Statistical framework to

measure corruption
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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

This publication was produced by the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC).

UNODC would like to extend its appreciation to the authorities who provided valuable feedback
to this publication:

Anticorruption Office of the Republic of Argentina; Ministry of Justice and Statistics Committee
of the Republic of Armenia; Attorney-General's Department of the Commonwealth of
Australia; Federal Anti-Corruption Bureau of the Republic of Austria; Anti-Corruption
Commission of Republic of Azerbaijan; General Prosecutor Office and National Statistical
Office of Republic of Belarus; Office of Administrative Ethics and Professional Conduct of
Kingdom of Belgium; National Institute of Statistics and Demography of Republic of Benin;
Anticorruption Commission of Kingdom of Bhutan; Ministry of Justice and Institutional
Transparency of the Plurinational State of Bolivia, Department of Assets Recovery and
International Legal Cooperation and Office of the Comptroller General of the Federative
Republic of Brazil; Commission for Combating Corruption of the Republic of Bulgaria;
National Statistical Institute, Prosecutor’s Office, National Revenue Agency and National Audit
Office of the Republic of Bulgaria; Anti-corruption Research and Training Center of Burkina
Faso; National Police and Special Brigade Anti-corruption of the Republic of Burundi; Centre
for Justice and Community Safety Statistics of Canada; National Commission of Supervision,
Ministry of Foreign Affairs and National Commission of Supervision of the People’s Republic
of China; National Administrative Department of Statistics, National Institute of Legal Medicine
and Forensic Sciences and Ministry of Justice and Law and General Attorney Office of the
Republic of Colombia; National Institute of Statistics and Censos of the Republic of Costa
Rica; Ministry of Justice and Human Rights and High Authority for Good Governance of the
Republic of Côte d'Ivoire; Ministry of Justice and Public Administration and Bureau of
Statistics of the Republic of Croatia; Comptroller General of the Republic of the Republic of
Cuba; General Directorate of Ethics and Government Integrity of the Dominican Republic;
Secretary of Anti-Corruption Public Policy, State Attorney General's Office, President’s Office
and National Institute for Statistics and Census of the Republic of Ecuador; Administrative
Control Authority of the Arab Republic of Egypt; National Civil Police of the Republic of El
Salvador; Statistics Finland; Statistical Service of the Republic of Ghana; National
Transparency Authority of the Hellenic Republic of Greece; National Protective Service of
Hungary; Central Vigilance Commission of the Republic of India; Ministry of Justice of the
Islamic Republic of Iran; Ministry of Justice and Central Bureau of Statistics of the State of
Israel; National Institute of Statistics, Anticorruption Authority and National School of
Administration of the Republic of Italy; Integrity Commission of Jamaica; Ministry of Foreign
Affairs of Japan; Integrity and Anti-corruption Commission of the Hashemite Kingdom of
Jordan; Anti-Corruption Agency and National Statistics Bureau of the Republic of
Kazakhstan; Public Prosecution, Ethics and Anti-Corruption Commission and National Bureau
of Statistics of the Republic of Kenya; Anticorruption Authority of State of Kuwait; Ministry of
Foreign Affairs of the Principality of Liechtenstein; Special Investigation Service of the
Republic of Lithuania; Committee to Safeguard Integrity of the Republic of Madagascar;
Police Force and National Statistical Office of the Republic of Malta; Independent Commission
Against Corruption of the Republic of Mauritius; National Institute of Statistics and Geography
and Ministry of Public Administration of Mexico; Anticorruption Prosecutor and National Anti-
Corruption Centre of Moldova; Independent Authority Against Corruption of Mongolia;
National Authority for Probity, Prevention and Fight against Corruption of the Kingdom of
Morocco; Anti-Corruption Commission Office of the Republic of the Union of Myanmar;
Ministry of Justice of the Republic of Namibia; National Accountability Bureau of the Islamic
Republic of Pakistan; Central Bureau of Statistics of Palestine; Senior Anti-Corruption
Prosecutor of the Republic of Panama; National Anticorruption Secretariat of the Republic of
Paraguay; Undersecretary of Strategic Management of Public Integrity of the Republic of
Peru; Department of Justice of the Republic of Philippines; National Prosecutor’s Office of
the Republic of Poland; Statistics Portugal; Anticorruption Agency of State of Qatar; Ministry
of Justice and National Anticorruption Directorate of Romania; General Prosecutor Office and
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation; Oversight and Anti-Corruption Authority
of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia; Agency for Prevention of Corruption, Ministry of Interior and
Prosecutors Office of the Republic of Serbia; Anti-Corruption Commission of the Republic of
Seychelles; Ministry of Justice and Corruption Prevention Department and Statistical Office
of the Slovak Republic; Anti-Corruption and Civil Rights Commission of South Korea;
Department of Statistical System of Criminality and Victims of the Kingdom of Spain;
Commission to Investigate Allegations of Bribery of Corruption and Department of Census and
Statistics of Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka; Federal Statistical Office of the Swiss
Confederation; Agency for State Financial Control and Combating Corruption of the Republic
of Tajikistan; National Anti-Corruption Commission of Kingdom of Thailand; Ministry of
Justice, Statistical Institute and Personal Data Protection Authority of Türkiye; Joint
Anticorruption Unit, United Kingdom; National Agency on Corruption Prevention and Anti-
Corruption Prosecutor's Office of Ukraine; United States Department of State and U.S.
Bureau of Justice Statistics; Anti-Corruption Commission of the Republic of Zimbabwe.

UNODC also acknowledges with gratitude the contribution of the following experts who
provided valuable input concerning the content of the publication: Mihaly Fazekas
(Government Transparency Institute); Jesper Johnson, Rusudan Mikhelidze and Sara Sultan
Balbuena (Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development); Irina Sokolova and
Janithrika Jayasundara (Transparency International); Rajen Bablee (Transparency Mauritius);
Sofia Selkämaa (University of Helsinki); Isam Haj Hussein (Coalition for Accountability and
Integrity); Sofie Arjon Schütte (U4 Anti-Corruption Resource Centre); Jerg Gutmann
(University of Hamburg), Samantha Feinstein (Government Accountability Project), Joy
D’Angelo and Richard E. Messick. UNODC wishes to acknowledge Alina Mungiu Pippidi
(Hertie School of Government) and Roberto Martinez B. Kukutschka (Transparency
International) as the leading authors of the conceptual framework of this document.

The publication was prepared under the supervision of Angela Me, Chief of the UNODC
Research and Analysis Branch and benefited from the valuable input of Salome Flores Sierra
Franzoni, UNODC Information Centre, Stefanie Holling and Zorana Markovic from UNODC’s
Corruption and Economic Branch, Mayra Carolina Lemus Way, and Roberto Murguia Huerta,
UNODC INEGI Center of Excellence.

This document has not been formally edited.

Table of contents
b.7 Preventive measures for the
private sector ................................. 23
What is this framework? .......................... 2
b.8 Preventive measures for state-
How was this framework developed? ...... 2 owned enterprises ......................... 24
How is this framework useful? ................. 2 b.9 Training programs .................... 25
How can Member States use this c) Enabling environment to report
framework? ............................................ 2 and address corruption ..................... 26
Which authorities can use this framework? c.1 Resources allocated to fighting
.............................................................. 2 corruption ...................................... 26
How to collect data to measure c.2 Public reporting and access to
corruption? ............................................. 3 information .................................... 27
Why did UNODC develop this framework? c.3 Reporting and protection of
.............................................................. 4 reporting persons ........................... 28
What is the relationship between this End notes ............................................ 29
framework and the Implementation Review
Mechanism? ........................................... 5
Is this framework going to be used to rank
countries? .............................................. 5
How will UNODC support countries in
using this framework? ............................. 5
Conceptual framework ............................ 6
Statistical Framework to measure
corruption ............................................. 10
a) Criminal offenses under UNCAC 10
a.1 Bribery of national public officials
...................................................... 10
a.2 Embezzlement , misappropriation,
or diversion of property or public funds
...................................................... 12
a.3 Money laundering ..................... 13
a.4 Illicit enrichment ....................... 15
a.5 Abuse of functions .................... 16
b) Preventive measures ................ 17
b.1 Public hiring based on merit...... 17
b.2. Independence and integrity of the
judiciary ......................................... 18
b.3 Conflict of interest .................... 19
b.4 Management of public finances. 20
b.5 Public Procurement .................. 21
b.6 Candidature for and election to
public office .................................... 22

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What is this framework? baselines to grasp corruption and monitor their
ongoing efforts to address it over time.
The framework is an ambitious set of
indicators that requires a holistic national How can Member States use this
system of statistical and non-statistical framework?
sources that probably does not exist in its
entirety in any country, but similarly to the SDG
Countries are not anticipated to report data
indicators framework, the objective is to offer
based on this framework; instead, they are
countries a reference frame to guide national
efforts to develop national information systems encouraged to utilize it as a tool to gradually
on corruption. collect, analyze and use relevant data on
corruption at the national and subnational
levels to inform and monitor their policies.
How was this framework developed?

It is the result of two global consultations Which authorities can use this
hosted by UNODC in December 2022 and framework?
November 2023. During these consultations,
experts appointed by Member States Collecting relevant data to measure corruption
exchanged their national experiences on is a shared responsibility involving various
corruption measurement, discussed the stakeholders including:
dimensions to measure corruption, and finally
provided the last review of the framework. 1. National statistical offices.
These consultations also included other They are responsible for collecting,
stakeholders from international organizations, compiling, and disseminating official
think tanks, academia and civil society. More
statistics on various topics including
than 200 national experts participated.
corruption. Some conduct population and
In total, 149 entities from 81 Member States business surveys to measure the
provided written feedback, including 25 perceptions of corruption and the
national statistical offices, 56 anti-corruption prevalence of bribery. They are
authorities, 25 criminal justice authorities, responsible for reporting progress on
ministries, think tanks, academia, and civil Sustainable Development Goals indicators
society organizations. 16.5.1 and 16.5.2.

2. National Anti-Corruption Agencies:

How is this framework useful? Many countries have dedicated anti-
corruption commissions or agencies
Given that measuring corruption is a complex
responsible for implementing and
and gradual task that cannot rely on a single
monitoring National Anticorruption policies
indicator, the framework comprises 145
and preventing corruption.
indicators. Throughout consultations, Member
States and other stakeholders deliberated on
3. Ethics Commissions:
the relevance and feasibility of each indicator.
These commissions or similar bodies are
responsible for promoting ethical conduct
This extensive set of indicators enables
in public service. These entities may
countries to gain a profound understanding of
collect data on ethical violations, including
the extent of corruption and to monitor the
corruption-related misconduct.
effectiveness of preventive policies. Although
indicators within the framework are not
4. Public Procurement Units:
exhaustive, collecting and analyzing them can
Agencies or administrative units
help countries in establishing comprehensive
responsible for overseeing public

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 procurement processes may collect data patterns, trends, and indicators of
on corrupt practices related to government corruption, assess the effectiveness of anti-
contracts, bidding processes, and corruption measures, and formulate
procurement transactions. evidence-based policies and strategies to
combat corruption effectively.

How to collect data to measure

5. Financial Regulatory Authorities:
corruption?
Agencies overseeing financial institutions
and transactions, such as central banks, Integrating different data sources can provide
financial regulatory bodies and financial valuable insights. A general approach to
intelligence units may collect data on integration can follow these steps:
suspicious financial activities and
transactions related to corruption. 1 Coordination. It's important for all relevant
agencies to coordinate their data collection
6. Customs and Border Control Agencies: efforts and share information to build a more
Agencies responsible for customs and comprehensive and accurate picture of
border control may collect data on corruption, its associated risks and the
corruption related to smuggling, bribery at government’s response within a country,
border crossings, and other illicit activities. according to the indicators in this statistical
framework. Ideally, countries could establish a
7. Tax Authorities: mechanism to ensure maximum coordination,
Tax agencies may gather data on tax discuss measurement priorities and indicators,
evasion, fraudulent financial activities, and agree on definitions and methodologies, and
corrupt practices related to tax collection. establish sharing arrangements. A custodian
of a unified database or platform should also
8. Law Enforcement Agencies: be defined. National Statistical Offices are
Police and other law enforcement impartial and have the technical capacity and
agencies are often involved in infrastructure to fulfil this role. However, if
investigating and prosecuting corruption there are constraints on the implementation of
cases. They collect data related to the data collection and follow-up analysis,
corruption allegations, investigations, other arrangements and partnerships should
arrests, and legal proceedings. be explored.

9. Auditing Agencies 2. Data collection. The sources from which

Government auditing bodies, such as the data will be collected should be identified in
national audit office or inspector general, advance and data should be gathered in
may collect data related to financial accordance with the indicators that have been
irregularities, misuse of public funds, and agreed upon in advance. These sources can
other corrupt practices through their audit include administrative records from different
processes. institutions, national survey data or any other
secondary sources. It is important to ensure
10. Judicial Bodies: the use of common definitions and units of
Courts and judicial bodies may collect data measurement to ensure consistency and
on corruption cases, convictions, and legal
accuracy in data collection procedures. The
outcomes related to corruption charges.
data collection process should be documented
By systematically collecting and analyzing comprehensively as documentation enhances
administrative records from all these transparency.
agencies, Member States can identify

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3. Data validation. Data should be checked for trends that may indicate corruption. Due
errors, missing data, anomalies, and caution must be exercised, however, as the
inconsistencies to maintain data quality. In this use of technology is only possible if the
phase, government agencies should verify that datasets are standardized, clean, and contain
data is complete, that there are no missing enough data points to apply robust analytical
values or gaps, and that data is consistent and techniques.
does not contain contradictory information.
Identifying and eliminating duplicate records or 8. Dissemination. In this phase, data should be
entries is also part of this phase. Data made available to users in a usable and
validation ensures that the dataset is accurate accessible format. The easiest way to
and reliable before analysis. disseminate data is through a centralized
online platform that allows access to datasets
4. Data integration. Data from multiple sources and metadata. Platforms should also offer at
should be combined into a single database or least some basic visualization functionalities
platform. There are different techniques for and analytical tools.
integrating data; some involve extracting data
from existing source systems, while others 9. Continuous monitoring. Corruption is
involve loading data into a target system. The dynamic and may evolve over time. Data
choice of the most appropriate technique collection and monitoring should be an
should consider existing capacities and ongoing activity to assess the effectiveness of
resources. Data can only be integrated when anti-corruption measures and to identify
similar rules are used when recording it. This emerging trends.
involves using identification codes, definitions
and variables that standardize data collection By systematically following these steps,
and enable data integration. national authorities can collect high-quality
data that is reliable, valid, and conducive to
5. Analysis and interpretation. Once the data generating valuable insights to fight corruption,
is ready for analysis, an expert inter- promote accountability, promote fairness, and
institutional group should analyze the key ultimately improve the well-being of societies.
indicators and decide how best to organize
and visualize the key findings. This group Why did UNODC develop this
should also provide explanations of the framework?
patterns, trends, and relationships between
the different indicators in each dimension, as Since 2013, UNODC has promoted a road map
well as their implications for decision making to improve the quality and availability of crime
or policy development. and criminal justice statistics
(E/CN.3/2013/11). The 2013 roadmap
6. Confidentiality and security. Sensitive data acknowledged corruption among those
should be handled responsibly, ensuring the emerging and difficult-to-measure crimes that
privacy and security of individuals and demanded additional methodological
organizations involved. Compliance with development since its measurement
relevant data protection regulations is presented major weaknesses often based on
essential. indirect or perception-based methodology
without a consolidated approach to produce
7. Use of technology. Technologies such as reliable and standardized measurements, and
data mining, machine learning, and natural a lack of commonly agreed statistical
language processing should be leveraged to concepts, methods, tools, and indicators.
efficiently analyze large data sets. These tools
can help identify patterns, anomalies, and

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UNODC is also the custodian agency of SDG What is the relationship between this
indicators 16.5.1 and 16.5.2 which measure framework and the Implementation
the prevalence of bribery i in households and Review Mechanism?
businesses. UNODC and UNDP produced the
Manual on Corruption Surveys: This Statistical Framework does not intend to
Methodological Guidelines on the replace or substitute the Mechanism for the
Measurement of Bribery and Other Forms of Review of Implementation of UNCAC. On the
contrary, the indicators of the Statistical
Corruption through Sample Surveys which
Framework may contribute to add a statistical
provides technical guidance to measure types perspective to the findings of the Mechanism.
of corruption.
If a Member State collects data and measures
Furthermore, the Conference of the States different aspects of corruption or has
Parties (CoSP) to the United Nations developed a national statistical system for its
Convention against Corruption adopted measurement based on this statistical
resolution 8/10 entitled “Measurement of framework, the indicators produced may be
Corruption” and requested UNODC “to used to inform the Implementation Review
Mechanism and contribute to the assessment
continue expert-level consultations on
of the effectiveness of anti-corruption efforts.
identifying and refining methodologies on the
issue of the measurement of corruption in Is this framework going to be used to
order to develop proposals on a rank countries?
comprehensive, scientifically sound and
objective framework for the purpose of The Statistical Framework is intended purely
assisting States Parties, upon their request, in for domestic use by Member States as a tool
measuring corruption, consistent with the to support their adoption of knowledge-based
Convention”. anti-corruption measures. It does not aim to
create any sort of ranking or compare levels of
The special session of the General Assembly corruption among States, and it will not be
against corruption (UNGASS), in 2021, used as a tool by the United Nations to assess
adopted the political declaration “Our common the implementation of the United Nations
commitment to effectively addressing Convention against Corruption.
challenges and implementing measures to
prevent and combat corruption and strengthen How will UNODC support countries in
international cooperation”. It encouraged using this framework?
UNODC, in coordination with the UN Statistical
Commission and in broad cooperation across UNODC can facilitate knowledge sharing and
the United Nations system, to develop and coordination among relevant stakeholders in
share a comprehensive, scientifically sound the adoption of this framework, including by
and objective statistical framework, grounded sharing relevant metadata for each indicator
in methodological work and reliable data describing the key definitions and concepts
sources, to support States in their efforts to associated with each indicator, units of
measure corruption, its impact and all relevant measurement, data sources, data collection
aspects of preventing and combating it, in methods, calculation methods and proposed
order to inform and strengthen evidence- disaggregation.
based anti-corruption policies and strategies,
consistent with the Convention against Corruption is not a static phenomenon and
Corruption. there may be other, new forms of corruption,
so the framework may be reviewed and
adapted in the future if deemed necessary.

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Conceptual framework
The statistical framework to measure
The146 indicators that form the Statistical corruption is presented in a table that contains
Framework to measure corruption consider the a list of indicators that relate to different forms
complexity of corruption by looking at the of corruption and to distinguish between direct
different dimensions of corruption together or indirect measures.
with elements that can describe it.
Direct measures assess the prevalence of
The Framework is constructed through a table
with different dimensions: specific types of corruption, particularly bribery
or in other words, the percentage of the
• types of corruption (based on the United population or businesses that have
Nations Convention against Corruption) experienced bribery when dealing with public
and type of measurement: officials. Estimating the prevalence of bribery
• perception, output/direct measures by type of public official and sector provides
(experience of corruption), and guidance on where to focus preventive
• indirect measures (risks and measures. These indicators can typically be
responses). produced through population and business
surveys, and they are robust, accurate and
The types of corruption considered in the
framework are based on the United Nations representative if statistical designs of the
Convention against Corruption, and include surveys are representative of the whole
the following aspects, which were included for population. The challenge in the
their potential to generate data: implementation of these surveys is that they
are usually expensive and not always easy
a) Criminal offences under UNCAC. and sustainable to conduct repeatedly.
Measuring corruption directly is often not
a.1 Bribery of national public officials possible due to the context and the nature of
a.2 Embezzlement, misappropriation, or other the sector. For example, if a sector is by its
diversion of property by a public official
nature hidden from the public (e.g. due to the
a.3 Money-laundering
a.4 Illicit enrichment subject matter, such as defense or national
a.5 Abuse of functions security, or because it involved personal data)
direct measurement through a survey would
b) Preventive measures not help to reveal the true scale of corruption
because the public would have no direct
b.1 Public hiring based on merit experience to report.
b.2 Independence and integrity of the judiciary
b.3 Conflict of interest Indirect measures: Due to the elusive nature
b.4 Management of public finances
of corruption and the challenge to collect data
b.5 Public procurement
to measure it directly, indirect measures are
b.6 Candidature for and election to public
office included in the framework: while not
b.7 Preventive measures for the private sector measuring corruption per se, they can
b.8 Preventive measures for the state-owned measure elements that may enable or deter
enterprises corruption. The following indirect measures
b.9 Training programs are considered:

c) Enabling environment to report and • Perception indicators. The

address corruption measurement of the perception of
corruption may include a broad range of
c.1 Resources allocated to fight corruption
attitudes and beliefs (for example
c.2 Public reporting and access to information
c.3 Protection of reporting persons regarding conflict of interest, abuse of

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 power, embezzlement of public funds, Another example of a constraint indicator
etc.). Perception indicators may be is the proportion of persons or business
influenced by a variety of subjective that report bribery to the competent
factors that may not be directly linked to authorities, as this shows their willingness
the prevalence of corruption, such as to take a stand against corruption and
culture, mass communication, and values. contribute to the fight against this
Therefore, perception-based measures corrosive phenomenon.
are not suitable to monitor corruption
levels and trends but can help to examine • Response indicators. As risk varies
the trends and scope of the relationship across societies so does the State
between direct experience of corruption, response. For instance, some countries
general perception, trust in public have resources concentrated in few
agencies. Measuring perception of institutions or lower oversight in certain
corruption together with indicators on sectors, which provide higher
direct experience of corruption can opportunities for corruption. The response
provide an understanding of the gap indicators are indirect measures because
between the perception and the corruption they do not measure the occurrence of
experienced by the surveyed populations. corruption, but how the State responds to
it through:
• Risk indicators. These measures • legislative initiatives (classified in
provide information on possible existing or the framework as de jure), and
non-existing infrastructures and • criminal justice actions or other
procedures that increase or decrease the actions that target corruption
risk of corruption, rather than the perpetrators (classified in the
occurrence of corruption itself. Risk framework as de facto response).
indicators measure the context that can
enable corruption. They are useful to map Response indicators measure a mix of
the different types of corruption and to trends in the capacity and concrete
understand the context in which these response to combat corruption. They are
occur. The risk depends on the capacity of labelled as indirect rather than direct
a State to prevent public officials, private measures because they do not clearly
sector entities and individuals from inform on the level of corruption.
committing corruption. Where this
capacity is low, corruption risk is high. The de jure category can be further
Measuring opportunities or risks quantified using a benchmark (For
(circumstances that enable corruption) example, comprehensiveness of bribery
and constraints (circumstances that deter regulation, for instance) and the
corruption) is important for policy makers measurement of each country against it.
to identify existing risks as well as
possible measures for addressing them. A The de jure and the de facto measures are
State with moderate to low constraints separated because the evidence shows
may still manage to control corruption if that important implementation gaps exist,
opportunities remain low. For example, and countries with the most comprehensive
measuring the proportion of persons who regulation are not necessarily the least
interact with government through digital corrupt or the ones that improve the most.
platforms rather than directly contact with
public officials can be useful in assessing
the extent to which e-government
constrain discretionary decision-making.

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How to explain indicators? national experts, the indicators were
chosen for their potential to produce
The indicators included in the framework are concrete data and therefore be measured.
not to be used in isolation. The qualitative analysis of preventive
measures remains subject to review under
The framework is designed to measure the Implementation Review Mechanism.
different criminal offenses, such as bribery,
money laundering or illicit enrichment, among • Indicators as analytical categories.
others and to combine them with other Indicators use selected offences of
indicators as alone, each indicator may give corruption under the United Nations
partial or biased information. Convention against Corruption, thus
allowing for the assessment of different
For example, a high level of convictions for manifestations of corruption . Bribery,
corruption may mean a high level of corruption embezzlement and money-laundering as
or a high level of state response to corruption. mandatory offences that potentially
Considering this indicator in combination with generate the most data were chosen as
indicators on the level of bribery experience by the three primary offences. In addition,
citizens gives a more complete picture: high illicit enrichment and abuse of functions
bribery levels with low conviction rates suggest can be measured whether the underlying
a high level of corruption with a low state behaviour has been criminalized, by
response while low a level of bribery with a including indicators for administrative
high level of convictions indicates a low rather than criminal justice action.
incidence of corruption with a high level of
state response. Each type of corruption, say, bribery, is thus
monitored by perception, direct
How to read these indicators? measurements and indirect indicators, the
latter including also measures for enabling
and mitigating context, for the legal response
The framework can be used by combining the
and the de facto response. Implementation
different categories.
gaps can be calculated between the de jure
response and the de facto one. When duly
• Types of measures as analytical filled in, the framework will provide, in one
categories. Reading the framework by glance, a better picture of the prevalence of a
type of measure (direct or indirect) specific type of corruption (through
captures the analytic building blocks that measurements), as well as an overview of the
describe corruption, the factors that enable disabling and enabling circumstances.
it and the capacity to deter it. These
building blocks provide the space to The ensemble of the framework indicators and
integrate different types of measurement enabling and disabling factors for corruption
(direct, indirect), while also monitoring the can be measured at national, subnational and
relevant risks based on enabling and sector level, as each sector adds its own
mitigating circumstances for corruption, specificity and risks. This allows for a highly
i.e., the opportunities and constraints, as adaptable framework that can be replicated at
well as the official legal and law the sub-national or sectoral level depending on
enforcement responses. The rows related the context of each user and country.
to Risks and Responses describe some
specific elements of the preventive anti- However, the national context and legal
corruption policies and practices framework remains present in each and every
mentioned in chapter II of UNCAC. After sector, as it is the national level which shapes
global consultations with international and the primary legal and policy formulation

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against corruption. Differences may be found positions of decision-making and power where
at geographical level, e.g., types of corruption opportunities of corruption are generally more
or corruption risks may vary between cities, present.
and sectors.
A quarter of a century later, anti-corruption and
The gender dimension in measuring gender equality measures are considered to
corruption be mutually reinforcing, as diversity tends to
act as a corruption prevention measure as it
The relationship between corruption and can break up collusive networks. Bringing a
gender has increasingly been explored since gender perspective into corruption
the early days of the millennium. Initial measurement is important to fully understand
research looked into the impact of women's how corruption could affect different groups
political participation on the prevalence of within society due to existing social norms,
corruption and found that countries with higher power dynamics and unequal access to
representation of women in public resources. The starting point is the collection
administration and in the labour market show of disaggregated data to capture gender-
lower levels of corruption. specific perceptions, experiences, disparities
and barriers between groups.
However, since then, findings indicate that
women are not necessarily less prone to
corruption but have less agency and access to

Dimensions of the statistical framework to measure corruption.

DIRECT MEASURES:
How much corruption, prevention and enabling environment is there?

Different RESPONSE:
PERCEPTION: RISK:
elements and how much What is the scale of
dimensions corruption is How high are the risks of
government response to
associated with perceived? corruption?
address corruption?
corruption

INDIRECT
MEASURES
De Jure
De Facto
How many How many What is the
What is the
opportunties constraints for regulation in
response of
for corruption corruption are place to
criminal
are there? there? prevent and
justice to
fight
corruption?
corruption?

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Statistical Framework to measure corruption 2

Components of the statistical framework to measure corruption 3

a) Criminal offenses under UNCAC 4

Dimension a.1 Bribery of national public officials 5 (Art. 15 UNCAC)

a.1.1 Prevalence of bribery in dealings with public officials 6 among the population
Proportion of persons who had at least one contact with a public official and who paid a bribe (gave a public official money, a
gift or counter favour) to a public official, or were asked for a bribe by those public officials, during the previous 12 mon ths 7
Disaggregated by function of public official, sex of the person and the public official

a.1.2 Prevalence of bribery in dealings with public officials among businesses

Direct measure Proportion of businesses who had at least one contact with a public official and who paid a bribe (gave a public official
money, a gift or counter favour) to a public official or were asked for a bribe by those public officials, during the previou s 12
months

a.1.3 Total monetary value (in US Dollars) of bribes paid by all people during the previous 12 months.
Disaggregated by function of the public official and sex

a.1.4 Perception of corruption in the public sector 8

Proportion of persons who perceive that the public sector is corrupt 9
Perception
Disaggregated by age, sex and by government branches (e.g., executive, legislative and judiciary) and by
government level (e.g., national, local) and sector
OPPORTUNITIES N/A
(Circumstances
that enable
Indirect Measures corruption)
a.1.5 E-Government 10 coverage
Proportion of persons who engaged in at least one public service delivery and who did so
Risk
CONSTRAINTS using a digital platform
(Circumstances Disaggregated by sex, age, and type of procedure
that may deter a.1.6 Reporting bribery in dealings with public officials among the
corruption) population/business.
Proportion of people/businesses who reported a case to competent authorities in the last
12 months
Response DE JURE a.1.7 Criminalization of bribery

10 | P a g e
(Regulation) Comprehensive criminalization of bribery under national legislation, in line with Article 15
of UNCAC
a.1.8 Comprehensive definition of public official. All public officials should be covered
by national legislation, in line with Article 2 of UNCAC
a.1.9 Bribery detection
Total number of actual or suspected bribes brought to the attention of relevant authorities
in the last 12 months
a.1.10 Bribery investigation 11
Total number of persons under criminal investigation for bribery recorded in a given year
divided by the total population in the same year, multiplied by 100,000
Disaggregated by sex
a.1.11 Bribery prosecution 12
Total number of persons prosecuted for bribery recorded in a given year divided by the
DE FACTO total population in the same year, multiplied by 100,000
(Implementation) Disaggregated by sex
a.1.12 Bribery conviction 13
Total number of persons convicted for bribery recorded in a given year divided by the total
population in the same year, multiplied by 100,000
Disaggregated by sex
a.1.13 Assets recovered from bribery
Total amount of assets recovered 14 from bribery convictions
a.1.14 Total number of administrative sanctions (such as disciplinary measures for
public officials or debarment of companies from public procurement) recorded in a given
year
Disaggregated by sex

11 | P a g e
Dimension a.2 Embezzlement 15, misappropriation, or diversion 16 of property or public funds (Art. 17 UNCAC)

Direct measure N/A

N/A
Perception
OPPORTUNITIES a.2.1 Discretional allocation
(Circumstances Proportion of total government budget that can be allocated outside the formal budget
that enable approval process
corruption)
Risk
CONSTRAINTS a.2.2 Misused public funds identified
(Circumstances Monetary value of irregularities ruled by the Supreme Audit Institution as a share of the
that may deter total audited 17 public budget
corruption) a.2.3 Frequency of audits
Number of planned and ad hoc audits conducted in the last 12 months
a.2.4 Criminalization of embezzlement, misappropriation or diversion of property or
public funds
Criminalization of embezzlement, misappropriation or diversion of property or public funds
DE JURE
in the national legislation, in line with article 17 of UNCAC
(Regulation)
a.2.5 Regulations on management of resources
Indirect Measures Regulatory framework with a clear separation of duties and responsibilities of public
officials in charge of managing resources
a.2.6 Embezzlement, misappropriation, or diversion investigation
Total number of persons under investigation for engaging in embezzlement,
misappropriation, or diversion recorded in a given year divided by the total population in
the same year, multiplied by 100,000
Response
Disaggregated by sex
a.2.7 Embezzlement, misappropriation, or diversion prosecution
Total number of persons prosecuted for embezzlement, misappropriation, or diversion
DE FACTO
recorded in a given year divided by the total population in the same year, multiplied by
(Implementation)
100,000
Disaggregated by sex
a.2.8 Embezzlement, misappropriation, or diversion conviction
Rate of persons convicted engaging in embezzlement, misappropriation, or diversion
recorded in a given year divided by the total population in the same year, multiplied by
100,000
Disaggregated by sex
a.2.9 Assets recovered from embezzlement, misappropriation, or diversion

12 | P a g e
 Total amount of assets recovered from embezzlement, misappropriation, or diversion
convictions or proceedings
a.2.10 Total number of administrative sanctions for embezzlement, misappropriation, or
diversion recorded in a given year

a.3 Money laundering (UNCAC art.14)

Dimension

N/A
Direct measure
a.3.1 Perception of corruption in the financial system
Perception Proportion of persons who perceive that the financial system is corrupt
Disaggregated by sector (e.g. banking system, real estate, customs)
OPPORTUNITIES N/A
(Circumstances
that enable
corruption)
a.3.2 Addressing risk gaps
Risk Number of gaps that have been addressed since the last evaluation by an international
CONSTRAINTS peer review body or since national risk assessment
(Circumstances a.3.3 Supervision on AML regulatory framework
that may deter Number of supervisory activities conducted regarding institutions obliged under AML
corruption) framework
a.3.4 Freezing transactions
Indirect Measures Number of transactions frozen
a.3.5 Criminalization of money laundering and predicate offenses in the national
legislation as per Article 14 of UNCAC
a.3.6 Beneficial ownership transparency
Access by financial institutions and relevant authorities to accurate and up-to-date
information on the ultimate beneficial owner
DE JURE
a.3.7 Regulation on anonymous cash transactions
(Regulation)
a.3.8 Regulation on virtual assets
Response
Virtual asset service providers are licensed, registered and subject to supervision
a.3.9 Information sharing mechanisms
Existing information sharing mechanisms to exchange information across relevant
institutions
a.3.10 Suspicious transactions
DE FACTO
Number of suspicious transactions registered by the financial intelligence unit in a calendar
(Implementation)
year
a.3.11 Money laundering investigation

13 | P a g e
Total number of persons under investigation for engaging in money laundering recorded in
a given year divided by the total population in the same year, multiplied by 100,000
Disaggregated by sex
a.3.12 Money laundering prosecution
Total number of persons prosecuted for money laundering recorded in a given year divided
by the total population in the same year, multiplied by 100,000
Disaggregated by sex
a.3.13 Money laundering conviction
Rate of persons convicted engaging in money laundering recorded in a given year divided
by the total population in the same year, multiplied by 100,000.
Disaggregated by sex
a.3.14 Money laundering administrative sanctions
Number of legal entities sanctioned for engaging in money laundering recorded in a given
year
Disaggregated by sex
a.3.15 Assets recovered from money laundering
Total amount of assets recovered from money laundering convictions or proceedings

14 | P a g e
 a.4 Illicit enrichment 18
(Art. 20 UNCAC)
Dimension

a.4.1 Income declaration

Direct measure
Proportion of public officials whose assets cannot be explained 19
Perception N/A
OPPORTUNITIES N/A
(Circumstances
that enable
corruption)
Risk CONSTRAINTS a.4.2 Asset and interest disclosure of public officials
(Circumstances Existence of accessible and up-to-date registries or databases on bank accounts, and luxury
that may deter assets (e.g.real estate, vehicles).
corruption) a.4.3 Existence of a control body to monitor, validate and enforce asset and interest
disclosures of public officials
DE JURE a.4.4 Financial disclosure regime Existence of regulation on wealth disclosure for public
(Regulation) officials (including real state and vehicles)
a.4.5 Illicit enrichment inquiries
Total number of inquiries by control bodies regarding public officials potentially engaging in
illicit enrichment
Indirect
Measures a.4.6 Illicit enrichment investigation
Total number of persons under investigation for engaging in illicit enrichment recorded in a
given year divided by the total population in the same year, multiplied by 100,000
Disaggregated by sex
a.4.7 Illicit enrichment prosecution
Response Total number of persons prosecuted for illicit enrichment recorded in a given year divided by
DE FACTO
the total population in the same year, multiplied by 100,000.
(Implementation)
Disaggregated by sex
a.4.8 Illicit enrichment conviction
Total number of public officials convicted for engaging in illicit enrichment divided by the total
population in the same year, multiplied by 100,000
Disaggregated by sex
a.4.9 Assets recovered from illicit enrichment
Total amount of assets recovered from illicit enrichment convictions or proceedings
a.4.10 Total number of administrative sanctions for illicit enrichment recorded in a given
year
Disaggregated by sex

15 | P a g e
 a.5 Abuse of functions 20 (Art. 19 UNCAC)
Dimension

N/A
Direct measure

Perception N/A
OPPORTUNITIES N/A
(Circumstances
that enable
corruption)
a.5.1 Mechanisms to assess risk of corruption in vulnerable positions.
Risk CONSTRAINTS
Existence of a mechanism to assess risks of corruption in vulnerable positions
(Circumstances
a.5.2 Mandatory training.
that may deter
Percentage of public officials that have received mandatory training on integrity and ethics in
corruption)
relation of the total numbers of public officials in the last 12 months
Disaggregated by sex
DE JURE a.5.3 Effective sanctions
Indirect (Regulation) Existence of effective criminal or administrative sanctions for abuse of functions
Measures a.5.4 Abuse of functions investigation
Total number of persons under investigation for abuse of functions recorded in a given year
divided by the total population in the same year, multiplied by 100,000
Disaggregated by sex
a.5.5 Abuse of functions prosecution
Total number of persons prosecuted for abuse of functions recorded in a given year divided
by the total population in the same year, multiplied by 100,000
Response
DE FACTO Disaggregated by sex
(Implementation) a.5.6 Abuse of functions conviction
Total number of persons convicted for abuse of functions recorded in a given year divided by
the total population in the same year, multiplied by 100,000
Disaggregated by sex
a.5.7 Assets recovered from abuse of functions
Total amount of assets recovered from abuse of functions convictions or proceedings
a.5.8. Total number of administrative sanctions for abuse of functions recorded in a given
year
Disaggregated by sex

16 | P a g e
 b) Preventive measures

Dimension b.1 Public hiring based on merit (Art. 7(1)(2) UNCAC)

Direct measure b.1.1 Open recruitment

Proportion of public sector employees appointed without an open and competitive recruitment process in the past 12 months
Disaggregated by sex

b.1.2. Use of personal connections to obtain public employment

Percentage of public officials that perceive that public officials influence the hiring of friends or relatives in the
Perception
public sector
Disaggregated by sex
OPPORTUNITIES b.1.3 Non-competitive recruitment
(Circumstances Proportion of open recruitments for public sector positions with just one candidate
that enable
corruption)
Risk b.1.4 Existence of a complaint mechanism for rejected candidates
CONSTRAINTS
(Circumstances
b.1.5 Positions vulnerable to corruption
Indirect that may deter
Number of recruitments of positions vulnerable to corruption that followed a risk assessment
Measures corruption)
criterion in the last 12 months
b.1.6 Public service 21 regime
DE JURE Existence of laws and guidelines for merit-based recruitment in the public sector based on
(Regulation) pre-set criteria
b.1.7 Transparency in recruitment procedures
Publicly available procedures around hiring, promotion, retirement, and dismissal, as well as
Response
salary scales
b.1.8 Irregular hiring processes
DE FACTO Number of public sector appointments reverted due to irregularities in the hiring process per
(Implementation) 1,000 recruitments in the last 12 months
b.1.9 Number of complaints to appeal mechanisms regarding recruitment in the last 12
months

17 | P a g e
Dimension b.2. Independence and integrity 22 of the judiciary (Art. 11 UNCAC)

b.2.1 Judicial ethics 23 Number of admonishments for magistrates on ethical grounds in the past 12 months
Direct measure
b.2.2 Number of successful motions against a judge’s refusal to recuse from a case in the last 12 months
b.2.3 Perception of corruption in the judiciary
Perception Proportion of persons who perceive that the judiciary is corrupt
Disaggregated by sex
b.2.4 Perception of corruption in public prosecution offices
Perception Proportion of persons who perceive that prosecutors are corrupt
Disaggregated by sex
OPPORTUNITIES
(Circumstances that N/A
enable corruption)
b.2.5 Transparency
Proportion of court proceedings that were public in the past 12 months
Risk CONSTRAINTS
b.2.6 Randomization
(Circumstances that
Proportion of case files that were randomly assigned in the past 12 months
may deter
b.2.7 Mandatory training
corruption)
Percentage of judges and prosecutors that have received training on ethics and integrity in
Indirect
relation to the total number of public officials in the last 12 months
Measures
Disaggregated by sex
DE JURE b.2.8 Institutional reporting
(Regulation) Existence of annual public reporting on integrity problems in the judiciary
b.2.9 Ethical and integrity-related dismissal
Proportion of judges or prosecutors dismissed on the grounds of ethics and integrity
breaches
Disaggregated by sex
b.2.10 Number of investigations of judges and prosecutors for corruption offences in the
Response
DE FACTO last 12 months
(Implementation) Disaggregated by sex
b.2.11 Number of prosecutions of judges and prosecutors for corruption offences in the
last 12 months
Disaggregated by sex
b.2.12. Number of convictions of judges and prosecutors for corruption offences in the
last 12 months
Disaggregated by sex

18 | P a g e
 b.3 Conflict of interest (Art. 7 UNCAC)
Dimension

b.3.1 Numbers of detected conflicts of interests that were not declared by public officials
Direct measure

Perception N/A
OPPORTUNITIES N/A
(Circumstances
that enable
corruption)
b.3.2 Asset and conflict of interest disclosure regimes in place
Risk
CONSTRAINTS
(Circumstances b.3.3 Control body/bodies to monitor and manage conflict of interest disclosures
that may deter
Indirect
corruption) b.3.4 Employment cooling off periods for public officials in place
Measures
b.3.5 Existence of conflict of interest regulation including clear guidance on what and
how to report conflicts, and the consequences
DE JURE
(Regulation) b.3.6 Existence of lobbying regulation including clear guidance on what and how to report
Response lobbying activities

DE FACTO b.3.7 Percentage of public officials sanctioned for not disclosing conflicts of interest
(Implementation) in the previous year

19 | P a g e
 b.4 Management of public finances (Art. 9 UNCAC)
Dimension

N/A
Direct measure

Perception N/A
OPPORTUNITIES N/A
(Circumstances
that enable
corruption)

CONSTRAINTS b.4.1 Accessibility of budgetary information

Risk (Circumstances Percentage of total government budget not subject to public disclosure (e.g. due to
that may deter confidentiality)
corruption) b.4.2 Frequency of audits
Number of planned and ad hoc audits conducted on public expenditures in the last 12
Indirect months
Measures b.4.3 Public participation in budgeting process
Existence of mechanisms to foster participation of citizens in budgetary processes
DE JURE b.4.4 Comprehensiveness of budget disclosure requirements
(Regulation) The extent to which national laws, regulations, policies, and guidelines provide a basis for
collecting and publishing data on public finances
b.4.5 Bottom-up approach in budgeting process
Existence of mechanisms to foster participation of authorities and their administrative units in
Response
the budgetary processes
DE FACTO b.4.6 Sanctions24 against public officials for financial misconduct 25
(Implementation) Number of public officials and civil servants sanctioned (e.g. disciplined, fined or imprisoned)
for embezzlement, misappropriation, or diversion of public funds per 1,000,000 population
Disaggregated by sex

20 | P a g e
Dimension b.5 Public Procurement (UNCAC art. 9)

Direct measure b.5.1 Percentage of public contracts awarded without competition (without another bidder)

Perception N/A
Risk OPPORTUNITIES N/A
(Circumstances
that enable
corruption)
CONSTRAINTS b.5.2 Transparency in procurement
(Circumstances Percentage of public tenders for which information was published (open call/invitation,
that may deter selection criteria, selection process, award information, appeal process).
corruption)
b.5.3 Existence of an effective remedy for competitors in biding processes

Indirect b.5.4 Blacklist and/or whitelist of suppliers in place

Measures Systems in place to pre-vet suppliers that participate in tenders and/or to keep track of
suppliers barred from tendering

Response DE JURE b.5.5 Compliance of public procurement regulation and procedures with article 9 UNCAC
(Regulation)
b.5.6 Rules on public procurement in times of crisis/emergencies
Exceptions from usual procedures in place for emergency situations

DE FACTO b.5.7 Ratio of criminal convictions 26 related to irregularities in procurement processes

(Implementation)
b.5.8 Number of administrative sanctions against companies for participating in irregular
procurement, e.g., debarment

21 | P a g e
Dimension b.6 Candidature for and election to public office (Art. 7(2)(3) UNCAC)

Direct measure b.6.1 Total campaign spending per candidate vs. total campaign funds allocated per candidate

b.6.2 Total campaign spending per political party vs. total campaign funds allocated per political party

b.6.3 Percentage of population who experienced vote buying during the past election
Disaggregated by sex
Indirect Perception b.6.4 Percentage of citizens who perceived corruption in the processes of election to public office
Measures
Risk OPPORTUNITIES b.6.5 Anonymous donations
(Circumstances Percentage of anonymous donations to political campaigns in relation to the total campaign
that enable funds
corruption)
CONSTRAINTS b.6.6 Existence of an autonomous electoral body
(Circumstances b.6.7 Existence of regulatory body to monitor financing of political campaigns and electoral
that may deter processes
corruption)

Response DE JURE b.6.8 Regulatory measures on the prevention and sanctioning of acts of corruption in
(Regulation) elections

b.6.9 Regulatory measures on political party financing

DE FACTO b.6.10 Percentage of public officials who were sanctioned for failing to disclose required
(Implementation) information on campaign public financing or otherwise violating regulations on elections
Disaggregated by sex
b.6.11 Percentage of candidates who were sanctioned for failing to disclose required
information on campaign public financing or otherwise violating regulations on elections
Disaggregated by sex

22 | P a g e
 b.7 Preventive measures for the private sector
Dimension

N/A
Direct measure
b.7.1 Perception of corruption in the private sector
Perception Proportion of persons who perceive that the private sector is corrupt 27
Disaggregated by sector and by sex
OPPORTUNITIES N/A
(Circumstances
that enable
corruption)
Risk
b.7.2 Proportion of medium and large private enterprises with a compliance/integrity
CONSTRAINTS unit or regime 28
(Circumstances
that may deter b.7.3 Existence of checks and balances such as policies and processes aimed at
corruption) detecting and preventing corruption and irregularities

b.7.4 Existence of compliance legislation/regulation or guidance regarding corporate

Indirect
compliance
Measures
DE JURE
b.7.5 Regulatory framework regarding the involvement of intermediaries in money
(Regulation)
laundering

b.7.6 Restrictions on professional activities of former public officials

Response
b.7.7 Number of sanctions or measures imposed 29 following the identification of
irregularities during investigations or audits
DE FACTO
b.7.8 Number of dismissals following the identification of irregularities during
(Implementation)
investigations or audits

b.7.9 Number of reports of irregularities found to law enforcement authorities

23 | P a g e
Dimension b.8 Preventive measures for state-owned enterprises

Direct measure N/A

Indirect Perception b.8.1 Perception of corruption in state-owned enterprises

Measures Proportion of persons who perceive that state-owned enterprises (public companies such as electricity, oil,
telecommunications) are corrupt
Disaggregated by sector and by sex
Risk OPPORTUNITIES N/A
(Circumstances
that enable
corruption)
CONSTRAINTS b.8.2 Audits
(Circumstances Number of internal and external audits performed in processes vulnerable to corruption
that may deter
corruption)
Response DE JURE b.8.3 Existence of a comprehensive regulatory framework on finance, funding,
(Regulation) operations, and oversight of state-owned enterprises

b.8.4 Disclosure and transparency requirements, e.g. as per the OECD Guidelines on
Corporate Governance of State-Owned Enterprises

DE FACTO N/A
(Implementation)

24 | P a g e
Dimension b.9 Training programs (UNCAC art. 7)

Direct measure b.9.1 Proportion of public officials that completed anti-corruption training programs

Indirect Perception N/A

Measures Risk OPPORTUNITIES N/A
(Circumstances
that enable
corruption)
CONSTRAINTS N/A
(Circumstances
that may deter
corruption)
Response DE JURE b.9.2 Existence of compulsory anti-corruption/training education for public officials
(Regulation)
DE FACTO N/A
(Implementation)

25 | P a g e
 c) Enabling environment to report and address corruption

c.1 Resources allocated to fighting corruption

Dimension

c.1.1 Percentage of funds in the annual budget allocated for specialized body/bodies to fight corruption
Direct measure

Perception N/A
OPPORTUNITIES N/A
(Circumstances
that enable
Risk corruption)
CONSTRAINTS N/A
(Circumstances
that may deter
Indirect
corruption)
Measures
DE JURE c.1.2 Existence of an adequate legal framework ensuring regular funding for specialized
(Regulation) bodies to fight corruption

c.1.3 Existence of a body/bodies focused on the fight against corruption with the
Response
necessary independence

DE FACTO c.1.4 Percentage of filled positions divided by envisaged positions in specialized bodies
(Implementation) to fight corruption x 100

26 | P a g e
Dimension c.2 Public reporting and access to information (Articles 10, 13 UNCAC)

Direct measure c.2.1 Access to Information Requests

Proportion of requests for access to information that were denied
Indirect Perception N/A
Measures Risk OPPORTUNITIES c.2.2 Existence of summary proceedings
(Circumstances Percentage of laws that were adopted through summary proceedings in relation to the total
that enable number of laws adopted in the last 12 months
corruption)
c.2.3 Exemptions
Number of exemptions allowing the withholding of certain pieces or categories of information

CONSTRAINTS c.2.4 Existence of a regulatory body responsible for addressing complaints regarding
(Circumstances access to information
that may deter
corruption) c.2.5 Civil Society Activities
Number of activities by civil society organizations regarding preventing and tackling
corruption

c.2.6 Media
Number of media reports regarding potential corruption cases

Response DE JURE c.2.7 Regulatory framework in place on access to information to ensure public access to
(Regulation) information and protect fundamental freedoms

c.2.8. Appeal mechanism

Existence of an appeal mechanism for requests not granted

DE FACTO c.2.9 Proactive publication of information, including on risks of corruption

(Implementation)

27 | P a g e
 c.3 Reporting and protection of reporting persons (Arts. 8(4) and 33 UNCAC)
Dimension

c.3.1 Whistleblower 30 reporting

Number of proceedings opened due to whistle-blower reporting
Direct measure
Disaggregated by sex of the reporting person, sex of the alleged perpetrator and type of alleged crime/conduct

c.3.2 Proportion of public officials who would not report for fear of retaliation
Perception
Disaggregated by sector and by sex
OPPORTUNITIES N/A
(Circumstances
that enable
corruption)
CONSTRAINTS c.3.3 Existence of internal and external reporting channels to facilitate the reporting of
(Circumstances acts of corruption to appropriate authorities
that may deter
Indirect corruption)
Measures c.3.4 Mechanisms for protecting whistleblowers
Risk DE JURE Mechanisms in place against potential retaliation or intimidation for whistleblowers who
(Regulation) report corruption

c.3.5 Number of reports received by appropriate units or authorities

c.3.6 Number of reports addressed by appropriate units or authorities

DE FACTO
(Implementation)
c.3.7 Number of whistleblowers that have received protection from appropriate units or
authorities

28 | P a g e
End notes

i
Indicator 16.5.1 Proportion of persons who had at least one contact with a public official and who paid
a bribe to a public official, or were asked for a bribe by those public officials, during the previous
12 months and indicator 16.5.2 Proportion of businesses that had at least one contact with a
public official and that paid a bribe to a public official, or were asked for a bribe by those public
officials during the previous 12 months. See Global SDG Indicator Framework adopted by the
General Assembly in A/RES/71/313 available at: https://unstats.un.org/sdgs/indicators/indicators-
list/
2 All definitions presented in the framework are definitions for statistical purposes, they are not legal

definitions.

4 Criminalization: an act or determination of a ruler about certain acts which by the society or members
of the society are considered as acts which can be penalized as a criminal act or making an act
to become a criminal act and therefore can be penalized by the government by and on behalf of
the government.
5 Bribery: the promise, offering or giving to a public official, directly or indirectly, of an undue advantage,

for the official himself or herself or another person or entity, in order that the official act or refrain
from acting in the exercise of his or her official duties. Or the solicitation or acceptance by a public
official, directly or indirectly, of an undue advantage, for the official himself or herself or another
person or entity, in order that the official act or refrain from acting in the exerci se of his or her
official duties. It can include public or foreign public officials.
6 Public official: (i) any person holding a legislative, executive, administrative or judicial office of a State

Party, whether appointed or elected, whether permanent or temporary, whether paid or unpaid,
irrespective of that person’s seniority; (ii) any other person who performs a public function,
including for a public agency or public enterprise, or provides a public service, as defined in the
domestic law of the State Party and as applied in the pertinent area of law of that State Party; (iii)
any other person defined as a “public official” in the domestic law of a State Party
7 International standards to use population and business surveys to measure the experience of bribery

by public officials can be found at: https://www.unodc.org/documents/data-and-analysis/Crime-

statistics/CorruptionManual_2018_web.pdf.
8 Public Sector: Set of administrative bodies through which the State fulfills or enforces the policy and

will be expressed in the fundamental laws of the country. It includes all administrative bodies of
the federal legislative, executive, and judicial branches, and autonomous public agencies. It
therefore includes the Central Sector and the State-owned enterprises, and all local levels
9 This indicator is a better measure than the perception recorded among public officials because it

overcomes the reporting bias of those who may be corrupted themselves or those who fear
retaliation if they report corruption. International standards to use population and business
surveys to measure the perception of bribery can be found at:
https://www.unodc.org/documents/data-and-analysis/Crime-
statistics/CorruptionManual_2018_web.pdf.
10 E-government can be defined as the use of ICT by government agencies for the purpose of increasing

and improving accessibility, effectiveness, and accountability. The principal goals of e -government
should be efficient and improved service to customers, i ncreased transparency, empowerment
through access to information, efficient government purchasing and efficient administration
11 Investigation: investigation is understood as the gathering of evidence about the detected case of

potential corruption, including information about its extent, nature, effects, and the parties
involved, to decide whether and which measures need to be taken. Investigations may be carried
out internally within the organization concerned or through law enforcement agencies or other
external actors, such as anti-corruption agencies
12 Prosecution: to bring legal action against a suspect for redress or punishment of a crime or violation

of law
13 Sentencing: The punishment the competent court or authority decides should be given to someone

who has been convicted of a crime

14 Asset recovery: the seizure, freezing, confiscation and return of illicitly obtained assets for the

purpose of redressing the impact of corruption

15 Embezzlement. misappropriation or other diversion by a public official for his or her benefit or for the

benefit of another person or entity, of any property, public or private funds or securities or any

29 | P a g e
 other thing of value entrusted to the public official by virtue of his or her position
16 Diversion of public resources: The authorization, request, or performance of acts for the allocation
or diversion of public resources, whether material, human or financial, without legal basis or
contrary to the applicable rules
17 Audit: A formal investigation of the accounts or financial situation of an organization or individual and

a methodical examination and review. Audits can be internal, meaning they are performed by the
organization itself; or external, meaning they are performed by an independent outside entity
18 Statistical measure of illicit enrichment: The significant increase in the assets of a public official with

respect to his or her legitimate income that cannot be reasonably justified, nor is of legitimate
origin; based on the indicators, illicit enrichment can be assessed by States whether or not they
have criminalized the underlying behaviour
19 This can be applied only in jurisdictions where there is a system for public officials to declare their

income
20 Abuse of functions: the performance of or failure to perform an act, in violation of laws, by a public

official in the discharge of his or her functions, for the purpose of obtaining an undue advantage
for himself or herself or for another person or entity
21 Public service: Comprises persons employed by public authorities at central, regional, and local

levels and include both civil servants and public employees

22 Integrity: behaviors and actions consistent with a series of moral or ethical standards and principles,

adopted by individuals as well as institutions, which operate as a barrier against corruption and
in favor of the rule of law. Strict adherence to a moral code, reflected in honesty, transparency,
and complete harmony in what one thinks, says and does
23 Ethics: the attempt to understand the nature of human values, of how we ought to live and of what

constitutes the right conduct

24 Sanction: In addition to the provisions regarding the liability of legal persons. disciplinary measures

for public officials and asset recovery, article 30 para. 1 UNCAC provides that “each State Party
shall make the commission of [corruption] offences […] liable to sanctions that take into account
the gravity of that offence.” According to the Legislative Guide for the Implementation of the United
Nations Convention against Corruption “it is also necessary to ensure that the prosecution,
treatment and sanctioning of offenders around the world is […] consistent with the harm they have
caused and with the benefits they have derived from their criminal activities. […] The penalties
provided for similar crimes in various jurisdictions diverge significantly, reflecting different national
traditions, priorities and policies. It is essential, however, to ensure that at least a minimum level
of deterrence is applied by the international community to avoid the perception that certain types
of crime “pay”, even if the offenders are convicted. In other words, the sanctions must clearly
outweigh the benefits of the crime.” ”
25 Misconduct: Contravention of the provisions of the law, which might be classified at least as: serious,

non-serious
26 Conviction: Adjudication of a criminal defendant's guilt
27 Current survey tools measure perception of bribery in the private sector
28 Compliance: Procedures, systems or departments within public agencies or companies that ensure

that all legal, operational, and financial activities comply with applicable laws, rules, norms,
regulations, and standards
29 Sanctions are intended to be effective, proportionate, and dissuasive. These aim to improve

performance and are financial or non-financial. Non-financial sanctions may encompass private
notices requiring abstaining from repetition of the observed conduct; a public notice for the same
effect; order to take action; temporary ban to perform its functions; permanent ban from functions.
30 Whistle-blower: Person who reports on reasonable grounds to the competent authorities any facts

concerning offences established in accordance with the UNCAC

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