G.R. No.

224162 November 7, 2017

JANET LIM NAPOLES, Petitioner

vs.
SANDIGANBAYAN (THIRD DIVISION), Respondent

FACTS: (If evidence of guilt is strong [reclusion perpetua], bail

cannot be granted)

Petitioner Janet Lim Napoles filed a motion for reconsideration on December

20, 2017. The motion challenged the Court's Decision dated November 7,
2017. The case revolves around Napoles' application for bail, which the
Sandiganbayan denied in its Resolutions dated October 16, 2015, and March
2, 2016. Napoles argued that the ruling in "Macapagal-Arroyo v. People" (July
19, 2016) should apply to her case. In the Macapagal-Arroyo case, the
Sandiganbayan's denial of the demurrer to evidence in a plunder case
against former President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo was reversed due to the
prosecution's failure to identify the main plunderer.

Napoles contended that this precedent should influence her case. The Court
found her argument unmeritorious and upheld the Sandiganbayan's denial of
her bail application, citing no grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction.

ISSUE: WON, the Sandiganbayan gravely abused its discretion in denying

Napoles' application for bail?

RULING:

No. The Sandiganbayan did not gravely abused its discretion in

denying Napoles' application for bail.

This right to bail is guaranteed in the Bill of Rights, except when the
accused is charged with a capital offense, viz.:

Section 13. All persons, except those charged with offenses punishable
by reclusion perpetua when evidence of guilt is strong, shall, before
conviction, be bailable by sufficient sureties, or be released on recognizance
as may be provided by law. The right to bail shall not be impaired even when
the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended. Excessive bail shall
not be required.

While bail may generally be granted as a matter of right prior to the

conviction of the accused, those charged with a capital offense is granted
bail only when the evidence of guilt is not strong:

Section 7. Capital offense of an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or

life imprisonment, not bailable. - No person charged with a capital offense, or
an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, shall be
admitted to bail when evidence of guilt is strong, regardless of the stage of
the criminal prosecution. (7a)

In this case, the charge of Plunder against Napoles in this case alleges
a conspiracy. On this point, this Court has consistently ruled that the
conspiracy among the accused to commit the crime of Plunder is usually an
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agreement or connivance to secretly cooperate in doing the unlawful act.
The implied conspiracy among Napoles and her co-accused was proven
through various documentary and testimonial evidence showing that they
acted towards the common goal of misappropriating the PDAF of former
Senator Enrile.

A.M. No. MTJ-17-1893

TEODORA ALTOBANO-RUIZ, Complainant

vs.
HON. RAMSEY DOMINGO G. PICHAY, PRESIDING JUDGE, BRANCH 78,
METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURT, PARANAQUE CITY, Respondent

FACTS: (Bail can be filed other than where the case is pending –
exceptions to general rule)

Teodora Altobano-Ruiz filed a complaint against Judge Ramsey

Domingo G. Pichay for gross ignorance of the law and gross misconduct in
connection with the latter's act of granting bail in favor of Francis Eric
Paran (Paran), the accused in adultery case.

Ruiz alleged that Judge Pichay had no authority to approve the bail as the
case was pending in another court and outside his jurisdiction.

Judge Pichay defended his actions as being in good faith and in line with his
duties.

ISSUE: WON, respondent has the authority to grant bail in this case?

RULING:

No. The respondent has no authority to grant bail in this case.

Section 17 (a) of Rule 114 of the Rules of Court, as amended by

Administrative Circular No. 12-94 which governs the approval of bail bonds
for criminal cases pending outside the judge's territorial jurisdiction is
instructive, to wit:

Section 17. Bail, where filed. - (a) Bail in the amount fixed may be filed with
the court where the case is pending, or in the absence or unavailability of
the judge thereof, with any regional trial judge, metropolitan trial
judge, municipal trial judge, or municipal circuit trial judge in the
province, city, or municipality. If the accused is arrested in a province,
city, or municipality other than where the case is pending, bail may also be
filed with any Regional Trial Court of said place, or if no judge thereof is
available, with any metropolitan trial judge, municipal trial judge, or
municipal circuit trial judge therein.

The foregoing provision anticipates two (2) situations.

First, the accused is arrested in the same province, city or municipality

where his case is pending.

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Second, the accused is arrested in the province, city or municipality other
than where his case is pending.

In the first situation, the accused may file bail in the court where his case is
pending or, in the absence or unavailability of the judge thereof, with
another branch of the same court within the province or city.

In the second situation, the accused has two (2) options. First, he may file
bail in the court where his case is pending or, second, he may file bail with
any regional trial court in the province, city or municipality where he was
arrested. When no regional trial court judge is available, he may file bail with
any metropolitan trial judge, municipal trial judge or municipal circuit trial
judge therein.8

However, in the instant case, the case where Judge Pichay approved Paran's
bail bond and issued release order was not pending before his sala
(Parañaque City). As correctly pointed out by the OCA, although accused
Paran was detained at the Station Detention Cell, Parañaque City Police
Station, he was nevertheless arrested at his residence in Quezon City.
Considering that Paran was arrested in Quezon City, he could also file his bail
application before any branch at the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, and
in the absence of any judge thereat, then before any branch of the
Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City. Paran ·could have also filed his bail
application before the MTCC, Trece Martires City, where his case was
pending.

A.M. No. 03-1462-MTJ April 19, 2007

JUDGE DOLORES L. ESPAÑOL, Regional Trial Court, Branch 90,

Dasmariñas, Cavite, Complainant,
vs.
JUDGE LORINDA B. TOLEDO-MUPAS, Municipal Trial Court,
Dasmariñas, Cavite, Respondent.

Art. 125 RPC - Delay in the delivery of detained persons to the proper
judicial authorities. (12 hrs – light felonies, 18 hours – correctional penalties;
36 hours – capital offenses)

"Detention Pending Investigation of the Case" – not a waiver for a

prolong detention.

FACTS:

An administrative complaint was filed by Judge Lorinda B. Toledo-Mupas

(Judge Mupas) of the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Dasmariñas, Cavite,
against Judge Dolores L. Español (Judge Español) of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC), Branch 90, Dasmariñas, Cavite.

The complaint, filed against the accused, Judge Español of Gross Ignorance
of the Law, Grave Abuse of Authority, Misconduct, and Conduct Prejudicial to
the Best Interest of the Service.

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Judge Mupas alleged that Judge Español illegally usurped the functions of the
Executive Judge of Dasmariñas, Cavite, by ordering her to desist from
accepting criminal cases for preliminary investigation that fell within the
exclusive jurisdiction of the RTC.

Judge Español defended her actions, stating that her order was within her
authority as the Executive Judge and aimed at stopping Judge Mupas from
conducting preliminary investigations in violation of the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure, Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code, and Republic Act
No. 7438.

Judge Español said that Judge Mupas operated the MTC of Dasmariñas,
Cavite as a "One-Stop Shop" where criminal suspects apprehended without a
warrant are ordered detained in the municipal jail by virtue of an unsigned
"Detention Pending Investigation of the Case," in lieu of a waiver of the
provisions of Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code, as prescribed by R.A. No.
7438 and by Section 7, Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure.

Judge Español added, that the apprehended persons were detained for a
long time until Judge Mupas set the case for preliminary investigation. If the
detainee can post bail, Judge Mupas would fix the amount of bail and require
that the premium, usually equivalent to 20% or 30% thereof, be paid in cash.
If the surety bond was secured outside of the MTC, the bond would be
rejected. Hence, the applicants for bail bonds would go to the RTC of
Dasmariñas, Cavite to complain and apply for the release of the detention
prisoners.

ISSUE: WON, Judge Mupas violate Rule 112, Section 7 of the Revised Rules
of Criminal Procedure, Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code, and Republic
Act No. 7438 by issuing "Detention Pending Investigation of the Case"
orders?

RULING:

Yes

"Sec. 2 e) of RA 7438 is in point, thus:

xxx Any waiver by a person arrested or detained under the provisions of

Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code, or under custodial investigation, shall
be in writing and signed by such person in the presence of his counsel;
otherwise the waiver shall be null and void and of no effect. (Underscoring
supplied)

"The afore cited law is clear and simple. Thus, construction is unnecessary.
Clearly, what the said provision requires to protect the rights of the accused
is a written waiver signed by the accused with the assistance of a counsel.
However, the procedure adopted by the Respondent runs counter thereto.
She resorted to the issuance of a commitment order dubbed as ‘Detention
Pending Investigation of the Case’ to legally prolong the detention of the
accused pending the resolution of the preliminary investigation. Obviously,
this is not within the contemplation of the law. Thus, the practice is highly
erroneous – a blatant manifestation of ignorance in the legal procedure.

G.R. No. 218232, July 24, 2018

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RAMON "BONG" B. REVILLA, JR., PETITIONER, VS. SANDIGANBAYAN
(FIRST DIVISION) AND PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENTS.

BAIL may be denied if evidence of guilt is strong for crime punishable by

reclusion perpetua.

FACTS:

The Office of the Ombudsman charged Revilla, Cambe and Napoles, among
others, with the crime of Plunder for an alleged PDAF scam. The
Sandiganbayan issued warrants of arrest against Revilla, Cambe, and
Napoles.

On the same day, Revilla voluntarily surrendered to the PNP and filed a
Motion to Elect Detention Facilities Ad Cautelam praying for his detention at
the PNP Custodial Center in Camp Crame. Thereafter, Cambe also
voluntarily surrendered to the Sandiganbayan and filed an Urgent
Motion to Commit Accused to Criminal Investigation and Detection Group
(CIDG) pending trial of the case.

Revilla filed a Petition for Bail Ad Cautelam; Cambe for Application for Bail;
and Napoles filed a Joint Petition for Bail, together with Ronald John Lim (Lim)
and John Raymund de Asis (De Asis).However, the Sandiganbayan denied
the separate applications for bail filed by Revilla, Cambe and
Napoles. It held that the prosecution duly established with strong evidence
that Revilla, Cambe, and Napoles, in conspiracy with one another, committed
the crime of plunder; thus, they are not entitled to the constitutional right to
bail.

ISSUE: WON, the Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion

amounting to lack and excess of jurisdiction in denying bail to Cambe and
Napoles (since Revilla withdrew his motion)?

RULING:

No. The Sandiganbayan did not commit grave abuse of discretion.

The grant or denial of bail in an offense punishable by

reclusion perpetua, such as plunder, hinges on the issue of whether or not
the evidence of guilt of the accused is strong. This requires the conduct of
bail hearings where the prosecution has the burden of showing that the
evidence of guilt is strong, subject to the right of the defense to cross-
examine witnesses and introduce evidence in its own rebuttal. The court is to
conduct only a summary hearing, or such brief and speedy method of
receiving and considering the evidence of guilt as is practicable and
consistent with the purpose of the hearing which is merely to determine the
weight of evidence for purposes of bail

The Court finds that the Sandiganbayan did not abuse its discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it denied bail to Cambe and
Napoles, upon a finding of strong evidence that they committed the crime of
plunder in conspiracy with one another.

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G.R. Nos. 205904-06 October 17, 2018

GWENDOLYN F. GARCIA, PETITIONER, V. HONORABLE

SANDIGANBAYAN, AND PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENTS.

A court has the power to prohibit a person admitted to bail from leaving the
Philippines. This is a necessary consequence of the nature and function of a
bail bond.

FACTS:

A criminal case was filed against Garcia, herein petitioner, as the Provincial
Governor the province of Cebu, for a violation of Section 3(g) of Republic Act
No. 3019 (R.A. 3019), otherwise known as the "Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act”.

The petitioner signed a MOA for the sale of ten (10) parcels of land
composing the Balili Estate which tendered installment payments worth
multimillion pesos for a total area of 247,317 sq. meters. However, when
representative from DENR and the Office of the Ombudsman-Visayas (OMB-
Visayas) conducted a verification survey, the team discovered that 202,456-
sq m portion of the 247,317-sq m property was classified as timberland.
Further, 196,696-sq m portion thereof was underwater.

It was likewise discovered that the appropriation for the purchase of the lots
was classified as "Site Development and Housing Program" but no item
enumerated thereon included site/land acquisition.

Subsequently, the OMB-Visayas, through PACPO-Visayas initiated the filing of

criminal and administrative charges against the accountable public officials
and employees pursuant to a letter of complaint from an anonymous letter-
sender.

The Sandiganbayan issued three (3) (HDOs) against the petitioner and her
co-accused.

The petitioner, who was based in Cebu, voluntarily surrendered to Judge

Soliver C. Peras (Judge Peras), First Vice Executive Judge of Cebu City, and
made three separate cash deposits of P30,000.00 as bail for her provisional
liberty corresponding to the three cases filed against her. Accordingly, Judge
Peras issued three separate orders of release.

She claimed that the HDOs were violative of her constitutional right to travel,
which may be impaired only in the interest of national security, public safety,
or public health, as maybe provided by law.

She argued that there should be an actual case "filed and pending" with the
Court before an HDO can be issued. Since there was no final resolution yet
on her motion for reconsideration, it cannot be said that there is already a
pending criminal case against her. The issuance of the HDOs, therefore, was
premature.

The petitioner argued that Sandiganbayan has no authority to issue HDO

since it is within the jurisdiction of the RTC.

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ISSUE: WON, the Sandiganbayan has the authority to issue HDO against the
petitioner?

RULING:

Yes. The Sandiganbayan has the authority to issue HDO against the
petitioner.

The point of distinction in the guidelines is not on the type of court that
may issue an HDO but the kind of cases involved. Thus, the first paragraph of
the SC Circular 39-97 was worded as follows:

“Hold-Departure Orders shall be issued only in criminal cases within the

exclusive jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Courts.”

Notably, the language of the circular places emphasis on criminal cases that
warrant the issuance of an HDO, specifically the graver or more serious
transgressions of the law that are punishable with imprisonment of more
than six years, which incidentally are within the exclusive jurisdiction of the
RTCs. The circular was not meant to exclude all other courts from issuing
HDO but, more accurately, seeks to make a distinction among the types of
criminal offenses by excluding less grave and light offenses from the
instances when an HDO may be validly issued.

The Sandiganbayan issues HDO because it has the authority to do so and

this attaches from the moment it acquired jurisdiction over the case and over
the person. In this case, jurisdiction over the case was acquired when the
Informations against the petitioner were filed with the Sandiganbayan on July
19, 2012. Thereafter, the petitioner voluntarily submitted herself to the
jurisdiction of the court by posting bail of P30,000.00 for each of the cases
filed against her.

The implication of posting of a bond was well-explained in Manotoc v. Court

of Appeals,[73] viz.:

A court has the power to prohibit a person admitted to bail from leaving the
Philippines. This is a necessary consequence of the nature and function of a
bail bond.

Rule 114, Section 1 of the Rules of Court defines bail as the security required
and given for the release of a person who is in the custody of the law, that he
will appear before any court in which his appearance may be required as
stipulated in the bail bond or recognizance.

Its object is to relieve the accused of imprisonment and the state of the
burden of keeping him, pending the trial, and at the same time, to put the
accused as much under the power of the court as if he were in custody of the
proper officer, and to secure the appearance of the accused so as to answer
the call of the court and do what the law may require of him.

The condition imposed upon petitioner to make himself available at all times
whenever the court requires his presence operates as a valid restriction on
his right to travel.

Upon posting bail, the accused subjects himself to the jurisdiction of the
court and may validly be restricted in his movement and prohibited from
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leaving this jurisdiction. He cannot leave the country without the permission
of the court where his case is pending.

G.R. No. 236461 December 05, 2018

REYNALDO ARBAS RECTO, PETITIONER, VS. THE PEOPLE OF THE

PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENT.

Murder downgraded to Homicide – Bail as a matter of right

FACTS:

An Information for Murder was filed against petitioner Reynaldo

Arbas Recto (Recto) for the death of Margie Carlosita
(Carlosita).Thereafter, on May 23, 2011, Recto's former counsel filed a
Petition for Bail with the Regional Trial Court of Bacoor City, Branch 89
(RTC).

However, on April 11, 2014, the RTC issued an Order denying Recto's
Petition for Bail as it gave credence to the testimony of prosecution witness
Joshua Emmanuel Rabillas (Rabillas), son of Carlosita, that Recto was the one
who killed his mother. The RTC, in denying the Petition for Bail, noted that
"without, however, prejudging in any way the result of the case, the Court is
of the impression that the evidence of guilt is strong, and it is incumbent on
the part of the accused to take the witness stand to show otherwise." Trial on
the merits then ensued.

After the prosecution rested its case, Recto filed a Demurrer to Evidence on
June 22, 2015 for insufficiency of evidence to hold him guilty of the crime of
Murder. The RTC, however, denied the Demurrer to Evidence through an
Order dated December 22, 2015.

In the said Order, the RTC stated: Considering, therefore, the testimony of
Joshua pointing to the accused as the perpetrator of the crime compared
with the mere allegations of the accused that the victim committed suicide,
it is imperative on the part of the accused to take the witness stand, that is,
if he so desires, to support his claim that he is not guilty as charged.

Subsequently, on April 27, 2016, petitioner filed a Motion to Fix Bail alleging
that the prosecution was able to show that the crime charged should be
Homicide only and not Murder. He pointed out that Rabillas, who was five
years old at the time of the incident, testified that Carlosita was hit by the
bottle during a quarrel over money.

Citing People v. Rivera a case with substantially the same facts wherein the
common-law wife was killed by the common-law husband during a heated
argument, Recto argued that the case established by the prosecution was
thus merely Homicide due to the absence of the qualifying
circumstance of treachery. As Recto had not taken the witness stand,
then the RTC ruled against the Motion to Fix Bail. Recto moved for
reconsideration, but the same was denied by the RTC on January 29, 2016.

ISSUE: WON, the petitioner be allowed to fix bail on the basis that the crime
charged against him should be homicide and not murder?
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RULING:

Yes. The petitioner be allowed to fix bail.

In this case, the denial of the Motion to Fix Bail by the RTC amounted
to an evasion or refusal to perform a positive duty enjoined by law. The
Order denying the Motion to Fix Bail was thus issued with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess or jurisdiction.

Section 13, Article III of the Constitution provides:

SECTION 13. All persons, except those charged with offenses punishable
by reclusion perpetua when evidence of guilt is strong, shall, before
conviction, be bailable by sufficient sureties, or be released on recognizance
as may be provided by law. The right to bail shall not be impaired even when
the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended. Excessive bail shall
not be required.

The following Constitutional provision is implemented by the following

provisions of the Rules of Court:

SEC. 4. Bail, a matter of right; exception. - All persons in custody shall be

admitted to bail as a matter of right, with sufficient sureties, or released on
recognizance as prescribed by law or this Rule (a) before or after conviction
by the Metropolitan Trial Court, Municipal Trial Court, Municipal Trial Court in
Cities, or Municipal Circuit Trial Court, and (b) before conviction by the
Regional Trial Court of an offense not punishable by death, reclusion
perpetua, or life imprisonment.

xxxx

SEC. 7. Capital offense or an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or

life imprisonment, not bailable. - No person charged with a capital offense, or
an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, shall be
admitted to bail when evidence of guilt is strong, regardless of the stage of
the criminal prosecution.22

Thus, as a rule, all persons charged with a criminal offense have the right
to bail. However, persons charged with an offense punishable by reclusion
perpetua cannot avail of this right if the evidence of guilt is strong.

In the present case, Recto was charged with Murder - an offense

punishable by reclusion perpetua. Thus, the RTC was acting within its powers
or jurisdiction when it denied Recto's initial Petition for Bail. The RTC
possesses sufficient discretion to determine, based on the evidence
presented before it during the bail hearing, whether the evidence of guilt is
strong.

However, after the prosecution had rested its case, Recto filed a Motion to
Fix Bail on the ground that bail had become a matter of right as the evidence
presented by the prosecution could only convict Recto of Homicide, not
Murder. This Motion to Fix Bail was denied by the RTC, reiterating its earlier
finding that, in its judgment, the evidence of guilt is strong. This is where the
RTC committed grave abuse of discretion, and the CA thus erred in upholding
the RTC's Order denying the Motion to Fix Bail.

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As correctly pointed out by Recto, the evidence of the prosecution could, at
best, only convict him of Homicide and not Murder. The prosecution has not
proven that the killing was committed with treachery.

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