Money, Oil, and Empire in The Middle East: Sterling and Postwar Imperialism, 1944-1971 Mary Ann Heiss 2011
Money, Oil, and Empire in The Middle East: Sterling and Postwar Imperialism, 1944-1971 Mary Ann Heiss 2011
Iranian Studies
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To cite this article: Mary Ann Heiss (2012) Money, Oil, and Empire in the Middle East: Sterling and
Postwar Imperialism, 1944–1971, Iranian Studies, 45:1, 159-161, DOI: 10.1080/00210862.2011.594639
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Money, Oil, and Empire in the Middle East: Sterling and Postwar Imperialism,
1944–1971, Steven G. Galpern, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009,
$93.00, ISBN 978-0-521-76790-3, 345pp.
Given the dozens—if not hundreds—of books on the broad topic of Middle Eastern
oil diplomacy, it is reasonable to ask whether the world needs another. Scholars have,
after all, by now well covered all manner of aspects of the broad story of the region and
its petroleum, from the rise of western concessions, to major flashpoints, to great
power rivalry in the struggle for control. They have also written volumes about the
British imperial role in the Middle East, from its expansion after World War II to
its contraction a little more than two decades later. In the face of such a voluminous
historiography, what, therefore, could possibly be left to say? As Steven G. Galpern’s
Money, Oil, and Empire in the Middle East: Sterling and Postwar Imperialism, 1944–
1971 makes clear, the answer is plenty. Building upon but moving well beyond the
extant literature, Galpern explores the way British efforts to protect the pound ster-
ling’s international standing influenced the nation’s petroleum diplomacy in the
Middle East. The tale this creatively conceived, tightly focused and impeccably
researched monograph tells has heretofore been ignored, or at best slighted. In the
main, Galpern chronicles a less than successful effort, as London failed to either pre-
serve the pound as a major international currency or maintain the nation’s position of
prominence—some would even say dominance—in the Middle East. By shedding new
light on why oil was important to British policymakers rather than simply noting that
it was, Galpern adds considerably to the literature on the post-World War II Middle
Eastern oil situation. By demonstrating the complex financial considerations that went
into making British Middle Eastern oil policy, he reveals that much more was at play
than cold war strategic calculations or a desire to preserve the nation’s international
standing as a great power. And by highlighting the important role that perceptions
played in shaping British policy, he illustrates that reality is often only a secondary con-
sideration in policy formation.
The heart of Money, Oil, and Empire in the Middle East lies in four chronologically
arranged case studies that trace British efforts to defend the nation’s sterling interests
insofar as oil was concerned against a variety of challenges. The first episode Galpern
addresses pitted London’s determination to protect its sterling position by whatever
160 Reviews
means were necessary, even discriminatory measures against American oil companies
and the creation of an overall sterling bloc, against Washington’s own self-interested
calls for free trade. The second and third incidents, the Iranian nationalization imbro-
glio and the Suez crisis, have certainly been well covered in the literature, but Galpern’s
focus here on the crises’ sterling aspects and implications breaks considerable new
ground. The final case study examines less well known British efforts to control the
Kuwaiti search for investment outlets for that nation’s sterling oil revenues.
Galpern remains true to his focus on sterling throughout and masterfully delineates
the ways British officials sought to ensure that the nation gained sterling benefits from
its involvement in Middle Eastern oil rather than suffering losses or damage from
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them. As he also makes clear, these efforts achieved varying levels of success. Early
postwar Anglo-American squabbles over oil policy in the region painted in bold
relief London’s determination to protect what policymakers saw as the national inter-
est, even in the face of opposition from Washington. The Iran and Suez crises brought
Britain into direct conflict with two of the Middle East’s most powerful states and also
revealed fissures in the Anglo-American relationship. Neither episode, of course,
turned out well for Britain, with the latter being particularly devastating. The
Kuwaiti surplus episode was much less confrontational than the others, perhaps
because Kuwait itself was more vulnerable regionally and therefore less able or inclined
to challenge Britain’s position. Of the episodes Galpern chronicles, it amounted to the
largest short-term success for Britain, though it exposed serious weaknesses and
opened the door to Britain’s subsequent wholesale withdrawal from the region.
Although Galpern is primarily interested in restoring sterling considerations to pro-
minence within the pantheon of other factors that shaped British policy toward
Middle Eastern oil—a task at which he succeeds admirably—he also adds nuance
to a variety of other important historiographical themes. When it comes to the
Anglo-American relationship, he demonstrates clearly the overall lack of agreement
regarding Middle Eastern oil policy, the different national interests that each side
sought to protect, and the cost to Britain when the United States refused its
backing at crucial crisis points, such as Suez. He also adds a new piece to the puzzle
of Britain’s confrontation with indigenous nationalism, revealing the complicated
nature of British efforts to retain control of valuable regional resources. A third
area where Galpern advances prevailing thinking pertains to the agency or influence
that Middle Eastern leaders were able to exert when it came to oil matters, as he
makes clear that they were hardly pawns or simple responders to great power policy
choices. On the contrary, they were powerful actors in their own right and initiated
policy actions that suited their own national interests, rather than those of Britain.
In breathing new life into a seemingly well worn topic, Money, Oil, and Empire in the
Middle East constitutes a significant and lasting contribution to the historiography. It
reveals the value in asking new questions of old subjects, demonstrates that historical
explanations are always multifaceted and never as simple as they seem, and goes some dis-
tance toward providing a fuller appreciation for the multifaceted considerations that
drove British policy toward Middle Eastern oil. It even includes an interesting and
thought-provoking afterword that moves from the realm of historical monograph to pol-
Reviews 161
itical analysis, using the British experience in the Middle East as a point of departure for
analyzing the current situation the United State faces in the region. Scholars from fields as
diverse as Middle East studies, international history, the British Empire, business and
economic history, and US foreign relations will read this book with great profit. And
read it they must if they are to develop a more sophisticated—and thus more complete
—understanding of the postwar British role in the Middle East.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00210862.2011.594639