SP-2447 Bridging Docv
SP-2447 Bridging Docv
Document ID SP-2447
Discipline Wells
Version 1
Link (Intranet)
Keywords: Business Direction, Business Management, HSE Management System, PDO Control
Framework, Technical Authorities, Financial Authorities, Manual of Authorities, Training,
Competence, Management of Change, Variation, Deviation Management of Contractors, EDM
This document is the property of Petroleum Development Oman, LLC. Neither the whole nor any part
of this document may be disclosed to others or reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted
in any form by any means (electronic, mechanical, reprographic recording or otherwise) without prior
written consent of the owner.
Rev.: 0
Petroleum Development Oman LLC Effective: Dec 2023
i Document Authorisation
ii Revision History
The following is a brief summary of the most recent revisions to this document. Details of all revisions
prior to these are held on file by the issuing department.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Contents
i Document Authorisation ............................................................................................................... 3
ii Revision History ............................................................................................................................ 3
iii Extend of Business Impact ........................................................................................................... 3
iv Related Business Processes ........................................................................................................ 3
v Related Corporate Management System (CMS) Documents ...................................................... 4
1 Introduction ................................................................................................................................. 10
1.1 Background ......................................................................................................... 10
1.2 Purpose ............................................................................................................... 10
1.3 Target Audience .................................................................................................. 11
1.4 Scope .................................................................................................................. 11
1.5 Review and Improvement ................................................................................... 11
1.6 PDO CMS............................................................................................................ 11
1.7 PDO’s HSE MS ................................................................................................... 12
1.8 How to access Company Standards ................................................................... 13
2 Leadership and Commitment ..................................................................................................... 14
2.1 Goal ZERO .......................................................................................................... 14
2.2 Leadership........................................................................................................... 14
2.3 PDO code of conduct .......................................................................................... 15
2.4 PDO Golden Rules .............................................................................................. 15
2.5 HSE Responsibilities ........................................................................................... 16
2.6 Stop Work Authority / Empowerment to STOP ................................................... 16
2.7 Leadership HSE Engagement ............................................................................ 17
2.8 Wells LSF ( Leaders Safety Forum )................................................................... 17
2.9 Frontline Supervisors Safety Leadership Program (FLS) ................................... 17
2.10 People Recognition ............................................................................................. 17
2.10.1 Solooki Recognition Schemes ............................................................................ 17
2.10.2 HSE LTI-free Milestones ..................................................................................... 18
2.11 Life Saving Rules ................................................................................................ 19
2.12 Consequence Management ................................................................................ 19
2.13 HSE Communication ........................................................................................... 20
3 Planning ...................................................................................................................................... 21
3.1 HSE Planning ...................................................................................................... 21
3.1.1 HSE Business Plan ............................................................................................. 21
TABLE OF FIGURES
Figure 1-1, PDO Control Framework ................................................................................................. 10
Figure 1-2, Access to Standards ....................................................................................................... 13
Figure 3-1, Hierarchy of Controls ....................................................................................................... 30
Figure 3-2, HSE Case Components .................................................................................................. 32
Figure 8-1, IRC Process Flow Chart .................................................................................................. 67
LIST OF TABLES
Table 8-1, Well Engineering HSE Meetings ..................................................................................... 66
1 Introduction
This document is meant as a specification which explains how Wells manage the Health, Safety &
Environment aspects of the business within PDO’s HSE Management System. Wherever detailed
coverage exists the document provides a short summary and a reference. Some topics are discussed
in more detail in this document because the subject is not covered in other CMS documents.
The term “Wells” comprises Well Engineering as well as Completion and Well Intervention.
The term “work unit” or “unit” comprises rigs, hoists, CWI units as well as flush-by units
1.1 Background
The PDO Control Framework is the highest-level document in PDO’s Management System. It
describes the framework that integrates all of PDO’s activities. It consists of (1) the Legal &
Governance Framework and External Influences, (2) the Organisation, (3) the Business Principles
and (4) the Corporate Management System (CMS). It is the duty of all staff to be aware of these
elements and of the company’s vision and mission. This Wells HSE Specification is part of Well
Engineering Management Framework and is integral part of the PDO Control Framework
The PDO Control Framework provides Business Direction and communicates this through Business
Control Documents. The definitions of the various types of CMS documents can be found in FR-01 -
PDO Control Framework.
1.2 Purpose
This document is intended to provide an overview of how PDO HSE Management in Well Engineering
for achieving PDO’s business objectives.
1.4 Scope
This document applies equally to all Wells (Well Engineering, Completion and Well Intervention)
activities.
The maximum validity period for CMS documents is five years from the date of publishing.
Guidelines are not mandatory and do not form part of CMS, they provide advice on how an
activity or task is best performed.
CMS consists of the following
Policies
Policies are mandatory, and provide the course of action stating intentions and principles
Policies contain statements of PDO’s attitude in response to a business need
These are defined at Corporate level, where the structure and operating framework are
described
Document Owner: MD
Code of Practice
Code of Practice provide a high-level overview of expectation & requirements for each
function
Code of Practice translate the policies into practical activities to be executed repeatedly.
These are defined at Function level, where it further mandates operating requirements in the
form of Code of Practice
Document Owner: Function Director
Procedures & Specifications
Procedures describe the specific way the activity is to be performed. It is the formal
description for executing an activity to achieve a result in accordance with the specification
Specifications provide the rules for testing compliance. They prescribe requirements to be
fulfilled by a product, process or service in line with the code of practice.
These are defined at Business Area level, processes and procedures through which the
business is to be compliance and meets Corporate and Function requirements.
Related Documents
CP-122, Health Safety and Environmental Protection
2.2 Leadership
All members of the Well Engineering Directorate and not only the Well Engineering Director, the
members of the UWD Leadership team (UWDLT) and Wells team leaders, shall provide strong, visible
leadership and commitment in their respective areas of accountability to achieve PDO’s business
objectives and performance targets, whilst maintaining due regard for Wells Process Safety, Well
Integrity and HSE. This shall be demonstrated by displaying PDO’s leadership behaviors.
Stop work: Intervention action that will not impact the ability of the work-unit to continue operating
as the impact is localized to addressing people or equipment non-compliance e.g. non-conformance
on crane noticed while crane not executing major activity that will impact ongoing work unit
operations.
Shutdown: Intervention action that requires remedial actions that will affect the ability of the work-
unit to safely and efficiently execute operations e.g. non-conformance in crane noticed while using
crane for casing running resulting in having to stop casing running activity to address the crane non-
conformance.
For more details on Stop work & Shutdown in refer GU-962-Wells “Stop work” and “Shutdown”
FLM Front line management: this phase of the programme aims at sustaining the actions
generated in the FLS1 and FLS2 workshops with focus on engagement between
frontline supervisors and Wells engineers. The frontline supervisors are evaluated on
the key learnings they have taken away from the FLS workshops and areas for
improvement are defined. The respective team lead is responsible to ensure
All PDO front line supervisors shall undergo the FLS1 & FLS2 training and implement their respective
Personal Action Plan (PAP). These PAP’s will be tracked through the frontline management tool by
the respective Team lead.
Related Documents / Links
FLM Tool
FLM SOP
FLS Specification
Weekly HSE recognition is given to personnel who make a real difference to create and promote a
safe working culture and who demonstrate the PDO golden rules: Comply, Intervene and Respect.
The weekly HSE incentive is made to an individual in recognition of his safety behaviour,
observations and/or interventions related to personal or process safety.
Solooki
Contractors shall have a HSE recognition program to reward key behaviours and achievements that
includes examples such as ‘Best Driver’, LTI Free, Hazard Hunt, Employee of the month etc.
3 Planning
safety , Road Safety & Contractor HSE management. These 6 areas are supported by three key
enablers Assurance, data & technology and fair event handling.
All operational decisions taken during an emergency should be made in line with the above priorities.
At no point should any action be taken, that could endanger personnel.
UWD regularly conduct exercises to improve the emergency preparedness of the department.
Exercises may include scenarios such as rig emergency, major road traffic accident involving
chemical spillage, man lost etc.
PDO’s Wells Emergency Procedures and drills requirements are outlined in PR-1287 - Emergency
Response Document Part III, Contingency Plan Volume II, Well Engineering Operations
Reporting to and liaising with the LEBC, providing the following information:
On-site situation updates (Emergency escalating/not escalating)
Personnel situation
Services and support request
Acting on further instructions and/or suggestions of the LEBC
Coordinating with EC in the control of emergency teams, activities on site and confirmation
of well/process/utility shutdowns
Providing information to all personnel of current status and course of action
Accounting for all personnel
Ensuring the safety of all personnel, including:
Oneself
Emergency teams carrying out emergency services
Personnel at muster
Managing of stress in all personnel and ensuring that all personnel remain calm
Ensuring the protection of the environment
Continuous gathering of information from personal observation, EC, Command and Control
Board, other team members and continuously reassessing emergency response
3.2.4 Scribe
The Scribe is usually the PDO Supervisor on-site or the Assistant PDO Supervisor (if available). He
is in charge of keeping a log of events and information. He reports to and liaises with the EC or OSC.
3.2.7 Medic
The Medic or the Medical Team leader is usually a contractor medic. He may or may not be onsite. If
not on site, he will be mobilised to the site by the EC.
The WETF will be tasked with providing support to the Onsite Response Team (ORT) during the
intervention portion of the well control project. It is expected that all initial response activities such as
evacuation, medical assistance, site security and initial pollution containment activities will have been
completed by the LECC and OSC before operational control is handed over to the WETF.
Related Documents
PL-10 - Security and Emergency Response Policy
CP-123 - Emergency Response Documents, Part I
PR-1065 - Emergency Response Documents Part II
PR-1287 - Emergency Response Document Part III, Contingency Plan Volume II, Well
Engineering Operations
GU-576 – Well Control contingency Plan
PR-1243 – Medical Emergency Response Plan & site-specific MER
Tolerate
Tolerating a risk requires full understanding of what the risk potential is for the company. It is usually
related to a risk that is controllable and manageable. Controls will be introduced that seek to minimise
the potential for the risk materialising. They also provide means to manage or control the event should
it happen as well as recover from the event. Typically, this is where there is one or more controls in
place in the event that one fails.
Another factor influencing whether to tolerate risk is the ability to provide for any losses that might be
incurred in the event the risk materialising.
Transfer
Risk transfer entails transferring or placing the risk with somebody else who is a specialist at
managing the risk. The are three prime methods used, and we use all three them.
Physical transfer. This is where certain activity or functions are outsourced to a company that has a
speciality in that area. Cleaning services, accommodation and canteen are examples.
Financial transfer. This is usually in the form of insurance and is done by the financial team in areas
such as exports. Many of the assets are also insured. In addition things like medical, as well as
pension benefits for the category of transfer.
Contractual transfer. This is where responsibility for providing products and services is transferred to
a company for a fee. The majority of our activities are contracted out. Many of our contractors in turn,
subcontract activities to third-party for things that they themselves are unable to deliver. However the
primary contractor remains liable for the work or service that a subcontractor provides.
Terminate
Termination occurs when a process is completely stopped. It is difficult to implement this as a strategy
as hazardous procedures are often integral to operation. When they are terminated it impacts
production.
Terminating any process usually has significant impact on an operation. It can often result in changes
being required to get to the new environment.
Example. The withdrawal of single use plastic has required providing alternative supplies of water,
as well as make it difficult to comply to sit and requirements that were not considered. Any vehicle is
required to have a certain quantity of water when traveling in the interior which is now impacted by
the lack of access to water in plastic bottles.
Introducing solar power is beneficial to the environment. However, it requires developing new means
of storing energy, ensuring that the panel’s get cleared, and the lack of sunlight during the evening in
itself creates new challenges that need to be addressed.
Treat
Treatment as a control mechanism can take many forms. It can take the form of creating new ways
of working. It can result in new equipment being acquired. It can result in modifications to current
equipment as well as the acquisition of new technologies.
Road fatalities are amongst the highest risks that the company faces. Many controls exist to treat
and reduce potential fatalities. Vehicles have to be SP 2000 compliant. They need to have IVMS
installed controls and records speed, deceleration, accelerations, safety belts, etc. Vehicles also
have speed limiters, roll-over cages, extra spare wheels, etc. Drivers have to attend specialized
training, competency assessments by third parties, complete and comply with journey management
plans, etc.
HAZID is a technique for early identification of potential hazards and threats. Early identification and
assessment of the critical HSE hazards provides essential input to project development decisions.
The objective of HAZID study during the Identify /Assess/ Select stage of the project is to capture all
major hazards and risks, to identify any major showstoppers and to identify the HSE risk boundary. It
is particularly important to record the base assumptions for the HAZID study because of the
immaturity of the information at early stage and revisit the findings if the scope subsequently changes.
The objective of the detailed HAZID study for the selected concept during the Basis for Design (BFD)
stage or the subsequent project phases is below.
Detailed identification and inventorying the hazards and threats.
Establish a baseline list of key risks, uncertainties, concerns, information needs, and
prioritized actions and recommendations within the HSE Risk register.
Identify MAH (Major Accident Hazard).
Hazards (i.e. substances, activities, operations or conditions) which are assessed as having a
consequence severity of 5 or risk ranking of red as defined in the PDO ‘Risk Assessment Matrix’
(RAM) are categorised as Major Accident Hazards. Hazards with potential risk ranking of 3E, 4D, 4E,
5A, 5B, 5C, 5D, 5E as per PDO Risk Assessment Matrix (RAM) are categorized as Major Accident
Hazard (MAH). PDO Risk Assessment Matrix provided shall be used for HAZID.
Risk ranking to people, assets, the environment and company reputation shall be considered during
risk ranking exercise. Major Accident Hazards (MAH) shall not be tolerated in the risk management
process and shall be taken through the treatment options.
All contractors and subcontractors of PDO shall use PDO Risk Assessment Matrix (RAM) for Hazard
Identification (HAZID) studies.
Related Documents
HAZID – sec 3.2 of SP2062
PR-1971 (being updated)
Related Documents
Risk Register format
Hierarchy of controls
The higher the controls in the hierarchy the better the chance of eliminating the top event form
happening i.e.
For example if we are relying on a single valve for an isolation against high pressure gas then the
hazard would be risk of explosion if ignition source present. (RAM 4CP) However if we provide
controls such barricading the area, removing all ignition sources, providing continuous gas monitoring
the likelihood of an explosion can be reduced. (RAM 4BP) The severity remains the same because
we still have high pressure gas against a single valve but the likelihood reduces therefore the overall
risk is reduced.
The only way to really reduce the severity is to depressurize the line to reduce the impact of the
hazard (2BP)
Related Documents
Operational Risk A210779ssessment Form
The contractor shall demonstrate all activities carried out site are ALARP As Low As Reasonably
Practicable.
The use of the ALARP principle requires judgement to determine whether risk levels are as low as
reasonably practicable. ALARP can be demonstrated when the sacrifice (cost, time, effort) required
to reduce the risk any further would be disproportionate to the risk reduction potentially achieved (the
benefit). The term ‘sacrifice’ relates to the time, effort and/or cost of the complete implementation and
future maintenance and operation of the particular risk reduction measure in question. ‘Benefit’ relates
to the level of risk reduction offered by a risk reduction measure. ‘Reasonably practicable’ is the
balance between the sacrifice and benefit of implementing the risk reduction measure.
Where risks are quantifiable, As Low As Reasonably Practicable (ALARP) principle is used to
determine whether residual risks are broadly acceptable, tolerable or intolerable via comparison
against established company risk acceptance criteria.
Should the controls fail to prevent or avoid the release of a hazard then some kind of counter
measures are required to limit the number and severity of the consequences of the hazardous event
or effect. These counter measures are aimed at mitigating the consequences of the hazard and aid
in reinstatement of the normal operation or activity.
Recovery measures can reduce the likelihood or probability that the first hazardous event will develop
into further consequences and provide lifesaving capabilities should the “top event‟ escalate further.
To assist with recovery, it is important that all personnel are fully briefed and drilled as to the response
measures planned, including evacuation and restoration procedures. For major incidents, this may
also include crisis management and business continuity planning.
Quantitative Risk Assessment allows for the comparison of risk reduction options for a particular
hazard on an equivalent basis, as well as allowing for the comparison of risks that are generated from
separate and unique hazards.
At the concept stage the QRA study is conducted to evaluate risk tolerability, compare the risk
between different concept options along with optimizing the plant layout and facility siting options.
At Front End Engineering and Design (FEED) and Detailed Design stage, the QRA study further
evaluates risk tolerability and risk reduction options during design. QRA at this stage is mostly
employed to evaluate the sum of all risks for all hazards at a facility. This gives an indication of the
overall risk for that facility, while the sum of all risks in each particular area of the facility gives an
indication as to which locations or equipment sections are the most hazardous. Therefore, the
effectiveness of each risk reduction measures can be evaluated against each other.
In wells QRA is done to determine / model the quantity of releases from a well , extend of thermal
radiation from a fire , determining the size of EPZ etc.
MSE4 team are the focal points for QRA in PDO and for any activity needing QRA their support
Related Documents
The close out of Remedial Action plan shall be demonstrated by the contractor prior to accepting the
HSE Case.
Details of all emergency response equipment’s on site shall be listed in Part 5 of the HSE case.
(alignment with asset HSE case)
The asset owner shall ensure a process is in place to operationalise the HSE case on site. The site
shall have a list of all safety critical equipment derived from the HSE case & safety critical tasks for
various crew on site.
All barrier owners as per Major accident hazard’s bowtie shall be fully aware of their responsibilities
when it comes maintaining the barriers.
Related Documents
IADC HSE Case format
SP 2062 Specification for HSE Case
3.4.8 Hazard and Operability Study (HAZOP), Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA)
and other safety related studies
Hazard and Operability Study (HAZOP), Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) and other safety
related studies need to be performed, as appropriate, for new projects and new types of equipment
and processes prior to their introduction to our operation.
Page 32 Wells HSE Printed 26/12/23
The controlled version of this CMS Document resides online in Livelink®. Printed copies are UNCONTROLLED.
Revision: 0
Effective: Dec. 2023 Petroleum Development Oman LLC
The requirement for these studies shall be stipulated in the contract document and shall completed
during the mobilisation phase of the work unit. The operational readiness audits shall verify that
controls identified during these studies are implemented.
FMEA studies shall be conducted for all new mechanization being introduced into operation to identify
the failure modes during the various interfaces while using these new equipment’s. e.g. Automatic
Pipe cat , Hydraulic elevators, Iron derrickman etc
HAZOP studies shall be conducted when any new processes are introduced in wells e.g., managed
pressure drilling, coil tubing drilling etc.
Related Documents
PR-1696 - HAZOP Procedure.
The HRA shall consider risks arising from chemical, physical, biological, ergonomic and psychological
hazards associated with the work environment. HRA shall be covered in all operational activities,
maintenance, including new projects, acquisition, closure, divestment an abandonment of facilities.
All contractors shall develop an HRA specific to the project and have it approved by MCOH team prior
start of contract.
4 Support
4.1 Training
All contractors shall ensure the crew (employees & third party) are adequately trained and have an
approved training matrix agreed with the contract holder with mandatory and other trainings (HSE &
trade related) as per PDO specification & contract section C9. The compliance with this training matrix
shall be reviewed on a quarterly basis by the contract holder. The mandatory training compliance
prior start of contract will be verified as part of operations readiness Audit (ORA).
Any deviation / non-compliance from / to the training matrix shall require an MoC.
Related Documents / link
SP1157 , HSE Training Specification
Sl No: Topic
HSE Planning
Leadership
3
- FLS1
- FLS2
- FLM
Behaviours
4 - IHTIMAM
- Safety Support center
- Dilemma management
Risk Management
Campaigns
Line of Fire
Out of Sight
6 Crane Forklift Operators Engagement
Road Safety
Summer /Ramadhan
Life Saving Rules
Communication
Environment Management
Sewage Management
8 Waste Management
GHG management
Waste consignment note
Motivation
10 Solooki
Behaviour Based Recognition
HSE continuous Improvement
Emergency Response
11 PR-1287
On scene commander Training
Drills
Incident management
12 Incident Management Flow chart
PIM Training
A Short Service Employee (SSE ) is any person who has less than 6 months experience in the
industry or company or the job
The contractor shall have a short service employee policy. This Short Service Employee (SSE) Policy
ensures that contractor employees with less than 6 months experience are identified, adequately
supervised, trained, and managed to prevent injury to themselves or others, property damage, or
environmental harm. Each SSE shall have a formally assigned mentor at the worksite under the
Contractor’s own Green Hat/Hand Policy. PDO contractors will manage their sub-contractors in
alignment with this policy. Each Contractor shall submit monthly SSE statistics to PDO SWE and
UWC CH monthly for review and tracking.
SSE Management
Internal promotions shall be managed with contractor competency program. Non-SSE contract
employees who are new to a location must be considered by the PDO site supervisor for inclusion in
the SSE program based on the specifics of their assignment. Factors to consider include significant
differences in:
o job responsibilities/duties from previous assignments,
o work processes/practices from previous assignments,
o equipment/tools from previous assignments, and
o skill level, familiarity with co-workers.
For purposes of this policy, a crew is defined as those employees working at a single location and
employed by the same contractor.
Crews with 4 persons or less:
o Single person “crew” cannot be a SSE.
o 2-4 person crews can have only 1 SSE per crew.
Exceptions to these “small crew” requirements require PDO contract holder, Team Lead and WSV
approval.
> 30% • Written approval by the PDO CH, Team Lead and WSV using
eMOC tool
• Delivery Manager (UWOX, UWOD, UWI) concurrence
SSE personnel shall be easily identified in the unit by wearing high visibility hard hat or other means
To be removed from SSE status, an employee must exhibit safe behaviour for 6 months (e.g. incident
free performance, proactive participation in HSE programs such as incident reporting including near
misses, BBS, JSA development, safety meetings) and have a general awareness and working
knowledge of the Contractor’s and PDO’s HSE policies. The Contractor may recommend a reduction
of the 6-month requirement based on the employee’s performance and relevant industry experience.
This reduction must be approved by the PDO WSV and include Team Lead notification concurrence.
The contractor shall maintain all records related to the progression of an employee from a Short
service employee to a regular employee.
UWZ team is the responsible party about HSE campaigns within Wells. It is the team responsibility
to facilitate corporate campaigns for well engineering teams. Any material to be used for a Wells HSE
campaign is to be endorsed by UWZ team.
All contractors & PDO staff shall ensure the crew are aware of the campaign and their responsibilities
in ensuring effective implementation of the deliverables from the campaign.
4.8 Welfare
Welfare of all wells staff working in our concession is key to ensure our people are in a safe and
productive environment. The PDO & contractor supervisor on site is responsible to ensure the camp
and other facilities are inspected and complies with the requirements.
HSE Specification SP 1232, Public health specifies the minimum requirements related to the welfare
facilities onsite.
The camp inspection checklist shall be used for inspecting the condition of the camp. All items
highlighted as critical is where compliance is non-negotiable. In the event of non-compliance to
highlighted items, camp to be shut immediately and responsible Contract Holder advised of closure.
The contractor shall ensure Welfare committee are established onsite and periodic meetings are
happening.
personal protective equipment) which may be required for the safe execution of a task. All employees
shall undergo fitness to work assessment as per SP-1230.
5 Operation
In all cases an uncontrolled hazardous environment will pose danger to human life and possibly
damage to Company assets.
In addition to the normal controls and recovery measures that are normally applied in a single
operations permit, the additional hazards introduced by the SIMOPS should be identified and extra
controls and recovery measures should be added to manage the interfaces through SIMOPS risk
assessment and Manual of Permitted Operations (MOPO).
Note that the identified restrictions placed on operations should be regarded as a minimum and
additional restrictions may be required during course of the Well Engineering programme.
Related Documents / link
SP 1220, Simultaneous Operations
5.7 Toolbox Talks (TBT) and Toolbox Talk Risk Identification Card (TRIC)
Before carrying out any activity on site a toolbox talk shall be held with all personnel involved. Toolbox
Talk Risk ID Cards (TRIC) shall be used for effective delivery of the TBT.
The TRIC is used as a planning & risk communication tool used at site level. It should be developed
by the key supervisors and crew involved in the job listing the tasks involved and the hazards involved
& its controls while carrying out the job. The TRIC card needs to be discussed with all parties involved
in carrying out the job. The TRIC card is a live document and shall be used as an aid to identify the
dynamic risks while carrying out the activities.
If your JSA has an option to capture the dynamic/ additional risks along with assigning responsibilities,
it can be used a replacement for TRIC.(Refer Appendix 6)
Related Documents / link
Toolbox Talk Risk ID Cards (TRIC)
Musta’ed checks can be used prior starting a job , during and after any job. It can also be used by
lone workers and when there are multiple parties involved in carrying out the work. Moreover ,
Musta’ed is to be utilized for developing the first alert for incident to identify the immediate causes.
The Environment management on site shall be managed according SP2194. The following minimum
requirement shall be always complied on wells location.
- Availability and display of cluster environment permit.
- Clean up spills and restore the site prior to moving to a new location.
- Availability & display of site-specific impacts & aspects register with controls implemented.
- Reduce, reuse & recycle waste whenever possible.
- Availability of emergency response plans with environmental spill scenarios
- Waste from all streams to be properly segregated and send to an authorised waste facility
through an authorised transported. Maintain proper waste consignment notes.
- Do not use produced water in drilling top section.
- Minimise freshwater consumption whenever possible.
- Management of sewage system (septic tank followed by holding tank or soak away pit) with
adequate monitoring and schedule for sewage collection. Ensure proper maintenance of
sewage networks.
- Comply with regulatory noise requirements of MD 79/1994
- Environmental incidents and upset scenarios (e.g. oil spill, continued black smoke etc.) are
reported and corrective action taken.
- Chemicals including oil drums shall be segregated and stored properly according to
MSDS/SHOC cards.
- Availability and maintenance of waste pit liner and prevention of overflow
- Maintain power generators to minimise emissions.
- Ensure adequate controls in diesel tank filling operations to avoid overflow and spill.
The path of line of fire hazards can have an unpredictable nature. It is often considered in a linear
sense but can in fact be non-linear (e.g., a swinging load or a ricochet). Line of fire is not always
obvious or constant and can be introduced as the task progresses. At all times individuals need to
monitor their surroundings and position themselves to avoid being in the line of fire.
All 10 hazards of the Line of Fire hazards listed should be considered when identifying Line of Fire
Hazards. The tools available to help with identifying the hazards include hazard hunts and HazIDs
etc. Once the Line of Fire hazards have been identified they should be risk assessed and controls
implemented as per the hierarchy of controls. The controls shall focus on having a restricted
access/no-entry zone(s) established before the associated work commences.
5.10.1.1.2 General
Machinery and equipment shall be operated and maintained as per OEM instruction.
5.10.1.1.4 Machinery
Machine guarding shall be used to protect operators and other personnel from pinch points
and projectiles.
NOTE: Machine guarding addresses both pinch points within the machinery and between
moving machinery and other objects.
Hands & finger injuries have been the most common injury across UWD community. To ensure we
manage the risk of hands & finger injury in our operations UWD follows the “Hands Off ” approach.
Prior to start of any activity the “Four Questions to keep your hands safe” should be used to assess
the potential of carrying out the job “hands off” or any potential risk involved when carrying out the
activity.
• How can the job be done Hands Off?
• Do you think about stored energy release that can injure your Hands & Fingers?
• Do you identify pinch points & discuss them during your TBT?
• Are the hand tools we use fit for the job and used correctly?
All units shall assess their activities and ensure fit for purpose hands off tools (push pull sticks, finger
savers etc.) are made available at site and the crew trained to use these tools.
The gloves used for the activities shall be fit for purpose and the contractor shall define the usage in
line with SP 1234 Personal Protective Equipment Specification
A matrix for the type of gloves/hands off tools w.r.t the activity should be available as part of the
contractor hand and finger injury prevention program.
All units shall have a pinch point register which identifies all potential pinch points on location and the
controls needed to prevent pinch point injuries. The register includes as a minimum the following.
- Operation/Activity/Task identified/ Equipment involved.
- Photograph (Before)
- Hazard Identified
- Controls currently in place
- Photograph (After)
- Proposed controls to reduce exposure.
Hazard Hunts shall be carried out regularly to identify potential pinch points and the pinch point
register updated half yearly.
Each derrick/mast shall be equipped with a fixed ladder(s) providing access from the rig floor
to the crown block platform as well as access to each intermediate platform.
Personnel climbing the ladder shall always be wearing a harness and be secured by a fall
arrestor / ladsafe device.
Harnesses to be certified, inspected and controlled (equipment register).
Fall arrestor lines shall be routed to not interfere with the travelling block at any time –
consideration to be given to lateral block movement on units with swinging blocks.
Ladsafe systems shall be provided for all fixed derricks and should be the default for all units
where it can be installed.
The travelling block shall be stationary while personnel are climbing up or working in the
derrick and also during the change of personnel at the monkey board.
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In the event of a lost in hole (LIH) radioactive source, the ultimate decision to abandon a radioactive
material rest with the Asset Manager after consultation with the Senior Well Engineer and Corporate
Radiation and Environment Focal Points. Abandonment of radioactive materials down hole shall be
performed in accordance with the procedure
The abandonment of the radioactive material shall be reported to the authorities via the environmental
advisor, who shall provide advice about the information required. A letter by the Asset Owner,
accompanied by the completed “Radioactive source lost in Hole template”, shall be sent to the
Environment Authority (EA).
The management and reporting of stuck and lost radioactive sources is detailed in the Standard
Operation Procedure (SOP) for radioactive source incident reporting and management.
5.10.7 Explosives
Well Engineering requirements for managing risks associated with use of explosives in wells are
described in PDO PR-2284 Use of explosives in Wells. This procedure includes the requirement for
transport of explosives, use of explosives on site and how to handle misfired guns.
Hydrogen Sulphide (H2S) is a highly toxic gas. Brief exposure to high concentrations of H2S can
cause rapid unconsciousness without warning symptoms. Death due to respiratory paralysis may
follow within a few minutes.
The occurrence of H2S in Oman is extensive, both in association with aquifers and hydrocarbon
bearing formations. Virtually all streams from PDO’s current producing fields contain some Hydrogen
Sulphide, some of which levels are greater than 10 ppm.
Wells operations shall comply with the requirements of SP 1190 Part 2 H2S & SO2 Management,
Drilling and Well Intervention for managing H2S & SO2.
For units that are in the Emergency Planning Zone (EPZ) all precautions related to working in EPZ
shall be implemented.
Part-B: Vehicle
Requirements for the vehicles
Roadworthiness Assurance Standard (RAS)
All vehicle operating for UWD operations shall be registered with Journey Management Control
Center (JMCC).
Vehicles
Vehicles shall be parked in a designated area outside the rig location.
Other obvious access points to the rig location shall be blocked to vehicles by tool skids or other
appropriate means.
Visitors may only drive vehicles onto the location for operational purposes when conditions allow, and
after authorisation from the PDO or contractor site supervisor.
Personnel
All personnel entering the rig-site shall place their identity card /H2S pass on a muster board. The
muster board shall be located at the gate keeper’s office or the contractor site supervisor’s office.
Cards shall be removed from the muster board prior to leaving the location.
On arrival, visitors shall sign in the Visitor logbook (record as minimum name, company, H2S permit
number and expiry date, time in and time out) and shall receive a safety induction/ briefing by the
responsible contractor personnel.
In cases of unauthorised access to the location by the local population, the PDO or contractor site
supervisor shall attempt to resolve the problem locally. In case of difficulty, assistance should be
sought from Public Relations in the respective area. Such instances shall be reported as soon as
possible to the Senior Wells Engineer.
Signs
Warning and awareness signs, including but not limited to
shall be displayed in a manner that is visible to all traffic approaching the well site.
All signs within the prepared site shall be illuminated under conditions of poor visibility and at night.
All signs not illuminated shall be painted with reflective paint such that they shall be readily visible
from other light sources.
6 Performance Evaluation
The key requirements of a good assurance system shall understand the critical processes involved
in good governance and good management. An Annual Assurance Plan is required to demonstrate
a risk-based audit plan, the compliance process, gap analysis against known gaps, an action plan on
how to close the gaps and reflection on the threats and self-improvement. The objectives of the audits
at each level should establish the following.
Assurance levels
The contractor assurance framework shall clearly define the assurance levels and they type of
assurance activities at each level.
It is expected that the Assurance levels begin with establishing system effectiveness through
independent external audits at the highest level. Both functions and Senior management shall audit
system compliance through a series of internal audits. Then line management shall quality assure
the tasks are performed and meets the objectives of providing confidence that the process is followed
and effective. The first line of defense starts with the work site to properly implement the daily tasks
and quality check the work performed.
To support the various levels of assurance the Contractor shall develop an Annual audit plan and the
templates for performing quality audits that assures all key business objectives, business
performance, personal safety performance, environmental and process safety. Audit findings and
incident learnings shall be directly fed into the next level of audits to assure that the implementation
of actions is effective, and learnings embedded.
Elements of the assurance are to identify gaps in the following key areas.
System (processes in place)
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Contractors are to apply a qualitative scoring for both the system effectiveness and system
compliance (implementation). The severity of the gaps are to be linked to the RAM for potential
severity. Further linking to causation learnings and controls are to be included in accordance with
PDO barrier thinking philosophy.
It is important to understand the pain areas, both severity and frequency. The use of Leading and
Lagging Indicators shall help with developing trends and provide management oversight on the gaps
and threats to the business that requires focused attention to rectify. The audit frequency against the
plan, the quality of the audits and the trends of the performance shall be reported Monthly to PDO.
Continual Improvement starts with measuring the performance and continual monitoring of the
processes. A correlation between the assurance activities as proactive focus areas can be made with
the successful delivery of safe and reliable performance. Both incidents and audit findings should be
reviewed as a minimum on an annual basis and used to improve the audit focus areas and assign
actions that can be measured through self-assurance.
Accountability for the delivery of the assurance program resides with the CEO. At year end a
statement of declaration is requested from the CEO to PDO with the following key deliverables.
The layout of KIPs used in Wells are: HSE KPIs: Leading & Lagging, Process Safety KPIs. Below
a list of examples for the various types of KPIs:
1) Leading KPIs:
% PIM actions close out
% Incident closeout in PIM
% LSR's closeout in PIM
% MSE IRC comply with the timeline
Number of UWDLT field visits Vs Plan
% of Level II audits done vs. plan
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7 Improvement
Wells staff shall comply with the requirements stipulated in PR-1418 - Incident Non-conformity &
Corrective Action. All incidents are reviewed by the Wells Leadership Team. Incidents with a Risk
Assessment Matrix (RAM) Rating of 3 and above are reviewed by an Incident Review Committee.
Based on the severity of the incident the incident will be reviewed at directorate level or at MD level.
The SP-1418 details the levels of incidents which needs to be investigated and incident management
process.
- Incident First Alert
The contractor shall share the first alert of the incident for sharing with UWD community
- Incident Second alert
The second alert is generated after the Incident review process and the second alert captures the
learnings for the crew & the self audit questionnaire for management. The second alert will be shared
across UWD in the form of LFI booklets on a half yearly basis.
7.3 IHTIMAM
IHTIMAM is PDO’s Behaviour Based Safety (BBS) System that was developed in house. IHTIMAM
concept bases itself on new findings in behavioural science that are key factors in its methodology:
1. People’s behaviours are driven by influencers, the system or situation, not the individual.
2. No matter what measures are put in place, if the influencers of the unsafe behaviour are not
identified and resolved, the unsafe behaviour will continue to happen.
Unlike other BBS systems, with IHTIMAM the principal focus for safety improvement should not be
on the psychology of correcting worker behaviour; rather it should be on the design of the workplace,
its methods and management systems.
All UWD contractors shall have IHTIMAM implemented on their locations. For sites opting for a
different BBS program , approval shall be obtained from the contract holder.
IDEAL is a standalone auditing tool developed for UWD as a module within eWCAT, which requires
user’s role to be assigned and training provided.
The Assurance tool is designed to perform Level 2, Level 3 and continuous assurance for the UWD
Directorate across MSE and UWD audit requirements in accordance with PR-1969. It is accessible
for both PDO & Contractors to plan, self-evaluate, execute audits, agree action plans and track close
out of actions. It is also a depository for Contractor HSE Management System documents whilst
maintaining confidentiality and allows post processing and analysis of the common pain areas across
the Directorate from HSE Performance, Business Performance and Wells Process Safety.
The HSE & Assurance performance shall be reviewed on a continuous basis to measure the
effectiveness of the management system to ensure that management system remain focused on the
direction of the business and continual improvement .This can be based on inputs from Incidents
trends , Audit findings , crew engagements , deep dives etc. and necessary actions are taken to
address the issues identified. This can be in the form of a change in procedure, HSE campaign, stand
downs or an input to next year’s business plan
8 Appendix
Term/Abbreviation Definition
TRIC Toolbox Risk Identification Card
Unsafe Acts Is an action by a person which could have led to an injury,
damage or harm, but which did not result in any on this
occasion.
Unsafe Condition Is a condition of a worksite which could have led to an injury,
damage or harm, but which did not result in any on this
occasion.
WE Well Engineer, Well Engineering
Wells Well Engineering and Completion and Well Intervention
WPS Wells Process Safety
PEOPLE
Severity Definition
Level
No injury or health effect
0
Slight injury or health effect
1 No treatment Case or First Aid Cases
Illnesses that result in noticeable discomfort, minor irritation or transient effects that are reversible
after exposure stops.
Minor injury or health effect
2 Medical Treatment Case
Lost Workday Case or Restricted Work Case where either has a duration of up to and including 5
days
Illnesses with reversable health effects such as food poisoning or dermatitis
Major injury or health effect
3 Lost Workday Case or Restricted Work Case where either has a duration exceeding 5 days
Illnesses with irreversible health effects such as sensitisation, noise induced hearing loss, chronic
back disorders or repetitive strain injury
Mental illness due to stress with reversible health effects
Permanent total disability or up to three fatalities
4 Illnesses with irreversible health effects such as corrosive burns, asbestosis, silicosis
Cancer
Mental illness due to stress with irreversible health effects
More than three fatalities
5 Illnesses with irreversible health effects such as multiple asbestosis cases traced to a single exposure
situation
Cancer in a large, exposed population
ASSETS
Severit Definition
y Level
0 No damage
Slight damage
1 Costs less than US$ 10,000
Minor damage
2 Costs between US$ 10,000 and US$ 100,000
Moderate damage
3 Costs between US$ 100,000 and US$ 1 million
Major damage
4 Costs between US$ 1 and US$ 10 million
Massive damage
5 Costs in excess of US$ 10 million
ENVIRONMENTAL
Severity Definition
Level
No effect
0
1 Slight effect
Slight environmental damage – contained within the premises. Example:
Small spill in process area or tank farm area that readily evaporates
Minor effect
Contamination Damages
Minor environmental damage, but no lasting effect. Examples:
2
Small spill off-site that seeps into the ground
On-site groundwater contamination
Complaints from up to 10 individuals
Single exceedance of statutory or other prescribed limit
No permanent effect on the environment
3 Moderate effect
Limited environmental damage that will persist or require cleaning up. Examples:
Spill from a pipeline into soil/sand that requires removal and disposal of a large quantity of soil/sand
Observed off-site effects or damage, e.g. fish kill or damaged vegetation
Off-site groundwater contamination
Complaints from community organisations (or more than 10 complaints from individuals)
Frequent exceedance of statutory or other prescribed limit, with potential long-term effect
Major effect
4 Severe environmental damage that will require extensive measures to restore beneficial uses of the
environment. Examples:
Oil spill at a jetty during tanker (off) loading that ends up on local beaches, requiring clean-up operations
Off-site groundwater contamination over an extensive area
Many complaints from community organisations or local authorities.
Extended exceedance of statutory or other prescribed limits, with potential long term effects
Massive effect
5 Persistent severe environmental damage that will lead to loss of commercial, recreational use or loss of natural
resources over a wide area. Example:
Crude oil spillage resulting in pollution of a large part of a river estuary and extensive clean-up and
remediation measures
REPUTATION
Severity Description
Level
No impact
0
Slight impact
1 Local public awareness but no discernible concern
No media coverage
Minor impact
2 Local public concern
Local media coverage
Moderate impact – Significant impact in region or country
3 Regional public concern
Local stakeholders, e.g. community, NGO, industry and government, are aware
Extensive attention in local media. Some regional or national media coverage.
Major impact – Likely to escalate and affect Group reputation
4 National public concern
Impact on local and national stakeholder relations. National government and NGO involvement with
potential for international NGO action.
Extensive attention in national media. Some international coverage.
Potential for regulatory action leading to restricted operations or impact on operating licences.
Massive impact – Severe impact on Group reputation
5 International public concern.
High level of concern amongst governments and action by international NGOs.
International media attention.
Significant potential for effect on national/international standards with impact on access to new areas,
grants of licences and/or tax legislation.
Are
Controls
Controls: Recovery Plan: in Place?
Consequences:
Hazards: What controls are in place Mention your Yes / No
Tasks (if What could be possible or will you put in place? recovery Responsibilities:
applicable) What hazards did you outcome of identified preparation in case
# find for each task? Note: Mandatory PPEs are Hard Who will be responsible for each
hazard? Hat, Glasses, Gloves, Coveralls and controls barriers are
Shoes. Additional PPE must be lost of those controls?
mentioned.
IMPORTANT NOTES:
INSTRUCTIONS: (1) Capture new identified Hazards which are not covered in this JSA and include them in the field above and transfer to main JSA if applicable
(2) This JSA to be printed and signed off by all attendees during TBT prior Job Starts.
(3) Tick and discuss Hazards, WPS & LSR which are related to the job during TBT
Additional Tables are provided below for reference to identify Severity Consequences.