EN BANC

August 15, 2017

G.R. No. 226679

SALVADOR ESTIPONA, JR. y ASUELA, Petitioner,

vs.
HON. FRANK E. LOBRIGO, Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 3, Legazpi
City, Albay, and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents.

DECISION

PERALTA, J.:

Challenged in this petition for certiorari and prohibition1 is the constitutionality of Section 23 of
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9165, or the "Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002, "2 which
provides:

SEC 23. Plea-Bargaining Provision. - Any person charged under any provision of this Act regardless
of the imposable penalty shall not be allowed to avail of the provision on plea-bargaining.3

The facts are not in dispute.

Petitioner Salvador A. Estipona, Jr. (Estipona) is the accused in Criminal Case No. 13586 for
violation of Section 11, Article II of R.A. No. 9165 (Possession of Dangerous Drugs). The Information
alleged:

That on or about the 21st day of March, 2016, in the City of Legazpi, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, not being lawfully authorized to
possess or otherwise use any regulated drug and without the corresponding license or prescription,
did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have, in his possession and under his control
and custody, one (1) piece heat-sealed transparent plastic sachet marked as VOP 03/21/16- l G
containing 0.084 [gram] of white crystalline substance, which when examined were found to be
positive for Methamphetamine Hydrocloride (Shabu), a dangerous drug.

CONTRARY TO LAW.4

On June 15, 2016, Estipona filed a Motion to Allow the Accused to Enter into a Plea Bargaining
Agreement,5 praying to withdraw his not guilty plea and, instead, to enter a plea of guilty for violation
of Section 12, Article II of R.A. No. 9165 (Possession of Equipment, Instrument, Apparatus and
Other Paraphernalia for Dangerous Drugs) with a penalty of rehabilitation in view of his being a first-
time offender and the minimal quantity of the dangerous drug seized in his possession. He argued
that Section 23 of R.A. No. 9165 violates: (1) the intent of the law expressed in paragraph 3, Section
2 thereof; (2) the rule-making authority of the Supreme Court under Section 5(5), Article VIII of the
1987 Constitution; and (3) the principle of separation of powers among the three equal branches of
the government.

In its Comment or Opposition6 dated June 27, 2016, the prosecution moved for the denial of the
motion for being contrary to Section 23 of R.A. No. 9165, which is said to be justified by the
Congress' prerogative to choose which offense it would allow plea bargaining. Later, in a Comment
or Opposition7 dated June 29, 2016, it manifested that it "is open to the Motion of the accused to
enter into plea bargaining to give life to the intent of the law as provided in paragraph 3, Section 2 of
[R.A. No.] 9165, however, with the express mandate of Section 23 of [R.A. No.] 9165 prohibiting plea
bargaining, [it] is left without any choice but to reject the proposal of the accused."

On July 12, 2016, respondent Judge Frank E. Lobrigo of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 3,
Legazpi City, Albay, issued an Order denying Estipona's motion. It was opined:
The accused posited in his motion that Sec. 23 of RA No. 9165, which prohibits plea bargaining,
encroaches on the exclusive constitutional power of the Supreme Court to promulgate rules of
procedure because plea bargaining is a "rule of procedure." Indeed, plea bargaining forms part of
the Rules on Criminal Procedure, particularly under Rule 118, the rule on pre-trial conference. It is
only the Rules of Court promulgated by the Supreme Court pursuant to its constitutional rule-making
power that breathes life to plea bargaining. It cannot be found in any statute.

Without saying so, the accused implies that Sec. 23 of Republic Act No. 9165 is unconstitutional
because it, in effect, suspends the operation of Rule 118 of the Rules of Court insofar as it allows
plea bargaining as part of the mandatory pre-trial conference in criminal cases.

The Court sees merit in the argument of the accused that it is also the intendment of the law, R.A.
No. 9165, to rehabilitate an accused of a drug offense. Rehabilitation is thus only possible in cases
of use of illegal drugs because plea bargaining is disallowed. However, by case law, the Supreme
Court allowed rehabilitation for accused charged with possession of paraphernalia with traces of
dangerous drugs, as held in People v. Martinez, G.R. No. 191366, 13 December 2010. The ruling of
the Supreme Court in this case manifested the relaxation of an otherwise stringent application of
Republic Act No. 9165 in order to serve an intent for the enactment of the law, that is, to rehabilitate
the offender.

Within the spirit of the disquisition in People v. Martinez, there might be plausible basis for the
declaration of Sec. 23 of R.A. No. 9165, which bars plea bargaining as unconstitutional because
indeed the inclusion of the provision in the law encroaches on the exclusive constitutional power of
the Supreme Court.

While basic is the precept that lower courts are not precluded from resolving, whenever warranted,
constitutional questions, the Court is not unaware of the admonition of the Supreme Court that lower
courts must observe a becoming modesty in examining constitutional questions. Upon which
admonition, it is thus not for this lower court to declare Sec. 23 of R.A. No. 9165 unconstitutional
given the potential ramifications that such declaration might have on the prosecution of illegal drug
cases pending before this judicial station.8

Estipona filed a motion for reconsideration, but it was denied in an Order9 dated July 26, 2016;
hence, this petition raising the issues as follows:

I.

WHETHER SECTION 23 OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 9165, WHICH PROHIBITS PLEA BARGAINING
IN ALL VIOLATIONS OF THE SAID LAW, IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL FOR BEING VIOLATIVE OF
THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE LAW.

II.

WHETHER SECTION 23 OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 9165 IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL AS IT

ENCROACHED UPON THE POWER OF THE SUPREME COURT TO PROMULGATE RULES OF
PROCEDURE.

III.

WHETHER THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, AS PRESIDED BY HON. FRANK E. LOBRIGO,

COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF
JURISDICTION WHEN IT REFUSED TO DECLARE SECTION 23 OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 9165
AS UNCONSTITUTIONAL.10

We grant the petition.

PROCEDURAL MATTERS

The People of the Philippines, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), contends that the
petition should be dismissed outright for being procedurally defective on the grounds that: (1) the
Congress should have been impleaded as an indispensable party; (2) the constitutionality of Section
23 of R.A. No. 9165 cannot be attacked collaterally; and (3) the proper recourse should have been a
petition for declaratory relief before this Court or a petition for certiorari before the RTC. Moreover,
the OSG argues that the petition fails to satisfy the requisites of judicial review because: (1) Estipona
lacks legal standing to sue for failure to show direct injury; (2) there is no actual case or controversy;
and (3) the constitutionality of Section 23 of R.A. No. 9165 is not the lis mota of the case.

On matters of technicality, some points raised by the OSG maybe correct. Nonetheless, without
1âw phi 1

much further ado, it must be underscored that it is within this Court's power to make exceptions to
the rules of court. Under proper conditions, We may permit the full and exhaustive ventilation of the
parties' arguments and positions despite the supposed technical infirmities of a petition or its alleged
procedural flaws. In discharging its solemn duty as the final arbiter of constitutional issues, the Court
shall not shirk from its obligation to determine novel issues, or issues of first impression, with far-
reaching implications.11

Likewise, matters of procedure and technicalities normally take a backseat when issues of
substantial and transcendental importance are present.12 We have acknowledged that the
Philippines' problem on illegal drugs has reached "epidemic," "monstrous," and "harrowing"
proportions,13 and that its disastrously harmful social, economic, and spiritual effects have broken the
lives, shattered the hopes, and destroyed the future of thousands especially our young citizens.14 At
the same time, We have equally noted that "as urgent as the campaign against the drug problem
must be, so must we as urgently, if not more so, be vigilant in the protection of the rights of the
accused as mandated by the Constitution x x x who, because of excessive zeal on the part of the
law enforcers, may be unjustly accused and convicted."15 Fully aware of the gravity of the drug
menace that has beset our country and its direct link to certain crimes, the Court, within its sphere,
must do its part to assist in the all-out effort to lessen, if not totally eradicate, the continued presence
of drug lords, pushers and users.16

Bearing in mind the very important and pivotal issues raised in this petition, technical matters should
not deter Us from having to make the final and definitive pronouncement that everyone else depends
for enlightenment and guidance.17 When public interest requires, the Court may brush aside
procedural rules in order to resolve a constitutional issue.18

x x x [T]he Court is invested with the power to suspend the application of the rules of procedure as a
necessary complement of its power to promulgate the same. Barnes v. Hon. Quijano
Padilla discussed the rationale for this tenet, viz. :

Let it be emphasized that the rules of procedure should be viewed as mere tools designed to
facilitate the attainment of justice. Their strict and rigid application, which would result in
technicalities that tend to frustrate rather than promote substantial justice, must always be
eschewed. Even the Rules of Court reflect this principle. The power to suspend or even disregard
rules can be so pervasive and compelling as to alter even that which this Court itself has already
declared to be final, x x x.

The emerging trend in the rulings of this Court is to afford every party litigant the amplest opportunity
for the proper and just determination of his cause, free from the constraints of technicalities. Time
and again, this Court has consistently held that rules must not be applied rigidly so as not to override
substantial justice. 19

SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES

Rule-making power of the Supreme

Court under the 1987 Constitution

Section 5(5), A1iicle VIII of the 1987 Constitution explicitly provides:

Sec. 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:

xxxx

(5) Promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights, pleading,
practice, and procedure in all courts, the admission to the practice of law, the Integrated Bar, and
legal assistance to the underprivileged. Such rules shall provide a simplified and inexpensive
procedure for the speedy disposition of cases, shall be uniform for all courts of the same grade, and
shall not diminish, increase, or modify substantive rights. Rules of procedure of special courts and
quasi-judicial bodies shall remain effective unless disapproved by the Supreme Court.

The power to promulgate rules of pleading, practice and procedure is now Our exclusive domain and
no longer shared with the Executive and Legislative departments.20 In Echegaray v. Secretary of
Justice, 21 then Associate Justice (later Chief Justice) Reynato S. Puno traced the history of the
Court's rule-making power and highlighted its evolution and development.

x x x It should be stressed that the power to promulgate rules of pleading, practice and procedure
was granted by our Constitutions to this Court to enhance its independence, for in the words of
Justice Isagani Cruz "without independence and integrity, courts will lose that popular trust so
essential to the maintenance of their vigor as champions of justice." Hence, our Constitutions
continuously vested this power to this Court for it enhances its independence. Under the 1935
Constitution, the power of this Court to promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice and
procedure was granted but it appeared to be co-existent with legislative power for it was subject to
the power of Congress to repeal, alter or supplement. Thus, its Section 13, Article VIII provides:

"Sec. 13. The Supreme Court shall have the power to promulgate rules concerning pleading,
practice and procedure in all courts, and the admission to the practice of law. Said rules shall be
uniform for all courts of the same grade and shall not diminish, increase, or modify substantive
rights. The existing laws on pleading, practice and procedure are hereby repealed as statutes, and
are declared Rules of Court, subject to the power of the Supreme Court to alter and modify the
same. The Congress shall have the power to repeal, alter or supplement the rules concerning
pleading, practice and procedure, and the admission to the practice of law in the Philippines."

The said power of Congress, however, is not as absolute as it may appear on its surface. In In re:
Cunanan Congress in the exercise of its power to amend rules of the Supreme Court regarding
admission to the practice of law, enacted the Bar Flunkers Act of 1953 which considered as a
passing grade, the average of 70% in the bar examinations after July 4, 1946 up to August 1951 and
71 % in the 1952 bar examinations. This Court struck down the law as unconstitutional. In
his ponencia, Mr. Justice Diokno held that "x x x the disputed law is not a legislation; it is a judgment
- a judgment promulgated by this Court during the aforecited years affecting the bar candidates
concerned; and although this Court certainly can revoke these judgments even now, for justifiable
reasons, it is no less certain that only this Court, and not the legislative nor executive department,
that may do so. Any attempt on the part of these departments would be a clear usurpation of its
function, as is the case with the law in question." The venerable jurist further ruled: "It is obvious,
therefore, that the ultimate power to grant license for the practice of law belongs exclusively to this
Court, and the law passed by Congress on the matter is of permissive character, or as other
authorities say, merely to fix the minimum conditions for the license." By its ruling, this Court
qualified the absolutist tone of the power of Congress to "repeal, alter or supplement the rules
concerning pleading, practice and procedure, and the admission to the practice of law in the
Philippines.

The ruling of this Court in In re Cunanan was not changed by the 1973 Constitution. For the 1973
Constitution reiterated the power of this Court "to promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice and
procedure in all courts, x x x which, however, may be repealed, altered or supplemented by the
Batasang Pambansa x x x." More completely, Section 5(2)5 of its Article X provided:

xxxx

"Sec. 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers.

xxxx

(5) Promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts, the admission to the
practice of law, and the integration of the Bar, which, however, may be repealed, altered, or
supplemented by the Batasang Pambansa. Such rules shall provide a simplified and inexpensive
procedure for the speedy disposition of cases, shall be uniform for all courts of the same grade, and
shall not diminish, increase, or modify substantive rights."

Well worth noting is that the 1973 Constitution further strengthened the independence of the
judiciary by giving to it the additional power to promulgate rules governing the integration of the Bar.

The 1987 Constitution molded an even stronger and more independent judiciary. Among others, it
enhanced the rule making power of this Court. Its Section 5(5), Article VIII provides:

xxxx

"Section 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:

xxx

(5) Promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights, pleading,
practice and procedure in all courts, the admission to the practice of law, the Integrated Bar, and
legal assistance to the underprivileged. Such rules shall provide a simplified and inexpensive
procedure for the speedy disposition of cases, shall be uniform for all courts of the same grade, and
shall not diminish, increase, or modify substantive rights. Rules of procedure of special courts and
quasi-judicial bodies shall remain effective unless disapproved by the Supreme Court. "

The rule making power of this Court was expanded. This Court for the first time was given the power
to promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights. The Court
was also granted for the .first time the power to disapprove rules of procedure of special courts and
quasi-judicial bodies. But most importantly, the 1987 Constitution took away the power of Congress
to repeal, alter, or supplement rules concerning pleading, practice and procedure. In fine, the power
to promulgate rules of pleading, practice and procedure is no longer shared by this Court with
Congress, more so with the Executive. x x x.22

Just recently, Carpio-Morales v. Court of Appeals (Sixth Division)23 further elucidated:

While the power to define, prescribe, and apportion the jurisdiction of the various courts is, by
constitutional design, vested unto Congress, the power to promulgate rules concerning the
protection and enforcement of constitutional rights, pleading, practice, and procedure in all
courts belongs exclusively to this Court. Section 5 (5), Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution reads:

xxxx

In Echegaray v. Secretary of Justice (Echegaray), the Court traced the evolution of its rule-making
authority, which, under the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions, had been priorly subjected to a power-
sharing scheme with Congress. As it now stands, the 1987 Constitution textually altered the old
provisions by deleting the concurrent power of Congress to amend the rules, thus solidifying
in one body the Court's rule-making powers, in line with the Framers' vision of institutionalizing a
" [ s] tronger and more independent judiciary."

The records of the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission would show that the Framers
debated on whether or not the Court's rulemaking powers should be shared with Congress. There
was an initial suggestion to insert the sentence "The National Assembly may repeal, alter, or
supplement the said rules with the advice and concurrence of the Supreme Court," right after the
phrase "Promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights,
pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts, the admission to the practice of law, the integrated
bar, and legal assistance to the underprivileged[,]" in the enumeration of powers of the Supreme
Court. Later, Commissioner Felicitas S. Aquino proposed to delete the former sentence and, instead,
after the word "[under]privileged," place a comma(,) to be followed by "the phrase with the
concurrence of the National Assembly." Eventually, a compromise formulation was reached
wherein (a) the Committee members agreed to Commissioner Aquino's proposal to delete the
phrase "the National Assembly may repeal, alter, or supplement the said rules with the advice and
concurrence of the Supreme Court" and (b) in turn, Commissioner Aquino agreed to withdraw his
proposal to add "the phrase with the concurrence of the National Assembly." The changes were
approved, thereby leading to the present lack of textual reference to any form of
Congressional participation in Section 5 (5), Article VIII, supra. Theprevailing consideration
was that "both bodies, the Supreme Court and the Legislature, have their inherent powers."

Thus, as it now stands, Congress has no authority to repeal, alter, or supplement rules concerning
pleading, practice, and procedure.x x x.24

The separation of powers among the three co-equal branches of our government has erected an
impregnable wall that keeps the power to promulgate rules of pleading, practice and procedure
within the sole province of this Court.25 The other branches trespass upon this prerogative if they
enact laws or issue orders that effectively repeal, alter or modify any of the procedural rules
promulgated by the Court.26 Viewed from this perspective, We have rejected previous attempts on
the part of the Congress, in the exercise of its legislative power, to amend the Rules of
Court (Rules), to wit:

1. Fabian v. Desierto27 -Appeal from the decision of the Office of the Ombudsman in an
administrative disciplinary case should be taken to the Court of Appeals under the provisions of Rule
43 of the Rules instead of appeal by certiorari under Rule 45 as provided in Section 27 of R.A. No.
6770.

2. Cathay Metal Corporation v. Laguna West Multi-Purpose Cooperative, Inc. 28 - The Cooperative
Code provisions on notices cannot replace the rules on summons under Rule 14 of the Rules.

3. RE: Petition for Recognition of the Exemption of the GSIS from Payment of Legal Fees; 29 Baguio
Market Vendors Multi-Purpose Cooperative (BAMARVEMPCO) v. Hon. Judge Cabato-Cortes;30 In
Re: Exemption of the National Power Corporation from Payment of Filing/Docket Fees; 31 and Rep. of
the Phils. v. Hon. Mangotara, et al. 32 - Despite statutory provisions, the GSIS, BAMARVEMPCO, and
NPC are not exempt from the payment of legal fees imposed by Rule 141 of the Rules.

4. Carpio-Morales v. Court of Appeals (Sixth Division)33 - The first paragraph of Section 14 of R.A.
No. 6770, which prohibits courts except the Supreme Court from issuing temporary restraining order
and/or writ of preliminary injunction to enjoin an investigation conducted by the Ombudsman, is
unconstitutional as it contravenes Rule 58 of the Rules.
Considering that the aforesaid laws effectively modified the Rules, this Court asserted its discretion
to amend, repeal or even establish new rules of procedure, to the exclusion of the legislative and
executive branches of government. To reiterate, the Court's authority to promulgate rules on
pleading, practice, and procedure is exclusive and one of the safeguards of Our institutional
independence.34

Plea bargaining in criminal cases

Plea bargaining, as a rule and a practice, has been existing in our jurisdiction since July 1, 1940,
when the 1940 Rules took effect. Section 4, Rule 114 (Pleas) of which stated:

SEC. 4. Plea of guilty of lesser offense. - The defendant, with the consent of the court and of the
fiscal, may plead guilty of any lesser offense than that charged which is necessarily included in the
offense charged in the complaint or information.

When the 1964 Rules became effective on January 1, 1964, the same provision was retained under
Rule 118 (Pleas). Subsequently, with the effectivity of the 1985 Rules on January 1, 1985, the
1âwphi1

provision on plea of guilty to a lesser offense was amended. Section 2, Rule 116 provided:

SEC. 2. Plea of guilty to a lesser offense. - The accused with the consent of the offended party and
the fiscal, may be allowed by the trial court to plead guilty to a lesser offense, regardless of whether
or not it is necessarily included in the crime charged, or is cognizable by a court of lesser jurisdiction
than the trial court. No amendment of the complaint or information is necessary. (4a, R-118)

As well, the term "plea bargaining" was first mentioned and expressly required during pre-trial.
Section 2, Rule 118 mandated:

SEC. 2. Pre-trial conference; subjects. - The pre-trial conference shall consider the following:

(a) Plea bargaining;

(b) Stipulation of facts;

(c) Marking for identification of evidence of the parties;

(d) Waiver of objections to admissibility of evidence; and

(e) Such other matters as will promote a fair and expeditious trial. (n)

The 1985 Rules was later amended. While the wordings of Section 2, Rule 118 was retained,
Section 2, Rule 116 was modified in 1987. A second paragraph was added, stating that "[a]
conviction under this plea shall be equivalent to a conviction of the offense charged for purposes of
double jeopardy."

When R.A. No. 8493 ("Speedy Trial Act of 1998 ') was enacted,35 Section 2, Rule 118 of
the Rules was substantially adopted. Section 2 of the law required that plea bargaining and other
matters36 that will promote a fair and expeditious trial are to be considered during pre-trial conference
in all criminal cases cognizable by the Municipal Trial Court, Municipal Circuit Trial Court,
Metropolitan Trial Court, Regional Trial Court, and the Sandiganbayan.

Currently, the pertinent rules on plea bargaining under the 2000 Rules37 are quoted below:

RULE 116 (Arraignment and Plea):

SEC. 2. Plea of guilty to a lesser offense. - At arraignment, the accused, with the consent of the
offended party and the prosecutor, may be allowed by the trial court to plead guilty to a lesser
offense which is necessarily included in the offense charged. After arraignment but before trial, the
accused may still be allowed to plead guilty to said lesser offense after withdrawing his plea of not
guilty. No amendment of the complaint or information is necessary. (Sec. 4, Cir. 38-98)

RULE 118 (Pre-trial):

SEC. 1. Pre-trial; mandatory in criminal cases. - In all criminal cases cognizable by

the Sandiganbayan, Regional Trial Court, Metropolitan Trial Court, Municipal Trial Court in Cities,
Municipal Trial Court and Municipal Circuit Trial Court, the court shall, after arraignment and within
thirty (30) days from the date the court acquires jurisdiction over the person of the accused, unless a
shorter period is provided for in special laws or circulars of the Supreme Court, order a pre-trial
conference to consider the following:
(a) plea bargaining;

(b) stipulation of facts;

(c) marking for identification of evidence of the parties;

(d) waiver of objections to admissibility of evidence;

(e) modification of the order of trial if the accused admits the charge but interposes a lawful defense;
and

(f) such matters as will promote a fair and expeditious trial of the criminal and civil aspects of the
case. (Sec. 2 & 3, Cir. 38-98)

Plea bargaining is a rule of procedure

The Supreme Court's sole prerogative to issue, amend, or repeal procedural rules is limited to the
preservation of substantive rights, i.e., the former should not diminish, increase or modify the
latter.38 "Substantive law is that part of the law which creates, defines and regulates rights, or which
regulates the right and duties which give rise to a cause of action; that part of the law which courts
are established to administer; as opposed to adjective or remedial law, which prescribes the method
of enforcing rights or obtain redress for their invasions."39 Fabian v. Hon. Desierto40 laid down the test
for determining whether a rule is substantive or procedural in nature.

It will be noted that no definitive line can be drawn between those rules or statutes which are
procedural, hence within the scope of this Court's rule-making power, and those which are
substantive. In fact, a particular rule may be procedural in one context and substantive in another. It
is admitted that what is procedural and what is substantive is frequently a question of great difficulty.
It is not, however, an insurmountable problem if a rational and pragmatic approach is taken within
the context of our own procedural and jurisdictional system.

In determining whether a rule prescribed by the Supreme Court, for the practice and procedure of
the lower courts, abridges, enlarges, or modifies any substantive right, the test is whether the rule
really regulates procedure, that is, the judicial process for enforcing rights and duties recognized by
substantive law and for justly administering remedy and redress for a disregard or infraction of them.
If the rule takes away a vested right, it is not procedural. If the rule creates a right such as the right to
appeal, it may be classified as a substantive matter; but if it operates as a means of implementing an
existing right then the rule deals merely with procedure.41

In several occasions, We dismissed the argument that a procedural rule violates substantive rights.
For example, in People v. Lacson, 42 Section 8, Rule 117 of the Rules on provisional dismissal was
held as a special procedural limitation qualifying the right of the State to prosecute, making the time-
bar an essence of the given right or as an inherent part thereof, so that its expiration operates to
extinguish the right of the State to prosecute the accused.43 Speaking through then Associate Justice
Romeo J. Callejo, Sr., the Court opined:

In the new rule in question, as now construed by the Court, it has fixed a time-bar of one year or two
years for the revival of criminal cases provisionally dismissed with the express consent of the
accused and with a priori notice to the offended party. The time-bar may appear, on first impression,
unreasonable compared to the periods under Article 90 of the Revised Penal Code. However, in
fixing the time-bar, the Court balanced the societal interests and those of the accused for the orderly
and speedy disposition of criminal cases with minimum prejudice to the State and the accused. It
took into account the substantial rights of both the State and of the accused to due process. The
Court believed that the time limit is a reasonable period for the State to revive provisionally
dismissed cases with the consent of the accused and notice to the offended parties. The time-bar
fixed by the Court must be respected unless it is shown that the period is manifestly short or
insufficient that the rule becomes a denial of justice. The petitioners failed to show a manifest
shortness or insufficiency of the time-bar.

The new rule was conceptualized by the Committee on the Revision of the Rules and approved by
the Court en banc primarily to enhance the administration of the criminal justice system and the
rights to due process of the State and the accused by eliminating the deleterious practice of trial
courts of provisionally dismissing criminal cases on motion of either the prosecution or the accused
or jointly, either with no time-bar for the revival thereof or with a specific or definite period for such
revival by the public prosecutor. There were times when such criminal cases were no longer revived
or refiled due to causes beyond the control of the public prosecutor or because of the indolence,
apathy or the lackadaisical attitude of public prosecutors to the prejudice of the State and the
accused despite the mandate to public prosecutors and trial judges to expedite criminal proceedings.
It is almost a universal experience that the accused welcomes delay as it usually operates in his
favor, especially if he greatly fears the consequences of his trial and conviction. He is hesitant to
disturb the hushed inaction by which dominant cases have been known to expire.

The inordinate delay in the revival or refiling of criminal cases may impair or reduce the capacity of
the State to prove its case with the disappearance or nonavailability of its witnesses. Physical
evidence may have been lost. Memories of witnesses may have grown dim or have faded. Passage
of time makes proof of any fact more difficult. The accused may become a fugitive from justice or
commit another crime. The longer the lapse of time from the dismissal of the case to the revival
thereof, the more difficult it is to prove the crime.

On the other side of the fulcrum, a mere provisional dismissal of a criminal case does not terminate
a criminal case. The possibility that the case may be revived at any time may disrupt or reduce, if not
derail, the chances of the accused for employment, curtail his association, subject him to public
obloquy and create anxiety in him and his family. He is unable to lead a normal life because of
community suspicion and his own anxiety. He continues to suffer those penalties and disabilities
incompatible with the presumption of innocence. He may also lose his witnesses or their memories
may fade with the passage of time. In the long run, it may diminish his capacity to defend himself
and thus eschew the fairness of the entire criminal justice system.

The time-bar under the new rule was fixed by the Court to excise the malaise that plagued the
administration of the criminal justice system for the benefit of the State and the accused; not for the
accused only.44

Also, We said in Jaylo, et al. v. Sandiganbayan, et al. 45 that Section 6, Rule 120 of the Rules, which
provides that an accused who failed to appear at the promulgation of the judgment of conviction
shall lose the remedies available against the judgment, does not take away substantive rights but
merely provides the manner through which an existing right may be implemented.

Section 6, Rule 120, of the Rules of Court, does not take away per se the right of the convicted
accused to avail of the remedies under the Rules. It is the failure of the accused to appear without
justifiable cause on the scheduled date of promulgation of the judgment of conviction that forfeits
their right to avail themselves of the remedies against the judgment.

It is not correct to say that Section 6, Rule 120, of the Rules of Court diminishes or modifies the
substantive rights of petitioners. It only works in pursuance of the power of the Supreme Court to
"provide a simplified and inexpensive procedure for the speedy disposition of cases." This provision
protects the courts from delay in the speedy disposition of criminal cases - delay arising from the
simple expediency of nonappearance of the accused on the scheduled promulgation of the judgment
of conviction.46

By the same token, it is towards the provision of a simplified and inexpensive procedure for the
speedy disposition of cases in all courts47 that the rules on plea bargaining was introduced. As a way
of disposing criminal charges by agreement of the parties, plea bargaining is considered to be an
"important," "essential," "highly desirable," and "legitimate" component of the administration of
justice.48 Some of its salutary effects include:

x x x For a defendant who sees slight possibility of acquittal, the advantages of pleading guilty and
limiting the probable penalty are obvious - his exposure is reduced, the correctional processes can
begin immediately, and the practical burdens of a trial are eliminated. For the State there are also
advantages - the more promptly imposed punishment after an admission of guilt may more
effectively attain the objectives of punishment; and with the avoidance of trial, scarce judicial and
prosecutorial resources are conserved for those cases in which there is a substantial issue of the
defendant's guilt or in which there is substantial doubt that the State can sustain its burden of
proof. (Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 752 [1970])

Disposition of charges after plea discussions x x x leads to prompt and largely final disposition of
most criminal cases; it avoids much of the corrosive impact of enforced idleness during pretrial
confinement for those who are denied release pending trial; it protects the public from those accused
persons who are prone to continue criminal conduct even while on pretrial release; and, by
shortening the time between charge and disposition, it enhances whatever may be the rehabilitative
prospects of the guilty when they are ultimately imprisoned. (Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257,
261 [1971])

The defendant avoids extended pretrial incarceration and the anxieties and uncertainties of a trial;
he gains a speedy disposition of his case, the chance to acknowledge his guilt, and a prompt start in
realizing whatever potential there may be for rehabilitation. Judges and prosecutors conserve vital
and scarce resources. The public is protected from the risks posed by those charged with criminal
offenses who are at large on bail while awaiting completion of criminal proceedings. (Blackledge v.
Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 71 [1977])

In this jurisdiction, plea bargaining has been defined as "a process whereby the accused and the
prosecution work out a mutually satisfactory disposition of the case subject to court
approval."49 There is give-and-take negotiation common in plea bargaining.50 The essence of the
agreement is that both the prosecution and the defense make concessions to avoid potential
losses.51 Properly administered, plea bargaining is to be encouraged because the chief virtues of the
system - speed, economy, and finality - can benefit the accused, the offended party, the prosecution,
and the court.52

Considering the presence of mutuality of advantage,53 the rules on plea bargaining neither create a
right nor take away a vested right. Instead, it operates as a means to implement an existing right by
regulating the judicial process for enforcing rights and duties recognized by substantive law and for
justly administering remedy and redress for a disregard or infraction of them.

The decision to plead guilty is often heavily influenced by the defendant's appraisal of the
prosecution's case against him and by the apparent likelihood of securing leniency should a guilty
plea be offered and accepted.54 In any case, whether it be to the offense charged or to a lesser
crime, a guilty plea is a "serious and sobering occasion" inasmuch as it constitutes a waiver of the
fundamental rights to be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved, to be heard by himself and
counsel, to meet the witnesses face to face, to bail (except those charged with offenses punishable
by reclusion perpetua when evidence of guilt is strong), to be convicted by proof beyond reasonable
doubt, and not to be compelled to be a witness against himself.55

Yet a defendant has no constitutional right to plea bargain. No basic rights are infringed by trying him
rather than accepting a plea of guilty; the prosecutor need not do so if he prefers to go to
trial.56 Under the present Rules, the acceptance of an offer to plead guilty is not a demandable right
but depends on the consent of the offended party57 and the prosecutor, which is a condition
precedent to a valid plea of guilty to a lesser offense that is necessarily included in the offense
charged.58 The reason for this is that the prosecutor has full control of the prosecution of criminal
actions; his duty is to always prosecute the proper offense, not any lesser or graver one, based on
what the evidence on hand can sustain.59

[Courts] normally must defer to prosecutorial decisions as to whom to prosecute. The reasons for
judicial deference are well known. Prosecutorial charging decisions are rarely simple. In addition to
assessing the strength and importance of a case, prosecutors also must consider other tangible and
intangible factors, such as government enforcement priorities. Finally, they also must decide how
best to allocate the scarce resources of a criminal justice system that simply cannot accommodate
the litigation of every serious criminal charge. Because these decisions "are not readily susceptible
to the kind of analysis the courts are competent to undertake," we have been "properly hesitant to
examine the decision whether to prosecute. "60

The plea is further addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court, which may allow the accused
to plead guilty to a lesser offense which is necessarily included in the offense charged. The
word may denotes an exercise of discretion upon the trial court on whether to allow the accused to
make such plea.61 Trial courts are exhorted to keep in mind that a plea of guilty for a lighter offense
than that actually charged is not supposed to be allowed as a matter of bargaining or compromise
for the convenience of the accused.62

Plea bargaining is allowed during the arraignment, the pre-trial, or even up to the point when the
prosecution already rested its case.63 As regards plea bargaining during the pre-trial stage, the trial
court's exercise of discretion should not amount to a grave abuse thereof.64 "Grave abuse of
discretion" is a capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment so patent and gross as to amount to
an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, as where the
power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner because of passion or hostility; it arises
when a court or tribunal violates the Constitution, the law or existing jurisprudence.65

If the accused moved to plead guilty to a lesser offense subsequent to a bail hearing or after the
prosecution rested its case, the rules allow such a plea only when the prosecution does not have
sufficient evidence to establish the guilt of the crime charged.66 The only basis on which the
prosecutor and the court could rightfully act in allowing change in the former plea of not guilty could
be nothing more and nothing less than the evidence on record. As soon as the prosecutor has
submitted a comment whether for or against said motion, it behooves the trial court to assiduously
study the prosecution's evidence as well as all the circumstances upon which the accused made his
change of plea to the end that the interests of justice and of the public will be served.67 The ruling on
the motion must disclose the strength or weakness of the prosecution's evidence.68 Absent any
finding on the weight of the evidence on hand, the judge's acceptance of the defendant's change of
plea is improper and irregular.69
On whether Section 23 of R.A. No.
9165 violates the equal protection
clause

At this point, We shall not resolve the issue of whether Section 23 of R.A. No. 9165 is contrary to the
constitutional right to equal protection of the law in order not to preempt any future discussion by the
Court on the policy considerations behind Section 23 of R.A. No. 9165. Pending deliberation on
whether or not to adopt the statutory provision in toto or a qualified version thereof, We deem it
proper to declare as invalid the prohibition against plea bargaining on drug cases until and unless it
is made part of the rules of procedure through an administrative circular duly issued for the purpose.

WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari and prohibition is GRANTED. Section 23 of Republic Act
No. 9165 is declared unconstitutional for being contrary to the rule-making authority of the Supreme
Court under Section 5(5), Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution.

SO ORDERED.

DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

MARIA LOURDES P.A. SERENO

Chief Justice

ANTONIO T. CARPIO PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

Associate Justice Associate Justice

TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO LUCAS P. BERSAMIN

Associate Justice Associate Justice

MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE

Associate Justice Associate Justice

See separate concurring opinion

FRANCIS H. JARDELEZA
MARVIC M.V.F. LEONEN
Associate Justice
Associate Justice

On wellness leave
SAMUEL R. MARTIRES
ALFREDO BENJAMIN S. CAGUIOA
Associate Justice
Associate Justice

NOEL GIMENEZ TIJAM ANDRES B. REYES, JR.

Associate Justice Associate Justice

ALEXANDER G. GESMUNDO
Associate Justice

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to the Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that the conclusions in the above
Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion
of the Court’s Division.

MARIA LOURDES P.A. SERENO

Chief Justice

Footnotes

*
On wellness leave.

1
With Urgent Prayer for Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ of
Preliminary Injunction.
2
Approved on June 7, 2002.

3
This repealed Section 20-A of R.A. No. 6425 ("Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972"), as amended
by R.A. No. 7659 ("Death Penalty Law"), which was approved on December 13, 1993. It
provided: SEC. 20-A. Plea-bargaining Provisions. - Any person charged under any provision
of this Act where the imposable penalty is reclusion perpetua to death shall not be allowed to
avail of the provision on plea-bargaining.

4
Rollo, p. 47.

5
Id. at 49-51.

6
Id. at 52.

7
Id. at 53.

8
Id. at 44-45.

9
Id. at 46, 54-55.

10
Id. at 3, 15-16.

11
See Garcia v. Judge Drilon, et al., 712 Phil. 44, 84(2013).

12
GMA Network, Inc. v. COMELEC, 742 Phil. 174, 209-210 (2014).

13
See People v. Castro, 340 Phil. 245, 246 (1997); People v. Camba, 302 Phil. 31 I, 323
(1994); People v. Tantiado, 288 Phil. 241, 258 (1992); Peopie v. Zapanta, 272-A Phil. 161,
166 (1991); People v. Taruc, 241 Phil. 177, 186 (1988); and People v. Ale, 229 Phil. 81, 87
(1986).

People v. Tantiado, supra, as cited in People v. Camba, supra, and People v. Caco, 294
14

Phil. 54, 65 (1993).

15
People v.Quintana, 256 Phil, 430, 436 (1989).

See People v. Gatlabayan, 669 Phil. 240, 261 (2011); People v. Lagmay, 365 Phil. 606,
16

632 (1999); and People v. Arcega. G.R. No. 96319, March 31, 1992, 207 SCRA 681, 688.

17
See GMA NETWORK, Inc. v COMELEC, supra note 12 at 210.

18
Matibag v. Benipayo, 429 Phil 554, 579 (2002)

Philippine Woman's Christian Temperance Union, Inc. v. Teodoro R. Yangco 2nd And 3rd
19

Generation Heirs Foundation, Inc., 731Phil.269, 292 (2014). (Citation omitted and italics
supplied)

20
Echegaray v. Secretary of Justice, 361 Phil. 73, 88 (1999), as cited in RE: Petition for
Recognition of the Exemption of the GSIS from Payment of Legal Fee, 626 Phil. 93, 106
(2010) and Baguio Market Vendors Multi-Purpose Cooperative (BAMARVEMPCO) v. Hon.
Judge Cabato-Cortes, 627 Phil. 543, 549 (2010).

21
Supra.

22
Echegaray v. Secretary of Justice, supra note 20, at 85-88. (Citations omitted). See
also RE: Petition for Recognition of the Exemption of the GSIS from Payment of Legal Fee,
supra note 20, at 106- 108 and In Re: Exemption of the National Power Corporation from
Payment of Filing/Docket Fees, 629 Phil. 1, 4-5 (2010).

23
G.R. Nos. 217126-27, November 10, 2015, 774 SCRA 431.

24
Carpio-Morales v. Court of Appeals (Sixth Division), supra, at 505-508. (Citations omitted).

RE: Petition for Recognition of the Exemption of the GSIS from Payment of legal Fee,
25

supra note 20, at 108.

26
Id.
27
356 Phil. 787 (1998).

28
738 Phil. 37 (2014).

29
Supra note 20.

30
Supra note 20.

31
Supra note 22.

32
638 Phil. 353 (2010).

33
Supra note 23.

34
See Carpio-Morales v. Court of Appeals (Sixth Division), supra note 23, at 517-518,
citing Baguio Market Vendors Multi-Purpose Cooperative (BAMARVEMPCO) v. Hon. Judge
Cabato-Cortes, supra note 20, at 550.

35
Approved on February 12, 1998.

Such as stipulation of facts, marking for identification of evidence of parties, and waiver of
36

objections to admissibility of evidence.

37
Effective December 1, 2001 (People v. Mamarion, 459 Phil. 51, 74 [2003]).

38
CONSTITUTION, A1t. VIII, Sec. 5(5). See also Ogayon v. People, 768 Phil. 272, 288
(2015) and San Ildefonso Lines, Inc. v. CA, 352 Phil. 405, 415-416 (1998).

39
See Carpio-Morales v. Court of Appeals (Sixth Division), supra note 23, at 516-517.

40
Supra note 27.

41
Fabian v. Desierto, supra at 808-809. See also Carpio-Morales v. Court of Appeals (Sixth
Division), supra note 23, at 517; Securities and Exchange Commission v. Judge Laigo, et
al., 768 Phil. 239, 269-270 (2015): Jaylo, et al. v. Sandiganbayan, et al., 751 Phil. 123, 141-
142 (2015); Land Bank of the Phils. v. De Leon, 447 Phil. 495, 503 (2003);
and Bernabe v. Alejo, 424 Phil. 933, 94 l (2002).

42
448 Phil. 317 (2003).

43
See Los Banos v. Pedro, 604 Phil. 215, 229 (2009).

44
People v. Lacson, supra note 42, at 387-389. (Citations omitted).

45
Supra note 41.

46
Jaylo, et al. v. Sandiganbayan, et al., id. at 142-143. (Citation omitted).

CONSTITUTION, Art. VIII, Sec. 5(5). See also Neypes v. Court of'Appea/s, 506 Phil. 613,
47

626 (2005) and San Ildefonso lines, Inc. v. CA, supra note 38, at 415-416.

See Corbitt v. New Jersey, 439 U.S. 212 (1978); Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63 (l 977);
48

and the Majority Opinion and Mr. Justice Douglas' Concurring Opinion in Santobello v. New
York, 404 U.S. 257 (1971).

49
People v. Villarama, Jr., 285 Phil. 723, 730 (1992), citing Black's Law Dictionary, 5th Ed.,
1979, p. 103 7. See also Gonzales Ill v. Office of the President of the Philippines, et al, 694
Phil. 52, 106 (2012); Atty. Amante-Descallar v. Judge Ramas, 601 Phil. 21, 40 (2009); Daan
v. Hon. Sandiganbayan, 573 Phil. 368, 375 (2008); and People v. Mamarion, supra note 37,
at 75.

50
Parker v. North Carolina, 397 U.S. 790 (1970).

51
Hughey v. United States, 495 U.S. 411 (1990).

52
See Santobello v. New York, supra note 48 and Blackledge v. Allison, supra note 48.
53
Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742 (1970).

54
Id.

55
See Brady v. United States, supra, and Mr. Justice Douglas' Concurring Opinion
in Santobello v. New York, supra note 48, at 264.

Weatherford v. Bursey, 429 U.S. 545 (1977). See also Mr. Justice Scalia's Dissenting
56

Opinion in Lafler v. Cooper, 566 U.S. 156 (2011).

The State is the offended party in crimes under R.A. No. 9165. In People v. Villarama, Jr.,
57

supra note 49, at 732 the Court ruled:

"x x x While the acts constituting the crimes are not wrong in themselves, they are
made so by law because they infringe upon the rights of others. The threat posed by
drugs against human dignity and the integrity of society is malevolent and
incessant (People v. Ale, G.R. No. 70998, October 14, 1986, 145 SCRA 50, 58).
Such pernicious effect is felt not only by the addicts themselves but also by their
families. As a result, society's survival is endangered because its basic unit, the
family, is the ultimate victim of the drug menace. The state is, therefore, the offended
party in this case. As guardian of the rights of the people, the government files the
criminal action in the name of the People of the Philippines. The Fiscal who
represents the government is duty bound to defend the public interests, threatened
by crime, to the point that it is as though he were the person directly injured by the
offense (see United States v. Samia, 3 Phil. 691, 696). Viewed in this light, the
consent of the offended party, i.e. the state, will have to be secured from the Fiscal
who acts in behalf of the government."

58
People v. Villarama, Jr., supra note 49.

59
Id.

60
Newton v. Rumery, 480 U.S. 386, 396 (1987).

Daan v. Hon. Sandiganbayan, supra note 49, at 732. In Capati v. Dr. Ocampo (199 Phil.
61

230, 234 [1982], citing In Re: Hirsh's Estate SA. 2d 160, 163; 334 Pa. 172; Words &
Phrases, permanent edition, 26a.), the Court also held:

"It is well settled that the word 'may' is merely permissive and operates to confer
discretion upon a party. Under ordinary circumstances, the term 'may be' connotes
possibility; it does not connote certainty. 'May' is an auxiliary verb indicating liberty,
opportunity, permission or possibility."

Daan v. Hon. Sandiganbayan, supra note 49, at 377 and People v. Vil/arama, Jr,
62

supra note 49, at 730.

See Daan v. Hon. Sandiganbayan, id. at 376; People v. Mamarion, supra note 37, at
63

75; Ladino v. Hon. Garcia, 333 Phil. 254, 258 (1996); and People v. Villarama, Jr.,
supra note 49, at 731.

64
See Daan v. Hon. Sandiganbayan, supra note 49, at 378.

65
Sofronio Albania v. Commission on Elections, et al., G.R. No. 226792, June 6, 2017.

People v. Villarama, Jr., supra note 49, at 252, as cited in Gonzales III v. Office of the
66

President of the Philippines, et al., supra note 49, at 106 and People v. Mamarion,
supra note 37, at 76.

67
People v. Villarama, Jr., supra note 49, at 731.

68
See People v. Villarama, supra.

69
People v. Villarama, Jr., supra note 49.
 SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 249459, June 14, 2021

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, v. NOEL SABATER Y ULAN,

Respondent.

DECISION

LAZARO-JAVIER, J.:

The Case

Petitioner People of the Philippines, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG),
seeks to reverse and set aside the following dispositions of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. SP. No. 158342:chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

1. Resolution1 dated January 28, 2019 dismissing the petition for late filing;
and

2. Resolution2 dated September 17, 2019 denying reconsideration.

Antecedents

Under Information3 dated December 19, 2016, the Naga City Prosecutor's Office
charged respondent Noel Sabater y Ulan with violation of Section 5, Republic Act No.
(RA) 9165, thus:chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
That on November 4, 2016, in the City of Naga, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction
of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, without authority of law, did then
and there willfully, unlawfully and criminally sell, dispense and deliver to poseur-buyer
PO1 Reimon Joy N. Paa�o one (1) pc. small heat-sealed transparent sachet with
markings RJNP�AN 11/04/16, weighing 0.049 gram, containing white crystalline
substance which when tested, was found positive for the presence of Methamphetamine
Hydrochloride popularly known as "shabu", a dangerous drug, in violation of the above-
cited law.

ACTS CONTRARY TO LAW.

The case was raffled to the Regional Trial Court-Br. 24, Naga City as Criminal Case No.
2016-0935. On arraignment, respondent pleaded not guilty. Thereafter, trial ensued.4

Approximately five (5) months after the prosecution had formally offered its evidence,
respondent, on June 28, 2018 filed a motion for plea bargaining, proposing to
plead guilty to a lesser offense, i.e. violation of Section 12, RA 9165 for possession of
equipment, instrument, apparatus and other paraphernalia for dangerous drugs, citing
AM. No. 18-03-16-SC entitled Adoption of the Plea Bargaining Framework in Drugs
Cases.5

The prosecution opposed, citing DOJ Circular No. 027 dated June 26, 2018. It provides
that when an accused is charged with selling less than five (5) grams of shabu in
violation of Section 5, RA 9165, as here, he or she may plead guilty to the lesser
offense of illegal possession of dangerous drugs under Section 11(3) of RA 9165, but
not under Section 12 of the same law.6

The Ruling of the Trial Court

By Order7 dated August 2, 2018, the trial court granted respondent's motion, nullifying
DOJ Circular No. 027 in the process, thus:chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
WHEREFORE, the Motion is GRANTED. This Court declares that DOJ Circular 27 is
contrary to the Rules of Court, and encroachment on the Rule-Making Power of the
Supreme Court of the Philippines. The Opposition has no valid factual and legal basis.
Plea bargaining is allowed in these cases.

SO ORDERED.8
Hence, respondent's not guilty plea was vacated and he was re�arraigned. This time,
respondent pleaded guilty to violation of Section 12, RA 9165.9

As borne in its Judgment10 dated September 12, 2018, the trial court rendered a verdict
of conviction against respondent for violation of Section 12, RA
9165, viz.:chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered finding the accused NOEL SABATER y ULAN,
GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the offense under Section 12, Article II of R.A.
9165.

Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the accused is hereby sentenced to suffer
imprisonment of six months and one day as minimum to four (4) years as maximum.
He is further ordered to pay a fine of Fifty Thousand Pesos (Php50,000.00). He is
further directed to submit himself to a drug dependency test. If he admits drug use, or
deny it but is found positive after the drug dependency test, he shall undergo treatment
and rehabilitation for a period of not less than 6 months.

In the service of his sentence, the accused shall be credited with the period of his
preventive detention pursuant to Article 29 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended.

SO ORDERED.11
The Ruling of the Court of Appeals

Aggrieved, the People elevated the case to the Court of Appeals via certiorari, docketed
as CA-G.R. SP. No. 158342. But by Resolution12 dated January 28, 2019, the Court of
Appeals dismissed the petition for late filing. It found that prosecution received the trial
court's Order dated August 2, 2018 six (6) days later on August 8, 2018. Thus, it had
sixty (60) days therefrom or until October 9, 2018 to file a petition for certiorari. As it
was, the OSG filed its recourse on November 13, 2018 only or thirty five (35) days
late.13

The Court of Appeals denied reconsideration on September 17, 2019.14

The Present Petition

The People now prays anew that respondent's plea to a lesser offense of violation of
Section 12, RA 9165 be set aside, and the case, remanded to the trial court for further
proceedings.15 It faults the Court of Appeals for ruling that its petition for certiorari was
filed out of time. It brings to fore the fact that government functions in a bureaucracy
and certain procedures had to be observed before they may elevate a case to a higher
court.16 It is because they followed procedure that the OSG only received copy of the
trial court's Order dated August 2, 2018 on November 8, 2018, after the lapse of the
sixty day period for filing a petition for certiorari.17 The People, thus, prays that it be
accorded leniency as regards the period for filing its recourse before the Court of
Appeals.

The People likewise argues that the Court of Appeals should have resolved the case on
the merits, rather than focusing on mere technicalities.18 On the merits, the People
faults the Court of Appeals for effectively sustaining respondent's plea bargaining
proposal despite the apparent lack of consent and over the vigorous opposition of the
prosecutor. It asserts that while the landmark case of Estipona v. Hon.
Lobrigo19 allowed plea bargaining in drug cases, it did not deviate from the consensual
nature and essence of plea bargaining.20 Thus, when the trial court granted
respondent's motion for plea bargaining despite the prosecution's objection, the trial
court effectively encroached upon the government's prerogative to prosecute crimes.21

At any rate, the trial court gravely abused its discretion when it allowed respondent to
plead to a lesser offense which is not necessarily included in the offense originally
charged.22

Too, the trial court gravely abused its discretion when it declared DOJ Circular No. 027
contrary to the Rules of Court and an encroachment into the rule-making power of the
Court. Instead of choosing between DOJ Circular No. 27 and A.M. No. 18-03-16-SC, the
trial court should have harmonized these issuances.23

In his comment,24 respondent notes that the People has repeatedly acknowledged its
belated filing of its petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals without offering
cogent justification for the lapse. He also notes that the People did not move for
reconsideration of the trial court's Order dated August 2, 2018, a condition sine qua
non for filing a petition for certiorari.

In any event, courts have authority to overrule the prosecution's objections in plea
bargaining, especially so when strict adherence to DOJ Circular No. 027 would defeat
the principle behind the Court's ruling in Estipona which nullified the "no-plea
bargaining" provision of RA 9165. A contrary view is tantamount to a surrender of the
court's sole and supreme authority to command the course of the case.

Besides, there is wisdom in allowing the accused in drugs cases to plea bargain to the
lesser offense of violation of Section 12, RA 9165 from Section 5 of the same law where
the quantity of drugs involved is miniscule: 1) to provide a platform for rehabilitation of
small-time drug offenders; 2) to curb police operatives' nefarious practice of utilizing
buy-bust as a tool for abuse; and 3) to unclog our courts and focus the government's
resources to the real bane of society.

Finally, Pascua v. People25 already resolved whether an accused charged with

violation of Section 5, RA 9165 may plea bargain to the lesser offense of violation of
Section 12 of the same law.

Threshold Issues

Did the Court of Appeals commit reversible error when it dismissed the People's petition
for certiorari for belated filing?

II

Did the trial court commit grave abuse of discretion when it granted respondent's
proposal to plead guilty to the lesser offense of violation of Section 12, RA 9165 without
the consent and over the objection of the prosecutor?

III

Did the trial court commit grave abuse of discretion when it declared DOJ Circular No.
027 an encroachment of the Court's rule-making power?

Ruling

We grant the petition.

The Court of
Appeals
committed
reversible error
�
when it declared
that the petition
for certiorari was
filed out of time

Section 4, Ru1e 65 of the Rules of Court decrees:chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

Section 4. When and where petition filed. - The petition shall be filed not later than
sixty (60) days from notice of the judgment, order or resolution. In case a motion for
reconsideration or new trial is timely filed, whether such motion is required or not, the
sixty (60) day period shall be counted from notice of the denial of said motion.

xxx

No extension of time to file the petition shall be granted except for compelling reason
and in no case exceeding fifteen (15) days.
To recall, the sole reason for the dismissal of CA-G.R. SP. No. 158342 was its supposed
belated filing. According to the Court of Appeals, the 60- day period under Section 4,
Rule 65 is reckoned from the prosecution's receipt of the trial court's Order dated
August 2, 2018 granting respondent's motion for plea bargaining. Thus, the petition
was filed thirty five (35) days late on November 13, 2018.

But contrary to the Court of Appeals' ruling as well as the allegations of respondent and
even the OSG, the 60-day reglementary period should have been counted from the
prosecution's receipt of the trial court's Judgment dated September 12, 2018, rather
than the Order dated August 2, 2018. People v.
Majingcar26 elucidates:chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, a petition for certiorari must be filed within sixty
(60) days from notice of the judgment, order, or resolution sought to be assailed. Here,
the People claims that it reckoned the sixty (60) day period from September 18, 2018
when the prosecutor received a copy of the trial court's judgment of conviction that was
rendered on the same day. Remarkably, neither respondents nor the Court of Appeals
disagrees that indeed, on September 18, 2018, the trial rendered the assailed
judgment and it was on the same day, too, when the prosecutor had notice thereof. It
follows, therefore, that starting from September 18, 2018, the sixty day period expired
on November 17, 2018. So when the People filed its petition for certiorari on November
16, 2018, it did so well within the reglementary period.

At any rate, the Court of Appeals clearly had its way of counting the sixty days.
Although it did not mention from what date it started counting, logic dictates that it
started counting on September 5, 2018, when respondents were re-arraigned and
allowed to plead "guilty" to the lesser offense of violation of Section 12, Article II of RA
9165 in Criminal Case Nos. 2016-0774 and 2016-0775. We arrive at this conclusion
because the Court of Appeals referred to November 4, 2018 as the last day for filing the
petition for certiorari. Counting backward, the Court of Appeals appears to have started
counting from September 5, 2018, the date when respondents got re-arraigned and
pleaded guilty to the lesser offense of violation of Section 12, Article II of RA 9165 in
both Crim. Case Nos. 2016-0774 and 2016-0775.

But this counting is erroneous. For it was still much later, on September 18,
2018, when the prosecutor actually had notice of the trial court's judgment of
conviction that was rendered on the same day. Hence, the People correctly
reckoned the sixty day period from September 18, 2018 or until November 17,
2018. Therefore, we repeat that when the People subsequently filed its
petition for certiorari on November 16, 2018, it was well within the
reglementary period.

To clarify, the Plea Bargaining Resolutions dated August 6, 2018 and

September 1, 2018 are mere interlocutory orders which cannot be the subject
of a petition for certiorari. To allow a challenge thereof via Rule 65 will not only
breed undue delay in the administration of justice but a much frowned upon piecemeal
attacks against the court's mere interim issuances. Consistent with consideration of
expediency, the proper remedy is a one time challenge against the court's final
judgment on the merits. To allow otherwise would result in a never ending trial, not to
mention the clogging of the dockets of appellate court with ad infinitum petitions of
aggrieved parties-litigants against every interlocutory order of the trial court.
(emphases added)
Unfortunately, the OSG never alleged when the People received notice of the Judgment
dated September 12, 2018. Assuming that the People received notice on the same day
judgment was promulgated, the OSG had until November 11, 2018 to file a petition
for certiorari before the Court of Appeals. But since the deadline fell on a Sunday, the
petition became due on November 12, 2018. As it was, CA-G.R. SP. No. 158342 was
filed on November 13, 2018 or one (1) day late.

Indeed, the OSG admitted that CA-G.R. SP. No. 158342 was belatedly filed. Generally,
failure to avail of any remedy against an adverse ruling within the reglementary period
would allow it to lapse into finality. Once final, it becomes immutable and unalterable. It
may no longer be modified or amended by any court in any manner even if the purpose
of the modification or amendment is to correct perceived errors of law or fact. This is
the doctrine of immutability of judgment.27

But the principle of immutability of judgment is not absolute and admits of four (4)
exceptions, viz.:28chanrobleslawlibrary
(1) Correction of clerical errors;

(2) So-called nunc pro tunc entries which cause no prejudice to any party;

(3) Void judgments; and

(4) Whenever circumstances transpire after the finality of the decision rendering its
execution unjust and inequitable. (emphasis added)
As will be discussed below, the third exception is applicable here.

The trial court's

judgment was
void as it granted
respondent's
plea-bargaining �
proposal, sans the
consent and over
the opposition of
the prosecution

Section 2, Rule 116 of the Rules of Court embodies the rule on plea�bargaining,
thus:chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Sec. 2. Plea of guilty to a lesser offense. - At arraignment, the accused, with the
consent of the offended party and the prosecutor, may be allowed by the trial
court to plead guilty to a lesser offense which is necessarily included in the offense
charged. After arraignment but before trial, the accused may still be allowed to plead
guilty to said lesser offense after withdrawing his plea of not guilty. No amendment of
the complaint or information is necessary. (emphasis added)
Verily, the consent of the prosecutor is a condition precedent before an accused may
validly plead guilty to a lesser offense.29 As Associate Justice Rodil V. Zalameda
explained in his Separate Concurring Opinion in Sayre v. Xenos:30The reason for this
is obvious. The prosecutor has full control of the prosecution of criminal
actions. Consequently, it is his duty to always prosecute the proper offense, not any
lesser or graver one, when the evidence in his hands can only sustain the former.

Where the prosecution withholds its consent, the trial court cannot proceed to approve
a plea bargain. There is no meeting of the minds, hence, there can be no plea
bargaining "agreement" to speak of. Should the trial court nevertheless approve the
plea bargain over the prosecution's objection, it would be doing so in grave abuse of
discretion. Justice Zalameda further explained:chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
In choosing to respect the prosecution's discretion to give or withhold consent, the
Court is not surrendering any of its powers. Instead, it is an exercise of sound judicial
restraint. Courts cannot forcefully insist upon any of the parties to plead in accordance
with the Plea Bargaining Framework. To emphasize, when there is no unanimity
between the prosecution and the defense, there is also no plea bargaining
agreement to speak of. If a party refuses to enter a plea in conformity with the Plea
Bargaining Framework, a court commits grave abuse of discretion should it
unduly impose its will on the parties by approving a plea bargain and issuing a
conviction based on the framework.
Grave abuse of discretion is such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is
equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. The abuse must be grave as where the power is
exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility.
It must also be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or to a
virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined by or to act at all in contemplation of law.31

Here, the trial court acted with grave abuse of discretion or without jurisdiction when
despite the vehement objection of the prosecution, it peremptorily, in clear violation of
Section 2, Rule 116 of the Rules of Court, approved respondent's proposal to plead
guilty to the lesser offense of violation of Section 12, RA 9165, in lieu of the original
charge of violation of Section 5 of the same law.

Otherwise stated, the trial court acted without or beyond its jurisdiction when it
rendered the assailed Judgment dated September 12, 2018. Mercury Drug
Corporation v. Sps. Huang teaches that such judgment is actually void, hence, has
no legal or binding effect, thus:32chanrobleslawlibrary
Void judgments produce "no legal [or] binding effect." Hence, they are
deemed non-existent. They may result from the "lack of jurisdiction over the subject
matter" or a lack of jurisdiction over the person of either of the parties. They may also
arise if they were rendered with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction. (emphases added)
Consequently, the Judgment dated September 12, 2018 is void, ineffectual, and could
never lapse into finality.

DOJ Circular
No. 27 does not
encroach upon
�
the rule making
power of the
Court

Another. DOJ Circular No. 027 does not infringe upon the Court's rule making power
under the Constitution. This matter has been categorically resolved in the landmark
ruling of Sayre,33 thus:

In this petition, A.M. No. 18-03-16-SC is a rule of procedure established pursuant to the
rule-making power of the Supreme Court that serves as a framework and guide to the
trial courts in plea bargaining violations of R.A. 9165.

Nonetheless, a plea bargain still requires mutual agreement of the parties and remains
subject to the approval of the court. The acceptance of an offer to plead guilty to a
lesser offense is not demandable by the accused as a matter of right but is a matter
addressed entirely to the sound discretion of the trial court.

Section 2, Rule 116 of the Rules of Court expressly states:

Sec. 2. Plea of guilty to a lesser offense. - At arraignment, the accused, with the
consent of the offended party and the prosecutor, may be allowed by the trial
court to plead guilty to a lesser offense which is necessarily included in the effense
charged. After arraignment but before trial, the accused may still be allowed to plead
guilty to said lesser offense after withdrawing his plea of not guilty. No amendment of
the complaint or information is necessary.

The use of the word "may" signifies that the trial court has discretion whether to allow
the accused to make a plea of guilty to a lesser offense. Moreover, plea bargaining
requires the consent of the accused, offended party, and the prosecutor. It is also
essential that the lesser offense is necessarily included in the offense charged.

Taking into consideration the requirements in pleading guilty to a lesser offense, We

find it proper to treat the refusal of the prosecution to adopt the acceptable
plea bargain for the charge of Illegal Sale of Dangerous Drugs provided in A.M.
No. 18-03-16-SC as a continuing objection that should be resolved by the RTC.
This harmonizes the constitutional provision on the rule making power of the Court
under the Constitution and the nature of plea bargaining in Dangerous Drugs
cases. DOJ Circular No. 27 did not repeal, alter, or modify the Plea Bargaining
Framework in A.M. No. 18-03-16-SC.

Therefore, the DOJ Circular No. 27 provision pertaining to acceptable plea

bargain for Section 5 of R.A. 9165 did not violate the rule-making authority of
the Court. DOJ Circular No. 27 merely serves as an internal guideline for
prosecutors to observe before they may give their consent to proposed plea
bargains. (Emphases added)

This ruling by the Court En Banc further compels the invalidation of the assailed trial
court judgment and its concomitant orders.

ACCORDINGLY, the petition is GRANTED. The Resolutions dated January 28, 2019
and September 17, 2019 in CA-G.R. SP. No. 158342 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
The Judgment dated September 12, 2018 and the concomitant orders of the Regional
Trial Court-Branch 24, Naga City in Criminal Case No. 2016-0935 are VOID for having
been issued in grave abuse of discretion. The trial court is ORDERED to proceed with
the criminal case against respondent Noel Sabater y Ulan with utmost
dispatch.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

SO ORDERED.

Perlas-Bernabe, Senior Associate Justice, (Chairperson), M. Lopez, Rosario, and J.

Lopez,*JJ., concur.chanrobleslawlibrary

Endnotes:

* Designated as additional member per Special Order No. 2822 dated April 7, 2021.

1Penned by Associate Justice Elihu A. Yba�ez and concurred in by Associate Justices

Ma. Luisa Quijano-Padilla and Germano Francisco D. Legaspi; rollo, p. 61.

2Id. at 66.

3Id. at 108.

4Id. at 18.

5Id.

6Id. at 19-20.

7Id. at 68-71.

8Id. at 71-72.

9Id. at 21.

10Id. at 119.

11Id. at 119-120.

12Penned by Associate Justice Elihu A. Yba�ez and concurred in by Associate Justices

Ma. Luisa Quijano-Padilla and Germano Francisco D. Legaspi; id. at 61.

13Id. at 62-63.

14Id. at 66.

15Id. at 50-51.

16Id. at 28.

17Id. at 27-28.

18Id. at 33.

19 816 Phil. 739, 806 (2017).

20Rollo, pp. 35-41.

21Id. at 43-46.

22Id. at 41.

23Id. at 46-48.

24Id. at 116.

25 G.R. No. 250578, September 07, 2020.

26 G.R. No. 249629, March 15, 2021.

27National Housing Authority v. Court of Appeals, 731 Phil. 400, 405 (2014).

28FGU Insurance Corp. v. Regional Trial Court of Makati City, 659 Phil. 117, 123 (2011).

29People vs. Villarama, 285 Phil. 723, 727 (1992).

30 G.R. Nos. 244413 & 244415-16, February 18, 2020.

31Neri v. Yu, G.R. No. 230831, September 05, 2018.

32 817 Phil. 452, 434 (2017).

33 G.R. Nos. 244413 & 244415-16, February 18, 2020. cralawredlibrary