PSIR Answer Writing Module - Target 2024

Model Answers
Test 16

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1. “The complex security scenario significantly raises the risk of the possible nuclear war
in South Asia.” In Light of the above do you think that there is a need to bring some
fundamental changes in India's Nuclear Policy?
Approach
1. Introduction: Context with Mike Pompeo’s statement on the South Asia security
scenario.
2. Body
a. What is the Security Scenario in South Asia (SA)
b. India’s Nuclear Policy/India’s Nuclear Doctrine
c. Salient Features of India’s Nuclear Policy
d. No First Use (NFU) Against NWS and Non-Use Against NNWS
3. Conclusion: Periodic revision is a must to address the complex security scenario in SA.

Introduction
1. Major security and geo-strategic challenges in South Asia can be attributed to fragile
democratic structures, weak and unstable governments, growing radicalisation,
uncertainty in Afghanistan, and increasing Chinese influence in the South Asian region.
2. Reflecting on his own experience of crisis management in the region, US former
Secretary of State Mike Pompeo recently wrote that he does “not think the world
properly knows just how close the India-Pakistan rivalry came to spilling over into a
nuclear conflagration in February 2019.”
Body
1. What is the Security Scenario in South Asia?
a. It is the only place on earth where Nuclear Weapon States (NWS) often engage in
violent confrontation along their disputed borders.
b. Nuclear stability in the region is getting harder to manage due to India-China border
tensions, advanced military/nuclear technologies and more capable delivery
systems.
c. No matter how well designed, nuclear systems are complicated and involve the
potential for human or technical error. E.g. India’s misfires of a Brahmos missile test
into Pakistan.
 d. Fear, hatred and other emotions can cloud human judgment, especially in the heat
of a crisis when information is imperfect and communication difficult.
e. A return to a serious India-Pakistan crisis could be just one terrorist attack away.
f. Hostile rhetoric among them is growing, and there is a reason to anticipate it could
get far worse as Pakistan faces heightened economic and security pressure at home.

1. India’s Nuclear Policy/ India’s Nuclear Doctrine

a. A nuclear doctrine/policy is a set of principles which acts as a guiding path for an NWS.
b. It outlines how an NWS will exercise its nuclear forces during times of peace as well as
war.
c. It enables the nation to build deterrence w.r.t its enemy during peace by conveying its
real intention to the adversary and if deterrence fails, directs the response of the state
during crisis.
d. Since, its emergence it has generated significant debates amid the strategic community,
national security analysts, military officials, and policymakers alongside the political
class.
e. Debates on India’s Nuclear Policy can be classified under two schools of thought i.e.
extremists – want to abolish No First Use (NFU) and moderates – want to retain NFU.
2. Salient Features of India’s Nuclear Doctrine/Policy are as follows:

a. NFU against NWS and Non Use against Non Nuclear Weapon State (NNWS);
b. Credible Minimum Deterrence (CMD);
c. Massive Retaliation (MR);
d. Command and Control (civilian control);
e. Deterring CBWs via Nuclear Weapons; and
f. Universal Nuclear Disarmament and Arms Control.

3. NFU against NWS and Non-Use against NNWS

a. India’s commitment to NFU is undeniably the major contentious component of its
nuclear debate.
b. Some strategists label India’s NFU pledge as a moral and cultural one rather than a
strategic one. NFU shows India’s historical aversion towards nuclear weapons.
c. Moderates regard NFU as the focal point of India’s Nuclear Policy and firmly hold on to
it. According to them, NFU policy offers manifold remuneration to India.
d. K. Subrahmanyam, “deterrence is more about perception than numbers, and as long
as the other side perceives a survivable nuclear capability, deterrence will hold”.
e. Manpreet Sethi argues “the major plus point of NFU is that it prevents the arms race
among nations which hinders the call for costly nuclear weapon infrastructure which is
directly linked with First-Use Doctrine.”
f. Bharat Karnad, a prominent critique of NFU, contends that NFU stance is only
appropriate for a state which has absolute faith in the survivability of its nuclear forces
 enough to undertake a catastrophic retaliatory strike including the effectiveness of its
crisis management system.
g. NFU is beneficial for those where there is no or negligible possibility of conflict whereas
South Asia has always been a zone of conflict and any crisis has the potential to escalate
to nuclear level.
h. Considering that India is surrounded by two NWSs thus sticking to NFU may not serve
better for India.
i. However, India's NFU stance is not concrete and India may shift from its policy of NFU
if the situation demands to do so.
j. There is concern regarding Pakistan’s Tactical Nuclear Weapons (TNWs) and their effect
on India’s conventional military strategies.
k. Nevertheless, the central argument is that no change is required in the doctrine
because of TNWs. This shows India has level-headed options to tackle this.
l. Instead of threatening with nuclear weapons India should use its conventional military
superiority to counter Pakistani attacks and prove Pakistan’s nuclear threat as null and
void. India has already proved Pakistan's Nuclear Bluff by conducting surgical strikes.
Conclusion
1. Since India is a non-aggressive and democratic nation therefore it has certain underlying
principles as well as reasons behind the NFU strategy contrary to First Use.
2. The Theatre of India-Pakistan or India-China presents a very short time reaction because
of geographical proximity which will never allow any government to order a nuclear
attack just on the grounds of suspicion.
3. India should continue with its existing nuclear policy, especially with its stance on NFU.
However, policy’s periodic revision is a must to address the security scenario of South
Asia and beyond.

2. The present state of the world disorder puts India into the scenario of many hard choices
yet opens the room for new opportunities to play a vital role in the World Order.
Comment

Approach
1. Introduction: Uncertainty seems to be the key feature of international politics.
2. Body
a. Present State of World Disorder
b. Hard Choices of India
c. New Opportunities for India to play a vital role in the World Order
3. Conclusion: Geopolitical makeover favours India’s rise in the 21st Century.
Introduction
 1. As Shakespeare rightly said, “There is a tide in the affairs of men, which taken at the flood,
leads to fortune.” Such a tide has now reached India’s shores. If India decides to sail out
on this tide, it will achieve great fortune.
2. According to C. Raja Mohan, the rise of China and its expansionism, the reassertion of
Russia, the reordering of US global priorities, and the breakdown of the post-Cold War
global political and economic order have opened up unprecedented challenges and
opportunities for India.
3. Rule-based international order in the long run seems like a daydream and uncertainty and
impermanence are likely to be the dominant aspect of international politics.
Body
1. Present State of World Disorder
a. Authoritarianism and nationalism are on the rise around the world with governments
becoming less transparent and losing peoples’ trust.
b. The ongoing war between Russia and Ukraine, the latter being backed by the U.S. and
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) forces.
c. Taliban’s return to power in Afghanistan has led to a material shift in the balance of
power in an already troubled region on India’s periphery.
d. Developments in Afghanistan have fueled the ambitions of quite a few ‘anti-state
militant groups’ across the region.
e. Increasing Chinese Dominance is possibly the most disrupting one, given the challenge
it poses to the existing international order.
f. China’s expansionist policies via its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) are also being seen as
a threat by other global powers such as the US, EU, the G7 countries as well as India.
g. The UN’s experience of over seven decades has shown that its ability to make a
difference, particularly in the peace and security areas is losing ground.
2. Hard Choices for India
a. How Far to Go in Support of Russia: The foremost hard choice for India today is how far
to go in support of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine as it has certain pros and cons for India.
India has several geopolitical interests most of which Russia cannot help India with like
China.
b. How to balance China: China is a neighbour, an emerging power, an economic partner,
a looming threat and a nation with which India has several convergences in areas like
climate change, trade etc. Unlike Pakistan, it is neither easy to push back China nor is it
possible to ignore it.
c. Balancing Maritime and Continental Domain: India is geopolitically vulnerable in the
continental domain but is relatively strong in the maritime domain. Whatever it does in
one will have implications in the other. E.g. if India increases its maritime engagements
with other powers, it will prompt China to be aggressive in the continental realm.
d. Living with Strategic Contradictions:
i. Firstly, being a democracy, India normatively identifies with the West but is
geographically located in the middle of a chaotic, hostile non-western landmass.
 ii. Secondly, India needs both the US-led Western nations as well as Russia to meet
its national security and strategic objectives.
3. New Opportunities for India to Play a Vital Role in the World Order:
a. “Non-interference” and “multilateral approaches” of India are well suited to support and
sustain global governance in a multi-polar world.
b. India can emerge as a bridge between many extremes of the world. Interestingly, India
is at the crossroads of two of the world’s most dynamic regions, Eurasia and non-Pacific.
c. Fall of Afghanistan’s democratic regime resulted in a fall in the US prestige. They will
almost certainly be drawn into Yemen and Sudan after that but it will continue to strive
to retain its waning influence where India can play a constructive role.
d. India can take the lead in bringing about a new world order to propagate a truly
democratic process and a system of peaceful coexistence.
e. India can become a rescuer of the UN by introducing principles like Panchsheel or
Panchamrit which will bring some solace from the existing mess.
f. The ASEAN nations face the heat of China’s aggression. India can use this opportunity to
engage deeply with all ASEAN members at bilateral and multilateral levels.
g. India can smartly convert its humanitarian programme into strategic opportunities in its
periphery as well as across the region.
h. India has the opportunity to present itself as a natural stabilizing power in South Asia
and the Indian Ocean Region (IOR).
i. India should aim to create new pillars of the new global order through engagement and
partnership with middle powers.

Conclusion

1. India is experiencing transformational events. It would be right to say that the gears and
levels in geopolitics are changing at a rate faster than ever.
2. If the past century was known as the “American Century,” the 21st century is known as
the “Asian Century,” with India as the prominent player.

3. US relations with India are not only a recognition of India’s growing stature in World
Politics but also a testimony to the success of India’s policy of non-alignment and
strategic autonomy. Critically examine.
Approach
1. Introduction: Define strategic autonomy and context with experts’ views.
2. Body
a. How US-India relations recognize India’s growing stature in World Politics?
b. US-India relations: Testimony to the success of India’s policy of NAM and Strategic
Autonomy
3. Conclusion: The US respects India’s strategic autonomy as the latter is important to
fulfil its geopolitical interests.
Introduction

1. Strategic autonomy refers to a state’s ability to make decisions insulated from external
pressure.
2. Sreemoy Talukdar defines it as the “exercise of choice-driven purely by sovereign
considerations and interest.”
3. Since independence, it has been a feature of the Indian Foreign Policy (IFP). In the 20th
century, it was viewed as a pillar of, and sometimes synonymous with, non-alignment.
Although, NAM was a vehicle for preserving the former.
4. Rajesh Rajagopalan argues, “When a country is facing serious threats, alignments can
enhance strategic autonomy. For India, China’s hegemony over Asia would be a direct
security threat that would severely constrain New Delhi’s strategic autonomy.”
5. Harsh Pant suggests that “when India engages in the so-called ‘Quad,’ it enhances its
strategic autonomy vis-à-vis China.”

Body

1. How US-India relationship recognise India’s Growing Stature in World Politics?

a. The breadth and depth of Indo-US ties remain unmatched and the drivers of this
partnership have been growing at an unprecedented rate.
b. The relationship remains unique insofar as this is driven at both strategic and people-
to-people levels.
c. The “Strategic Dialogue” was established in July 2009 during the visit of US Secretary
of State Hillary Clinton to India to strengthen bilateral cooperation across diverse
sectors.
d. In the context of the US, India is the centrepiece of the Biden administration’s Indo-
Pacific strategy.
e. Vajra Prahar and Yudh Abhyas are the two military exercises between the two
countries.
f. India and the US have also signed foundational Defence agreements i.e. General
Security of Military Information Agreement (GSOMIA) in 2002; the Logistics Exchange
Memorandum of Agreement (LEMOA) in 2016; Communications Compatibility and
Security Agreement (COMCASA) in 2018, the Basic Exchange and Cooperation
Agreement (BECA) in 2020.
g. Following the US-India “Climate and Clean Energy Agenda 2030 Partnership”, India
and the USA have launched the Strategic Clean Energy Partnership (SCEP).
h. The US also accounts for one-third of all Foreign Portfolio Investments in India.

2. US-India Relations: Testimony to the Success of India’s Policy of NAM and Strategic
Autonomy
 a. At present, the world appears to be again splitting into two power blocks, one in which
the US is dominant and comprises mainly NATO, QUAD, and AUKUS. In the other block
are Russia, China and their allies.
b. Here again, India is watched closely by the US, mainly on the Ukraine war and the
growing animosity between the US and China.
c. On the Ukraine issue, India has tweaked its policy of supporting Russia. It has
condemned the invasion and often called for a cease-fire.
d. However much to the US and NATO’s annoyance, India has neither buckled under US
pressure to vote against Russia on the same issue, nor has it stopped having strategic
and trade ties with Russia.
e. India today is confident that it can ally with the US without losing its ability to hold
independent opinions and chart an independent path in its foreign policy. The US and
the rest of the world have now developed a deep respect for India’s policy of ‘strategic
autonomy.’
f. This is reflected in the Indian PM’s attendance at the QUAD summit in Tokyo in May
2022, followed by his attending the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) meet in
Samarkand in Uzbekistan in September 2022.
g. These facts also exhibit that India will always consider US requests against the
backdrop of its own national interest. It will join only if its national interests coincide
with the US policy.
h. Its unwillingness to break ties with its strategic and economic partner Russia and US
acceptance of it is observed in the US permitting India to buy the S400 air defence
missile system and Russian oil, despite US sanctions on Russia.
i. Even with China, India has not prevented from trading extensively with it despite the
ongoing US-China trade war or joining the strategically important SCO.
j. India has also taken loans from the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) and
New Development Bank (NDB) in which China is the majority shareholder.
Conclusion
1. Respecting India’s strategic autonomy, the US views India as an important partner in its
FP and geopolitical ambitions to curb China.
2. India, too understands that in today’s multi-polar world, the US is still a major force, a
major source of high-end technology and military equipment, an important trading
partner and a counter to growing Chinese influence.
3. Strategic autonomy followed under the umbrella of non-alignment has been a pragmatic
yet principled approach to deal with a world dominated by divisive power politics as well
as in present to deal with uncertain geopolitical happenings.

4. Analyse the implications of recent Geo-Political Developments in West Asia for India’s
interest in the region.
Approach
 1. Introduction: Brief about West Asia’s geography and its strategic importance.
2. Body
a. Recent Geopolitical Developments in West Asia
b. Implications for India’s Interest in the Region
c. Way Forward
3. Conclusion: Look West Policy and Soft Power can ensure its interests in the region.
Introduction
1. West Asia is a land bridge which links three continents Asia, Africa and Europe. It is called
the gateway of Asia-Africa and the back door of Europe.
2. West Asia landmass meets three seas – the Mediterranean, Red and the Arabian Sea. It
is the centre of international trade.
3. The discovery of oil in this region has immensely increased its importance. Strategic
considerations have led the world powers to intervene in this region.
4. Strategic thinker Mohammed Soliman argues that India is moving to the centre of global
geopolitics by virtue of its geography, demography, economy, and civilization; eventually,
this will enable Delhi as the kingmaker of the Eurasian chessboard.
Body
1. Recent Geopolitical Developments in West Asia
a. West Asia has always been a playfield for historic rivalries underpinned by the geo-
political, geo-economic and geo-religious contestations which have kept the big
powers engaged due to oil riches, maritime security, and the geo-strategic location
between the East and the West.
b. US withdrawal from Afghanistan, its erratic policies and uncertainty of its security
umbrella for the region have generated anxiety among West Asian nations.
c. This anxiety has been bound to be expressed in a policy shift by local majors and
erstwhile close alliance partners like the GCC countries and even Israel.
d. Biden administration’s tactical shifts towards reengaging West Asia such as the
Abraham Accords (for Israel-Arab bonhomie), I2U2 mechanisms etc.
e. From the Ukraine war to OPEC+, the Gulf States increasingly go alone as free agents.
f. Iran-Russia relations have deepened amid growing international pressure. According
to the White House, the partnership has deepened so much that Iranian specialists are
now training Russian forces in the use of Iranian-made drones in the Ukraine war.
g. Saudi Arabia and Iran agreed to restore diplomatic relations in an agreement brokered
by China that shows China’s growing political sphere in the region.
h. Terrorism especially, the rise of the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) is the most
disturbing trend.
2. Implications for India’s Interests in the Region
a. Political instability, increasing competition for resources and conflict in the region can
lead to disruptions in oil supplies, thus affecting India’s energy security.
 b. US withdrawal from the Iran nuclear deal and its threatened imposition of economic
sanctions on Iran may weaken the dialogue mechanisms, embolden conservatives, and
threaten regional stability even more. India also has significant oil trade with Iran and
stakes in connectivity through Chabahar port and other projects.
c. The decline of oil and gas prices, along with the rising cost of “war conditions,” has led
to the slowing of Arab Gulf economies, resulting in salary cuts, layoffs, contracting
employment opportunities, and nationalization of workforces at the cost of the Indian
expatriate community.
d. Pakistan's close ties with the region have incapacitated India from advancing its
commercial interests in West Asia, including the bringing to fruition of the Iran-India-
Pakistan (IPI) and Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India (TAPI) gas pipeline projects.
e. China is continuously making inroads into West Asia through the OBOR initiative. This
has made Gulf Arabs more inclined to seek China as a better security partner, rather
than India.
f. India’s deepening defence and strategic relations with Israel have not gone down well
with Iran, which has started to play its China and Pakistan card to extract more from
India.
g. Saudi–Iran–Israel rivalry has been destabilizing West Asia and influencing West Asian
geopolitics. The US withdrawal from JCPOA can be seen through the prism of this
rivalry. It will be a difficult task for India to continue to balance its relations with all
three countries without antagonizing any of them.
h. Largely, the involvement of extra-regional players such as the USA and Russia in the
internal conflicts in West Asia (Syria) has further aggravated the situation for India’s
interest in the region.
i. Terrorism has created a threat to the Indian diaspora residing in West Asia. Also, the
radicalization of Indian youth and their joining ISIS has been a major problem.

Way Forward

1. India’s closer engagements with West Asia and its Look West Policy have led to the
development of strategic partnerships which can help India advance its interests in the
region and beyond.
2. India’s most distinct soft power asset is the diaspora and its role in buttressing a positive
image of the country (including the policy of non-interference and mutual respect).
3. The North-South corridor (from Chabahar port via Afghanistan) and Bandar Abbas port
(via Uzbekistan to Central Asia) is now under pressure due to the Taliban regime in
Afghanistan and the likelihood of China becoming a dominant player. India must assure
Iran that it is still interested in building the corridor.
4. India needs to assure Egypt because in many ways the connectivity corridor and some
of the elements of maritime security will infringe on the Suez Canal, the Red Sea and
Egypt’s dominance in that area.
Conclusion

Certainly, there are challenges in dealing with the complications of West Asia. Balancing the
rival countries diplomatically and strategically to maintain friendly relations with each of
them is essential for India.
5. The most difficult challenge for India is how to manage the expanding asymmetricity of
power with China. Discuss.
Approach
1. Introduction: China's rise reflects in stark relief the cost of an unbalanced Asia.
2. Body
a. Challenges Posed by China’s Growing Power.
b. How India can manage its Power Asymmetry with China?
3. Conclusion: India’s choices will change with the changing geopolitical scenario.

Introduction
1. In the words of Rajesh Rajagopalan, “India is a rising power, but its transformation is
occurring in the shadow of China’s even more impressive ascent.”
2. China’s growing assertiveness demonstrates in stark relief the consequences of an
unbalanced Asia.
3. This is the central strategic problem that India faces: how to secure itself and promote
its national interests in a grossly unbalanced strategic environment.
Body
1. Challenges Posed by China’s Growing Power
a. China’s power, geographical proximity, and policies already represent a clear danger to
India’s security and global interests.
b. China is a direct military threat to India, particularly in light of the two countries’
border disputes. Though India has considerable military power, China’s forces are
already stronger and better-funded. China’s outsized wealth will likely allow it to
outspend New Delhi for the foreseeable future.
c. China’s influence in both established international organizations like the UN, NSG
etc. and new institutions like AIIB, SCO, BRICS etc. is setting up which gives it
opportunities to hamper Indian interests and goals in multilateral forums, especially
when it comes to reforming these institutions and giving India a greater voice in
global affairs.
d. China’s alignment with Pakistan and deepening relations with other South Asian
nations represents a significant challenge to India’s position in the region, which
India has dominated for decades.
 e. Beijing’s ability to provide financial assistance and balance against New Delhi may
tempt India’s smaller neighbours to play one power against the other, undermining
India in its own backyard.
f. China’s economic power allows it to spread its influence around the world, which
could be used to India’s detriment.
2. How India can manage its Power Asymmetry with China?
a. The balance of power (BOP) analysis suggests that New Delhi has several strategic
options to consider.
b. India’s choices from a BOP perspective outline the consequences of relative power
dynamics for strategic policy – an approach that requires considering both India’s
strengths and weaknesses.
c. Geo-strategists suggest that India has six choices to deal with China i.e. non-
alignment, hedging, internal balancing (building indigenous defence capabilities),
regional balancing, alignment with China, and closer alignment with the US.
d. However, none of India’s potential strategic choices are easy or obvious. Every
option has advantages and shortcomings.
e. India’s objective should be to pick the best out of these imperfect choices as a
primary strategy and supplement with other complementary approaches as needed.
f. Geopolitical experts believe that India’s strategic interests would likely be best
served by the sixth option: a closer alignment with the US.
g. If closer ties with the US seem difficult, a regional balancing strategy with other
powers in the Indo-Pacific offers India an alternative approach.
h. Such regional partnerships could also be a potential supplement to an augmented
U.S.-India alignment.
i. Rajagopalan stressed that; the type of alignments that India may pursue would not
necessarily be formal military alliances, though such alliances would not be excluded
outright. Rather, such relationships would be chiefly grounded in informal but deep
strategic cooperation targeted against a common threat.
j. Such partnerships and even military alliances tend to be temporary and focused.
k. They are troublesome in many respects but also unavoidable, especially in situations
when the balance of power is unfavourable.
l. India should also resist the temptation to postpone critical short- and medium-term
strategic decisions in the hope that long-term economic development will suffice to
address China's challenge.
m. India has four types of tools at its disposal: military power, potential partnerships
with other nations, multilateral diplomacy, and international economic integration.
India should cultivate these tools as much as possible.
n. The US is an attractive partner because of four factors: its power, its self-interests,
its external balancing strategy, and its willingness to partner with India.

Conclusion
 1. Regional as well as internal balancing is necessary but supplemental strategies to a
strengthened U.S. alignment, and these options could serve as alternatives if U.S.
willingness should be in question.
2. India’s choice of strategy is not stagnant and has to be based on the prevailing balance
of power. If this changes, the strategy also has to change.

6. Critically evaluate, India’s evolving contributions in UN peace keeping and it’s relevance
for India’s National Interest.
Approach
1. Introduction: India’s professionalism, experience & expertise have contributed a lot to
Un Peacekeeping (UNPK) missions.
2. Body
a. What is the UN Peacekeeping?
b. India’s evolving contribution to the UN Peacekeeping missions
c. Medical Care as part of India’s Peacekeeping Missions.
d. Relevance of India’s Peacekeeping Missions for its national interests.
3. Conclusion: To achieve its national interests through UNPK, India should remain alert.
Introduction
1. PM Modi stated that “the foundation of the UN was led by the brave soldiers on the
battlefield of the Second World War. By 1945, they included 2.5 million men of the Indian
Army, the largest volunteer force in history.”
2. The professionalism, experience, and expertise of Indian troops have contributed largely
to the correct implementation of the UNPK doctrine; be it ensuring a smooth political
transition augmenting peace-building activities or leading the ground-level response.
Body
1. What is the UN Peacekeeping (UNPK)?
a. UNPK began in 1948 when the UNSC authorized the deployment of UN military
observers to the Middle East.
b. UNPK helps countries navigate the difficult path from conflict to peace.
c. It deploys troops and police from around the world, integrating them with civilian
peacekeepers to address a range of mandates set by the UNGA and the UNSC.
d. Aim: provide security, political and peace-building support to conflict-ridden nations.
e. Three basic principles of UNPK mission: -
i. Consent of the Parties
ii. Impartiality
iii. Non-use of force except in self-defence and defence of the mandate

2. India’s Evolving Contribution to the UNPK Missions

 a. India has a long history of service in UNPK, having contributed more personnel than
any other country.
b. India’s contribution to UNPK began with its participation in the UN operation in Korea
in 1950.
c. To date, more than 2.5 lakh Indians have served in 49 of the 71 UNPK missions
established around the world since 1948.
d. India is the fifth largest troop contributor with about 5,323 personnel deployed in 8
out of 13 active UNPK Missions, of which more than 165 are police personnel.
e. India served as Chair of 3 international commissions for supervision of Vietnam,
Cambodia, and Laos established by the 1954 Geneva Accords on Indo-China.
f. Approximately 175 Indian peacekeepers have died so far while serving the UN. India
has lost more peacekeepers than any other UN member state.
g. In 2007, India became the first country to deploy an all-women contingent to a UN
Peacekeeping Mission.
h. Indian women officers not only restored security in the West African nation but also
contributed to an increase in the number of women in Liberia’s security sector.
i. India has provided 17 Force Commanders to various Missions. Besides the Force
Commanders, India also had the honour of providing two Military Advisers, one Female
Police Adviser, and one Deputy Military Adviser to the Secretary General of the United
Nations.
j. India was the first country to contribute to the Trust Fund on sexual exploitation and
abuse, which was set up in 2016.
3. Medical Care as Part of the India Peacekeeping Mission
a. Medical care is among the many services Indian Peacekeepers provide to the
communities in which they serve on behalf of the Organization.
b. Indian veterinarians serving with UNPK in South Sudan (UNMISS) helped cattle
herders who were losing their stock to malnutrition and disease in the war-torn nation.
c. The Indian contingent in South Sudan has provided vocational training and life-saving
medical assistance, as well as carrying out significant road repair work.
d. In 2020, based on the request received from the UN Secretariat, India deployed two
medical teams of 15 medical personnel each at Goma (DRC) and Juba (South Sudan).
4. Relevance of India’s Peacekeeping Missions at the UN for its National Interests
a. India’s painstaking efforts at the UNPK have been acknowledged globally and
generated enough goodwill for India.
b. This goodwill can be leveraged in the form of voting for India’s UNSC membership.
c. It shows India’s credibility and reliability and therefore, can establish India as a
“responsible player” in the international system.
d. India’s continuous efforts at the UN and its role in the UNPK have helped in setting
the UN agenda on behalf of “third world” countries.
e. It can establish India as a “global power” that is willing to take proactive actions for
international peace and security.
 f. It enhances prospects for India getting a permanent seat on the global “high-table”
i.e. the UNSC.
g. Experience in multilateral operations equips Indian forces with requisite skills, tactical
knowledge and outstanding training.
h. It gives confidence to India to negotiate on its own terms i.e. compromise wherever
necessary and avoid commitments that hamper its geopolitical ambitions.

Conclusion

India has to tread the journey of the international leadership of global high tables through
peacekeeping carefully as any complacency can backfire & undo years of hard-earned goodwill
especially when nationalism is on the rise globally.

7. What are the salient features of Japan’s new Indo-Pacific vision? In what way did India
emerge as the Indispensable partner of Japan?
Approach
1. Introduction: Set the context with the recent launch of Japan’s new FOIP.
2. Body
a. Need for New FOIP
b. Salient Features of Japan’s New FOIP Vision
c. How India emerges as the Indispensable Partner of Japan
3. Conclusion: Shared vision and common interests have cemented India-Japan ties.

Introduction
Japanese PM Fumio Kishida visited India and unveiled “Japan’s New Plan for a Free and
Open Indo-Pacific” (FOIP) and exchanged views about deepening the “Japan-India Special
Strategic and Global Partnership.”
Body
1. Need for New FOIP?
With recent geopolitical developments such as the ongoing Russia-Ukraine war,
growing China’s assertiveness in the South and East China Sea, the Indian Line of
Actual Control (LAC), & the Taiwan Strait; there is a need to give a fresh push and
momentum to the concept of FOIP.
2. Salient Features of Japan’s New FOIP Vision
a. It stresses the need to uphold the rules-based order and respect each
other’s territorial sovereignty.
b. It believes that the key to stability and prosperity in the world is the dynamism that
is created by combining two continents – Asia and Africa & two oceans – the Pacific
and Indian.
c. The fact that Japan under the FOIP should work with like-minded countries in the
region has been mentioned, with India being billed as an ‘indispensable’ partner.
 d. It also underlines the importance of ASEAN centrality and unity for the stability and
prosperity of every country and the region as a whole.
e. Four pillars of cooperation:
i. Principles for Peace and Rules for Prosperity: It has been pointed out that
vulnerable countries usually suffer the most if there is erosion in the rule of
law. Therefore, Japan wants to engage in economic development
programs such as promoting the implementation of the G-20
Principles for “Quality Infrastructure Investment”.
ii. Addressing Challenges in an Indo-Pacific way: Japan envisages the expansion
of cooperation for the FOIP by incorporating realistic and practical projects in a
wide range of areas, such as climate change, food security, global health and
cyber security.
iii. Multi-layered Connectivity: Three areas identified for introducing more such
projects are Southeast Asia, South Asia and the South Pacific/Pacific Island
countries.
1) Major connectivity initiatives involve the East-West Economic Corridor,
Southern Economic Corridor (in South West Asia), North-East Connectivity
Improvement Project (in India), Bengal Bay Industrial Growth Zone,
Mombasa/Northern Corridor etc.
iv. Extending efforts for security and safe use of the “sea to the air”:
1) Japan will help in strengthening the capabilities of maritime law
enforcement agencies in other countries.
2) Under this, Japan announced that it would “mobilize” a total of more than
$75 billion in public and private funds in the Indo-Pacific region by
2030 for infrastructure development.

3. How India Emerges as an Indispensable Partner of Japan?

a. Japan’s new FOIP vision openly declared India as its indispensable partner.
b. Japan’s Investment Plans in India: At the 46th joint meeting of the India-Japan
Business Cooperation Committee, the Japanese ambassador to India said,

“A Japan Bank for International Cooperation (JBIC) worldwide survey has shown
that India tops the list for future investment targets for mid- and long-term
investment”.

c. Japan’s PM, in his recent visit, announced plans to invest 5 trillion yen in
India over five years.
d. Japan is the 5th largest investor in India, with around 1,450 Japanese companies
already operating in India today.
e. Cooperation & Skill Development: With Memorandums of Cooperation signed
by the two countries on the Technical Intern Training Programme (TITP) as well
 as Specified Skilled Worker (SSW), they are also cooperating in the areas of skill
development and the movement of skilled workers.
f. Focus on Northeast India: Besides ASEAN & South Asia, Northeast India has been
the second area where Japan’s policy focuses predominantly.
g. Resolve to lead: As Japan and India assume the Presidencies of the G7 and the
G20 respectively, both countries have resolved to renew the pledge and do their
utmost to lead the Indo-Pacific region as well as the world.

Conclusion

Notwithstanding some differences in the Ukraine conflict, Japan remains one of India’s closest
friends in Asia given their shared vision of the Indo-Pacific and concerns over China’s rise.

8. “The Indian-Taliban-Pakistan, triangle provides a window into the Taliban’s desire to

pursue both material and ideological interest”. Comment
Approach
1. Introduction: Balancing legitimacy & interests has put the Taliban in a dilemma.
2. Body
a. Why the Taliban are looking towards India now?
b. What the Taliban are doing to win India’s trust?
c. India’s Response to the Taliban
d. Way Forward
3. Conclusion: India must follow a proactive approach in dealing with the Taliban.
Introduction
Taliban are facing complex dilemmas. Their desire to strike a balance between gaining
domestic and international legitimacy on one hand, and maintaining ideological and symbolic
interests on the other, seems to result in an arduous, incompatible, and fickle national and
foreign policy.
Body
1. Why the Taliban are Looking towards India now?
a. Taliban leaders are realizing that, unlike past, they cannot continue to keep all their
eggs in the Pakistani basket.
b. Moreover, even the billions of dollars promised by China as future investments in
Afghanistan remain uncertain.
c. India’s geographical proximity, economic size, military capacity, and robust
diplomatic network serve as a decisive and overt module in the Taliban’s quest for
internal and external legitimacy.
d. Moreover, India has cemented its position as a major developmental partner of
Afghanistan and has also earned the goodwill of Afghans.
 e. India’s people-centric approach leverages New Delhi over other regional states vis-
à-vis Afghanistan.

2. What the Taliban are Doing to Win India’s trust?

a. In a bid to show autonomy, the Taliban have been engaging in activities that
challenge Pakistan’s desire to maintain an uncontested influence over
Afghanistan’s affairs.
b. In fact, the Taliban have openly expressed their discontent toward Pakistan’s
attempts to undermine their development and relations with India.
c. Further issue revolves around the Taliban’s unwillingness to accept the Durand Line
(the 2,640 km border between Pakistan and Afghanistan).
d. To flaunt sovereignty vis-à-vis Pakistan, the Taliban have congruently been seeking
to improve ties with India to tap its expanding normative and material capacity.
e. The Taliban are urging India to increase its role in Afghanistan’s growth
by resuming its development assistance projects.
f. Besides, the Taliban are also seeking India’s support in training Afghan troops.
g. The Taliban have even expressed their desire to deepen diplomatic and commercial
ties with India. E.g. Taliban support for the Chabahar Port in Iran.
3. India’s Response to the Taliban
a. Given this backdrop, India has reciprocated to a certain extent by providing
humanitarian assistance and re-opening its embassy in Kabul.
b. Interestingly, India also sent its first official delegation to Afghanistan in June last
year which paved the way for direct interaction with senior Taliban officials.
c. Here, it can be argued that India’s decision-making reflects a clear understanding
of realpolitik.
d. Geopolitically, India has several stakes in the region ranging from connectivity to
energy security and the proliferation of terror activities.
e. Accordingly, Afghanistan maintains its centrality among all the aforementioned
areas of concern.
4. Way Forward
a. While India invests in Afghan people, it will have to proactively engage with the
group in power to facilitate long-term cooperation without directly granting
legitimacy to the Taliban.
b. India cannot afford to stay behind the line of regional players seeking to
incorporate the Taliban and Afghanistan in their strategic calculations.
c. India must maintain a position that factors in the potential of future uncertainty.
d. The Taliban may be showing significant accommodation toward India in terms of
attaining their material interests; however, there is barely any evidence that the
Taliban have the desire to marginalize or abandon their ideological interests.
e. Despite the history of accommodation given to the Taliban by Pakistan over the
past two decades, the Taliban are still not ready to disentangle from ideological
allies such as the TTP.
 f. Similarly, the Taliban continue to sympathize and maintain an ideological
connection with fellow Deobandi groups.
g. Deobandism is often linked with several militant groups operating in and from
Pakistan, many of which target Kashmir.
h. Such situations directly impact India’s national interests. India needs to closely
monitor all the activities of the Taliban and the hidden agenda behind them.
Conclusion
1. The Taliban’s desire to balance material and ideological interests and goals creates an
undesirable equation toward regional security and peace.
2. India must proactively engage based on a deep realization of short-term and long-term
costs and benefits, unlike Pakistan which has been largely reactive in its approach
toward the Taliban.