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EN BANC

January 12, 2016

A.C. No. 10910

[Formerly CBD Case No. 12-3594)

ANTERO M. SISON, JR., Complainant,

vs.
ATTY. MANUEL N. CAMACHO, Respondent.

DECISION

PERCURIAM:

In his verified affidavit-complaint,1 dated September 17, 2012, filed before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
Commission on Bar Discipline (JBP-CBD), complainant Atty. Antero M. Sison, Jr. (Atty. Sison), president of
Marsman-Drysdale Agribusiness Holdings Inc. (MDAHI), charged respondent Atty. Manuel Camacho (Atty.
Camacho) with violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR). He accused Atty. Camacho of violating
Rule 1.01, for dishonestly entering into a compromise agreement without authorization, and Rule 16.01, for failure to
render an accounting of funds which were supposed to be paid as additional docket fees.

Complaint's Position

Atty. Sison alleged that Atty. Camacho was the counsel of MDAHI in an insurance claim action against Paramount
Life & General Insurance Corp. (Paramount Insurance), docketed as Civil Case No. 05-655, before the Regional
Trial Court, Makati City, Branch 139 (RTC). The initial insurance claim of MDAHI against Paramount Insurance was
P14,863,777.00.

On March 4, 2011, Atty. Camacho met with Atty. Enrique Dimaano (Atty. Dimaano), corporate secretary of MDAHI,
and proposed to increase their claim to P64,412,534. l 8 by taking into account the interests imposed. Atty.
Camacho, however, clarified that the increase in the claim would require additional docket fees in the amount of
Pl,288,260.00, as shown in his hand-written computation.2 MDAHI agreed and granted the said amount to Atty.
Dimaano which was evidenced by a Payment Request/Order Form.3 On May 27, 2011, Atty. Dimaano gave the
money for docket fees to Atty. Camacho who promised to issue a receipt for the said amount, but never did.4

Atty. Sison later discovered that on May 26, 2011, the RTC had already rendered a decision5 in favor of MDAHI
granting its insurance claim plus interests in the amount of approximately P65,000,000.00.

On August 11, 2011, Atty. Camacho sent a letter6 to MDAHI recommending a settlement with Paramount Insurance
in Civil Case No. 05-655 in the amount of Pl5,000,000.00 allegedly to prevent a protracted appeal with the appellate
court. MDAHI refused the offer of compromise and did not indicate its conforme on the letter of Atty. Camacho.
Surprisingly, even without the written conformity of MDAHI, Atty. Camacho filed the Satisfaction of Judgment,7 dated
August 15, 2011, before the R TC stating that the parties had entered into a compromise agreement.

On August 18, 2011, Atty. Sison met with Atty. Camacho to clarify the events that transpired.8 He asked Atty.
Camacho whether he paid the amount of Pl,288,260.00 as additional dockets fees, and the latter replied that he
simply gave it to the clerk of court as the payment period had lapsed.

Disappointed with the actions of Atty. Camacho, Atty. Sison sent a letter,9 dated August 24, 2011, stating that he was
alarmed that the former would accept a disadvantageous compromise; that it was against company policy to bribe
any government official with respect to the Pl,288,260.00 given to the clerk of court; and that MDAHI would only pay
P200,000.00 to Atty. Camacho as attorney's fees.

Respondent's Position

In his verified answer,10 dated October 30, 2012, Atty. Camacho denied all the allegations against him. He stressed
that he had the authority to enter into the compromise agreement. Moreover, the alleged docket fees given to him by
MDAHI formed part of his attorney's fees.

He further stated in his position paper11 that the judgment debt was paid and accepted by MDAHI without any
objection, as duly evidenced by an acknowledgment receipt.12 Thus, there was no irregularity in the compromise
agreement.

With respect to the amount handed to him, Atty. Camacho averred that he filed a Motion to Compel Plaintiff to Pay
Attorney's Fee on September 13, 2011 before the RTC. The Court granted the said motion in its April 12, 2012
Order13 stating that the amount of Pl,288,260.00 was considered as part of his attorney's fees.

On July 6, 2012, the R TC issued an Order14 resolving the motion for reconsideration filed by both parties in favor of
Atty. Camacho. In the said order, the RTC opined that only P300,000.00 was previously paid to Atty. Camacho15 as
attorney's fees. Based on the foregoing, Atty. Camacho asserted that the amount of Pl,288,260.00 which he
received, truly formed part of his unpaid attorney's fees. He stressed that the said RTC order had attained finality
and constituted res judicata on the present administrative case. He added that MDAHI disregarded the RTC order
as it filed an estafa case against him concerning the amount ofl:ll,288,260.00.

Report and Recommendation

After the mandatory conference on January 24, 2013 and upon a thorough evaluation of the evidence presented by
the parties in their respective position papers, the IBP-CBD submitted its Report and Recommendation,16 dated April
1, 2013 finding Atty. Camacho to have violated the provisions of Rule 1.01 and Rule 16.01 of the CPR and
recommending the imposition of the penalty of one (1) year suspension from the practice of law against him. In its
Resolution No. XX-2013-474,17 dated April 16, 2013, the Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
(Board) adopted the said report and recommendation of Investigating Commissioner Eldrid C. Antiquiera.

Aggrieved, Atty. Camacho filed a motion for reconsideration18 before the Board reiterating that the compromise
agreement was valid because MDAHI did not reject the same and that the amount of Pl,288,260.00 formed part of
his attorney's fees.

In his Comment/Opposition,19 Atty. Sison countered that Atty. Camacho never denied that he filed the satisfaction of
judgment without the written authority of MDAHI and that there was ca pending estafa case against him before the
Regional Trial Court, Makati City, Branch 146, docketed as Criminal Case No. 13-1688, regarding the Pl,288,260.00
handed to him.

In its Resolution No. XXI-2014-532,20 dated August 10, 2014, the Board adopted the report and recommendation21
of National Director Dominic C.M. Solis. The Board partially granted the motion for reconsideration and dismissed,
without prejudice, the charge regarding the failure to account for the money, because it was premature to act on
such issue due to the pending criminal case against the Atty. Camacho. Accordingly, the penalty of one (1) year
suspension imposed was lowered to six (6) months suspension from the practice of law.

Hence, the case was elevated to the Court.

The Court's Ruling

The Court finds that Atty. Camacho violated Rules 1.01 and 16.01 of the CPR.

Entering into a compromise

agreement without written
authority of the client

Those in the legal profession must always conduct themselves with honesty and integrity in all their dealings.
Members of the Bar took their oath to conduct themselves according to the best of their knowledge and discretion
with all good fidelity as well to the courts as to their clients and to delay no man for money or malice. These
mandates apply especially to dealings of lawyers with their clients considering the highly fiduciary nature of their
relationship.22

In the practice of law, lawyers constantly formulate compromise agreements for the benefit of their clients. Article
1878 of the Civil Code provides that " [ s ]pecial powers of attorney are necessary in the following cases: xxx (3) To
compromise, to submit questions to arbitration, to renounce the right to appeal from a judgment, to waive objections
to the venue of an action or to abandon a prescription already acquired xxx."

In line with the fiduciary duty of the Members of the Bar, Section 23, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court specifies a
stringent requirement with respect to compromise agreements, to wit:

Sec. 23. Authority of attorneys to bind clients. - Attorneys have authority to bind their clients in any case by any
agreement in relation thereto made in writing, and in taking appeals, and in all matters of ordinary judicial procedure.
But they cannot, without special authority, compromise their client's litigation, or receive anything in
discharge of a client's claim but the full amount in cash.

[Emphasis and Underscoring Supplied]

In the case at bench, the R TC decision, dated May 26, 2011, awarded MDAHI approximately P65,000,000.00.
When Paramount Insurance offered a compromise settlement in the amount of Pl5,000,000.00, it was clear as
daylight that MDAHI never consented to the said offer. As can be gleaned from Atty. Camacho's letter, MDAHI did
not sign the conforme regarding the compromise agreement.23

Glaringly, despite the lack of a written special authority, Atty. Camacho agreed to a lower judgment award on behalf
of his client and filed a satisfaction of judgment before the R TC. The said pleading also failed to bear the conformity
of his client.24 Although MDAHI subsequently received the payment of P15M from Paramount Insurance, it does not
erase Atty. Camacho's transgression in reaching the compromise agreement without the prior consent of his client.

For entering into a compromise agreement without the written authority of his client, Atty. Camacho violated Rule
1.01 of the CPR, which states that " [a] lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful
conduct." Members of the Bar must always conduct themselves in a way that promotes public confidence in the
integrity of the legal profession.25

Failing to account for

the money of the client

Atty. Camacho was also charged with violation of Rule 16.01 of the CPR, which provides for a lawyer's duty to
"account for all money or property collected or received for or from the client."

Here, Atty. Sison alleged that MDAHI gave Atty. Camacho the amount of P 1,288,260.00 as payment of additional
docket fees but the latter failed to apply the same for its intended purpose. In contrast, Atty. Camacho invoked the
July 6, 2012 Order of the RTC which declared the MDAHI allegation as unsubstantiated, and claimed that the said
amount formed part of his attorney's fees. The Board, on the other hand, opined that it was still premature to decide
such issue because there was a pending estafa case, docketed as Criminal Case No. 13-1688, filed by MDAHI
against Atty. Camacho involving the same amount of P 1,288,260.00.

The Court is of the view that it is not premature to rule on the charge against Atty. Camacho for his failure to account
for the money of his client. The pending case against him is criminal in nature. The issue therein is whether he is
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of misappropriating the amount of Pl,288,260.00 entrusted to him by his client. The
present case, however, is administrative in character, requiring only substantial evidence. It only entails a
determination of whether Atty. Camacho violated his solemn oath by failing to account for the money of his client.
Evidently, the adjudication of such issue in this administrative case shall not, in any way, affect the separate criminal
proceeding.

In disciplinary proceedings against lawyers, the only issue is whether the officer of the court is still fit to be allowed
to continue as a member of the Bar. The only concern of the Court is the determination of the respondent's
1âwphi1

administrative liability. The findings in this case will have no material bearing on other judicial action which the
parties may choose to file against each other. While a lawyer's wrongful actuations may give rise at the same time to
criminal, civil, and administrative liabilities, each must be determined in the appropriate case; and every case must
be resolved in accordance with the facts and the law applicable and the quantum of proof required in each.26

Delving into the substance of the allegation, the Court rules that Atty. Camacho indeed violated Rule 16.01 of the
CPR. When Atty. Camacho personally requested MDAHI for additional docket fees, the latter obediently granted the
amount of Pl ,288,260.00 to the former. Certainly, it was understood that such amount was necessary for the
payment of supposed additional docket fees in Civil Case No. 05-655. Yet, when Atty. Sison confronted Atty.
Camacho regarding the said amount, the latter replied that he simply gave it to the clerk of court as the payment
period had lapsed. Whether the said amount was pocketed by him or improperly given to the clerk of court as a form
of bribery, it was unmistakably clear that Atty. Camacho did not apply the amount given to him by his client for its
intended legal purpose.

Atty. Camacho did not even deny making that request to MDAHI for additional docket fees and receiving such
amount from his client. Rather, he set up a defense that the said amount formed part of his attorney's fees. Such
defense, however, is grossly contradictory to the established purpose of the Pl,288,260.00. In its Payment
Request/Order Form,27 it is plainly indicated therein that MDAHI released the said amount only to be applied as
payment for additional docket fees, and not for any other purposes. Consequently, the lame excuse of Atty.
Camacho is bereft of merit because it constitutes a mere afterthought and a manifest disrespect to the legal
profession. Atty. Camacho is treading on a perilous path where the payment of his attorney's fees is more important
than his fiduciary and faithful duty of accounting the money of his client. Well-settled is the rule that lawyers are not
entitled to unilaterally appropriate their clients' money for themselves by the mere fact that the clients owe them
attorney's fees.28

Moreover, Atty. Camacho failed to issue a receipt to MDAHI from the moment he received the said amount. In Tarog
v. Ricafort,29 the Court held that ethical and practical considerations made it both natural and imperative for a lawyer
to issue receipts, even if not demanded, and to keep copies of the receipts for his own records. Pursuant to Rule
16.01 of the CPR, a lawyer must be aware that he is accountable for the money entrusted to him by the clients, and
that his only means of ensuring accountability is by issuing and keeping receipts.

Worse, on May 26, 2011, the RTC already rendered its decision in Civil Case No. 05-655, adjudging MDAHI entitled
to an insurance claim in the amount of approximately P.65,000,000.00. From that date on, there was no more need
for additional docket fees. Apparently, still unaware of the judgment, MDAHI subsequently released the money for
additional docket fees to Atty. Dimaano, who handed it to Atty. Camacho on May 27, 2011. Despite a decision
having been rendered, Atty. Camacho did not reject the said amount or return it to his client upon receipt. Instead,
he unilaterally withheld the said amount by capriciously invoking the payment of his attorney's fees.

The fiduciary nature of the relationship between the counsel and his client imposes on the lawyer the duty to
account for the money or property collected or received for or from his client. Money entrusted to a lawyer for a
specific purpose but not used for the purpose should be immediately returned. A lawyer's failure, to return upon
demand, the funds held by him on behalf of his client gives rise to the presumption that he has appropriated the
same for his own use in violation of the trust reposed in him by his client. Such act is a gross violation of general
morality as well as of professional ethics. It impairs public confidence in the legal profession and deserves
punishment.30

Administrative penalty

A member of the Bar may be penalized, even disbarred or suspended from his office as an attorney, for violation of
the lawyer's oath and/or for breach of the ethics of the legal profession as embodied in the CPR. The practice of law
is a profession, a form of public trust, the performance of which is entrusted to those who are qualified and who
possess good moral character. The appropriate penalty for an errant lawyer depends on the exercise of sound
judicial discretion based on the surrounding facts.31

In Luna v. Galarrita,32 the Court suspended the respondent lawyer for two (2) years because he accepted a
compromise agreement without valid authority and he failed to tum over the payment to his client. In the case of
Melendrez v. Decena,33 the lawyer therein was disbarred because he entered into a compromise agreement
without the special authority of his client and he drafted deceptive and dishonest contracts. Similarly, in Navarro v.
Meneses III,34 another lawyer, who misappropriated the money entrusted to him by his client which he failed and/or
refused to account for despite repeated demands, was disbarred because his lack of personal honesty and good
moral character rendered him unworthy of public confidence.

In this case, Atty. Camacho entered into a compromise agreement without the conformity of his client which is
evidently against the provisions of the CPR and the law. Moreover, he deliberately failed to account for the money
he received from his client, which was supposed to be paid as additional docket fees. He even had the gall to
impute that the money was illicitly given to an officer of the court. The palpable indiscretions of Atty. Camacho shall
not be countenanced by the Court for these constitute as a blatant and deliberate desecration of the fiduciary duty
that a lawyer owes to his client.

The Court finds that Atty. Camacho's acts are so reprehensible, and his violations of the CPR are so flagrant,
exhibiting his moral unfitness and inability to discharge his duties as a member of the Bar. His actions erode rather
than enhance the public perception of the legal profession. Therefore, in view of the totality of his violations, as well
as the damage and prejudice they caused to his client, Atty. Camacho deserves the ultimate penalty of disbarment.

Further, he must be ordered to return the amount of Pl,288,260.00 to MDAHI, which he received in his professional
capacity for payment of the purported additional docket fees. Disciplinary proceedings revolve around the
determination of the respondent-lawyer's administrative liability, which must include those intrinsically linked to his
professional engagement.35

WHEREFORE, Atty. Manuel N. Camacho is found guilty of violating Rule 1.01 and Rule 16.01 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility. For reasons above-stated, he is DISBARRED from the practice of law and his name
stricken off the Roll of Attorneys, effective immediately.

Furthermore, Atty. Manuel N. Camacho is ORDERED to return to Marsman-Drysdale Agribusiness Holdings Inc. the
money intended to pay for additional docket fees which he received from the latter in the amount of P 1,288,260.00
within ninety (90) days from the finality of this decision.

Let a copy of this decision be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant to be entered into the records of respondent
Atty. Manuel N. Camacho. Copies shall likewise be furnished the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and the Office of
the Court Administrator for circulation to all courts concerned.

SO ORDERED.

MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO

Chief Justice

ANTONIO T. CARPIO PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

Associate Justice Associate Justice

TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO ARTURO D. BRION

Associate Justice Associate Justice

DIOSDADO M. PERALTA LUCAS P. BERSAMIN

Associate Justice Associate Justice

MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.

Associate Justice Associate Justice

JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA

Associate Justice Associate Justice

BIENVENIDO L. REYES ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE

Associate Justice Associate Justice

MARVIC M.V.F. LEONEN FRANCIS H. JARDELEZA

Associate Justice Associate Justice

CERTIFIED XEROX COPY:

FELIPA B. ANAMA
CLERK OF COURT, EN BANC
SUPREME COURT

Footnotes
1
Rollo, pp. 2-8.
2
Id.at9-10.
3
Id. at I 0-12.
4
Id. at 31 and 208.
5
Id. at 13-27.
6
Id. at 28.
7
Id. at 29-30.
8
Id. at 4.
9
Id.at31-32.
10
Id. at 80-92.
11
Id. at 164-170.
12
Id. at 146.
13
Id. at 193-195.
14
Id. at 196-201.
15
In the parties' agreement, dated June 30, 2005, MDAHI agreed to pay Atty. Camacho a contingency
attorney's fee of20% of the judgment award less the .P300,000.00 acceptance fee previously paid. See id. at
165 and 190.
16
Id. at 229-231.
17
Id. at 228.
18
Id. at 232-234.
19
Id. at 248-251.
20
Id. at 262.
21
Id. at 263-268.
22
Luna v. Galarrita, A.C. No. 10662, July 7, 2015.
23
Rollo, p. 28.
24
Id. at 29-30.
25
Cerdan v. Gomez, 684 Phil. 418, 428 (2012).
26
Saladaga v. Astorga, A.C. Nos. 4697 & 4728, November 25, 2014.
27
Rollo, p. 11.
28
Luna v. Galarrita, supra note 22, citing Almendarez, Jr. v. Atty. Langi!, 528 Phil. 814, 819-820 (2006) and
Schulz v. Flores, 462 Phil. 601, 613 (2003).
29
660 Phil. 618 (2011).
30
Foster v. Agtang, A.C. No. 10579, December 10, 2014.
31
Id.
32
Supra note 22.
33
257 Phil. 672 (1989).
34
349 Phil. 520 (1998).
35
See Pitcher v. Gagate, A.C. No. 9532, October 8, 2013, 707 SCRA 13, 25-26.

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