ORIGINAL RESEARCH

published: 08 October 2020

doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2020.530152

A Map of Consciousness Studies:

Questions and Approaches
Takuya Niikawa 1,2* †
1
Institut Jean Nicod, ENS, Paris, France, 2 Faculty of Humanities and Human Sciences, Hokkaido University, Sapporo, Japan

This article aims to present a map of consciousness studies, which consists of a

list of fundamental questions about consciousness and existing approaches to them.
The question list includes five fundamental categories: Definitional, Phenomenological,
Epistemological, Ontological, and Axiological. Each fundamental category is divided into
more determinate questions. Existing approaches to each question are also classified
into a few groups, presenting principal researchers who take each kind of approach. In
the final section, I demonstrate the usefulness of the proposed map of consciousness
studies by applying it to examine the integrated information theory and the global
workspace theory of consciousness.
Keywords: consciousness, consciousness science, philosophy of consciousness, approach to consciousness,
questions about consciousness

Edited by:
Christopher Gutland,
Sun Yat-sen University, China
INTRODUCTION
Reviewed by: Academic research starts with research questions. An area of research typically develops by research
Koji Ota, questions being sophisticated, in particular, those being conceptually clarified and being divided
Niigata University, Japan
into more determinate questions. In the philosophy of language, for instance, the research question
Garrett Mindt,
Central European University, Hungary
of “what is the meaning of symbols?” was divided into two different types of questions, namely,
the question about semantics—“what is the meaning of this or that symbol (for a particular person
*Correspondence:
or group)?”—and the question about foundation—“in virtue of what facts about that person or
Takuya Niikawa
[email protected]
group does the symbol have that meaning?” (Speaks, 2019, sec. 1). This division has helped us
† Present
to develop theories of meaning without confusion. In linguistics, likewise, the research question of
address:
Takuya Niikawa,
“what is the linguistic capacity?” can be divided into two distinct questions, namely, the competence
Graduate School of Humanities, Kobe question—“what is the linguistic competence?”—and the performance question—“what is the
University, Kobe, Japan linguistic performance ability?” (Chomsky, 2014). This distinction helps us to develop theories of
linguistic capacities while avoiding unnecessary confusion.
Specialty section: Consciousness studies have rapidly developed in the last three decades; many philosophical
This article was submitted to and scientific theories of consciousness have been proposed. However, it is far less clear how
Consciousness Research, such theories of consciousness are related to each other. Some theories target different aspects
a section of the journal
of consciousness; some theories address the same aspect of consciousness but with different
Frontiers in Psychology
methodologies. Consider two influential scientific theories of consciousness, the integrated
Received: 28 January 2020
information theory (IIT) (Tononi, 2008; Tononi et al., 2016) and the global workspace theory
Accepted: 02 September 2020
(GWT) (Baars, 2005; Dehaene, 2014). Although many assume that they are competitive, it is
Published: 08 October 2020
unclear whether they are concerned with the same research subject in the first place (Ball, 2019).
Citation:
Given that there already exist many theories of consciousness, and it is far less clear how they
Niikawa T (2020) A Map
of Consciousness Studies: Questions
are related, we need to stop trying to answer a specific research question set out in a theoretical
and Approaches. framework for a moment and instead take research questions about consciousness themselves as the
Front. Psychol. 11:530152. target of investigation. In other words, a second-order investigation of the research questions about
doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2020.530152 consciousness is required to further develop consciousness studies.

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Niikawa A Map of Consciousness Studies

As an initial step of the second-order investigation, this article

presents a systematic list of questions about consciousness (see
section “The List of Questions”). This list helps us to understand
what questions the existing theories of consciousness address. In
addition, the list helps each consciousness researcher to see what
aspects of consciousness they are interested in.
After proposing a list of questions about consciousness,
I also submit a list of approaches to each question (see section
“The List of Approaches”). The list of approaches gives us the
methodological overview of consciousness studies. It also helps
researchers working in various fields to see what question they
can tackle in their methodological/theoretical frameworks.
The list of questions is constructed by a top–down approach.
I apply the traditional taxonomy of philosophical inquiries to
categorize questions about consciousness. Thus, the proposed
classificatory framework is neither arbitrary nor groundless. The
list of approaches is constructed by a bottom–up approach. I take
the existing approaches to each kind of question and then classify
them based on their crucial methodological differences.
The final section of this article is dedicated to demonstrate the
usefulness of the map of consciousness studies, which consists
of the lists of questions and approaches, by applying it to
examine IIT and GWT. I will argue that the proposed map is
useful in that it can provide a multidimensional framework in
which to compare various scientific theories of consciousness,
including IIT and GWT.

THE LIST OF QUESTIONS

Philosophical inquiries have typically been divided into three
categories: Ontological, Epistemological, and Axiological (Lee,
1966, p. 72; Woleński, 2004, p. 3). In addition to this traditional
distinction, I incorporate two other fundamental categories into
the classificatory framework for questions about consciousness,
namely, Definitional and Phenomenological. Definitional
inquiries explore satisfactory definitions of key concepts, such
as “good” and “knowledge.” The term “consciousness” is also a
target of this inquiry. Phenomenology is a discipline in which
to investigate conscious phenomena from the subjective point
of view, which is typically distinguished from other disciplines
of philosophy (Smith, 2018, sec. 1). There is no doubt that
the category of phenomenology should be included in the
classificatory framework for questions about consciousness.
Thus, we have five fundamental categories in which
questions about consciousness are classified: Definitional,
Phenomenological, Epistemological, Ontological, and Axiological1 .
Each fundamental category (except the definitional) has FIGURE 1 | The list of questions about consciousness.
subcategories. The subcategories are set out partially in a
bottom–up manner: it is partially based on the widely accepted
division in the subject matter. In the rest of this section, I present
the five fundamental questions about consciousness and how
Definitional Question
How should we define the term “consciousness” and its cognates?
they are divided into subquestions (Figure 1).
The definitional question is not divided into subquestions. . . .
1
Note that I do not claim that the questions belonging to distinct fundamental
categories are independent of each other. Rather, they are interrelated in such a
way that the answer to one question affects the scope of possible answers to other Phenomenological Question
kinds of questions. What phenomenological features does consciousness have?

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Niikawa A Map of Consciousness Studies

The phenomenological question is divided into three Distribution Question

subquestions, depending on what aspect of consciousness to How is consciousness distributed in the physical world? (In other
focus on, namely, content, dimension, or structure. The content of words, what has consciousness?)
consciousness is understood as variable features of consciousness,
such as experienced color, shape, movement, taste, or feel2 . The Axiological Question
dimension of consciousness is understood as the fundamentally What values does consciousness have?
different kinds of conscious experiences, such as perceptual,
This question is divided into four subquestions, depending on
cognitive, and emotional dimensions (Kriegel, 2015). The
what kind of value to address, namely, cognitive, epistemic, moral,
structure of consciousness is understood as invariable features
or aesthetic4 .
of consciousness, such as unity and figure-ground structure
(Bayne, 2010; Watzl, 2011; Macpherson, 2015). While the general Cognitive Value Question
structures of consciousness itself are typically discussed in the What type of cognitive capacity does consciousness enable its
philosophy of consciousness, the specific structures of each possessor to have?
dimension of consciousness can also be investigated.
Epistemic Value Question
Content Question What type of knowledge does consciousness enable its possessor
What content does consciousness have? to have?
Dimension Question Moral Value Question
What dimensions does consciousness have? What type of moral status does consciousness enable its possessor
to have?
Structure Question
What structures does consciousness have? Aesthetic Value Question
What type of aesthetic value does consciousness enable its
Epistemological Question possessor to have?
How do we know about consciousness?
The epistemological question is divided into two subquestions,
depending on whose consciousness to address, whether one’s own
THE LIST OF APPROACHES
consciousness or the consciousness of others. In this section, I present approaches to each kind of questions
that have been actually employed by consciousness researchers
Epistemological Question About One’s Own with a brief assessment of them (Figure 2). Note that although
Consciousness each approach can be taken individually to address one question,
How do we know about our own consciousness? we can also take different approaches in combination to
address one specific question. In this sense, these approaches
Epistemological Question About Others’ are not exclusive.
Consciousness
How do we know about the consciousness of others? Approaches to the Definitional Question
Let us start with the definitional question: How should we
Ontological Question define the term “consciousness” and its cognates? There are
How is consciousness located in the world? two approaches to the definitional question: (I) example-based
The ontological question is divided into two subquestions3 . approach and (II) essence-based approach.
The first concerns the relation between consciousness and The example-based approach defines the term
the physical world; the second concerns the distribution of “consciousness” as something that is shared by typical examples of
consciousness over the physical world. conscious states/experiences, such as pain experience and visual
experience (Velmans, 2009; Nida-Rümelin, 2016; Prinz, 2016;
Mind–Body Question Schwitzgebel, 2016). This approach can provide a theoretically
What relation holds between consciousness and the physical neutral definition of consciousness, since it does not refer to any
world (in particular our brain)? distinctive property in the definition of the term “consciousness.”
The problem of the example-based approach is that it is unclear
2
For the overview of philosophical issues about the content of consciousness, see
how we should determine the scope of typical examples of
Macpherson (2011) and Siegel (2016). conscious experiences. If we restrict the “typical” examples
3
One might wonder why I do not formulate the ontological question as “what
4
is consciousness?” The reason is that it is ambiguous in that it can also be Although I owe this division partly to Kriegel (2019), there are two differences.
interpreted as the definitional question and as the phenomenological question First, I do not introduce the distinction between intrinsic and instrumental values
asking the essential phenomenological features of consciousness. This ambiguity for the sake of simplicity. Second, I add cognitive value because (1) it does not
of the question of “what is consciousness?” may cause confusions in consciousness seem to be reducible to other kinds of value and (2) the cognitive value question
studies. has actually been discussed in scientific consciousness studies (Kanai et al., 2019).

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Niikawa A Map of Consciousness Studies

FIGURE 2 | The list of questions about consciousness and each approach to them.

of conscious experiences too narrowly, borderline cases of The essence-based approach defines the term “consciousness”
consciousness, such as dreamless sleep and vegetative states, may by referring to its essential property such as phenomenality
be automatically excluded from consciousness studies. However, (or “what-it-is-like-ness”) (Chalmers, 1997), the property of
it is controversial whether dreamless sleep and vegetative states being inner, qualitative, and subjective (Searle, 2000), and being
are conscious states (Shea and Bayne, 2010; Windt et al., 2016). accurately reportable (Baars, 1993, p. 19). The merit of this

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Niikawa A Map of Consciousness Studies

approach is that it can provide an informative definition of of introspection are not sophisticated to the required extent, but
the term “consciousness.” Its problem is that it is highly because it is unclear how introspective data are related to these
controversial what property we should count as the definitional issues. We need to clarify what introspective data are predicted
property of consciousness; there may be no single property if we consciously experience causal relations between events in
that all the consciousness researchers accept to be essential for addition to experiencing sequential occurrences of events, if we
consciousness. Thus, the essence-based approach may cause a consciously experience the property of being water in addition
dispute over the correct definition of consciousness. This dispute to experiencing the presence of clear, colorless liquid, and if
can be resolved if we take a pluralist position about the definition consciousness has a cognitive dimension as being irreducible
of consciousness, allowing that there are several different to other dimensions such as sensory and imaginative ones.
notions of consciousness defined in different manners, such as Introspection turns out useless if no introspectable difference is
“phenomenal consciousness” and “access consciousness” (Block, predicted there. A more fundamental limitation of introspection
1995). However, meta-level questions arise for the pluralists: what is that one’s introspection is not effective to understand the
relation holds between those notions of consciousness? Are they phenomenological features of conscious experiences that one
different aspects of a single phenomenon, or do they refer to is unable to have. For instance, it is hard for normal people to
different phenomena? understand by introspection the phenomenological features of
schizophrenic experiences and synesthetic experiences.
Approaches to the Phenomenological The observation approach is to infer what phenomenological
Question features a conscious experience has from its possessor’s
The second question is the phenomenological question: What observable states/behaviors, including their subjective reports.
phenomenological features does consciousness have? This For instance, when one reports that she sees a red patch,
question is divided into three subquestions: content, dimension, then we can infer that her conscious experience has red-color
and structure. There are three approaches to each subquestion: content; when one groans painfully, we can infer that she
(I) introspection approach, (II) observation approach, and (III) has pain experience6 . This approach is available to explore
reasoning approach. the phenomenological features of conscious experiences
The introspection approach explores the phenomenological that are difficult for researchers to have by themselves,
features of conscious experiences by introspection in a broad such as schizophrenic and synesthetic experiences. We can,
sense, where it involves not only the cognitive activities of in principle, infer what phenomenological features such
“turning one’s attention inward and attending to one’s own conscious experiences have from their possessors’ observable
concurrent internal goings-on” but also uses of memory, states/behaviors, in particular, their introspective reports
imagination, and concept application (Kriegel, 2015, pp. 20, 21). (Hubbard and Ramachandran, 2003; Fuchs, 2007; Simmonds-
Thus, introspection in this sense can include imagining Moore, 2016). Experimental neuroscience of consciousness
a conscious experience and conceptually describing its typically employs the observation approach in investigating
phenomenological feature; it can also involve imaginatively neural properties responsible for the phenomenological features
comparing a current conscious experience with past conscious of conscious experiences (Tononi and Koch, 2015, sec. 3).
experiences5 . This is in part because it needs to collect quantitative data
The introspection approach works for basic contents about neural activities from many experimental participants
of conscious experiences and their salient dimensions and rather than the researchers themselves alone. The practical
structures. For instance, when I introspect on my current problem with this approach lies in how to interpret the
conscious experience of drinking Springbank 15 years, I observable states/behaviors. In addressing untypical conscious
can find that it has sweetness, smokiness, saltiness, and its experiences, even the introspective reports of such experiences
distinctive sulfur smell as its flavor contents, that it has temporal are difficult to interpret. Here is a report from a patient with
continuity as its structure, and that it has perceptual and depersonalization syndrome: “I feel as though I’m not alive
algedonic dimensions. However, there are cases for which as though my body is an empty, lifeless shell. I seem to be
the introspection approach does not work. For instance, standing apart from the rest of the world, as though I’m not
sophisticated skills of introspection are required to capture the really here” (Bockner, 1949, p. 969). It is hard to understand
complex phenomenological features of consciousness such as what the patient’s experience is like. Furthermore, Michel (2019)
dynamical interactions of attentional shifts and flavor profiles points to the crucial role of background beliefs in interpreting
of drinking Springbank 15 years, but people typically lack such observable states/behaviors, claiming that the disagreements
skills. Furthermore, introspection seems unable to determine among consciousness scientists mainly lie in whether to interpret
whether a perceptual experience can have causal relations (e.g., certain observable states/behaviors as evidence for the presence
touching a screen causing the screen flashing) and natural of a phenomenological feature.
kind properties (e.g., being water) as its content (Siegel, 2007) The reasoning approach infers what phenomenological
and whether consciousness has cognitive phenomenology as a features consciousness has from a given thesis about
distinct dimension (Spener, 2011). This is not because our skills
6
It is controversial whether some kind of inference is always required to know
5
Husserlian Phenomenology can be counted as introspective on this broad what others consciously experience. This paper sets aside this issue for simplicity.
definition of introspection (Breyer and Gutland, 2016, p. 13; Gutland, 2018). See McDowell (1983) for an argument against the necessity of inference.

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Niikawa A Map of Consciousness Studies

consciousness. For instance, Pitt (2004) argues that given [for the conceptual relation between introspection and
that the possession of consciousness enables us to introspectively metacognition, see Overgaard and Sandberg (2012, sec. 1)].
know what we think, consciousness must have a cognitive A theory of introspection can also be evaluated based on the
dimension as being irreducible to other dimensions7 . A challenge relevant scientific findings. Likewise, to describe how one knows
to those who adopt this approach is to justify a thesis about about the consciousness of others from the third-personal
consciousness used as a premise for reasoning. Note that the perspective is to describe third-personally the processes of
premise in Pitt’s reasoning can be counted as an answer to knowing others’ conscious experiences. This approach includes
the epistemic value question: What type of knowledge does attempts to describe the processes of mind reading and empathy.
consciousness enable its possessor to have? As shown in this, Some focus on the relevant neural/psychological processes
answers to other kinds of questions, in particular, the ontological (Marsh, 2018), others address external conditions in which
question and the axiological question, can possibly be the premises we try to know others’ conscious experiences (Gallagher and
used in the reasoning approach. Hutto, 2008). A theory of mind reading/empathy can be
constructed/assessed based on the data acquired through this
Approaches to the Epistemological type of exploration.
Questions The betterment approach explores how we can better know
The third question is the epistemological question: How do about consciousness, rather than just describing how we know
we know about consciousness? This question is divided into about it. There are a few research projects that can be counted
two subquestions depending on whose consciousness to address, as the betterment approach. Some training programs to enhance
namely, one’s own consciousness or the consciousness of others. the skills of empathy have been developed (Lam et al., 2011;
There are three approaches to the epistemological question: Englander, 2014). Likewise, there is a research project to design
(I) first-person descriptive approach, (II) third-person descriptive a training program to enhance the skills of introspection in
approach, and (III) betterment approach. general (Miyahara et al., 2020). There are also many attempts
The first-person descriptive approach describes how we know to invent an interview-based method to know better what
about our own consciousness and the consciousness of others others consciously experience (Petitmengin, 2006; Langdridge,
from the first-person perspective. To describe how one knows 2007; Giorgi, 2009; Petitmengin et al., 2019). Moreover, brain-
about one’s own consciousness from the first-person perspective decoding techniques may be available to know better about the
is to describe first-personally the processes of introspection. consciousness of others, including behaviorally non-responsive
This approach is employed in constructing/assessing theories patients’ experiences (Naci et al., 2017). Importantly, we can see
of introspection. For example, some philosophers reflect on the betterment approach as developing methods to address the
the process of introspection on perceptual experience and phenomenological question8 .
describe it as being “transparent” in that we know the
contents of our own perceptual experience through being Approaches to the Ontological Question
aware of the external objects/events (Harman, 1990; Tye, The fourth question is the ontological question: How is
2000). A theory of introspection is constructed/assessed partially consciousness located in the world? This question is divided into
based on the transparency of perceptual experience. If a two subquestions. The first is the mind–body question: What
theory of introspection implies that introspection is entirely relation holds between consciousness and the physical world (in
distinct from perceptual awareness, the theory seems to particular our brain?) The second is the distribution question:
conflict with the transparency of perceptual experience and How is consciousness distributed in the physical world? (In other
therefore be assessed negatively. Likewise, to describe how words, what has consciousness?) There are two approaches to the
one knows about the consciousness of others from the first- mind–body question: (I) correlation approach and (II) reasoning
person perspective is to describe first-personally the processes of approach. There are also two approaches to the distribution
knowing others’ conscious experiences. Some philosophical and question: (I) intuition approach and (II) reasoning approach.
phenomenological accounts of how to know others’ conscious The correlation approach explores what neural or
experiences are partially based on the first-personal descriptions informational feature is correlated with the presence of a
of such processes (Wittgenstein, 1980, sec. 570; Scheler, 2008; phenomenological feature of consciousness (or the presence
Overgaard, 2017). of consciousness itself) by using brain scanning technologies
The third-person descriptive approach describes how we such as functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) and
know about our own consciousness and the consciousness brain stimulation techniques such as repetitive transcranial
of others from the third-person perspective. To describe magnetic stimulation (rTMS). Simply put, this is to explore
how one knows about one’s own consciousness from the “neural correlates of consciousness (NCC),” which are the
third-personal perspective is to describe third-personally the minimal neuronal mechanisms jointly sufficient for a specific
processes of introspection. This approach typically focuses on
8
the neural/psychological processes responsible for introspection One might wonder why the question of “how it is possible for us to know about
consciousness,” which has been much discus-sed in philosophy, is not included in
(Fleming et al., 2010; Baird et al., 2013; Jacobs and Silvanto, 2015), the list of subcategories of the epistemological question. The reason is that the “how
where introspection is not differentiated from metacognition possible” question should be interpreted as a form of the ontological question,
namely: what relation must hold between consciousness and the world (including
7
This is not the original form of Pitt’s argument but its possible reformulation. our body and brain) given that it is possible for us to know about consciousness?

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Niikawa A Map of Consciousness Studies

content, dimension, or structure of consciousness (or the machines like my laptop do not seem to have consciousness. It is
presence of consciousness itself) (Crick and Koch, 1990). unclear to me whether insects and plants are conscious. On the
There are many findings of the neural and informational assumption that intuition is a reliable epistemic route to know
correlates of consciousness (Koch et al., 2016; Boly et al., about the distribution of consciousness over the world, we can
2017; Wu, 2018, secs 4, 5). For example, some found that the employ our intuition to answer the distribution question. The
conscious experience of a visual scene is correlated with the obvious problem with this approach is to justify the assumption
activities of the parahippocampal place area of our brain (a that intuition is reliable with respect to the distribution of
subregion of the parahippocampal cortex that lies medially consciousness over the world.
in the inferior temporo-occipital cortex) (Mégevand et al., The reasoning approach is also available to address the
2014); others found that the conscious experience of a human distribution question: to infer what has consciousness from
face is correlated with the activities of the posterior and mid a given thesis about consciousness. For example, if we
fusiform gyrus (Parvizi et al., 2012). The limitation of the take biological naturalism that consciousness is a biological
correlation approach is that it cannot, in principle, reveal a phenomenon (Searle, 1992) as a premise for reasoning, we can
more substantial relationship between consciousness and the infer that non-biological entities, such as machines and robots,
physical world than the correlation relation. Since the correlation cannot have consciousness. If we take IIT that consciousness
relation is consistent with many metaphysical relations such as is identical to internally generated and integrated information
causal relation, grounding relation, and identity relation, the (Tononi, 2008) as a premise for reasoning, we can conclude that
correlation approach cannot determine which metaphysical any system that generates information in an integrated manner
relation holds between consciousness and the physical world has consciousness (for the detail of IIT, see section “Applications:
(Kozuch and Kriegel, 2015). Integrated Information Theory and Global Workspace Theory”).
The reasoning approach infers what relation holds between As we have seen, the essential difficulty with this approach is to
consciousness and the physical world from a given thesis about settle the debates between those who take distinct theses, which
consciousness. For example, Papineau (2002, pp. 31–35) takes the are justified in different manners, as the premises for reasoning.
causal efficacy thesis that consciousness can cause physical effects Note that the answer to the distribution question directly
as a key premise for reasoning and argues that consciousness affects the scope of the phenomenological and epistemological
is identical to physical properties. Chalmers (2010, pp. 106– questions. For instance, since IIT implies that computers
108) takes the conceivability of a phenomenal zombie—the which generate information in an integrated manner possess
thesis that it is conceivable that a physical duplicate of us consciousness, the question of how we can know about the
lacks consciousness—as a key premise for reasoning and argues consciousness of such computers arises for advocates of IIT.
that consciousness cannot be physical. Campbell (2002, chap. Likewise, IIT opens up the phenomenological question about
6) argues that perceptual consciousness must be constituted such computers: What content, dimension, and structure does
by ordinary mind-independent objects on the premise that their consciousness have?
perceptual consciousness enables its possessor to know about
such ordinary mind-independent objects demonstratively. As Approaches to the Axiological Question
shown in these examples, the reasoning approach can address The fifth question is the axiological question: What values
what metaphysical relation holds between consciousness and the does consciousness have? This question is divided into four
physical world beyond mere correlation. As we saw in section subquestions depending on what kind of value to address:
“Approaches to the Phenomenological Question”, however, a cognitive, epistemic, moral, and esthetic. The scope of those
challenge to those who adopt this approach is to justify the subquestions is not restricted to the values of consciousness itself
thesis about consciousness used as a key premise for reasoning. but includes those of each content, dimension, and structure
To address this, for example, one may try to justify the causal of consciousness. There are three approaches to the axiological
efficacy thesis by appealing to our folk psychological briefs, question: (I) first-person contrast approach, (II) third-person
such as the one that “my conscious thirst caused me to fetch contrast approach, and (III) reasoning approach.
a beer” (Papineau, 2002, p. 21); another may try to justify the The first-person contrast approach explores what difference
conceivability of a phenomenal zombie by providing an argument there is in relevant value between the cases where one has
against the a priori entailment from physical facts to phenomenal and lacks consciousness (or where one’s consciousness has and
facts. The essential difficulty with the reasoning approach is lacks a specific phenomenological feature) from the first-person
to settle the conflicts between those who take distinct theses, perspective. This approach typically consists of the following two
which are justified in different manners, as the premises to steps: (a) to first-personally imagine that one loses consciousness
infer opposing ontological positions (such as physicalism and (or a specific phenomenological feature disappears from one’s
anti-physicalism). consciousness) and (b) to consider what value-related feature
The intuition approach to the distribution question asks she thereby loses. Siewert (1998, 2014) takes this approach,
our intuition what has consciousness. We typically have some arguing that (1) consciousness makes the life of its possessor
intuitive thoughts about what can have consciousness. For worth living and that (2) only the possessor of consciousness
instance, it seems doubtless to me that other human beings are can perform intentional cognitive activities/processes such as
conscious. Many other kinds of mammals, such as dogs and cats, making judgments and having desires. The first point concerns
seem to have consciousness. However, microphysical entities and moral value and possibly aesthetic value; the second point

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Niikawa A Map of Consciousness Studies

concerns cognitive value. Campbell (2002, chap. 1) also takes In doing so, I point out several challenges to IIT. I then
this approach, arguing that perceptual experience enables its take the same procedure to examine GWT. I finally propose
possessor to know about ordinary mind-independent objects a way to clarify the relation between IIT and GWT with
demonstratively. The problem with this approach is that it the help of the proposed map of consciousness studies. The
is controversial whether our first-personal thoughts about the discussion is sketchy but still sufficient to demonstrate how the
values of consciousness are reliable. When reflecting on how proposed map can be used to examine and compare theories
we visually discriminate an object from others, for example, we of consciousness.
are likely to think that if we lose perceptual consciousness, we Let us start with the definitional question. Tononi (2015,
cannot carry out the discrimination task. However, this intuitive abstract, emphasis added) claims that IIT “attempts to identify
thought seems to be falsified by the case of blindsight: the patient the essential properties of consciousness (axioms) and, from
can achieve various visual discrimination tasks by “guesswork,” there, infers the properties of physical systems that can
even though he said he did not have any visual experience account for it (postulates).” He lists five essential properties
(Weiskrantz, 2007). of consciousness, namely, intrinsic existence, composition,
The third-person contrast approach explores what difference information, integration, and exclusion, and calls them “axioms”
there is in relevant value between the cases where one has (Tononi, 2015, sec. 2). The intrinsic existence axiom states
and lacks consciousness (or where one’s consciousness has that consciousness exists independently from external observers,
and lacks a specific phenomenological feature) from the third- the composition axiom states that consciousness is structured,
person perspective. Dehaene and Naccache (2001) take this the information axiom states that each conscious experience
approach, arguing that consciousness enables durable and explicit is the particular way it is and thereby it differs from other
information maintenance, novel combinations of operations, and possible conscious experiences, the integration axiom states
intentional behavior. Weiskrantz (1997, chap. 7) focuses on a that consciousness is unified, and the exclusion axiom states
broad spectrum of syndromes in which there seems to be a that consciousness is definite in content and spatiotemporal
loss of capacities related to consciousness, such as blindsight grain9 . The fact that they are called “axioms” suggests that the
and aphasic disorders, arguing that consciousness grounds the conjunction of the listed essential properties fixes the reference of
capacities to perform flexible thinking and imagining. Kriegel “consciousness.” Thus, IIT takes the essence-based approach to
(2017) compares our natural attitudes to conscious beings and the definitional question, claiming that consciousness is defined
non-conscious beings, and argues that consciousness confers in terms of the five axioms.
dignity as a moral status on its possessors (possibly with some One slogan of IIT is that it goes “from phenomenology to
other conditions). However, it may be objected that the apparent physics” (Tononi et al., 2016, p. 450); the axioms are called
differences in values can be explained without appealing to the “phenomenological axioms” (Oizumi et al., 2014). This
consciousness (Lau, 2009; see also Rosenthal, 2008). Hence, indicates that the axioms are derived from phenomenological
a challenge to the third-person contrast approach is to argue considerations, namely, by addressing the phenomenological
that the proposed difference in a type of value cannot be well question, in particular, the structure question of what invariant
explained without referring to consciousness. features consciousness has (since the essential properties of
The reasoning approach infers what values consciousness consciousness are the invariant of consciousness). This suggests
has from a given thesis about consciousness. For example, Tye that advocates of IIT answer the definitional question through
(1996) takes the representationalist thesis that consciousness is tackling the structure question.
representational as the key premise for reasoning and concludes Advocates of IIT claim that the phenomenological axioms
that consciousness enables its possessor “to do a wide variety “cannot be doubted and do not need proof ” and are “taken
of things that they would not be able to do without it—for to be immediately evident” (Oizumi et al., 2014, p. 2).
example, to recognize objects, to avoid knocking into them” (pp. This shows that they take the introspection approach to the
301, 302). The proponents of the attentional schema thesis that structure question, rather than the observation approach and
consciousness is an internal model of attention (Graziano and the reasoning approach, to derive the phenomenological axioms.
Webb, 2014) can take it as a premise for reasoning and conclude However, some philosophers cast doubt on the plausibility
that consciousness enables its possessor to control attention of the axioms as capturing the essential phenomenological
in proper manners. features of consciousness (Bayne, 2018; Pokropski, 2018;
Miyahara and Witkowski, 2019). This demonstrates that the
phenomenological axioms can be doubted and should not
APPLICATIONS: INTEGRATED be taken to be immediately evident. Thus, advocates of IIT
INFORMATION THEORY AND GLOBAL must justify the phenomenological axioms, employing the other
WORKSPACE THEORY approaches if needed.
Let us next move onto the ontological question. IIT
This article proposes a map of consciousness studies, which specifies five informational features of physical systems (so-
consists of a systematic list of questions about consciousness called “postulates”), each of which is supposed to account
and existing approaches to each question. In this final section,
I apply this map to examine IIT and GWT. I first address 9
For more details of axioms in IIT, see Oizumi et al. (2014); Tononi et al. (2016),
how IIT answers each fundamental question that I have listed. and Miyahara and Witkowski (2019).

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Niikawa A Map of Consciousness Studies

for a corresponding phenomenological axiom, and states that behavioral standard can be used to determine whether one is
every physical system that realizes the five postulates possesses aware of a piece of information, as being different from the one
consciousness10 . This statement is counted as the answer to the for reportability. Nevertheless, Dehaene does not seem to provide
distribution question. Nevertheless, it is not fully clear what an analytic explanation of the notion of awareness. Instead, he
reasoning is in play here (especially in what sense each postulate presents a few examples of being aware of something. For instance,
“accounts for” a corresponding phenomenological axiom and he presents an example of visual illusion and states:
why each postulate necessitates the phenomenological feature
Twelve dots, printed in light gray, surround a black cross. Now stare
represented by the corresponding axiom). In order to evaluate
intently at the central cross. After a few seconds, you should see some
IIT’s answer to the distribution question, thus, we should clarify of the gray dots fade in and out of existence. For a few seconds, they
the exact premises and inferential steps that constitute the vanish from your awareness; then they pop back in. Sometimes the
reasoning in question. entire set goes away, temporarily leaving you with a blank page—
IIT answers the mind–body question by stating that conscious only to return a few seconds later with a seemingly darker shade of
experience is identical to an integrated informational structure gray. (Dehaene, 2014, p. 17)
of physical systems that instantiates the five postulates (Tononi,
2015, sec. 4). There is, however, no mention of how the identity This suggests that Dehaene leads his readers to grasp the sense
claim is derived in any IIT literature. As we have seen in of “awareness” through the examples presented in his book. If
section “Approaches to the Ontological Question”, identity is this is correct, his definition of consciousness is not entirely
not reasonably inferred only from the presence of correlation, operational, for it does not reduce the sense of “consciousness”
since other metaphysical relations such as causal relation and to reportability alone. In defining consciousness, Dehaene seems
grounding relation are also compatible with the presence of to take the example-based and essence-based approaches in
correlation. To justify the identity claim, advocates of IIT need combination; the former corresponds to the “awareness” part,
to clarify what theses they use as the premises for the reasoning and the latter corresponds to the “reportability” part.
in question, in addition to the experimental finding that there is a Dehaene (2014, chap. 4) takes the correlation approach to
correlation between the presence of consciousness and a relevant the mind–body question, presenting many relevant empirical
informational structure of brains (Massimini et al., 2005). findings11 . Based on them, he identifies four physiological
Otherwise, we cannot properly evaluate IIT’s identity claim. markers that index whether a stimulus is consciously accessible:
Let us finally examine what implications IIT have for the First, a conscious stimulus causes an intense neuronal activation
epistemological and the axiological questions. First, IIT seems that leads to a sudden ignition of parietal and prefrontal circuits.
to have an implication for the epistemological question about Second, in the EEG, conscious access is accompanied by a slow
the consciousness of others. IIT states that the phenomenological wave called the P3 wave, which emerges as late as one-third of a
features of consciousness (in particular contents and dimensions) second after the stimulus. Third, conscious ignition also triggers a
are reflected in the form of the informational structure of physical late and sudden burst of high-frequency oscillations. Finally, many
systems (Tononi, 2015, sec. 4; Tononi et al., 2016, p. 459). It regions exchange bidirectional and synchronized messages over long
follows from this that we can infer the phenomenological features distances in the cortex, thus forming a global brain web. (Dehaene,
2014, pp. 158, 159)
of the consciousness of others from the form of the informational
structure of their brain, which we can, in principle, specify Dehaene then provides a functionalist account as to why
from the third-person perspective. This can be counted as an consciousness is correlated with those physiological makers.
answer to the epistemological question about the consciousness
of others. IIT also has an implication for the cognitive value The human brain has developed efficient long-distance networks,
question. If it is cognitively advantageous for physical systems to particularly in the prefrontal cortex, to select relevant information
and disseminate it throughout the brain. Consciousness is an
generate information in an integrated manner, IIT implies that
evolved device that allows us to attend to a piece of information and
the possession of consciousness is cognitively advantageous for keep it active within this broadcasting system. Once the information
that very reason. is conscious, it can be flexibly routed to other areas according to our
I turn to how GWT (in particular its major advocate Stanislas current goals. Thus we can name it, evaluate it, memorize it, or use
Dehaene) answers each fundamental question listed in The it to plan the future (Dehaene, 2014, p. 161).
List of Questions section. Dehaene (2014, pp. 8, 9) defines
consciousness in terms of “conscious access”: the content of This functionalist account describes how a piece of
mental state/process is consciously accessible if and only if information is cognitively processed in our brain when it is
it enters awareness and becomes reportable to others. This consciously accessible and thereby explains why the above
definition consists of two notions, awareness and reportability. physiological makers occur in functional terms. This account
The property of being reportable serves to provide an informative is thus an empirically supported correlation-based answer
definition of consciousness, since we can set out an objective to the mind–body question. This is, I think, the core thesis
procedure to determine whether a piece of information is of GWT. However, Dehaene (2014, p. 161) goes beyond the
reportable for its possessor. In contrast, it is unclear how
11
“awareness” is different from “consciousness” in our ordinary It is necessary to address the content question before exploring the correlation
conceptual understandings. Furthermore, it is unclear what between the contents of consciousness and neural/informational features of brains.
Dehaene (2014, p. 41–45) takes the observation approach to address the content
question, emphasizing the availability of subjective reports from experimental
10
For the details of the postulates, see Oizumi et al. (2014). participants as objective data.

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Niikawa A Map of Consciousness Studies

empirically supported claim regarding correlation, claiming I close this article by presenting three ideas on how to proceed
that “consciousness is brain-wide information sharing.” If we with consciousness research with the help of the lists of questions
interpreted this statement literally, it would mean the identity and approaches proposed in this article. First, we should examine
between consciousness and the brain-wide information sharing. how existing theories of consciousness answer each fundamental
However, this identity claim does not directly follow from the question about consciousness and what approach their advocates
empirically supported claim about correlation. If Dehaene (2014) adopt. By doing so, we can obtain systematic understandings
defined consciousness only in terms of reportability, then the of each theory of consciousness, which enable us to see what
identity claim would be derived from the fact that reportability part of each theory of consciousness needs to be justified
can be reductively explained in terms of brain-wide information and developed. Second, we should conduct a multidimensional
sharing. However, Dehaene (2014) includes “awareness” in his comparison of the existing theories of consciousness. This
definition of consciousness, which is supposed to be grasped enables us to obtain a detailed and well-organized review of
through examples. It is unclear whether the property of being how they are related to each other. These two points have been
aware of something is considered to be reductively explained in demonstrated in the discussions of IIT and GWT. Third, each
functional terms, unlike reportability. Thus, Dehaene is required research group should clarify what question and approach to
to explain why the property of being aware of something should take in investigating consciousness. By doing so, they can be
be counted as standing in the identity relation, rather than other aware of the scope, limitation, and potential implications of their
metaphysical relations, to the brain-wide information sharing. research project and also of its relations to existing theories
As in the case of IIT, we cannot properly evaluate IIT’s identity of consciousness.
claim unless some explanation is provided. Although I believe that the proposed lists of questions and
Global workspace theory has implications for (i) the cognitive approaches contribute to the development of consciousness
value question, (ii) the epistemological question about the studies, I do not think that they are entirely satisfactory. The
consciousness of others, and (iii) the distribution question. Given map of consciousness studies presented in this article can be
that a piece of information can be flexibly routed to many brain revised and further enriched. I hope that this article also works
areas only when it is consciously accessible, it is plausible to think as a springboard for a further second-order investigation on
that (i) consciousness enables its possessor to process information consciousness studies as being distinct from the first-order
in such flexible manners (Dehaene, 2014, chap. 3) and that (ii) investigation on consciousness.
we can know about the content of the consciousness of others
by detecting the information widely shared in his/her brain. (iii)
It follows from GWT’s identity claim that every creature who DATA AVAILABILITY STATEMENT
has “brain-wide information sharing” is conscious (Dehaene,
The original contributions presented in the study are included in
2014, chap. 6.7).
the article/supplementary material.
We can clarify the relation between IIT and GWT by
comparing their answers to each fundamental question. Let us
take three questions, for example, the definitional question, the AUTHOR CONTRIBUTIONS
mind–body question, and the distribution question. For the
definitional question, IIT states that consciousness is defined The author confirms being the sole contributor of this work and
in terms of the five phenomenological axioms, which are has approved it for publication.
supposed to capture the essential properties of consciousness. In
contrast, GWT defines consciousness in terms of awareness and
reportability. By comparing the two definitions of consciousness, FUNDING
we can examine whether IIT and GWT have the same research
I gratefully acknowledge the support of the Japan Society
subject in the first place. For the mind–body question, IIT
for the Promotion of Science (JSPS KAKENHI Grant
states that conscious experience is identical to an integrated
Number: 18K00031).
informational structure of physical systems that instantiates the
five postulates. In contrast, GWT states that consciousness is
brain-wide information sharing. By comparing the two identity ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
claims, we can examine whether they are compatible or conflicting.
For the distribution question, IIT states that every physical I would like to thank Benedicte Veillet, Ying-Tung Lin, Katsunori
system that realizes the five postulates possesses consciousness. Miyahara, Matthieu Koroma, Lok-Chi Chan, and Uriah Kriegel
In contrast, GWT implies that every creature who has brain-wide for their detailed comments on this article. I also thank the
information sharing has consciousness. By examining whether audience at the 22nd conference of the Association for the
each kind of creature overlaps, we can see whether IIT and Scientific Study of Consciousness, the 10th Annual Meeting of
GWT substantially differ in what existing creatures/entities have Japan Association for Contemporary and Applied Philosophy,
consciousness. In this way, we can conduct a multidimensional the consciousness workshop at National Yang-Ming University,
comparison between IIT and GWT. This enables us to assess and Paris Consciousness/Self-consciousness Group for their
the two theories systematically and comparatively in the questions and comments. I appreciate Nanami Yamada for
multidimensional evaluative space. designing the figures in this article.

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Niikawa A Map of Consciousness Studies

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9780203116623-9 absence of any commercial or financial relationships that could be construed as a
Simmonds-Moore, C. A. (2016). An interpretative phenomenological analysis potential conflict of interest.
exploring synesthesia as an exceptional experience: insights for consciousness
and cognition. Q. Res. Psychol. 13, 303–327. doi: 10.1080/14780887.2016. Copyright © 2020 Niikawa. This is an open-access article distributed under the terms
1205693 of the Creative Commons Attribution License (CC BY). The use, distribution or
Smith, D. W. (2018). “Phenomenology,” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of reproduction in other forums is permitted, provided the original author(s) and the
Philosophy, ed. E. N. Zalta (Stanford, CA: Stanford University). copyright owner(s) are credited and that the original publication in this journal
Speaks, J. (2019). “Theories of meaning,” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of is cited, in accordance with accepted academic practice. No use, distribution or
Philosophy, ed. E. N. Zalta (Stanford, CA: Stanford University). reproduction is permitted which does not comply with these terms.

Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org 12 October 2020 | Volume 11 | Article 530152