NUCLEAR LECTURE

Nations modernising nuclear warheads, says report

STOCKHOLM: The overall number of nuclear warheads in the world has
declined in the past year but nations are modernising their arsenals, a report
published on Monday said.

At the start of 2019, the United States, Russia, Britain, France, China, India, Pakistan, Israel
and North Korea had a total of some 13,865 nuclear weapons, according to estimates in a
new report by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI).

That represents a decrease of 600 nuclear weapons compared to the start of 2018.

But at the same time all nuclear weapon-possessing countries are modernising these arms,
and China, India and Pakistan are also increasing the size of their arsenals.

“The world is seeing fewer but newer weapons,” Shannon Kile, director of the SIPRI Nuclear
Arms Control Programme and one of the report’s authors, told AFP.

The drop in recent years can mainly be attributed to the US and Russia, whose combined
arsenals still make up more than 90 per cent of the world’s nuclear weapons.

This is in part due to the countries fulfilling their obligations under the New START treaty —
which puts a cap on the number of deployed warheads and was signed by the US and Russia
in 2010 — as well as getting rid of obsolete warheads from the Cold War era.

The START treaty is however due to expire in 2021, which Kile said was worrying since
there are currently “no serious discussions under way about extending it”.

Next year the treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) — considered the
cornerstone of the world’s nuclear order — turns 50.

The myth and reality of nuclear proliferation

AFTER the 1974 Indian nuclear test, according to his famous autobiography
'My Country My Life', Indian BJP leader L. K. Advani equated the significance
of this event with that of the Indian Army entering triumphantly into the
streets of Dhaka in December 1971.

The euphoria was not limited to the right-wing leaders in India. The director of nuclear
policy at the prestigious Carnegie Endowment for International Peace in Washington D.C.,
George Perkovich quotes the suave left-leaning Indian former prime minister I.K. Gujral, in
his award-winning book 'India's Nuclear Bomb', that the entry within the UN Security
Council is possible only for those with either economic wealth or nuclear weapons. Hence,
for India, building and detonating nuclear weapon was a short cut to great power status.

In response to the Indian nuclear test in 1974, ironically called 'Smiling Buddha' by the
Indian government, Pakistan proposed to declare South Asia as a nuclear weapons free zone
and in 1979 suggested simultaneous adherence to NPT by both India and Pakistan, but was
curtly shrugged off by India on both occasions. The docile response of the international
community and the sobering experiences of naively entrusting external powers with the
provision of security against a huge neighbour during both 1965 and 1971 wars, almost
forced Islamabad's hand to follow suit.

On the international, legal and diplomatic fronts, from the very outset, the nuclear
disarmament commitment of the five states, recognised as the only nuclear weapon states
under the Non-Proliferation Treaty, was questionable at best. The common intention of the
permanent members of the UN Security Council was to confine the scope of NPT to limiting
horizontal proliferation of nuclear weapons and its related technology. In plain words, no
other states should build nuclear weapons in future.

However, their acceptance of indefinite vertical proliferation obligations and nuclear

disarmament was a reluctant arrangement and the 1995 NPT review conference almost gave
up on its cause of nuclear disarmament by the nuclear weapon states, by indefinitely
extending NPT. This drastically eroded whatever leverage the non-nuclear weapon states
might have had over the nuclear weapon states to progress towards general and
comprehensive nuclear disarmament. In 1995, NPT ceased to be a tool for nuclear
disarmament and conferred upon the five nuclear powers not only a legitimate but also an
indefinite nuclear power status, imposing no specific timeframe whatsoever within which to
eliminate their nuclear weapons.

According to the International Court of Justice's unanimous opinion issued in 1996, the
Article VI of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) goes beyond the mere obligation of
conducting the negotiations in good faith but also to conclude the negotiations. In fact,
initially Germany, Italy, Japan and Switzerland insisted that the nuclear weapon states
should disarm before rendering their own non-nuclear weapon status, but in the end they
also gave up their insistence. Most probably, the US presence of extended nuclear
deterrence over Western Europe and Japan might have something to do with it.

In terms of elimination of nuclear weapons by nuclear states, the NPT has completely failed
as all the five nuclear weapon states have continued to develop and improve their nuclear
weapons. One must rest assured that the recent bilateral New START Treaty between the US
and Russia is not motivated by a sudden inspiration by Article VI of the NPT, nor any
mysterious desire has overtaken the either side to eliminate their nuclear weapons. This
bilateral arrangement, which is yet to be ratified by the US Congress, primarily aims at more
effective and efficient management of their ever evolving nuclear arsenals rather than their
complete elimination. This discriminatory approach has not only weakened the
international nuclear non-proliferation efforts but has also encouraged states aspiring to
acquire nuclear weapons, considering it as the ultimate tool to achieve big power status.

Three years after the eventful 1995 NPT Review Conference, in order to rectify the gaping
strategic imbalance within South Asia and to pacify BJP leadership's belligerent threats to
retake Azad Jammu and Kashmir from Pakistan, the second series of Indian 1998 nuclear
tests, left Pakistan with no option but to respond in kind.

The initial international reaction to the Indian and Pakistan nuclear tests was that of shock
but was coupled with a nascent hope that the 'overt nuclear dimension' will lead to restrain
in conventional arms race, conflict resolution and eventually peace. After the end of the
World War II, similar hopes were expressed but the Berlin crisis and Korean War proved
that the acquisition of destructive capability does not necessarily lead to an increased sense
of responsibility.

The experience of the past twelve years in South Asia has also been no different. The Kargil
war turned Kashmir into a 'nuclear flashpoint' and the tense military standoff in 2001-2002
led Islamabad to once again use the nuclear threat to deter India from carrying out 'hot
pursuit' against Pakistan. Moreover, thanks to a sustained global arms shopping 'spree',
today the Indian conventional superiority over Pakistan has reached such unprecedented
levels that despite 'operationalisation' of nuclear weapons and deployment of various
ballistic and cruise missiles by both countries, the Indian military leadership seems hell
bent to test the 'credibility of the Pakistani nuclear deterrent' by planning for another
conventional war against Pakistan, in the form of its Pakistan-specific 'Cold Start' doctrine.

In this context, the Pakistan's Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee, Gen. Tariq chose
the recent National Defence University convocation in Islamabad as the appropriate time
and place to tell both friends and foes that 'the retention of nuclear capability was a
compulsion not a choice for Pakistan, which has to be mindful of the military
preponderance in its eastern neighbourhood. Although supportive of non-discriminatory
non-proliferation efforts, Islamabad will not accept Pakistan-specific treaties such as Fissile
Material Treaty (FMT) and the world needs to be sensitive to its security concerns, including
those in Afghanistan.'

Micael Krepon, who is the founder of the Henry L. Stimson Center, Washington D.C., and
has authored 13 books and more than 350 articles on international nuclear and strategic
issues, told me last month that since the dominant motive behind the Indian quest for
nuclear weapons was big power status, New Delhi will not settle for merely a 'nuclear
weapon capability' but despite its obvious political, diplomatic and economic costs and
inevitable international condemnation, will not stop short of acquiring 'the thermo-nuclear
weapon', which thanks to its hundreds of times more destructive power than a nuclear
weapon dropped on Hiroshima by the US in 1945, is the ultimate international status
symbol, and is possessed and tested by all five big powers.

It seems that the western powers have resigned to the inevitability of the Indian rise as a
major power to such an extent that even when a Canadian supplied reactor and US supplied
nuclear material destined solely for peaceful purposes was utilised by New Delhi for its
nuclear test in 1974, and under the 123 Agreement, New Delhi has been allowed by the US
and Nuclear Supplier Group to keep its current and future reprocessing plants and
fast-breeder reactors outside international safeguards, the world sees little or no harm in it.

However, Pakistan, a state which despite not signing the NPT, voluntarily keeps its
KANUPP, Chashma I and Chashma II reactors, under IAEA safeguards, has had its nuclear
fuel denied by Canada and a reprocessing plant declined by France under overt and
sustained US pressure. During one of his visits to Pakistan, the US Secretary of State Henry
Kissinger had threatened the Pakistani prime minister Z.A. Bhutto with grave consequences
if the country did not shut down its modest nuclear programme.

In his autobiography, L.K. Advani describes the US counter-proliferation policy in South

Asia as based on three Ds — 'Double standards, discrimination and duplicity'. On the
contrary, the Indian breach of international trust and confidence by the diversion of
Canadian and US supplied nuclear technology and materials towards its nuclear test led to
the formulation of Nuclear Suppliers Group and passing of US Nuclear Non-Proliferation
Act, 1978. These historical facts and US own laws were bypassed and international
non-proliferation regime seriously dented, when the US voraciously pursued the Indo-US
nuclear deal, which neither took into account the history of Indian nuclear programme nor
imposed any restrictions upon New Delhi from raising its 'unsafeguarded fissile material'
stocks, and keeping its Fast-Breeder nuclear reactors and reprocessing plants outside IAEA
safeguards.

It is strange that despite a major energy crisis being faced by Pakistan, the acquisition of
Chasma III and Chasma IV, which like the other three reactors mentioned above, are purely
for civilian energy purposes and will also be under international safeguards, is being
severely criticised by Washington, which according to recent reports, has decided to oppose
it in the Nuclear Suppliers Group.

This is an unfortunate development for the economic and energy security of a major ally of
the US which has sacrificed more than any other state in the war on terror, and more so
when the Chinese Foreign Ministry has assured the international community that 'the
civilian nuclear co-operation between China and Pakistan is in line with each side's
international obligations and it is purely for peaceful purposes and under the strict
supervision of the IAEA'. Pakistan already has an indigenous nuclear weapon programme
and acquisition of Chinese power reactors, whose complete operation will be under IAEA
safeguards, will have no relevance or effect on the issue of either vertical or horizontal
nuclear proliferation and both China and Pakistan are willing to guarantee that.

One cannot help but recall that the Indian 1998 nuclear tests were vehemently criticised by
prime minister Manmohan Singh as the leader of the opposition and had warned of grave
consequences of the Indian tests and a costly arms race, which could send the defence
expenditure skyrocketing to a point where ' there would be nothing left to defend'. Today at
a whopping 32 billion dollars, the Indian annual defence budget is higher than ever.
Moreover, compelled by the Indian scientists community and driven by long-term global
political and strategic aspiration of acquiring a big power status, senior US nuclear experts
like Michael Krepon are predicting a resumption of nuclear tests by India in the foreseeable
future.

These unfortunate historical ironies point to the fact that the world continues to remain an
anarchic place, whose diverse dangers force small and insecure states to pursue security
through various means. Of these, over time none has proven to be more effective at
preventing war than instilling the element of fear of destruction in the minds of adversaries.

The strategic stability resulting from this credible threat of unacceptable and unimaginable
destruction is a fragile but effective tool rather than an end in itself, toward preserving the
state structure in an anarchical world and to give societies an opportunity to pursue the
higher goals of economic, social and environmental security, under the shadow of nuclear
weapons, as the Western European and North American democracies did during the cold
war. The historical paradox is that fear is the key to security.

India, Kashmir & deterrence

KASHMIR is generally described as a nuclear flashpoint. Reference to Pakistan
and India being nuclear-armed neighbours is often cited in times of heightened
tension between the two countries and as a reminder that they must avoid an
all-out conflict. The Aug 5 Indian move to annex India-held Kashmir (IHK), the
draconian lockdown in the Valley since that date, and reckless Indian claims to
Azad Kashmir have created a radically new and dangerous situation which has
been the subject of extensive comment.

In a recent Dawn article, my respected senior colleague ambassador Ashraf Jehangir Qazi
pointed to an impending genocide in the Valley and suggested that “if the people of the
Valley are threatened with genocide, as indeed they are, Pakistan’s [nuclear] deterrent must
cover them”. The concept of nuclear deterrence has an inbuilt ambiguity, but given the
gravity of the subject matter, it needs further scrutiny.

Two questions readily come to mind. Will the post-Aug 5 conditions in IHK morph into a
genocidal crisis and how should Pakistan respond to such a situation? Second, what broadly
underpins Pakistan’s thinking on resort to its nuclear deterrent and how will it apply to
Kashmir?

Arguably, the lockdown of eight million Kashmiris represents a most reprehensible human
rights violation that deserves the severest international condemnation, but despite the
danger, in the general perception, genocide is tied to large-scale massacres, mass exodus
and international outrage. The Indians appear to be avoiding that tipping point and are
attempting to pursue calculated repression to tire the Kashmiris out and entice pliable
Kashmiri individuals to acquiesce in the new diktat. They are embarked on a long haul.

Pakistan, on the other hand, is waiting to see how Kashmiris react to repression when they
find some breathing space. This policy dilemma is at play in Prime Minister Imran Khan’s
warning to those intending to cross the Line of Control. The current impasse is fraught and
nothing is clear about its denouement. If, however, the situation deteriorates and there is
bloodshed and people start fleeing the Valley, Pakistan’s restraint will come under great
stress and become untenable. A stage may come when beyond exhausting diplomatic
options, Pakistan would be unable to withhold material assistance to the Kashmiri struggle.

That scenario can precipitate a conflict for which Pakistan must be fully prepared.

In all probability, conflict would draw international intervention and activate the United
Nations Security Council to call for a ceasefire and dialogue for a political settlement of
Kashmir. This could become a new basis for dialogue, since the heart of a meaningful
dialogue on Kashmir provided by the Shimla Accords, the Lahore Summit Declaration and
subsequent bilateral pronouncements has been knocked out by the Aug 5 move of the Modi
government. This could usher in a period of tenuous peace and another status quo over
Kashmir. But conflicts can have unpredictable trajectories and far worse, and disastrous
consequences cannot be ruled out, which makes the talk of nuclear deterrent relevant.
Pakistan developing a nuclear deterrent was a necessary and understandable response to
rectify the qualitative force imbalance created by India’s 1974 nuclear test. Pakistan
obviously had no outside nuclear umbrella available and had to rely on its own capacity.
Since 1998, Pakistan’s nuclear doctrine has maintained that its deterrent is entirely
defensive and meant to be a shield against any intended aggression to destroy its territorial
integrity.

India’s Cold Start Doctrine forced further fine-tuning of Pakistan’s thinking as to the
practical applicability of its deterrent. Because the Cold Start Doctrine contemplated
incursion and lopping off a vulnerable part of Pakistani territory, Pakistan responded by
developing tactical nuclear weapons to be deployed against an invading force inside
Pakistan. India has reacted by declaring that use of a nuclear weapon, however limited,
anywhere (including inside Pakistan) would draw a massive nuclear retaliation. Regardless
of the debates swirling around these scenarios, they provide the clearest indication of
Pakistan’s determination to go to any extent to defend its territorial integrity.

How does all this apply to Kashmir? In practical terms, Pakistan’s deterrent cannot protect
people in the Valley or prevent mayhem in IHK. But a genocide can lead to a conflict
between Pakistan and India with its own dynamic and risks, thus Kashmir becoming a
nuclear flashpoint. Pakistan’s nuclear deterrent must however cover Azad Kashmir and
Gilgit-Baltistan to thwart any Indian designs to capture any part of that territory. Many
among the current BJP leadership mince no words about their covetous intentions and
claims over the territory. It is imperative that we leave no one in doubt that we will defend
Azad Kashmir and GB as we will defend any part of Pakistan. We cannot tolerate a repeat of
Siachen.

Islamabad must also brace itself for Indian-sponsored subversion and disaffection in Azad
Kashmir and GB, and, recognising their special status, ensure well-being, development,
rights and opportunities for the people of these areas.

The Aug 5 move by the Modi government has so poisoned the well that it is difficult see a
path to normal relations with India. Imran Khan’s Kartarpur initiative and his call to curb
any jihadist impulse along the LoC are laudable. These measures, or any other similar
gestures or initiatives, are unlikely to compel India to change course to some form of a
policy reversal that respects Kashmiri sentiment and restores an environment for
purposeful interaction with Pakistan. Much will depend on the Kashmiris and sensitivity of
the international community to their predicament and to sane voices within India.
Meanwhile, barring further deterioration, Pakistan has little choice but to maintain only a
circumspect functional relationship with its eastern neighbour without expectations of
normalisation any time soon.

World must wake up to India’s nuke threat, says PM

ISLAMABAD: Amid an escalating war of words between Pakistani and Indian
leaders, Prime Minister Imran Khan on Sunday asked the world to worry about
Indian nuclear weapons under a “fascist” and “racist” government in Delhi.

“The world must also seriously consider the safety & security of India’s nuclear arsenal in
the control of the fascist, racist Hindu Supremacist Modi govt. This is an issue that impacts
not just the region but the world,” the prime minister said in a series of tweets on India.
Read: 'World must seriously consider safety, security of India's nuclear arsenal in control
of fascist Modi'

PM Khan further said that the Hindu supremacist government in India was not only a threat
to its own minorities and “the very fabric of Nehru and Gandhi’s India”, but also to Pakistan.
He urged the world to better understand the extremist mindset of the Bharatiya Janata
Party and its ideological fountainhead, the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS).

About the plight of the Indian Muslims, he said: “Already 4m Indian Muslims face detention
camps and cancellation of citizenship. World must take note as this genie is out of the bottle
& the doctrine of hate and genocide, with RSS goons on the rampage, will spread unless the
international community acts now to stop it.”

Rajnath’s tweet shows the predicament Delhi finds itself in after its
illegal actions in held Kashmir, says FM
Tensions between Pakistan and India have been aggravating since Delhi moved to annex the
disputed territory of Kashmir on Aug 5 through a presidential order. The situation was
discussed at the United Nations Security Council on Friday where members expressed their
concern and asked the parties to the conflict to avoid taking unilateral steps that could lead
to further escalation.

On the same day, Indian Defence Minister Rajnath Singh brought the nuclear issue into the
limelight by hinting that India could alter its nuclear policy of no first use. The remarks were
immediately condemned by Pakistan as “irresponsible” and “unfortunate”, and its
leadership vowed to maintain credible minimum deterrence posture. However, the
acrimony has refused to die down.

The Indian defence minister in his latest comments has suggested that there can be no talks
with Pakistan, as being encouraged by various countries, and if ever there is going to be a
discussion, it will be on Azad Kashmir.

“Some people believe and say that there should be talks with Pakistan, but until Pakistan
stops supporting terrorism, there will be nothing. If there are talks with Pakistan then it will
be on” Azad Kashmir, he tweeted.

Foreign Minister Shah Mehmood Qureshi, in a statement in response to Mr Singh’s latest

comment, said it was a reflection of India’s troubled mindset after its controversial and
“illegal” move on held Kashmir.

“We have seen the comments made by the Indian defence minister today. These are
reflective of the predicament that India finds itself in after its illegal and unilateral actions
imperilling peace and security in the region and beyond,” the foreign minister said.

He underscored that the Jammu and Kashmir dispute was to be decided on the basis of the
UN Security Council resolutions and in accordance with the wishes of the Kashmiri people.
He maintained that Pakistan’s position on the dispute was based on the UN Charter and
international law and remained unchanged.
Mr Qureshi also condemned the worsening human rights situation in occupied Kashmir,
where the Indian government has imposed a curfew, now in its 13th day, and restrictions on
communications.

“Equally condemnable is the completely indefensible lockdown of the entire population in

occupied Jammu and Kashmir, that has gone on for two weeks, and continues to deepen the
dire humanitarian tragedy as reported by the international human rights organisations and
the international media,” he said. “The world community, including the United Nations
Security Council, has taken cognisance of this utterly untenable situation.”

Speaking in Multan, Mr Qureshi challenged the Indian leadership to hold a referendum on

the revocation of Article 370 of the Constitution to see for itself how Kashmiris were looking
at it.

“In Srinagar, or wherever you see fit, hold a public referendum today,” he said.

“I challenge Narendra Modi to lift the curfew and call the entire Kashmiri leadership —
including those who have been in government with you such as Mehbooba Mufti, a former
chief minister, Omar Abdullah, also a former CM, and the Hurriyat leadership: Mirwaiz
Omar Farooq, Ali Gilani, Yasin Malik — there are numerous individuals,” he said.

The nuclear dimension

US PRESIDENT Donald Trump spoke harshly about Pakistan; but he has not yet imposed
sanctions, as has been the case with Iran, nor threatened to “totally destroy” it, like North
Korea. Pakistani diplomats believe there is room to maintain a working if not a cosy
relationship with Washington.

That remains to be seen. Islamabad disagrees with the ‘new’ US strategy concerning
Afghanistan. It will not fight Afghanistan’s war on its soil. It will continue to oppose an
expanded Indian role in Afghanistan. It wants a political settlement between Kabul and the
Afghan Taliban, rather than continued conflict, and coordinated action to eliminate the
militant Islamic State group and Al Qaeda, as well as the Tehreek-i-Taliban Pakistan, the
Jamaatul Ahrar and the Balochistan Liberation Army, that operate from safe havens in
Afghanistan.

Even if Pakistan and the US are able to reconcile their divergent positions on Afghanistan,
the emerging strategic alignments that will shape policies in Asia are unlikely to change. The
US has chosen India as its major strategic partner in Asia to counter the rising power of
China. The resulting escalation in the Indian threat to Pakistan’s security is either irrelevant
for the US or part of its strategic plan to weaken Pakistan’s opposition to Indo-US regional
domination. The recent visit of the US defence secretary to India has confirmed and
reinforced their strategic alliance and intention to collaborate in Afghanistan.

Without its nuclear and missile capabilities, Pakistan would have

been sanctioned like Iran.
Pakistan’s ability to resist Indian diktat and to disagree with America’s strategic design
flows from one principal source: its nuclear and missile capabilities. Without this, Pakistan
would have been attacked like Iraq or sanctioned like Iran. On the other hand, North Korea,
despite its isolation, has been able to thumb its nose at America because of its demonstrated
nuclear and missile prowess.

An Islamic nuclear power was always anathema for America and much of the Western
world. The US worked ceaselessly — even when Pakistan was a close ally — to retard and
reverse its nuclear and missile programmes. This endeavour has intensified since the
emergence of the American alliance with India. Apart from the discriminatory technological
and political restrictions it has long imposed against Pakistan’s strategic programmes, the
US now demands that Pakistan unilaterally halt fissile material production and the
development and deployment of short- and long-range nuclear-capable missiles.
Meanwhile, it is actively assisting India in enlarging and modernising its nuclear arsenal, its
missile and anti-ballistic missile capabilities, its air and naval forces, as well as satellite and
space capabilities.

There are credible and not-so-secret reports that the US has formulated plans to seize or
destroy Pakistan’s nuclear weapons in a crisis. American think tanks have concocted
scenarios of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons falling into the hands of terrorists or, even more
absurdly, of the Pakistan Army turning into an ‘extremist’ or ‘jihadi’ force. Indeed, such
scary scenarios could be engineered as an excuse to execute the ‘seize or destroy’ plans.

Matters are more likely to come to a head in the event of another war between Pakistan and
India. Kashmir is an ongoing dispute and a nuclear flashpoint. Every India-Pakistan war
game confirms the likelihood of a rapid escalation of a conflict to the nuclear level due to the
asymmetry in conventional forces. A war should thus be unthinkable. Yet, India’s political
and military leaders continue to speak of ‘surgical strikes’ and a ‘limited’ war against
Pakistan. If India does ever decide to go to war with Pakistan, it would have to first conduct
a pre-emptive strike to eliminate Pakistan’s nuclear deterrence capabilities. Or, would the
US be prepared to do so on India’s behalf? Pakistan must be prepared for both
contingencies.

Islamabad must presume that in the course of its past (ill-considered) ‘cooperation’ with the
US to enhance the ‘safety and security’ of Pakistan’s nuclear assets, the US has gained
considerable intelligence about Pakistan’s strategic assets. However, Pakistani officials
correctly discount America’s ability to seize Pakistan’s nuclear weapons. These are too
many, and too widely dispersed and well protected, thus not amenable to any seizure or
strike. But nuclear delivery systems are more difficult to hide and protect.

In a crisis, it is the delivery systems that will be the prime target of a pre-emptive strike.
These are most likely to be detected when, in a crisis, they are being ‘mated’ with the
separately stored warheads. Furthermore, as revealed during the current Korean drama,
missile launches can be sabotaged by cyberattacks and other technical means.

In the emerging strategic scenario, nuclear deterrence is Pakistan’s ultimate assurance

against external aggression and coercion.

Pakistan needs to take several measures so that the credibility of its nuclear deterrence is
assured. One, the massive deployment of artillery and short-range missiles (à la North
Korea) as the first line of conventional deterrence and defence against an Indian Cold Start
attack. This would deter Indian attack and also raise the nuclear threshold. Two, the
multiplication of long-, medium- and short-range nuclear-capable missiles to ensure the
penetration of any ballistic missile defence systems that India deploys. Three, the continued
production of fissile materials to provide warheads for the enlarged missile force.

Then, there is the need to ‘mate’ at least some warheads with delivery vehicles, their
dispersal and disguise, or protection in hardened silos, to respond to a pre-emptive strike.
Eventually, submarine-launched ballistic missiles could provide an assured second-strike
capability. Five, the deployment of effective air defence systems plus a limited number of
advanced (and expensive) anti-ballistic missile systems to protect command and control
centres. Six, the development of offensive and defensive cyber-warfare capabilities.

Following this, Pakistan needs the acquisition and deployment of early-warning capabilities
— satellites, surveillance aircraft and drones. In the meantime, Pakistan should utilise
Chinese early warning capabilities. Lastly, greater integration and inter-operability with
Chinese land, air and naval forces to enhance conventional and strategic deterrence, quickly
and cheaply.

Once Pakistan can demonstrate the complete credibility of its nuclear deterrence posture, its
offers to negotiate peace and security in South Asia and to resolve the Kashmir dispute may
evoke a more positive response from both India and the US. Pakistan will then also be able
to pursue its socioeconomic objectives free from the threats of external coercion,
intervention and aggression.