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i
In this book, David Jarrett argues that the influential Lockean thesis of
justice in property, which traces back to John Locke, seems to entail much
egalitarian property redistribution.
Put briefly, Lockeans argue that people justly own: (1) any unowned
natural resources they labour on, (2) any resources they receive via volun-
tary transfer from a legitimate owner, and (3) any resources they legitim-
ately receive in compensation for harm done to their person or legitimately
held property. However, a question that has been largely overlooked by
Lockeans is how to address the problem of property that did not arise in
line with Lockean justice. What do we do about property that derives from
feudal and colonial conquest, for example? Drawing on a range of theoret-
ical and historical sources, this book argues that the legal concept of resti-
tution is the most reasonable way to address the problem. If we apply this
concept, it appears that much property in the world is held unjustly and
should be redistributed in an egalitarian manner.
Lockean Property Ethics and Restitution will be of interest to political
theorists and philosophers alike.
David Jarrett
iv
Contents
Acknowledgements vi
List of acronyms vii
Introduction 1
5 Redistribution 105
Conclusion 124
Acknowledgements
Acronyms
Introduction
DOI: 10.4324/9781003090984-1
2
2 Introduction
place ‘within a shared framework of Lockean values’. Patomaki (2006) has
also argued that the Lockean thesis of justice in property is central to the
ideas promoted by international institutions such as the World Bank and
International Monetary Fund. We further suggest that it is the Lockean
thesis that Hardt and Negri (2009, 7) have in mind when they discuss
the centrality of popular, ‘internalised’ notions of justice in property to
maintaining global order. There is no other thesis of justice in property
that comes close in influence.
The recent rise of the right-libertarian1 movement is also worth noting
when considering the influence of Lockeanism. Murray Rothbard—
arguably the founding thinker of the movement and the inventor of
so-called ‘anarcho-capitalism’—believed that he was for the most part
simply refining Locke’s ideas, as transmitted through American Lockeans.
Rothbard argued that Locke’s contribution to right-libertarianism was to
‘set forth the natural rights of each individual to his person and property’
(Rothbard 2006, 4). Rothbard further wrote in Ethics of Liberty (here-
after referred to as ‘Ethics’), that ‘It was the Lockean individualist trad-
ition’ upon which he was attempting to build (Rothbard 1998, 21).2 As an
example of the right-libertarian movement’s influence, the United States-
based Libertarian Party has become by far the third largest political party
in that country. The party promotes the idea of limiting the government
to only protecting ‘life, liberty and property’ (Libertarian Party 2020),
echoing Locke’s ideas. Meanwhile, self-declared ‘libertarians’ such as Alex
Jones have gained extensive media followings and regularly publicise the
ideas of Lockean theorists including Rothbard (see, for example, Rockwell
2016). Also worth mentioning are two popular think tanks co-founded
by Rothbard: the Cato Institute and the Mises Institute, which promote
Lockean right-libertarian views. The Cato Institute was also co-founded
by, and remains under the control of, Charles Koch of Koch Industries—
the sixth richest person in the world in 2018. Named after followers of John
Locke, the institution regularly ranks as one of the most influential think
tanks in the world (Cato Institute 2001; McGann 2018).
It should also be noted that Lockean ideas are unlikely to go away any
time soon. Not only are they seemingly broadly internalised and apparently
becoming more explicitly popular, but there are also difficulties in arguing
against them. For one thing, while they are extremely problematic in cer-
tain ways (as we shall discuss in Chapter 1), Lockean notions of justice in
property do seem to have a certain intrinsic appeal—recognised even by
ardent critics. (We will not speculate here how far this appeal is something
nurtured by the dominant socio-economic status quo rather than being an
innate feature of human beings.) Discussing only the self-ownership part
of the Lockean justice thesis, as presented by Nozick, the pro-egalitarian
G.A. Cohen makes the following comments:
The thesis of self-ownership has, after all, plenty of appeal, quite apart
from anything that Nozick urges on its behalf. Its antecedent (that is,
3
Introduction 3
pre-philosophical) appeal rivals that of whatever principles of equality
it is thought to contradict, even for many committed defenders of such
principles: that is why Anarchy, State, and Utopia unsettles so many
of its liberal and socialist readers… In my experience, leftists who
disparage Nozick’s essentially unargued affirmation of each person’s
rights over himself lose confidence in their unqualified denial of the
thesis of self-ownership when they are asked to consider who has the
right to decide what should happen, for example, to their own eyes.
They do not immediately agree that, were eye transplants easy to
achieve, it would then be acceptable for the state to conscribe potential
eye donors into a lottery whose losers must yield an eye to beneficiaries
who would otherwise be not one-eyed but blind.
(Cohen 1995, 70)
We will examine these positions in more detail in the next chapter. Here our
aim is simply to note that the core principles of Lockean ownership are not
prima facie outlandish or ridiculous.
It also appears that the Lockean thesis cannot be proven objectively
false. After a philosophical examination, Cohen (1995) claimed that while
the appeal of the self-ownership thesis can be reduced by argumentation,
it cannot be strictly refuted. We suggest that the same goes for the Lockean
approach to justice in world-ownership. It is worth noting that this would
explain Lockeanism’s longevity and its ability to renew its popularity with
the right-libertarian movement.
4
4 Introduction
Introduction 5
to the problem of unjustly gained holdings, as outlined by the Lockean
theorists Rothbard, Nozick and Spooner, respectively, have had serious
shortcomings, which the LLOR seems to address.
The book should also be of interest to those interested in the topic of
reparations. Multiple reparations theorists have implicitly or explicitly
employed Lockean arguments to make their case. However, this book claims
that such arguments do not work. They rely on incoherent Rothbardian
or Nozickean approaches to addressing historical injustice. Yet, according
to the LLORAT approach outlined in this book, addressing historical
Lockean injustice requires redistribution which will look very different to
that which Lockean-influenced reparations theorists have argued for.
The argument should also be of interest to socialists. This is for three
reasons. First, if the Lockean thesis is the main defence of existing property
titles, then socialists should have a strong focus on critiquing this defence.
Having an increased awareness of the problems with the Lockean defence
of existing property titles could be politically useful to socialists when
engaging in debates with defenders of existing property titles. Second,
there is a strand of socialist thinking—explicit but incomplete in the
writing of Spooner, and implicit and incomplete in the writing of Marx—
which suggests that mass property redistribution is justified because of his-
torical Lockean injustice. This book critically reflects on these arguments,
which may be useful for helping socialists think about how they argue for
reallocation of resources. Third, this book argues that according to the
LLOR, it appears that egalitarian redistribution is required. It may be the
case that socialists want to use the arguments in this book to argue for
socialist reallocation of control over resources. Alternatively, the book may
help highlight the problems with arguing for reallocation of resources on
the grounds of historical Lockean injustice. (Note that this book is not
making an argument for Lockean restitution. It is an investigation into
what Lockeans should favour if they want to be intellectually consistent.)
Finally, the book’s appendix outlines an account of Lockean exploit-
ation which should be of interest to academics, students or lay persons
interested in the topic of economic exploitation. It should be of particular
interest to Marxists, as the book clarifies an implicit Lockean exploitation
argument in the work of Marx.
Chapters outline
Chapter 1 focuses on outlining the Lockean thesis and assessing the
arguments in favour of it. The first sections of the chapter are dedicated
to clarifying the rights involved in Lockeanism. First, the thesis of self-
ownership is introduced. Then Lockean world-ownership rights are
introduced. Part of this discussion involves clarifying (as far as possible)
which specific version of Lockean rights we will be referring to in the
rest of the book. Later sections of Chapter 1 are concerned with critic-
ally assessing the defences of Lockean rights. We argue that none of
6
6 Introduction
these defences are very strong (particularly when compared to a possible
alternative—mutualist possession rights). Despite arguing that upon exam-
ination the justifications put forward for Lockeanism are weak, the rest of
the book proceeds as a thought experiment, looking into what is entailed if
its legitimacy is accepted for the sake of argument.
Chapter 2 is an attempt to clarify and begin defending the LLOR frame-
work for addressing unjust gains (discussion of the LLOT aspect of the
LLORAT is postponed until Chapter 5). According to the LLOR (which
draws on modern restitution law), all property not gained in line with
Lockean justice must go through a restitution process. This involves—
in lieu of good reason otherwise—giving the property to persons who
would have gotten it had it not been for an identifiable injustice taking
place. Where it is entirely unknown who would have gotten the property
without an injustice taking place, then the property should be confiscated
and ideally redistributed in an egalitarian manner among all persons in the
world. The chapter then defends this LLOR approach to addressing the
problem of unjust gains against what we label the ‘innocent homesteader
scheme’ put forward by Rothbard. Put very briefly, according to Rothbard,
holdings should stay as they are unless a theft victim (or their heir) can
be found. We argue that unlike the LLOR, Rothbard’s approach fails to
address a significant form of Lockean injustice—monopoly. Rothbard’s
approach is also weaker than the LLOR in other respects, so the LLOR is
a more reasonable way to address the problem of unjust gains.
Chapter 3 continues defending the LLOR against other approaches to
addressing unjust gains. The first approach which is considered is what
we label the ‘Young Rothbard scheme’. It is argued that while the Young
Rothbard scheme seems very different to Rothbard’s later innocent home-
steader scheme—discussed in Chapter 2—the two schemes are actually very
similar, so suffer from similar shortcomings. The second approach which
we defend the LLOR from in Chapter 3 is that of the left-Rothbardian,
Gabriel Konkin. We argue that Konkin’s approach to addressing histor-
ical injustice is somewhat unclear, but it appears that he holds to one of
Rothbard’s schemes, in which case, it suffers from the same problems as
those schemes. The third approach that we defend the LLOR from is
Nozick’s ‘rectification’ principle. According to the rectification principle,
the aim is to get holdings to those who would have had them were it not
for all historical injustice. Nozick’s approach is not technically unsound
but would be entirely impossible to enact in our actual world because
nobody would exist were it not for all historical injustice, so nobody could
be entitled to anything under his scheme. However, the LLOR approach we
outline seems not to suffer from this problem so is advantageous in terms
of being (at least theoretically) possible to enact.
We then discuss Spooner’s approach to addressing historical injustice,
which he outlined when pointing to violently derived land titles in Ireland,
England, and the British Empire. While Spooner has a very similar
understanding to us in terms of what makes existing titles illegitimate, he
7
Introduction 7
does not outline a clear approach for addressing the problem. He implies
that resource reallocation in line with what happened during the French
Revolution would be suitable, but the French Revolution actually left much
injustice in holdings unaddressed. The next approach to addressing histor-
ical injustice is Marx’s. We argue that it appears that Marx uses an implicit
Lockean argument in his ‘expropriate the expropriators’ rhetoric. That is,
he seems to imply that English peasants held their land justly on Lockean
grounds, and that expropriating capitalists in England would be justified
on the grounds that those peasants were first expropriated. However, we
point out that he leaves the argument implicit and incomplete.
Chapter 4 is concerned with identifying unjustly held property. The first
parts of the chapter continue our description—started in Chapter 2—of
what counts as unjust land monopoly. It argues that there are both ‘full’
and ‘partial’ forms of monopoly. A resource is fully monopolised when
somebody unjustly exercises ownership over it, preventing all other per-
sons legitimately acquiring it. A resource is partially monopolised when
some particular persons (e.g., slaves) are unjustly prevented from legitim-
ately acquiring that resource. The chapter then argues that all resources
in our actual world have been partially and fully monopolised for much
of recorded history, and—in lieu of special claims—have needed to be
redistributed in an egalitarian manner for many centuries. Furthermore,
any special claims would have to trace very far back into history, so it is
unlikely that anybody alive has sound special claims. The next part of the
chapter discusses how this understanding of the requirements of the LLOR
undermines Rothbard’s claim that the United States developed largely in
line with Lockean justice. There is then an additional discussion of unjust
monetary incomes due to various forms of contemporary Lockean injustice
such as land rents, state spending, and government regulations.
Chapter 5 is concerned with the topic of redistribution. The chapter
starts with the assumption that according to the LLOR, all resources need
to be redistributed in an egalitarian manner. Some principles for enacting
such redistribution are outlined. These principles can be labelled ‘mutualist’
(although our definition of ‘mutualism’ matches one definition of ‘com-
munism’). A few points are then made about what mutualist societies might
look like. It is suggested that creating a global ‘commune of communes’
would be a sound way to enact the principles. After discussing redistribu-
tion under the LLOR, the redistributive requirements of the LLOT are
discussed. We argue that it is not entirely clear what addressing Lockean
torts requires. First, it is not even entirely clear that all torts require com-
pensation in the form of property redistribution. Furthermore, if torts do
give rise to claims for property redistribution, it is not clear that anybody
has a right to a tortfeasor’s unjustly held property. Thus, it may be the case
that redistribution under the LLOT can only take place after redistribution
under the LLOR is enacted and resources are held justly by tortfeasors.
After discussing the redistributive requirements of the LLOR and LLOT,
some possible tactics that Lockean should pursue are discussed. It is argued
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Neljäs luku.