Hunt PathwaysEmpowermentReflections 2001
Hunt PathwaysEmpowermentReflections 2001
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to Gender and Development
Pathways to
empowerment?
Reflections on microfinance and
transformation in gender relations in
South Asia
Juliet Hunt and Nalini Kasynathan
This paper reflects on the strengths and weaknesses of approaches taken by three NG
and one NGO based in Bihar in India. All these NGOs consider the provision of microfinance to
women to be a major strategyfor empowering women. Our reflections in this article draw on a review
of the literature on the impacts of credit programmes, and on discussions with women's groups and
NGO staff. To ensure that microfinance programmes fulfil their promise to support women's
empowerment, development workers and researchers need to focus much more on strategies that
support the transformation of gender relations.
a far more complex picture of female and boxes' for credit and repayment. Without
joint female/male decision-making and some reflection on what constitutes joint
control of loans, with eight of the 13 control, and how to strengthen female
members reporting that they kept some control, field-level strategies for supporting
income from the loan. The remaining this aspect of empowerment are unlikely to
women only received loan repayments be developed or tested.
from their husbands, with no access to any Individual or personal factors that
income generated. Some women reported appear to increase the likelihood of a
that they had given part of their loans to woman controlling her loan and the income
male family members, and had kept the generated from it are:
remainder for their own business. One
reported that she gave her first two loans to * the absence of a husband (due to death,
her husband, but she had kept her third abandonment or long-term migration);
loan for her own business (leasing land in her * the use of the loan for a 'traditional'
own name and hiring labour to work it), female activity, particularly where the
because she didn't get any benefit from the woman is able to market her goods from
first two loans. When we asked why some home (such as paddy husking, sewing,
women controlled their loans, and others selling milk, or chicks).
did not, different interpretations of the
value of controlling credit emerged, in One of the key factors that constrains
addition to very different personal histories women in Bangladesh and India from
of gender relations in the household. For taking control of loan use and profit is
example: 'My husband knows I will not their lack of access to the market for the
lose the money. I studied to grade eight.' 'I purchase of inputs and for the sale of
was controlling household money before I goods, particularly for non-traditional
got a loan.' 'Not everyone is like them [the income-generating enterprises. Goetz and
women who control the loans] - they are Sen Gupta's research (1996) supports these
lucky.' And, 'My husband is the bread- findings, but also shows that providing
winner, it is his responsibility, so all the loans for traditional female income-
money should go to him. I never asked this generating activities does not by itself
question [about control of the loan and guarantee that women will control loan use
income].' and income.
Our findings are exploratory and based One further issue is the fact that some
on a very small sample. However, they traditional female income-generating
suggest that Goetz and Sen Gupta's activities yield extremely poor returns for
research (1996) gives a more realistic labour, particularly where there is no
assessment of the degree of control over technical assistance provided to assist
credit by women in poverty-oriented women to increase their productivity.
credit programmes in Bangladesh, in Women's labour counts for virtually
contrast to the more positive assessments nothing, regardless of who is controlling
made by NGO staff who are responsible for the loan enterprise. In their research,
implementing the programmes we visited, Goetz and Sen Gupta (1996) even found
and despite social development activities that women's labour earned a negative
that address women's rights in family law return (when calculated at the rate of a
matters such as divorce, polygamy, dowry, male agricultural labourer) for paddy
and early marriage. One disturbing trend husking, petty trade, and livestock rearing.
is the tendency for fieldworkers to say Very few development agencies have
that loans are controlled 'jointly', even in evaluated their programmes from this
situations where women are merely 'post- critical perspective, despite the fact that
some implementers target 'traditional' likely to use their loans for less productive
women's activities as a way of encouraging activities and for consumption. Other
higher levels of female control.7 BRAC research shows that in most cases,
husbands' income and other livelihood
activities are essential if members are to
Access to and control over
meet their weekly instalment payments
assets (Matin and Rab 1997). These findings raise
Kabeer's 1998 research found that serious questions about the impact of
microfinance has been effective in microfinance on poverty alleviation.
increasing incomes and assets, although
certainly not in the poorest households.
Impact on daughters and
Women tended to spend income, when
sons: education and
they controlled it, on household con-
workload
sumption and 'security-related assets'
such as homestead land, whereas male There is evidence that daughters are more
borrowers were more likely to invest in likely to be sent to school if mothers receive
further productive activities (Kabeer 1998, credit, than if fathers receive it (Kabeer
28). More interesting from the point of 1998). Two large NGOs we visited, which
view of gender transformation are the provide non-formal primary education for
questions of whose name any new assets the children of credit group members,
are registered in, and why. Kabeer found target girls' education specifically, and
that many women continue to register land have higher enrolment rates for girls than
and productive assets in their husband's boys. However, there is no information
name, because of inheritance laws. Assets available on educational attainment,
will be inherited by sons if registered in a retention, or transition rates from primary
husband's name, and by daughters if they to secondary schooling for either the
are registered in a wife's name (Kabeer daughters or sons of credit group members.
1998). This raises questions about any Drop-out rates, including why and when
assumed automatic links between credit girls drop out, are very important
and transformation in gender relations, but indicators of the impact of micro-credit on
also reflects the extreme dependence of daughters' lives.
women on husbands and sons for physical Although there is some evidence in
security, particularly in old age. Kabeer's study to suggest that withdrawal
Research undertaken by BRAC shows of girls from school is due to the fact that
very mixed results of the impact of their mothers have increased workloads
microfinance on the question of whether related to credit enterprises (Kabeer 1998),
women are able to acquire and control none of the NGOs we visited could shed
assets. While one study found that control any light on the impact of microfinance
of assets by women has increased due to activities on girls' education or other
their involvement in BRAC groups aspects of girls' lives. Given the very poor
(Banu et al. 1998), another study (Halder returns for women's labour in traditional
and Husain 1998) finds that both owner- women's income-generation activities, it is
ship of assets and calorie consumption of not at all surprising that girls may be
BRAC members is negatively correlated withdrawn from school to help their
with length of membership in BRAC mothers, where women's workloads have
groups. This implies that the poorest BRAC increased. Donors and implementing
members needed to sell some assets for agencies need to investigate the impact of
debt servicing, and that they were more microfinance on labour demands for both
girls and boys, and how this relates to NGO is collecting data which supports this
male, female, and joint control over loan view (personal communication). All the
use and income, and increases in women's NGOs we visited refer to violence against
workloads. Gender sensitivity in non- women and women's rights in their social
formal primary education materials development programmes, and some
provided in credit programmes also needs support women's groups in taking up cases
to be assessed. of violence with local authorities.
Once again, the existing research on the
impact of credit programmes on violence
Impact on women's
paints an inconsistent picture at best. Of
mobility
four studies undertaken, two show an
The importance of the social and cultural increase in violence for women who have
context in determining and interpreting access to credit (Goetz and Sen Gupta 1996;
the impact of microfinance on gender Khan et al. 1998) and two suggest that
relations cannot be underestimated (Kabeer incidences of violence against women may
1998; Mayoux 1998; Mayoux 1999). Women reduce as economic prosperity in the
who have very few life choices appear to be household improves (Kabeer 1998; Hussain
more likely than others to challenge the et al. 1998). Only one of these studies admits
social norms of purdah (seclusion) regarding the possibility of under-reporting, due to
visits to the marketplace, traditionally an shame or fear that the NGO concerned
exclusively male domain, whether or not would take up the matter without consent
they are involved in the activities of NGOs of the woman concerned (Khan et al. 1998).
(Islam 1998; Kabeer 1998, 54-5; Banu et al. Our discussions with NGO staff reveal
1998; Kamal 1998). For them, challenging insufficient appreciation of the complex
purdah is a matter of necessity, just as it is relationships between credit and violence.
for Bangladeshi women working in For example, one fieldworker told us about
garment factories, who need to travel daily a woman whose husband was beating her
to their work on public transport. and threatening to ask for further dowry
Despite the claims made by NGOs that payments if she did not bring in more
women are increasingly 'coming out' as credit. The fieldworker's response was to
a result of credit programmes, our provide a loan for the husband to purchase
discussions with women's groups suggest a rickshaw. There was no other attempt to
that contextual factors such as extreme intervene. One could argue that the credit-
poverty and landlessness may be more provider here was an alternative provider
strongly associated with increased mobility of 'dowry'. There were other examples like
beyond the village, than with microfinance this, equally disturbing in their lack of
prog-rammes. Although NGOs appear to insight into the causes of violence. The
have had some success in supporting assumption that credit, by itself, will lead
women to travel to NGO and local to less violence is questionable and
government offices, much more could be dangerous. Recent research from Calcutta
done to empower and support women to does suggest that women's social networks
enter the marketplace. (both formal and informal) can play an
important role in supporting women to
challenge male violence (Sen 1999). This
Violence against women
highlights the potential of strong women's
Most NGO staff we met sincerely believe groups to address male violence, but does
that providing credit to women helps to not reflect the current practice of most large
reduce violence against them, and one microfinance providers.
Self-respect and self-worth or that they have more value, because they
bring in credit.
During our discussions with women's
groups, we tried to explore what women
valued most about their membership in Microfinance: designed for
credit groups. All but one women's group the poor or poorest?
(by the far the poorest that we met)
It seems overwhelmingly clear to us that
answered that they most valued the
the largest micro-credit programmes -
confidence, knowledge, or training that
the ones that are being replicated inter-
they received. Many also mentioned the
nationally in the name of poverty
fact that they had access to credit, enabling
alleviation - do not, and cannot, reach the
them to make a contribution to household
poorest people. This raises very serious
finances, but for most groups this answer
questions about donor rhetoric and appraisal
came second, after they had already talked
processes. It is very clear that the poorest
about increased awareness. Some groups
women either exclude themselves from
focused on their knowledge of law and
credit groups, because they know that they
rights, and others focused on the strength
will never be able to meet weekly inflexible
that they said came from being in a group,
repayment rates at 10-15 per cent interest,
and feeling that they could now take action
or that they are excluded by group
against something that they knew was
members, for the same reason. With 15 per
wrong.
cent of households headed by women in
Although our sample is very small, rural Bangladesh, and 25 per cent among
the difference between male and female the landless (Kamal 1998), it is remarkable
answers to this question was striking. Men that NGOs are not reporting on this aspect
were more likely to focus on access to of group membership, and that few donors
money as the most valuable thing to have are requiring this type of monitoring. Yet
come from women's credit groups. NGO women-headed families are most likely to
staff also thought that men were more fall prey to trafficking of women and
interested in material benefits. children, one of the worst human rights
Several researchers have pointed out abuses in the region at this time.
that individual women respond to different While this exclusion of the poorest is
components and strategies in microfinance acknowledged in some research (Kamal
programmes in a highly complex way. 1998; Hulme 2000), it is rarely openly
Their responses depend on their individual acknowledged by NGO staff and donors.
attributes as well as the structural cons- One notable exception here is Banchte
traints and opportunities that surround Sheka, an NGO located in Jessore in the
them (Kabeer 1998; Mayoux 1998; Mayoux north of Bangladesh, which has different
1999). Our observation in the field was that loan packages designed to meet the needs
some women seem to need only a small of women from different socio-economic
opportunity to build their own pathway to groups, including interest-free loans, group
empowerment. With access to credit, just a loans, loans at five per cent interest rates,
little training, and some group support, and loans with long grace periods before
they are able to negotiate significant repayments are due, with women grad-
increases in power and decision-making uating to market rates once they have
within their households. We found (as did received enough training and gained
Kabeer 1998; Banu et al. 1998; and Kamal enough regular income to be able to repay.
1998) that some women do feel that they Donor agencies have a clear obligation to
gain respect, that they are listened to more, investigate the impact of microfinance on
equality within all the organisations we impacts of credit. Many NGOs have
visited, creating a positive and enabling entrenched assumptions about the positive
two large Bangladeshi NGOs in our sample women's empowerment such as violence,
have been successful at increasing and mobility, and control over family decision-
retaining female staff (from around 15 per making.
cent in 1995 to around 30 per cent in 2000). While we had neither time nor