2 Muslim Heritage Week IV
2 Muslim Heritage Week IV
Muslim Heritage
Creation
Al-Razi, as a Platonist, did not hold the world to be eternal, but said
that it was made of pre-existent matter that is eternal. No reason can
be found in God or matter for the creation of the world in time, but
this decision is attributed to an eternal soul made by God, which
desired to be united to matter. For Al-Razi, God, matter, the soul,
absolute space and absolute time are five eternal principles.
lbn-Masarra, in his Risiila, begins with the observation that the nature
of the elements cannot explain why water rises in a plant. His mind
then turns to the heavenly bodies as an explanation. From there he turns
to the world of heavenly souls, then intelligences, and finally God, the
king of all
The existence of God, and creation
lbn-Masarra/ Al-Farabi/Miskawayh
lbn-Masarra : The best way to know God is to consider his names and attributes mentioned
in the Qur'an. These are many, but each one implies all the others. Meditation on the names
of God, particularly his "greatest name" is not an esoteric (makhfi) but a privileged
(khususi) avenue to wisdom. God is both revealed and hidden by his creatures, whether
spiritual (al-ghayb) or material (ash-shahada)
Al-Farabi, the argument from contingency (as for the unity of God, like every Muslim), says
that God is one, without rival or contrary. But he also insists on the simplicity of God, saying
that he is absolutely indivisible; in particular, his essence is at the same time an intelligence
which understands and is understood. This position implicitly denies the distinction of the
Ash' arites between the attributes and the essence of God, but al-Farabi, on this question as
on others, only states the principles without drawing the conclusion.
Miskawayh, regarding the eternity of the world, affirms that God created overtyping from
non-existence (al-'adam}, but explains that this is true of every change. If an animal is made
of sperm, and sperm from blood, blood from food, food from plants and plants from simple
elements, these elements have only prime matter and form and can only come from non-
existence (adam).
Main Arguments
Movement/ Perfection
Ibn-Sina presents an argument for the existence of God from the masters of
natural science ((taba 'iyyun), starting from motion. In this way he has a place
for divine titles such as "First Mover" (almuharik alawal), and "First Principle
(almabdae alawal).
The Ta 'liqat presents the second way of Saint Thomas in its essentials, arguing
that a series of causes must necessarily end in a first non-caused cause. This
argument, as with Saint Thomas, is not an independent argument, but could be
applied to either motion or existence.
For the unity of God, Ibn-Sina presents the usual arguments for fact
that the Necessary Existent cannot be multiple.
As for the simplicity of God, lbn-Sina does not hesitate to take the
explicit position, so provocative to the Ash· arites, that there is no real
distinction between God and his attributes and among the attributes
themselves. He refutes the Ash' arite position.
Creation
In the question of creation, lbn-Sina keeps the idea of Plotinus and al-Farabi that
the One and the First can directly create only one thing. From the intellect which
is the first creature, emanate the other intellects, the souls of the heavenly bodies
and the rest of material creation. Thus God is the indirect Creator of everything
outside the first intellect
Ibn-Bajja presents God as the First Mover of the universe, although he admits a
multiplicity of first movers, each in a limited sphere, such as the souls of animals
which move their bodies through the instrumentality of physical forces; thus lbn Bajja
retains the idea of lbn-Sina that the form is the moving cause of matter
God is the moving and final cause of everything
In any case, the existence of God is established by the fact that the motion of the
heavenly spheres requires a mover or pusher. He explains that this is the meaning of
creation and the continual preservation of the world.
Just as God is the efficient cause (fa3 'il) of the world, in the sense that he is its
mover, he is also the final cause (ghaya) which moves as the object of desire
(mushtaha). Since he is absolutely unmovable, he is perfectly self-sufficient and
All attributes of God are one reality
As he defends the unicity of God, Ibn-Rushd defends also his simplicity, taking the
position of the Mu 'tazilites against the Ash' arites who, in distinguishing the attributes
of God, put in him a composition "of a defective essence and of attributes to this
essence". The reason that there is no distinction between essence and attributes in God
is because be is pure act, without any potency (quwwa); this excludes all matter, since
he is pure intelligibility and intelligence. Ibn-Rushd does not accept the accusation of
al-Ghazali that according to the Philosophers God has no quiddity (mahiyya) or
essence; he has, but in a completely simple and non-caused existence.
God is only the mover, through intermediaries, of
things in tne world
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