Climate Change INFORMATION SHEETS

Table of contents

Foreword
1 An introduction to climate change

Understanding the climate system

2 The greenhouse effect
3 Greenhouse gases and aerosols
4 How will greenhouse gas levels change in the future?
5 How will the climate change?
6 Has climate change already begun?
7 The evidence from climate models
8 The evidence from past climates

Facing the consequences

9 Adapting to the impacts of climate change
10 Agriculture and food security
11 Sea levels, oceans and coastal areas
12 Biological diversity and ecosystems
13 Water resources
14 Human health
15 Infrastructure, industry and human settlements
16 Climatic disasters and extreme events

The Climate Change Convention

17 The international response to climate change: A history
18 The Climate Change Convention
19 The Conference of the Parties (COP)
20 Sharing and reviewing critical information
21 The Kyoto Protocol

Limiting greenhouse gas emissions

22 How human activities produce greenhouse gases
23 Limiting emissions: The challenge for policymakers
24 Crafting policies that are cost-efficient
25 New energy technologies and policies
26 New transportation technologies and policies
27 New approaches to forestry and agriculture
28 Financing action under the Convention
29 Global cooperation on technology

Facts and figures

30 Data on greenhouse gas emissions and sources

Updated in July 1999. Sponsored by the UN Environment Programme, the UN Development Programme,
the UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs, the UN Institute for Training and Research, the
World Meteorological Organization, the World Health Organization, and the Climate Change Secretariat
(UNFCCC). For additional copies, please contact UNEP’s Information Unit for Conventions, International
Environment House (Geneva), C.P. 356, 1219 Châtelaine, Switzerland; tel. (+41-22) 917-8244/8196/
1234; fax (+41-22) 797 3464; e-mail [email protected]; web site http://www.unep.ch/iuc/.

These information sheets were written by Roberto Acosta, Myles Allen, Anilla Cherian, Sarah Granich,
Irving Mintzer, Alevino Suarez, and David von Hippel, and edited by Michael Williams. Each sheet was
reviewed by at least two experts.
Foreword

The most profound global threat facing humanity today is the prospect that our
economic activities will result in global warming, with serious consequences for the
earth’s entire ecosystem and for the way of life in rich and poor societies alike.

The expected consequences – rising sea levels, depleted agriculture, reduced water
flows, increased health hazards, turbulent weather, social strains – suggest that
both developed and developing countries have good reason to worry about climate
change.

Many scientists suspect that recent temperature increases and changes in climate
variability in various parts of the world may be the first signals of such global climate
change.

The stakes are high. We cannot allow damage to the systems that support human
life to become irreversible knowing that the cost of implementing future adaptive
measures will be prohibitive.

In this regard, the Kyoto Protocol to the Climate Change Convention goes beyond
mere calls for action. It relies on legally binding commitments to arrest and then
reverse the upward surge in emissions that started in the industrialized countries
150 years ago.

Now it is up to policymakers everywhere to refine and launch the many “win-win”

solutions available to them. Abandoning counterproductive incentives and subsidies,
removing barriers to market efficiency, and promoting investments in energy efficiency
can limit emissions while benefiting the national economy.

Economists have much to offer policymakers by analyzing win-win policies, market

mechanisms, and other solutions. The Kyoto Protocol is the first instance where
governments have agreed to use economic instruments to implement their
commitments. Developing these instruments will give stake-holders more
opportunities for achieving cost efficiencies.

One of the most important tasks facing policymakers will be to engage the energies
of business, local government, and civil society. Industry leaders must be convinced
to adjust their investment and marketing strategies and to develop more energy-
efficient vehicles, consumer goods, and production processes. At the local government
and community level, the Protocol should be seen as a harbinger of increased pressure
to make urban transport systems, public buildings, and town planning more energy
efficient and environmentally friendly.

Most importantly, individual households must contribute to emissions reduction

through their power of consumer choice and their personal lifestyle decisions.

For its part, the United Nations Environment Programme is fully committed to
strengthening its support to the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change and
its contribution to Convention-related activities, including public information services.
Only by working together in this way can the international community effectively
address the global challenge of climate change.

Klaus Töpfer
Executive Director
United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP)
 Climate Change INFORMATION SHEET 1

An introduction to climate change

◆ Human activities are releasing greenhouse gases into the atmosphere.

Carbon dioxide is produced when fossil fuels are used to generate energy and when
forests are cut down and burned. Methane and nitrous oxide are emitted from
agricultural activities, changes in land use, and other sources. Artificial chemicals
called halocarbons (CFCs, HFCs, PFCs) and other long-lived gases such as sulphur
hexafluoride (SF6) are released by industrial processes. Ozone in the lower
atmosphere is generated indirectly by automobile exhaust fumes.

◆ Rising levels of greenhouse gases are expected to cause climate change.

By absorbing infrared radiation, these gases control the way natural energy flows
through the climate system. In response to humanity’s emissions, the climate will
somehow have to adjust to a “thicker blanket” of greenhouse gases in order to
maintain the balance between energy arriving from the sun and energy escaping
back into space.

◆ Climate models predict that the global temperature will rise by about
1-3.5°C by the year 2100. This projected change is larger than any climate
change experienced over the last 10,000 years. It is based on current emissions
UUNN trends and assumes that no efforts are made to limit greenhouse gas emissions.
There are many uncertainties about the scale and impacts of climate change,
particularly at the regional level. Because of the delaying effect of the oceans,
surface temperatures do not respond immediately to greenhouse gas emissions,
UNEP
so climate change will continue for many decades after atmospheric concentrations
have stabilized. Meanwhile, the balance of the evidence suggests that the climate
may have already started responding to past emissions.

◆ Climate change is likely to have a significant impact on the global

environment. In general, the faster the climate changes, the greater will be the
risk of damage. The mean sea level is expected to rise 15-95 cm by the year 2100,
WMO
causing flooding of low-lying areas and other damage. Climatic zones (and thus
ecosystems and agricultural zones) could shift towards the poles by 150-550 km
in the mid-latitude regions. Forests, deserts, rangelands, and other unmanaged
ecosystems would face new climatic stresses. As a result, many will decline or
fragment, and individual species will become extinct.
WHO

◆ Human society will face new risks and pressures. Food security is unlikely to
be threatened at the global level, but some regions are likely to experience food
shortages and hunger. Water resources will be affected as precipitation and
UNITAR
UN evaporation patterns change around the world. Physical infrastructure will be
damaged, particularly by sea-level rise and by extreme weather events. Economic
activities, human settlements, and human health will experience many direct and
indirect effects. The poor and disadvantaged are the most vulnerable to the negative
consequences of climate change.
◆ People and ecosystems will need to adapt to future climatic regimes. Past and current
emissions have already committed the earth to some degree of climate change in the 21st century.
Adapting to these effects will require a good understanding of socio-economic and natural systems,
their sensitivity to climate change, and their inherent ability to adapt. Many strategies are available
for adapting to the expected effects of climate change.

◆ Stabilizing atmospheric concentrations of greenhouse gases will demand a major effort.

Based on current trends, the total climatic impact of rising greenhouse gas levels will be equal to
that caused by a doubling of pre-industrial CO 2 concentrations by 2030, and a trebling or more by
2100. Freezing global CO2 emissions at their current levels would postpone CO 2-doubling to 2100;
emissions would eventually have to fall to about 30% of their current levels for concentrations to
stabilize at doubled-CO2 levels sometime in the future. Given an expanding world economy and growing
populations, this would require dramatic improvements in energy efficiency and fundamental changes
in other economic sectors.

◆ The international community is tackling this challenge through the Climate Change
Convention. Adopted in 1992 and now boasting over 175 members, the Convention seeks to stabilize
atmospheric concentrations of greenhouse gases at safe levels. It commits developed countries to
take measures aimed at returning their emissions to 1990 levels by the year 2000. It further
requires all countries to limit their emissions, gather relevant information, develop strategies for
adapting to climate change, and cooperate on research and technology.

◆ The 1997 Kyoto Protocol will require stronger action in the post-2000 period. The Parties
to the Convention have agreed by consensus that developed countries will have a legally binding
commitment to reduce their collective emissions of six greenhouse gases by at least 5% compared
to 1990 levels by the period 2008-2012. The Protocol also establishes an emissions trading regime
and a “clean development mechanism”.

◆ Many options for limiting emissions are available in the short- and medium-term. Policymakers
can encourage energy efficiency and other climate-friendly trends in both the supply and consumption
of energy. Key consumers of energy include industries, homes, offices, vehicles, and farms. Efficiency
can be improved in large part by providing an appropriate economic and regulatory framework for
consumers and investors. This framework should promote cost-effective actions, the best current
and future technologies, and “no regrets” solutions that make economic and environmental sense
irrespective of climate change. Taxes, regulatory standards, tradable emissions permits, information
programmes, voluntary programmes, and the phase-out of counterproductive subsidies can all play
a role. Changes in practices and lifestyles, from better urban transport planning to personal habits
such as turning out the lights, are also important.

◆ Energy efficiency gains of 10-30% above baseline trends can be realized over the next 20-
30 years at no net cost. Some researchers believe that much greater gains are also feasible
during this period and beyond. Improvements over the baseline can be achieved in all major economic
sectors with current knowledge and with today’s best technologies. In the longer term, it will be
possible to move close to a zero-emissions industrial economy – with the innumerable environmental
and economic benefits that this implies.

◆ Reducing uncertainties about climate change, its impacts, and the costs of various response
options is vital. In the meantime, it will be necessary to balance concerns about risks and damages
with concerns about economic development. The prudent response to climate change, therefore, is
to adopt a portfolio of actions aimed at controlling emissions, adapting to impacts, and encouraging
scientific, technological, and socio-economic research.
Published in October 1999

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 Climate Change INFORMATION SHEET 2

The greenhouse effect

◆ The earth’s climate is driven by a continuous flow of energy from the sun.
This energy arrives mainly in the form of visible light. About 30% is immediately
scattered back into space, but most of the 70% that is absorbed passes down
through the atmosphere to warm the earth’s surface.

◆ The earth must send this energy back out into space in the form of infrared
radiation. Being much cooler than the sun, the earth does not emit energy as
visible light. Instead, it emits infrared, or thermal radiation. This is the heat thrown
off by an electric fire or grill before the bars begin to glow red.

◆ “Greenhouse gases” in the atmosphere block infrared radiation from

escaping directly from the surface to space. Infrared radiation cannot pass
straight through the air like visible light. Instead, most departing energy is carried
away from the surface by air currents and clouds, eventually escaping to space
from altitudes above the thickest layers of the greenhouse gas blanket.

◆ The main greenhouse gases are water vapour, carbon dioxide, ozone,
UN methane, nitrous oxide, and the chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs). Apart from CFCs
UN all of these gases occur naturally. Together, they make up less than 1% of the
atmosphere. This is enough to produce a “natural greenhouse effect” that keeps
the planet some 30oC warmer than it would otherwise be - essential for life as we
know it.
UNEP

◆ Levels of all key greenhouse gases (with the possible exception of water
vapour) are rising as a direct result of human activity. Emissions of carbon
dioxide (mainly from burning coal, oil, and natural gas), methane and nitrous oxide
(due to agriculture and changes in land use), ozone (generated by the fumes in
automobile exhausts) and CFCs (manufactured by industry) are changing how the
atmosphere absorbs energy. Water vapour levels may also be rising because of a
WMO “positive feedback”. This is all happening at an unprecedented speed. The result is
known as the “enhanced greenhouse effect”.

◆ The climate system must adjust to rising greenhouse gas levels to keep
WHO the global “energy budget” in balance. In the long term, the earth must get rid of
energy at the same rate at which it receives energy from the sun. Since a thicker
blanket of greenhouse gases helps to reduce energy loss to space, the climate
must change somehow to restore the balance between incoming and outgoing
energy.
UNITAR
UN
◆ This adjustment will include a “global warming” of the earth’s surface and
lower atmosphere. But this is only part of the story. Warming up is the simplest
way for the climate to get rid of the extra energy. But even a small rise in
temperature will be accompanied by many other changes: in cloud cover and wind
patterns, for example. Some of these changes may act to enhance the warming (positive feedbacks),
others to counteract it (negative feedbacks).

◆ Meanwhile, industrially-generated “sulphate aerosols” may have a local cooling effect. Sulphur
emissions from coal­ and oil­fired power stations produce clouds of microscopic particles that
reflect sunlight back out into space. This partly compensates for greenhouse warming. These sulphate
aerosols, however, remain in the atmosphere for a relatively short time compared to the long-lived
greenhouse gases. They also cause problems, such as acid rain. This means we should not rely on
sulphate aerosols to keep the climate cool indefinitely.

◆ Climate models predict that the global average temperature will rise by about 2oC (3.6oF)
by the year 2100 if current emission trends continue. This projection uses 1990 as a baseline. It
also takes into account climate feedbacks and the effects of sulphate aerosols as they are presently
understood. Because there are still many uncertainties, current estimates of how much it will
warm during the 21st century range from 1 to 3.5oC.

◆ Past emissions have already committed us to some climate change. The climate does not
respond immediately to emissions. It will therefore continue to change for many years even if
greenhouse gas emissions are reduced and atmospheric levels stop rising. Some important impacts
of climate change, such as a predicted rise in sea level, will take even longer to be fully realized.

◆ There is evidence that climate change has already begun. The climate varies naturally, making
it difficult to identify the effects of rising greenhouse gases. But the pattern of temperature trends
over the past few decades does resemble the pattern of greenhouse warming predicted by models.
These trends are unlikely to be due entirely to known sources of natural variability. While many
uncertainties remain, scientists believe that “the balance of the evidence suggests a discernible
human influence on global climate.”

◆ It is still too early A schematic illustration of the climate system

to predict the size
and timing of climate
change in specific re-
gions. Current climate
models are only able to
predict patterns of
change for the conti-
nental scale. Predicting
how climate change will
affect the weather in a
particular region is
much more difficult.
Thus the practical
consequences of “glob-
al warming” for in-
dividual countries or
regions remain very
uncertain.

Source: IPCC 1995.

Published in October 1999

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 Climate Change INFORMATION SHEET 3

Greenhouse gases and aerosols

◆ Greenhouse gases (GHGs) control energy flows in the atmosphere by

absorbing infra­red radiation. These trace gases comprise less than 1% of the
atmosphere. Their levels are determined by a balance between “sources” and
“sinks”. Sources are processes that generate greenhouse gases; sinks are
processes that destroy or remove them. Humans affect greenhouse gas levels by
introducing new sources or by interfering with natural sinks.

◆ The largest contributor to the natural greenhouse effect is water vapour.

Its presence in the atmosphere is not directly affected by human activity.
Nevertheless, water vapour matters for climate change because of an important
“positive feedback”. Warmer air can hold more moisture, and models predict that
a small global warming would lead to a rise in global water vapour levels, further
adding to the enhanced greenhouse effect. On the other hand, it is possible that
some regions may become drier. Because modelling climate processes involving
clouds and rainfall is particularly difficult, the exact size of this crucial feedback
remains unknown.

◆ Carbon dioxide is currently responsible for over 60% of the “enhanced”

UUNN greenhouse effect, which is responsible for climate change. This gas occurs
naturally in the atmosphere, but burning coal, oil, and natural gas is releasing the
carbon stored in these “fossil fuels” at an unprecedented rate. Likewise,
deforestation releases carbon stored in trees. Current annual emissions amount
UNEP
to over 7 billion tonnes of carbon, or almost 1% of the total mass of carbon dioxide
in the atmosphere.

◆ Carbon dioxide produced by human activity enters the natural carbon cycle.
Many billions of tonnes of carbon are exchanged naturally each year between the
atmosphere, the oceans, and land vegetation. The exchanges in this massive and
complex natural system are precisely balanced; carbon dioxide levels appear to
WMO have varied by less than 10% during the 10,000 years before industrialization. In
the 200 years since 1800, however, levels have risen by almost 30%. Even with
half of humanity’s carbon dioxide emissions being absorbed by the oceans and land
vegetation, atmospheric levels continue to rise by over 10% every 20 years.
WHO
◆ A second important human influence on climate is aerosols. These clouds of
microscopic particles are not a greenhouse gas. In addition to various natural
sources, they are produced from sulphur dioxide emitted mainly by power stations,
and by the smoke from deforestation and the burning of crop wastes. Aerosols
UNITAR
UN settle out of the air after only a few days, but they are emitted in such massive
quantities that they have a substantial impact on climate.

◆ Aerosols cool the climate locally by scattering sunlight back into space.
Aerosol particles block sunlight directly and also provide “seeds” for clouds to
form, and often these clouds also have a cooling effect. Over heavily industrialized regions, aerosol
cooling may counteract nearly all of the warming effect of greenhouse gas increases to date.

◆ Methane is a powerful greenhouse gas whose levels have already doubled. The main “new”
sources of methane are agricultural, notably flooded rice paddies and expanding herds of cattle.
Emissions from waste dumps and leaks from coal mining and natural gas production also contribute.
The main sink for methane is chemical reactions in the atmosphere, which are very difficult to model
and predict.

◆ Methane from past emissions currently contributes 15­20% of the enhanced greenhouse
effect. The rapid rise in methane started more recently than the rise in carbon dioxide, but methane’s
contribution has been catching up fast. However, methane has an effective atmospheric lifetime of
only 12 years, whereas carbon dioxide survives much longer. This means that the relative importance
of methane versus carbon dioxide emissions depends on the “time horizon”. For example, methane
emitted during the 1980s is expected to have about 80% of the impact of that decade’s carbon
dioxide emissions over the 20­year period 1990­2010, but only 30% over the 100­year period
1990­2090 (see figure).

◆ Nitrous oxide, chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs), and ozone contribute the remaining 20% of the
enhanced greenhouse effect. Nitrous oxide levels have risen by 15%, mainly due to more intensive
agriculture. CFCs increased rapidly until the early 1990s, but levels of key CFCs have since stabilised
due to tough emission controls introduced under the Montreal Protocol to protect the stratospheric
ozone layer. Ozone is another naturally-occurring greenhouse gas whose levels are rising in some
regions in the lower atmosphere due to air pollution, even as they decline in the stratosphere.

◆ Humanity’s greenhouse gas emissions have already disturbed the global energy budget by
about 2.5 Watts per square metre. This equals about one percent of the net incoming solar energy
that drives the climate system. One percent may not sound like much, but added up over the
earth’s entire surface, it amounts to the energy content of 1.8 million tonnes of oil every minute, or
over 100 times the world’s current rate of commercial energy consumption. Since greenhouse
gases are only a by-product of energy consumption, it is ironic that the amount of energy humanity
actually uses is tiny compared to the impact of greenhouse gases on natural energy flows in the
climate system.

Relative impact of carbon dioxide, methane and nitrous oxide emitted during the 1980s, considering their cumulative impact on the earth’s radiation
budget over a 20-year and 100-year time-horizon. Methane has an atmospheric lifetime of only about 12 years, so it’s relative impact declines as
we look over longer timescales. Ozone and CFCs are omitted because current rates are uncertain or changing rapidly.
Source: IPCC94 with updated GWPs from IPCC95. Methane impact includes indirect.
Published in October 1999

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 Climate Change INFORMATION SHEET 4

How will greenhouse gas levels change

in the future ?

◆ Future greenhouse gas emissions will depend on global population, economic,

technological, and social trends. The link to population is clearest: the more
people there are, the higher emissions are likely to be. The link to economic
development is less clear. Rich countries generally emit more per person than do
poor countries. However, countries of similar wealth can have very different emission
rates depending on their geographical circumstances, their sources of energy,
and the efficiency with which they use energy and other natural resources.

◆ As a guide to policymakers, economists produce “scenarios” of future

emissions. A scenario is not a prediction. Rather it is a way of investigating the
implications of particular assumptions about future trends, including policies on
greenhouse gases. Depending on the assumptions, a scenario can project growing,
stable, or declining emissions.

◆ Most scenarios suggest that future growth in emission rates will be

dominated by what happens in developing countries. The bulk of emissions to
date have come from industrialized countries. However, most future growth is
likely to come from emerging economies where economic and population growth is
UUNN
fastest - and for which projections are most uncertain.

◆ In a typical “non­intervention” scenario, carbon dioxide emissions rise from

7 billion tonnes of carbon per year in 1990 to 20 billion in 2100.
UNEP
“Non­intervention” means that no new policies are adopted to reduce emissions in
response to the threat of climate change. It does not mean that nothing else
changes: in this particular scenario (known as IS92a), world population doubles by
2100 while economic growth continues at 2­3% per year. (Remember that scenarios
are based on assumptions, which may be quite wrong.)

◆ This scenario leads to the equivalent of a doubling of pre­industrial CO2

WMO
concentrations by 2030, and a trebling by 2100. This includes the effects of
other greenhouse gas emissions, translated into their carbon-dioxide equivalents.
Even a doubling of pre-industrial carbon dioxide would take levels of long-lived
greenhouse gases higher than they have been for several million years.
WHO
◆ Different assumptions about sources and sinks give very different results.
Future emissions are uncertain, and they have to be translated into future
atmospheric concentrations using models of the carbon cycle and atmospheric
chemistry. This introduces more uncertainty, since it is unclear how key sinks
UNITAR
UN (processes that absorb or destroy greenhouse gases) will respond to a changing
climate. Rising carbon dioxide levels, for example, cause plants to grow faster (the
“CO 2­fertilisation effect”) and absorb more carbon dioxide through photosynthesis.
CO2 fertilisation, together with forest re-growth in northern countries, may be
absorbing up to 25% of the carbon dioxide currently produced by human activity.
No-one knows how this sink will behave in the future: if more land is required for food production, the
trend may reverse.

◆ “Intervention” scenarios are designed to examine the impact of efforts to reduce greenhouse
gas emissions. They depend not only on assumptions about population and economic growth, but
also about how future societies will respond to the introduction of policies such as taxes on carbon-
rich fossil fuels.

◆ Existing international commitments could slightly reduce the rate of growth in emissions
through the 21st century. Under the Climate Change Convention, developed countries are trying
to return their greenhouse gas emissions to 1990 levels by the year 2000. If they were to succeed,
the date of CO2 doubling would be postponed by less than five years. A goal of making more substantial
reductions in atmospheric concentrations would clearly require all countries to make dramatically
stronger cuts in their emissions.

◆ Freezing global emissions at current levels would postpone CO2 ­doubling to 2100. While
such a scenario is far beyond any proposals now being considered, it still would not be enough to
prevent greenhouse gas concentrations from continuing to rise far beyond the year 2100. Stabilising
carbon dioxide at double its pre-industrial concentration sometime in the 22nd century would require
emissions to fall eventually to less than 30% of their current levels, despite growing populations and
an expanding world economy.

◆ Reducing uncertainties about climate change impacts and the costs of various response
options is vital for policymakers. Stabilising or reducing emissions world-wide would have an impact
on almost every human activity. To decide if it is worthwhile, we need to know how much it would
cost, and how bad things will get if we let emissions grow. There are tough moral questions too: how
much are we prepared to pay for the climate of the 22nd century, which only our children’s children
will see?

Future carbon dioxide emissions (left panel) for a range of policy scenarios and the resulting atmospheric carbon dioxide concentrations (right panel)
estimated from a carbon cycle model. The IS92a scenario assumes that world population grows to 11.3 billion by 2100, economic growth
continues at 2.3-2.9% per annum, and no active steps are taken to reduce CO 2 emissions. IS92b makes the same assumptions about population
Published in October 1999

and growth, but assumes commitments by many OECD countries to stabilize or reduce emissions. S550 illustrates a pattern of emissions that
would stabilize CO 2 at approximately double its pre-industrial level shortly after 2100. GtC is one billion tonnes of carbon; ppmv is parts per million
by volume. Source: IPCC 1995; data provided by the Hadley Centre for Climate Prediction and Research, UK.

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 Climate Change INFORMATION SHEET 5

How will the climate change ?

◆ If nothing is done to reduce emissions, current climate models predict a

global warming of about 2 oC between 1990 and 2100. This projection takes into
account the effects of aerosols and the delaying effect of the oceans. This oceanic
inertia means that the earth’s surface and lower atmosphere would continue to
warm by a further 1-2oC even if greenhouse gas concentrations stopped rising in
2100.

◆ The range of uncertainty in this projection is 1oC to 3.5oC. Even a 1oC rise
would be larger than any century-time-scale trend for the past 10,000 years.
Uncertainties about future emissions, climate feedbacks, and the size of the ocean
delay all contribute to this uncertainty range.

◆ The earth’s average sea level is predicted to rise by about 50 cm by 2100.

The uncertainty range is large - 15 to 95 cm - and changing ocean currents could
cause local and regional sea levels to rise much more or much less than the global
average. The main cause of this rise is the thermal expansion of the upper layers of
the ocean as they warm, with some contribution from melting glaciers. Slightly
faster melting of the Greenland and Antarctica ice sheets is likely to be balanced
UUNN by increased snowfall in both regions. As the warming penetrates deeper into the
oceans and ice continues to melt, sea level will continue rising well after surface
temperatures have levelled off.
UNEP
◆ Regional and seasonal warming predictions are much more uncertain.
Although most areas are expected to warm, some will warm much more than
others. The largest warming is predicted for cold northern regions in winter. The
reason is that snow and ice reflect sunlight, so less snow means more heat is
absorbed from the sun, which enhances any warming: a strong positive feedback
effect. By the year 2100, parts of northern Canada and Siberia are predicted to
warm by up to 10oC in winter, but less than 2oC in summer.
WMO
◆ Inland regions are projected to warm faster than oceans and coastal zones.
The reason is simply the ocean delay, which prevents the sea surface from warming
as fast as the land. The size of this delay depends on how deep any warming
penetrates into the oceans. Over most of the oceans, the uppermost few hundred
WHO
metres do not mix with the water beneath them. These upper layers will warm
within just a few years, while the deep ocean stays cold. Water mixes down into
the ocean depths in only a few very cold regions, such as the Atlantic south of
Greenland and the Southern Ocean near Antarctica. In these regions, warming will
UNITAR
UN be delayed because much more water needs to be warmed up to get the same
temperature change at the surface.

◆ Aerosols may counteract some of the effects of greenhouse warming in the

vicinity of major industrialised regions. Clouds of superfine sulphate particles
from burning coal and oil should counteract greenhouse warming over much of the Eastern USA,
Eastern Europe, and parts of China. But since some action is likely to reduce sulphur emissions
because of acid rain, the size of this effect is unpredictable.

◆ Total precipitation is predicted to increase, but at the local level trends are much less
certain. Wintertime precipitation in the far north is likely to rise, but what happens in mid-latitudes
and in the tropics depends very much on the details of the particular climate model and the emissions
scenario. Including the effects of aerosols, for example, significantly weakens the Asian summer
monsoon in the two models which have so far run this experiment.

◆ More rain and snow will mean wetter soil conditions in high-latitude winters, but higher
temperatures may mean drier soils in summer. Local changes in soil moisture are clearly important
for agriculture, but models still find it difficult to simulate them. Even the sign of the global change
in summertime soil moisture - whether there will be an increase or a decrease - is uncertain.

◆ The frequency and intensity of extreme weather events such as storms and hurricanes may
change. However, models still cannot predict how. The models used to simulate climate change
cannot themselves simulate these extreme weather events, so the evidence is indirect. There is
some concern that patterns of extreme weather may change because the models predict changes
in ocean surface temperatures and other factors that are known to affect storm and hurricane
development. However, it will be many years before scientists can predict whether individual regions
will become more or less stormy.

◆ Rapid and unexpected climate transitions cannot be ruled out. The most dramatic such
change, the collapse of the West Antarctic ice sheet, which would lead to a catastrophic rise in sea
level, is now considered unlikely in the next
100 years. There is evidence that changes in
ocean circulation which have a significant
impact on regional climate (such as a
weakening of the Gulf Stream that warms
Europe) can take place in only a few decades,
but it is unknown whether or not greenhouse
warming could trigger any such change.
External factors, such as a series of volcanic
eruptions or a change in the power output of
the sun, could also have a major impact, but
the consensus is that climate change over
the 21st century as a whole is likely to be
dominated by the effects of greenhouse gas
emissions.

Predicted surface-temperature change in a climate

model forced with the effects of changing greenhouse
gas levels and sulphate aerosols. The maps show the
difference between the decade 2040-2049 and the
period 1950-1979 during a) the December-January-
February period and b) June-July-August . White
Published in October 1999

indicates warming less than 1 o C, light shading 1-2 oC,

and heavy shading greater than 2 oC. Notice how there
is more warming over land than over sea, and that the
strongest warming is at high latitudes in winter.
Source; Deutsches Klimarechenzentrum.

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 Climate Change INFORMATION SHEET 6

Has climate change already begun ?

◆ The earth’s climate is already adjusting to past greenhouse gas emissions.

The climate system must adjust to changing greenhouse gas concentrations in
order to keep the global energy budget balanced. This means that the climate is
changing and will continue to change as long as greenhouse gas levels keep rising.
But this is not very useful. The real question is how large the change is likely to be
relative to the natural climate fluctuations that human societies and natural
ecosystems have learned to adapt to.

◆ Measurement records indicate a warming of 0.3o-0.6oC in global average

temperature since 1860. This is in line with model projections of the size of
warming to date, particularly when the cooling effect of sulphur emissions is included.
But observations are sparse before 1900 and much of the warming occurred
between 1910 and 1940, before the largest rise in greenhouse gases. There is
clearly more going on than a simple, direct response to emissions. This is to be
expected as the climate is a complicated and chaotic system.

◆ Mean sea level has risen by 10 to 25 cm and mountain glaciers have retreated.
UN As the upper layers of the oceans warm, water expands and sea level rises. Models
UN suggest that a 0.3o-0.6oC warming should indeed result in a 10 to 25 cm sea-level rise.
But other, harder-to-predict, changes also affect the real and apparent sea level, notably
snowfall and ice-melt in Greenland and Antarctica and the slow “rebound” of northern
continents freed from the weight of ice age glaciers. Almost all recorded mountain
UNEP
glaciers show a retreat over the past century but, as with sea level, this is unlikely to be
only a response to changes in greenhouse gases.

◆ The observed global warming trend is larger than the trends that models
indicate could be due to natural variability. A key problem in climate change research
is that scientists have no direct way of observing what would have happened if humanity
had left the climate alone. There is no direct way of comparing the greenhouse “signal”
WMO
with the background “noise” of natural climate variability. Instead, this background
variability can be estimated by running climate change computer models with constant
greenhouse gas levels. The results indicate that the warming trend of 0.3o­0.6oC per
century is unlikely to be a chance fluctuation. However, indirect evidence from past
climates suggests that these models underestimate the size of natural climate
WHO
variability, so they may be overestimating the significance of the signal.

◆ Climate models omit many sources of variability that could also cause
apparent long-term trends. Current model-based estimates of natural variability
UNITAR
UN do not include the effects of volcanic eruptions, which can cool the global climate
temporarily by several tenths of a degree. They are also only beginning to include
the effects of long­term changes in the power output of the sun. The sun may have
been responsible for relatively cool periods during the 16th, 17th, and 19th
centuries (the so-called “Little Ice Age”) when the northern hemisphere may have
been about 0.5oC colder than it is today. Some of the warming over the past century (about 20­30%
of it, according to some recent model results) may still be a recovery from that time.

◆ Models can also be used to predict the overall pattern of climate change. Because so many
unknown factors may affect the global average temperature, scientists are reluctant to conclude that
greenhouse warming has arrived on the evidence of that one number alone. Instead, they look for similarities
between the pattern of change emerging in the observations and the pattern projected by climate models.

◆ Several studies have reported increasingly close agreement between model-predicted and
observed patterns of temperature change. Studies of surface temperature records show some
evidence that the land is warming faster than the oceans. They also show reduced warming in areas
affected by sulphate aerosols and in those ocean regions where surface water mixes down, distributing
any warming to the ocean depths - all features of the model­predicted pattern. But coverage is
incomplete, and observations in different regions (e.g. land vs. sea) are made in different ways. A
more consistent, but much shorter, record is provided by air temperatures from meteorological
stations. These show a pattern of cooling in the stratosphere (above about 10 km) and warming in
the troposphere (lower atmosphere), which is also predicted by climate models (see figure).

◆ The satellite record is still too short to reveal significant trends. The climate has to be observed
over several decades before any climate change signal can be distinguished from natural variability. The
longest satellite records are still well under 20 years. Models predict that it should not be possible to
detect anything in such a short period, so all that can be said about the satellite data for the moment is
that they are consistent with climate model projections and with evidence from conventional observations.
Satellite data do provide global coverage, which helps to validate models and reduce uncertainties.

◆ The evidence suggests that recent changes are unlikely to be entirely due to known sources of
natural variability. The pattern of change seems to point to some human influence on climate similar to that
projected by climate models and larger than expected from natural fluctuations. This point is not yet settled,
however, mainly because of uncertainty over the ability of current models to simulate natural variability realistically.
Nevertheless, it is reassuring for
many modelers because it suggests
that the models are pointing in
roughly the right direction.

◆ Uncertainty about the ability

of models to simulate natural
climate variability remains a
significant problem. As with
trends in global mean tempe-
rature, scientists must use
climate model simulations to
assess the probability of getting
a certain level of agreement purely
by chance between the model and
the observed patterns of change.
There are many sources of natural
variability that these models
simulate poorly or not at all, and
one of these might be associated Top: Vertical pattern of temperature change in a north-south section through the atmosphere,
with a pattern similar to the averaged over all longitudes, as observed over the past 35 years. Bottom: Same section as
predicated by a climate model simulation of the same period including changes in greenhouse gas
greenhouse warming pattern. levels, sulphate aerosols, and stratosphere ozone. The vertical axis shows height above the
Thus there is still a wide range of surface, the horizontal axis shows latitude. The pattern of warming (lightest shade) below 7-12
Published in October 1999

km and of cooling (darker shades) above that level is the same in both figures. The model appears
uncertainty about the size and to predict the strength of the pattern approximately correctly, although clear differences remain.
origin of the present signal and Source: Tett, Mitchell, Parker and Allen, Science, vol. 247, pp. 1170-1173, 1998, figures
provided by the Hadley Centre for Climatic Prediction and Research and the Space Science
about the size of future changes. Department of the Rutherford Appleton Laboratory, UK.

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 Climate Change INFORMATION SHEET 7

The evidence from climate models

◆ The climate system is extremely complex. Consequently, there is no simple

way of determining how much the climate will change in response to rising
greenhouse gas levels. If the only changes were air and surface temperatures, it
would be easy to predict a 1­1.5oC warming by 2100 assuming that current
emissions trends continue. But this “direct response” figure (which is less than
the current “best guess” of future warming) is almost meaningless because it is
physically impossible for the climate system to warm up by over 1 oC without any
other changes.

◆ Complex computer simulations are therefore essential for understanding

climate change. Computers allow scientists to model the many interactions between
different components of the climate system. The most detailed projections are
based on coupled atmosphere-ocean general circulation models (AOGCMs). These
are similar to the models used to predict the weather, in which the physical laws
governing the motion of the atmosphere are reduced to systems of equations to
be solved on supercomputers. However, climate models must also include equations
representing the behaviour of the oceans, land vegetation, and the cryosphere
(sea ice, glaciers, and ice caps).
UUNN
◆ “Positive feedbacks” involving water vapour, snow, and ice may amplify the
direct response to greenhouse gas emissions by a factor of two to three. Snow
and ice reflect sunlight very effectively. If a small warming melts snow earlier in the
UNEP
year, more energy will be absorbed by the ground exposed underneath it, in turn
causing more warming. This is the main reason wintertime northern regions are
expected to warm the most. The water vapour feedback is even more important:
water vapour is itself a powerful greenhouse gas, and models project that global
warming will raise water vapour levels in the lower atmosphere.

◆ Changes in cloud cover, ocean currents, and chemistry and biology, may
WMO
either amplify or reduce the response. Models generally predict that cloudiness
will change in a warmer world, but depending on the type and location of the
clouds, this could have various effects. Clouds reflect sunlight, implying that more
clouds would have a cooling effect. But most clouds, particularly those at high
WHO altitudes, also have an insulating effect: being very cold, they shed energy to space
relatively ineffectively, thus helping to keep the planet warm. So the net cloud
feedback could go either way. Clouds are the main reason for the large uncertainty
about the size of warming under any given emissions scenario.

UNITAR
UN ◆ The speed and timing of climate change strongly depends on how the oceans
respond. The uppermost layers of the oceans interact with the atmosphere every
year and so are expected to warm along with the earth’s surface. But it takes
over 40 times as much energy to warm the top 100 m of the ocean as to warm
the entire atmosphere by the same amount. With ocean depths reaching several
kilometres, the oceans will therefore slow down any atmospheric warming. How much they slow it
down depends on how deeply the warming penetrates. The latest climate models are only just
beginning to represent the processes which exchange energy between the atmosphere and ocean
depths, so this remains an important source of uncertainty.

◆ Climate projections must begin from a stable and realistic simulation of the present-day
climate, which is not easy to obtain. Ideally, scientists would like to allow a model to settle down
with pre-industrial levels of greenhouse gases and then increase greenhouse gas levels to examine
the response. But the inevitable approximations mean that the model generally starts to drift away
from the present climate at a rate comparable to, or even larger than, the warming expected due to
changing greenhouse gas levels. There are various ways of correcting for this “climate drift” to
obtain a stable model climate before starting a climate change experiment. None of these correction
schemes is very satisfactory, since they are covering up model errors that might be important for
climate change. The size of these corrections is diminishing as models improve, however, which
suggests that it may be possible to eliminate them altogether in the relatively near future.

◆ Scientists’ ability to verify model projections is often limited by incomplete knowledge of

the real climate. The processes that matter for climate change are those that operate on time-
scales of decades or more. Detailed observations only exist for a few decades, but scientists can
attempt to extend the record back using indirect evidence. This record suggests that model
simulations of past climates and natural year-to-year climate fluctuations are improving, although
they still have significant shortcomings.

◆ Climate models are scientific tools, not crystal balls. Large climate modelling experiments
consume enormous computing resources and are so expensive that each year only a handful of such
experiments can be performed world-wide. Then the work involved in interpreting the results of a
computer simulation is often greater than the work needed to perform the experiment in the first
place. All of this work and expense can give models the aura of truth. But even the most sophisticated
models are approximate representations of a very complex system, so they will never be an infallible
guide to the future.
This said, the level of
uncertainty in climate
models should not be
exaggerated; it is no
greater than the
uncertainty in the
economic models on
which many other far-
reaching decisions
must be based. So
think of climate
models as sophis-
ticated tools for
extending our know-
ledge of present and
past climate into an
unexplored future.
Since climate change
will only happen once,
they are the best tool
we have. Global average near-surface temperature change from 1860 to 2100 as predicted by a climate model
(black line). Changes in greenhouse gases and sulphate aerosols are prescribed following the observed
Published in October 1999

changes up to 1990, and following a scenario (IS92a) under which no new policies are adopted to
combat climate changes from 1990-2100. The grey line shows observed global average temperature
changes since 1860. Data provided by the Hadley Centre for Climate Prediction and Research, UK.

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 Climate Change INFORMATION SHEET 8

The evidence from past climates

◆ The earth’s climate varies naturally. Each component of this complex system
evolves on a different timescale. The atmosphere changes in hours, and its detailed
behaviour is impossible to predict beyond a few days. The upper layers of the
oceans adjust in the course of a few seasons, while changes in the deep oceans
can take centuries. The animal and plant life of the biosphere (which influences
rainfall and temperature) normally varies over decades. The cryosphere (snow and
ice) is slower still: changes in thick ice sheets take centuries. The geosphere (the
solid earth itself) varies slowest of all - mountain-building and continental drift
(which influence winds and ocean currents) take place over millions of years.

◆ Past natural climate changes offer vital insights into human-induced climate
change. Studies of past climates (“paleoclimatology”) give a sense of the scale of
future changes projected by climate models. They also provide a crucial check on
scientists’ understanding of key climate processes and their ability to model them.

◆ Systematic global temperature records are available only since 1860. These
include land-based air temperature measurements and sea-surface temperature
measurements. Such data need to be checked carefully for any biases that may be
UUNN introduced by changes in observation methods or sites. For example, many
meteorological stations have been located in or near cities. As cities grow, they
can have a significant warming effect on the local climate. Such effects must be -
and are - taken into account in estimating recent changes in global temperature.
UNEP

◆ Studies of earlier climates are based on indirect evidence. Changing lake

levels, for example, can reveal the past balance between rainfall and evaporation.
Tree-rings, coral, ice-caps, or ocean sediments can all preserve information about
the past. Using a combination of measurements, models, and “detective work”,
scientists convert the quantities they can measure (such as the chemical
composition of an ice-core sample) into the physical variables they wish to investigate
WMO (such as the Antarctic temperature of 100,000 years ago).

◆ The earth’s climate has been dominated by ice ages for the past few million
years. Ice ages are almost certainly triggered by slow “wobbles” in the earth’s
axis and its orbit around the sun. These wobbles affect the total amount of energy
WHO
the planet receives from the sun and in particular its geographic distribution.
During an ice age, global temperatures fall by 5oC and ice-sheets advance over
much of Europe and North America. Ice ages are separated by warmer “interglacial”
periods.
UNITAR
UN
◆ Changes in greenhouse gas concentrations may have helped to amplify ice-
age cycles. The small fluctuations in energy arriving from the sun due to the
earth’s orbital wobbles are not large enough to account for the size of global
temperature changes during the ice age cycles. Ice-core samples show that
greenhouse gas levels also varied significantly and may have played an important role in amplifying
temperature fluctuations.

◆ Reconstructions of past climates can be used as a check on climate model projections.

Comparing a model “prediction” of ice-age climate with the evidence from paleoclimatology provides
a crucial check on the model’s representation of processes relevant for future climate change. But
the paleoclimatic evidence can be ambiguous: some sources suggest that, compared with today,
tropical seas were some 5oC colder at the peak of the last ice age, while others suggest only 1-2 oC.
As a result, separating model errors from uncertainties in the evidence can be difficult.

◆ The climate seems to have been remarkably stable since the last ice age ended 10,000
years ago. As far as scientists can tell, global temperatures have varied by less than one degree
since the dawn of human civilisation. Against the apparently extreme and sometimes rapid climate
fluctuations of the preceding 100,000 years, this stands out as a relatively peaceful interglacial
period.

◆ Models predict that the climate could be

warmer by the end of the 21st century than it
was during any previous inter-glacial period. In
a period between two ice ages about 125,000
years ago, much of Europe and Asia appear to
have been about 2oC warmer than they are today.
However, models are predicting that temperatures
could rise by more than 4oC over much of this
region during the 21st century if greenhouse gas
emissions continue as projected.

◆ Abrupt climate variations in the distant

past appear to have been traumatic for life on
earth. The earth’s biological history is punctuated
by so-called “mass extinction events” during which
a large fraction of the world’s species are wiped
out. There are many possible reasons for mass
extinctions, but the records suggest that some
of these events coincided with relatively abrupt
changes in climate - similar in magnitude to the
kind of change now forecast for the 21st century.
Over the next 100 years we may experience
conditions unknown since before the ice ages
began many millions of years ago.

Sources: AJ Schematic of global average temperature compiled from ice-

core records from IPCC 1990. BJ Schematic of global temperature
Published in October 1999

estimated from geological records adapted from T.J. Crowley and G.R.
North, Science, Vol. 240, pp. 996-1002, 1988, scaled for global
temperature following T.J. Crowley in A. Berger et. al. (eds.), “Climate
and the Geo-Sciences”, pp. 179-207, Kluwer, 1989. Dinosaur by David
Catling.

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 Climate Change INFORMATION SHEET 9

Adapting to the
impacts of climate change

◆ Even an immediate and dramatic cut in global greenhouse gas emissions

would not fully prevent climate change impacts. The climate system responds to
changes in greenhouse gas levels with a time lag, in part because of the oceans’
thermal inertia. Past and present emissions have already committed the earth to
at least some climate change in the 21st century. Natural ecosystems and human
societies will be sensitive to both the magnitude and the rate of this change.
Therefore, while controlling emissions is vital, it must be combined with efforts to
minimize damage through adaptation.

◆ The most vulnerable ecological and socio-economic systems are those with
the greatest sensitivity to climate change and the least ability to adapt.
Sensitivity is the degree to which a system will respond to a given change in
climate; it measures, for example, how much the composition, structure, and
functioning of an ecosystem will respond to a given temperature rise. Adaptability
is the degree to which systems can adjust in response to, or in anticipation of,
changed conditions. Vulnerability defines the extent to which climate change may
damage or harm a system; this depends not only on the system’s sensitivity, but
on its ability to adapt.
UUNN
◆ Ecosystems that are already under stress are particularly vulnerable. Most
ecosystems are sensitive to humanity’s unsustainable management practices and
increasing demands for resources. For example, human activities can fragment
UNEP
lightly managed and unmanaged ecosystems, limiting their potential for adapting
naturally to climate change. Fragmentation of ecosystems will also complicate
human efforts to assist adaptation, for example by creating migration corridors.

◆ Socio-economic systems tend to be more vulnerable in developing countries

with weaker economies and institutions. People who live in arid or semi-arid
lands, low-lying coastal areas, flood-prone areas, or on small islands are at particular
WMO
risk. Greater population densities have made some sensitive areas more vulnerable
to hazards such as storms, floods, and droughts.

◆ Adapting to climate change can be a spontaneous or planned act. Individuals,

WHO businesses, governments, and nature itself will often adapt to climate change
impacts without any external help. In many cases, however, people will need to plan
how to minimize negative impacts or benefit from positive ones. Planned adaptation
can be launched prior to, during, or after the onset of the actual consequences.

UNITAR
UN ◆ Six general strategies are available for adapting to climate change.
Measures can be taken in advance to prevent losses, for example by building
barriers against sea-level rise. It may be possible to reduce losses to a tolerable
level; this could include redesigning crop mixes to ensure a guaranteed minimum
yield under even the worst conditions. The burden on those directly affected by
climate change can be eased by spreading or sharing losses, perhaps through government disaster
relief. Communities can also change a use or activity that is no longer viable, or change the location
of an activity, for example by re-siting a hydro-electric power utility in a place where there is more
water. Sometimes it may be best to restore a site, such as an historical monument newly vulnerable
to flood damage.

◆ Successful strategies will draw on ideas and advances in law, finance, economics, technology,
public education, and training and research. Technological advances often create new options for
managed systems such as agriculture and water supply. However, many regions of the world currently
have limited access to new technologies and to information. Technology transfer is essential, as is
the availability of financial resources. Cultural, educational, managerial, institutional, legal, and
regulatory practices are also important to effective adaptation, at both the national and international
levels. For example, the ability to incorporate climate change concerns into development plans can
help ensure that new investments in infrastructure reflect likely future conditions.

◆ Many adaptation policies would make good sense even without climate change. Present-day
climatic variability, including extreme climatic events such as droughts and floods, already causes a
great deal of destruction. Greater efforts to adapt to these events could help to reduce damage in
the short term, regardless of any longer-term changes in climate.

◆ Crafting adaptation strategies is complicated by uncertainty. It is still not possible to quantify

future impacts on any particular system at any particular location. This is because climate change
predictions at the regional level are uncertain, current understanding of natural and socio-economic
processes is often limited, and most systems are subject to many different interacting stresses.

◆ Detecting early impacts will be difficult, and unexpected changes cannot be ruled out. The
unambiguous detection of climate-induced changes in most ecological and socio-economic systems
will prove extremely difficult in the coming decades. Knowledge has increased dramatically in recent
years, but research and monitoring remain essential for gaining a better understanding of potential
impacts and the adaptation strategies needed to deal with them.

Published in October 1999

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 Climate Change INFORMATION SHEET 10

Agriculture and food security

◆ Some agricultural regions will be threatened by climate change, while others

may benefit. The impact on crop yields and productivity will vary considerably.
Added heat stress, shifting monsoons, and drier soils may reduce yields in the
tropics and subtropics, whereas longer growing seasons may boost yields in
northern Canada and Europe. Projections of regional climate change and the
resulting agricultural impacts, however, are still full of uncertainties (as illustrated
by the table below).

◆ Climate and agricultural zones are likely to shift towards the poles. Because
average temperatures are expected to rise more near the north and south poles
than near the equator, the shift in climate zones will be more pronounced at higher
latitudes. In the mid-latitude regions (45 o to 60o), present temperature zones
could shift by 150­550 km. Since each of today’s latitudinal climate belts is optimal
for particular crops, such shifts could strongly affect agricultural and livestock
production. Efforts to shift crops poleward in response could be limited by the
inability of soil types in the new climate zones to support intensive agriculture as
practiced today in the main producer countries.
UUNN ◆ Soil moisture will be affected by changing precipitation patterns. Based on
a global warming of 1­3.5oC over the next 100 years, climate models project that
both evaporation and precipitation will increase, as will the frequency of intense
rainfalls. While some regions may become wetter, in others the net effect of an
UNEP
intensified hydrological cycle will be a loss of soil moisture. Some regions that are
already drought-prone may suffer longer and more severe dry spells. The models
also project seasonal shifts in precipitation patterns: soil moisture will decline in
some mid-latitude continental regions during the summer, while rain and snow will
probably increase at high latitudes during the winter.

◆ Higher temperatures will influence production patterns. Plant growth and

WMO health may benefit from fewer freezes and chills, but some crops may be damaged
by higher temperatures, particularly if combined with water shortages. Certain
weeds may expand their range into higher-latitude habitats. There is also some
evidence that the poleward expansion of insects and plant diseases will add to the
WHO risk of crop loss.

◆ More carbon dioxide in the atmosphere could boost productivity. In principle,

higher levels of CO2 should stimulate photosynthesis in certain plants. This is
particularly true for so-called C3 plants because increased carbon dioxide tends
UNITAR
UN to suppress their photo-respiration, making them more water efficient. C3 plants
make up the majority of species globally, especially in cooler and wetter habitats,
and include most crop species, such as wheat, rice, barley, cassava and potato.
The response of C4 plants would not be as dramatic. C4 plants include such tropical
crops as maize, sugar cane, sorghum and millet, which are important for the food
security of many developing countries, as well as pasturage and forage grasses. Experiments based
on a doubling of CO2 concentrations have confirmed that “CO 2 fertilization” can increase mean yields
of C3 crops by 30%. This effect could be enhanced or reduced, however, by accompanying changes
in temperature, precipitation, pests, and the availability of nutrients.

◆ The productivity of rangelands and pastures would also be affected. For example, livestock
would become costlier if agricultural disruption leads to higher grain prices. In general, it seems
that intensively managed livestock systems will more easily adapt to climate change than will crop
systems. This may not be the case for pastoral systems, however, where communities tend to
adopt new methods and technologies more slowly.

◆ The global yield from marine fisheries should remain unchanged by global warming. The
principal effects will be felt at the national and local levels as the mix of species changes and people
respond by relocating fisheries. These possible local effects could threaten the food security of
countries that are highly dependent on fish. In general, some of the positive effects of climate
change could include longer growing seasons, lower natural winter mortality, and faster growth
rates at higher latitudes. The negative ones could include upsets in established reproductive patterns,
migration routes, and ecosystem relationships.

◆ Food security risks are primarily local and national. Studies suggest that global agricultural
production could be maintained relative to the expected baseline levels over the next 100 years.
However, regional effects would vary widely, and some countries may experience reduced output
even if they take measures to adapt. This conclusion takes into account the beneficial effects of CO2
fertilization but not other possible effects of climate change, including changes in agricultural pests
and soils.

◆ The most vulnerable people are the landless, poor, and isolated. Poor terms of trade, weak
infrastructure, lack of access to technology and information, and armed conflict will make it more
difficult for these people to cope with the agricultural consequences of climate change. Many of the
world’s poorest areas, dependent on isolated agricultural systems in semi-arid and arid regions,
face the greatest risk. Many of these at-risk populations live in sub-Saharan Africa; South, East and
Southeast Asia; tropical areas of Latin America; and some Pacific island nations.

◆ Effective policies can help to improve food security. The negative effects of climate change
can be limited by changes in crops and crop varieties, improved water-management and irrigation
systems, adapted planting schedules and tillage practices, and better watershed management and
land-use planning. In addition to addressing the physiological response of plants and animals, policies
can seek to improve how production and distribution systems cope with fluctuations in yields.

Selected crop studies of future climate change

Region Impact on yields (%)
Maize Wheat
Latin America -61 to an increase ­50 to ­5
Former Soviet Union - ­19 to +41
Europe ­30 to an increase increase or decrease
North America ­55 to +62 ­100 to +234
Africa ­65 to +6 -
South Asia ­65 to ­10 ­61 to +67
Other Asia and Pacific Rim - ­41 to +65

Note: Based on double CO2­equivalent equilibrium scenarios from global climate models.
Published in October 1999

Source: Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, “Summary for Policymakers: Scientific-Technical Analysis of Impacts,
Adaptations, and Mitigation of Climate Change”, p. 10, in “Climate Change 1995”, Vol. 2, Cambridge University Press.

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 Climate Change INFORMATION SHEET 11

Sea levels, oceans, and coastal areas

◆ The global average sea level has risen by 10 to 25 cm over the past 100
years. It is likely that much of this rise is related to an increase of 0.3­0.6oC in the
lower atmosphere’s global average temperature since 1860.

◆ Models project that sea levels will rise another 15 to 95 cm by the year
2100 (with a “best estimate” of 50 cm). This will occur due to the thermal
expansion of ocean water and an influx of freshwater from melting glaciers and ice.
The projected rise is two to five times faster than the rise experienced over the
past 100 years. The rate, magnitude, and direction of sea-level change will vary
locally and regionally in response to coastline features, changes in ocean currents,
differences in tidal patterns and sea-water density, and vertical movements of the
land itself. Sea levels are expected to continue rising for hundreds of years after
atmospheric temperatures stabilize.

◆ Coastal zones and small islands are extremely vulnerable. Coasts have been
modified and intensively developed in recent decades and thus made even more
vulnerable to higher sea levels. Developing countries with their weaker economies
and institutions face the gravest risks, but the low-lying coastal zones of developed
UUNN countries could also be seriously affected. Given the present degree of protection,
a sea-level rise of one metre would cause estimated land losses of 0.05% in Uruguay,
1% in Egypt, 6% in the Netherlands, 17.5% in Bangladesh, and up to about 80%
for Atoll Majuro in the Marshall Islands.
UNEP

◆ Flooding and coastal erosion would worsen. Salt-water intrusion will reduce
the quality and quantity of freshwater supplies. Higher sea levels could also cause
extreme events such as high tides, storm surges, and seismic sea waves (tsunami)
to reap more destruction. Flooding due to storm surges already affects some 46
million people in an average year, most of them in developing countries. Studies
suggest that this figure could increase to 92 million with a 50 cm sea-level rise,
WMO
and to 118 million with a one-metre rise.

◆ Sea-level rise could damage key economic sectors . . . A great deal of food is
produced in coastal areas, making fisheries, aquaculture, and agriculture particularly
vulnerable. Other sectors most at risk are tourism, human settlements, and insurance
WHO
(which has already suffered record losses recently due to extreme climate events). The
expected sea-level rise would inundate much of the world’s lowlands, damaging coastal
cropland and displacing millions of people from coastal and small-island communities.

UNITAR
UN ◆ . . . and threaten human health. The displacement of flooded communities,
particularly those with limited resources, would increase the risk of various
infectious, psychological, and other illnesses. Insects and other transmitters of
disease could spread to new areas. The disruption of systems for sanitation, storm-
water drainage, and sewage disposal would also have health implications.
◆ Valuable coastal ecosystems will be at serious risk. Coastal areas contain some of the world’s
most diverse and productive ecosystems, including mangrove forests, coral reefs, and sea grasses.
Low-lying deltas and coral atolls and reefs are particularly sensitive to changes in the frequency and
intensity of rainfall and storms. Coral will generally grow fast enough to keep pace with sea-level rise
but may be damaged by warmer sea temperatures.

◆ Ocean ecosystems may also be affected. In addition to higher sea levels, climate change could
reduce sea-ice cover and alter ocean circulation patterns, the vertical mixing of waters, and wave
patterns. This could have an impact on biological productivity, the availability of nutrients, and the
ecological structure and functions of marine ecosystems. Changing temperatures could also cause
geographical shifts in biodiversity, particularly in high-latitude regions, where the growing period
should increase (assuming light and nutrients remain constant). People would be more affected by
changes in fish and other biotic resources, and less by impacts on transport (due to changed
currents) and physical resources such as oil and gravel. Finally, any changes in plankton activity
could affect the oceans’ ability to absorb and store carbon. This could “feedback” into the climate
system and moderate or boost climate change.

◆ Various natural forces will influence the impact that higher sea levels will have. Coastal
areas are dynamic systems. Sedimentation, physical or biotic defenses (such as coral reefs), and
other local conditions will interact with rising sea-water. For example, freshwater supplies in coastal
zones will be more or less vulnerable depending on changes in freshwater inflows and the size of the
freshwater body. The survival of salt marshes and mangrove forests will depend in part on whether
the rate of sedimentation is greater than or less than the rate of local sea-level rise. Sedimentation
is more likely to exceed sea-level rise in sediment-rich regions such as Australia, where strong tidal
currents redistribute sediments, than in sediment-starved environments such as the Caribbean.

◆ Human activities will also play a role. Roads, buildings, and other infrastructure could limit or
affect the natural response of coastal ecosystems to sea-level rise. Pollution, sediment deposits,
and land development will influence how coastal waters respond to, and compensate for, climate
change impacts.

◆ Many policy options are available for adapting to sea-level rise. Sensitive environmental,
economic, social, and cultural values are at stake, and trade-offs may be unavoidable. Until recently,
the assessment of possible response strategies focused mainly on protection, and studies have
shown that protecting low-lying islands and large delta areas with sea walls and other barriers is
likely to be costly. A fuller range of options would include protection (dikes, dune restoration, wetland
creation), accommodation (new building codes, protection of threatened ecosystems), and planned
retreat (regulations against new coastal development). Other specific examples are dredging ports,
strengthening fisheries management, and improving design standards for offshore structures.
“Integrated coastal zone management” can offer a portfolio of possible responses from which to
choose, including social, cultural, legal, structural, financial, economic, and institutional measures.
Published in October 1999

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 Climate Change INFORMATION SHEET 12

Biological diversity and ecosystems

◆ Biological diversity - the source of enormous environmental, economic, and

cultural value - will be threatened by rapid climate change. A warming of 1­3.5 oC
over the next 100 years would shift current climate zones poleward by approximately
150­550 km - and vertically by 150­550 m - in mid-latitude regions. The composition
and geographic distribution of unmanaged ecosystems will change as individual
species respond to new conditions. At the same time, habits will be degraded and
fragmented by the combination of climate change, deforestation, and other
environmental pressures. Species that cannot adapt quickly enough may become
extinct - an irreversible loss.

◆ Forests adapt slowly to changing conditions. Observations, experiments,

and models demonstrate that a sustained increase of just 1oC in the global average
temperature would affect the functioning and composition of forests. A typical
climate change scenario for the 21st century shows a major impact on the species
composition of one third of the world’s existing forests (varying by region from one
seventh to two thirds). Entire forest types may disappear, while new combinations
of species, and hence new ecosystems, may be established. Other stresses caused
by warming may include more pests, pathogens, and fires. Because higher latitudes
UUNN are expected to warm more than equatorial ones, boreal forests will be more
affected than temperate and tropical forests.

◆ Forests play an important role in the climate system. They are a major
UNEP
reservoir of carbon, containing some 80% of all the carbon stored in land vegetation,
and about 40% of the carbon residing in soils. Large quantities of carbon may be
emitted into the atmosphere during transitions from one forest type to another
because mortality releases carbon faster than growth absorbs it. Forests also
directly affect climate on the local, regional, and continental scales by influencing
ground temperature, evapo-transpiration, surface roughness, albedo (or
reflectivity), cloud formation, and precipitation.
WMO
◆ Deserts and arid and semi-arid ecosystems may become more extreme.
With few exceptions, deserts are projected to become hotter but not significantly
wetter. Higher temperatures could threaten organisms that now exist near their
WHO heat-tolerance limits.

◆ Rangelands may experience altered growing seasons. Grasslands support

approximately 50% of the world’s livestock and are also grazed by wildlife. Shifts in
temperatures and precipitation may reshape the boundaries between grasslands,
UNITAR
UN shrublands, forests, and other ecosystems. In tropical regions such changes in the
evapo-transpiration cycle could strongly affect productivity and the mix of species.

◆ Mountain regions are already under considerable stress from human

activities. The projected declines in mountain glaciers, permafrost, and snow cover
will further affect soil stability and hydrological systems (most major river systems start in the
mountains). As species and ecosystems are forced to migrate uphill, those whose climatic ranges
are already limited to mountain tops may have nowhere to go and become extinct. Agriculture,
tourism, hydropower, logging, and other economic activities will also be affected. The food and fuel
resources of indigenous populations in many developing countries may be disrupted.

◆ The cryosphere will shrink. Representing nearly 80% of all freshwater, the cryosphere
encompasses all of the earth’s snow, ice, and permafrost. Frozen water is, of course, highly sensitive
to temperature change (a fact that researchers have used for studying past climate changes).
Climate models project that mountain glaciers could be reduced by one third to one half over the
next 100 years. This in turn will affect nearby ecosystems and communities as well as seasonal river
flows and water supplies - which in turn would affect hydropower and agriculture. The landscapes of
many high mountain ranges and polar regions would change dramatically. The melting of permafrost
could destabilize infrastructure and release additional carbon and methane into the atmosphere.
Reduced sea-ice would open certain rivers and coastal areas to navigation for longer seasons.
Despite these many striking effects, the Greenland and Antarctic ice sheets are not expected to
change much over the next 50­100 years.

◆ Non-tidal wetlands will also be reduced. These open-water and waterlogged areas provide
refuge and breeding grounds for many species. They also help to improve water quality and control
floods and droughts. Studies from several countries suggest that a warmer climate will contribute
to the decline of wetlands through higher evaporation. By altering their hydrological regimes, climate
change will influence the biological, biogeochemical, and hydrological functions of these ecosystems,
as well as their geographical distribution.

◆ Human actions can help natural ecosystems adapt to climate change. Creating natural
migration corridors and assisting particular species to migrate could benefit forest ecosystems.
Reforestation and the “integrated management” of fires, pests, and diseases can also contribute.
Rangelands could be supported through the active selection of plant species, controls on animal
stocking, and new grazing strategies. Wetlands can be restored and even created. Desertified
lands may adapt better if drought-tolerant species and better soil conservation practices are
encouraged.

Published in October 1999

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 Climate Change INFORMATION SHEET 13

Water resources

◆ Climate change will lead to more precipitation - but also to more evaporation.
In general, this acceleration of the hydrological cycle will result in a wetter world.
The question is, how much of this wetness will end up where it is needed?

◆ Precipitation will probably increase in some areas and decline in others.

Climate models are still unable to make precise regional predictions. In addition,
the hydrological cycle is extremely complex: a change in precipitation may affect
surface wetness, reflectivity, and vegetation, which then affect evapo-transpiration
and cloud formation, which in turn affect precipitation. Meanwhile, the hydrological
system is also responding to other human activities such as deforestation,
urbanization, and the over-use of water supplies.

◆ Changing precipitation patterns will affect how much water can be captured.
Several models suggest that downpours will become more intense. This would
increase floods and runoff while reducing the ability of water to infiltrate the soil.
Changes in seasonal patterns may affect the regional distribution of both ground
and surface water supplies.
UUNN ◆ The drier the climate, the more sensitive is the local hydrology. Relatively
small changes in temperature and precipitation could cause relatively large changes
in runoff. Arid and semi-arid regions will therefore be particularly sensitive to reduced
rainfall and to increased evaporation and plant transpiration.
UNEP

◆ High-latitude regions may see more runoff due to greater precipitation.

Runoff would also be affected by a reduction in snowfall, deep snow, and glacier
ice, particularly in the spring and summertime when it is traditionally used for
hydroelectricity and agriculture. All climate change models show increased
wintertime soil moisture in the high northern latitudes, with a reduction of moisture
in some areas. Most models produce less soil moisture in summer in northern mid
WMO latitudes, including some important grain producing areas; these projections are
more consistent for Europe than for North America.

◆ The effects on the tropics are harder to predict. Different climate models
produce different results for the future intensity and distribution of tropical rainfall.
WHO

◆ Reservoirs and wells would be affected. Changes at the surface would

influence the recharging of groundwater supplies and, in the longer term, aquifers.
Water quality may also respond to changes in the amount and timing of precipitation.
UNITAR
UN
◆ New patterns of runoff and evaporation will also affect natural ecosystems.
Freshwater ecosystems will respond to altered flood regimes and water levels.
Changes in water temperatures and in the thermal structure of fresh waters
could affect the survival and growth of certain organisms, and the diversity and
productivity of ecosystems. Changes in runoff, groundwater flows, and precipitation directly over
lakes and streams would affect nutrients and dissolved organic oxygen, and therefore the quality
and clarity of the water.

◆ Rising seas could invade coastal freshwater supplies. Coastal aquifers may be damaged by
saline intrusion as salty groundwater rises. The movement of the salt-front up estuaries would
affect freshwater pumping plants upriver.

◆ Reduced water supplies would place additional stress on people, agriculture, and the
environment. Regional water supplies, particularly in developing countries, will come under many
stresses in the 21st century. Climate change will exacerbate the stresses caused by pollution and
by growing populations and economies. The most vulnerable regions are arid and semi-arid areas,
some low-lying coasts, deltas, and small islands.

◆ Conflicts could be sparked by the additional pressures. The links among climate change,
water availability, food production, population growth, and economic growth are many and complex.
But climate change is likely to add to economic and political tensions, particularly in regions that
already have scarce water resources. A number of important water systems are shared by two or
more nations, and in several cases there have already been international conflicts.

◆ Improved water resource management can help to reduce vulnerabilities. New supplies must
be developed and existing supplies used more efficiently. Long-term management strategies should
include: regulations and technologies for directly controlling land and water use, incentives and
taxes for indirectly affecting behavior, the construction of new reservoirs and pipelines to boost
supplies, and improvements in water-management operations and institutions. Other adaptation
measures can include removing levees to maintain flood plains, protecting waterside vegetation,
restoring river channels to their natural form, and reducing water pollution.

Published in October 1999

Published by UNEP/IUC, International Environment House, 1219 Châtelaine, Switzerland

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 Climate Change INFORMATION SHEET 14

Human health

◆ Climate change is expected to have wide-ranging consequences for human

health. Public health depends on sufficient food, safe drinking water, secure shelter,
good social conditions, and a suitable environmental and social setting for controlling
infectious diseases. All of these factors can be affected by climate.

◆ Any increase in the frequency or intensity of extreme weather events would

pose a threat. Heat waves, flooding, storms, and drought can cause deaths and
injuries, famine, the displacement of populations, disease outbreaks, and
psychological disorders. While scientists are uncertain how climate change will
affect storm frequency, they do project that certain regions will experience
increased flooding or drought. In addition, coastal flooding is expected to worsen
due to sea-level rise unless sea defences are upgraded.

◆ Heat waves are linked to cardiovascular, respiratory, and other diseases.

Illness and deaths from these causes could be expected to increase, especially for
the elderly. A greater frequency of warm or hot weather and of thermal inversions
(a meteorological phenomenon that can delay the dispersal of pollutants) may worsen
air quality in many cities. On the other hand, milder winters in temperate climates
UUNN would probably reduce cold-related deaths in some countries.

◆ By reducing fresh water supplies, climate change may affect water resources
and sanitation. This in turn could reduce the water available for drinking and washing.
UNEP
It could also lower the efficiency of local sewer systems, leading to increased
concentrations of bacteria and other micro-organisms in raw water supplies. Water
scarcity may force people to use poorer quality sources of fresh water, such as
rivers, which are often contaminated. All of these factors could result in an increased
incidence of diarrhoeal diseases.

◆ Food security may be undermined in vulnerable regions. Local declines in

WMO
food production would lead to more malnutrition and hunger, with long-term health
consequences, particularly for children.

◆ The geographical distribution of species that transmit disease may be

WHO altered. In a warmer world, mosquitoes, ticks, and rodents could expand their
range to higher latitudes and higher altitudes. Approximately 45% of the world’s
human population presently live in regions suitable for malaria transmission. Climate
change impacts models suggest that the largest changes in the potential for
disease transmission will occur at the fringes — in terms of both latitude and
UNITAR
UN altitude — of the current malaria risk areas. Generally, people in these border
areas will not have developed immunity to the disease. The seasonal transmission
and distribution of many other diseases that are transmitted by mosquitoes
(dengue, yellow fever) and by ticks (Lyme disease, hantavirus pulmonary syndrome,
tick-borne encephalitis) may also be affected by climate change.
◆ There is a long list of other potential health effects. Asthma, allergic disorders, and cardio-
respiratory diseases could result from climate-induced changes in the formation and persistence of
pollens, spores, and certain pollutants. Changes in the production of both aquatic pathogens and
biotoxins may jeopardize the safety of seafood.

◆ People will have to adapt or intervene to minimize these enhanced health risks. Many effective
measures are available. The most important, urgent, and cost-effective is to rebuild the public
health infrastructure in countries where it has deteriorated in recent years. Many diseases and
public health problems that may be exacerbated by climate change can be effectively prevented with
adequate financial and human resources. Adaptation strategies can include infectious disease
surveillance, sanitation programmes, disaster preparedness, improved water and pollution control,
public education directed at personal behaviour, training of researchers and health professionals,
and the introduction of protective technologies (such as housing improvements, air conditioning,
water purification, and vaccination).

◆ Assessing the potential health effects of climate change involves many uncertainties.
Researchers must consider not only future scenarios of climate change but many non-climate factors
as well. For example, trends in socio-economic conditions can have a major affect on a population’s
vulnerability. Clearly, poorer communities will be more vulnerable to the health impacts of climate
change than rich ones.

Mediating process Health outcomes

Direct

Exposure to thermal extremes Altered rates of heat- and

cold-related illness and death
Altered frequency and/or intensity Deaths, injuries, psychological disorders;
TEMPERATURE of other extreme weather events damage to public health infrastructure
AND
WEATHER Indirect
CHANGES
DISTURBANCES OF
ECOLOGICAL SYSTEMS
Effects on range and activity of
Vectors and infective parasites Changes in geographic ranges
and incidence of vector-borne diseases
Altered local ecology of waterborne
Changed incidence of diarrhoeal
and foodborne infective agents
and other infectious diseases

Altered food (especially crop) Malnutrition and hunger, and

productivity, due to changes in consequent impairment of
climate, weather events, and child growth and development
associated pests and diseases

Sea-level rise with

Increased risk of infectious
population displacement and
disease, psychological disorders
damage to infrastructure

Levels and biological impacts Asthma and allergic disorders;

of air pollution, including other acute and chronic
pollens and spores respiratory disorders and deaths

Social economic and Wide range of public health

demographic dislocations due to consequences; mental health and
effects on economy, infrastructure nutritional impairment,
and resource supply infectious diseases, civil strife

Skin cancers, certain types of cataract

and immune system suppression; indirect
Published in October 1999

STRATOSPHERIC OZONE DEPLETION

impacts via impaired productivity of
agricultural and aquatic systems

Source: “Climate change and human health”, WHO/WMO/UNEP, 1996.

Published by UNEP/IUC, International Environment House, 1219 Châtelaine, Switzerland

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 Climate Change INFORMATION SHEET 15

Infrastructure, industry,
and human settlements

◆ Climate change will have some negative effects on humanity’s physical

assets. Some of the most valuable infrastructure includes industrial plants and
products; equipment for producing and distributing energy; roads, ports, and other
transportation facilities; residential and commercial properties; and coastal
embankments. While climate change may have important consequences for
infrastructure, they are likely to be smaller than those resulting from demographic,
technological, and market changes, in good part because of the many opportunities
for adaptation.

◆ Industrial, energy, and transport infrastructure may be damaged. Changes

in temperature, precipitation, or extreme events can destroy exposed infra-
structure or affect productive output. Among the extreme events that may become
more frequent or intense in some regions are coastal storm surges, floods, and
landslides induced by local downpours, windstorms, rapid snow-melt, tropical
cyclones and hurricanes, and drought-induced forest and bush fires.

◆ Some economic activities are particularly vulnerable. In general, the climate

UN sensitivity of the industry, energy, and transportation sectors is relatively low
UN
compared to that of agriculture and natural ecosystems. Most susceptible to
surprises, sudden changes, and extreme events are agro-industry; the production
of hydroelectricity, biomass, and other forms of renewable energy; energy use;
construction; some transportation activities; and infrastructure located in coastal
UNEP
zones, on permafrost, or other vulnerable areas.

◆ Rising sea levels could have the most dramatic and direct consequences.
Many coastlines are highly developed and contain human settlements, industry,
ports, and other infrastructure. Among the most vulnerable are some small island
nations, developing countries, and densely populated coasts that currently lack
extensive sea and coastal defense systems. Sea-level rise, storm surges, and
WMO
flooding could force populations to migrate, with additional consequences for
infrastructure further in-land.

◆ The property insurance sector is particularly vulnerable to extreme climate

WHO events. A greater risk of extreme events due to climate change could lead to
higher insurance premiums or the withdrawal of insurance coverage in some
vulnerable areas. Changes in climate variability and the risk of extreme events may
be hard to detect or predict, making it difficult for insurance companies to adjust
their premiums correctly. If such problems lead these firms to insolvency, they
UNITAR
UN may not be able to honor outstanding insurance contracts. This in turn could
weaken other economic sectors, such as banking.

◆ Industry would experience many indirect effects . . . Because economic

activities are so interconnected, an impact on one sector can affect the entire
economy. Industry, energy, and transportation are likely to feel knock-on effects via climate-sensitive
resource sectors such as agro-industry and biomass production. Climate-sensitive markets will
also send signals, such as a changing energy demand for heating or cooling buildings. The result will
be an aggregation of many individual impacts.

◆ . . . as would human settlements. For example, a decline in the productivity of natural resources
in rural areas may accelerate rural-to-urban migration, especially in the developing world. Migration
in response to chronic crop failures, regional flooding, or drought would put pressure on existing
housing, water, food, and health systems.

◆ Settlements stressed by population growth, poverty, industrialization, and environmental

degradation are the most vulnerable. Also at risk are large primary coastal cities, squatter camps
located in flood plains and on steep hillsides, settlements in forested areas vulnerable to increased
seasonal wildfires, and communities that depend on subsistence agriculture or on commercial fishing.
In all cases, the poorest people will be the most affected.

◆ Human infrastructure can be protected through well-chosen policies and management

strategies. The life cycles for planning and investing in infrastructure are often short enough to
allow managers to anticipate future climate change. They could adapt to climate change by replacing
capital at the normal pace with more appropriate designs and locations. However, it cannot be
assumed that people and organizations will always adopt such adaptation strategies automatically.
Governments may need to set policy and regulatory frameworks to encourage private action. They
may also need to take direct action to protect certain vulnerable infrastructure. The message,
then, is clear: future risks can be reduced if climate change is incorporated into all current planning.

◆ Diversifying the economy can offer additional protection. Developing countries that rely on a
limited number of crops or other resources are economically vulnerable to climate change. When
combined with improved management practices such as “integrated coastal management”, economic
diversification can be an important precautionary response. However, these strategies will often
encounter resistance. Some of the possible constraints are technological advancement, human
resources, finances, cultural and social sensitivities, and political and legal obstacles. The lack of
financial and human resources is especially acute for developing countries.

Published in October 1999

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 Climate Change INFORMATION SHEET 16

Climate disasters and extreme events

◆ The climate varies naturally on all time­scales. Variations can be caused by

external forces such as volcanic eruptions or changes in the sun’s energy output.
They can also result from the internal interactions of the climate system’s various
components - the atmosphere, oceans, biosphere, ice cover, and land surface. These
internal interactions can cause fairly regular fluctuations, such as the El Nino/
Southern Oscillation (ENSO) phenomenon, or apparently random changes in climate.

◆ Natural variability often leads to climate extremes and disasters. On

time­scales of days, months, and years, weather and climate variability can produce
heat waves, frosts, floods, droughts, severe storms, and other extremes. A climate
extreme is a significant departure from the normal state of the climate system,
irrespective of its actual impact on life or the earth’s ecology. When a climate
extreme has a major adverse impact on human welfare, it is called a climatic disaster.
In some parts of the world climatic disasters occur so frequently that they may be
considered part of the norm. It is possible that greenhouse gas­induced climate
change will alter the frequency, magnitude, and character of both climate extremes
and climatic disasters.
UUNN ◆ Every region of the world experiences record­breaking climate extremes
from time to time. In 1995, for example, summer heat­waves affected both the US
Midwest and the Indian sub­continent. More than 700 people died from heat stress
in the US; 500 died in northern India when June temperatures soared to 50 degrees
UNEP
Celsius. Earlier that year, river flooding in the Netherlands caused the evacuation of
over 200,000 people and almost half a million livestock. It was the worst flooding
since the Dutch sea dikes failed in 1953. In the first decades of this century, a trend
towards increased drought in the North American Midwest culminated in the “Dust
Bowl” decade of the 1930s, after which conditions eased. More recently, annual
rainfall over the Sahel zone of northern Africa during nine of the years since 1970
has dropped more than 20% below the average prevailing during this century’s first
WMO seven decades; those previous 70 years saw only one extreme of this magnitude.

◆ Do today’s frequent reports of record­breaking events mean that climate

extremes are becoming more common? According to the Intergovernmental Panel
on Climate Change, “there are inadequate data to determine whether consistent
WHO
changes in climate variability or weather extremes have occurred over the 20th
century”. There have been some regional trends but “some of these changes have
been toward greater variability; some have been toward lower variability”. It may
simply be that people are much more aware of extreme events because the
UNITAR
UN communications revolution has made news and information so much more widely
available than ever before.

◆ Increased human vulnerability is transforming extreme events into more

climatic disasters. People in many parts of the world are being forced to live in
more exposed and marginal areas. Elsewhere, high­value property is being developed in high­risk
zones. This has been reflected in the severe pounding that the insurance industry has received from
a series of “billion dollar” storms since 1987.

◆ In the future, global climate change may significantly affect the frequency, magnitude, and
location of extreme events. Any shift in mean climate will almost inevitably affect the frequency of
extreme events (see figure). In general, more heat­waves and fewer frosts could be expected, and
more intense rainfalls may lead to increased flooding in some regions. However, extreme events last
for a relatively short time and are usually a local experience, making it difficult for scientists to
predict how these events might respond to climate change. For example, a warming of the tropical
oceans would by itself be expected to increase the frequency, and perhaps the severity, of tropical
cyclones. But other factors, such as changing winds or storm tracks, might offset this effect at
the local level. In any case, growing human vulnerability to climate extremes, combined with the
uncertainties of climate change, clearly offers cause for concern.

◆ While extreme events are inherently abrupt and random, the risks they pose can be reduced.
Improved preparedness planning is urgently needed in many parts of the world, with or without
climate change. Better information, stronger institutions, and new technologies can minimize human
and material losses. For example, new buildings can be designed and located in ways that minimize
damage from floods and tropical cyclones, while sophisticated irrigation techniques can protect
farmers and their crops from droughts.

◆ Scientists cannot state that today’s extreme events result from climate change. They
simply do not understand the climate system and the effects of greenhouse gas emissions well
enough to conclude that particular events are linked to the general problem. (It is possible that in
future decades they may look back and realise with the benefit of hindsight that certain events
indeed were linked.) Nevertheless, monitoring and studying extreme events, and learning how to
predict and cope with them, must be a priority. Of all the effects of climate variability in the decades
to come, extreme events are likely to be of greatest consequence for human well-being.

The frequency distribution of

monthly temperature before
and after a change in mean
climate in this hypothetical
example, temperature rises by
2.5oC from a present mean
given as 25 oC. Without any
other changes in the character
of the local climate, this doubles
the frequency of cases in which
the temperature exceeds 30 oC.
Number of events

The probability of temperature

extremes greater than 30oC in
the present is indicated by the
darker areas while the lighter
shaded area indicates the effect
of increasing the mean tempe-
rature by 2.5oC. The frequency
of low temperature extremes
decreases correspondingly.
Source: Climatic Research Unit,
University of East Anglia.

Degrees Celcius
Published in October 1999

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 Climate Change INFORMATION SHEET 17

The international response

to climate change

◆ The First World Climate Conference recognized climate change as a serious

problem in 1979. This scientific gathering explored how climate change might
affect human activities. It issued a declaration calling on the world’s governments
“to foresee and prevent potential man-made changes in climate that might be
adverse to the well-being of humanity”. It also endorsed plans to establish a World
Climate Programme (WCP) under the joint responsibility of the World Meteorological
Organization (WMO), the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), and
the International Council of Scientific Unions (ICSU).

◆ A number of intergovernmental conferences focusing on climate change

were held in the late 1980s and early 1990s. Together with increasing scientific
evidence, these conferences helped to raise international concern about the issue.
Participants included government policy-makers, scientists, and environmentalists.
The meetings addressed both scientific and policy issues and called for global
action. The key events were the Villach Conference (October 1985), the Toronto
Conference (June 1988), the Ottawa Conference (February 1989), the Tata
Conference (February 1989), the Hague Conference and Declaration (March 1989),
the Noordwijk Ministerial Conference (November 1989), the Cairo Compact
UUNN
(December 1989), the Bergen Conference (May 1990), and the Second World
Climate Conference (November 1990).

◆ The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) released its First

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Assessment Report in 1990. Established in 1988 by UNEP and WMO, the Panel
was given a mandate to assess the state of existing knowledge about the climate
system and climate change; the environmental, economic, and social impacts of
climate change; and the possible response strategies. Approved after a painstaking
peer review process, the Report confirmed the scientific evidence for climate
change. This had a powerful effect on both policy-makers and the general public
and provided the basis for negotiations on the Climate Change Convention.
WMO
◆ In December 1990, the UN General Assembly approved the start of treaty
negotiations. The Intergovernmental Negotiating Committee for a Framework
Convention on Climate Change (INC/FCCC) met for five sessions between February
WHO 1991 and May 1992. Facing a strict deadline – the June 1992 Rio “Earth Summit”
– negotiators from 150 countries finalized the Convention in just 15 months. It
was adopted in New York on 9 May 1992.

◆ The 1992 UN Framework Convention on Climate Change was signed by

UNITAR
UN 154 states (plus the EC) at Rio de Janeiro. Twenty years after the 1972 Stockholm
Declaration first laid the foundations of contemporary environmental policy, the
Earth Summit became the largest-ever gathering of Heads of State. Other
agreements adopted at Rio were the Rio Declaration, Agenda 21, the Convention
on Biological Diversity, and Forest Principles.
◆ The Convention entered into force on 21 March 1994. This was 90 days after the receipt of
the 50th instrument of ratification (after signing a convention a state must also ratify). The next
critical date was 21 September when developed country Parties started submitting national
communications describing their climate change strategies. Meanwhile, the INC continued its
preparatory work, meeting for another six sessions to discuss matters relating to commitments,
arrangements for the financial mechanism, technical and financial support to developing countries,
and procedural and institutional matters. The INC was dissolved after its 11th and final session in
February 1995, and the Conference of the Parties (COP) became the Convention’s ultimate authority.

◆ The Conference of the Parties held its first session in Berlin from 28 March - 7 April 1995.
Delegates from 117 Parties and 53 Observer States participated in COP-1, as did over 2,000
observers and journalists. They agreed that the commitments contained in the Convention for
developed countries were inadequate and launched the “Berlin Mandate” talks on additional
commitments. They also reviewed the first round of national communications and finalized much of
the institutional and financial machinery needed to support action under the Convention in the years
to come. COP-2 was held at the Palais des Nations in Geneva from 8-19 June 1996.

◆ The IPCC adopted its Second Assessment Report in December 1995. Published in time for
COP-2, the Second Assessment Report was written and reviewed by some 2,000 scientists and
experts world-wide. It was soon widely known for concluding that “the balance of evidence suggests
that there is a discernible human influence on global climate.” However, the Report did much more,
for example confirming the availability of so-called no-regrets options and other cost-effective
strategies for combating climate change. The IPCC will produce a series of technical papers and
special reports before publishing its Third Assessment Report in 2001.

◆ The Kyoto Protocol was adopted at COP-3 in December 1997. Some 10,000 delegates,
observers, and journalists participated in this high-profile event from 1 - 11 December. Under the
Protocol, which was adopted by consensus, industrialized countries have a legally binding commitment
to reduce their collective greenhouses gas emissions by at least 5% compared to 1990 levels by
the period 2008-2012. The Protocol will enter into force 90 days after it has been ratified by at
least 55 Parties to the Convention, including developed countries representing at least 55% of this
group’s total 1990 CO2 emissions.

◆ The 1998 Buenos Aires conference adopted a two-year Plan of Action. Held from 2-13
November, COP-4 set deadlines for finalizing the outstanding details of the Kyoto Protocol so that
the agreement will be fully operational when it enters into force sometime after the year 2000. In
addition to the Protocol’s “mechanisms”, the Plan of Action addresses work on compliance issues
and on policies and measures. COP-5 will be held from 25 October - 5 November in Bonn, and COP-
6 will be held in late 2000. Published in October 1999

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 Climate Change INFORMATION SHEET 18

The Climate Change Convention

◆ The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Convention is the

foundation of global efforts to combat global warming. Opened for signature in
1992 at the Rio Earth Summit, its ultimate objective is the “stabilization of
greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that would prevent
dangerous anthropogenic [human-induced] interference with the climate system.
Such a level should be achieved within a time-frame sufficient to allow ecosystems
to adapt naturally to climate change, to ensure that food production is not
threatened and to enable economic development to proceed in a sustainable
manner.”

◆ The Convention sets out some guiding principles. The precautionary principle
says that the lack of full scientific certainty should not be used as an excuse to
postpone action when there is a threat of serious or irreversible damage. The
principle of the “common but differentiated responsibilities” of states assigns the
lead in combating climate change to developed countries. Other principles deal
with the special needs of developing countries and the importance of promoting
sustainable development.
UUNN ◆ Both developed and developing countries accept a number of general
commitments. All Parties will develop and submit “national communications”
containing inventories of greenhouse gas emissions by source and greenhouse gas
removals by “sinks”. They will adopt national programmes for mitigating climate
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change and develop strategies for adapting to its impacts. They will also promote
technology transfer and the sustainable management, conservation, and
enhancement of greenhouse gas sinks and “reservoirs” (such as forests and
oceans). In addition, the Parties will take climate change into account in their
relevant social, economic, and environmental policies; cooperate in scientific,
technical, and educational matters; and promote education, public awareness,
and the exchange of information related to climate change.
WMO
◆ Industrialized countries undertake several specific commitments. Most
members of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD)
plus the states of Central and Eastern Europe – known collectively as Annex I
countries – are committed to adopting policies and measures aimed at returning
WHO
their greenhouse gas emissions to 1990 levels by the year 2000. They must also
submit national communications on a regular basis detailing their climate change
strategies. Several states may together adopt a joint emissions target. The
countries in transition to a market economy are granted a certain degree of flexibility
UNITAR
UN in implementing their commitments.

◆ The richest countries shall provide “new and additional financial resources”
and facilitate technology transfer. These so-called Annex II countries (essentially
the OECD) will fund the “agreed full cost” incurred by developing countries for
submitting their national communications. These funds must be “new and additional” rather than
redirected from existing development aid funds. Annex II Parties will also help finance certain other
Convention-related projects, and they will promote and finance the transfer of, or access to,
environmentally sound technologies, particularly for developing country Parties. The Convention
recognizes that the extent to which developing country Parties implement their commitments will
depend on financial and technical assistance from the developed countries.

◆ The supreme body of the Convention is the Conference of the Parties (COP). The COP
comprises all the states that have ratified or acceded to the Convention (over 175 by May 1999).
It held its first meeting (COP-1) in Berlin in 1995 and will continue to meet on a yearly basis unless
the Parties decide otherwise. The COP’s role is to promote and review the implementation of the
Convention. It will periodically review existing commitments in light of the Convention’s objective,
new scientific findings, and the effectiveness of national climate change programmes. The COP can
adopt new commitments through amendments and protocols to the Convention; in December 1997
it adopted the Kyoto Protocol containing stronger emissions-related commitments for developed
countries in the post-2000 period.

◆ The Convention also establishes two subsidiary bodies. The Subsidiary Body for Scientific
and Technological Advice (SBSTA) provides the COP with timely information and advice on scientific
and technological matters relating to the Convention. The Subsidiary Body for Implementation (SBI)
helps with the assessment and review of the Convention’s implementation. Two additional bodies
were established by COP-1: the Ad hoc Group on the Berlin Mandate (AGBM), which concluded its
work in Kyoto in December 1997, and the Ad hoc Group on Article 13 (AG13), which concluded its
work in June 1998.

◆ A financial mechanism provides funds on a grant or concessional basis. The Convention

states that this mechanism shall be guided by, and be accountable to, the Conference of the Parties,
which shall decide on its policies, programme priorities, and eligibility criteria. There should be an
equitable and balanced representation of all Parties within a transparent system of governance. The
operation of the financial mechanism may be entrusted to one or more international entities. The
Convention assigns this role to the Global Environment Facility (GEF) on an interim basis; in 1999
the COP decided to entrust the GEF with this responsibility on an on-going basis and to review the
financial mechanism every four years.

◆ The COP and its subsidiary bodies are serviced by a secretariat. The interim secretariat
that functioned during the negotiation of the Convention became the permanent secretariat in
January 1996. The secretariat arranges for sessions of the COP and its subsidiary bodies, drafts
official documents, services meetings, compiles and transmits reports submitted to it, facilitates
assistance to Parties for the compilation and communication of information, coordinates with
secretariats of other relevant international bodies, and reports on its activities to the COP.
Published in October 1999

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 Climate Change INFORMATION SHEET 19

The Conference of the Parties (COP)

◆ The Conference of the Parties is the “supreme body” of the Climate Change
Convention. The vast majority of the world’s states are members – over 175 as of
May 1999. The Convention enters into force for a state 90 days after that state
ratifies it. The COP held its first session in 1995 and will continue to meet annually
unless decided otherwise. (The various subsidiary bodies that advise and support
the COP meet more frequently.)

◆ The COP must promote and review the Convention’s implementation. The
Convention states that the COP must periodically examine the obligations of the
Parties and the institutional arrangements under the Convention. It should do this
in light of the Convention’s objective, the experience gained in its implementation,
and the current state of scientific knowledge.

◆ Progress is reviewed largely through the exchange of information. The COP

assesses information about policies and emissions that the Parties share with
each other through their “national communications.” It also promotes and guides
the development and periodic refinement of comparable methodologies, which are
needed for quantifying net greenhouse gas emissions and evaluating the
UUNN effectiveness of measures to limit them. Based on the information available, the
COP assesses the Parties’ efforts to meet their treaty commitments and adopts
and publishes regular reports on the Convention’s implementation.
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◆ Mobilizing financial resources is vital for helping developing countries carry
out their obligations. They need support so that they can submit their national
communications, adapt to the adverse effects of climate change, and obtain
environmentally sound technologies. The COP therefore oversees the provision of
new and additional resources by developed countries.

◆ The COP is also responsible for keeping the entire process on track. In
WMO
addition to the two subsidiary bodies established under the Convention – the
Subsidiary Body for Implementation (SBI) and the Subsidiary Body for Scientific
and Technological Advice (SBSTA) – the COP can establish new ones to help it with
its work, as it did at its first session (see below). The COP reviews reports from
these bodies and guides them. It must also agree and adopt, by consensus, rules
WHO
of procedure and financial rules for itself and the subsidiary bodies (as of early
1999 the rules of procedures had not been adopted and, with the exception of the
rule on voting, are being “applied”).

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UN ◆ The Conference of the Parties held its first session (known as COP-1) in
Berlin. From 28 March -7 April 1995, the historic city of Berlin was the site of the
first global climate change meeting attended by ministers since the 1992 Rio
“Earth Summit”. The Convention required COP-1 to review whether the commitment
by developed countries to take measures aimed at returning their emissions to
1990 levels by the year 2000 was adequate for meeting the Convention’s objective. The Parties
agreed that new commitments were indeed needed for the post-2000 period. They adopted the
“Berlin Mandate” and established a new subsidiary body, the Ad hoc Group on the Berlin Mandate
(AGBM), to draft “a protocol or another legal instrument” for adoption at COP-3 in 1997. The Berlin
meeting also started the review process to consider the implementation of the Convention by
discussing a compilation and synthesis of the first 15 national communications submitted by developed
countries.

◆ The second session of the COP took stock of progress on the Berlin Mandate. Ministers
stressed the need to accelerate talks on how to strengthen the Climate Change Convention. Their
Geneva Declaration endorsed the 1995 Second Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel
on Climate Change (IPCC) “as currently the most comprehensive and authoritative assessment of
the science of climate change, its impacts and response options now available.” Held at the Palais
des Nations in Geneva from 8-19 July 1996, COP-2 also considered the review process for national
communications and decided on the contents of the first national communications that developing
countries were to start submitting in April 1997.

◆ The third session of the Conference of the Parties adopted the Kyoto Protocol. The Parties
met in Kyoto, Japan from 1-11 December 1997 to conclude the Berlin Mandate process. The
Protocol they crafted is a legally binding agreement under which industrialized countries are to
reduce their collective emissions of six greenhouse gases by 5.2% by 2008-12, calculated as an
average over these five years. To help Parties reduce emissions cost-effectively while promoting
sustainable development, the Protocol includes three “mechanisms”: the clean development
mechanism, an emissions trading regime, and joint implementation. COP-3 also considered funding,
technology transfer, and the review of information under the Convention.

◆ COP-4 adopted a two-year Plan of Action to finalize the Protocol’s outstanding details. To
ensure that the agreement will be fully operational when it enters into force sometime after the
year 2000, governments agreed to a COP-6 deadline for deciding just how its “mechanisms” will
function. The Plan also addresses compliance issues and policies and measures and Convention-
related issues such as the transfer of climate-friendly technologies to developing countries and the
special needs and concerns of countries affected by global warming and by the economic implications
of response measures. COP-4 was held in Buenos Aires from 2 -13 November 1998. COP-5 will take
place in Bonn from 25 October - 5 November 1999, and COP-6 will be held in late 2000 or early
2001.

Published in October 1999

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 Climate Change INFORMATION SHEET 20

Sharing and reviewing

national information

◆ The sharing of information by governments is central to how the Climate

Change Convention works. The Convention requires its members to submit “national
communications” to the Conference of the Parties (COP) on a regular basis. This
information about national greenhouse gas emissions, international cooperation,
and national activities is reviewed periodically so that the Parties can track the
Convention’s effectiveness and draw lessons for future national and global action.

◆ National communications describe what a Party is doing to implement the

Convention. Relevant issues could include policies for limiting greenhouse gas
emissions and adapting to climate change, climate research, monitoring of climate
impacts on ecosystems and agriculture, voluntary action by industry, integration
of climate change concerns into long-term planning, coastal-zone management,
disaster preparedness, training, and public awareness.

◆ “National inventories” of greenhouse gas emissions and removals are

updated regularly. This data details the sources of emissions for each gas, the
“sinks” (such as forests) that remove greenhouse gases from the atmosphere,
and the quantities involved. The information should be collected using agreed
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methodologies to ensure that national data are consistent and comparable and
can be incorporated into global data sets.

◆ Developed countries are providing additional details on their efforts to limit

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emissions. These so-called Annex I Parties must describe the policies and measures
they are adopting in an effort to return their greenhouse gas emissions to 1990
levels by the year 2000. They also provide projections through the year 2000 of how
these policies will affect emissions and sinks. Developed countries were committed
to making their first submissions no later than six months after becoming a Party.
These initial communications were single documents, normally with annexes and a
brief executive summary. The majority of developed countries have already submitted
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their second communications, which were due starting April 1997.

◆ National communications from developed countries are subjected to a three-

step review process. The first step is to compile and synthesize the information
WHO contained in all the submissions. A team of experts from developed and developing
countries and from international organizations is assembled by the Convention’s
secretariat for each review. The first review of the second national communications in
late 1997 considered submissions from 18 Parties, while the second review in late
1998 was based on 26.
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UN
◆ The second step is the in-depth review of individual communications. Based in
part on on-site visits, the experts conduct a comprehensive technical assessment of
each submission. In addition to providing a more rigorous analysis, this approach has
the benefit of building capacity in developing countries through the participation of their
experts. Together with the information compiled in step one, the in-depth reviews are summed up in a
“compilation and synthesis” report that is prepared for each session of the Conference of the Parties.

◆ The process concludes with an overall review by the COP. This third step focuses on the big
picture of how the Convention is influencing international action on climate change.

◆ The 1998 review revealed that greenhouse gas emissions in the richest (essentially OECD)
countries have risen by 3.5% since 1990. Meanwhile, emissions in the economies in transition
(Central/Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union) have declined by 28% due to economic
restructuring. As a result, overall emissions from developed countries have declined by 4.6% since
1990. Comparing data from the 1990 inventories with projections for the years 2000 and 2010
suggests that emissions will be some 3% lower in 2000. They will rise by 8% by 2010 if additional
control measures are not adopted. (For details on CO2 see Table 4 on Sheet 30.)

◆ Carbon dioxide accounted for 82% of total greenhouse gas emissions from developed countries
in 1995. The 1998 review confirmed that fuel combustion is the most important source of CO2, accounting
for 96% of 1995’s emissions. Since the 36 Parties included in this review account for a major part of
1990 global carbon dioxide emissions, this seems to confirm carbon dioxide as the most important
greenhouse gas resulting from human activities. Governments generally believe that their data on carbon
dioxide have a high confidence level (with the exception of land-use change and the forestry sector).

◆ Methane and nitrous oxide accounted for 12% and 4% of total emissions, respectively.
Confidence levels for data on these gases are medium to low, depending on the sector. For methane,
all but five Parties project that their emissions will decline or stabilize. Nitrous oxide trends will also
decline or stabilize in the majority of developed countries. These countries’ combined emissions of
HFCs, PFCs, and SF6 represented 2% of the 1995 total.

◆ Developed countries are exploring a wide range of climate change policies and measures. The
policies governments choose are generally dictated by national circumstances such as political structure
and the overall economic situation. Many are “no regrets” measures that have environmental or
economic benefits while responding to climate change concerns. In addition to regulatory and economic
instruments, Parties are promoting voluntary agreements with industry and public authorities. Other
measures involve research and development, and information and education.

◆ Specific measures are being used for most of the major economic sectors. Policies for the energy
sector (the largest source of emissions for many countries) include switching to low-or no-carbon fuels,
energy market liberalization, and removing subsidies on coal. Industry-related policies include voluntary
arrangements, efficiency standards, financial incentives, and liberalized energy prices. The focus in the
residential, commercial, and institutional sector is on energy-efficiency standards for new buildings,
higher energy prices, and public information campaigns. Agricultural measures include reducing herd
sizes and fertilizer use and improving waste management. While most governments project an expansion
of the transportation sector, relatively few measures for controlling its emissions were reported.

◆ Developing countries started making their initial submissions in 1997. Their due date is 36
months after becoming a Party or having access to the necessary financial resources. Parties that are
least developed countries may make their initial communications at their discretion. In 1996, the COP
adopted the guidelines and format that developing countries should use for these initial communications.
It has also emphasized to the Global Environmental Facility the need to expedite the approval and
disbursement of financial resources so that developing countries can make their submissions on time.

◆ The frequency of future communications by all Parties will be determined by the COP. In 1998,
the COP asked developed countries to submit their third national communications by 30 November
Published in October 1999

2001. The COP will also continue to work towards improving the quality and usefulness of the national
communications. In particular, many methodological and practical problems concerning data collection
and the calculation of inventories must still be resolved. The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate
Change (IPCC) is therefore working to refine the methodologies used for national communications.
Published by UNEP/IUC, International Environment House, 1219 Châtelaine, Switzerland
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 Climate Change INFORMATION SHEET 21

The Kyoto Protocol

◆ The Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate

Change strengthens the international response to climate change. Adopted by
consensus at the third session of the Conference of the Parties (COP-3) in December
1997, it contains legally binding emissions targets for Annex I (developed) countries
for the post-2000 period. By arresting and reversing the upward trend in
greenhouse gas emissions that started in these countries 150 years ago, the
Protocol promises to move the international community one step closer to achieving
the Convention’s ultimate objective of preventing “dangerous anthropogenic [man-
made] interference with the climate system”.

◆ The developed countries commit themselves to reducing their collective

emissions of six key greenhouse gases by at least 5%. This group target will be
achieved through cuts of 8% by Switzerland, most Central and East European
states, and the European Union (the EU will meet its target by distributing different
rates to its member states); 7% by the US; and 6% by Canada, Hungary, Japan,
and Poland. Russia, New Zealand, and Ukraine are to stabilize their emissions,
while Norway may increase emissions by up to 1%, Australia by up to 8%, and
Iceland 10%. The six gases are to be combined in a “basket”, with reductions in
UUNN individual gases translated into “CO2 equivalents” that are then added up to produce
a single figure.

◆ Each country’s emissions target must be achieved by the period 2008-

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2012. It will be calculated as an average over the five years. “Demonstrable
progress” must be made by 2005. Cuts in the three most important gases –
carbon dioxide (CO 2), methane (CH4), and nitrous oxide (N 20) - will be measured
against a base year of 1990 (with exceptions for some countries with economies
in transition). Cuts in three long-lived industrial gases – hydrofluorocarbons (HFCs),
perfluorocarbons (PFCs), and sulphur hexafluoride (SF 6) - can be measured against
either a 1990 or 1995 baseline. (A major group of industrial gases,
WMO chlorofluorocarbons, or CFCs, are dealt with under the 1987 Montreal Protocol
on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer.)

◆ Actual emission reductions will be much larger than 5%. Compared to

emissions levels projected for the year 2000, the richest industrialized
WHO
countries (OECD members) will need to reduce their collective output by about
10%. This is because many of these countries will not succeed in meeting
their earlier non-binding aim of returning emissions to 1990 levels by the year
2000, and their emissions have in fact risen since 1990. While the countries
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UN with economies in transition have experienced falling emissions since 1990,
this trend is now reversing. Therefore, for the developed countries as a whole,
the 5% Protocol target represents an actual cut of around 20% when
compared to the emissions levels that are projected for 2010 if no emissions-
control measures are adopted.
◆ Countries will have a certain degree of flexibility in how they make and measure their
emissions reductions. In particular, an international “emissions trading” regime will be established
allowing industrialized countries to buy and sell emissions credits amongst themselves. They will
also be able to acquire “emission reduction units” by financing certain kinds of projects in other
developed countries. In addition, a “clean development mechanism” for promoting sustainable
development will enable industrialized countries to finance emissions-reduction projects in developing
countries and to receive credit for doing so. The operational guidelines for these various schemes
are being elaborated under a two-year Plan of Action that is to conclude by COP-6 in late 2000 or
early 2001.

◆ They will pursue emissions cuts in a wide range of economic sectors. The Protocol encourages
governments to cooperate with one another, improve energy efficiency, reform the energy and
transportation sectors, promote renewable forms of energy, phase out inappropriate fiscal measures
and market imperfections, limit methane emissions from waste management and energy systems,
and protect forests and other carbon “sinks”. The measurement of changes in net emissions
(calculated as emissions minus removals of CO2) from forests is methodologically complex and still
needs to be clarified.

◆ The Protocol will advance the implementation of existing commitments by all countries.
Under the Convention, both developed and developing countries agree to take measures to limit
emissions and promote adaptation to future climate change impacts; submit information on their
national climate change programmes and inventories; promote technology transfer; cooperate on
scientific and technical research; and promote public awareness, education, and training. The Protocol
also reiterates the need to provide “new and additional” financial resources to meet the “agreed full
costs” incurred by developing countries in carrying out these commitments.

◆ The Conference of the Parties (COP) of the Convention will also serve as the meeting of the
Parties (MOP) for the Protocol. This structure is expected to reduce costs and facilitate the
management of the intergovernmental process. Parties to the Convention that are not Parties to
the Protocol will be able to participate in Protocol-related meetings as observers.

◆ The new agreement will be periodically reviewed. The Parties will take “appropriate action” on
the basis of the best available scientific, technical, and socio-economic information. The first review
will take place at the second COP session serving the Protocol. Talks on commitments for the post-
2012 period must start by 2005.

◆ The Protocol was opened for signature for one year starting 16 March 1998. It will enter
into force 90 days after it has been ratified by at least 55 Parties to the Convention, including
developed countries representing at least 55% of the total 1990 carbon dioxide emissions from
this group. In the meantime, governments will continue to carry out their commitments under the
Climate Change Convention. They will also work on many practical issues relating to the Protocol and
its future implementation at their regular COP and subsidiary body meetings.
Published in October 1999

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 Climate Change INFORMATION SHEET 22

How human activities

produce greenhouse gases

◆ Most important human activities emit greenhouse gases (GHGs). Emissions

started to rise dramatically in the 1800s due to the Industrial Revolution and
changes in land use. Many greenhouse gas-emitting activities are now essential to
the global economy and form a fundamental part of modern life.

◆ Carbon dioxide from the burning of fossil fuels is the largest single source
of greenhouse gas emissions from human activities. The supply and use of fossil
fuels accounts for about three quarters of mankind’s carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions
(equal to some 5.9 billion metric tonnes of carbon in 1992), one-fifth of the methane
(CH4), and a significant quantity of nitrous oxide (N2O). It also produces nitrogen
oxides (NOx), hydrocarbons (HCs), and carbon monoxide (CO), which, though not
greenhouse gases themselves, influence chemical cycles in the atmosphere that
create or destroy other greenhouse gases, such as tropospheric ozone. Meanwhile,
fuel-related releases of sulphate aerosols are temporarily masking part of the
warming effect of greenhouse gases.

◆ Most emissions associated with energy use result when fossil fuels are
UN burned. Oil, natural gas, and coal (which emits the most carbon per unit of energy
UN
supplied) furnish most of the energy used to produce electricity, run automobiles,
heat houses, and power factories. If fuel burned completely, the only by-product
containing carbon would be carbon dioxide. But combustion is often incomplete, so
carbon monoxide and other hydrocarbons are also produced. Nitrous oxide and
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other nitrogen oxides are produced because fuel combustion causes nitrogen in
the fuel or air to combine with oxygen in the air. Sulphur oxides (SOx) result when
sulphur (primarily from coal and heavy fuel oil) combines with oxygen; the resulting
sulphate aerosols have a cooling effect on the atmosphere.

◆ Extracting, processing, transporting, and distributing fossil fuels also

releases greenhouse gases. These releases can be deliberate, as when natural
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gas is flared or vented from oil wells, emitting mostly carbon dioxide and methane,
respectively. They can also result from accidents, poor maintenance, and small
leaks in well heads, pipe fittings, and pipelines. Methane occurring naturally in coal
seams as pockets of gas or “dissolved” in the coal itself is released when coal is
WHO mined or pulverized. Hydrocarbons enter the atmosphere as a result of oil spills
from tanker ships or small losses during the routine fueling of motor vehicles.

◆ Deforestation is the second largest source of carbon dioxide. When forests

are cleared for agriculture or development, most of the carbon in the burned or
UNITAR
UN decomposing trees escapes to the atmosphere. However, when new forests are
planted the growing trees absorb carbon dioxide, removing it from the atmosphere.
Recent net deforestation has occurred mainly in the tropics. There is a great deal of
scientific uncertainty about emissions from deforestation, but it is estimated that
from 600 million to 2.6 billion tonnes of carbon are released globally every year.
◆ Producing lime (calcium oxide) to make cement accounts for 2.5% of CO 2 emissions from
industrial sources. Like the CO2 emitted from fossil fuels, the carbon dioxide released during cement
production is derived from limestone and is thus of fossil origin, primarily sea shells and other
biomass buried in ancient ocean sediments.

◆ Domesticated animals emit methane. The second-most important greenhouse gas after carbon
dioxide, methane is produced by cattle, dairy cows, buffalo, goats, sheep, camels, pigs, and horses.
Most livestock-related methane emissions are produced by “enteric fermentation” of food by bacteria
and other microbes in the animals’ digestive tracts; another source is the decomposition of animal
manure. Livestock account for about one-quarter of the methane emissions from human activities,
totalling some 100 million tonnes a year.

◆ Rice cultivation also releases methane . . . “Wetland” or “paddy” rice farming produces
roughly one-fifth to one-quarter of global methane emissions from human activities. Accounting for
over 90 percent of all rice production, wetland rice is grown in fields that are flooded or irrigated for
much of the growing season. Bacteria and other micro-organisms in the soil of the flooded rice
paddy decompose organic matter and produce methane.

◆ . . . as does the disposal and treatment of garbage and human wastes. When garbage is
buried in a landfill, it sooner or later undergoes anaerobic (oxygen-free) decomposition and emits
methane (and some carbon dioxide). Unless the gas is captured and used as a fuel, the methane
eventually escapes to the atmosphere. This source of methane is more common near cities, where
garbage from many homes is brought to a central landfill, than in rural areas where garbage is
typically burned or left to decompose in the open air. Methane is also emitted when human waste
(sewage) is treated anaerobically, for example in anaerobic ponds or lagoons.

◆ Fertilizer use increases nitrous oxide emissions. The nitrogen contained in many fertilizers
enhances the natural processes of nitrification and denitrification that are carried out by bacteria
and other microbes in the soil. These processes convert some nitrogen into nitrous oxide. The
amount of N2O emitted for each unit of nitrogen applied to the soil depends on the type and amount
of fertilizer, soil conditions, and climate - a complex equation that is not fully understood.

◆ Industry has created a number of long-lived and potent greenhouse gases for specialized
uses. Developed in the 1920s, chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs) have been used as propellants in aerosol
cans, in the manufacture of plastic foams for cushions and other products, in the cooling coils of
refrigerators and air conditioners, as fire extinguishing materials, and as solvents for cleaning.
Thanks to the 1987 Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, atmospheric
concentrations of many CFCs are stablizing and expected to decline over the coming decades. Other
halocarbons that are being used as ozone-safe replacements for CFCs — notably hydrofluorocarbons
(HFCs) and perfluorocarbons (PFCs) — contribute to global warming and so are targeted for reduction
under the 1997 Kyoto Protocol. The Protocol also targets sulphur hexafluoride (SF6), used as an
electric insulator, heat conductor, and freezing agent; molecule for molecule, its global warming
potential is thought to be 23,900 times greater than that of carbon dioxide
Published in October 1999

Published by UNEP/IUC, International Environment House, 1219 Châtelaine, Switzerland

Tel. (+41 22) 979 91 11 ◆ Fax (+41 22) 797 34 64 ◆ E-mail [email protected] ◆ Web site http://www.unep.ch
 Climate Change INFORMATION SHEET 23

Limiting emissions:
The challenge for policymakers

◆ Climate change will have economic consequences. The damage it causes

plus the measures people take to adapt to a new climate regime will impose
quantifiable market costs as well as non-quantifiable, non-market costs. The fact
that some important types of damages cannot be easily monetized makes current
damage estimates highly uncertain.

◆ Damages will be unevenly distributed and sometimes irreversible. Although

developed countries are responsible for more than two thirds of historical
greenhouse gas emissions and approximately 75% of current annual emissions,
their strong economies and institutions leave them better positioned than other
countries to cope with changes in climate. The annual costs to developed countries
of a world with twice the pre-industrial levels of carbon dioxide could equal 1­3% of
their aggregate gross domestic product (GDP). The estimated costs for developing
countries are 2­9% of GDP. Again, it must be emphasized that these estimates
include only readily monetized damages and thus understate the likely costs. Some
studies have created a “vulnerability index” showing that developing countries are,
on average, about twice as vulnerable to the negative impacts of climate change
as are developed countries; small island developing countries are about three times
UUNN
as vulnerable.

◆ Policies for minimizing risks by reducing greenhouse gas emissions will

also come with a price-tag. Estimates of how much such policies will cost vary
UNEP
widely. For example, cost estimates for stabilizing emissions from the developed
countries vary from ­0.5% of GDP (that is, a net savings of US$ 60 billion) to
+2% of GDP (equal to a net loss of US$ 240 billion). The costs (and potential
benefits) of adaptation measures are less well understood. Nevertheless, it seems
that for both emissions reduction and adaptation, policymakers can often seek
to minimize climate change damage while actually benefiting their national
economies.
WMO
◆ While some damage from human-induced climate change seems inevitable,
policymakers can try to limit the risks. The earth’s climate has periodically warmed
and cooled during natural cycles that have lasted from decades to millennia. The
WHO climate will continue to vary due to these cycles and to the human-enhanced
greenhouse effect. The risks posed by rapid climate change due to human action,
however, are qualitatively different than those posed by the climate variations that
humanity has experienced since the start of civilization. The Climate Change
Convention does not seek to avoid all future human-induced climate change, but
UNITAR
UN rather to minimize it and slow the rate of change to ensure that ecosystems and
human societies can adapt.

◆ Climate change policies should be viewed as an integral part of sustainable

development. Actions to address climate change can promote both socio-economic
development and environmental protection (such as reduced urban smog). Climate change strategies
should be integrated into national development plans for all economic sectors.

◆ Early action to limit the risks of climate change can have multiple benefits. Many researchers
believe it will be possible to reduce climate change damages and adaptation costs while generating
economic benefits, such as more cost-effective energy systems and greater technological innovation.
Some climate change policies can also bring local and regional environmental benefits, such as
reductions in air pollution and increased protection for forests and thus biodiversity. The scientific,
technical, and socio-economic literature shows that such “no regrets” opportunities are available in
most countries. It also suggests that the risk of net damage, a concern for risk aversion, and the
precautionary principle together provide a rationale for actions that go beyond “no regrets” - that
is, for actions to reduce emissions that do indeed have net costs beyond climate change benefits.

◆ Policymakers should not overlook the importance of equity. Choosing policies that are both
cost-efficient and fair is not easy. Traditional economics rigorously explores how to formulate flexible
and cost-effective policies; it has less to say about equity. Because countries differ considerably in
their vulnerability to climate change, the costs of damage and adaptation will vary widely unless
special efforts are made to redistribute them. Policymakers can pursue equitable solutions by
promoting capacity building in poorer countries and reaching collective decisions in a credible and
transparent manner. They could also develop financial and institutional mechanisms for sharing risks
among countries.

◆ The fact that some climate change impacts will not be felt for many decades also raises the
issue of intergenerational equity. Future generations are not able to influence directly the choice
of policies made today. What’s more, it might not be possible to compensate them for any negative
effects on their well-being. This concern should be factored into current policies.

◆ To be effective, policies will require support from the public and from key interest groups.
Governments cannot act alone to cut emissions - individuals, communities, and businesses must
also cooperate. Education and public information is vital. For example, increased energy consciousness
would encourage people to adopt any number of minor changes in their lifestyles, such as riding
public transport, using more efficient lighting and appliances, and re-using materials to reduce the
need for exploiting natural resources. Local authorities could start restructuring communities to
minimize commuting distances by placing homes closer to shops and offices; they could also introduce
standards that encourage building designs that take maximum advantage of sunlight and solar
heating. Many other changes in the high-consumption lifestyles of the rich countries are also possible.

◆ Cooperation is also essential at the international level. There are different views on whether
or not specific policies and measures should be coordinated globally, proponents arguing that
coordination ensures fairness and a “level playing field” for business, opponents believing that national
flexibility is more cost-effective. But the need for internationally-agreed targets and timetables for
emissions reductions and for financial and technological cooperation is more universally accepted.
Policymakers must therefore be sensitive to both national conditions and to international trends
and concerns.

◆ The prudent response to climate change is to adopt a portfolio of actions aimed at mitigation,
adaptation, and research. The economic literature suggests that the optimal policy mix will necessarily
differ among countries and over time. The challenge is not for all countries to agree on what is the
single best policy and to maintain it for the next 100 years. Rather, each country should select a
prudent strategy and adjust it over time in light of new information and changing circumstances. By
constructing a balanced portfolio of policy options aimed at reducing emissions, adapting to climate
change, and improving the knowledge base, national policymakers can reduce the risks of rapid
Published in October 1999

climate change while promoting sustainable development.

Published by UNEP/IUC, International Environment House, 1219 Châtelaine, Switzerland

Tel. (+41 22) 979 91 11 ◆ Fax (+41 22) 797 34 64 ◆ E-mail [email protected] ◆ Web site http://www.unep.ch
 Climate Change INFORMATION SHEET 24

Crafting policies that are cost-efficient

◆ The costs of climate change policies can be minimized through “no regrets”
strategies. Such strategies make economic and environmental sense whether or
not the world is moving towards rapid climate change. Despite their many
differences, economists do broadly agree that energy efficiency gains of 10-30%
above baseline trends can be achieved over the next two or three decades at zero
net cost or even with net gains. A substantial range of technically feasible and
cost-effective policies and measures for reducing emissions are available today.
For example, raising energy efficiency not only reduces greenhouse gas emissions
but can also make industries and countries more competitive in international
markets. While no-regrets policies are certainly justified, the precautionary principle
and the level of net damage expected from climate change justify adopting policies
that go beyond no regrets.

◆ Although immediate action may sometimes seem more expensive than

waiting, delays could lead to greater risks and therefore greater long-term
costs. Governments can choose whether to phase-in emissions cuts slowly or
rapidly. This choice must balance the economic costs of early actions (including the
risk of prematurely retiring some still usable capital stock) against the corresponding
UUNN costs of delay. One risk of delay is that it would “lock-in” the currently available
models of high-emissions capital equipment for many years to come; if people then
become convinced of the need for more rapid emissions reductions, these
investments would have to be prematurely retired at a large cost. An earlier push
UNEP
to control emissions would increase the long-term flexibility of how humanity works
toward stabilizing atmospheric concentrations of greenhouse gases.

◆ Many variables need to be considered in the cost equation. The

internationally-agreed timetables and targets for emissions reductions, global
population and economic trends, and the development of new technologies will all
play a role. Policymakers must also heed the rate of capital replacement (which
WMO relates to the natural lifetime of equipment), the range of discount rates that
economists use for putting a current value on future benefits (which affects
investment decisions), and the possible actions of industry and consumers in
response to climate change and related policies.
WHO
◆ Many cost-effective policies involve sending the appropriate economic and
regulatory signals to national markets. Policies to reduce price distortions and
subsidies can increase the efficiency of energy, transport, agricultural, and other
markets. Consistent and appropriate signals will encourage research and give
UNITAR
UN producers and consumers the information they need to adapt to future constraints
on greenhouse gas emissions. For example, by adopting policies and measures
early enough to allow enterprises to replace their capital stocks at the end of
their natural economic lifetimes, the costs of adaptation and mitigation will be
much lower than if companies are forced to prematurely retire their capital. Some
of the greatest benefits of climate policies may be realized in developing countries that are experiencing
rapid economic growth and in countries with economies in transition to a market economy.

◆ Economic incentives can be used to influence investors and consumers. If they are market-
based, incentives can often be more flexible and efficient than regulatory policies alone. For example,
deposit-refund systems can encourage people to trade-in their cars and appliances for more energy-
efficient models. Technology and performance standards can reward manufacturers for selling climate-
friendly goods, or penalize those who do not. Targeted subsidies, voluntary agreements linked to
appropriate targets, and direct government investment can also be cost-effective in shaping the
behavior of both consumers and producers.

◆ Introducing or removing taxes or subsidies can incorporate climate change concerns into
prices. For example, a tax on the carbon content of oil, coal, and gas would discourage fossil-fuel
use and so reduce carbon dioxide emissions. Carbon taxes have already been tried by a number of
industrialized countries. Many economists believe that carbon taxes could achieve reductions in CO2
emissions at minimum cost; however, because taxes give individuals and companies the flexibility to
choose how to respond, they would be less effective at ensuring that a prescribed emissions level is
reached. To be effective, the tax must be well designed and administered. A number of economic
studies show that if such taxes are revenue neutral and replace taxes that inhibit investment and
employment, they can result in net economic gains. Although such taxes tend to be somewhat
regressive, requiring poorer households to pay a higher share of their income on energy bills than
rich ones, other taxes and transfers can be adjusted to offset this negative impact.

◆ Tradable emissions permits could also offer a cost-efficient and market-driven approach.
This is how permits can work: A government must determine how many tonnes of a particular gas
may be emitted each year. It then divides this quantity up into a number of tradable emissions
entitlements – measured, perhaps, in CO2-equivalent tonnes – and allocates or sells them to individual
firms. This gives each firm a quota of greenhouse gases that it can emit. Then the market takes
over. Those polluters that can reduce their emissions relatively cheaply may find it profitable to do
so and then sell their permits to other firms. Those that find it expensive to cut emissions may find
it attractive to buy extra permits. Tradable emissions permits are already used in the US for certain
non-greenhouse gas pollutants. The 1997 Kyoto Protocol contains provisions for the international
trading of permits for greenhouse gas emissions amongst developed countries; the details of this
scheme must still be elaborated.

Published in October 1999

Published by UNEP/IUC, International Environment House, 1219 Châtelaine, Switzerland

Tel. (+41 22) 979 91 11 ◆ Fax (+41 22) 797 34 64 ◆ E-mail [email protected] ◆ Web site http://www.unep.ch
 Climate Change INFORMATION SHEET 25

New energy technologies and policies

◆ The production and use of energy is the leading source of humanity’s

greenhouse gas emissions. The combustion of coal, oil, and natural gas accounts
for roughly three quarters of all carbon dioxide emissions, or some six billion metric
tonnes of carbon annually (as of 1992). Extracting and using fossil fuels emits almost
one-fifth of all humanity’s methane, some carbon dioxide, and large quantities of
carbon monoxide and other air pollutants. The industrial sector accounts for more
than a third of the global CO2 emissions from fossil-fuel combustion (excluding the
power generation sector), the residential and commercial sector 32%, and the
transport sector a bit over 21% (and growing rapidly). These energy-related emissions
could be significantly reduced through a combination of new technologies and policies.

◆ Leaks and spills during the extraction and transport of fossil fuels can be
minimized. New “integrated recovery” techniques can cut methane emissions from
coal mines by up to 80­90% compared to standard practices. Technologies available
today can reduce methane emissions from natural-gas distribution systems by up
to 80% (compared to the world average). In oil fields where natural gas is flared off
or vented because its sale is uneconomic, small on-site power generators can be
introduced to make electricity for local use, or the gas can be compressed or
UUNN converted for use by transport or near-by industries. These and many other
technologies could together reduce total fugitive emissions from energy extraction
and fuel transport by 50­90%.
UNEP
◆ Fiscal and tax policies can encourage the early introduction of new
technologies. By the year 2100, the entire capital stock of the world’s current
commercial energy system will be replaced at least twice. Incentives for investing
in more cost-effective and energy-efficient technologies could maximize the
opportunity this replacement offers for reducing emissions. Taxing emissions or
the carbon content of fuels can steer investments toward lower-emissions
technologies. Economists estimate that a worldwide phase-out of fossil-fuel
WMO
subsidies would cut global emissions by 4­18% while boosting real incomes.

◆ The conversion efficiency of electric power plants can be raised. The world-
average conversion efficiency of 30% could be more than doubled in the longer term.
WHO The best available coal- and natural gas-fired power plants already convert fuel into
useable energy with an efficiency of 45% and 52% respectively. One promising new
technology is combined cycle power plants, where heat from the burning fuel drives
steam turbines while the thermal expansion of the exhaust gases drives gas turbines.
Another is cogeneration, or combined production of heat and power, which could
UNITAR
UN increase the amount of useful energy produced to approximately 80­90% of the
heat energy in the fuel; this is much higher than what could be achieved with separate
electricity and heat production plants, although users needing cooling or heat must
exist nearby. Raising the efficiency of a typical coal-fired plant from 40% to 41%
would cut the plant’s CO2 emissions by 2.5%.
◆ Power-plant emissions can also be reduced by switching from coal to less carbon-intensive
fuels. Switching from coal to natural gas can reduce emissions by up to 40­50%. (A possible
constraint is that estimated coal reserves far exceed those of natural gas.) The efficient use of
biomass in steam and gas-turbine cogeneration systems can reduce emissions; these systems
have already shown themselves to be commercially feasible for certain pulp and paper and agricultural
applications in some developing regions. Renewable energy technologies such as wind, solar, and
small hydro can also reduce emissions while distributing electricity more flexibly “off the grid”.

◆ Industry can further reduce its energy intensity while cutting production costs. During the
last two decades, fossil-fuel emissions from industry have declined or remained constant in developed
countries due to technological trends and structural changes in the economy. These countries
could reduce their industrial CO2 emissions by 25% or more relative to 1990 levels simply by replacing
existing facilities and processes with the most efficient technological options currently available. If
this upgrading of equipment occurred at the time of normal capital stock turnover, it would be a
cost-effective way to reduce industrial emissions. At the global level, industrial emissions are projected
to grow dramatically as developing countries industrialize; slowing their rate of emissions growth
will require that they have access to the most efficient technologies available.

◆ The residential and commercial sectors can adopt energy-efficient technologies. Technologies
with pay-back periods of five years or less are available for many types of equipment now used in
buildings. They could cut CO2 emissions 20% by 2010, 25% by 2020, and up to 40% by 2050
compared to the baseline scenario (in which energy efficiency improves gradually without any deliberate
climate-related policy intervention). Buildings can be made more energy-efficient through market-
based programmes in which customers or manufacturers receive technical support or financial
incentives. Other options are mandatory or voluntary energy-efficiency standards, public and private
research into more efficient products, and information and training programs. A combination of
regulatory, information, and incentive programmes may offer the best approach to boosting the
energy efficiency of these sectors.

◆ Non-fiscal policies can also promote low-emissions technologies. The spread of new technologies
and practices is often blocked by cultural, institutional, legal, informational, financial, and economic
barriers. Government policies can help to remove some of the blockages. Information-sharing and
product-labeling programmes, for example, can help consumers to recognize the broader
consequences of their decisions. Governments can also support carefully targeted research,
development, and demonstration projects for technologies that can reduce emissions and improve
efficiency. While they will want to avoid trying to pick technology “winners”, governments can play a
valuable role by lowering the barriers faced by innovators and promoting a balanced national portfolio
of energy options and research programmes. Another option is to introduce emissions targets
together with tradable emissions permits that companies can buy and sell.

◆ Deep reductions in greenhouse gas emissions from fossil fuels are possible over the next 50
to 100 years. A “thought experiment” based on several scenarios for a Low CO2­Emitting Energy
Supply System (LESS) finds that current and expected technologies could reduce global fossil-fuel-
related CO2 emissions from about 6 billion tonnes of carbon annually in 1990 to about 4 billion
tonnes in 2050 and 2 billion in 2100. Technology innovation and an emphasis on renewable energy
sources, particularly biomass, will be essential for achieving these goals, and some countries may
also consider nuclear energy. Since many different combinations of technologies could be used, this
future energy-supply system could be constructed in any number of ways. In the short-term, however,
with the global demand for energy certain to rise, actions to reduce emissions must continue to
include improvements in energy efficiency.
Published in October 1999

Published by UNEP/IUC, International Environment House, 1219 Châtelaine, Switzerland

Tel. (+41 22) 979 91 11 ◆ Fax (+41 22) 797 34 64 ◆ E-mail [email protected] ◆ Web site http://www.unep.ch
 Climate Change INFORMATION SHEET 26

New transportation
technologies and policies

◆ The transport sector is a major and rapidly growing source of greenhouse

gas emissions. Fossil-fuel combustion in vehicles and transport equipment
accounted for about one-fifth of global carbon dioxide emissions in 1990.
Transportation’s global fuel consumption rose by 50% between 1973 and 1990,
largely because of higher incomes and steady or declining fuel costs. Without new
measures to slow the growth in emissions, the use of fossil fuel for transportation
is expected to increase by another 35­130% by the year 2025. Transportation
also contributes to local and regional pollution problems through its emissions of
carbon monoxide, lead, sulfur oxides (SO x) and nitrogen oxides (NOx).

◆ Automobiles are the transport sector’s largest consumer of petroleum

and its largest source of carbon dioxide emissions. The developed world has the
highest per-capita ownership of private cars today; developing countries currently
claim a mere 10% of the world’s cars, but are expected to account for most of
the future growth in automobile use.

◆ New technologies can increase the efficiency of automobiles and reduce

UN emissions per kilometer traveled. New materials and designs can reduce a vehicle’s
UN
mass and increase the efficiency at which it converts energy, thus lowering the
amount of energy required to move it. With improved transmission designs, engines
can operate closer to their optimal speed and load conditions. Technological
improvements in combustion-engine technology and in petroleum formulations have
UNEP
already started to reduce per-vehicle emissions of both greenhouse gases and
conventional pollutants. The energy intensity of these engines can probably still be
improved by 15­30% using current technology. More dramatic improvements could
be achieved by, for example, adopting hybrid cars that use a combination of fuel-
fired engines and electric motors.

◆ Switching to less carbon-intensive fuels can also reduce carbon dioxide

WMO
emissions. The feasibility of operating vehicles on fuels other than gasoline has
been demonstrated in many countries. Alternative transport fuels include
compressed natural gas, ethanol, methanol, and electricity derived from non-fossil
sources. Compressed natural gas has been used successfully in fleet vehicles for
WHO a number of years in the US, Europe, and New Zealand. Brazil has a programme to
promote the use of cars fueled by ethanol derived from sugar cane and other
biomass. Such programmes can offer long-term global climate benefits in tandem
with immediate improvements in local air quality.

UNITAR
UN ◆ Renewable energy technologies are becoming more and more competitive.
Renewable energy could one day offer cost-effective alternatives to petroleum-
based fuels. Electricity derived from hydroelectric, solar photovoltaics, wind
systems, and hydrogen fuel cells can power the movement of people and goods
with almost zero greenhouse gas emissions. The combustion of liquid fuels derived
from sustainably grown biomass does emit carbon, but an equal amount of carbon is recaptured by
the vegetation grown to make new biomass. The use of renewable fuels in the transport sector can
help to reduce new CO2 emissions while delivering the degree of personal mobility that people desire.

◆ Emissions can be further cut through changes in maintenance and operating practices.
Many vehicles are not adequately maintained due to high costs or to the limited local availability of
spare parts. In some areas, maintenance may simply be a low priority for drivers and vehicle owners.
Recent studies suggest that an average vehicle’s fuel consumption can be reduced by as much as
2­10% just through regular engine tune-ups.

◆ Policies to reduce road traffic congestion can save both emissions and costs. The energy
intensity of transport and the amount of congestion on the roads are strongly influenced by the
average occupancy rate for passenger vehicles. Computerized routing systems for trucks can save
money and fuel by optimizing payloads and minimizing time spent in traffic; some studies indicate
that it is already technically possible to reduce energy use per tonne-kilometer by 25­30%. Similarly,
measures to improve general traffic control and restrict the use of motor vehicles have reduced
energy use in some areas by as much as 20­40%.

◆ Urban planners can encourage low-emissions transport. Convincing people to switch from
automobiles to buses or trains can reduce primary energy use per passenger-seat-kilometer by
30­70%. A vital part of encouraging this transition is providing safe and efficient public transport
systems. Cities can also promote walking, bicycling, and car pooling by limiting automobile access to
certain roads, increasing the fees for public parking, and converting existing roads into bicycle
lanes, bus-access roads, or “High Occupancy Vehicle” (HOV) lanes during peak hours. The introduction
of computerized traffic-light control systems, more informative signs, and improved network designs,
especially in urban areas with a high density of vehicles during peak travel hours, can also boost
efficiency. In the short term, the greatest potential that urban planning has for affecting transport
is in rapidly developing cities where cars are still in limited use.

◆ Policies to reduce air traffic congestion can cut emissions while improving safety. Present
flight patterns seek to reduce fuel consumption and other in-flight costs. Nevertheless, crowding
at airports leads to long holding times at many destinations and contributes to higher-than-necessary
fuel emissions. Advances in booking systems, policies to increase seat occupancy rates, and efforts
to discourage simultaneous, partly-filled flights on the same route could further reduce congestion,
minimize landing delays, and decrease emissions. Additional aviation fuel taxes could also play a role
in promoting energy efficiency.

◆ Policies to accelerate the rate of capital stock turnover in automobile and aircraft fleets
may be the quickest way to reduce the short-term rate of emissions growth. This is especially
true for developed countries, where large fleets with many older vehicles are already in place.
Rewards can be offered for retiring older vehicles and airplanes that do not meet current national
emissions standards, or small environmental “user fees” can be imposed, with the fees proportional
to the vehicle’s energy consumption. Fuel-efficiency standards for autos and aircraft are vital to
reducing the energy intensity of transport over the longer term, but they affect only the newest
vehicles.

◆ The appropriate mix of policies will vary from city to city and country to country. In addition,
measures to reduce emissions in the transport sector can take years or even decades to show
their full results. But if carried out with care, climate-friendly transport policies can play a major
role in promoting economic development while minimizing the local costs of traffic congestion, road
accidents, and air pollution.
Published in October 1999

Published by UNEP/IUC, International Environment House, 1219 Châtelaine, Switzerland

Tel. (+41 22) 979 91 11 ◆ Fax (+41 22) 797 34 64 ◆ E-mail [email protected] ◆ Web site http://www.unep.ch
 Climate Change INFORMATION SHEET 27

New approaches to
forestry and agriculture

◆ Forestry and agriculture are important sources of carbon dioxide, methane,

and nitrous oxide. The world’s forests contain vast quantities of carbon. Some
forests act as “sinks” by absorbing carbon from the air, while forests whose carbon
flows are in balance act as “reservoirs”. At the global level, deforestation and
changes in land use make forests a net source of carbon dioxide. As for agriculture,
it accounts for about 20% of the human-enhanced greenhouse effect. Intensive
agricultural practices such as livestock rearing, wet rice cultivation, and fertilizer
use emit 50% of human-related methane and 70% of our nitrous oxide. Fortunately,
measures and technologies that are currently available could significantly reduce
net emissions from both forests and agriculture - and in many cases cut production
costs, increase yields, or offer other socio-economic benefits.

◆ Forests will need better protection and management if their carbon dioxide
emissions are to be reduced. While legally protected preserves have a role,
deforestation should also be tackled through policies that lessen the economic
pressures on forest lands. A great deal of forest destruction and degradation is
caused by the expansion of farming and grazing. Other forces are the market
demand for wood as a commodity and the local demand for fuel-wood and other
UUNN
forest resources for subsistence living. These pressures may be eased by boosting
agricultural productivity, slowing the rate of population growth, involving local people
in sustainable forest management, adopting policies to ensure that commercial
timber is harvested sustainably, and addressing the underlying socio-economic
UNEP
and political forces that spur migration into forest areas.

◆ The carbon stored in trees, vegetation, soils, and durable wood products
can be maximized through “storage management”. When secondary forests and
degraded lands are protected, they usually regenerate naturally and start to absorb
significant amounts of carbon. Their soils can hold additional carbon if they are
deliberately enriched, for example with fertilizers, and new trees can be planted.
WMO
The amount of carbon stored in wood products can be increased by designing
products for the longest possible lifetimes, perhaps even longer than what is
normal for living wood.

WHO ◆ Sustainable forest management can generate forest biomass as a renewable

resource. Some of this biomass can be substituted for fossil fuels; this approach
has a greater long-term potential for reducing net emissions than does growing
trees to store carbon. Establishing forests on degraded or non-forested lands
adds to the amount of carbon stored in trees and soils. In addition, the use of
UNITAR
UN sustainably-grown fuel-wood in place of coal or oil can help to preserve the carbon
reservoir contained in fossil fuels left unneeded underground.

◆ Agricultural soils are a net source of carbon dioxide - but they could be
made into a net sink. As much as 400­800 million tonnes of carbon could be taken
up by agricultural soils every year through improved management practices designed to increase
agricultural productivity. Low-tech strategies include the use of composting and low- or no-tillage
practices, since carbon is more easily liberated from soil that is turned over or left bare. In the
tropics, soil carbon can be increased by returning more crop residues to the soil, introducing
perennial (year-round) cropping practices, and reducing periods when fallow fields lie bare. In semi-
arid areas, the need for summer fallow could be reduced through better water management or by
the introduction of perennial forage crops (which would also eliminate the need for tillage). In temperate
regions, soil carbon could be increased by the use of more animal manure. One recent study suggests
that reduced tillage practices alone could convert US agricultural soils from an estimated net
source of 200 million tonnes of carbon per year to a net sink of 200­300 million tonnes by the year
2020, while improving yields for some crops.

◆ Methane emissions from livestock could be cut with new feed mixtures. Cattle and buffalo
account for an estimated 80% of annual global methane emissions from domestic livestock. Additives
can increase the efficiency of animal feed and boost animals’ growth rates, leading to a net decrease
of 5­15% in methane emissions per unit of beef produced. In rural development projects in India and
Kenya, adding vitamin and mineral supplements to the feed mixture of local dairy cows has significantly
increased milk production and decreased methane emissions. Laboratory experiments with bovine
somatotropin, a growth hormone for cows, have increased milk production in dairy cows while reducing
methane emissions by up to 9%.

◆ Methane from wet rice cultivation can be reduced significantly through changes in irrigation
and fertilizer use. Some 50% of the total cropland used to grow rice is irrigated. Today’s rice
farmers can only control flooding and drainage in about one-third of the world’s rice paddies, and
methane emissions are higher in continually flooded systems. Recent experiments suggest that
draining a field at specific times during the crop cycle can reduce methane emissions by up to 50%
without decreasing rice yields. Additional technical options for reducing methane emissions are to
add sodium sulfate or coated calcium carbide to the urea-based fertilizers now in common use, or to
replace urea altogether with ammonium sulfate as a source of nitrogen for rice crops.

◆ Nitrous oxide emissions from agriculture can be minimized with new fertilizers and practices.
Fertilizing soils with mineral nitrogen and with animal manure releases N2O into the atmosphere. By
increasing the efficiency with which crops use nitrogen, it is possible to reduce the amount of
nitrogen needed to produce a given quantity of food. Other strategies aim to reduce the amount of
nitrous oxide produced as a result of fertilizer use and the amount of N20 that then leaks from the
agricultural system into the atmosphere. One approach, for example, is to match the timing and
amount of nitrogen supply to a crop’s specific demands. Another is to use advanced fertilization
techniques such as controlled-release fertilizers and systems that deliver fertilizer to the plant’s
roots through its leaves rather than through the soil (where most nitrous oxide production occurs).
The fertilizer’s interactions with local soil and climate conditions can also be influenced by optimizing
tillage, irrigation, and drainage systems.
Published in October 1999

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 Climate Change INFORMATION SHEET 28

Financing action under the Convention

◆ Developing countries need financial resources so that they can address

the causes and consequences of climate change. The Climate Change Convention
therefore states that developed countries should provide “new and additional”
funds to help developing countries meet their treaty commitments. Support can
come from bilateral donors, multilateral sources, or the private sector.

◆ The Convention’s financial “mechanism” is a major source of funding. Its

role is to transfer funds and technology to developing countries and to countries
with economies in transition on a grant or concessional basis. The mechanism
must be guided by, and accountable to, the Conference of the Parties (COP) to
the Convention, which decides on policies, programme priorities, and eligibility
criteria. The Convention states that the operation of the financial mechanism
can be entrusted to one or more international entities with “an equitable and
balanced representation of all Parties within a transparent system of
governance”. The COP has given this responsibility to the Global Environment
Facility (GEF).

◆ The Global Environment Facility was established in 1990, before the

UUNN start of the Convention negotiations. The idea of an international mechanism
to support projects benefiting the global environment was first discussed in
1987 by the Brundtland Commission. The GEF was launched several years later
with the World Bank, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), and
UNEP
the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) as the implementing
agencies. By the time the Earth Summit was held in 1992, the GEF was
considered a possible source of funds for the implementation of the biodiversity
and climate change conventions.

◆ The GEF pays the “agreed full incremental costs” of projects to protect
the global environment. GEF funds complement regular development assistance,
WMO
offering developing countries the opportunity to incorporate environmentally-friendly
features that address global environmental concerns. For example, if a country
invests in a new power plant to promote economic development, the GEF may
provide the additional, or incremental, funds needed to buy equipment for reducing
WHO the emissions of greenhouse gases. In this way, GEF funds normally cover only a
portion of a project’s entire costs.

◆ The available funds are based on voluntary contributions from governments.

During the “pilot phase” of 1991-94, the GEF trust fund contained some $800
UNITAR
UN million from participating governments. When the GEF was later restructured to
make it more universal, democratic, and transparent, it was replenished from 1
July 1994 through 30 June 1998 with over $2 billion. The second replenishment
for the four-year period starting in 1998 will be based on pledges from 36
governments totaling $2.75 billion.
◆ Projects must be country-driven and based on national priorities that support sustainable
development. The GEF covers four focal areas: climate change, biological diversity, international
waters, and protection of the ozone layer. In addition, the agreed incremental costs of activities to
combat land degradation (primarily desertification and deforestation) as they relate to the four
focal areas may also be eligible for funding. So too are the agreed incremental costs of other
activities under Agenda 21, insofar as they achieve global environmental benefits in the focal areas.
At the end of 1996, climate change activities accounted for about 38% of the gross funds allocated
in the GEF portfolio.

◆ In addition to technical assistance and investment projects, the GEF supports various
“enabling activities.” These activities help countries to develop the necessary institutional capacity
for developing and carrying out strategies and projects. In particular, the GEF pays the full costs of
preparing the national communications that are required by the Convention. Projects relating to
grassroots action sponsored by non-governmental organizations are supported through a Small
Grants Programme managed by UNDP, while medium-sized projects (under $1 million) can be financed
through UNDP, UNEP, or the World Bank. Besides directly providing grants, the GEF facilitates
other bilateral, co-financing, and parallel financing arrangements. It also promotes the leveraging of
private-sector participation and resources.

◆ Funding proposals are submitted to the GEF through one of the three implementing agencies.
UNDP, UNEP, and the World Bank each has its own special role to play in promoting projects and
supporting the GEF process. The GEF Secretariat oversees the work programme and helps to
ensure that projects comply with GEF programming strategies and policies. Once approved, projects
are carried out by a wide range of executing agencies, such as government ministries, non-
governmental organizations (NGOs), UN bodies, regional multilateral institutions, and private firms.
The final authority for all funding decisions and operational, programmatic, and strategic issues is
vested in the GEF Council. The Council consists of 32 of the GEF’s 157 members and meets semi-
annually, while the Assembly of all participating countries meets every three years.

◆ In 1999, the COP asked the GEF to continue operating the financial mechanism. It decided
to review the situation again within four years. As required by the Convention, the COP continues to
provide guidance on the GEF’s policies, programme priorities, and eligibility criteria relating to climate
change projects. It has emphasized that projects funded by the GEF should be cost-effective and
supportive of national development priorities, and that they should focus, at least initially, on enabling
activities that help developing countries prepare and submit information about their implementation
of the Convention.

Published in October 1999

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 Climate Change INFORMATION SHEET 29

Global cooperation on technology

◆ Climate change is a global problem that requires a global solution. Developed

countries account for the largest part of historical and current greenhouse gas
emissions; their share for 1994 was about 75% of the global total. However, while
per-capita emissions in developed countries are likely to stabilize (at well above the
world average), developing-country emissions continue to rise steadily and are
expected to represent some 50% of the global total before the year 2025.

◆ Developing countries will need access to climate-friendly technologies if

they are to limit emissions from their growing economies. Such technologies are
essential to establishing a low-emissions industrial infrastructure. Under the
Climate Change Convention, the richest countries (essentially the OECD members)
agree to “take all practical steps to promote, facilitate, and finance, as appropriate,
the transfer of, or access to, environmentally-sound technologies and know-how
to other Parties, particularly developing country Parties, to enable them to
implement the Convention.”

◆ Technology can be transferred through several different channels. The

UN traditional channel has been bilateral and multilateral development assistance in
UN the form of export credits, insurance, and other trade support. Incorporating
climate change considerations into the programmes of national development offices
and multilateral development banks would greatly increase the transfer of low-
emissions technologies. The Convention also provides for two new channels. The
UNEP
first is the government-funded Global Environment Facility (GEF). The second is
“Activities Implemented Jointly”, or AIJ, which seeks to attract private sector
funds for the transfer of technology and know-how to developing countries and
countries with economies in transition. The Convention emphasizes that these
two new channels must add to, rather than replace, traditional development
assistance.

WMO
◆ The GEF has a critical role to play in the co-development and transfer of
advanced technologies. The GEF supports both the development and demonstration
of technologies that can improve economic efficiency and reduce greenhouse gas
emissions while promoting sustainable development in developing and transition
countries. GEF projects can be used to demonstrate the technological feasibility
WHO
and cost-effectiveness of renewable energy technologies and energy efficiency
options. In these cases, the GEF pays the added cost of introducing a climate-
friendly technology in place of a more polluting one.

UNITAR
UN ◆ Activities Implemented Jointly has been conceived as one way of channeling
private-sector money into climate change activities. If successful, AIJ could
promote the co-development of advanced technologies and their transfer from
developed countries to other parts of the world. These technologies would need to
be appropriate to local circumstances, environmentally sound, and economically
competitive. AIJ is carried out through partnerships between an investing company in a developed
country and a counterpart in a host country (which could be developed, developing, or in transition
to a market economy). The investing partner is expected to provide most of the required technology
and financial capital. The host-country partner may provide the site, the principal staff, and the
organization needed to launch and sustain the project.

◆ AIJ is currently being tested through a pilot phase that will end by 1999. Proponents argue
that AIJ can reduce global emissions cost-effectively, as reducing a given quantity of emissions may
be cheaper in many developing and transition countries than in some developed countries. Skeptics
are concerned that AIJ will not only transfer technology but – contrary to the spirit of the Convention
– the responsibility for combating climate change from developed to developing countries. Under the
pilot phase, the investing country does not receive credits for the emissions it helps to reduce in
another country, although supporters of the concept emphasize the importance of a credit system
if AIJ is to achieve its full potential. Other issues include how to structure the reporting and
regulatory regime and how to prevent the transfer of uncompetitive and inappropriate technologies.

◆ Technology transfer must be accompanied by capacity building. The delivery of new hardware
alone rarely leads to “real, measurable and long-term environmental benefits” in the host country. In
many cases it is absolutely essential to strengthen existing local institutions. This includes building
managerial and technical skills and transferring the know-how for operating and replicating new
technological systems on a sustainable basis. Without such preparation, advanced technologies
may fail to penetrate the market. Capacity building also has a role to play in ensuring that new
technologies are, in the words of the Convention, “compatible with and supportive of national
environment and development priorities and strategies, [and] contribute to cost-effectiveness in
achieving global benefits.”

◆ The 1997 Kyoto Protocol provides for a “clean development mechanism”. This mechanism is
intended to help developing countries achieve sustainable development and contribute to the
Convention’s goals. It will be guided by the Parties to the Protocol, supervised by an executive
board, and based on voluntary participation. Project activities will result in “certified emissions
reductions” that developed countries can use to meet their own binding emissions targets. These
projects can involve private or public entities and must lead to real and measurable long-term
emissions-limitation benefits. The details of just how this mechanism will work in practice must still
be developed.

Published in October 1999

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 Climate Change INFORMATION SHEET 30

DATA on greenhouse gas emissions and sources

Table 1: A sample of greenhouse gases affected by human activities
CO2 CH4 N2O CFC­11 HCFC­22 CF4 SF6
(carbon (methane) (nitrous (a CFC (a perfluoro­ (sulphur
dioxide) oxide) substitute) carbon) hexafluoride)
Pre­industrial level ~280 ppmv+ ~700 ppbv ~275 ppbv zero zero zero zero
1994 Concentration 358 ppmv 1720 ppbv 312 § ppbv 268§ pptv 110 pptv 72§ pptv 3-4 pptv
Rate increase* 1.5 ppmv/yr 10 ppbv/yr 0.8 ppbv/yr 0 pptv/yr 5 pptv/yr 1.2 pptv/yr 0.2/pptv/yr
0.4%/yr 0.6%/yr 0.25%/yr 0%/yr 5%/yr 2%/yr ~5%/yr
Lifetime (years) 50­200++ 12+++ 120 50 12 50,000 3,200

§ Estimated from 1992­93 data.

+ 1 ppmv = 1 part per million by volume; 1 ppbv = 1 part per billion by volume; 1 pptv = 1 part per trillion (million million) by volume.
++ No single lifetime for CO2 can be defined because of the different rates of uptake by different sink processes.
+++ This has been defined as an adjustment time which takes into account the indirect effect of methane on its own lifetime.
* The growth rates of CO2 , CH4 and N2O are averaged over the decade beginning 1984; halocarbon growth rates are based on recent years (1990s).
(Ed. note: 1kg of carbon = 3.664 kg of CO2 .)
Source: Climate Change 1995, IPCC Working Group I, p. 15.

Table 2: Global energy consumption in 1990 by energy source and by sector, in EJ/yr
Coal Oil Gas Nuclear Hydroa) Electricity Heat Biomass Total
Primary 91 128 71 19 21 — — 55 385
Final 36 106 41 — — 35 8 53 279
Industry 25 15 22 — — 17 4 3 86
Transport 1 59 0 — — 1 0 0 61
Others 10 18 18 — — 17 4 50 117
Feedstocksb) 0 14 1 — — — — — 15
UUNN Notes: Primary energy is recovered or gathered directly from natural sources (e.g., mined coal, collected biomass, or harnessed hydroelectricity), then is
converted into fuels and electricity (e.g., electricity, gasoline, and charcoal), resulting in final energy after distribution and delivery to the point of consumption.
(An EJ, or exajoule, is one billion joules, equal to the energy content of about 24 million tonnes of oil ­ ed.)
a)
Nuclear and hydropower electricity have been converted into primary thermal equivalent, with an average factor of 38.5% (WEC, 1983).
b)
Feedstocks represent non­energy use of hydrocarbons.
Source: Climate Change 1995, IPCC Working Group II, p. 83; based on IEA, 1993; Hall, 1991, 1993; UN, 1993; WEC, 1983, 1993a, 1993b: Nakicenovic et al., 1993.
UNEP

Table 3: Land area and use, 1982­94

Land use (000 hectares)

Population Domes- Cropland Permanent pasture Forest & woodland Other land

Land density ticated % % % %

area (per 1,000 land as a change change change change
(000 hectares) % of land since since since since
WMO
hectares) 1996 areaa) 1994 1992-4 1982-4 1992­4 1982­4 1992­4 1982­4 1992­4 1982­4

Worldb) 13,048,300 442 37 1,465,814 2.0 3,410,203 3.2 4,177,088 (2.2) 3,992,533 (1.0)
Africa 2,963,468 249 36 189,803 6.5 889,350 0.0 713,405 (0.3) 1,171,024 (0.8)
Europe 2,260,320 322 22 317,837 X 178,549 X 947,761 X 816,036 X
North
WHO America 1,838,009 163 27 233,276 (1.1) 267,072 1.2 749,290 2.9 588,371 (2.6)
Central
America 264,835 475 53 40,053 5.4 98,503 6.2 74,524 1.2 85,910 (9.2)
South
America 1,752,925 184 35 113,116 9.0 495,341 3.0 934,860 0.6 209,471 (12.3)
UNITAR Asia 3,085,414 1,130 51 520,175 X 1,051,311 X 556,996 X 956,913 X
UN Oceania 849,135 34 57 51,553 1.4 430,077 (2.8) 200,252 (0.2) 164,807 6.3

Notes: a) Domesticated land is the sum of cropland and permanent pasture. b) Does not include Antarctica. X = not available; negative numbers are shown in
parentheses.
Source: Adapted from World Resources 1998­99, published by WRI, UNEP, UNDP, and the World Bank, pp. 298-99; based on Food and Agriculture Organization
of the United Nations, the United Nations Population Division and other sources.
Table 4: Total anthropogenic CO 2 emissions, excluding land-use change and forestry, 1990-
1995, and projections for 2000
Percentage relative to 1990, 1990=100 Projections
1990a 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 2000 percentage change
from baselineb
(Gg) % % % % % (Gg) %
Australia 273 123 101 102 103 105 109 311 200 19
Austria 61 880 107 97 96 96 100 57 300 -7
Belgium 116 090 103 102 99 104 125 200 8
Bulgaria 96 878 68 62 64 61 64 74 730 -11
Canada 464 000 98 101 101 104 108 500 600 8
Czech Republic 165 490 93 85 81 77 78 139 000 -17
Denmark 52 277 120 110 114 121 114 54 309 -9
Estonia 37 797 98 73 58 60 55 19 700 -47
Finland c 53 800 97 99 110 104 (58 000 - 60 000) (8 - 12)
France 378 379 106 106 99 99 102 372 934 -2
Germany 1 014 155 96 91 91 89 88 894 000 -12
Greece 84 575 100 102 103 105 107 89 120 16
Hungary 83 676 81 72 73 71 71 64 300 -23
Iceland 2 147 96 102 107 105 106 2 697 26
Ireland 30 719 103 105 104 108 110 34 998 14
Italyc 432150 95 101 421 272 5
Japan 1 124 532 102 103 101 108 108
Latvia 24 771 78 66 58 48 49 12 274 -51
Lithuaniac 39 535 27 147 -31
Luxembourg c 12 750 94 75 5 684 -45
Monacoc 71
Netherlands 167 550 104 103 105 105 109 173 500 0
New Zealand 25 476 102 110 107 107 107 31 080 22
Norway 35 544 95 97 101 106 107 44 000 22
Poland c 476 625 78 78 425 000 -12
Portugalc 47 123 104 112 107 108 50 130 35
Romaniac 198 479 71 62 61
Russian Fed.c 2 372 300 93 85 78 70 1 750 000 -26
Slovak Rep. 60 032 88 81 77 72 81 (44 780 - 46 178) (-25) - (-23)
Slovenia c 13 935
Spainc 226 423 100 104 100 102 258 247 14
Sweden 55 445 100 101 101 106 105 60 100 3
Switzerland 45 070 104 101 98 96 98 43 900 -7
Ukrainec 700 107 530 042 -25
United Kingdom 583 747 101 98 95 95 93 550 000 -5
United States 4 960 432 99 100 103 104 105 5 627 310 13
Source: Climate Change Secretariat: “Second compilation and synthesis of second national communications”, Doc. FCCC/CP/1998/11/Add.2. Data for Romania is from Doc. FCCC/SBI/1997/INF.4
Notes: Gg = 1,000 tonnes
a
In accordance with decision 9/CP.2 some Parties with economies in transition use base years other than 1990: Bulgaria (1988), Hungary (average of 1985-87), Poland (1988) and Romania (1989).
b
The baseline figure used for calculation of percentage change may differ than that of the 1990 figure given in this table due to use of a different baseline other than 1990, use of only a subset
of the 1990 figure, subsequent updating of inventory data, calibration of projection models or rounding.
c
Party did not provide estimates for all years subsequent to 1990.

Table 5: Greenhouse gas emissions, 1991 (000 metric tons) Table 6: Per­capita
CO2 CO 2 CO2 emissions
emissions emissions Methane from anthropogenic sources (metric tons):
from from 10 indicative rates
industrial land use Solid Coal Oil & gas Wet rice
processes change waste mining production agriculture Livestock Total Brazil 1.6
China 2.7
World 22,339,408 4,100,000 43,000 36,000 44,000 69,000 81,000 270,000
Czech Republic 10.9
Africa 715,773 730,000 1,700 1,700 6,000 2,400 9,000 21,000
Japan 9.0
Europe 6,866,494 11,000 17,000 6,600 15,000 420 14,000 53,000
North & Russian Fed. 12.2
Central Swaziland 0.5
America 5,715,466 190,000 11,000 6,100 8,200 590 9,200 35,000 India 1.0
Published in October 1999

South Malaysia 5.3

America 605,029 1,800,000 2,200 280 2,200 870 15,000 21,000 UK 9.3
Asia 7,118,317 1,300,000 9,900 20,000 12,000 65,000 30,000 140,000 US 20.5
Oceania 297,246 38,000 690 1,400 310 75 3,300 5,800 Source: 1995 figures; adapted from CDIAC
Source: World Resources Institute, as cited in World Resources 1996­97, pp. 326­329. as cited in World Resources 1998­99.
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