MOHD AMAR BIN MOHAMED v SHAHRUL KAMAL BIN ROSLAN &

ORS
CaseAnalysis
| [2022] MLJU 2410

Mohd Amar bin Mohamed v Shahrul Kamal bin Roslan & Ors [2022] MLJU
2410
Malayan Law Journal Unreported

HIGH COURT (KUALA LUMPUR)

JOHN LEE KIEN HOW @ MOHD JOHAN LEE JC
SUIT NO WA-23NCvC-106-11 OF 2021
25 September 2022

Pavendeep Singh (with Hanis Adiba) (Paven & Co) for the plaintiff.
A Vishnukumar (with S Manisha) (JS Pillay & Mohd Haaziq) for the second and third defendants.

John Lee Kien How @ Mohd Johan Lee JC:

GROUNDS OF JUDGMENT

(Application pursuant to Order 18, r 19(1)(a) of the Rules of Court 2012)

Introduction

[1] The 2nd and 3rd Defendants in this case have filed an application pursuant to Order 18 r 19(1)(a) (“this
Application”) of the Rules of Court (‘ROC 2012’) praying for an order to strike out the Plaintiff’s claim against them
as pleaded in the statement of claim dated 03.11.2021 (“SOC”).
Facts of the case

[2] Briefly, the Plaintiff is married to one Sharifah Aisyah binti Syed Mohamed, the younger sister of the 2nd and 3rd
Defendants. Meanwhile, the 1st Defendant is the husband of the 2nd Defendant. The Plaintiff and the 1st Defendant
were known to be friends since as early as 2005.

[3] Around May 2021, the Plaintiff and the 1st Defendant had a misunderstanding which resulted in a murky
relationship between them. On 21.10.2021, there was a family dinner attended by the Plaintiff, his wife, his in-laws
and the 1st, 2nd, and the 3rd Defendants. After the dinner, the Plaintiff claimed that the 1st Defendant had punched
him on his face. This incident was witnessed by the 2nd and 3rd Defendants. The Plaintiff also claimed that rather
than helping him, the 2nd and 3rd Defendants instigated the 1st Defendant with the assault. It was allegedly that they
only tried to stop the 1st Defendant after a while but not before the 2nd Defendant shouted to the Plaintiff, ‘you do not
deserve my sister’.

[4] Consequently, the Plaintiff sustained serious injuries and had to seek medical attention. The Plaintiff later
lodged a police report regarding the assault.

[5] On 03.11.2021, the Plaintiff filed a writ and statement of claim (‘this Action’) against the 1st, 2nd and 3rd
Defendants seeking a declaration that the 1st, 2nd, and 3rd Defendants had committed assault and trespass to
person on him, and further seeking an injunctive order to restrain the 1st, 2nd, and 3rd Defendants from nearing the
Plaintiff.

[6] Thereafter, the 2nd and 3rd Defendants filed this Application to strike out the Plaintiff’s claim against them.

Benjamin Tan Jer Chien Benjamin Tan Jer Chien

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Submission by the 2nd and 3rd Defendants

[7] In essence, the 2nd and 3rd Defendants submitted that the Plaintiff’s SOC did not raise any reasonable cause of
action against them. It is the 2nd and 3rd Defendants’ submission that their inaction to help the Plaintiff does not
constitute any assault or trespass to person. The 2nd and 3rd Defendants further contended that their inaction also
did not constitute an imminent threat against the Plaintiff.

[8] The 2nd and 3rd Defendants further submitted that, the words uttered by the 2nd Defendant, ‘you do not deserve
my sister’ are not threatening in nature. Hence the Plaintiff has no cause of action for assault and trespass against
the 2nd and 3rd Defendants.

[9] The 2nd and 3rd Defendants also argued that the Plaintiff’s claim for conspiracy to injure was not specifically
pleaded in his SOC. It is the 2nd and 3rd Defendants’ submission that in order for the Plaintiff to raise an allegation
for conspiracy, the Plaintiff must plead all the elements in his pleading with clarity and precision. In this case, the 2nd
and 3rd Defendants submitted that the Plaintiff had failed to do so.
Submission by the Plaintiff

[10] In contrast, the Plaintiff submitted that the 2nd and 3rd Defendants’ inaction and the words uttered by the 2nd
Defendant could amount to an assault. Here, the Plaintiff relied on the case of R v Ireland [1998] AC 147.

[11] Moreover, the Plaintiff also contended that whether such inaction or words uttered by the 2nd Defendant
constituted an assault is a factual question. Thus, it will be inappropriate for this Court to dismiss the SOC at this
stage because any factual question should be determined during trial by deliberating on the testimonies of the
witnesses.

[12] Next, the Plaintiff also alleged that he had already pleaded all the particulars for conspiracy in his SOC. It is
Plaintiff’s submission that, even if this Court find otherwise, the Plaintiff submitted that the purported error was not
fatal. Here, the Plaintiff quoted the case of Pacific Orient Insurance Co Berhad v. Mohammad Hafizi Bahari & Anor
[2021] 1 LNS 647.
This Court’s Findings

[13] Having appraised the facts adduced by all the parties and after considering the submissions by the learned
counsels and detailed reading of the SOC of this Action, I allow the 2nd and 3rd Defendants’ striking out application.
Herein are my reasons.

[14] It is well settled that any application of striking out must be made under Order 18 r 19 of ROC 2012 which
says,

“Striking out pleadings and endorsements (O.18, r.19)

19. (1) The Court may at any stage of the proceedings order to be struck out or amended any pleading or the endorsement,
of any writ in the action, or anything in any pleading or in the endorsement, on the ground that –

(a) It discloses no reasonable cause of action or defence, as the case may be;…”

[15] As highlighted in Malaysian Civil Procedure, 2021, Vol. 1 at p. 275, a striking out application is not designed
as a mechanism for the defendant to force a preliminary hearing on the merits, but is rather aimed at culling actions
in plain and obvious cases, i.e. where there is no reasonable cause of action, to avoid an unnecessary trial or if the
claim is frivolous, vexatious or an abuse of court process, or if the defence is unarguable. The power of the courts
under the four grounds of this rule is exercised when it can clearly be seen that a claim or answer is prima facie
obviously unsustainable (see Bandar Builder Sdn Bhd v United Malayan Banking Corp Bhd [1993] 2 AMR 1969;
[1993] 3 MLJ 36; Cepatwawasan Group Bhd & Anor v Tengku Dato’ Kamal Ibni Sultan Sir Abu Bakar & 17 Ors
[2008] 2 AMR 504; [2008] 2 MLJ 915; Linde Gas Malaysia Sdn Bhd v Pasifik Utama Sdn Bhd & Anor [2011] 5 CLJ
40; Metroplex Holdings Sdn Bhd v Commerce International Merchants Bankers Bhd [2013] 4 MLJ 520; Lifomax
Woodbuild Sdn Bhd v Ng Yee Teck [2017] 1 LNS 528, CA.)

[16] The 2nd and 3rd Defendants in this Application only relied on Order 18 r 19 (a) namely that the SOC discloses
no reasonable cause of action or defence,’. It is a well- established principle that in such situation the court only
needs to consider whether the SOC discloses a reasonable cause of action. It is also essential that the court will not
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summarily strike out pleadings unless the cases were plainly and obviously not sustainable as decided in Abdul
Rahim bin Abdul Hamid v Perdana Merchant Bankers Sdn Bhd [2000] 2 CLJ 457:

“In considering an application under O. 18 r. 19(1)(a), the court has to take into account the statement of claim on
the face of it and no consideration whatsoever shall be paid to the evidence in the form of these affidavits. So long
as the statement of claim discloses a reasonable cause of action, however weak the claim is, the claim cannot be struck off
summarily. At that stage of the proceedings, it is not for us or for the learned judge of the High Court to consider the merits
of Carah’s claim. On an application under O. 18 r. 19(1)(a) the court has only to consider whether the statement of
claim discloses a reasonable cause of action. The well-established principle is that the court will not summarily
strike out pleadings, except only in plain and obvious cases where the claim or counterclaim is plainly and
obviously not sustainable.” [Emphasis added.]

[17] In the Federal Court case of Serac Asia Sdn Bhd v Sepakat Insurance Brokers Sdn Bhd [2013] 6 CLJ 673
where it was laid down that:

“[42] Although the power to strike out is a wide discretion, it should be exercised with care and only when the
threshold requirement of ‘an obvious and unsustainable case’ can be a pleading be struck out. In exercising it, and
especially under r.19(1)(a), the court must have regard to the ‘quality of an all circumstances surrounding the plead
(see Lembaga Kumpulan Wang Simpanan Pekerja v. Kesatuan Kakitangan Lembaga Kumpulan Wang Simpanan Pekerja
[2000] 3 CLJ 81; [2000] 2 AMR 2119, FC). The court should also bear in mind that the effect of striking out a
pleading is to completely deprive a plaintiff from having his day in court.” [Emphasis added]

[18] Thus, bearing the above principle in mind, I am of the view that the SOC on the face of it, discloses no
reasonable cause of action and the 2nd and 3rd Defendants had successfully established to this Court that the
Plaintiff’s claim is not sustainable. I refer to Dato Kamil Noor Ariff Bin Kamil Mushir Ariff (Menyaman Sebagai
Pegawai Awam Berdaftar Kelab Taman Perdana Diraja Kuala Lumpur Bagi Dan Pihaknya) v. Chan Kok Choong
(Mengamal Di Bawah Nama dan Gaya Messrs KC Chan & Partners) And Other Appeal [2018] MLJU 1637 where
the court held that:

“[16] An application under O 18 r 19(1)(a) of the ROC 2012 requires a perusal of the Plaintiff’s pleadings to ascertain
whether it does in fact discloses a reasonable cause of action.”

[19] I shall now discuss the Plaintiff’s causes of action against the 2nd and 3rd Defendants and my analysis on them
separately in arriving at my findings.
i) Assault

[20] In the SOC, the Plaintiff had alleged that the 2nd and 3rd Defendants had committed an assault on him.
However, there is nothing in the SOC that really narrated this. The closest of the pleaded facts were as follows:

“33.1 The 1st Defendant suddenly, without the Plaintiff’s consent, punched the Plaintiff from the back across the Plaintiff
face, first hitting the Plaintiff on the nose and then on the left eye;

33.2 The Plaintiff fell onto the ground face down;

33.3 The 1st Defendant then, without the Plaintiff’s consent proceeded to sit on the Plaintiff’s back and contiguously punch
the Plaintiff at the back of his head;

33.4 The 2nd and 3rd Defendants were present during this time but did not stop the 1st Defendant but instead instigated the
1st Defendant to carry one;

33.5 The 3rd Defendant upon seeing the Plaintiff bleeding told the 1st Defendant to stop; and

33.6 The 2nd Defendant did stop the 1st Defendant but instead shouted words to the effect that “you do not deserve my
sister” and kept encouraging the 1st Defendant to carry on the assault on the Plaintiff.”

[21] Unfortunately, I do not find the pleaded facts above giving rise to an act of assault. An assault is an intentional
offer of force or violence to a person or another. I find the passage quoted by the 2nd and 3rd Defendants from
Bullen & Leake & Jacob’s Precedents of Pleadings, Vol. 1, 2001 at p. 31 of great guidance:
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“An assault is an act involving an imminent threat to touch another in a hostile manner with the capability to carry out such
threat.”

[22] Looking at the pleaded facts in the SOC, I do not find that the 2nd and 3rd Defendants’ inaction to help the
Plaintiff in this Action amounting to any assault. As eloquently put by the learned counsel for the 2nd and 3rd
Defendants, they were mere by-standers. The Plaintiff tried to refute this by saying that the fact that they were in the
position to help the Plaintiff, which in this case they did not do so, amounts to assault. In another word, the Plaintiff
is alleging that the 2nd and 3rd Defendants’ inaction is tantamount to an assault. With due respect, I have to
disagree.

[23] It is trite that, any action which brings a threat of violence together with the fact that the defendant is in a
position to inflict force upon the plaintiff would be tantamount to an assault. Based on the pleaded facts, it is my
view that the 2nd and 3rd Defendants’ inaction does not amount to a threat nor bring a reasonable apprehension for
an immediate infliction of force on the Plaintiff.

[24] The Plaintiff relied heavily on the English case of R v Ireland [1998] AC 147 where the House of Lords
explained differentiate how words and/or inaction may give raise an assault. Lord Steyn at pp. 546 – 547 elucidated
that:

“That brings me to the critical question whether a silent caller may be guilty of an assault. The answer to this question
seems to be “Yes, depending on the facts.” It involves questions of fact within the province of the jury. After all, there is no
reason why a telephone caller who says to a woman in a menacing way “I will be at your door in a minute or two”
may not be guilty of an assault if he causes his victim to apprehend immediate personal violence. Take now the
case of the silent caller. He intends by his silence to cause fear and he is so understood. The victim is assailed by
uncertainty about his intentions. Fear may dominate her emotions, and it may be the fear that the caller’s arrival at
her door may be imminent. She may fear the possibility of immediate personal violence. As a matter of law, the caller
may be guilty of an assault: whether he is or not will depend on the circumstance and in particular on the impact of the
caller’s potential mincing call or calls on the victim…”

[25] To this, Lord Hope of Craighead concurred and further reasoned at p. 551, “If the words or gestures are
accompanied in their turn by gestures or by words which threaten immediate and unlawful violence, that will be
sufficient for an assault. The words or gestures must be seen in their whole context.”

[26] The Plaintiff, therefore, alleged that the inaction together with the statement, “you don’t deserve my sister” in
our case here in its globality constituted an assault. I disagree with the Plaintiff’s contention. The ratio in R v Ireland
(supra), is very clear that for words or gestures to be seen as an assault, such words or gestures must be
accompanied by the apprehension of violence and immediate threat. “Mere spoken words may be insulting or
threatening and, in most cases, would not amount to an assault unless they provoke fear of immediate violence.
The test in determining an assault is objective,…”(see Bullen & Leak & Jacob’s Malaysian Precedents of
Pleadings, 2nd Edition, 2020, at p. 89)

[27] I find no such fear of immediate violence in the sentence, “you don’t deserve my sister”. Hence, I am
agreeable with the 2nd and 3rd Defendants that their inaction and the words uttered by the 2nd Defendant objectively
do not provoke any fear of violence. Accordingly, the Plaintiff’s cause of action for assault against the 2nd and 3rd
Defendants is obviously untenable.
ii) Conspiracy to Injure

[28] The Plaintiff also claimed that the 2nd and 3rd Defendants conspired to injure him. In the submission, the
Plaintiff asserted that such particulars of conspiracy to injure could be reiterated in paragraph 50 of his SOC which
says:

“50. The Plaintiff asserts that the Defendants conspired and combined amongst themselves with the intention to injure the
Plaintiff through unlawful acts or with the predominant purpose of injuring the Plaintiff and depriving the Plaintiff from being
carrying out his functions as Captain and being gainfully employed.

PARTICULARS

50.1 Paragraphs 29 – 37 and 47 – 48 above are reiterated.”

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[29] However, the learned counsel for the 2nd and 3rd Defendants brought it to the attention of this Court that
detailed particularisation of the elements was needed for the Plaintiff to initiate a claim under tort of conspiracy
against them. In this case, they contended that the Plaintiff had failed to plead the first element of conspiracy.

[30] The leading authority for the elements to be pleaded in an action under the tort of conspiracy was set out by
the Court of Appeal in Renault SA v Inokom Corporation Sdn Bhd & Anor and Other Applications [2010] 5 CLJ 32
where His Lordship KN Segara JCA explicated that:

“[32] In regard to the tort of conspiracy, the following need to be satisfied at this interlocutory stage:

(a) An agreement between two or more persons (that is an agreement between Tan Chong and others);

(b) An agreement for the purpose of injuring Inokom and Quasar;

(c) The acts done in execution of that agreement resulted in damage to Inokom and Quasar;

(d) Damage is an essential element and where damage is not pleaded the Statement of Claim may be struck out.

(see Yap JH v. Tan Sri Loh Boon Siew & Ors [1991] 3 CLJ 2960; [1991] 4 CLJ (Rep) 243 HC)

[33] It is clear that the very first element to be shown must be an agreement between two or more persons for the purpose
of injuring Inokom and Quasar. ‘Agreement’ is not limited to a signed and sealed agreement but any informal agreement,
but including a combination of efforts of the alleged co-conspirators. After that, it has to be shown or at least alleged that
acts were done in execution of that agreement which resulted in damage to Inokom, and Quasar. In this case, the acts
done would have to be unlawful, namely, the alleged false representation made by Renault to Inokom and Quasar as to the
level of investment Inokom and Quasar will have to make for the Kangoo Project.

[34] It is trite law that the agreement to injure must come first (in other words the agreement should have
crystallized, before the alleged unlawful acts are done in execution or pursuant to the agreement.” [Emphasis
added.]

[31] The 2nd and 3rd Defendants submitted that paragraph 50 of the SOC does not show whether there was an
agreement made between the 2nd and 3rd Defendants conspiring to injure or to cause damage against the Plaintiff.

[32] It is crucial to note that ‘Agreement’ in the context of tort of conspiracy does not mean literal agreements that
are generally understood in commercial or contractual agreements (see Global Ventures Network Sdn Bhd v
Lokman bin Dato’ Mohd Kamal and another appeal [2018] 6 MLJ 103). ‘Agreement’ in the tort of conspiracy is
understood when there is a combination of efforts or common intention between the alleged co-conspirators.
Regrettably, in the present case, the Plaintiff has failed to do so.

[33] His Lordship KN Segara JCA in Renault SA (supra) further articulated that one must plead and state precisely
the agreement between the defendants to conspire and the purpose or objects of the alleged conspiracy. His
Lordship, in his judgment has also quoted the Common Law Library on this at paragraphs [42] – [43]:

“[42]… The gist of tort of conspiracy is not the conspirational agreement alone but that agreement plus the overt acts
causing damage (Marrinam v. Vibart [1963] 1 QB 234, affirmed [1963] 1 QB 528).

Pleading. The Statement of Claim should describe who the several parties are and their relationship with each other. It
should allege the agreement between the defendants to conspire, and state precisely what was the purpose or what the
objects of the alleged conspiracy, and it must then proceed to set forth, with clarity and precision, the overt acts which are
alleged to have been done by each of the alleged conspirators in pursuance and in furtherance of the conspiracy; and
lastly, it must allege the injury and damages occasioned to the plaintiff thereby. [The Common Law Library – Number 5 –
Precedents of Pleadings – Section 26 – Conspiracy]

[43] It is to be noted that besides the absence of allegations of overt acts on the part of TC Euro the statement of claim
has also failed to plead the agreement between the defendants to conspire and state precisely what was the
purpose or what were the objects of the alleged conspiracy. The statement of claim has also failed to set forth with
clarity and precision the overt acts which are alleged to have been done by each of the alleged conspirators in
pursuance and in furtherance of the conspiracy.” [Emphasis added].
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[34] Similarly, in my previous judgment in Loh Chun Hoo v Loh Chun Hoo & Ors [2022] 1 LNS 25 where I stuck
out the plaintiff’s SOC due to the failure of the plaintiff to plead the necessary elements required under the tort of
conspiracy. In that case, the plaintiff alleged that the 1st defendant had conspired with the other defendants to extort
the plaintiff. However, none of the elements was ever pleaded in the statement of claim.

[35] In our present case, the 2nd and 3rd Defendants submitted that the Plaintiff was obliged to state sufficient facts
in order for the cause of action to be complete and relied upon. In the present case, the Plaintiff has failed to plead
the first element of conspiracy (namely, the ‘agreement’). Thus, it should be rejected.

[36] On that account, the question remains as to whether the Plaintiff had pleaded any facts concerning the
agreement on the alleged conspiracy to injure? Just as in Loh Chun Hoo (supra), my finding from my close reading
of the SOC is unfortunately negative. The allegation stated in paragraph 50 of the SOC is too general and broad
about the 2nd and 3rd Defendants conspiring with the 1st Defendant to hurt the Plaintiff. It only states mere allegation
without anything to suggest any agreement between the Defendants. Likewise, the reading of paragraphs 29-37
and paragraphs 47-48 of the SOC would conclude with the same finding. There is not anything in these paragraphs
in the SOC that could suggest any of such agreement.

[37] In Seow Hoon Hin v Hartalega Holdings Bhd & Ors [2019] 5 MLJ 421, the Court of Appeal held at page 470
as follows:

“[209] …In such claims, the plaintiff is required to establish that there is an agreement between two or more persons to do
certain acts; the predominant purpose of that agreement is to injure or cause damage to the plaintiff, that the certain or
identified acts are performed in furtherance of that agreement, and that damage from such acts were suffered by the
plaintiff.”

[38] The Plaintiff further argued that even if this Court agree with the 2nd and 3rd Defendants’ contentions, such
failure would not be fatal. The learned counsel of the Plaintiff cited the High Court case of Pacific Orient Insurance
Co Berhad v. Mohammad Hafizi Bahari & Anor [2021] 1 LNS 647 for this. In Pacific Orient Insurance (supra), the
defendants contended that the plaintiff failed to plead the elements of the conspiracy to defraud properly. The
defendants argued that the plaintiff’s statement of claim does not plead (1) the existence of an agreement between
the defendants and Thanabalan a/l M Rajamanickam, (2) such agreement was to injure the plaintiff and (3) the acts
done in the execution of the agreement resulted in damage to the plaintiff.

[39] It was held by Liza Chan Sow Keng JC that while Her Ladyship agreed with the defendant’s contention, she
did not find the defect to be fatal and deserving of a striking out. She further premised that the plaintiff’s allegation
for conspiracy was not a bare assertation and devoid of contemporaneous of documents as there was a police
report pleaded in the said statement of claim.

[40] I agree with the counsel for the 2nd and 3rd Defendants that Pacific Orient Insurance (supra) can be
distinguished from our present case. Unlike that case, in our present case, the Plaintiff barely pleaded that there
was supposedly conspiracy between the Defendant to injure the Plaintiff. Apart from the bare assertation of
conspiracy, no particulars of any kind were made by the Plaintiff to show that the 2nd and 3rd Defendants had
agreed or conspired to injure the Plaintiff. As succinctly put by the Counsel for the 2nd and 3rd Defendants, to which I
agree, a quick reference to the precedents in Bullen & Leak & Jacob’s Malaysian Precedents of Pleadings
would at least suggest what basic particulars should be pleaded so that the Defendants would have sufficient ideas
to defence their case. No such minimum particulars were stated in the SOC at all. Also, as discussed previously,
this Court is of the view that the 2nd and 3rd Defendants were merely by-standers during the incident. Hence, I
disagree with the submission by the learned counsel of the Plaintiff and find that the Plaintiff had failed to sufficiently
plead the first element for the tort of conspiracy.
iii) Discretion of the Court to Amend Pleading

[41] During the oral submission, the Plaintiff attempt to argue that even if this Court find that there was such a
defect, this Court has the inherent jurisdiction to amend the pleadings instead of allowing the striking out. To this, I
find guidance in the Court of Appeal decision in AIC DotCom Sdn Bhd (suing in capacity of representative for MTEX
Corp Sdn Bhd) v MTEX Corp Sdn Bhd [2011] 3 MLJ 476. In that case, the court clarify about the discretion of the
court to amend pleadings under O 18 r 19(1). His Lordship Gopal Sri Ram JCA (as he then was) succinctly
reasoned at pp. 479 – 480 that:

“[6] It is now well settled that a court which is moved to strike out a pleading has a separate and independent
jurisdiction to direct an amendment to save the pleading in lieu of it being struck out (see Shahidan Shafie v Atlan
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Holdings Bhd & Anor & other appeals [2005] MLJU 279, ; [2005] 3 CLJ 793). But the power may only be exercised if the
pleading is capable of being saved by an amendment. On the facts that form common ground between the litigants
before us, no amendment can possibly save the appellant’s pleading because this is not a case in which the appellant is in
a position to contend that the alleged wrongdoers are in control of the subject company. It is therefore purely an academic
exercise to see whether the amending power ought to have been restored to by the learned judge whose order is now
under appeal.” [Emphasis added]

[42] Likewise in the present case, no amendment could possibly save the Plaintiff’s case against the 2nd and 3rd
Defendants because mere inaction could not in any way constitute any assault or agreement on any conspiracy to
injure. The same goes to a mere saying that the Plaintiff does not deserve the 2nd Defendant’s sister. I do not find
any of these attributes any assault or agreement or conspiracy to injure. In the present case, following the ratio in
AIC DotCom Sdn Bhd (supra), I do not find that the SOC is capable of being saved by an amendment. This is
because, the pleading is as such that no reasonable cause of action can be found against the 2nd and 3rd
Defendants. Hence, even if I were to exercise my discretion to amend, it would not help the Plaintiff’s SOC. Since
no reasonable cause of action can be concluded against the 2nd and 3rd Defendants, unfortunately, the Plaintiff’s
SOC should be struck out.
Conclusion

[43] To conclude, this Court find that the 2nd and 3rd Defendants have successfully proved to this Court that the
Plaintiff’s claim against them does not disclose any reasonable causes of action. This Application under Order 18 r
19(1)(a) of the ROC is hereby allowed with costs.

[44] I therefore order that the Plaintiff’s SOC dated 03.11.2021 be struck out. The Plaintiff’s action against the 2nd
and 3rd Defendants is consequently dismissed.

End of Document