strategic Employment of
Military Forces,” 21 Oct 1937, AWC file 195-38-2K. AWC Course 1938-39. COL Ned
B. Rehkopf, Assistant Commandant AWC, “Strategy, a lecture, 11 Apr 1939, AWC
file WP #19, 1939.
lxxi
AWC Course 1930-31, CAPT W.D. Puleston, “The Probable Future Trend of
Joint Operations,” lecture, Conduct of War CSE #16, AWC file 376-A-16.
lxxii
AWC Course 1930-31, Report of Committee #5, Employment and Organization
of Army Aviation and Anti-Aircraft Defense” 27 Sept 1930, AWC file 373-5.
lxxiii
Collins, “Army and Large Units.”, p. 3.
lxxiv
Memo from MAJ J.H. Wilson to Director WPD, SUBJ: GHQ AF Units Attached to
Group of Armies,” dtd 2 May 1936, AWC file 7-1936-50.
lxxv
Air Force Manual, The Employment of Combat Aviation, (Maxwell Field, AL:
Air Corps Tactical School, 1 Apr 1939). P. 32,WC file 97-124D.

21
lxxvi
See 1936-1937 Air Force Problems, (Maxwell Field, AL: Air Corps Tactical
School), AWC file 97-124C.
lxxvii
AWC Course 1935-36, Report of War Plans Group #4, “Participation with
Allies,” 15 Apr 1936, AWC file 5-1936-21.
lxxviii
AWC Course 1933-34, War Plans Group #4, “Participation with Allies,
Blue, Pink, Red, Yellow VS. Orange, Carnation,” 21 Apr 1934, AWC file 405-24.
lxxix
Ibid., p. 17.
lxxx
AWC Course 1937-38, BG Walter Kreuger, A C/S WPD, “The War Plans Division,
War Department General Staff,” lecture, 1 Mar 1938, AWC file WP #5, 1938.
lxxxi
AWC Course 1933-34, Report of Committee #1, Joint Plans and Army
Strategical Plans,” 22 Sept 1933, AWC file 403-1.

22