The Metaphysics of Evolution

Evolutionary Theory in Light of First Principles

By

Fr. Chad Ripperger, Ph.D.

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 Contents
Introduction
Chapter 1
Chapter 2
Chapter 3
Conclusion
An Initial Dictionary of Scholastic Terms and Principles
Bibliography
 Introduction

Nevertheless, this gift of reason can perform these functions

safely and well, only when properly trained, that is, when
imbued with that sound philosophy which has long stood out
as a patrimony handed down from the earliest Christian
ages, and so possesses the authority of an even higher order,
because the Magisterium of the Church has carefully
weighed its principles and chief assertions, which were
gradually made clear and defined by men of great genius, by
the test of divine "revelation" itself. Indeed, this philosophy,
recognized and accepted within the Church, protects the true
and sincere value of human understanding, and constant
metaphysical principlesnamely, of sufficient reason,
causality, and immutable truth.1

When one reads about evolution, reference is made to evolution as a

theory, a fact, a dogma or even fiction. How one views evolution largely
depends on one’s philosophical assumptions or underpinnings or, to be
more specific, it depends on one’s philosophy of nature. But very often the
philosophy of nature is founded on a particular metaphysics and even the
empirical sciences have metaphysical underpinnings. Unfortunately, on the
side of some scientists, there is a psychological refusal to accept that
evolution is not really a conclusion derived from the empirical sciences but
really a philosophical theory. Even though most forms of evolutionary
theory are really metaphysical considerations, admission of this fact is rare
because to admit it means, in the mind of most scientists, that evolution is
not scientific. This is based upon the fact that most scientists labor under
the belief that the only form of science is an empirical science.
Most empirical scientists assume that empirical sciences are the only
valid forms of science because of the fact that their methodology allows for
verification, while the other sciences do not. However, the empirical
method is not the only valid method of proceeding for a science. While the
empirical method is proper to its own material and formal object,2 it is not
proper to philosophy which is also a valid science. Very often, those
working in the empirical sciences try to reformulate the definition of a
science in order to exclude philosophy (and theology) from being
considered sciences. However, such a motion on their part is inherently
contradictory, for the formulation of the definition of a science cannot be
derived by the empirical method and therefore to give a true, formal
definition requires one to engage in philosophy. So either empirical
scientists accept that philosophy is a science or they are left with the
unseemly prospect of not having a “scientific” definition of science itself.
This is said in order to make clear that to enter into a philosophical
discussion about the nature of evolution is a scientific approach, albeit not
an empirical one.
The scope and purpose of this work is to place evolutionary theory
under philosophical analysis. The reader will note that there will be very
little said about the theological question regarding evolution3as well as the
empirical evidence that mounts day by day which undermines evolutionary
theory.4 Very little has been written on the philosophy of evolution and
therefore this book will address certain aspects of metaphysics which are
incompatible with various forms of evolutionary theory.
Since the Church has repeatedly pointed Catholic philosophers to the
philosophy of St. Thomas5 in order to avoid error6, it would seem fitting
that in proffering an explanation of aetiology, we employ the writings of St.
Thomas. The writings of St. Thomas as well as the writings of authors in
the Thomistic tradition offer a good foundation for the discussion of the
nature of principles themselves as well as an outline of the various
principles. Since not all of the principles would apply to the consideration
and discussion of evolutionary theory, we will only focus on a few of those
which offer some insight into the difficulties inherent in evolutionary
theory.7

1Pope Pius XII, Humani Generis, para. 29 (DS 2320/3892).

2
For a discussion of the material object, formal object and method of the sciences, see
Ripperger, Introduction to the Science of Mental Health, p 2-12. Certain parts of this text are taken
from Introduction to the Science of Mental Health.
3For consideration of the theological considerations of evolution, see among others, the
website: http://www.kolbecenter.org/.
4Numerous texts available both in book form as well as on the internet provide ample
evidence in this regard. Any cursory internet search will provide the reader with numerous texts in
this regard.
5See among others see: Leo XIII, Aeterni Patris, passim, but especially paras. 21, 25 and 33;
Pope St. Pius X, Pascendi Dominici Gregis, para. 45; CIC/83 can. 252, §3 and Sacred Congregation
For Catholic Education, Ratio Fundamentalis, paras. 79 and 86.
6Among other see: Leo XIII, op. cit., paras. 18, 21 & 29 and Pope St. Pius X, loc. cit.
7It may behoove the reader to familiarize himself with the terms in the lexicon before reading
this text, if he does not possess a scholastic/philosophical training.
 Chapter 1:
First Principles
First principles are studied in first philosophy which is a branch of
metaphysics.8As with any philosophical consideration, it is necessary to
discuss the definition of certain concepts before one can proceed. The
definition of a principle is as follows:

Principle, n. 1. That from which something in some way

follows; a being or truth from which being, change,
knowledge, or discussion, respectively, starts. 2. any cause.
(For cause is the main type of principle.) 3. Anything that is
in any way first even if it has no connection with later
members.9

There are different kinds of principles given the definition. There are
some principles which follow from other principles but those principles
which are first are those which do not come from another principle and
which have no prior principles in their own series.10 To having no prior
principles in its own series means that in that category of first principles,
there are no other principles prior to that principle.
Some principles relate to being itself, i.e. to real things, while others
determine how we know a thing or come to knowledge of a thing. In the
order of being, there is what is called a:

Real principle, the principle from which being proceeds; a

being from which another being or modification of being
proceeds in some way. Real principles include beginning,
foundation, origin, location, condition, cause of any type,
and elements of composition.11

Real principles tell us something about the very nature of being. Real
principles are counter distinguished from logical or what are sometimes
called gnoseological principles.

Logical principle: (1) a principle of knowledge; a truth from

which other truth proceeds; a source of knowledge or a cause
of thought. These include definitions, signs, questions,
problems, sources of truth, axioms, norms, premises, bases
of division, etc. (2) a rule of logic. (3) a methodological
principle or rule of procedure special to a science.12

A logical principle is one that governs how we come to know a thing

and logical principles are said to be built into the very structure of our
intellect. By virtue of the fact they are built into our intellect by nature they
are said to be connatural. Something is connatural which belongs “to a
nature and exist[s] in it from its beginning; congenital or innate; not
acquired; present in and operating by natural endowment, tendency or need
of nature.”13 Something is connatural which is in the very nature of the
thing; it is innate or possessed from the very beginning and it is not
acquired or added.14 It is connatural to the human intellect to perform its
operations according to the first principles, e.g. it is contrary to the nature of
the intellect to violate the principle of non-contradiction. In the writings of
St. Thomas, we see that there are natural habits regarding the first principles
of the intellect. These habits are connatural or natural in the sense that they
are not acquired but are in the intellect from the beginning. St. Thomas
discusses what he calls the natural habit15 of intellectus principiorum or
understanding of the [first] principles. It is a natural or innate16 habit by
which we are able to understand the first principles and insofar as it is
innate, it is found equally in all men.17 This habit helps one to grasp or
understand those first principles without inquisition or motion of the
intellect,18 i.e. once the terms are grasped and the formulation of the first
principle is heard or thought, one immediately knows or understands the
meaning and truth of the principle. This natural habit moves the intellect to
grasp the first principles immediately, without ratiocination. This means
that one does not grasp the first principles as in a conclusion19 but they are
grasped immediately as self-evident.20
Since they are self-evident, one must give assent to the first
principles21 as moved by this natural habit. Moreover, it means that one
cannot err regarding the first principles,22 i.e. reason is always right when it
grasps the first principles. However, the history of philosophy, the history of
man, as well as common sense experience have shown that man does not
always act according to these principles or he does not understand them.
Some philosophers have denied implicitly the first principles of the
speculative intellect in their philosophical discourses.23 However, there are
two reasons why first principles are repudiated. The first is that the person
does not understand the terms of the principle and therefore cannot give
assent to it because he cannot understand the formulation of the principle
since it is composed of terms not understood. The second is that there is
something impeding the use of reason. For example, the young cannot make
use of the habit24 because they have not reached sufficient maturity to think
abstractly enough to grasp the principles fully. The gravely mentally ill
cannot make use of the habit because of reason’s inability to function
properly. In fact, one of the ways we know someone is mentally ill is by
virtue of the fact that they do not act according to first principles, e.g. they
contradict themselves or assert things which violate the principle of
sufficient reason. Another impediment is the foolishness of the person, i.e.
as Aristotle observes, it pertains to the fool to deny what is self-evident; or
we may say a person who denies self-evident principles is irrational.
In addition to being self-evident, first principles are true, necessary and
immediate. The first principles are true because they formulate what is
actually the case in the objective order of things. They reflect reality and are
not theories or hypotheses, nor are they merely noble ideas capable of
realization.25 First principles are necessary in the sense that there would be
no basis for any science without them. For without first principles, reality
would be rendered unintelligible to us in that they indicate the fundamental
structure of reality, i.e. the created world.26 First principles are also
immediate in the sense that they are truths grasped without the help of
intermediate notions or middle terms or, as was stated above, without
reasoning. The truth becomes immediately known once the terms are
grasped and this is called “self evident” or “known through itself” (per se
nota).27
Why is it necessary to discuss the nature of principles as well as the
principles themselves in the context of evolution? The reason is that
evolution, if it is true, must adhere to the first principles. Any violation of
the first principles renders either the whole or a part of evolutionary theory
false. As will become evident, many aspects of evolution are simply
incompatible with first principles.

8See Thomas Aquinas, In Duodecim Libros Metaphysicorum Aristotelis Expositio,

prooemium.
9Wuellner, A Dictionary Scholastic Philosophy, p. 244.
10Ibid.
11Ibid., p. 245.
12Ibid., p. 244. A formal principle is one of the basic principles and rules to justify the
validity of reasoning, such as the principle of non-contradiction. All formal principles are logical
principles but not all logical principles are formal principles. This is due to the fact that a logical
principle deals with knowledge in general, whereas formal principles deal with the principles
governing logic or reasoning.
13Ibid., p. 59.
14Sometimes acquired habits and virtues are said to be connatural, as if to indicate that they
constitute a second nature. However, they are not connatural in the proper sense, since they are not
innate.
15See III Sent., d. 23, q. 3, a. 2, ad 1; ST I, q. 58, a. 3; ibid., q. 79, a. 12; ST I-II, q. 51, a. 1
and ibid., q. 57, a. 2 and De Ver., q. 1, a. 12.
16II Sent., d. 24, q. 2, a. 3.
17ST II-II, q. 5, a. 4, ad 3.
18II Sent., d. 3, q. 1, a. 6, ad 2; ibid., d. 24, q. 3, a. 3, ad 2; III Sent., d. 27, q. 1, a. 3, ad 1 and
De malo q. 16, a. 5.
19ST I-II, q. 65, a. 1, ad 3. This would indicate that the Cartesian mentality that one must be
able to prove something for it to be true cannot stand for two reasons. The first is that the first
principles from which all other conclusions are drawn are selfevident, i.e. grasped immediately
without proof. One can only show that, if one rejects a first principle, one is left in absurdity. The
second is if everything must be proven, the first principles must be proven by syllogistic reasoning
and the premises of that syllogism must be proven, etc. ad infinitum. The problem is that there would
never be a first principle and subsequently never anything after it. The impossibility of an infinite
regress regarding principles militates against the Cartesian notion of everything having to be proven.
This would apply equally to the empirical sciences as well as to all the other sciences.
20I Sent., d. 3, q. 1, a. 4, ad 3; ST I, q. 17, a. 3, ad 2; SCG II, c. 47, n. 3 and De Ver., q. 10, a.
11, ad 12.
21ST I, q. 82, a. 2. See also De Ver., q. 15, a. 1.
22ST I, q. 17, a. 3, ad 2.
23For example, Hume in his critique of causality not only denies the principle of causality
which is self-evident but he must also deny the principle of sufficient reason and non-contradiction as
a result of his rejection of the principle of causality. Hegel, in his dialectic, holds that in the synthesis
both contradictories are contained in the synthesis together, thereby indicating that reason gives
assent to two things which are contradictory.
24ST I-II, q. 94, a. 1, ad 4.
25McInerny, Metaphysics, p. 23. See also Gardeil, Metaphysics, page 108.
26McInerny, Metaphysics, p. 23.
27Gardeil, Metaphysics, page 108.
 Chapter 2:
Real Principles and Evolution
In order to evaluate evolutionary theory in its various forms, we want
to begin considering the first real principles. We will not be discussing all
real principles but only those which apply most directly to the analysis of
evolutionary theory.

1. Priority of act to potency: act is prior to potency in nature, in

excellence, in intelligibility. Hence it is said to be absolutely prior to
potency. (Princ. 2)28

In the theory of evolution, the existence of a being comes from that

which is lower. For example, something without sight through a mutation
begets something with sight. Since the faculty of sight is higher than
blindness in the order of being, something without sight begets something
with sight. This violates the principle of priority of act to potency insofar as
that which has sight (act) has a dependency on that which does not have
sight (potency) for its existence. In this respect, the theory of evolution
places potency prior to act, not just in the order of time, but in the
ontological order. This however is absurd since to possess a perfection (act)
is better than not to have a perfection (potency).

2. Actualization of potency: no potency can actualize itself. A

potency can be brought to actuality only by the influence of a being
in act. (Princ. 5)

While the theory of evolution in part deals with the development of

living things from inorganic material, it is often rooted in a cosmological
theory of the Big Bang. Some of those who support the Big Bang theory
also argue that there is no need for God to account for the Big Bang. For
example, Stephen Hawking made headlines by observing, "Spontaneous
creation is the reason there is something rather than nothing, why the
Universe exists, why we exist. It is not necessary to invoke God to ... set the
Universe going."29 Spontaneous creation is one in which there is no
antecedent cause in which the thing simply comes into being from nothing.
This violates the principle of the actualization of potency. It is clearly
rooted in the principle of sufficient reason as well, which will be dealt with
later.
In the case of evolution, a particular being which is only potentially
capable of begetting another being actualizes itself into a being able to
beget a being that is higher than itself. In other words, something which
only potentially has sight must actually have sight, at least virtually,30in
order to give it. Putting aside the question of theistic evolution which we
shall address in our discussion of another principle, barring the intervention
of a being that has sufficient act in order to beget sight in the order of
material causes, a being would have to actualize itself to having an actuality
in order to be able to reduce the potency to act, prior to its reducing the
other being from potency to act. But this is manifestly not the case. For we
notice in the order of causes that nothing can reduce something from
potency to act unless it already has that act.31

3. Degrees of being: a thing is perfect to the degree that it is in act,

and imperfect insofar as it is in potency. (Princ. 23)

Variant: The principle of degrees or grades of being: a thing is

perfect to the degree that it is in act, and imperfect insofar as it is in
potency. (Princ. 209)

Corollary: in material and living bodies we find an ascending order

of perfection in which the higher beings have their own perfections
as well as those of the lower level of being. In the unity of the
higher being the multiplicity of the lower beings is virtually present.
(Princ. 210)

Corollary: the principle of continuity: the order of the universe

displays a gradual scale of perfections from end to end through all
essentially different intermediate steps. (Princ. 212)

In this particular set of principles, what is being stated is that there are
degrees of perfection based upon the degrees of act various things possess.
The various beings with various degrees of perfection constitute what is
known as the hierarchy of being. In the Summa Contra Gentiles, St.
Thomas Aquinas makes the following observation:

Again, not all creatures are constituted in one level of

goodness. For some of them, substance is their form and
their act: this is so for that which, because of what it is
essentially, it suits to be in act and to be good. For others,
indeed, substance is composed of matter and form: to such a
being it is suits to be and to be good—but by virtue of some
part of it, viz. by virtue of its form. Therefore, divine
substance is its own goodness, but a simple substance
participates in goodness by virtue of what it is essentially,
while composite substance does so by virtue of something
that belongs to it as a part.32

In the subsequent paragraphs, St. Thomas goes on to discuss the

various grades of being within this hierarchy, i.e. there is a being which is
perfectly simple whose essence and existence are one (God), beings whose
essence and existence are distinct but who are form only (angels) and
beings which are composites of form and matter (man and all lower
creatures). Even some of the charts that promote evolution, which show
different creatures starting from the amoeba going up through various kinds
of animals to apes and then finally to human beings, give some indication
of this hierarchy. The fundamental problem with evolution is that at root it
is a misinterpretation of the hierarchy of being.
Some of the characteristics of the hierarchy of being are expressed by
other principles. For example, in the principle of the degrees of material
being we find: “in material and living bodies we find an ascending order of
perfection in which the higher beings have their own perfections as well as
those of the lower level of being. In the unity of the higher being, the
multiplicity of the lower beings is virtually present.”(Princ. 210) Connected
to this is the principle of continuity or the principle of the changes of being
which states: “the order of the universe displays a gradual scale of
perfections from end to end through all essentially different intermediate
steps.”(Princ. 212) The universe constitutes a creation33 in which there is
perfection of every grade and level of being from the smallest or most
elementary element that exists on its own (for example a single hydrogen
atom or even some other part of an atom independently existing for short
periods of time as we see in certain modern supercollider experiments), all
the way up through the various grades of being to God, who is the highest.
A corollary to the principle of continuity or we may say an alternate
form of expressing it is: “every superior nature in its least perfection or
operation borders on the highest perfection or operation of the nature
ranking next below it in the scale of being.”(Princ. 214) If one connects
these principles indicating the hierarchy of being and its constituent
structure, along with the other things which we will be discussing in this
book, to the principle which states: “the inference from possibility of being
or action to actual being or action is not valid” (Princ. 25), what one
discovers is an invalid inference on the side of those proposing evolution. In
other words, by looking at the fossil records and considering the hierarchy
of being, they infer that lower beings were the cause of higher beings, rather
than merely bordering them in the hierarchy of being. Again, putting aside
any consideration of whether the fossil records actually contained evidence
of macroevolution,34 we can simply see the error committed by the
evolutionists in relationship to an invalid inference drawn from the
hierarchy of being.

4. The principle of non-contradiction:35 a thing cannot both be

and not be at the same time in the same respect or relation. (Princ.
33)

A variant to this principle states: “the same attribute cannot at the

same time and in the same being be truly affirmed and denied of the
same subject.”(under princ. 33) At first, it does not seem as if those
who are proposing evolution are contradicting themselves. But there
are a few instances in which we actually see evolutionists violating
the principle of non-contradiction. We quoted Stephen Hawking. In
the same vein, he makes the following observation: “Because there
is a law such as gravity, the Universe can and will create itself from
nothing." The contradiction is manifest: to state that the universe
can and will create itself is contradictory because it must posit the
universe in the order of being in order that it may be able to bring
itself out of being or from nothing. We may reformulate his
 statement in this manner: the universe is from nothing. The universe
is treated (i.e. action is predicated of it) as if it is a being, whereas
nothing is nonbeing and therefore we see the contradiction.

This is a common error committed when insufficient reflection is given

to the mode of knowing of human beings in relationship to the “concept of
nothing”. If a person truly thinks of nothing, then he is not thinking at all.
For us as human beings, in order to think of nothing, we must take
something and negate it, e.g. we think of blackness (negation of light) or we
think of the absence of existing things or matters of this sort. So when
someone proposes that something came from nothing, he is thinking of
nothing in terms of something, without recognizing the negation or the fact
that no thing exists. It is the thing which is negated that is, in fact, on a
psychological level, actually treated as if it were something and therefore,
for we human beings can easily err by asserting the existence of nothing,
because we are thinking of it as a thing, albeit negated in terms of existence.
Do evolutionists commit the same kind of error? They do by positing
something coming from nothing, i.e. they argue that from a lower grade of
being, which does not have a perfection, a perfection comes via a mutation
or some other mechanism. Strictly speaking, this is not possible due to the
principle of sufficient reason, which we will address shortly. Ultimately, in
the order of mutations, the only mutation that should arise from any order
of lower beings without the intervention of a higher being is a mutation
which is lower than the being who is causing the mutation. This would
mean that things are not going from a less organized state to a more
organized state in something that is complex.36

The principle of excluded middle: a thing must either be or

not be at the same time in the same respect or relation.
(Princ. 34)

A variant of this real principle is the logical principle of excluded

middle which states: an attribute must be either affirmed or denied of its
(corresponding) subject. Essentially speaking the principle of the excluded
middle states that either a thing is or is not. The problem with evolution is
that it asserts that a being has a perfection in order to beget something
higher than itself through mutation or some similar form of mechanism,
while not having that perfection itself. Since a thing cannot beget what it
does not have,37 at the most fundamental level, evolutionists who purport
that one thing begets a higher thing are stating an inherent contradiction as
well as violating the principle of excluded middle, which says a thing either
has a perfection or does not. If it does not have the perfection, it cannot pass
on that perfection. If it does possess it, then it can.

The principle of sufficient reason, ontological formula:

A) there is a sufficient reason or adequate necessary objective

explanation for the being of whatever is and for all attributes of any
being.
B)full formula: every being must have either in itself or in another
being a sufficient reason for its possibility, actualities, origin,
existence and the mode of existence, its essence (nature or
constitution), its subjective potentialities, powers, habits, operations,
changes, unity, intelligibility, goodness, beauty, end, relationships,
and any other attributes or predicates that may belong to it.(Princ.
35)
Alternate: the existence of being is accountable either in itself or in
another.

Without a doubt, this principle is the most violated among

evolutionary theorists. Starting with the theory of the Big Bang which is
sometimes connected to the theory of evolution, insofar as it is considered
that all factors necessary to beget life are already present at the beginning of
the universe, we reconsider again Stephen Hawking’s observation,
"Spontaneous creation is the reason there is something rather than nothing,
why the Universe exists, why we exist. It is not necessary to invoke God to
... set the Universe going."38 That there is here a violation of the principle
of sufficient reason is clear, for it does not give a true accounting of the
actual existence of the universe. Since nothing is actually a case of
nonexistence, i.e. there is no existence or no thing existing, then it cannot
bring itself into existence. In this particular case, the theory of spontaneous
creation leaves the person without an actual accounting of the existence of
the universe because the universe itself cannot in itself give an accounting
of its own existence nor did “nothing” have existence to account for its
causing the universe to exist. In other words: from nothing, nothing comes.
Under this conceptualization, the reason the current universe cannot
give an accounting of its own existence lies in the observation made by St.
Thomas in his discussion of the five ways to prove God’s existence in the
Summa Theologiae. St. Thomas observes the following in his first way of
proving God’s existence:

But nothing can be reduced from potentiality to actuality, except by

some being in act, as that which is actually hot, as fire, makes wood,
which is potentially hot, to be actually hot, and thereby moves and
changes it. Now it is not possible that the same thing should be at
once in actuality and potentiality in the same respect, but only in
different respects. For what is actually hot cannot at the same time
be potentially hot; but it is at the same time potentially cold. It is
therefore impossible that in the same respect and in the same way a
thing should be both mover and moved, i.e. that it should move
itself. Therefore, whatever is in motion must be put in motion by
another.39

While this is the principle of motion, the formulation here clearly

manifests the principle of sufficient reason insofar as a thing cannot render
itself into motion or existence because then there would not be a sufficient
reason for its motion or existence. The same holds true in relationship to the
Big Bang, prescinding from the consideration of a deity, for nothing cannot
bring itself into existence because the existence was not there to begin with.
In the context of evolution, we find the same difficulty. Since one
species does not have the existence of the essence in itself to be able to
confer it to another species, it cannot be the cause of another
species/essence. There are two aspects to this consideration. The first is the
nature by which a thing acts and the necessity for the essence to be created
directly by God. In relationship to the first consideration, all things that are
created do not act through their substances40 (essence/species) but through
proper accidents41 called faculties and so the faculties are those by which a
thing acts. These proper accidents or faculties flow from the essence.42
At this point, it is necessary to take a slight diversion into
epistemology and another area of metaphysics.43 Metaphysicians observe
that not any accident can exist in any substance, e.g. thought, which is an
accident in man, cannot exist in a stone because the substance of a stone
does not have enough act to cause the act of existence of thought. St.
Thomas makes the following observations about the relationship of
substances and accidents:
As the essence of some universal species is related to all per se
accidents of the species, so the essence of the singular is related to all the
proper accidents of that singular; all the accidents found in it are of such a
kind: since those are made proper to things by virtue of that in which things
are individuated. Moreover, the intellect knowing the essence of the species,
through it comprehends all the per se accidents of that species: since,
according to the Philosopher [i.e. Aristotle], of every demonstration which
arrives at a conclusion about the proper accidents of a subject, the principle
[i.e. premise] is that which is.44
St. Thomas is noting that the intellect knows the accidents which relate
per se (i.e. essentially) to a specific kind of essence. In other words, certain
kinds of accidents reside in certain kinds of substances. Not every accident
can reside in every kind of substance. For example, accidents of lead, such
as its color, texture, density, etc. cannot be the same as the accidents of a
human being. Each has different accidents. Since the substance can only
cause certain accidents, only certain accidents can exist in it. The different
kinds of accidents relate to the different kinds of substance.45 This
essentially means that a specific set of accidents actually reveals the nature
of the substance. For instance, when we observe a stone, we do not observe
rational behavior; we do not observe free acts of the will; we do not observe
speech coming from the stone because these types of accidents cannot exist
in a stone. However, the stone does reveal its substance through its
accidents, i.e. by virtue of the fact that it has certain colors and textures and
consistencies, it reveals that it has the essence of stoneness and not the
essence of dogness. The fact that it lies motionless unless it is acted upon
from the outside indicates that it is not alive and does not possess a faculty
of locomotion. Its rest reveals that it is a stone and not an animal.
This also implies that two essentially different substances are
incapable of having the same accidents. For instance lead and gold cannot
have the same accidents since they are essentially different. However, this is
not to deny that some categories of accidents can be shared by two
essentially different substances, e.g. a man with black hair has the same
quality of color of hair as a black bear. However, while they may have some
accidents in common, they do not have all the same accidents in common,
i.e. a man and bear do not have the exact same set of accidents, for a man is
bipedal while a black bear is quadrupedal. Moreover, even the hair that
might have the same color will reveal that it comes from a bear by virtue of
its coarseness, consistency, etc., so that even accidents that are shared are
joined to accidents which differentiate the thing that they affect, e.g. even
though a bear and a man may have the same hair color, the hair of a bear is
accidentally different in other ways from the hair of a man. Hence, the
various accidents come together collectively to reveal the essence of a
thing. There appear to be three kinds of accidents in relation to essences. 1)
There are those kinds of accidents which are per se accidents and always
accompany a given essence, sometimes called proper accidents since they
are proper to an essence as such, e.g. whenever one finds a human essence,
one also finds a possible intellect and will. 2) Then there are those accidents
which are common to many in a species but not necessarily to all, e.g. man,
generally speaking, has hair on his head, but some men are bald. Even these
accidents reveal the nature, for as was shown in the example, a bear’s hair
and man’s hair are different. Moreover, the fact that one finds a biped which
is bald on the head but has hair elsewhere is found only in men, even
though it is not a proper accident. 3) Then there are those accidents which
are not common or found in the most part in men, but in a few, e.g. red
haired people are not that common in comparison to black or blond haired
people. But even the scarcity of the red-hairedness reveals man’s nature to a
degree because, again, it is coupled with other qualities which other animals
do not have and the accidents are a part of the total number of possible
types of accidents in relation to the human essence. In other words, even
though two substances have the same essence, their accidents may vary, but
even those accidents which vary are limited by the nature of the thing. It is
not possible for a human essence to have the accidental qualities of hair
which are proper to a goat. What this means is that even though a given
essence can reveal itself in a variety of accidental variations, those
variations are always within a given set of possibilities. But those various
accidents in themselves reveal something about the nature, but in different
ways, e.g. one person’s speech which is an accident may contain a southern
drawl but another’s may reflect a different accent and yet we know that
those two accidents are possible modifications of speech.
 Since there is a specific kind of relation between the accidents and the
substance, the essence of a thing is implicitly contained in the accidents, for
only certain accidents can reside in certain substances. This fact is
expressed in the principle of operation, which is expressed as agere sequitur
esse (action follows upon being) or operatio sequitur esse (operation
follows upon being).46 This principle essentially states that the nature of the
being determines the nature of the operation or act. In this case, a substance
determines the types of accidents or actions.
The reversal of this principle expresses the basis of the cognitive order.
While in the ontological order the type of being determines the actions, in
the cognitive order, the actions reveal the substance. This is because the
human intellect is a mirror image47 of the ontological order. The ontological
order starts first with existence of some thing (essence) in which adhere
accidents (existence-essence-accidents), whereas the human cognitive
powers first know the accidents, then the essence, then the existence.
Abstraction is the process by which the agent intellect draws out the
essence which is revealed in the accidents which are contained in the
phantasm in the imagination. Therefore, the agent intellect is able to derive
the intelligible species by means of induction, i.e. by separating the form
which is implicit in the particular accidents of a thing to derive the universal
nature or essence of the thing which corresponds to those accidents.48 It is
precisely because the substance expresses or reveals itself through its
accidents that the agent intellect is able to derive the essence from those
revealing accidents. The process of abstraction which is the process of
drawing the essence out of the accidents is analogous to the putting together
of the pieces of a jigsaw puzzle. If one took a box containing the pieces of
the puzzle which was not yet constructed, one could not see the picture,
even though the entire picture was contained in the pieces. Analogically, the
agent intellect is able to “see” the picture (essence)in the pieces (accidents)
which contain the picture. The agent intellect is an important faculty. It
makes it possible for man to keep in contact with reality since it abstracts
the essences of real things from their accidents. It makes it possible for man
to have true intellectual knowledge of things by means of his senses.
By holding that one species causes another, the theory of evolution
essentially asserts that since a thing acts through its accidents, it is through
the accidents of a thing that a mutation either in that thing or from some
external cause, such as environment, causes the other thing to have the
characteristics that are proper to a different species. But the various
essences or substances in the environment do not have sufficient order to be
able to cause a mutation of a higher order because, in that particular case,
the things in the environment do not contain sufficient existence to be able
to beget that existence in another thing. Moreover, the environment cannot
cause an essence, for an essence is greater than accidents. This is based
upon what is called the principle of the cause is greater than the effect.49
The fact that the essence confers existence to the accidents and therefore is
a cause of the accidents, shows that it is therefore greater than the accidents.
Based upon the principle of sufficient reason, we begin to see that there has
to be a proportion between the cause and the effect and since the
environment is lower in the order of being than the mutation, it would cause
in some species a higher order; there would not be here a proportion
between the cause and the effect and thus there is a violation of the
principle of sufficient reason.
If we talk about one species causing another, we are left with the same
problem. Since each species/essence acts through its accidents, the
accidents cannot cause a change of a higher order in some other thing when
the causing agent is of a lower order. In other words, one essence acting
through its accidents cannot beget another essence of a higher order through
those accidents.50 Metaphysically, evolution without the aid of a deity51 is
intellectually unsustainable at the level of first principles.
What of the objection that evolution is actually not a case of begetting
a higher being from one species to another but merely a higher being
begetting different abilities on a lower being. This violates the principle of
sufficient reason based upon the fact that you cannot give what you do not
have. If a particular species does not have the gift of sight, it cannot beget
the gift of sight to some other thing based upon the fact that it does not have
the existence or sufficient act in itself to create that gift of sight, because it
does not possess it in some manner.52
Furthermore, it is self evident to human reason that some perfections
are higher than others and this is based upon a principle of hierarchy of
being, which was discussed above. To have sight is greater than not to have
sight or one may say the same thing in relationship to any perfection which
evolutionists claim is bequeathed by mutations to lower things. While it is
true that some perfections require a greater complexity at the material level,
the possession of those perfections is still higher. Moreover, the more
complex a thing is, the greater principle of unification is required to have
that complexity work harmoniously. Essentially what this means is that the
substantial form of a thing must be on a higher order so that greater
complexity can be brought about at the level of matter. In evolution, further
complexity in matter is asserted without accounting for higher substantial
form. This again violates the principle of sufficient reason.53
To return to the question of the relationship between accidents and
substance, it was noted that certain kinds of accidents reside in certain kinds
of substances. Not every accident can reside in every kind of substance.
Since any given substance can only cause certain accidents, only certain
accidents can exist in it. Yet, this also means that there are two kinds of
substance. There are those kinds of substances which can only have certain
accidents and those accidents cannot vary, e.g. hydrogen as an
independently existing substance can only have a specific set of accidents
and those accidents cannot vary. There are those kinds of substances in
which the accidents can vary within a certain gamut, e.g. a human being can
have a variety of different colors of skin (color being the accident of
quality). Even when a particular substance has a specific accident, that
accident can vary under certain circumstances, e.g. a man goes out and
stays in the sun for long period of time and his skin changes from white to
tan. This fact, observable in nature, shows us that when certain kinds of
substances are acted upon from the outside, the result can be a variation in
the accidents. Most notably, this is seen in fruit flies. This indicates that a
particular substance (essence) can undergo accidental change within the
context of what that substance is able to support according to its nature.
This variation within a species is sometimes called microevolution. Hence,
we see that microevolution is possible, while macroevolution is not.

7. The principle of proportionate causality: the effect cannot be

greater than the cause. (Princ. 87a)
Variant: the cause must possess, at least virtually but not necessarily
formally, whatever perfection it gives to the effect. (Princ. 87b)
Variant: activities cannot surpass the perfection of the natures,
forms, and powers which perform them. (Princ. 87d)
Variant: The cause always surpasses the effect somehow. The cause
is nobler than the effect. That is, the cause of anything is that kind of
thing in a greater degree. (Princ. 92)
 In the context of evolution, this is somewhat connected to the principle
of sufficient reason but it is formally different. In the case of the principle
of sufficient reason, there has to be accountability relative to the existence
of the thing either in itself or in another. But this principle indicates that an
effect cannot have greater existence than the cause. In the case of
macroevolution, the higher being (effect) is greater than its cause
(environment or some such thing). For example, when something which
does not have sight begets a being which does have sight, the effect is
greater than what is found in the cause. It is possible to have more than one
cause in any given effect. According to some evolutionists, the mutation
occurs when one particular being is acted upon by environmental causes or
factors and therefore results in a different being. The difficulty lies in the
fact that neither the being which is the primary cause nor the environmental
causes possess a perfection that they bequeathed to the thing (effect). As
with the example of sight, the primary being which receives the causation
from the environmental factor or factors does not possess sight. Nor did
environmental factors possess that perfection, for if they did, then it is not a
true case of evolution. Two or more causes that do not contain a perfection
which is higher in the order of existence cannot together produce an effect
that is higher than all of them. This precludes one being evolving into a
higher being by environmental factors or other agents that do not already
contain that perfection.

8. The principle of resemblance: every agent produces a thing that

is in some degree like its own form.
Variant: like begets like.
Variant: substance can only come from substance.
Variant: all life comes from life.

This principle is connected to the principle of sufficient reason insofar

as each thing which possesses a perfection can only bequeath that same
perfection. A thing cannot give what it does not have. But if it has a
perfection, it can be the cause of that same perfection. If it does not have a
perfection, it cannot give that perfection. In the context of the principle of
resemblance, this means that the nature of a thing determines the nature of
its effects. In the case of macroevolution, beings are bequeathing to others
perfections that they do not have and things that are not like themselves.
The variant which states that substance can only come from substance
indicates that no created thing, since it acts through its accidents, can be the
cause of a higher substance. For accidents cannot cause substances because
they do not have sufficient existence or act, since accidents are lower in the
order of being than substances. This is the foundation for the Scholastics
saying that only God (substance) can create (another substance). Moreover,
since life is a higher order of existence than nonlife, only that which has life
in some analogous way can beget something that has life. The inverse of
this principle logically compels the conclusion that inorganic substances
cannot produce organic substances, for inorganic substances would just
produce other inorganic substances, not organic substances.

9. The principle of operation: agere sequitur esse (operation

follows upon being). (Princ. 97)

Variant: as a thing acts, so it is. As a thing is, so it acts.

Variant: the mode of being determines the mode of operation.
Variant: actions reveal the essence.
Variant: each thing acts according to its own form.
Corollary: activities cannot surpass the perfection of the being
(nature, form, power) which is the principle from which these
proceed.
Corollary: the acts are like the nature.

Essentially what this principle states is that the nature of a thing

determines how it acts or behaves. In the context of macroevolution, what is
ultimately asserted is that a particular nature does not act or behave
according to its nature, for it is producing something that is not according to
its nature. Moreover, since a particular action or behavior of a particular
substance reveals the essence, in the case of macroevolution what is being
produced does not in fact reveal the nature of the thing. This follows from
the fact that what it is producing is different from itself and therefore does
not reveal the nature of that substance or nature. Just as the discussion
above regarding the accidents and how they must relate to a specific kind of
substance indicates that only certain substances can have certain kinds of
accidents and therefore act in certain ways (action is an accident in a
substance), so in one being causing another, it can only do so according to
its nature. This means it is impossible, based upon the principle of
operation, for one being to act in such a way that it begets something
contrary or different from its nature. This principle limits the action based
upon the limits of the essence or nature and therefore makes it impossible
for it to beget something higher than itself, greater than itself or different
from itself. While in this particular case the connection is similar to the
principle of resemblance, the foundation for that is the principle of
operation, since like begets like is based upon the principle that a thing can
only act according to its nature and therefore produces only something that
is like its nature, i.e. the principle of operation. Macroevolution essentially
asserts that a thing does not act according to its nature, for if it acted
according to its nature, it would not produce something other than its
nature. Or to put it another way, the principle of operation coupled with the
principle of resemblance indicates one species can only cause its own
species or likeness.

10. The principle of uniformity of nature: a necessary or natural

cause always produces the same effect, one effect, and always acts
with the same intensity and in the same manner. (Princ.107)

Variant: the same natural (necessary) causes under the same

adequate set of circumstances always produce the same result(s).

As was mentioned above, inorganic compounds cannot produce life

because life does not exist in the inorganic compounds. Even when one has
more than one set of causes, if life is not contained in those causes, life
cannot come from those causes, regardless of how many there might be. To
put this in the context of macroevolution, a “primordial soup and lightning”
cannot produce something that has life because neither one of them has it.
To state that they do denies the principle of uniformity of nature because it
is stating that things are producing enough act that are different from
themselves or in a different intensity or in a different manner than those
causes possess, rather than the same effect, same intensity and same
manner.

11. The principle of finality: every agent or nature in acting must

act for an end. (Princ. 127)
 This principle essentially states that any time any kind of activity
occurs, there must be a finality for that activity, i.e. contained in every
action there is an intrinsic finality towards which that action is striving. In
some evolutionary theories, the change in species is due to random
mutation. But random change begetting a new species is against the
principle of finality since all the agents involved in producing the change in
a species would have to be acting according to their natures which would
determine what kinds of finality they would introduce into the action. Due
to the principle of resemblance, there are, strictly speaking, in the natural
order, no random causes but only causes which act according to a definite
finality based upon the natures of their actions which flow from their own
natures or essences.
All natures of the same species have the same intrinsic end (Princ.
146) and every end is achieved by some means. The end determines the
means (see Princ. 134) or action. Therefore, all natures of the same species
have the same determinate ends and therefore those determinate ends
specify the means that the particular nature is able to employ or, we may
say, the particular actions the thing may perform. Yet, form is the end of
generation (Princ. 176) and so we must conclude that every being tries to
produce its own form (i.e. produce something like itself) in the process of
generation. However, in macroevolution, the thing’s own form is not the
finality of the action that ends up occurring. When we take the order of
causes into consideration, there may be more than one cause and therefore
more than one agent may be causing the changes. However, each one of
these agents produces its own form in some way in the effects. However,
there is nowhere in the agents an introduction of a form which is higher,
either by mutation or some other mechanism of this sort. Rather, each agent
produces or contributes its own form so that when more than one agent
comes together, they produce something that does not have a form that is
not like the two of them, or three of them, etc., taken together.

12. The principle of finiteness of received act: every act that is

finite is limited by the potency receiving it. (Princ. 158)

Essentially what this principle states is that anytime a cause brings

about an act in something that has the potentiality to receive that act, that
potentiality limits the reception of the act. This is somewhat of a variation
of the principle that “whatever is received is received according to the mode
of the receiver.” (Princ. 378) This is important to keep in mind in the
context of evolution because the being receiving actuality from some kind
of cause or causes limits the reception of the act that is received. In effect,
this means that the particular nature of the thing receiving the actuality
limits how the causes can act upon it by virtue of the potentiality within the
thing that is receiving the activity.
If we recall the principle of operation which states that a thing acts as
it is or that nature determines action or that being determines act, on the
side of the cause, there is always potentiality introduced into the effect. Any
time a limited thing acts, i.e. a thing which is determined in the finiteness of
its being by potentiality, it introduces some aspect of its potentiality into the
thing that it causes. In other words, like (potentiality or limitedness) begets
like (potentiality or limitedness). Therefore, this principle is the result of not
only the principle of operation but also the principle of resemblance,
efficient causality, as well as several other principles.
If one takes the principle that every act that is finite is limited by the
potency receiving it and consider that a thing introducing its own
potentiality in the thing that it causes because the cause is always in some
way in the effect, potentiality is always being introduced into the effect and
being determined by the effect. In the case of evolution, these two
principles are being denied by virtue of the fact that the potency receiving it
is actually receiving something beyond which it is capable of receiving and
the thing causing is not producing the potency in the effect which it has by
nature, for it is causing something greater. For example, if a thing does not
have sight, it introduces that limitation into the effect, i.e. lack of sight. If
the thing caused does not contain sight or have the capacity for sight, the
sight will not be caused. Therefore, on the side of both the limited cause
and on the side of the thing caused, there is not sufficient act in order to
produce a higher effect.54

28All formulations of principles are taken from Wuellner, Summary of Scholastic Principles,
unless otherwise noted. In this text, we will simply place the principle number as it appears in
Wuellner after the principle for reference.
29Steven Hawkings as quoted in: http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2010/09/02/stephen-
hawking-god-not-n_n_703179.html.
30Virtually is defined as: “not actually or formally, but equivalently, implicitly, efficaciously,
and sometimes, even eminently” (Wuellner, A Dictionary of Scholastic Philosophy, p. 322).
 31We will put aside the question of the actual observability of one species changing into
another as indicated by the fossil records. That pertains more to an actual question of empirical
science.
32SCG III, 20, no 3: Rursus. Non omnes creaturae in uno gradu bonitatis constituuntur. Nam
quorundam substantia forma et actus est: scilicet cui secundum id quod est, competit esse actu et
bonum esse. quorundam vero substantia ex materia et forma composita est: cui competit actu esse et
bonum esse, sed secundum aliquid sui, scilicet secundum formam. Divina igitur substantia sua
bonitas est; substantia vero simplex bonitatem participat secundum id quod est; substantia autem
composita secundum aliquid sui. (All translations are the authors unless otherwise noted.) See also
De ente et essentia, chpts. 4f.
33The principle of plenitude states: by the free choice of the Creator the universe of being
contains all essential levels of perfections and of natures. (Princ. 216)
34Macroevolution is defined as “evolution on a large scale extending over geologic era and
resulting in the formation of new taxonomic groups.” Alternatively, we may say it is the theory of
evolution in which a species possessing new organs or functions evolves out of a species that does
not possess those organs or functions. This is counter distinguished from microevolution, whichsees
changes within a species.
35At times this is called the principle of contradiction. Since the name of the principle
actually states the nature of the principle, it is more accurate that it be named the principle of non-
contradiction, since things do not contradict themselves rather than contradict themselves. However,
it should be noted that in many books that deal with this subject, it is sometimes called the principle
of contradiction. For a discussion of this different name for the principle, see McInerny, Metaphysics,
footnote 10, p. 303.
36The idea that things are going from a less ordered state to a more ordered state or to greater
beings is contrary to the law of entropy.
37See the principle of sufficient reason below.
38Steven hawkings as quoted in http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2010/09/02/stephen-
hawking-god-not-n_n_703179.html.
39ST I, q. 2, a. 3: movere enim nihil aliud est quam educere aliquid de potentia in actum, de
potentia autem non potest aliquid reduci in actum, nisi per aliquod ens in actu, sicut calidum in actu,
ut ignis, facit lignum, quod est calidum in potentia, esse actu calidum, et per hoc movet et alterat
ipsum. Non autem est possibile ut idem sit simul in actu et potentia secundum idem, sed solum
secundum diversa, quod enim est calidum in actu, non potest simul esse calidum in potentia, sed est
simul frigidum in potentia. Impossibile est ergo quod, secundum idem et eodem modo, aliquid sit
movens et motum, vel quod moveat seipsum. Omne ergo quod movetur, oportet ab alio moveri.
40ST I, q. 77, a. 1; I Sent., d. 3, q. 4, a. 2; Quod. X, q. 3, a. 1; De spiritualibus creaturis, a. 11
and De anima, a. 12.
41A proper accident is an accident which always accompanies a given substance. Whenever a
given substance exists, the accident is likewise present.
42ST I, q. 77, a. 6 and I Sent., d. 3, q. 4, a. 2. In the case of man, the proper accidents flow
from the essence of the soul.
43The following section is in substance taken from Ripperger, An Introduction to the Science
of Mental Health, 55-57.
44De Ver., q. 2, a. 7: “sicut se habet essentia universalis alicuius speciei ad omnia per se
accidentia illius speciei, ita se habet essentia singularis ad omnia accidentia propria illius singularis,
cuiusmodi sunt omnia accidentia in eo inventa: quia per hoc quod in ipso individuantur, efficiuntur ei
propria. Intellectus autemcognoscens essentiam speciei, per eam comprehendit omnia per se
accidentia speciei illius: quia, secundum philosophum, omnis demonstrationis, per quam accidentia
propria de subiecto concluduntur, principium est quod quid est.” The Latin phrase “quod quid est,”
translated as “that which is,” is a technical Latin idiom in the medieval period referring to the essence
of a thing.
45In De Ver., q. 27, a. 2, ad 7, St. Thomas makes the observation that the accidents of the soul
are proportionate to the soul. This is a sign that there is a fundamental relationship between the kinds
of accidents that can exist in certain kinds of substances.
46See below.
47St. Thomas observes that the concept in the possible intellect is like a mirror image with
respect to the thing itself, see SCG II, c. 74, n. 2. While this is observed in respect to the possible
intellect, it can be applied to the entire intellect, including the possible intellect, agent intellect, four
interior senses and the five exterior senses.
48For a greater understanding of this section pertaining to epistemology, see Ripperger, op.
cit.
49See Wuellner, p. 31, princ. 92.
50This is the basis for saying that only God can create an essence since only He acts through
His substance and therefore can create another substance/essence/species.
51Again, we will discuss the aid of a deity in the context of evolution below.
52The formulation of this last sentence is very precise. God does not have physical sight in
the substance of deity itself, even though we say He is the cause of sight in those things that have it.
But this is by virtue of the fact that God contains all perfections in Himself, analogically speaking.
For a discussion of that consideration, see ST I, q. 4, a. 3 and SCG I, c. 29.
53Wuellner lists, among others, in his exercises for the principle of sufficient reason, the
following things that require a sufficient reason (p. 17): the beginning of a new being; the existence
of this contingent universe; variety in the universe; order in the universe; the continuing existence of
accidents; life in man; the unity of man’s nature.
54In creation, since God is pure act, there is no potency in Him and therefore He is able, both
on the side of the cause (i.e. Himself) as well as on the side of the effect, to produce something which
is not restricted in its potency except insofar as it depends upon Him. In other words, God can
arrange on the side of the thing caused its potency to be able to receive a particular actualization
which He causes. This is why evolution is not possible but creation is.
 Chapter 3:
Logical Principles and Evolution
Having discussed the real principles in relationship to evolution, we
now turn our attention to logical or formal principles. As was mentioned, a
logical or formal principle is one which governs the process of reasoning.
The logical principles reflect the structure and nature of the intellect in
conjunction with the ontological nature of things. In other words, our
intellect has a specific structure and the principles reflect that structure by
indicating the proper mode by which the intellect must operate to be true to
its proper nature. The human intellect is designed to know ontological
reality and therefore the principles that express ontological reality govern
the operations of the intellect. In effect, we cannot reason properly unless
we follow proper logical principles which adhere to ontological reality. We
must therefore ask the question whether evolution properly adheres to
logical principles and the best way to answer that question is to simply take
a look at a few of the logical principles to see whether it properly adheres to
those principles.

1. The principle of evidence: the objective evidence of being is the

criterion of the truth of assent in the motive for certain assent.
(Princ.155)
Variant: the thing in the condition of evidence is the measure of the
truth of judgments.
Variant: there is no argument against the evidence. (Princ. 156a)
Variant: no inference contrary to the fact(s) is true. (Princ. 156b)
Variant: an explanation or hypothesis must take account of all the
evidence. (Princ. 157)

This principle constitutes a real difficulty for certain scientists who

support evolution. There is certain evidence which is incompatible with
evolution that has not been adequately explained by the scientists who
support evolution. The fallacy that is often committed is called the fallacy
of over generalization, in which a person tends to ignore or is unaware of
certain things and makes a generalization which appears to cover all of the
evidence. The problem is that the principle of evidence cannot be denied.
What proof do we have that certain evolutionists are in fact ignoring
evidence contrary to evolution?55 There are no transitional links and
intermediate forms in either the fossil record or the modern world.
Therefore, there is no actual evidence that evolution has occurred either in
the past or is occurring in the present.56 As we discussed in the previous
chapter, there is a false reading of the hierarchy of being resulting in a
misinterpretation which asserts that there are causal links between various
species within the hierarchy of being. A causal link requires actual evidence
and this evidence has been wanting. Other areas of study which have been
ignored by many of those supporting evolution have been the area of
stratification and sedimentology,57 paleontology,58genetic entropy59 and
irreducibly complex biological systems.60 Any theory or hypothesis to be
seriously considered must take into consideration all of the evidence. This
has become a fundamental problem for evolutionary theory since very often
it must ignore certain kinds of evidence. Any true explanation of nature
must include all of the evidence; otherwise, the theory or hypothesis, as it
stands, is unfounded. Furthermore, “an hypothesis must be probable (not in
conflict with other truths and not leading to consequences against the facts),
useful (as guiding and suggesting further research and experiment), and
capable of being further tested” (Princ. 261) and “no argument or
conclusion contrary to the evident facts is valid.” (Princ. 289) Conversely,
we may say, “an hypothesis or explanation which contradicts evident facts
is not rationally tenable.” (Princ. 290)

1. The principle of economy:

A. An explanation that accounts for all the facts in terms of a single
or a few principles is preferable to the more complex theory. (Princ.
292A)

One of the problems with evolution is that it ends up multiplying

causes without a sufficient reason. In other words, the evolutionist ends up
having to assert that a number of different mutations must occur in order for
something to reach a stage where it is actually useful to a particular creature
that displays the change for which the mutations are ordered. Each mutation
must come generally from a different cause or from the same cause on a
number of different occasions and this itself multiplies the number of
principles and makes the theory more complex when we could simply say
that God created the thing immediately.

B. An explanation of any phenomenon is to be regarded as better

and truer in which the minimum number of factors, the fewer steps
in the process, and more immediate causes are included. (Princ.
292A continued)

This variant of the principle of economy connects with what we stated

immediately above in a more explicit way. Since in some theories of
evolution there are millions of years required to gradually produce a
particular set of characteristics in a particular living thing, steps are added
in a process which are not necessary to postulate in order to give an
adequate explanation.61 Sometimes this principle is stated in the form of:
“in an explanation, one is not to multiply causes without a sufficient
reason.” Following this formulation, we can see how creation constitutes a
more perfect fulfillment of the principle of economy than does any theory
of evolution. This is because God suffices to account as the primary causal
principle of the whole of creation.62 This would indicate that even though
God often uses secondary causes to bring about certain things, this is in the
order of accidents rather than substances. Since a species pertains to
substances having the same essence, we can see how God immediately
creating each species by creating individuals within that species fulfills the
principle of economy more perfectly than any evolutionary theory.
Nor is it necessary to appeal to any kind of revelation in order to
actually come to this conclusion. For the Scholastics, St. Thomas being
preeminent among them, every essence is immediately created by God and
could not be caused by any created substance.63 The essential reason for
this is that to create a substance requires the ability to bridge the gap
between nothing and something. The gap between nothing and something
that is being actualized requires an infinite power since the ontological
distance between nothing and something is infinite. This requires a being of
infinite power and therefore can only pertain to God, since every created
substance is not infinite but finite according to its mode of being. Therefore
it is impossible to state that a created thing can be the cause of a new
species.
 C. In identifying an unseen cause of a phenomenon, the least cause
capable of explaining the phenomenon must be accepted. In other
words, a proportionate cause is required and suffices. For example:
miracles must not be postulated as an explanation of an event when
a natural cause suffices in the circumstances.

Variant: a demonstration of the necessary truth of some unseen

cause, reason, or theory requires both proof of the necessity and the
suitability of the explanation offered and the exclusion of the other
attempted explanations. (Princ. 292B)

It is here that we begin to realize that theistic evolution has difficulties.

In this case, we run up against a bit of a problem in the literature. Some
theistic evolutionists hold that evolution is just a natural process used by
God to bring about the various forms of life. Other theistic evolutionists
hold that evolution is a case of constant miracles being used in order to
bring about the various forms of life. As to those who hold it is a natural
process, they introduce God into the issue to provide what might be lacking
in the order of nature, such as the order that one finds in the universe, which
may not be accounted for by purely natural causes and this introduces the
above philosophical difficulty where only God can create a substance as
well as a whole host of other difficulties. Some theistic evolutionists may
even be motivated by religious reasons in order to give credibility to the
Scriptures or to make sure that God is not completely excluded, as we see in
the case of theistic evolutionary theory.
Theistic evolution in this sense succumbs to different difficulties. If it
is a natural process used by God, then all of the above violations of
principle would likewise apply in this case. If God is used to supply on the
side of the principle of sufficient reason, it ends up violating the principle of
economy because God must intervene to supply the sufficient reason at
each step. This indicates that it is not strictly a natural process but requires
the introduction of God into each step to be able to achieve the next higher
species in the evolutionary process. This violates the principle of economy
because what is ultimately being stated is that nature does not suffice in
order to produce each individual species on its own. This is a true enough
principle but theistic evolution requires God to be involved in each
individual step since the laws of nature do not suffice. At each step,
therefore, God must suspend the laws of nature and add what is lacking in
the order of nature. The definition of a miracle is: “something occurring
aside the whole created nature”.64 Theistic evolution, whether it states that
it is a natural process, which is really just a covert way of introducing
constant miracles, or asserts outright that miracles are constantly necessary
for the process, violates the principle of economy. It violates the principle
of economy because it posits a number of causes, in this case God
intervening as a cause on repeated occasions, without a sufficient reason. In
this sense, God creating directly all of the individual species in a short
period of time without a large number of secondary causes more perfectly
fulfills the principle of economy than any theory of evolution, theistic
evolution included.
We already know that God must be part of this on a purely
metaphysical level since to go from nothing to something requires an
infinite power. Regardless of whether one holds to the Aristotelian theory
that the world has always existed, or whether one holds to what we know by
revelation that God created these things out of nothing from the beginning,
does not matter as it pertains to this particular issue. While we know from
revelation that God did create everything ex nihilo, St. Thomas points out
that even if one holds that the world always existed, God still has to be the
cause in relationship to essences which come into existence through
substantial causation.65

55It should be noted that the point of this book is not to provide the scientific foundation for
why evolution is problematic but here we simply provide cursory scientific evidence that pertains to
the particular principle being delineated. Any cursory search on the internet will provide ample
sources of scientific evidence contrary to evolution.
56Johnson, Darwin on Trial, p. 50 observes: "...[one of] the outstanding characteristics of the
fossil record is the absence of evidence for evolution." The entire chapter of Johnson’s book deals
with this issue.
57See Berthault, Sedimentological Interpretation of the Tonto Group Stratigraphy (Grand
Canyon Colorado River).
58See Johnson, op. cit.
59
See Sanford, Genetic Entropy and the Mystery of the Genome.
60Behe, Darwin’s Black Box, passim.
61This theory of evolution is contrary to another theory of evolution called punctuated
equilibrium. Punctuated equilibrium is a theory in evolutionary biology which proposes that most
reproducing species will experience little evolutionary change for most of their geological history,
remaining in a stasis which is broken up by rare and rapid events of branching speciation in which
species split into two or multiple distinct species, rather than one species gradually transforming into
another. Punctuated equilibrium is commonly contrasted with the theory of phyletic gradualism,
which proposes that evolution generally occurs uniformly and by the steady and gradual
transformation of whole lineages. In other words, evolution is a generally smooth and continuous
process. In 1972, Niles Eldredge and Stephen Jay Gould published a paper developing this theory
and proposed that the degree of gradualism commonly attributed to Charles Darwin is virtually
nonexistent in the fossil record, and that stasis dominates the history of most fossil species. Even if it
is held that punctuated equilibrium does not violate the principle of economy, it still would violate
the other principles discussed earlier. This also brings to the fore the fact that even among
evolutionists themselves, there is not unanimity in relationship to the theory behind evolution.
62That this is not just a deus ex machina explanation, read below in relationship to the
creation of substances.
63See ST I, q. 45, a. 5 and De pot., q. 3, a. 4, among the numerous places St. Thomas says
this.
64ST I, q. 110, a. 4: aliqua fiunt praeter ordinem totius naturae creatae. This would include
the laws of nature and so one may say that a miracle is a suspension of the law(s) of nature. See also
SCG III, c. 103.
65See above.
 Conclusion

When we consider first philosophy, that is that branch of metaphysics

which studies first principles, and we apply first principles to evolutionary
theory, we begin to realize that every form of evolutionary theory violates
some first principle(s). There are numerous other first principles which we
did not consider in this small work, even though they equally could be
considered in light of evolutionary theory. Our chief concern has been to
show that, given some of the more evident first principles, it becomes clear
that evolutionary theory is not able to be sustained rationally. Since it is
irrational or contrary to reason to violate first principles in one’s reasoning
process, we can say that evolutionary theory is irrational or contrary to
reason. While it is true that evolutionary theory is irrational, we should not
think that everybody who holds evolutionary theory is intentionally being
irrational, or that they would have sufficient knowledge of the first
principles to recognize that their theory is irrational. However, in light of
this study, in light of the findings of serious empirical research that
contradicts the claims of the evolutionary hypothesis, and in light of
theological considerations, it is our hope that the scientific and academic
communities will stop taking a prejudiced view of the matter and begin
considering the issue with greater intellectual clarity.
 An Initial Dictionary of Scholastic Terms and Principles

This dictionary is obviously not meant to be exhaustive, but is intended

primarily for those who do not have an extensive background in
philosophical studies.
Abstraction: the process by which one proceeds from particulars to
universals; to separate a part from the whole; an operation performed by the
Agent Intellect in which it draws out the essence or concept latent in the
Phantasm, i.e. an operation in which the Agent Intellect makes explicit to
the Possible Intellect the Essence implicit in the Phantasm in the Passive
Intellect.
Accident: that which does not exist of itself but in another as in a subject;
refers to the last nine of the ten Categories of Aristotle.
Act: in Ontology, it refers to the existence of a thing.
Act, Pure: lacking any admixture of potency (ascribed only to God).
Agent: in Ethics, it refers to he who acts; in Ontology, it refers to that which
causes.
Agere Sequitur Esse: Act (or operation) follows being; as a thing is so it
acts; the mode of being determines the mode of operation; everything acts
according to its nature in act.
Argument: a course of reasoning aimed at demonstrating the truth or falsity
of something; sometimes used as a synonym of Syllogism.
Attribute: that quality which benefits a thing in a peculiar and original
manner, so that, if other things share in it, it befits that thing above all and
for the most part; a perfection naturally needed or present in a thing;
something which belongs to or is predicable of a thing which is not
accidental but essentially belongs to the thing; sometimes refers to the
proper accident of a thing which does not enter into its definition.
Being: (1) a thing which exists; (2) the act of existence.
Body: the material element in a composite living thing.
Categories: the predicate of a proposition; one of the modes of being that
may be asserted in predication, which are Substance, Quantity, Quality,
Relation, Place, Time, Habit, Disposition, Action and Passion.
Cause: that upon which something depends for its existence or for its
coming to be.
Cause, Efficient: that which causes the existence of a thing.
Cause, Final: the reason for which a thing is made.
Cause, First: that cause to which the effect is primarily and principally
ascribed; usually refers to God; counterdistinguished from Second Cause.
Cause, Formal: the essence determining the creation of the thing
Cause, Second: that cause to which the effect is only secondarily ascribed;
usually refers to a creature in relation to God as First Cause; counter-
distinguished from First Cause.
Change: the process by which one thing becomes another; a transition from
one form of existence to another.
Circumstances: those which are said to stand around a thing and are not
essential to it.
Composite: a being which is made up of more than one part or element.
Contingent: that which can be otherwise.
Corruption: the going out of existence of a thing; in a substantial change,
the one substance that goes out of existence is said to corrupt; counter-
distinguished from Generation.
Create: to bring about the existence of a thing from nothing, i.e. to cause
the existence of a thing out of nothingness; proper only to God; counter-
distinguished from “Making.”
Deduction: a form of logical reasoning in which the conclusion necessarily
follows from the premises; a form of argumentation in which one proceeds
from the general to the particular.
Definition: an oral or written expression of the essence of a thing.
Dependence: when the cause ceases to act or be, the effect ceases to be
insofar as it is dependent on the influence of that cause.
Disposition: the ability to effect or suffer something; the innate readiness of
something for certain kinds of activity.
Distinct: when one thing is not another.
Effect: that which depends upon something for its existence or for its
coming to be.
Empiricism: a philosophical system or epistemology which asserts that
man only has sense knowledge of reality.
End: that toward which something aims; that toward which something is
ordered or directed.
Essence: what a thing is; that by which a thing is what it is.
Existence: the actuality of a thing; the perfection by means of which
something is an existent; that by which something is.
Existent: that which has existence; that which exists.
Faculty: a potentiality or power of the soul by which it acts; a proper
accident flowing from the essence of the soul by which it acts.
Finite: that which has boundary, limit or end.
First Philosophy: a branch of Metaphysics which studies the First
Principles or Causes of things. Form, Accidental: that which confers a sort
of secondary being on a substance already constituted in its proper species
and determines it in one or an other accidental mode; the external shape, the
outline, the figure, the visible structure of a body;
Form, Substantial: the constitutive element of a substance which is the
principle or source of its activity and which determines its membership in a
definite species or class; that which makes matter into a certain kind of
being, e.g. the form of dogness makes this matter be a dog; the intelligible
structure, characters constituting a substance or species of substances, as
distinguished from the matter in which these characters are embodied.
Generation: the coming into existence of a thing; in a substantial change,
the substance that comes into existence is said to be generated; counter-
distinguished from Corruption.
Genus: that part of the essence of anything which belongs also to other
things differing from it in Species; a class of objects possessing an identical
character and consisting of two or more subclasses or species; counter
distinguished from Species.
Hypothesis: see Postulate.
Hierarchy of Being: the ontological order from the greatest to the least
existing things.
Induction: a form of philosophical reasoning in which the conclusion does
not necessarily follow from the premises, the certainty of the conclusion is
based upon the amount of support provided by the premises; a form of
argumentation in which one proceeds from the particular to the general.
Inference: in Logic, the procedure by which one derives the conclusion
from the premises.
Infinite: that which has no limit, boundary or end; counterdistinguished
from the Finite.
Intellect: the faculty by which a spiritual substance knows.
Intellect, Agent: an immaterial part of the intellect of man which abstracts
the essence of a thing from a given phantasm.
Intellect, Possible: the immaterial part of the faculty in man by which he
knows; this faculty performs three acts: (1) Simple Apprehension, (2)
Judgment and (3) Ratiocination.
Law: a promulgated ordinance of reason with respect to the common good,
by him who has care of the community (ST III, 90, 4 - quaedam rationis
ordinatio ad bonum commune, ab eo qui curam communitatis habet,
promulgata).
Logic: the philosophical science and art of right reasoning.
Make: the bringing about (causing) of a thing from something pre-existing;
counter-distinguished from Create.
Matter: that out of which something is made; the passive element in
Change; the substrate of substantial Change.
Metaphysics: a philosophical science which studies being and its attributes;
metaphysics is broken into three branches: (1) First Philosophy, (2)
Ontology (sometimes called metaphysics in the more restrictive sense) and
(3) Natural Theology.
Motion: the reduction of a thing from potency, insofar as it is in potency, to
act.
Nature: the essence of a thing as it is a principle of motion or action.
Necessary: that which cannot be otherwise.
Non Sequitur: a conclusion which does not follow from its premises.
Perfection: the state of being complete; a state in which a thing possesses
all the goods proper to it. Philosophy: Love of Wisdom; the science which
studies the essences of things.
Postulate: a primary truth of a given branch of knowledge, but which is
derived from another branch of knowledge; a postulate which is not certain
or not evident from another branch of knowledge or not evident in itself is
known as a hypothesis.
Potency: that which is capable of being actualized; sometimes used in the
same sense as Faculty. Power: see Faculty.
Premise: a statement or Proposition used in support of a Conclusion.
Principle: that from which any thing in any way proceeds; the starting
point of being, change or thought.
Principle, First: a principle which does not proceed from a prior principle
in its own series.
Principle, Logical: a truth from which other truths proceed, i.e. a principle
of knowledge; a logical principle may be expressed in (a) an ontological
formula, then a general truth or a definition is expressed in terms of being;
(b) a logical formula, then a general truth or proposition is expressed in
terms of thought or speech (that is, of affirmation, negation, or predication).
The philosophical principles of thought in scholasticism are usually
principles ABOUT real beings.
Principle, Ontological: a being from which another proceeds.
Principle, Practical: a principle concerned with activity, whether doing or
making.
Principle, Real: see principle, ontological.
Principle, Self-Evident: a principle which is immediately known, i.e. one
which is seen to be true without reasoning or deduction from other
principles.
Principle, Speculative: a principle concerned with truth for its own sake.
Priority: when one thing is before another, either in the order of being,
time, causality or thought.
Property: a characteristic feature of a thing; an accident essential to and
common to all members of a class or species; an attribute that does not form
part of the essence of its subject but necessarily results from that essence as
a formal effect; a characteristic trait or attribute of a class of things.
Proposition: an assertion which affirms or denies something; the product of
the second act of the intellect, viz. Judgment.
Quality: that by virtue of which a thing is such and such; one of the ten
Categories.
Quantity: how much; the magnitude of a thing; the amount; one of the ten
Categories.
Rationalism: a philosophical system in which the criterion of truth is not
sensory but intellectual and deductive, i.e. the criterion for truth is reason
and not reality.
Realism: the epistemological position which holds that man can have true
intellectual knowledge of things.
Realism, Moderate: a form of realism which holds that we can have true
intellectual knowledge by means of the senses.
Realism, Radical: a form of realism which does not distinguish between
reality and the thing known.
Reason: the intellectual principle in man by which man knows; the
Intellect.
Relation: the reference of one thing to another; those things are called
relative, which, being either said to be of something else or related to
something else, are explained by reference to that other thing; one of the ten
Categories.
Relation, Causal: a Real Relation between two things which exists by
virtue of the fact that one of the things causes the existence of the other.
Relation of Reason: a Relation between two things which only exists in the
mind of the knower and not in the things themselves.
Relation, Real: a Relation which actually exists in reality between two
things.
Science: an organized body of knowledge; knowledge of something
through its causes; the intellectual virtue, residing in the intellect, by which
one judges rightly (i.e. it corrects the second act of the intellect of
judgment) about the things of this world; the Gift of the Holy Spirit,
residing in the intellect, by which we judge the things of this world the way
God judges them.
Self-Evident: that which is immediately known; what is selfevident is prior
to and not capable of proof.
Simple: that which is not composed of parts.
Species: the subdivision of a Genus constituted by the specific difference;
common Nature or Essence; counter-distinguished from Genus.
Subject: in the ontological order, that upon which accidental determinations
depend for existence, or that in which forms are received; in the logical
order, that of which something is predicated; synonym of Supposit,
Hypostasis and Substance.
Substance: that which exists of itself and not in another as in a subject.
Syllogism: a logical argument in which a Conclusion is inferred from a
Major Premise and a Minor Premise.
Theology, Natural: the branch of Metaphysics which has as its object of
study God, His Attributes, Separated Substances and Creation as they can
be known through the natural light of reason.
Theology, Revealed: the sacred science, which by the light of faith, studies
the deposit of faith, i.e. that which has been revealed by God.
Truth: the adequation of the intellect and thing (“adequatio intellectus et
rei”); the congruity between what is in the intellect or mind of the knower
and the thing known as it exists in reality.
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