The

Cultural Studies
Reader

Edited by
SIMON DURING

London and New York

 ENCODING, DECODING

6
model has been criticized for its linearity - sender/message/receiver - for
its concentration on the level of message exchange and for the absence
Stuart Hall of a structured conception of the different moments as a complex
structure of relations. But it is also possible (and useful) to think of this
process in terms of a structure produced and sustained through the
Encoding, decoding articulation of linked but distinctive moments - production, circulation,
distribution/consumption, reproduction. This would be to think of the
process as a 'complex structure in dominance', sustained through the
articulation of connected practices, each of which, however, retains its
distinctiveness and has its own specific modality, its own forms and
conditions of existence.
EDITOR'S INTRODUCTION The 'object' of these practices is meanings and messages in the form
of sign-vehicles of a specific kind organized, like any form of communi­
Stuart Hall's influential essay offers a densely theoretical account of how cation or language, through the operation of codes within the syntag­
messages are produced and disseminated, referring particularly to television. matic chain of a discourse. The apparatuses, relations and practices of
He suggests a four-stage theory of communication: production, circulation, production thus issue, at a certain moment (the moment of 'production/
use (which here he calls distribution or consumption), and reproduction. For circulation') in the form of symbolic vehicles constituted within the rules
him each stage is 'relatively autonomous' from the others. This means that the of 'language'. It is in this discursive form that the circulation of the
coding of a message does control its reception but not transparently - each 'product' takes place. The process thus requires, at the production end,
stage has its own determining limits and possibilities. The concept of relative its material instruments - its 'means' - as well as its own sets of social
autonomy allows him to argue that polysemy is not the same as pluralism:
(production) relations - the organization and combination of practices
messages are not open to any interpretation or use whatsoever - just because
within media apparatuses. But it is in the discursive form that the
each stage in the circuit limits possibilities in tKe next.
circulation of the product takes place, as well as its distribution to
In actual social existence, Hall goes on to argue, messages have a
different audiences. Once accomplished, the discourse must then be
'complex structure of dominance' because at each stage they are 'imprinted'
by institutional power relations. Furthermore, a message can only be received translated - transformed, again - into social practices if the circuit is to
at a particular stage if it is recognizable or appropriate - though there is space be both completed and effective. If no 'meaning' is taken, there can be
for a message to be used or understood at least somewhat against the grain. no 'consumption'. If the meaning is not articulated in practice, it has no
This means that power relations at the point of production, for example, will effect. The value of this approach is that while each of the moments, in
loosely fit those at the point of consumption. In this way, the communication articulation, is necessary to the circuit as a whole, no one moment can
circuit is also a circuit which reproduces a pattern of domination. fully guarantee the next moment with which it is articulated. Since each
This analysis allows Hall to insert a semiotic paradigm into a social has its specific modality and conditions of existence, each can constitute
framework, clearing the way both for further textualist and ethnographic work. its own break or interruption of the 'passage of forms' on whose conti­
His essay has been particularly important as a basis on which fieldwork like nuity the flow of effective production (that is, 'reproduction') depends.
David Morley's has proceeded. Thus while in no way wanting to limit research to 'following only
those leads which emerge from content analysis', we must recognize
Further reading: Hall 1977, 1980; Morley 1980, 1989.
that the discursive form of the message has a privileged position in the
S.D.
communicative exchange (from the viewpoint of circulation), and that
the moments of 'encoding' and 'decoding', though only 'relatively
Traditionally, mass-communications research has conceptualized the autonomous' in relation to the communicative process as a whole, are
process of communication in terms of a circulation circuit or loop. This determinate moments. A 'raw' historical event cannot, in that form, be
 ENCODING, DECODING

6
model has been criticized for its linearity - sender/message/receiver - for
its concentration on the level of message exchange and for the absence
Stuart Hall of a structured conception of the different moments as a complex
structure of relations. But it is also possible (and useful) to think of this
process in terms of a structure produced and sustained through the
Encoding, decoding articulation of linked but distinctive moments - production, circulation,
distribution/consumption, reproduction. This would be to think of the
process as a 'complex structure in dominance', sustained through the
articulation of connected practices, each of which, however, retains its
distinctiveness and has its own specific modality, its own forms and
conditions of existence.
EDITOR'S INTRODUCTION The 'object' of these practices is meanings and messages in the form
of sign-vehicles of a specific kind organized, like any form of communi­
Stuart Hall's influential essay offers a densely theoretical account of how cation or language, through the operation of codes within the syntag­
messages are produced and disseminated, referring particularly to television. matic chain of a discourse. The apparatuses, relations and practices of
He suggests a four-stage theory of communication: production, circulation, production thus issue, at a certain moment (the moment of 'production/
use (which here he calls distribution or consumption), and reproduction. For circulation') in the form of symbolic vehicles constituted within the rules
him each stage is 'relatively autonomous' from the others. This means that the of 'language'. It is in this discursive form that the circulation of the
coding of a message does control its reception but not transparently - each 'product' takes place. The process thus requires, at the production end,
stage has its own determining limits and possibilities. The concept of relative its material instruments - its 'means' - as well as its own sets of social
autonomy allows him to argue that polysemy is not the same as pluralism:
(production) relations - the organization and combination of practices
messages are not open to any interpretation or use whatsoever - just because
within media apparatuses. But it is in the discursive form that the
each stage in the circuit limits possibilities in tKe next.
circulation of the product takes place, as well as its distribution to
In actual social existence, Hall goes on to argue, messages have a
different audiences. Once accomplished, the discourse must then be
'complex structure of dominance' because at each stage they are 'imprinted'
by institutional power relations. Furthermore, a message can only be received translated - transformed, again - into social practices if the circuit is to
at a particular stage if it is recognizable or appropriate - though there is space be both completed and effective. If no 'meaning' is taken, there can be
for a message to be used or understood at least somewhat against the grain. no 'consumption'. If the meaning is not articulated in practice, it has no
This means that power relations at the point of production, for example, will effect. The value of this approach is that while each of the moments, in
loosely fit those at the point of consumption. In this way, the communication articulation, is necessary to the circuit as a whole, no one moment can
circuit is also a circuit which reproduces a pattern of domination. fully guarantee the next moment with which it is articulated. Since each
This analysis allows Hall to insert a semiotic paradigm into a social has its specific modality and conditions of existence, each can constitute
framework, clearing the way both for further textualist and ethnographic work. its own break or interruption of the 'passage of forms' on whose conti­
His essay has been particularly important as a basis on which fieldwork like nuity the flow of effective production (that is, 'reproduction') depends.
David Morley's has proceeded. Thus while in no way wanting to limit research to 'following only
those leads which emerge from content analysis', we must recognize
Further reading: Hall 1977, 1980; Morley 1980, 1989.
that the discursive form of the message has a privileged position in the
S.D.
communicative exchange (from the viewpoint of circulation), and that
the moments of 'encoding' and 'decoding', though only 'relatively
Traditionally, mass-communications research has conceptualized the autonomous' in relation to the communicative process as a whole, are
process of communication in terms of a circulation circuit or loop. This determinate moments. A 'raw' historical event cannot, in that form, be
 ENCODING, DECODING
STUART HALL

transmitted by, say, a television newscast. Events can only be signified ated, via a number of skewed and structured 'feedbacks', into the
within the aural-visual forms of the televisual discourse. In the moment production process itself. The consumption or reception of the television
when a historical event passes under the sign of discourse, it is subject message is thus also itself a 'moment' of the production process in its
to all the complex formal 'rules' by which language signifies. To put it larger sense, though the latter is 'predominant' because it is the 'point of
paradoxically, the event must become a 'story' before it can become a departure for the realization' of the message. Production and reception
communicative event. In that moment the formal sub-rules of discourse of the television message are not, therefore, identical, but they are
are 'in dominance', without, of course, subordinating out of existence related: they are differentiated moments within the totality formed by
the historical event so signified, the social relations in which the rules the social relations of the communicative process as a whole.
are set to work or the social and political consequences of the event At a certain point, however, the broadcasting structures must yield
having been signified in this way. The 'message form' is the necessary encoded messages in the form of a meaningful discourse. The
'form of appearance' of the event in its passage from source to receiver. institution-societal relations of production must pass under the discur­
Thus the transposition into and out of the 'message form' (or the mode sive rules of language for its product to be 'realized'. This initiates a
of symbolic exchange) is not a random 'moment', which we can take up further differentiated moment, in which the formal rules of discourse
or ignore at our convenience. The 'message form' is a determinate and language are in dominance. Before this message can have an 'effect'
moment; though, at another level, it comprises the surface movements (however defined), satisfy a 'need' or be put to a 'use', it must first be
of the communications system only and requires, at another stage, to be appropriated as a meaningful discourse and be meaningfully decoded. It
integrated into the social relations of the communication process as a is this set of decoded meanings which 'have an effect', influence,
whole, of which it forms only a part. entertain, instruct or persuade, with very complex perceptual, cogni­
From this general perspective, we may crudely characterize the tive, emotional, ideological or behavioural consequences. In a 'determi­
television communicative process as follows. The institutional structures nate' moment the structure employs a code and yields a 'message': at
of broadcasting, with their practices and networks of production, their another determinate moment the 'message', via its decodings, issues
organized relations and technical infrastructures, are required to pro­ into the structure of social practices. We are now fully aware that this re­
duce a programme. Production, here, constructs the message. In one entry into the practices of audience reception and 'use' cannot be
sense, then, the circuit begins here. Of course, the production process is understood in simple behavioural terms. The typical processes ident­
not without its 'discursive' aspect: it, too, is framed throughout by ified in positivistic research on isolated elements - effects, uses, 'gratifi­
meanings and ideas: knowledge-in-use concerning the routines of pro­ cations' - are themselves framed by structures of understanding, as well
duction, historically defined technical skills, professional ideologies, as being produced by social and economic relations, which shape their
institutional knowledge, definitions and assumptions, assumptions 'realization' at the reception end of the chain and which permit the
about the audience and so on frame the constitution of the programme meanings signified in the discourse to be transposed into practice or
through this production structure. Further, though the production consciousness (to acquire social use value or political effectivity).
structures of television originate the television discourse, they do not Clearly, what we have labelled in the diagram (below) 'meaning
constitute a closed system. They draw topics, treatments, agendas, structures 1' and 'meaning structures 2' may not be the same. They do
events, personnel, images of the audience, 'definitions of the situation' not constitute an 'immediate identity'. The codes of encoding and
from other sources and other discursive formations within the wider decoding may not be perfectly symmetrical. The degrees of symmetry -
socio-cultural and political structure of which they are a differentiated that is, the degrees of 'understanding' and 'misunderstanding' in the
part. Philip Elliott has expressed this point succinctly, within a more communicative exchange - depend on the degrees of symmetry/asym
traditional framework, in his discussion of the way in which the metry (relations of equivalence) established between the positions of the
audience is both the 'source' and the 'receiver' of the television message. 'personifications', encoder-producer and decoder-receiver. But this in
Thus - to borrow Marx's terms - circulation and reception are, indeed, turn depends on the degrees of identity/non-identity between the codes
'moments' of the production process in television and are reincorpor- which perfectly or imperfectly transmit, interrupt or systematically
 ENCODING, DECODING
STUART HALL

transmitted by, say, a television newscast. Events can only be signified ated, via a number of skewed and structured 'feedbacks', into the
within the aural-visual forms of the televisual discourse. In the moment production process itself. The consumption or reception of the television
when a historical event passes under the sign of discourse, it is subject message is thus also itself a 'moment' of the production process in its
to all the complex formal 'rules' by which language signifies. To put it larger sense, though the latter is 'predominant' because it is the 'point of
paradoxically, the event must become a 'story' before it can become a departure for the realization' of the message. Production and reception
communicative event. In that moment the formal sub-rules of discourse of the television message are not, therefore, identical, but they are
are 'in dominance', without, of course, subordinating out of existence related: they are differentiated moments within the totality formed by
the historical event so signified, the social relations in which the rules the social relations of the communicative process as a whole.
are set to work or the social and political consequences of the event At a certain point, however, the broadcasting structures must yield
having been signified in this way. The 'message form' is the necessary encoded messages in the form of a meaningful discourse. The
'form of appearance' of the event in its passage from source to receiver. institution-societal relations of production must pass under the discur­
Thus the transposition into and out of the 'message form' (or the mode sive rules of language for its product to be 'realized'. This initiates a
of symbolic exchange) is not a random 'moment', which we can take up further differentiated moment, in which the formal rules of discourse
or ignore at our convenience. The 'message form' is a determinate and language are in dominance. Before this message can have an 'effect'
moment; though, at another level, it comprises the surface movements (however defined), satisfy a 'need' or be put to a 'use', it must first be
of the communications system only and requires, at another stage, to be appropriated as a meaningful discourse and be meaningfully decoded. It
integrated into the social relations of the communication process as a is this set of decoded meanings which 'have an effect', influence,
whole, of which it forms only a part. entertain, instruct or persuade, with very complex perceptual, cogni­
From this general perspective, we may crudely characterize the tive, emotional, ideological or behavioural consequences. In a 'determi­
television communicative process as follows. The institutional structures nate' moment the structure employs a code and yields a 'message': at
of broadcasting, with their practices and networks of production, their another determinate moment the 'message', via its decodings, issues
organized relations and technical infrastructures, are required to pro­ into the structure of social practices. We are now fully aware that this re­
duce a programme. Production, here, constructs the message. In one entry into the practices of audience reception and 'use' cannot be
sense, then, the circuit begins here. Of course, the production process is understood in simple behavioural terms. The typical processes ident­
not without its 'discursive' aspect: it, too, is framed throughout by ified in positivistic research on isolated elements - effects, uses, 'gratifi­
meanings and ideas: knowledge-in-use concerning the routines of pro­ cations' - are themselves framed by structures of understanding, as well
duction, historically defined technical skills, professional ideologies, as being produced by social and economic relations, which shape their
institutional knowledge, definitions and assumptions, assumptions 'realization' at the reception end of the chain and which permit the
about the audience and so on frame the constitution of the programme meanings signified in the discourse to be transposed into practice or
through this production structure. Further, though the production consciousness (to acquire social use value or political effectivity).
structures of television originate the television discourse, they do not Clearly, what we have labelled in the diagram (below) 'meaning
constitute a closed system. They draw topics, treatments, agendas, structures 1' and 'meaning structures 2' may not be the same. They do
events, personnel, images of the audience, 'definitions of the situation' not constitute an 'immediate identity'. The codes of encoding and
from other sources and other discursive formations within the wider decoding may not be perfectly symmetrical. The degrees of symmetry -
socio-cultural and political structure of which they are a differentiated that is, the degrees of 'understanding' and 'misunderstanding' in the
part. Philip Elliott has expressed this point succinctly, within a more communicative exchange - depend on the degrees of symmetry/asym
traditional framework, in his discussion of the way in which the metry (relations of equivalence) established between the positions of the
audience is both the 'source' and the 'receiver' of the television message. 'personifications', encoder-producer and decoder-receiver. But this in
Thus - to borrow Marx's terms - circulation and reception are, indeed, turn depends on the degrees of identity/non-identity between the codes
'moments' of the production process in television and are reincorpor- which perfectly or imperfectly transmit, interrupt or systematically
STUART HALL ENCODING, DECODING

programme as messages about violence': but we have continued to research the ques­
/meaningful' discourse
� tion of violence, for example, as if we were unable to comprehend this
/ � epistemological distinction.
/ encoding decoding The televisual sign is a complex one. It is itself constituted by the
meaning meaning combination of two types of discourse, visual and aural. Moreover, it is
structures 1 �
structures 2 an iconic sign, in Peirce's terminology, because 'it possesses some of the
properties of the thing represented'. This is a point which has led to a
frameworks frameworks great deal of confusion and has provided the site of intense controversy
of knowledge of knowledge in the study of visual language. Since the visual discourse translates a
three-dimensional world into two-dimensional planes, it cannot, of
relations relations
course, be the referent or concept it signifies. The dog in the film can
of production of production
bark but it cannot bite! Reality exists outside language, but it is con­
technical technical stantly mediated by and through language: and what we can know and
infrastructure infrastructure say has to be produced in and through discourse. Discursive 'knowl­
edge' is the product not of the transparent representation of the 'real' in
distort what has been transmitted. The lack of fit between the codes has language but of the articulation of language on real relations and con­
a great deal to do with the structural differences of relation and position ditions. Thus there is no intelligible discourse without the operation of a
between broadcasters. and audiences, but it also has something to do code. Iconic signs are therefore coded signs too - even if the codes here
with the asymmetry between the codes of 'source' and 'receiver' at the work differently from those of other signs. There is no degree zero in
moment of transformation into and out of the discursive form. What are language. Naturalism and 'realism' - the apparent fidelity of the rep­
called 'distortions' or 'misunderstandings' arise precisely from the lack of resentation to the thing or concept represented - is the result, the effect,
equivalence between the two sides in the communicative exchange. Once of a certain specific articulation of language on the 'real'. It is the result
again, this defines the 'relative autonomy', but 'determinateness', of the of a discursive practice.
entry and exit of the message in its discursive moments. Certain codes may, of course, be so widely distributed in a specific
The application of this rudimentary paradigm has already begun to language community or culture, and be learned at so early an age, that
transform our understanding of the older term, television 'content'. We they appear not to be constructed - the effect of an articulation between
are just beginning to see how it might also transform our understanding sign and referent - but to be 'naturally' given. Simple visual signs
of audience reception, 'reading' and response as well. Beginnings and appear to have achieved a 'near-universality' in this sense: though
endings have been announced in communications research before, so evidence remains that even apparently 'natural' visual codes are culture­
we must be cautious. But there seems some ground for thinking that a specific. However, this does not mean that no codes have intervened;
new and exciting phase in so-called audience research, of a quite new rather, that the codes have been profoundly naturalized. The operation of
kind, may be opening up. At either end of the communicative chain the naturalized codes reveals not the transparency and 'naturalness' of
use of the semiotic paradigm promises to dispel the lingering behaviour­ language but the depth, the habituation and the near-universality of the
ism which has dogged mass-media research for so long, especially in codes in use. They produce apparently 'natural' recognitions. This has
its approach to content. Though we know the television programme is the (ideological) effect of concealing the practices of coding which are
not a behavioural input, like a tap on the knee cap, it seems to have been present. But we must not be fooled by appearances. Actually, what
almost impossible for traditional researchers to conceptualize the com­ naturalized codes demonstrate is the degree of habituation produced
municative process without lapsing into one or other variant of low­ when there is a fundamental alignment and reciprocity - an achieved
flying behaviourism. We know, as Gerbner has remarked, that equivalence - between the encoding and decoding sides of an exchange
representations of violence on the TV screen 'are not violence but of meanings. The functioning of the codes on the decoding side will
STUART HALL ENCODING, DECODING

programme as messages about violence': but we have continued to research the ques­
/meaningful' discourse
� tion of violence, for example, as if we were unable to comprehend this
/ � epistemological distinction.
/ encoding decoding The televisual sign is a complex one. It is itself constituted by the
meaning meaning combination of two types of discourse, visual and aural. Moreover, it is
structures 1 �
structures 2 an iconic sign, in Peirce's terminology, because 'it possesses some of the
properties of the thing represented'. This is a point which has led to a
frameworks frameworks great deal of confusion and has provided the site of intense controversy
of knowledge of knowledge in the study of visual language. Since the visual discourse translates a
three-dimensional world into two-dimensional planes, it cannot, of
relations relations
course, be the referent or concept it signifies. The dog in the film can
of production of production
bark but it cannot bite! Reality exists outside language, but it is con­
technical technical stantly mediated by and through language: and what we can know and
infrastructure infrastructure say has to be produced in and through discourse. Discursive 'knowl­
edge' is the product not of the transparent representation of the 'real' in
distort what has been transmitted. The lack of fit between the codes has language but of the articulation of language on real relations and con­
a great deal to do with the structural differences of relation and position ditions. Thus there is no intelligible discourse without the operation of a
between broadcasters. and audiences, but it also has something to do code. Iconic signs are therefore coded signs too - even if the codes here
with the asymmetry between the codes of 'source' and 'receiver' at the work differently from those of other signs. There is no degree zero in
moment of transformation into and out of the discursive form. What are language. Naturalism and 'realism' - the apparent fidelity of the rep­
called 'distortions' or 'misunderstandings' arise precisely from the lack of resentation to the thing or concept represented - is the result, the effect,
equivalence between the two sides in the communicative exchange. Once of a certain specific articulation of language on the 'real'. It is the result
again, this defines the 'relative autonomy', but 'determinateness', of the of a discursive practice.
entry and exit of the message in its discursive moments. Certain codes may, of course, be so widely distributed in a specific
The application of this rudimentary paradigm has already begun to language community or culture, and be learned at so early an age, that
transform our understanding of the older term, television 'content'. We they appear not to be constructed - the effect of an articulation between
are just beginning to see how it might also transform our understanding sign and referent - but to be 'naturally' given. Simple visual signs
of audience reception, 'reading' and response as well. Beginnings and appear to have achieved a 'near-universality' in this sense: though
endings have been announced in communications research before, so evidence remains that even apparently 'natural' visual codes are culture­
we must be cautious. But there seems some ground for thinking that a specific. However, this does not mean that no codes have intervened;
new and exciting phase in so-called audience research, of a quite new rather, that the codes have been profoundly naturalized. The operation of
kind, may be opening up. At either end of the communicative chain the naturalized codes reveals not the transparency and 'naturalness' of
use of the semiotic paradigm promises to dispel the lingering behaviour­ language but the depth, the habituation and the near-universality of the
ism which has dogged mass-media research for so long, especially in codes in use. They produce apparently 'natural' recognitions. This has
its approach to content. Though we know the television programme is the (ideological) effect of concealing the practices of coding which are
not a behavioural input, like a tap on the knee cap, it seems to have been present. But we must not be fooled by appearances. Actually, what
almost impossible for traditional researchers to conceptualize the com­ naturalized codes demonstrate is the degree of habituation produced
municative process without lapsing into one or other variant of low­ when there is a fundamental alignment and reciprocity - an achieved
flying behaviourism. We know, as Gerbner has remarked, that equivalence - between the encoding and decoding sides of an exchange
representations of violence on the TV screen 'are not violence but of meanings. The functioning of the codes on the decoding side will
STUART HALL
ENCODING, DECODING

frequently assume the status of naturalized perceptions. This leads us to confused with distinctions in the real world. There will be very few
think that the visual sign for 'cow' actually is (rather than represents) the instances in which signs organized in a discourse signify only their
animal, cow. But if we think of the visual representation of a cow in a 'literal' (that is, near-universally consensualized) meaning. In actual
manual on animal husbandry - and, even more, of the linguistic sign discourse most signs will combine both the denotative and the connota­
'cow' - we can see that both, in different degrees, are arbitrary with tive aspects (as redefined above). It may, then, be asked why we retain
respect to the concept of the animal they represent. The articulation of the distinction at all. It is largely a matter of analytic value. It is because
an arbitrary sign - whether visual or verbal - with the concept of a signs appear to acquire their full ideological value - appear to be open to
referent is the product not of nature but of convention, and the conven­ articulation with wider ideological discourses and meanings - at the
tionalism of discourses requires the intervention, the support, of codes. level of their 'associative' meanings (that is, at the connotative level) -
Thus Eco has argued that iconic signs 'look like objects in the real world for here 'meanings' are not apparently fixed in natural perception (that
because they reproduce the conditions (that is, the codes) of perception is, they are not fully naturalized), and their fluidity of meaning and
in the viewer'. These 'conditions of perception' are, however, the result association can be more fully exploited and transformed. So it is at the
of a highly coded, even if virtually unconscious, set of operations - connotative level of the sign that situational ideologies alter and trans­
decodings. This is as true of the photographic or televisual image as it is form signification. At this level we can see more clearly the active
of any other sign. Iconic signs are, however, particularly vulnerable to intervention of ideologies in and on discourse: here, the sign is open to
being 'read' as natural because visual codes of perception are very new accentuations and, in Volosinov's terms, enters fully into the
widely distributed and because this type of sign is less arbitrary than a struggle over meanings - the class struggle in language. This does not
linguistic sign: the linguistic sign, 'cow', possesses none of the properties mean that the denotative or 'literal' meaning is outside ideology.
of the thing represented, whereas the visual sign appears to possess Indeed, we could say that its ideological value is strongly fixed - because
some of those properties. it has become so fully universal and 'natural'. The terms 'denotation'
This may help. us to clarify a confusion in current linguistic theory and 'connotation', then, are merely useful analytic tools for distinguish­
and to define precisely how some key terms are being used in this ing, in particular contexts, between not the presence/absence of ideo­
article. Linguistic theory frequently employs the distinction 'denotation' logy in language but the different levels at which ideologies and
and 'connotation'. The term 'denotation' is widely equated with the discourses intersect.
literal meaning of a sign: because this literal meaning is almost univer­ The level of connotation of the visual sign, of its contextual refer­
sally recognized, especially when visual discourse is being employed, ence and positioning in different discursive fields of meaning and
'denotation' has often been confused with a literal transcription of association, is the point where already coded signs intersect with the deep
'reality' in language - and thus with a 'natural sign', one produced semantic codes of a culture and take on additional, more active ideologi­
without the intervention of a code. 'Connotation', on the other hand, is cal dimensions. We might take an example from advertising discourse.
employed simply to refer to less fixed and therefore more conventiona­ Here, too, there is no 'purely denotative', and certainly no 'natural',
lized and changeable, associative meanings, which clearly vary from representation. Every visual sign in advertising connotes a quality,
instance to instance arid therefore must depend on the intervention of situation, value or inference, which is present as an implication or
codes. implied meaning, depending on the connotational positioning. In
We do not use the distinction - denotation/connotation - in this Barthes's example, the sweater always signifies a 'warm garment' (deno­
way. From our point of view, the distinction is an analytic one only. It is tation) and thus the activity/value of 'keeping warm'. But it is also
useful, in analysis, to be able to apply a rough rule of thumb which possible, at its more connotative levels, to signify 'the coming of winter'
distinguishes those aspects of a sign which appear to be taken, in any or 'a cold day'. And, in the specialized sub-codes of fashion, sweater
language community at any point in time, as its 'literal' meaning (deno­ may also connote a fashionable style of haute couture or, alternatively, an
tation) from the more associative meanings for the sign which it is informal style of dress. But set against the right visual background and
possible to generate (connotation). But analytic distinctions must not be positioned by the romantic sub-code, it may connote 'long autumn walk
STUART HALL
ENCODING, DECODING

frequently assume the status of naturalized perceptions. This leads us to confused with distinctions in the real world. There will be very few
think that the visual sign for 'cow' actually is (rather than represents) the instances in which signs organized in a discourse signify only their
animal, cow. But if we think of the visual representation of a cow in a 'literal' (that is, near-universally consensualized) meaning. In actual
manual on animal husbandry - and, even more, of the linguistic sign discourse most signs will combine both the denotative and the connota­
'cow' - we can see that both, in different degrees, are arbitrary with tive aspects (as redefined above). It may, then, be asked why we retain
respect to the concept of the animal they represent. The articulation of the distinction at all. It is largely a matter of analytic value. It is because
an arbitrary sign - whether visual or verbal - with the concept of a signs appear to acquire their full ideological value - appear to be open to
referent is the product not of nature but of convention, and the conven­ articulation with wider ideological discourses and meanings - at the
tionalism of discourses requires the intervention, the support, of codes. level of their 'associative' meanings (that is, at the connotative level) -
Thus Eco has argued that iconic signs 'look like objects in the real world for here 'meanings' are not apparently fixed in natural perception (that
because they reproduce the conditions (that is, the codes) of perception is, they are not fully naturalized), and their fluidity of meaning and
in the viewer'. These 'conditions of perception' are, however, the result association can be more fully exploited and transformed. So it is at the
of a highly coded, even if virtually unconscious, set of operations - connotative level of the sign that situational ideologies alter and trans­
decodings. This is as true of the photographic or televisual image as it is form signification. At this level we can see more clearly the active
of any other sign. Iconic signs are, however, particularly vulnerable to intervention of ideologies in and on discourse: here, the sign is open to
being 'read' as natural because visual codes of perception are very new accentuations and, in Volosinov's terms, enters fully into the
widely distributed and because this type of sign is less arbitrary than a struggle over meanings - the class struggle in language. This does not
linguistic sign: the linguistic sign, 'cow', possesses none of the properties mean that the denotative or 'literal' meaning is outside ideology.
of the thing represented, whereas the visual sign appears to possess Indeed, we could say that its ideological value is strongly fixed - because
some of those properties. it has become so fully universal and 'natural'. The terms 'denotation'
This may help. us to clarify a confusion in current linguistic theory and 'connotation', then, are merely useful analytic tools for distinguish­
and to define precisely how some key terms are being used in this ing, in particular contexts, between not the presence/absence of ideo­
article. Linguistic theory frequently employs the distinction 'denotation' logy in language but the different levels at which ideologies and
and 'connotation'. The term 'denotation' is widely equated with the discourses intersect.
literal meaning of a sign: because this literal meaning is almost univer­ The level of connotation of the visual sign, of its contextual refer­
sally recognized, especially when visual discourse is being employed, ence and positioning in different discursive fields of meaning and
'denotation' has often been confused with a literal transcription of association, is the point where already coded signs intersect with the deep
'reality' in language - and thus with a 'natural sign', one produced semantic codes of a culture and take on additional, more active ideologi­
without the intervention of a code. 'Connotation', on the other hand, is cal dimensions. We might take an example from advertising discourse.
employed simply to refer to less fixed and therefore more conventiona­ Here, too, there is no 'purely denotative', and certainly no 'natural',
lized and changeable, associative meanings, which clearly vary from representation. Every visual sign in advertising connotes a quality,
instance to instance arid therefore must depend on the intervention of situation, value or inference, which is present as an implication or
codes. implied meaning, depending on the connotational positioning. In
We do not use the distinction - denotation/connotation - in this Barthes's example, the sweater always signifies a 'warm garment' (deno­
way. From our point of view, the distinction is an analytic one only. It is tation) and thus the activity/value of 'keeping warm'. But it is also
useful, in analysis, to be able to apply a rough rule of thumb which possible, at its more connotative levels, to signify 'the coming of winter'
distinguishes those aspects of a sign which appear to be taken, in any or 'a cold day'. And, in the specialized sub-codes of fashion, sweater
language community at any point in time, as its 'literal' meaning (deno­ may also connote a fashionable style of haute couture or, alternatively, an
tation) from the more associative meanings for the sign which it is informal style of dress. But set against the right visual background and
possible to generate (connotation). But analytic distinctions must not be positioned by the romantic sub-code, it may connote 'long autumn walk
STUART HALL ENCODING, DECODING

in the woods'. Codes of this order clearly contract relations for the sign derstanding' at the connotative level, we must refer, through the codes,
with the wider universe of ideologies in a society. These codes are the to the orders of social life, of economic and political power and of
means by which power and ideology are made to signify in particular ideology. Further, since these mappings are 'structured in dominance'
discourses. They refer signs to the 'maps of meaning' into which any but not closed, the communicative process consists not in the unproble­
culture is classified; and those 'maps of social reality' have the whole matic assignment of every visual item to its given position within a set of
range of social meanings, practices, and usages, power and interest prearranged codes, but of performative rules - rules of competence and
'written in' to them. The connotative levels of signifiers, Barthes use, of logics-in-use - which seek actively to enforce or pre-fer one
remarked, 'have a close communication with culture, knowledge, his­ semantic domain over another and rule items into and out of their
tory, and it is through them, so to speak, that the environmental world appropriate meaning-sets. Formal semiology has too often neglected
invades the linguistic and semantic system. They are, if you like, the this practice of interpretative work, though this constitutes, in fact, the
fragments of ideology'. real relations of broadcast practices in television.
The so-called denotative level of the televisual sign is fixed by In speaking of dominant meanings, then, we are not talking about a
certain, very complex (but limited or 'closed') codes. But its connotative one-sided process which governs how all events will be signified. It
level, though also bounded, is more open, subject to more active trans­ consists of the 'work' required to enforce, win plausibility for and
formations, which exploit its polysemic values. Any such already consti­ command as legitimate a decoding of the event within the limit of
tuted sign is potentially transformable into more than one connotative dominant definitions in which it has been connotatively signified. Terni
configuration. Polysemy must not, however, be confused with plural­ has remarked:
ism. Connotative codes are not equal among themselves. Any society/ By the word reading we mean not only the capacity to identify and
culture tends, with varying degrees of closure, to impose its classifi­ decode a certain number of signs, but also the subjective capacity to
cations of the social and cultural and political world. These constitute a put them into a creative relation between themselves and with other
dominant cultural order, though it is neither univocal nor uncontested. signs: a capacity which is, by itself, the condition for a complete
This question of the 'structure of discourses in dominance' is a crucial awareness of one's total environment.
point. The different areas of social life appear to be mapped out into
discursive domains, hierarchically organized into dominant or preferred Our quarrel here is with the notion of 'subjective capacity', as if the
meanings. New, problematic or troubling events, which breach our referent of a televisional discourse were an objective fact but the in­
expectancies and run counter to our 'common-sense constructs', to our terpretative level were an individualized and private matter. Quite the
'taken-for-granted' knowledge of social structures, must be assigned to opposite seems to be the case. The televisual practice takes 'objective'
their discursive domains before they can be said to 'make sense'. The (that is, systemic) responsibility precisely for the relations which dispar­
most common way of 'mapping' them is to assign the new to some ate signs contract with one another in any discursive instance, and thus
domain or other of the existing 'maps of problematic social reality'. We continually rearranges, delimits and prescribes into what 'awareness of
say dominant, not 'determined', because it is always possible to order, one's total environment' these items are arranged.
classify, assign and decode an event within more than one 'mapping'. This brings us to the question of misunderstandings. Television
But we say 'dominant' because there exists a pattern of 'preferred producers who find their message 'failing to get across' are frequently
readings'; and �hese both have the institutional/political/ideological concerned to straighten out the kinks in the communication chain, thus
order imprinted in them and have themselves become institutionalized. facilitating the 'effectiveness' of their communication. Much research
The domains of 'preferred meanings' have the whole social order em­ which claims the objectivity of 'policy-oriented analysis' reproduces this
bedded in them as a set of meanings, practices and beliefs: the everyday administrative goal by attempting to discover how much of a message
knowledge of social structures, of 'how things work for all practical the audience recalls and to improve the extent of understanding. No
purposes in this culture', the rank order of power and interest and the doubt misunderstandings of a literal kind do exist. The viewer does not
structure of legitimations, limits and sanctions. Thus to clarify a 'misun- know the terms employed, cannot follow the complex logic of argument
STUART HALL ENCODING, DECODING

in the woods'. Codes of this order clearly contract relations for the sign derstanding' at the connotative level, we must refer, through the codes,
with the wider universe of ideologies in a society. These codes are the to the orders of social life, of economic and political power and of
means by which power and ideology are made to signify in particular ideology. Further, since these mappings are 'structured in dominance'
discourses. They refer signs to the 'maps of meaning' into which any but not closed, the communicative process consists not in the unproble­
culture is classified; and those 'maps of social reality' have the whole matic assignment of every visual item to its given position within a set of
range of social meanings, practices, and usages, power and interest prearranged codes, but of performative rules - rules of competence and
'written in' to them. The connotative levels of signifiers, Barthes use, of logics-in-use - which seek actively to enforce or pre-fer one
remarked, 'have a close communication with culture, knowledge, his­ semantic domain over another and rule items into and out of their
tory, and it is through them, so to speak, that the environmental world appropriate meaning-sets. Formal semiology has too often neglected
invades the linguistic and semantic system. They are, if you like, the this practice of interpretative work, though this constitutes, in fact, the
fragments of ideology'. real relations of broadcast practices in television.
The so-called denotative level of the televisual sign is fixed by In speaking of dominant meanings, then, we are not talking about a
certain, very complex (but limited or 'closed') codes. But its connotative one-sided process which governs how all events will be signified. It
level, though also bounded, is more open, subject to more active trans­ consists of the 'work' required to enforce, win plausibility for and
formations, which exploit its polysemic values. Any such already consti­ command as legitimate a decoding of the event within the limit of
tuted sign is potentially transformable into more than one connotative dominant definitions in which it has been connotatively signified. Terni
configuration. Polysemy must not, however, be confused with plural­ has remarked:
ism. Connotative codes are not equal among themselves. Any society/ By the word reading we mean not only the capacity to identify and
culture tends, with varying degrees of closure, to impose its classifi­ decode a certain number of signs, but also the subjective capacity to
cations of the social and cultural and political world. These constitute a put them into a creative relation between themselves and with other
dominant cultural order, though it is neither univocal nor uncontested. signs: a capacity which is, by itself, the condition for a complete
This question of the 'structure of discourses in dominance' is a crucial awareness of one's total environment.
point. The different areas of social life appear to be mapped out into
discursive domains, hierarchically organized into dominant or preferred Our quarrel here is with the notion of 'subjective capacity', as if the
meanings. New, problematic or troubling events, which breach our referent of a televisional discourse were an objective fact but the in­
expectancies and run counter to our 'common-sense constructs', to our terpretative level were an individualized and private matter. Quite the
'taken-for-granted' knowledge of social structures, must be assigned to opposite seems to be the case. The televisual practice takes 'objective'
their discursive domains before they can be said to 'make sense'. The (that is, systemic) responsibility precisely for the relations which dispar­
most common way of 'mapping' them is to assign the new to some ate signs contract with one another in any discursive instance, and thus
domain or other of the existing 'maps of problematic social reality'. We continually rearranges, delimits and prescribes into what 'awareness of
say dominant, not 'determined', because it is always possible to order, one's total environment' these items are arranged.
classify, assign and decode an event within more than one 'mapping'. This brings us to the question of misunderstandings. Television
But we say 'dominant' because there exists a pattern of 'preferred producers who find their message 'failing to get across' are frequently
readings'; and �hese both have the institutional/political/ideological concerned to straighten out the kinks in the communication chain, thus
order imprinted in them and have themselves become institutionalized. facilitating the 'effectiveness' of their communication. Much research
The domains of 'preferred meanings' have the whole social order em­ which claims the objectivity of 'policy-oriented analysis' reproduces this
bedded in them as a set of meanings, practices and beliefs: the everyday administrative goal by attempting to discover how much of a message
knowledge of social structures, of 'how things work for all practical the audience recalls and to improve the extent of understanding. No
purposes in this culture', the rank order of power and interest and the doubt misunderstandings of a literal kind do exist. The viewer does not
structure of legitimations, limits and sanctions. Thus to clarify a 'misun- know the terms employed, cannot follow the complex logic of argument
S TUART HA LL ENCODING, DECODING

or exposition, is unfamiliar with the language, finds the concepts too argument of 'no necessary correspondence'. It also helps to deconstruct
alien or difficult or is foxed by the expository narrative. But more often the common-sense meaning of 'misunderstanding' in terms of a theory
broadcasters are concerned that the audience has failed to take the of 'systematically distorted communication'.
meaning as they - the broadcasters - intended. What they really mean to The first hypothetical position is that of the dominant- h egemonic
say is that viewers are not operating within the 'dominant' or 'preferred' position. When the viewer takes the connoted meaning from, say, a
code. Their ideal is 'perfectly transparent communication'. Instead, television newscast or current affairs programme full and straight, and
what they have to confront is 'systematically distorted communication'. decodes the message in terms of the reference code in which it has been
In recent years discrepancies of this kind have usually been encoded, we might say that the viewer is operating inside the dominant
explained by reference to 'selective perception'. This is the door via code. This is the ideal-typical case of 'perfectly transparent communi­
which a residual pluralism evades the compulsions of a highly struc­ cation' - or as dose as we are likely to come to it 'for all practical
tured, asymmetrical and non-equivalent process. Of course, there will purposes'. Within this we can distinguish the positions produced by the
always be private, individual, variant readings. But 'selective percep­ professional code. This is the position (produced by what we perhaps
tion' is almost never as selective, random or privatized as the concept ought to identify as the operation of a 'metacode') which the pro­
suggests. The patterns exhibit, across individual variants, significant fessional broadcasters assume when encoding a message which has
clusterings. Any new approach to audience studies will therefore have already been signified in a hegemonic manner. The professional code is
to begin with a critique of 'selective perception' th�ory. 'relatively independent' of the dominant code, in that it applies criteria
It was argued earlier that since there is no necessary correspondence and transformational operations of its own, especially those of a
between encoding and decoding, the former can attempt to 'pre-fer' but technico-practical nature. The professional code, however, operates
cannot prescribe or guarantee the latter, which has its own conditions of within the 'hegemony' of the dominant code. Indeed, it serves to repro­
existence. Unless they are wildly aberrant, encoding will have the effect duce the dominant definitions precisely by bracketing their hegemonic
of constructing some of the limits and parameters within which decod­ quality and operating instead with displaced professional codings which
ings will operate. If there were no limits, audiences could simply read foreground such apparently neutral-technical questions as visual qua­
whatever they liked into any message. No doubt some total misunder­ lity, news and presentational values, televisual quality, 'professiona­
standings of this kind do exist. But the vast range must contain some lism' and so on. The hegemonic interpretations of, say, the politics of
degree of reciprocity between encoding and decoding moments, other­ Northern Ireland, or the Chilean coup or the Industrial Relations Bill are
wise we could not speak of an effective communicative exchange at all. principally generated by political and military elites: the particular
Nevertheless, this 'correspondence' is not given but constructed. It is choice of presentational occasions and formats, the selection of person­
not 'natural' but the product of an articulation between two distinct nel, the choice of images, the staging of debates are selected and
moments. And the former cannot determine or guarantee, in a simple combined through the operation of the professional code. How the
sense, which decoding codes will be employed. Otherwise communi­ broadcasting professionals are able both to operate with 'relatively auton­
cation would be a perfectly equivalent circuit, and every message would omous' codes of their own and to act in such a way as to reproduce (not
be an instance of 'perfectly transparent communication'. We must think, without contradiction) the hegemonic signification of events is a com­
then, of the variant articulations in which encoding/decoding can be plex matter which cannot be further spelled out here. It must suffice to
combined. To elaborate on this, we offer a hypothetical analysis of some say that the professionals are linked wit}:t the defining elites not only
possible decoding positions, in order to reinforce the point of 'no by the institutional position of broadcasting itself as an 'ideo­
necessary correspondence'. lo � al apparatus', but also by the structure of access (that is, the system­
�
We identify three hypothetical positions from which decodings of a atic over-accessing' of selective elite personnel and their 'definition of
televisual discourse may be constructed. These need to be empirically the situation' in television). It may even be said that the professional
tested and refined. But the argument that decodings do not follow codes serve to reproduce hegemonic definitions specifically by not
inevitably from encodings, that they are not identical, reinforces the overtly biasing their operations in a dominant direction: ideological
S TUART HA LL ENCODING, DECODING

or exposition, is unfamiliar with the language, finds the concepts too argument of 'no necessary correspondence'. It also helps to deconstruct
alien or difficult or is foxed by the expository narrative. But more often the common-sense meaning of 'misunderstanding' in terms of a theory
broadcasters are concerned that the audience has failed to take the of 'systematically distorted communication'.
meaning as they - the broadcasters - intended. What they really mean to The first hypothetical position is that of the dominant- h egemonic
say is that viewers are not operating within the 'dominant' or 'preferred' position. When the viewer takes the connoted meaning from, say, a
code. Their ideal is 'perfectly transparent communication'. Instead, television newscast or current affairs programme full and straight, and
what they have to confront is 'systematically distorted communication'. decodes the message in terms of the reference code in which it has been
In recent years discrepancies of this kind have usually been encoded, we might say that the viewer is operating inside the dominant
explained by reference to 'selective perception'. This is the door via code. This is the ideal-typical case of 'perfectly transparent communi­
which a residual pluralism evades the compulsions of a highly struc­ cation' - or as dose as we are likely to come to it 'for all practical
tured, asymmetrical and non-equivalent process. Of course, there will purposes'. Within this we can distinguish the positions produced by the
always be private, individual, variant readings. But 'selective percep­ professional code. This is the position (produced by what we perhaps
tion' is almost never as selective, random or privatized as the concept ought to identify as the operation of a 'metacode') which the pro­
suggests. The patterns exhibit, across individual variants, significant fessional broadcasters assume when encoding a message which has
clusterings. Any new approach to audience studies will therefore have already been signified in a hegemonic manner. The professional code is
to begin with a critique of 'selective perception' th�ory. 'relatively independent' of the dominant code, in that it applies criteria
It was argued earlier that since there is no necessary correspondence and transformational operations of its own, especially those of a
between encoding and decoding, the former can attempt to 'pre-fer' but technico-practical nature. The professional code, however, operates
cannot prescribe or guarantee the latter, which has its own conditions of within the 'hegemony' of the dominant code. Indeed, it serves to repro­
existence. Unless they are wildly aberrant, encoding will have the effect duce the dominant definitions precisely by bracketing their hegemonic
of constructing some of the limits and parameters within which decod­ quality and operating instead with displaced professional codings which
ings will operate. If there were no limits, audiences could simply read foreground such apparently neutral-technical questions as visual qua­
whatever they liked into any message. No doubt some total misunder­ lity, news and presentational values, televisual quality, 'professiona­
standings of this kind do exist. But the vast range must contain some lism' and so on. The hegemonic interpretations of, say, the politics of
degree of reciprocity between encoding and decoding moments, other­ Northern Ireland, or the Chilean coup or the Industrial Relations Bill are
wise we could not speak of an effective communicative exchange at all. principally generated by political and military elites: the particular
Nevertheless, this 'correspondence' is not given but constructed. It is choice of presentational occasions and formats, the selection of person­
not 'natural' but the product of an articulation between two distinct nel, the choice of images, the staging of debates are selected and
moments. And the former cannot determine or guarantee, in a simple combined through the operation of the professional code. How the
sense, which decoding codes will be employed. Otherwise communi­ broadcasting professionals are able both to operate with 'relatively auton­
cation would be a perfectly equivalent circuit, and every message would omous' codes of their own and to act in such a way as to reproduce (not
be an instance of 'perfectly transparent communication'. We must think, without contradiction) the hegemonic signification of events is a com­
then, of the variant articulations in which encoding/decoding can be plex matter which cannot be further spelled out here. It must suffice to
combined. To elaborate on this, we offer a hypothetical analysis of some say that the professionals are linked wit}:t the defining elites not only
possible decoding positions, in order to reinforce the point of 'no by the institutional position of broadcasting itself as an 'ideo­
necessary correspondence'. lo � al apparatus', but also by the structure of access (that is, the system­
�
We identify three hypothetical positions from which decodings of a atic over-accessing' of selective elite personnel and their 'definition of
televisual discourse may be constructed. These need to be empirically the situation' in television). It may even be said that the professional
tested and refined. But the argument that decodings do not follow codes serve to reproduce hegemonic definitions specifically by not
inevitably from encodings, that they are not identical, reinforces the overtly biasing their operations in a dominant direction: ideological
STUART HALL
ENCODING, DECODING

reproduction therefore takes place here inadvertently, unconsciously,

from the contradictions and disjunctures between hegemonic-dominant
'behind men's backs'. Of course, conflicts, contradictions and even
encodings and negotiated-corporate decodings. It is just these mis­
misunderstandings regularly arise between the dominant and the pro­
matches in the levels which most provoke defining elites and pro­
fessional significations and their signifying agencies.
fessionals to identify a 'failure in communications'.
The second position we would identify is that of the negotiated code Finally, it is possible for a viewer perfectly to understand both the
or position. Majority audiences probably understand quite adequately
literal and the connotative inflection given by a discourse but to decode
what has been dominantly defined and professionally signified. The
the message in a globally contrary way. He/she detotalizes the message
dominant definitions, however, are hegemonic precisely because they in the preferred code in order to retotalize the message within some
represent definitions of situations and events which are 'in dominance' alternative framework of reference. This is the case of the viewer who
(global). Dominant definitions connect events, implicitly or explicitly, to listens to a debate on the need to limit wages but 'reads' every mention
grand totalizations, to the great syntagmatic views-of-the-world: they
of the 'national interest' as 'class interest'. He/she is operating with what
take 'large views' of issues: they relate events to the 'national interest' or we must call an oppositional code. One of the most significant political
to the level of geo-politics, even if they make these connections in moments (they also coincide with crisis points within the broadcasting
truncated, inverted or mystified ways. The definition of a hegemonic organizations themselves, for obvious reasons) is the point when events
viewpoint is (a) that it defines within its terms the mental horizon, the which are normally signified and decoded in a negotiated way begin to
universe, of possible meanings, of a whole sector of relations in a society be given an oppositional reading. Here the 'politics of signification' - the
or culture; and (b) that it carries with it the stamp of legitimacy - it struggle in discourse - is joined.
appears coterminous with what is 'natural', 'inevitable', 'taken for
granted' about the social order. Decoding within the negotiated version
contains a mixture of adaptive and oppositional elements: it acknowl­ NOTE
edges the legitimacy of the hegemonic definitions to make the grand
significations (abstract), while, at a more restricted, situational (situated) This article is an edited extract from 'Encoding and Decoding in Television Discourse',
level, it makes its own ground rules - it operates with exceptions to the CCCS Stencilled Paper no. 7.
rule. It accords the privileged position to the dominant definitions of
events while reserving the right to make a more negotiated application
to 'local conditions', to its own more corporate positions. This negotiated
version of the dominant ideology is thus shot through with contradic­
tions, though these are only on certain occasions brought to full visi­
bility. Negotiated codes operate through what we might call particular
or situated logics: and these logics are sustained by their differential and
unequal relation to the discourses and logics of power. The simplest
example of a negotiated code is that which governs the response of a
worker to the notion of an Industrial Relations Bill limiting the right to
strike or to arguments for a wages freeze. At the level of the 'national
interest' economic debate the decoder may adopt the hegemonic defi­
nition, agreeing that 'we must all pay ourselves less in order to combat
inflation'. This, however, may have little or no relation to his/her will­
ingness to go on strike for better pay and conditions or to oppose the
Industrial Relations Bill at the level of shop-floor or union organization.
We suspect that the great majority of so-called 'misunderstandings' arise
STUART HALL
ENCODING, DECODING

reproduction therefore takes place here inadvertently, unconsciously,

from the contradictions and disjunctures between hegemonic-dominant
'behind men's backs'. Of course, conflicts, contradictions and even
encodings and negotiated-corporate decodings. It is just these mis­
misunderstandings regularly arise between the dominant and the pro­
matches in the levels which most provoke defining elites and pro­
fessional significations and their signifying agencies.
fessionals to identify a 'failure in communications'.
The second position we would identify is that of the negotiated code Finally, it is possible for a viewer perfectly to understand both the
or position. Majority audiences probably understand quite adequately
literal and the connotative inflection given by a discourse but to decode
what has been dominantly defined and professionally signified. The
the message in a globally contrary way. He/she detotalizes the message
dominant definitions, however, are hegemonic precisely because they in the preferred code in order to retotalize the message within some
represent definitions of situations and events which are 'in dominance' alternative framework of reference. This is the case of the viewer who
(global). Dominant definitions connect events, implicitly or explicitly, to listens to a debate on the need to limit wages but 'reads' every mention
grand totalizations, to the great syntagmatic views-of-the-world: they
of the 'national interest' as 'class interest'. He/she is operating with what
take 'large views' of issues: they relate events to the 'national interest' or we must call an oppositional code. One of the most significant political
to the level of geo-politics, even if they make these connections in moments (they also coincide with crisis points within the broadcasting
truncated, inverted or mystified ways. The definition of a hegemonic organizations themselves, for obvious reasons) is the point when events
viewpoint is (a) that it defines within its terms the mental horizon, the which are normally signified and decoded in a negotiated way begin to
universe, of possible meanings, of a whole sector of relations in a society be given an oppositional reading. Here the 'politics of signification' - the
or culture; and (b) that it carries with it the stamp of legitimacy - it struggle in discourse - is joined.
appears coterminous with what is 'natural', 'inevitable', 'taken for
granted' about the social order. Decoding within the negotiated version
contains a mixture of adaptive and oppositional elements: it acknowl­ NOTE
edges the legitimacy of the hegemonic definitions to make the grand
significations (abstract), while, at a more restricted, situational (situated) This article is an edited extract from 'Encoding and Decoding in Television Discourse',
level, it makes its own ground rules - it operates with exceptions to the CCCS Stencilled Paper no. 7.
rule. It accords the privileged position to the dominant definitions of
events while reserving the right to make a more negotiated application
to 'local conditions', to its own more corporate positions. This negotiated
version of the dominant ideology is thus shot through with contradic­
tions, though these are only on certain occasions brought to full visi­
bility. Negotiated codes operate through what we might call particular
or situated logics: and these logics are sustained by their differential and
unequal relation to the discourses and logics of power. The simplest
example of a negotiated code is that which governs the response of a
worker to the notion of an Industrial Relations Bill limiting the right to
strike or to arguments for a wages freeze. At the level of the 'national
interest' economic debate the decoder may adopt the hegemonic defi­
nition, agreeing that 'we must all pay ourselves less in order to combat
inflation'. This, however, may have little or no relation to his/her will­
ingness to go on strike for better pay and conditions or to oppose the
Industrial Relations Bill at the level of shop-floor or union organization.
We suspect that the great majority of so-called 'misunderstandings' arise