DigitalForensics Unit1 2
DigitalForensics Unit1 2
ON
DIGITAL FORENSICS
UNIT -1 & 2
B. TECH IV YEAR - II SEM(2024-25)
UNIT – II
Reasons to collect Evidence. Collection Options, Obstacles, Types of Evidence, The Rules of
Evidence, Volatile Evidence, General Procedure, Collection and Archiving, Methods of
Collection, Artifacts, Collection Steps, Controlling Contamination
Preserving the Digital Crime Scene, Computer Evidence Processing Steps, Legal Aspects of
Collecting and Preserving Digital Forensic Evidence Computer Image Verification and
Authentication, Special Needs of Evidential Authentication, Practical Consideration, Practical
Implementation.
TEXT BOOKS:
5. Software Forensics Collecting Evidence from the Scene of a Digital Crime by Robert
M.Slade ,TMH 2005
UNIT-1
INTRODUCTION
1.1 WHAT IS DIGITAL FORENSICS?
Digital forensics is the process of methodically examining computer media (hard disks,
diskettes, tapes, etc.) for evidence. In other words, computer forensics is the collection,
preservation, analysis, and presentation of computer-related evidence.
Digital forensics also referred to as computer forensic analysis, electronic discovery,
electronic evidence discovery, digital discovery, data recovery, data discovery, computer
analysis, and computer examination.
Computer evidence can be useful in criminal cases, civil disputes, and human
resources/ employment proceedings.
Searching unallocated space on the hard drive, places where an abundance of data
often resides.
Tracing artifacts, those tidbits of data left behind by the operating system. Our
experts know how to find these artifacts and, more importantly, they know how to
evaluate thevalue of the information they find.
Processing hidden files — files that are not visible or accessible to the user — that
contain past usage information. Often, this process requires reconstructing and analyzing
the date codes for each file and determining when each file was created, last modified, last
accessed and when deleted.
Running a string-search for e-mail, when no e-mail client is obvious.
Employers must safeguard critical business information. An unfortunate concern today is the
possibility that data could be damaged, destroyed, or misappropriated by a discontented
individual. Before an individual is informed of their termination, a computer forensic specialist
should come on-site and create an exact duplicate of the data on the individual’s computer. In
this way, should the employee choose to do anything to that data before leaving, the employer
is protected. Damaged or deleted data can be re-placed, and evidence can be recovered to show
what occurred. This method can also be used to bolster an employer’s case by showing the
removal of proprietary information or to protect the employer from false charges made by the
employee. You should be equipped to find and interpret the clues that have been left behind.
This includes situations where files have been deleted, disks have been reformatted, or other
steps have been taken to conceal or destroy the evidence. For example, did you know?
That the electronic copy of a document can contain text that was removed from the final
printed version?
That some fax machines can contain exact duplicates of the last several hundred pages
received?
That faxes sent or received via computer may remain on the computer indefinitely?
That email is rapidly becoming the communications medium of choice for businesses?
That people tend to write things in email that they would never consider writing in a
memorandum or letter?
That email has been used successfully in criminal cases as well as in civil litigation?
That email is often backed up on tapes that are generally kept for months or years?
That many people keep their financial records, including investments, on computers?
1. DATA SEIZURE
2. DATA DUPLICATION/PRESERVATION
When one party must seize data from another, two concerns must be addressed:
the data must not be altered in any way
the seizure must not put an undue burden on the responding party
The computer forensics experts should acknowledge both of these concerns by making
an exact duplicate of the needed data.
When experts works on the duplicate data, the integrity of the original is maintained.
3. DATA RECOVERY
Using proprietary tools, your computer forensics experts should be able to safely recover
4. DOCUMENT SEARCHES
Computer forensics experts should also be able to search over 200,000 electronic
documents in seconds rather than hours.
The speed and efficiency of these searches make the discovery process less complicated
and less intrusive to all parties involved.
5. MEDIA CONVERSION
Computer forensics experts should extract the relevant data from old and un-readable
devices, convert it into readable formats, and place it onto new storage media for
analysis.
Computer forensics experts should offer various levels of service, each designed to suit your
individual investigative needs. For example, they should be able to offer the following
services:
Standard service: Computer forensics experts should be able to work on your case
during nor-mal business hours until your critical electronic evidence is found.
On-site service: Computer forensics experts should be able to travel to your location to
per-form complete computer evidence services. While on-site, the experts should
quickly be able to produce exact duplicates of the data storage media in question.
Emergency service: Your computer forensics experts should be able to give your case
the highest priority in their laboratories. They should be able to work on it without
interruption until your evidence objectives are met.
Priority service: Dedicated computer forensics experts should be able to work on your
case during normal business hours (8:00 A.M. to 5:00 P.M., Monday through Friday)
until the evidence is found. Priority service typically cuts your turnaround time in half.
Weekend service: Computer forensics experts should be able to work from 8:00 A.M.
to 5:00 P.M., Saturday and Sunday, to locate the needed electronic evidence and will
continue 14 Computer Forensics, Second Edition working on your case until your
evidence objectives are met.
Digital forensics experts should also be able to provide extended services. These services
include:
3. Extracted and possibly relevant evidence is properly handled and protected from later
mechanical or electromagnetic damage.
4. A continuing chain of custody is established and maintained.
1. Protect the subject computer system during the forensic examination from any possible
alteration, damage, data corruption, or virus introduction.
2. Discover all files on the subject system. This includes existing normal files, deleted yet
remaining files, hidden files, password-protected files, and encrypted files.
3. Recover all of discovered deleted files.
4. Reveal the contents of hidden files as well as temporary or swap files used by both the
application programs and the operating system.
5. Access the contents of protected or encrypted files.
6. Analyze all possibly relevant data found in special areas of a disk. This includes but is
not limited to what is called unallocated space on a disk, as well as slack space in a file
(the remnant area at the end of a file in the last assigned disk cluster, that is unused by
current file data, but once again, may be a possible site for previously created and
relevant evidence).
7. Print out an overall analysis of the subject computer system, as well as a listing of all
possibly relevant files and discovered file data.
8. Provide an opinion of the system layout; the file structures discovered; any discovered
data and authorship information; any attempts to hide, delete, protect, and encrypt
information; and anything else that has been discovered and appears to be relevant to the
overall computer system examination.
9. Provide expert consultation and/or testimony, as required.
Authorized users can securely reopen the DEBs for examination, while automatic audit
of all actions ensures the continued integrity of their contents.
The teams used other forensic tools and prototypes to collect and analyze specific
features of the digital evidence, perform case management and time lining of digital
events, automate event link analysis, and perform steganography detection.
The results of CFX-2000 verified that the hypothesis was largely correct and that it is
possible to ascertain the intent and identity of cyber criminals.
As electronic technology continues its explosive growth, researchers need to continue
vigorous R&D of cyber forensic technology in preparation for the onslaught of cyber
reconnaissance probes and attacks.
Digital forensics tools and techniques have become important resources for use in internal
investigations, civil lawsuits, and computer security risk management. Law enforcement
and military agencies have been involved in processing computer evidence for years.
1. Preservation of Evidence
Computer evidence is fragile and susceptible to alteration or erasure by any number of
occurrences.
Computer evidence can be useful in criminal cases, civil disputes, and human resources/
employment proceedings.
Black box computer forensics software tools are good for some basic investigation
tasks, but they do not offer a full computer forensics solution.
SafeBack software overcomes some of the evidence weaknesses inherent in black box
computer forensics approaches.
SafeBack technology has become a worldwide standard in making mirror image backups
since 1990.
TROJAN HORSE PROGRAMS
The computer forensic expert should be able to demonstrate his or her ability to avoid
destructive programs and traps that can be planted by computer users bent on
destroying data and evidence.
Such programs can also be used to covertly capture sensitive information, passwords,
and network logons.
DATA-HIDING TECHNIQUES
Trade secret information and other sensitive data can easily be secreted using any
number of techniques. It is possible to hide diskettes within diskettes and to hide entire
computer hard disk drive partitions. Computer forensic experts should understand such
issues and tools that help in the identification of such anomalies.
Net Threat Analyzer can be used to identify past Internet browsing and email activity
done through specific computers. The software analyzes a computer’s disk drives and
other storage areas that are generally unknown to or beyond the reach of most general
computer users. Net Threat Analyzer avail-able free of charge to computer crime
specialists, school officials, and police.
DUAL-PURPOSE PROGRAMS
Programs can be designed to perform multiple processes and tasks at the same time.
Computer forensics experts must have hands-on experience with these programs.
Computer evidence searches require that the computer specialist know what is being
searched for. Many times not all is known about what may be stored on a given
computer system.
In such cases, fuzzy logic tools can provide valuable leads as to how the subject computer
was used.
2. Disk Structure
Computer forensic experts must understand how computer hard disks and floppy
diskettes are structured and how computer evidence can reside at various levels within
the structure of the disk.
They should also demonstrate their knowledge of how to modify the structure and hide
data in obscure places on floppy diskettes and hard disk drives.
3. Data Encryption
Computer forensic experts should become familiar with the use of software to crack
security associated with the different file structures.
Binary Audit Identification Transfer (BAIT) is a powerful intrusion detection tool that
allows users to create trackable electronic documents.
BAIT identifies (including their location) unauthorized intruders who access, download,
and view these tagged documents.
BAIT also allows security personnel to trace the chain of custody and chain of
command of all who possess the stolen electronic documents.
The cost of recreating data, lost production time or instruction time, reporting
and investigating the theft, filing police reports and insurance claims, increased
insurance, processing and ordering replacements, cutting a check, and the like.
The loss of customer goodwill.
PC PHONEHOME
PC PhoneHome is a software application that will track and locate a lost or stolen
PC or laptop any-where in the world. It is easy to install. It is also completely
transparent to the user.
Back-up Obstacles
1. The ability of the system being backed up to push data to the backup
server
2. The ability of the backup server to accept data from multiple systems
simultaneously
3. The available throughput of the tape device(s) onto which the data is
moved
The role of Back-up has changed: The role of backup now includes
the responsibility for recovering user errors and ensuring that good data has
been saved and can quickly be restored.
a. The complex systems that have evolved over the past 30 years must be
We have fewer resources (people, processing power, time, and money) to do more work than
ever before, and we must keep your expenses under control. Systems must remain available to
make money and serve customers. Downtime is much too expensive to be tolerated.
One of the most critical data-management tasks involves recovering data in the event of a
problem. You must evaluate your preparations, make sure that all resources are available in
usable condition, automate processes as much as possible, and make sure you have the right
kind of resources.
If all of the resources (image copies, change accumulations, and logs) are available at recovery
time, these preparations certainly allow for a standard recovery. Finding out at recovery time
that some critical resource is missing can be disastrous!
Don’t let your resources fall through the cracks
Identifying different types of conditions is critical to ensuring a successful recovery. Checking
your assets to make sure they’re ready should be part of your plan.
Automated Recovery
With proper planning and automation, recovery is made possible, reliance on specific
personnel is reduced, and the human-error factor is nearly eliminated.
Data integrity and your business relay on building recovery job control language (JCL). In the
event of a disaster, the Information Management System (IMS) recovery control (RECON) data
sets must be modified in preparation for the recovery.
Cleaning your RECON data sets can take hours if done manually, and it’s an error-prone process.
Multithreading tasks shorten the recovery process. Recovering multiple databases with one
pass through your log data certainly will save time. Taking image copies, rebuilding indexes,
and validating pointers concurrently with the recovery process further reduce downtime.
Take Back-ups
The first step to a successful recovery is the backup of your data. Your goal in backing up data
is to do so quickly, efficiently, and usually with minimal impact to your customers. You might
need only very brief out-ages to take instant copies of your data, or you might have intelligent
storage devices that allow you to take a snapshot of your data. Both methods call for tools to
assist in the management of resources.
BMC software has developed a model called the Back-up and Recovery Solution (BRS) for the
Information Management System (IMS) product.
Image Copy
BRS contains an Image Copy component to help manage your image copy process.
BRS can take batch, on-line (fuzzy), or incremental image copies; Snapshot copies; or
Instant Snapshot copies.
The Image Copy component of BRS offers a variety of powerful features: dynamic allocation of
all input and output data sets, stacking of output data sets, high performance access methods
(faster I/O), copying by volume, compression of output image copies, and database group
processing--- all while interfacing with DBRC and processing asynchronously.
Change Accumulation
The BRS Change Accumulation component takes advantage of multiple engines, large virtual
storage resources, and high-speed channels and controllers that are available in many
environments.
Use of multiple tack control block (TCB) structures enables overlapping of as much processing
as possible, reducing both elapsed and CPU time.
Recovery
The BRS Recovery component, which functionally replaces the IMS Database
Recovery utility for null- function (DL/I) databases and data-entry databases (DEDBs),
allow recovery of multiple databases with one pass of the log and change accumulation
data sets while dynamically allocating all data sets required for recovery.
BRS recovers multiple databases to any point in time. BRS can determine the best
choice for a Point-in- Time (PIT) recovery. Full DBRS support includes:
RECOVERY MANAGER
notifies you when media errors have jeopardized your recovery resources.
POINTER CHECKING
BRS offers the capability to verify the validity of database pointers through the Concurrent
Pointer Checking function for both full-function databases and Fast Path data-entry databases
(DEDBs).
INDEX REBUILD
If indexes are ever damaged or lost, the Index Rebuild function of BRS allows you rebuild them
rather than recover them.
RECOVERY ADVISOR
The Recovery Advisor component of BRS allows you to monitor the frequency of your image
copies and change accumulations.
It helps you to determine whether all your databases are being backed-up. By using any
number of back-up and recovery tools available, you can better manage your world and be
ready to recover!
Unit-II
EVIDENCE COLLECTION AND DATA SEZIURE
2.1 Why Collect Evidence?
Future Prevention: Without knowing what happened, you have no hope of ever being
able to stop someone else from doing it again.
Responsibility: The attacker is responsible for the damage done, and the only way to
bring him to justice is with adequate evidence to prove his actions. The victim has a
responsibility to the community. Information gathered after a compromise can be
examined and used by others to prevent further attacks.
Pull the system off the network and begin collecting evidence: In this case you may
find that you have insufficient evidence or, worse, that the attacker left a dead man
switch that destroys any evidence once the system detects that its offline.
Leave it online and attempt to monitor the intruder: you may accidentally alert the
intruder while monitoring and cause him to wipe his tracks any way necessary,
destroying evidence as he goes.
2.3 Obstacles
Computer transactions are fast, they can be conducted from anywhere, can be encrypted
or anonymous, and have no intrinsic identifying features such as handwriting and
signatures to identify those responsible.
Any paper trail of computer records they may leave can be easily modified or destroyed,
or may be only temporary.
Auditing programs may automatically destroy the records left when computer
transactions are finished with them.
Investigating electronic crimes will always be difficult because of the ease of altering the
data and the fact that transactions may be done anonymously.
The best we can do is to follow the rules of evidence collection and be as assiduous as
possible.
Real Evidence: Real evidence is any evidence that speaks for itself without relying
on anything else. In electronic terms, this can be a log produced by an audit function—
provided that the log can be shown to be free from contamination.
Hearsay: Hearsay is any evidence presented by a person who was not a direct
witness. Hearsay is generally inadmissible in court and should be avoided.
1. Admissible: Admissible is the most basic rule. The evidence must be able to be used in
court.
2. Authentic: You must be able to show that the evidence relates to the incident in a relevant
way.
3. Complete: It’s not enough to collect evidence that just shows one perspective of the
incident.
4. Reliable: Your evidence collection and analysis procedures must not cast doubt on the
evidence’s authenticity and veracity.
5. Believable: The evidence you present should be clearly understandable and believable to a
jury.
Using the preceding five rules, we can derive some basic do’s and don’ts:
Minimize handling and corruption of original data: Once you’ve created a master
copy of the original data, don’t touch it or the original. Any changes made to the
originals will affect the outcomes of any analysis later done to copies.
Account for any changes and keep detailed logs of your actions: Sometimes evidence
alteration is unavoidable. In these cases, it is absolutely essential that the nature, extent,
and reasons for the changes be documented.
Comply with the five rules of evidence: Following these rules is essential to
guaranteeing successful evidence collection.
Do not exceed your knowledge: If you ever find yourself ―out of your depth,‖ either go
and learn more before continuing (if time is available) or find someone who knows the
territory.
Follow your local security policy: If you fail to comply with your company’s security
policy, you may find yourself with some difficulties.
Capture as accurate an image of the system as possible: Capturing an accurate image
of the system is related to minimizing the handling or corruption of original data.
Be prepared to testify: If you’re not willing to testify to the evidence you have collected,
you might as well stop before you start. No one is going to believe you if they can’t
replicate your actions and reach the same results.
Work fast: The faster you work, the less likely the data is going to change. Volatile
evidence may vanish entirely if you don’t collect it in time. If multiple systems are
Once we’ve developed a plan of attack and identified the evidence that needs to be
collected.
Logs and Logging: You should run some kind of system logging function. It is
important to keep these logs secure and to back them up periodically. Messages and
logs from programs can be used to show what damage an attacker did.
Monitoring: By monitoring we can gather statistics, watch out for irregular, and trace
where an attacker is coming from and what he is doing. Unusual activity or the sudden
appearance of unknown users should be considered definite cause for closer inspection.
You should display a disclaimer stating what monitoring is done when users log on.
There are two basic forms of collection: freezing the scene and honeypotting.
It involves taking a snapshot of the system in its compromised state. You should then
start to collect whatever data is important onto removable nonvolatile media in a
standard format.
All data collected should have a cryptographic message digest created, and those
digests should be compared to the originals for verification.
Honeypotting
It is the process of creating a replica system and luring the attacker into it for further
monitoring.
The placement of misleading information and the attacker’s response to it is a good
method for determining the attacker’s motives.
2.10 Artifacts
There is almost always something left behind by the attacker be it code fragments,
trojaned programs, running processes, or sniffer log files. These are known as artifacts.
Artifacts are capable of anything, and we want to make sure their effects are controlled.
1. Find the Evidence: Use a checklist. Not only does it help you to collect evidence, but it
also can be used to double-check that everything you are looking for is there.
2. Find the Relevant Data: Once you’ve found the evidence, you must figure out
what part of it is relevant to the case.
3. Create an Order of Volatility: The order of volatility for your system is a good
guide and ensures that you minimize loss of uncorrupted evidence.
4. Remove external avenues of change: It is essential that you avoid alterations to the
original data.
5. Collect the Evidence: Collect the evidence using the appropriate tools for the job.
A good way of ensuring that data remains uncorrupted is to keep a chain of custody. This
is a detailed list of what was done with the original copies once they were collected.
Analysis
Once the data has been successfully collected, it must be analyzed to extract the
evidence you wish to present and to rebuild what actually happened.
Time
To reconstruct the events that led to your system being corrupted, you must be
able to create a timeline.
Never, ever change the clock on an affected system.
When we analyze back-ups, it is best to have a dedicated host for the job. We need a
dedicated host which is secure, clean and isolated from any network for analyzing back-
ups.
Document everything you do. Ensure that what you do is repeatable and capable of
always giving the same results.
After collecting the data, we can attempt to reconstruct the chain of events leading to and
following the attacker’s break-in. We must correlate all the evidence we have gathered.
Include all of the evidence we’ve found when reconstructing the attack---no matter how
small it is.
There is no one methodology for performing a computer forensic investigation and analysis.
There are too many variables for to be just one way. Some of the typical variable that comes
to the mind includes operating systems; software applications; cryptographic algorithms and
applications; and hardware platforms. But moving beyond these obvious variables spring
other equally challenging variables: law, international boundaries, publicity, and
methodology.
There are a few widely accepted guidelines for computer forensic analysis:
A computer forensic examiner is impartial. Our job is to analyze the media and report
our findings with no presumption of guilt or innocence.
The media used in computer forensic examinations must be sterilized before each use.
A true image (bit stream) of the original media must be made and used for the analysis.
The integrity of the original media must be maintained throughout the entire investigation.
For the sake of first argument, you must have skilled technicians in-house and a top notch
lab
the right equipment, the right computer forensic tools, and so on.
District attorneys may require more documentation on the chain of evidence handling.
When you have a case arise, you know what is required and can work the case from the
inception in support of these requirements.
Methodology Development
Here methodology defines a method, a set of rules: guidelines that are employed by a
discipline.
Document Everything
Prior to search and seizure, you already have the proper documents filled as well as permission
from the authority to search and seize the suspect’s machine.
Step 1: Preparation
You should check all media that is to be used in the examination process. Document the
wiping and scanning process. Check to make sure that all computer forensic tools are
licensed for use and all lab equipment is in working order.
Step 2: Snapshot
Step 3: Transport
If you have the legal authority to transport the evidence to your lab, you should pack the
evidence securely. Photograph/videotape and document the handling of evidence leaving the
scene to the transport vehicle and from transport vehicle to the lab examination facility.
Step 4: Examination
You should prepare the acquired evidence for examination in your lab. There are many
options to on what tool to use image the drive. You could use EnCase, the Unix command
DD, ByetBack, or also SafeBack. It is wise to have a variety of tools in your lab. Each of
these tools has its respective strengths. The important note to remember here is: Turn off
virus-scanning software. We must record the time and date of the COMS. Do not boot the
suspect machine.
When making the image, make sure that the tool you use does not access the file system of
the target evidence media. After making the image, seal the original media in an
electrostatic-safe container, catalog it, and initial the container. Finally, the examination of
the acquired image begins.
After securing the computer, we should make a complete bit stream backup of all
computer data before it is reviewed or processed.
Bit stream backups are much more thorough than standard backups.
They involve copying of every bit of data on a storage device, and it is recommended
that two such copies be made of the original when hard disk drives are involved.
IMDUMP was the first software for taking bit stream back-ups developed by Michael
White.
SafeBack
SafeBack has become a law enforcement standard and is used by numerous government
intelligence agencies, military agencies, and law enforcement agencies worldwide.
SafeBack program copies and preserves all data contained on the hard disk.
Even it goes so far as to circumvent attempts made to hide data in bad clusters and even
sectors with invalid CRCs.
SnapBack
Another bit steam back-up program, called SnapBack, is also available and is used by
some law enforcement agencies primarily because of its ease of use.
It has error-checking built into every phase of the evidence back-up and restoration
process.
The hard disk drive should be imaged using specialized bit stream back-up software.
The floppy diskettes can be imaged using the standard DOS DISKCOPY program.
When DOS DISKCOPY is used, it is recommended that the MS DOS Version 6.22 be
used and (data verification) switch should be invoked from the command line.
Know and practice using all of your forensic software tools before you use them in the
processing of computer evidence.
There really are no strict rules that must be followed regarding the processing of computer
evidence.
The following are general computer evidence processing steps:
from all angles to document the system hardware components and how they are connected.
Labeling each wire is also important, so that it can easily be reconnected when the system
configuration is restored to its original condition at a secure location.
All evidence processing should be done on a restored copy of the bit stream backup rather
than on the original computer. Bit stream backups are much like an insurance policy and are
essential for any serious computer evidence processing.
You want to be able to prove that you did not alter any of the evidence after the computer
came into your possession. Since 1989, law enforcement and military agencies have used a
32- bit mathematical process to do the authentication process.
If the system clock is one hour slow because of daylight-savings time, then file timestamps
will also reflect the wrong time. To adjust for these inaccuracies, documenting the system
date and time settings at the time the computer is taken into evidence is essential.
it is all but impossible for a computer specialist to manually view and evaluate every file on
a computer hard disk drive. Gathering information from individuals familiar with the case to
help com-pile a list of relevant keywords is important. Such keywords can be used in the
search of all computer hard disk drives and floppy diskettes using automated soft-ware.
The Windows swap file is a potentially valuable source of evidence and leads. When the
computer is turned off, the swap file is erased. But the content of the swap file can easily be
captured and evaluated.
It is a source of significant security leakage and consists of raw memory dumps that occur
during the work session as files are closed. File slack should be evaluated for relevant
keywords to supplement the keywords identified in the previous steps. File slack is typically
a good source of Internet leads. Tests suggest that file slack provides approximately 80 times
more Internet leads than the Windows swap file.
Unallocated space should be evaluated for relevant keywords to supplement the keywords
identified in the previous steps.
11. Search files, file slack, and unallocated space for keywords.
The list of relevant keywords identified in the previous steps should be used to search all
relevant computer hard disk drives and floppy diskettes. It is important to review the output
of the text search utility and equally important to document relevant findings.
From an evidence standpoint, file names, creation dates, and last modified dates and times
can be relevant. The output should be in the form of a word-processing-compatible file that
can be used to help document computer evidence issues tied to specific files.
Encrypted, compressed, and graphic files store data in binary format. As a result, text data
stored in these file formats cannot be identified by a text search program. Manual evaluation
of these files is required. Depending on the type of file involved, the contents should be
viewed and evaluated for its potential as evidence.
Depending on the application software involved, running programs to learn their purpose
may be necessary. When destructive processes that are tied to relevant evidence are
discovered, this can be used to prove willfulness.
Definition
A chain of custody is a roadmap that shows how evidence was collected, analyzed, and
preserved in order to be presented as evidence in court.
Legal Requirements
When evidence is collected, certain legal requirements must be met. These legal
requirements are vast, complex, and vary from country to country.
This system is for the use of authorized users only. Individuals using
this computer system without authority, or in excess of their authority,
are subject to having all of their activities on this system monitored and
recorded by system personnel.
To prove that the policy has been communicated, employees should sign a statement
indicating that they have read, understood, and agreed to comply with corporate
policy and consent to sys-tem monitoring.
Do not rush.
They may also need to bring tools to produce reliable copies of electronic evidence,
including media to use in the copying process.
In some cases, legal counsel will want photographs of the system prior to search and
seizure. Then include a Polaroid camera in the list of tools.
will contact the other members of the response team as outlined in the Incident
Response Policy, when an incident is reported.
will be responsible for ensuring that every detail of the incident-handling procedure
is followed, upon arrival at the incident site.
will assign team members the various tasks outlined in the incident-handling procedure.
serve as the liaison to the legal team, law enforcement officials, management, and
public relations personnel.
Ultimate responsibility for ensuring that evidence is properly collected and preserved, and
that the chain of custody is properly maintained, belongs to the incident coordinator.
One team member will be assigned the task of maintaining the evidence note-book.
This person will record the who, what, where, when, and how of the investigation
process. At a minimum, items to be recorded in the notebook include the following task.
a) Who initially reported the suspected incident along with time, date, and circumstances
surrounding the suspected incident?
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g) Network diagrams.
i) A copy of the policy or policies that relate to accessing and using the systems previously
listed.
k) A detailed list of steps used in collecting and analyzing evidence. Specifically, this list
needs to identify the date and time each task was performed, a description of the task,
who performed the task, where the task was performed, and the results of the analysis.
l) An access control list of who had access to the collected evidence at what date and time.
A separate notebook should be used for each investigation. It should be bound in such a
way that it is obvious if a page or pages have been removed.
Evidence Collection
Another team member (or members) will be assigned the task of evidence collection.
To avoid confusion, the number of people assigned this task should be kept to a minimum.
This member (or members) should also be highly proficient with copying and analysis
tools.
This person will tag all evidence and work with the person responsible for the evidence
notebook to ensure that this information is properly recorded.
Next, the person will also be responsible for making a reliable copy of all data to be used
as evidence.
The data will include complete copies of drives on compromised or suspect systems, as
well as all relevant log files.
This can be done on-site or the entire system can be moved to a forensics lab, as needs
dictate.
The process must meet industry standards for quality and reliability.
Once all evidence is collected and logged, it can be securely transported to the forensics
lab.
A detailed description of how data was transported and who was responsible for the
transport, along with date, time, and route, should be included in the log.
If a defense lawyer can show that unauthorized persons had access to the evidence, it
could easily be declared inadmissible.
As analysis of evidence is performed, investigators must log the details of their actions
in the evidence notebook. The following should be included at a minimum:
Finally, once all evidence has been analyzed and all results have been recorded in the
evidence notebook, a copy of the notebook should be made and given to the legal team.
If the legal team finds that sufficient evidence exists to take legal action, it will be
important to maintain the chain of custody until the evidence is handed over to the
proper legal authorities.
Legal officials should provide a receipt detailing all of the items received for entry into
evidence.
It may be possible to seize or impound the computer system, but this risks violating the
basic principle of innocent until proven guilty, by depriving an innocent party of the
use of his or her system.
It should be perfectly possible to copy all the information from the computer system in
a manner that leaves the original system untouched and yet makes all contents
available for forensic analysis.
The courts may rightly insist that the copied evidence is protected from either
accidental or deliberate modification and that the investigating authority should prove
that this has been done. Thus, it is not the content that needs protection, but its
integrity.
A secure method of determining that the data has not been altered by even a
single bit since the copy was taken.
A secure method of determining that the copy is genuinely the one taken at the
time and on the computer in question.
These elements are collectively referred as the Digital Image Verification and
Authentication Protocol.
Without an assurance of the software’s integrity, and without knowing who published
the software, it’s difficult for customers to know how much to trust software.
It’s difficult to make the choice of downloading the software from the Internet.
For example (when using Microsoft Authenticode coupled with Digital IDs™ from
VeriSign®), through the use of digital signatures, software developers are able to
include information about themselves and their code with their programs.
Authenticode
Microsoft Authenticode allows developers to include information about themselves and
their code with their programs through the use of digital signatures.
Users can choose to trust all subsequent downloads of software from the same
publisher and all software published by commercial publishers that has been verified
by VeriSign.
Public keys are widely distributed to users, whereas private keys are kept safe and only
used by their owner.
Any code digitally signed with the publisher’s private key can only be successfully
verified using the complementary public key.
Code that successfully verified using the publisher’s public key, could only have been
digitally signed using the publisher’s private key, and has not been tampered with.
Certificate Authorities
Certification Authorities such as VeriSign are organizations that issue digital certificates
to applicants whose identity they are willing to vouch for. Each certificate is linked to
the certificate of the CA that signed it.
3. Managing certificates
Digital ID
A Digital ID/Certificate is a form of electronic credentials for the Internet.
A Digital ID is issued by a trusted third party to establish the identity of the ID holder.
The third party who issues certificates is known as a Certificate Authority (CA).
The purpose of a Digital ID is to reliably link a public/private key pair with its owner.
When a CA such as VeriSign issues a Digital IDs, it verifies that the owner is not
claiming a false identity.
When a CA issues you a digital certificate, it puts its name behind the statement that you
are the rightful owner of your public/private key pair.
Creates a package containing the code, the encrypted hash, and the publisher’s
certificate
4. The end user encounters the package
5. The end user’s browser examines the publisher’s Digital ID. Using the VeriSign root
Public Key, which is already embedded in Authenticode enabled applications, the end
user browser verifies the authenticity of Software Developer Digital ID (which is itself
signed by the VeriSign root Private Key)
6. Using the publisher’s public key contained within the publisher’s Digital ID, the end
user browser decrypts the signed hash.
7. The end browser runs the code through the same hashing algorithm as the publisher,
creating a new hash.
8. The end user browser compares the two hashes. If they are identical, the browser
messages that the content has been verified by VeriSign, and the end user has the
confidence that the code was signed by the publisher identified in the Digital ID, and the
code hasn’t been altered since it was signed.
Time Stamping: Because key pairs are based on mathematical relationships that can
theoretically be ―cracked‖ with a great deal of time and effort, it is a well-established
security principle that digital certificates should expire.
c. It should be possible for anyone to use a forensic data collection system with the
minimum amount of training.
To meet the conditions specified in items 2, 3, and 4, the digital integrity verification and
authentication protocol must be tailored to suit.
Only investigators issued with a valid digital signature would be able to complete copies.
It must be understood that during the copying process, procedures are implemented to
trap and handle hardware errors, mapping exceptions where necessary.
It must also be understood that procedures are implemented to verify that information is
copied correctly.
The cartridge is divided into blocks of an arbitrary chosen size. Blocks may contain
reference, ROM, CMOS, or disk data depending on their location on the cartridge. Each
cartridge contains the information copied from the suspect drive on a sector by sector
basis.
Once all the blocks relevant to a particular cartridge have been copied and treated in this
way, the whole group of safe boxes, collectively referred to as the vault, are treated as an
individual block and a vault hash value is generated and stored in the final safe box. The
vault is then copied to another area of the cartridge and this second copy is encrypted.
The vault hash value for each cartridge is stored in a separate area in memory and the
operator is prompted to insert a new cartridge until the copy is completed. The final
cartridge will contain similar information to the others in the series and in addition will
have the accumulated vault hash values from all other cartridges in the series.
Once the final cartridge has been copied, the operator is prompted to insert a
preformatted floppy disk into the drive used to start the DIBS process. All of the
accumulated vault hash values are then written to a floppy disk together with the
reference details of the whole copy procedure. At least two identical floppy disks are
created in this manner.
The floppy disks are then sealed in numbered, tamperproof bags and both numbers are
written on both envelops. The computer owner is given his or her chosen floppy and the
other is placed in secure storage.
Security Considerations
Computer forensics investigators are constantly discovering new vulnerabilities in old
image verification and authentication products.
As a result CIOs (Chief information Officers) are devoting more money and time to
image verification and authentication security.
Staff-members are the ones who make sure viruses don’t come in and holes aren’t
created in the firewall.
They have to understand that most business is built on trust, and their role in maintaining
trust is crucial.
You have to protect your data. It only takes one time ---one hacker getting in and
hacking all your financial data.
It would be irresponsible on CIO’s part not have the toughest image verification and
authentication security possible.