LN Ch1 16 Incl Appendix and Two Short Notes in One File Vaekstmaster2015
LN Ch1 16 Incl Appendix and Two Short Notes in One File Vaekstmaster2015
Christian Groth
Preface ix
2 Review of technology 23
2.1 The production technology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
2.1.1 A neoclassical production function . . . . . . . . . . . 24
2.1.2 Returns to scale . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
2.1.3 Properties of the production function under CRS . . . 32
2.2 Technological change . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
2.3 The concepts of a representative firm and an aggregate pro-
duction function . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
2.4 Long-run vs. short-run production functions* . . . . . . . . . 42
iii
iv CONTENTS
February 2015
Christian Groth
ix
x PREFACE
Introduction to economic
growth
• productivity growth.
1
2 CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION TO ECONOMIC GROWTH
• What are the roles of human capital and technology innovation in eco-
nomic growth? Getting the questions right.
Denmark 2,67 1,87
UK 1,96 1,46
USA 3,40 1,89
Japan 3,54 2,54
Table 1.1: Average annual growth rate of GDP and GDP per capita in percent,
1870—2006. Discrete compounding. Source: Maddison, A: The World Economy:
Historical Statistics, 2006, Table 1b, 1c and 5c.
Figure 1.1 displays the time path of annual GDP and GDP per capita in
Denmark 1870-2006 along with regression lines estimated by OLS (logarith-
mic scale on the vertical axis). Figure 1.2 displays the time path of GDP per
capita in UK, USA, and Japan 1870-2006. In both figures the average annual
growth rates are reported. In spite of being based on exactly the same data
as Table 1.1, the numbers are slightly different. Indeed, the numbers in the
figures are slightly lower than those in the table. The reason is that discrete
compounding is used in Table 1.1 while continuous compounding is used in
the two figures. These two alternative methods of calculation are explained
in the next section.
Figure 1.1: GDP and GDP per capita (1990 International Geary-Khamis dollars)
in Denmark, 1870-2006. Source: Maddison, A. (2009). Statistics on World Popu-
lation, GDP and Per Capita GDP, 1-2006 AD, www.ggdc.net/maddison.
Figure 1.2: GDP per capita (1990 International Geary-Khamis dollars) in UK,
USA and Japan, 1870-2006. Source: Maddison, A. (2009). Statistics on World
Population, GDP and Per Capita GDP, 1-2006 AD, www.ggdc.net/maddison.
ln = ln(1 + ) ⇒
0
ln 0
ln(1 + ) = ⇒ (1.3)
ln 0
= antilog( ) − 1. (1.4)
Note that in the formulas (1.2) and (1.4) equals the number of periods
minus 1.
For a given data set the calculated from (1.2) will be slightly above the
calculated from (1.6), cf. the mentioned difference between the growth rates
in Table 1.1 and those in Figure 1.1 and Figure 1.2. The reason is that a given
growth force is more powerful when compounding is continuous rather than
discrete. Anyway, the difference between and is usually unimportant.
If for example refers to the annual GDP growth rate, it will be a small
number, and the difference between and immaterial. For example, to
= 0040 corresponds ≈ 0039 Even if = 010, the corresponding is
00953. But if stands for the inflation rate and there is high inflation, the
difference between and will be substantial. During hyperinflation the
monthly inflation rate may be, say, = 100%, but the corresponding will
be only 69%.
Which method, discrete or continuous compounding, is preferable? To
some extent it is a matter of taste or convenience. In period analysis discrete
compounding is most common and in continuous time analysis continuous
compounding is most common.
For calculation with a pocket calculator the continuous compounding for-
mula, (1.6), is slightly easier to use than the discrete compounding formulas,
whether (1.2) or (1.4).
2
Unless otherwise specified, whenever we write ln or log the natural logarithm is
understood.
≈ 374 years,
Figure 1.3: The Kuznets facts. Source: Kongsamut et al., Beyond Balanced
Growth, Review of Economic Studies, vol. 68, Oct. 2001, 869-82.
Surprisingly, in spite of the Kuznets facts, the evolution at the aggregate level
in developed countries is by many economists seen as roughly described by
what is called Kaldor’s “stylized facts” (after the Hungarian-British econo-
mist Nicholas Kaldor, 1908-1986, see, e.g., Kaldor 1957, 1961)3 :
1. Real output per man-hour grows at a more or less constant rate
over fairly long periods of time. (Of course, there are short-run fluctuations
superposed around this trend.)
2. The stock of physical capital per man-hour grows at a more or less
constant rate over fairly long periods of time.
3. The ratio of output to capital shows no systematic trend.
4. The rate of return to capital shows no systematic trend.
5. The income shares of labor and capital (in the national account-
ing sense, i.e., including land and other natural resources), respectively, are
nearly constant.
6. The growth rate of output per man-hour differs substantially across
countries.
These claimed regularities do certainly not fit all developed countries
equally well. Although Solow’s growth model (Solow, 1956) can be seen as the
first successful attempt at building a model consistent with Kaldor’s “stylized
facts”, Solow once remarked about them: “There is no doubt that they are
stylized, though it is possible to question whether they are facts” (Solow,
1970). Yet, for instance a relatively recent study by Attfield and Temple
(2010) of US and UK data since the Second World War is not unfavorable
to Kaldor’s “facts”. The sixth Kaldor fact is, of course, generally accepted
as a well documented observation (a nice summary is contained in Pritchett,
1997).
Kaldor also proposed hypotheses about the links between growth in the
different sectors (see, e.g., Kaldor 1967):
a. Productivity growth in the manufacturing and construction sec-
tors is enhanced by output growth in these sectors (this is also known as
Verdoorn’s Law). Increasing returns to scale and learning by doing are the
main factors behind this.
b. Productivity growth in agriculture and services is enhanced by out-
put growth in the manufacturing and construction sectors.
3
Kaldor presented his six regularities as “a stylised view of the facts”.
By “grow faster” is meant that the growth rate of per capita income (or
per worker output) is systematically higher.
In many contexts, a more appropriate convergence concept is the follow-
ing:
≡ and
≡
where = real GDP, = employment, and = population. If the focus
is on living standards, is the relevant variable.5 But if the focus is on
(labor) productivity, it is that is relevant. Since most growth models
focus on rather than let os take as our example.
One might think that the standard deviation of could be a relevant
measure of dispersion when discussing whether convergence is present or
not. The standard deviation of across countries in a given year is
v
u
u1 X
≡ t ( − ̄)2 (1.8)
=1
where P
̄ ≡ (1.9)
i.e., ̄ is the average output per worker. However, if this measure were used,
it would be hard to find any group of countries for which there is income
convergence. This is because tends to grow over time for most countries,
and then there is an inherent tendency for the variance also to grow; hence
also the square root of the variance, tends to grow. Indeed, suppose that
for all countries, is doubled from time 1 to time 2 Then, automatically,
is also doubled. But hardly anyone would interpret this as an increase in
the income inequality across the countries.
Hence, it is more adequate to look at the standard deviation of relative
income levels: s
1 X
̄ ≡ ( − 1)2 (1.10)
̄
This measure is the same as what is called the coefficient of variation,
usually defined as
≡ (1.11)
̄
5
Or perhaps better, where ≡ ≡ − − Here, denotes net
interest payments on foreign debt and denotes net labor income of foreign workers in
the country.
that is, the standard deviation of standardized by the mean. That the two
measures are identical can be seen in this way:
q P
1 2 s s
( − ̄) 1 X − ̄ 2 1 X
≡ = ( ) = ( − 1)2 ≡ ̄
̄ ̄ ̄ ̄
The point is that the coefficient of variation is “scale free”, which the standard
deviation itself is not.
Instead of the coefficient of variation, another scale free measure is often
used, namely the standard deviation of ln , i.e.,
s
1X
ln ≡ (ln − ln ∗ )2 (1.12)
where P
∗ ln
ln ≡ (1.13)
√
Note that ∗ is the geometric average, i.e., ∗ ≡ 1 2 · · · Now, by a
first-order Taylor approximation of ln around = ̄, we have
1
ln ≈ ln ̄ + ( − ̄)
̄
Hence, as a very rough approximation we have ln ≈ ̄ = though
this approximation can be quite poor (cf. Dalgaard and Vastrup, 2001).
It may be possible, however, to defend the use of ln in its own right to
the extent that tends to be approximately lognormally distributed across
countries.
Yet another possible measure of income dispersion across countries is the
Gini index (see for example Cowell, 1995).
where
X
= and ln ∗ ≡ ln
Dispersion
21000
Dispersion of GDP per capita
18000
Dispersion of GDP per worker
15000
12000
9000
6000
3000
0
1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000
Year
Remarks: Germany is not included in GDP per worker. GDP per worker is missing for
Sweden and Greece in 1950, and for Portugal in 1998. The EU comprises Belgium,
Denmark, Finland, France, Greece, Holland, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Portugal, Spain,
Sweden, Germany, the UK and Austria.
Source: Pwt6, OECD Economic Outlook No. 65 1999 via Eco Win and World Bank Global
Development Network Growth Database.
Figure 1.4: Standard deviation of GDP per capita and per worker across 12 EU
countries, 1950-1998.
Dispersion
0,4
Dispersion of the log of GDP
0,36 per capita
0,32 Dispersion of the log of GDP per
worker
0,28
0,24
0,2
0,16
0,12
0,08
0,04
0
1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000
Year
Remarks: Germany is not included in GDP per worker. GDP per worker is missing for Sweden and
Greece in 1950, and for Portugal in 1998. The EU comprises Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France,
Greece, Holland, Ireland, Italy, Luxemb ourg, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Germany, the UK and
Austria.
Source: Pwt6, OECD Economic Outlook No. 65 1999 via Eco Win and World Bank Global
Development Network Growth Database.
Figure 1.5: Standard deviation of the log of GDP per capita and per worker across
12 EU countries, 1950-1998.
Coefficient of variation
0,9
Coefficient of variation for GDP per capita
0,8
Coefficient of variation for GDP per worker
0,7
0,6
0,5
0,4
0,3
0,2
0,1
0
1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000
Year
Remarks: Germany is not included in GDP per worker. GDP per worker is missing for Sweden and Greece in 1950,
and for Portugal in 1998. The EU comprises Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Greece, Holland, Ireland, Italy,
Luxembourg, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Germany, the UK and Austria.
Source: Pwt6, OECD Economic Outlook No. 65 1999 via Eco Win and World Bank Global Development Network
Growth Database.
Figure 1.6: Coefficient of variation of GDP per capita and GDP per worker across
12 EU countries, 1950-1998.
Coefficient
Coefficient
of variation
of variation
1,2
The world (1960 -88)
1
0,8
0,6 22 OECD countries (1950-90)
0,4
0,2 EU-12 (1960-9 5)
0
1950 1953 1956 1959 1962 1965 1968 1971 1974 1977 1980 1983 1986 1989 1992 1995
Remarks: 'T he world' comprises 1 21 countries (not weighed by size) where complete time series for GDP per cap ita exist.
The OECD coun tries exclu de South Korea, Hungary, Poland, Iceland , Czech Rep., Luxembourg and Mexico.
EU-12 co mprises: Benelux, Germany, France, Italy, Denmark, Ireland, UK, Spain, Portugal og Greece.
Source: Penn World Table 5.6 and OECD Economic Ou tlook, Statistics on Microcomputer Disc, Decemb er 1998.
Figure 1.7: Coefficient of variation of income per capita across different sets of
countries.
1.5 Literature
Acemoglu, D., 2009, Introduction to Modern Economic Growth, Princeton
University Press: Oxford.
Attfield, C., and J.R.W. Temple, 2010, Balanced growth and the great
ratios: New evidence for the US and UK, Journal of Macroeconomics,
vol. 32, 937-956.
Deininger, K., and L. Squire, 1996, A new data set measuring income in-
equality, The World Bank Economic Review, 10, 3.
Islam, N., 2003, What have we learnt from the convergence debate? Journal
of Economic Surveys 17, 3, 309-62.
Kaldor, N., 1957, A model of economic growth, The Economic Journal, vol.
67, pp. 591-624.
Quah, D., 1996a, Twin peaks ..., Economic Journal, vol. 106, 1045-1055.
Valdés, B., 1999, Economic Growth. Theory, Empirics, and Policy, Edward
Elgar.
The aim of this chapter is, first, to introduce the terminology concerning
firms’ technology and technological change used in the lectures and exercises
of this course. At a few points I deviate somewhat from definitions in Ace-
moglu’s book. Section 1.3 can be used as a formula manual for the case of
CRS.
Second, the chapter contains a brief discussion of the somewhat contro-
versial notions of a representative firm and an aggregate production function.
Regarding the distinction between discrete and continuous time analysis,
most of the definitions contained in this chapter are applicable to both.
23
24 CHAPTER 2. REVIEW OF TECHNOLOGY
(a) ( ) has continuous first- and second-order partial derivatives sat-
isfying:
0 0 (2.2)
0 0 (2.3)
(b) ( ) is strictly quasiconcave (i.e., the level curves, also called iso-
quants, are strictly convex to the origin).
( )
≡ − = 0 (2.5)
| =̄ ( )
That is, measures the amount of that can be saved (approxi-
mately) by applying an extra unit of labor. In turn, this equals the ratio
of the marginal productivities of labor and capital, respectively.2 Since
is neoclassical, by definition is strictly quasi-concave and so the marginal
rate of substitution is diminishing as substitution proceeds, i.e., as the labor
input is further increased along a given isoquant. Notice that this feature
characterizes the marginal rate of substitution for any neoclassical production
function, whatever the returns to scale (see below).
¯
2
The subscript ¯ = ̄ in (2.5) indicates that we are moving along a given isoquant,
( ) = ̄ Expressions like, e.g., ( ) or 2 ( ) mean the partial derivative of
w.r.t. the second argument, evaluated at the point ( )
K/L
F (K , L) Y
MRS KL
L
L
That is, IRS is present if, when all inputs are scaled up by some factor
1, output is scaled up by more than this factor. The existence of gains by
specialization and division of labor, synergy effects, etc. sometimes speak in
support of this assumption, at least up to a certain level of production. The
assumption is also called the economies of scale assumption.
4
In their definition of a neoclassical production function some textbooks add constant
returns to scale as a requirement besides (a) and (b). This course follows the alternative
terminology where, if in a given context an assumption of constant returns to scale is
needed, this is stated as an additional assumption.
That is, DRS is present if, when all inputs are scaled up by some factor,
output is scaled up by less than this factor. This assumption is also called
the diseconomies of scale assumption. The underlying hypothesis may be
that control and coordination problems confine the expansion of size. Or,
considering the “replication argument” below, DRS may simply reflect that
behind the scene there is an additional production factor, for example land
or a irreplaceable quality of management, which is tacitly held fixed, when
the factors of production are varied.
EXAMPLE 1 The production function
= 0 0 1 0 1 (2.8)
sources for departure from CRS may be minor and so many macroeconomists
feel comfortable enough with assuming CRS w.r.t. and alone, at least
as a first approximation. This approximation is, however, less applicable to
poor countries, where natural resources may be a quantitatively important
production factor.
There is a further problem with the replication argument. Strictly speak-
ing, the CRS claim is that by changing all the inputs equiproportionately
by any positive factor, which does not have to be an integer, the firm
should be able to get output changed by the same factor. Hence, the replica-
tion argument requires that indivisibilities are negligible, which is certainly
not always the case. In fact, the replication argument is more an argument
against DRS than for CRS in particular. The argument does not rule out
IRS due to synergy effects as size is increased.
Sometimes the replication line of reasoning is given a more subtle form.
This builds on a useful local measure of returns to scale, named the elasticity
of scale.
The elasticity of scale* To allow for indivisibilities and mixed cases (for
example IRS at low levels of production and CRS or DRS at higher levels),
we need a local measure of returns to scale. One defines the elasticity of
scale, ( ) of at the point ( ) where ( ) 0 as
( ) ∆ ( ) ( )
( ) = ≈ evaluated at = 1
( ) ∆
(2.10)
So the elasticity of scale at a point ( ) indicates the (approximate) per-
centage increase in output when both inputs are increased by 1 percent. We
say that ⎧
⎨ 1 then there are locally IRS,
if ( ) = 1 then there are locally CRS, (2.11)
⎩
1 then there are locally DRS.
The production function may have the same elasticity of scale everywhere.
This is the case if and only if the production function is homogeneous. If
is homogeneous of degree then ( ) = and is called the elasticity
of scale parameter.
Note that the elasticity of scale at a point ( ) will always equal the
sum of the partial output elasticities at that point:
( ) ( )
( ) = + (2.12)
( ) ( )
This follows from the definition in (2.10) by taking into account that
LMC (Y ) LAC (Y )
Y
Y*
( )
= ( ) + ( )
= ( ) + ( ) when evaluated at = 1
(̄ )
(̄ ̄) = (2.13)
(̄ )
where (̄ ) is average costs (the minimum unit cost associated with
producing ̄ ) and (̄ ) is marginal costs at the output level ̄ . The
in and stands for “long-run”, indicating that both capital and
labor are considered variable production factors within the period considered.
At the optimal plant size, ∗ there is equality between and ,
implying a unit elasticity of scale, that is, locally we have CRS. That the long-
run average costs are here portrayed as rising for ̄ ∗ is not essential
for the argument but may reflect either that coordination difficulties are
inevitable or that some additional production factor, say the building site of
the plant, is tacitly held fixed.
Anyway, we have here a more subtle replication argument for CRS w.r.t.
and at the aggregate level. Even though technologies may differ across
plants, the surviving plants in a competitive market will have the same aver-
age costs at the optimal plant size. In the medium and long run, changes in
7
By a “firm” is generally meant the company as a whole. A company may have several
“manufacturing plants” placed at different locations.
aggregate output will take place primarily by entry and exit of optimal-size
plants. Then, with a large number of relatively small plants, each produc-
ing at approximately constant unit costs for small output variations, we can
without substantial error assume constant returns to scale at the aggregate
level. So the argument goes. Notice, however, that even in this form the
replication argument is not entirely convincing since the question of indivis-
ibility remains. The optimal plant size may be large relative to the market
− and is in fact so in many industries. Besides, in this case also the perfect
competition premise breaks down.
(i) marginal costs are constant and equal to average costs (so the right-
hand side of (2.13) equals unity);
(iii) a production function known to exhibit CRS and satisfy property (a)
from the definition of a neoclassical production function above, will au-
tomatically satisfy also property (b) and consequently be neoclassical;
0 () 1
( ) = = 00 () = 00 ()
For a neoclassical production function with CRS, we also have
Indeed, from the mean value theorem9 we know there exists a number ∈
(0 1) such that for any given 0 we have () − (0) = 0 () From this
follows ()− 0 () = (0) ()− 0 () since 0 () 0 () by 00 0.
9
This theorem says that if is continuous in [ ] and differentiable in ( ) then
there exists at least one point in ( ) such that 0 () = ( () − ())( − )
In view of (0) ≥ 0 this establishes (2.16) And from () () − 0 ()
(0) and continuity of follows (2.17).
Under CRS the Inada conditions for can be written
In this case standard parlance is just to say that “ satisfies the Inada con-
ditions”.
An input which must be positive for positive output to arise is called an
essential input; an input which is not essential is called an inessential input.
The second part of (2.18), representing the upper Inada condition for
under CRS, has the implication that labor is an essential input; but capital
need not be, as the production function () = + (1 + ) 0 0
illustrates. Similarly, under CRS the upper Inada condition for implies
that capital is an essential input. These claims are proved in Appendix C.
Combining these results, when both the upper Inada conditions hold and
CRS obtain, then both capital and labor are essential inputs.10
Figure 2.3 is drawn to provide an intuitive understanding of a neoclassical
CRS production function and at the same time illustrate that the lower Inada
conditions are more questionable than the upper Inada conditions. The left
panel of Figure 2.3 shows output per unit of labor for a CRS neoclassical pro-
duction function satisfying the Inada conditions for . The () in the
diagram could for instance represent the Cobb-Douglas function in Example
1 with = 1− i.e., () = The right panel of Figure 2.3 shows a non-
neoclassical case where only two alternative Leontief techniques are available,
technique 1: = min(1 1 ) and technique 2: = min(2 2 ) In the
exposed case it is assumed that 2 1 and 2 1 (if 2 ≥ 1 at the
same time as 2 1 technique 1 would not be efficient, because the same
output could be obtained with less input of at least one of the factors by
shifting to technique 2). If the available and are such that 1 1
or 2 2 , some of either or respectively, is idle. If, however, the
available and are such that 1 1 2 2 it is efficient to combine
the two techniques and use the fraction of and in technique 1 and the
remainder in technique 2, where = (2 2 − )(2 2 − 1 1 ) In this
way we get the “labor productivity curve” OPQR (the envelope of the two
techniques) in Figure 2.3. Note that for → 0 stays equal to 1 ∞
whereas for all 2 2 = 0 A similar feature remains true, when
we consider many, say alternative efficient Leontief techniques available.
Assuming these techniques cover a considerable range w.r.t. the ratios,
10
Given a Cobb-Douglas production function, both production factors are essential
whether we have DRS, CRS, or IRS.
y y
f '(k0 ) Q
f (k 0 ) y f (k ) R
P
f(k0)-f’(k0)k0
k k
O k0 O B1 / A1 B2 / A2
Figure 2.3: Two labor productivity curves based on CRS technologies. Left: neo-
classical technology with Inada conditions for MPK satisfied; the graphical repre-
sentation of MPK and MPL at = 0 .as 0 (0 ) and ( 0 )− 0 (0 )0 are indicated.
Right: a combination of two efficient Leontief techniques.
we get a labor productivity curve looking more like that of a neoclassical CRS
production function. On the one hand, this gives some intuition of what lies
behind the assumption of a neoclassical CRS production function. On the
other hand, it remains true that for all = 011 whereas
for → 0 stays equal to 1 ∞ thus questioning the lower Inada
condition.
The implausibility of the lower Inada conditions is also underlined if we
look at their implication in combination with the more reasonable upper
Inada conditions. Indeed, the four Inada conditions taken together imply,
under CRS, that output has no upper bound when either input goes to
infinity for fixed amount of the other input (see Appendix C).
11
Here we assume the techniques are numbered according to ranking with respect to the
size of
= ( ) (2.22)
Another name for the same is capital-augmenting technological progress (be-
cause here technological change acts as if the capital input were augmented).
Solow’s original concept15 of neutral technological change is not well por-
trayed this way, however, since it is related to the notion of embodied tech-
nological change and capital of different vintages, see below.
It is easily shown (Exercise 2.5) that the Cobb-Douglas production func-
tion (2.8) satisfies all three neutrality criteria at the same time, if it satisfies
one of them (which it does if technological change does not affect and ).
It can also be shown that within the class of neoclassical CRS production
functions the Cobb-Douglas function is the only one with this property (see
Exercise 4.? in Chapter 4).
Note that the neutrality concepts do not say anything about the source
of technological progress, only about the quantitative form in which it ma-
terializes. For instance, the occurrence of Harrod-neutrality should not be
interpreted as indicating that the technological change emanates specifically
from the labor input in some sense. Harrod-neutrality only means that tech-
nological innovations predominantly are such that not only do labor and
capital in combination become more productive, but this happens to man-
ifest itself in the form (2.20). Similarly, if indeed an improvement in the
quality of the labor input occurs, this “labor-specific” improvement may be
manifested in a higher or both.
Before proceeding, we briefly comment on how the capital stock,
is typically measured. While data on gross investment, is available in
national income and product accounts, data on usually is not. One ap-
13
The name refers to the English economist and Nobel Prize laureate John R. Hicks,
1904−1989.
14
The name refers to the American economist and Nobel Prize laureate Robert Solow
(1924−).
15
Solow (1960).
X
= −1 +(1−) [−2 + (1 − )−2 ] = . . . = (1−)−1 − +(1−) −
=1
(2.24)
Based on a long time series for and an estimate of one can insert these
observed values in the formula and calculate , starting from a rough con-
jecture about the initial value − The result will not be very sensitive to
this conjecture since for large the last term in (2.24) becomes very small.
Note that even if technological change does not directly appear in the
production function, that is, even if for instance (2.20) is replaced by
= ( ) the economy may experience a rising standard of living when
is growing over time.
In contrast, disembodied technological change occurs when new technical
and organizational knowledge increases the combined productivity of the pro-
duction factors independently of when they were constructed or educated. If
the appearing in (2.20), (2.21), and (2.22) above refers to the total, histor-
ically accumulated capital stock as calculated by (2.24), then the evolution
of in these expressions can be seen as representing disembodied technolog-
ical change. All vintages of the capital equipment benefit from a rise in the
technology level No new investment is needed to benefit.
Based on data for the U.S. 1950-1990, and taking quality improvements
into account, Greenwood et al. (1997) estimate that embodied technological
progress explains about 60% of the growth in output per man hour. So,
empirically, embodied technological progress seems to play a dominant role.
As this tends not to be fully incorporated in national income accounting at
fixed prices, there is a need to adjust the investment levels in (2.24) to better
take estimated quality improvements into account. Otherwise the resulting
will not indicate the capital stock measured in efficiency units.
= ∗ ( )
and such that the choices of a single firm facing this production function
coincide with the aggregate outcomes, Σ=1 , Σ=1 and Σ=1 in the
original economy. Then ∗ ( ) is called the aggregate production function
where ≡ Hence, facing given factor prices, cost minimizing firms
will choose
P the same P capital intensity = for all From = then
follows = so that = Thence,
X X X
≡ = ( ) = () = () = ( 1) = ( )
Allowing also the existence of different output goods, different capital goods,
and different types of labor makes the issue more intricate, of course. Yet,
if firms are price taking profit maximizers and there are nonincreasing re-
turns to scale, we at least know that the aggregate outcome is as if, for
given prices, the firms jointly maximize aggregate profit on the basis of their
combined production technology (Mas-Colell et al., 1955). The problem is,
however, that the conditions needed for this to imply existence of an ag-
gregate production function which is well-behaved (in the sense of inheriting
simple qualitative properties from its constituent parts) are restrictive.
Nevertheless macroeconomics often treats aggregate output as a single ho-
mogeneous good and capital and labor as being two single and homogeneous
inputs. There was in the 1960s a heated debate about the problems involved
in this, with particular emphasis on the aggregation of different kinds of
equipment into one variable, the capital stock “”. The debate is known
as the “Cambridge controversy” because the dispute was between a group of
16
In his review of the Cambridge controversy Mas-Colell (1989) concluded that: “What
the ‘paradoxical’ comparative statics [of disaggregate capital theory] has taught us is
simply that modelling the world as having a single capital good is not a priori justified.
So be it.”
where ̄ is the size of the installed machinery (a fixed factor in the short
run) measured in efficiency units, is its utilization rate (0 ≤ ≤ 1) and
and are given technical coefficients measuring efficiency.
So in the short run the choice variables are and In fact, essentially
only is a choice variable since efficient production trivially requires =
̄ Under “full capacity utilization” we have = 1 (each machine is
used 24 hours per day seven days per week). “Capacity” is given as ̄ per
week. Producing efficiently at capacity requires = ̄ and the marginal
product by increasing labor input is here nil. But if demand, is less than
capacity, satisfying this demand efficiently requires = (̄) 1 and
= As long as 1 the marginal productivity of labor is a constant,
The various efficient input proportions that are possible ex ante may be
approximately described by a neoclassical CRS production function. Let this
function on intensive form be denoted = () When investment is decided
upon and undertaken, there is thus a choice between alternative efficient pairs
of the technical coefficients and in (2.26). These pairs satisfy
() = = (2.27)
pairs are ( ) = (( ) ( )) = 1 2. . . .17 We say that ex ante,
depending on the relative factor prices as they are “now” and are expected
to evolve in the future, a suitable technique, ( ) is chosen from an
opportunity set described by the given neoclassical production function. But
ex post, i.e., when the equipment corresponding to this technique is installed,
the production opportunities are described by a Leontief production function
with ( ) = ( )
In the picturesque language of Phelps (1963), technology is in this case
putty-clay. Ex ante the technology involves capital which is “putty” in the
sense of being in a malleable state which can be transformed into a range of
various machinery requiring capital-labor ratios of different magnitude. But
once the machinery is constructed, it enters a “hardened” state and becomes
”clay”. Then factor substitution is no longer possible; the capital-labor ra-
tio at full capacity utilization is fixed at the level = as in (2.26).
Following the terminology of Johansen (1972), we say that a putty-clay tech-
nology involves a “long-run production function” which is neoclassical and a
“short-run production function” which is Leontief.
In contrast, the standard neoclassical setup assumes the same range of
substitutability between capital and labor ex ante and ex post. Then the
technology is called putty-putty. This term may also be used if ex post there
is at least some substitutability although less than ex ante. At the opposite
pole of putty-putty we may consider a technology which is clay-clay. Here
neither ex ante nor ex post is factor substitution possible. Table 2.1 gives an
overview of the alternative cases.
least one strict equality), it may pay the firm to invest in the new technol-
ogy at the same time as some old machinery is scrapped. Real wages tend
to rise along with technological progress and the scrapping occurs because
the revenue from using the old machinery in production no longer covers the
associated labor costs.
The clay property ex-post of many technologies is important for short-run
analysis. It implies that there may be non-decreasing marginal productivity
of labor up to a certain point. It also implies that in its investment decision
the firm will have to take expected future technologies and future factor prices
into account. For many issues in long-run analysis the clay property ex-post
may be less important, since over time adjustment takes place through new
investment.
et al. (1997), and Groth and Wendner (2014). Hulten (2001) surveys the
literature and issues related to measurement of the direct contribution of
capital accumulation and technological change, respectively, to productivity
growth.
Conditions ensuring that a representative household is admitted and the
concept of Gorman preferences are discussed in Acemoglu (2009). Another
useful source, also concerning the conditions for the representative firm to be
a meaningful notion, is Mas-Colell et al. (1995). For general discussions of the
limitations of representative agent approaches, see Kirman (1992) and Galle-
gati and Kirman (1999). Reviews of the “Cambridge Controversy” are con-
tained in Mas-Colell (1989) and Felipe and Fisher (2003). The last-mentioned
authors find the conditions required for the well-behavedness of these con-
structs so stringent that it is difficult to believe that actual economies are
in any sense close to satisfy them. For a less distrustful view, see for in-
stance Ferguson (1969), Johansen (1972), Malinvaud (1998), Jorgenson et al.
(2005), and Jones (2005).
It is often assumed that capital depreciation can be described as geomet-
ric (in continuous time exponential) evaporation of the capital stock. This
formula is popular in macroeconomics, more so because of its simplicity than
its realism. An introduction to more general approaches to depreciation is
contained in, e.g., Nickell (1978).
2.6 References
(incomplete)
Brynjolfsson, E., and A. McAfee, 2014, The Second Machine Age, Norton.
Clark, G., 2008, A Farewell to Alms: A Brief Economic History of the
World, Princeton University Press.
Persson, K. G., 2010, An economic history of Europe. Knowledge, insti-
tutions and growth, 600 to the present, Cambridge University Press: Cam-
bridge.
Ruttan, V. W. , 2001, Technology, Growth, and Development: An Induced
Innovation Perspective, Oxford University Press: Oxford.
Smil, V., 2003, Energy at the crossroads. Global perspectives and uncer-
tainties, MIT Press: Cambridge Mass.
+1 − = 0 given,
47
48 CHAPTER 3. CONTINUOUS TIME ANALYSIS
where () is the saving flow at time . For ∆ “small” we have the approx-
imation ∆() ≈ ̇()∆ = ()∆ In particular, for ∆ = 1 we have ∆()
= ( + 1) − () ≈ ()
As time unit choose one year. Going back to discrete time, if wealth
grows at a constant rate 0 per year, then after periods of length one
year, with annual compounding, we have
0 And (3.4) is the solution to the linear differential equation ̇() = ()
given the initial condition (0) = 0 Now consider a time-dependent growth
rate, () The corresponding differential equation is ̇() = ()() and it
has the solution
() = (0) 0 ( ) (3.5)
R
where the exponent, 0 ( ) , is the definite integral of the function ( )
from 0 to The result (3.5) is called the basic accumulation formula in
continuous time and the factor 0 ( ) is called the growth factor or the
accumulation factor.
where () ≡ ̇ () () is the instantaneous inflation rate. In contrast to the
corresponding formula in discrete time, this formula is exact. Sometimes ()
and () are referred to as the nominal and real interest intensity, respectively,
or the nominal and real force of interest.
Calculating the terminal value of the deposit at time 1 0 given its
value at time 0 and assuming no withdrawal in the time interval [0 1 ], the
accumulation formula (3.5) immediately yields
1
()
(1 ) = (0 ) 0
0 is Z 1
= () − (3.7)
0
where () is the capital stock, () is the gross investment at time and
≥ 0 is the (physical) capital depreciation rate. Unlike in discrete time, here
1 is conceptually allowed. Indeed, suppose for simplicity that () = 0
for all ≥ 0; then (3.8) gives () = 0 − . This formula is meaningful for
any ≥ 0 Usually, the time unit used in continuous time macro models is
one year (or, in business cycle theory, rather a quarter of a year) and then a
realistic value of is of course 1 (say, between 0.05 and 0.10). However, if
the time unit applied to the model is large (think of a Diamond-style OLG
model), say 30 years, then 1 may fit better, empirically, if the model
is converted into continuous time with the same time unit. Suppose, for
example, that physical capital has a half-life of 10 years. With 30 years as
our time unit, inserting into the formula 12 = −3 gives = (ln 2) · 3 ' 2
In many simple macromodels, where the level of aggregation is high, the
relative price of a unit of physical capital in terms of the consumption good
is 1 and thus constant. More generally, if we let the relative price of the
capital good in terms of the consumption good at time be () and allow
̇() 6= 0 then we have to distinguish between the physical depreciation
of capital, and the economic depreciation, that is, the loss in economic
value of a machine per time unit. The economic depreciation will be () =
() − ̇() namely the economic value of the physical wear and tear (and
technological obsolescence, say) minus the capital gain (positive or negative)
on the machine.
Other variables and parameters that by definition are bounded from below
in discrete time analysis, but not so in continuous time analysis, include rates
of return and discount rates in general.
s (t )
s(t0 )
t
0 t0 t 0 t
Figure 3.1: With ∆ “small” the integral of () from 0 to 0 +∆ is ≈ the hatched
area.
[0, ∞). For example, when we say that () is “investment” at time ,
this is really a short-hand for “investment intensity” at time . The actual
investment in a time interval [0 0 + ∆) i.e., the invested amount during
R +∆
this time interval, is the integral, 00 () ≈ (0 )∆ Similarly, the flow
of individual saving, () should be interpreted as the saving intensity at
time The actual saving in a time interval [0 0 + ∆) i.e., the saved (or
R +∆
accumulated) amount during this time interval, is the integral, 00 ()
If ∆ is “small”, this integral is approximately equal to the product (0 )· ∆,
cf. the hatched area in Figure 3.1.
The notation commonly used in discrete time analysis blurs the distinc-
tion between stocks and flows. Expressions like +1 = + without further
comment, are usual. Seemingly, here a stock, wealth, and a flow, saving, are
added. In fact, however, it is wealth at the beginning of period and the
saved amount during period that are added: +1 = + · ∆. The tacit
condition is that the period length, ∆ is the time unit, so that ∆ = 1.
But suppose that, for example in a business cycle model, the period length
is one quarter, but the time unit is one year. Then saving in quarter is
= (+1 − ) · 4 per year.
+1 − =
Proof. Taking logs on both sides of the equation () = ()() gives ln ()
= ln () + ln (). Differentiation w.r.t. , using the chain rule, gives the
conclusion. ¤
In continuous time these simple formulas are exactly true. In discrete time
the analogue formulas are only approximately true and the approximation
can be quite bad unless the growth rates of and are small.
Special case: () = with 6= − and initial condition (0 ) = 0
Solution:
Z
−(−0 ) −(−0 ) (−0 )
() = 0 + (+)(−0 ) = (0 − )−(−0 ) +
0 + +
The remaining sections discuss the concept of balanced growth and present
three fundamental propositions about balanced growth. In view of the gen-
erality of the propositions, they have a broad field of application. Our propo-
sitions 1 and 2 are slight extensions of part 1 and 2, respectively, of what
Acemoglu calls Uzawa’s Theorem I (Acemoglu, 2009, p. 60). Our Proposi-
tion 3 essentially corresponds to what Acemoglu calls Uzawa’s Theorem II
(Acemoglu, 2009, p. 63).
57
CHAPTER 4. SKILL-BIASED TECHNICAL CHANGE.
58 BALANCED GROWTH THEOREMS
respectively.
In the US the skill premium (measured by the wage ratio for college
grads vis-a-vis high school grads) has had an upward trend since 1950 (see
for instance Jones and Romer, 2010).1 If in the same period the relative
supply of skilled labor had been roughly constant, by (4.3) in combination
with (4.2), a possible explanation could be that technological change has
been skill-biased in the sense of Hicks. In reality, in the same period also the
relative supply of skilled labor has been rising (in fact even faster than the
skill premium). Since in spite of this the skill premium has risen, it suggests
that the extend of “skill-biasedness” has been even stronger.
We may alternatively put it this way. As the function is CRS-neoclassical
w.r.t. 1 and 2 we have 22 0 and 12 0 cf. Chapter 2. Hence, by
(4.2), a rising 2 1 without technical change would imply a declining skill
premium. That the opposite has happened must, within our simple model,
be due to (a) there has been technical change, and (b) technical change
has favoured skilled labor (which means that technical change has been skill-
biased in the sense of Hicks).
An additional aspect of the story is that skill-biasedness helps explain
the observed increase in the relative supply of skilled labor. If for a constant
relative supply of skilled labor, the skill premium is increasing, this increase
strengthens the incentive to go to college. Thereby the relative supply of
skilled labor (reflecting the fraction of skilled labor in the labor force) tends
to increase.
where 1 and 2 are technical coefficients that may be rising over time.
In this production function capital and unskilled labor are perfectly substi-
tutable (the partial elasticity of factor substitution between them is +∞) On
the other hand there is direct complementarity between capital and skilled
labor, i.e., 2 (2 ) 0
Under perfect competition the skill premium is
Here, if technical change is absent (1 and 2 constant), a rising capital
stock will, for fixed 1 and 2 raise the skill premium.
A more realistic scenario is, however, a situation with an approximately
constant real interest rate, cf. Kaldor’s stylized facts. We have, again by
perfect competition,
µ ¶−1
−1 1− + 1 1
= ( + 1 1 ) (2 2 ) = = + (4.5)
2 2
where is the real interest rate at time and is the (constant) capital
depreciation rate. For = a constant, (4.5) gives
µ ¶− 1−
1
+ 1 1 +
= ≡ (4.6)
2 2
to “balanced growth” this implies a minor deviation from the way Acemoglu
briefly defines it informally on his page 57. The main purpose of the present
chapter is to lay bare the connections between these two concepts as well
as their relation to the hypothesis of Harrod-neutral technical progress and
Kaldor’s stylized facts.
Definition 4 A balanced growth path is a path ( )∞ =0 along which the
quantities and are positive and grow at constant rates (not necessarily
positive and not necessarily the same).
̇ +
= = +
so that is constant. This, together with constancy of and
implies that also and are constant. ¤
The nice feature is that this proposition holds for any model for which
the simple dynamic resource constraint (4.7) is valid. No assumptions about
for example CRS and other technology aspects or about market form are
involved. Note also that Proposition 1 suggests a link from balanced growth
to steady state. And such a link is present in for instance the Solow model.
Indeed, by (i) of Proposition 1, balanced growth implies constancy of
which in the Solow model implies that (̃)̃ is constant. In turn, the latter
is only possible if ̃ is constant, that is, if the economy is in steady state.
There exist cases, however, where this equivalence does not hold (some
open economy models and some models with embodied technological change,
see Groth et al., 2010). Therefore, it is recommendable always to maintain
a distinction between the terms steady state and balanced growth.
Proposition 2 (Uzawa’s balanced growth theorem) Let = ( () () ())∞ =0 ,
where 0 () () for all ≥ 0 be a path satisfying the capital accumu-
lation equation (4.7), given the CRS-production function (4.9) and the labor
force path in (4.10). Then:
(i) a necessary condition for this path to be a balanced growth path is that
along the path it holds that
where we have used (4.9) with = 0 In view of the precondition that ()
≡ () − () 0 we know from (i) of Proposition 1, that is constant
so that = . By CRS, (*) then implies
() = ̃ (() − () − 0) = ̃ (() ( −) () 0)
(ii) Suppose (4.11) holds with () = Let 0 be given such that
there is a + + with the property that
for some constant ̃ 0 Our strategy is to prove the claim in (ii) by con-
struction of a path = ( () () ())∞ =0 which satisfies it. We let
be such that the saving-income ratio is a constant ≡ ( + + ), i.e.,
() − () ≡ () = () for all ≥ 0 Inserting this, together with () =
(̃())()(), where (̃()) ≡ ̃ (̃() 1 0) and ̃() ≡ ()(()())
into (4.7), we get the Solow equation (4.8). Hence ̃() is constant if and
only if ̃() satisfies the equation (̃())̃() = ( + + ) ≡ By (**)
and the definition of the required value of ̃() is ̃ which is thus the
steady-state for the constructed Solow equation. Letting (0) satisfy (0)
= ̃(0) where = (0) we thus have ̃(0) = (0)((0)(0)) = ̃ So
that the initial value of ̃() equals the steady state value. It now follows
that ̃() = ̃ for all ≥ 0 and so ()() = (̃())̃() = (̃)̃ =
for all ≥ 0 In addition, () = (1 − ) () so that () () is constant
along the path By (ii) of Proposition 1 now follows that the path is a
balanced growth path, as was to be proved. ¤
The form (4.11) indicates that along a balanced growth path, technical
progress must be purely “labor augmenting”, that is, Harrod-neutral. It is in
this case convenient to define a new CRS function, by (() ()())
≡ ̃ (() ()() 0) Then (i) of the proposition implies that at least along
the balanced growth path, we can rewrite the production function this way:
First, notice that there is an asymmetry between capital and labor. Capital
is an accumulated amount of non-consumed output. In contrast, in simple
macro models labor is a non-produced production factor which (at least in
the context of (4.10)) grows in an exogenous way. Second, because of CRS,
the original formulation, (4.9), of the production function implies that
() ()
1 = ̃ ( ) (4.13)
() ()
Denoting the (gross) capital income share by () we can write this ()
(in equilibrium) in three ways:
where the first row comes from (4.16), the second from (4.14) and (4.15), the
third from the second together with Euler’s theorem.9 Comparing the first
and the last row, we see that in equilibrium
()
= () +
()
then equals the constant 0 (̃∗ ) along the BGP. It then follows from (4.17)
that () = 0 (̃∗ ) ≡ Moreover, 0 1 where 0 follows from
0 0 and 1 from the fact that = = (̃ ∗ )̃∗ 0 (̃∗ ) in view
of 00 0 and (0) ≥ 0 Then, by the first equality in (4.17), ()() ()
= 1 − () = 1 − . Finally, by (4.16), the (net) rate of return on capital is
= (1 − ()() ()) ()() − = − ¤
Here () − () is aggregate gross investment, () For a given level of ()
the resulting amount of new capital goods per time unit (̇()+()), mea-
sured in efficiency units, is independent of when this investment occurs. It is
thereby not affected by technological progress. Similarly, the interpretation
of ̃ 0 in (4.19) is that the higher technology level obtained as time
proceeds results in higher productivity of all capital and labor. Thus also
11
As to there is of course a trivial exception, namely the case where the production
function is Cobb-Douglas and therefore is a given parameter.
firms that have only old capital equipment benefit from recent advances in
technical knowledge. No new investment is needed to take advantage of the
recent technological and organizational developments.12
In contrast, we say that technological change is embodied, if taking ad-
vantage of new technical knowledge requires construction of new investment
goods. The newest technology is incorporated in the design of newly pro-
duced equipment; and this equipment will not participate in subsequent
technological progress. Whatever the source of new technical knowledge,
investment becomes an important bearer of the productivity increases which
this new knowledge makes possible. Without new investment, the potential
productivity increases remain potential instead of being realized.
As also noted in Chapter 2, we may represent embodied technological
progress (also called investment-specific technological change) by writing cap-
ital accumulation in the following way,
where () is gross investment at time and () measures the “quality”
(productivity) of newly produced investment goods. The increasing level of
technology implies increasing () so that a given level of investment gives
rise to a greater and greater additions to the capital stock, measured
in efficiency units. As in our aggregate framework, capital goods can be
produced at the same minimum cost as one consumption good, we have · =
1 where is the equilibrium price of capital goods in terms of consumption
goods. So embodied technological progress is likely to result in a steady
decline in the relative price of capital equipment, a prediction confirmed by
the data (see, e.g., Greenwood et al., 1997).
This raises the question how the propositions 1, 2, and 3 fare in the case
of embodied technological progress. The answer is that a generalized version
of Proposition 1 goes through. Essentially, we only need to replace (4.7) by
(13.13) and interpret in Proposition 1 as the value of the capital stock,
i.e., we have to replace by ̃ =
But the concept of Harrod-neutrality no longer fits the situation with-
out further elaboration. Hence to obtain analogies to Proposition 2 and
Proposition 3 is a more complicated matter. Suffice it to say that with em-
bodied technological progress, the class of production functions that are con-
sistent with balanced growth is smaller than with disembodied technological
progress.
12
In the standard versions of the Solow model and the Ramsey model it is assumed that
all technological progress has this form - for no other reason than that this is by far the
simplest case to analyze.
4.7 References
Acemoglu, D., 2009, Introduction to Modern Economic Growth, Princeton
University Press: Oxford.
Groth, C., K.-J. Koch, and Thomas Steger, 2010, When growth is less than
exponential, Economic Theory 44, 213-242.
Jones, C. I., 2005, The shape of production functions and the direction of
technical change. Quarterly Journal of Economics, no. 2, 517-549.
Jones, C. I., and P. M. Romer, 2010, The new Kaldor facts: Ideas, insti-
tutions, population, and human capital, American Economic Journal:
Macroeconomics, vol. 2 (1), 224-245. Cursory.
Stokey, N.L., 1996, Free trade, factor returns, and factor accumulation, J.
Econ. Growth, vol. 1 (4), 421-447.
Uzawa, H., 1961, Neutral inventions and the stability of growth equilibrium,
Review of Economic Studies 28, No. 2, 117-124.
5.1 Introduction
This chapter discusses the concepts of Total Factor Productivity, TFP, and
TFP growth, and ends up with three warnings regarding uncritical use of
them.
First, however, we should provide a precise definition of the TFP level
which is in fact a tricky concept. Unfortunately, Acemoglu (p. 78) does
not make a clear distinction between TFP level and TFP growth. Moreover,
Acemoglu’s point of departure (p. 77) assumes a priori that the way the pro-
duction function is time-dependent can be represented by a one-dimensional
index, () The TFP concept and the applicability of growth accounting
are, however, not limited to this case.
For convenience, we treat time as continuous (although the timing of the
variables is indicated merely by a subscript).1
1
I thank Niklas Brønager for useful discussions related to this chapter.
75
CHAPTER 5. GROWTH ACCOUNTING AND THE CONCEPT
76 OF TFP: SOME WARNINGS
2
Natural resources (land, oil wells, coal in the ground, etc.) constitute a third primary
production factor. The role of this factor is in growth accounting often subsumed under
.
3
Sometimes in growth accounting the left-hand side variable, in (5.2) is the gross
product rather than value added. Then non-durable intermediate inputs should be taken
into account as a third production factor and enter as an additional argument of ̃ in
(5.2). Since non-market production is difficult to measure, the government sector is usually
excluded from in (5.2). Total Factor Productivity is by some authors called Multifactor
Productivity and abbreviated MFP.
4
Cf. Section 2.2 in Chapter 2.
TFP, = −( ( ) − ( 0)) −( ( )− ( 0))
So the growth rate of TFP equals the growth rate of the joint-productivity
index corrected for the cumulative impact of technical change since time 0
on the direct contribution to time- output growth from time- input growth.
This impact comes about when the output elasticities w.r.t. capital and la-
bor, respectively, are affected by technical change, that is, when ( )
6= ( 0) and/or ( ) 6= ( 0)
Under Hicks-neutral technical change there will be no correction because
the output elasticities are independent of technical change. In this case TFP
coincides with the index In the absence of Hicks-neutrality the two indices
differ. This is why we in Section 2.2 characterized the TFP level as the
cumulative “direct contribution” to output since time 0 from cumulative
technical change, thus excluding the possible indirect contribution coming
about via the potential effect of technical change on the output elasticities
w.r.t. capital and labor and thereby on the contribution to output from input
growth.
Given that the joint-productivity index is the more intuitive joint-
productivity measure, why is TFP the more popular measure? There are at
least two reasons for this. First, it can be shown that the TFP measure has
more convenient balanced growth properties. Second, is more difficult to
measure. To see this we substitute (5.3) into (5.10) to get
by using data on prices and quantities alone, that is, without knowledge
of the production function. To evaluate , however, we need estimates
of the hypothetical output elasticities, ( 0) and ( 0) This
requires knowledge about how the output elasticities depend on the factor
combination and time, respectively, that is, knowledge about the production
function.
Now to the warnings concerning application of the TFP measure.
where () is a neoclassical production function with CRS and is the level
of labor-augmenting technology which, for simplicity, we assume shared by
all the countries (these are open and “close” to each other). So technical
progress is Harrod-neutral. Let the growth rate of be a constant 0
Many models imply that ̃ ≡ ( ) tends to a constant, ̃∗ , in the long
run, which we assume is also the case here. Then, for → ∞ ≡
≡ ̃ where ̃ → ̃∗ and ≡ ≡ ̃ where ̃ → ̃∗ = () (̃∗ );
here () is the production function on intensive form. So in the long run
and tend to = .
Formula (5.4) then gives the TFP growth rate of country in the long
run as
TFP = − (∗ + (1 − ∗ ) ) = − − ∗ ( − )
= − ∗ = (1 − ∗ ) (5.12)
where ∗ is the output elasticity w.r.t. capital, ()0 (̃ )̃ () (̃ ) evaluated
at ̃ = ̃∗ Under labor-augmenting technical progress, the TFP growth rate
thus varies negatively with the output elasticity w.r.t. capital (the capital
income share under perfect competition). Owing to differences in product
and industry composition, the countries have different ∗ ’s. In view of (5.12),
for two different countries, and we get
⎧
⎨ ∞ if ∗ ∗
→ 1 if ∗ = ∗ (5.13)
⎩ ∗ ∗
0 if
priority over the others w.r.t. a causal role. And there are important omitted
variables. There are simple illustrations in Exercises III.1 and III.2.
In a complete model with exogenous technical progress, part of will
be induced by this technical progress. If technical progress is endogenous
through learning by investing, as in Arrow (1962), there is mutual causa-
tion between and technical progress. Yet another kind of model might
explain both technical progress and capital accumulation through R&D, cf.
the survey by Barro (1999).
5.6 References
Antràs, P., 2004, Is the U.S. aggregate production function Cobb-Douglas?
New estimates of the elasticity of substitution, Contributions to Macro-
economics, vol. 4, no. 1, 1-34.
Attfield, C., and J.R.W. temple, 2010, Balanced growth and the great ratios:
New evidence for the US and UK, J. of Macroeconomics, vol. 32, 937-
956.
Hulten, C.R., 2001, Total factor productivity. A short biography. In: Hul-
ten, C.R., E.R. Dean, and M. Harper (eds.), New Developments in
Productivity Analysis, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2001, 1-
47.
Solow, R.M., 1957, Technical change and the aggregate production function,
Review of Economics and Statistics, vol. 39, 312-20.
Transitional dynamics.
Barro-style growth regressions
In this chapter we discuss three issues, all of which are related to the transi-
tional dynamics of a growth model:
Do poor countries necessarily tend to approach their steady state from
below?
How fast (or rather how slow) are the transitional dynamics in a growth
model?
What exactly is the theoretical foundation for a Barro-style growth
regression analysis?
The Solow growth model may serve as the analytical point of departure
for the …rst two issues and to some extent also for the third.
83
CHAPTER 6. TRANSITIONAL DYNAMICS. BARRO-STYLE
84 GROWTH REGRESSIONS
ỹ
(δ + g + n)k̃
f k̃
sf k̃
ỹ ∗
k̃
k̃ ∗ k̃0
Then there exists a unique non-trivial steady state, k~ > 0; that is, a unique
positive solution to the equation
sf (k~ ) = ( + g + n)k~ : (6.2)
Furthermore, given an arbitrary k~0 > 0; we have for all t 0;
~ T 0 for k(t)
k(t) ~ S k~ ; (6.3)
ỹ
(δ + g + n)
k̃
s
f k̃
ỹ ∗
k̃
k̃ ∗ k̃0
S
K
gk̃
δ+g+n
f (k̃)
s
k̃
k̃
k̃0 k̃ ∗
K @Y k~ 0 ~ ~
= f (k) "(k); (6.4)
Y @K ~
f (k)
~ < 1 for all k~ > 0:
where 0 < "(k)
(small y(0) = f (k~0 )A0 ) will be the countries with relatively small initial
capital-labor ratio, k0 : As all the countries in the group have approximately
the same A0 ; the poorer countries thus have k~0 k0 =A0 relatively small, i.e.,
k~0 < k~ . From y Y =L ~
y~A = f (k)A follows that the growth rate in
output per worker of these poor countries tends to exceed g: Indeed, we have
generally (for instance in the Solow model as well as the Ramsey model)
y_ y~ ~ k~
f 0 (k)
= +g = + g T g for k~ T 0; i.e., for k~ S k~ :
y y~ ~
f (k)
So, within the group, the poor countries tend to approach the steady state,
k~ ; from below.
The countries in the world as a whole, however, di¤er a lot w.r.t. their
structural characteristics, including their A0 : Unconditional convergence is
de…nitely rejected by the data. Then there is no reason to expect the poorer
countries to have k~0 < k~ rather than k~0 > k~ . Indeed, according to the
mentioned study by Cho and Graham (1996), it turns out that the data for
the relatively poor countries favors the latter inequality rather than the …rst.
6.3.1 ~
Convergence speed for k(t)
~ to (k(t)
The ratio of k(t) ~ k~ ) 6= 0 can be written
~
k(t) ~
d(k(t) k~ )=dt
= ; (6.5)
~
k(t) k~ ~
k(t) k~
d ~
k(t) k~ =dt ~
~ d(k(t) k~ )=dt
SOCt (k) = ; (6.6)
~
k(t) k~ ~
k(t) k~
k~ = '(k)
~ (sf 0 (k~ ) m)(k~ k~ )
sf 0 (k~ )
= ( 1)m(k~ k~ )
m
k~ f (k~ )
0
~
d(k(t) k~ )=dt ~
k(t)
~ =
SOCt (k) = (1 "(k~ ))( +g+n) (k~ ) > 0:
~
k(t) k~ ~
k(t) k~
(6.7)
This result tells us how fast, approximately, the economy approaches its
steady state if it starts “close” to it. If, for example, (k~ ) = 0:02 per year,
~ and k~ vanishes per year. We also see
then 2 percent of the gap between k(t)
that everything else equal, a higher output elasticity w.r.t. capital implies a
lower speed of convergence.
In the limit, for k~ k~ ! 0; the instantaneous speed of convergence
coincides with what is called the asymptotic speed of convergence, de…ned as
~
SOC (k) ~ = (k~ ):
lim SOCt (k) (6.8)
jk~ ~ j!0
k
~ ~ )t
k(t) k~ ~
(k(0) k~ )e (k
: (6.9)
This is the approximative time path for the gap between k(t) ~ and k~ and
shows how the gap becomes smaller and smaller at the rate (k~ ).
One of the reasons that the speed of convergence is important is that it
indicates what weight should be placed on transitional dynamics of a growth
model relative to the steady-state behavior. The speed of convergence mat-
ters for instance for the evaluation of growth-promoting policies. In growth
models with diminishing marginal productivity of production factors, suc-
cessful growth-promoting policies have transitory growth e¤ects and perma-
nent level e¤ects. Slower convergence implies that the full bene…ts are slower
to arrive.
6.3.2 ~
Convergence speed for log k(t) *
We have found an approximate expression for the convergence speed of k: ~
Since models in empirical analysis and applied theory are often based on log-
linearization, we might ask what the speed of convergence of log k~ is. The
answer is: approximately the same and asymptotically exactly the same as
that of k~ itself! Let us see why.
~ around k~ = k~ gives
A …rst-order Taylor approximation of log k(t)
~ 1 ~
log k(t) log k~ + (k(t) k~ ): (6.10)
~
k
By de…nition
~
d(log k(t) log k~ )=dt ~
dk(t)=dt
~ =
SOCt (log k) =
~
log k(t) log k~ ~
k(t)(log ~
k(t) log k~ )
~
dk(t)=dt k~
= ~ ! SOC (k)
SOCt (k) ~ = (k~ )(6.11)
~
k(t)
~
k(t) ~
k ~
k(t)
~
k
~
for k(t) ! k~ ;
where in the second line we have used, …rst, the approximation (6.10), second,
the de…nition in (6.7), and third, the de…nition in (6.8).
So, at least in a neighborhood of the steady state, the instantaneous rate
of decline of the logarithmic distance of k~ to the steady-state value of k~
approximates the instantaneous rate of decline of the distance of k~ itself to
its steady-state value. The asymptotic speed of convergence of log k~ coincides
with that of k~ itself and is exactly (k~ ):
In the Cobb-Douglas case (where "(k~ ) is a constant, say ) it is possible
to …nd an explicit solution to the Solow model, see Acemoglu p. 53 and
Exercise II.2. It turns out that the instantaneous speed of convergence in a
…nite distance from the steady state is a constant and equals the asymptotic
speed of convergence, (1 )( + g + n):
y(t) y~(t)
log = log = log y~(t) log y~
y (t) y~
1
log y~ + (~ y (t) y ) log y~ (…rst-order Taylor approx. of log y~ )
y~
1 ~
= (f (k(t)) f (k~ ))
f (k~ )
1
(f (k~ ) + f 0 (k~ )(k(t)
~ k~ ) f (k~ )) (…rst-order approx. of f (k))
~
f (k~ )
k~ f 0 (k~ ) k(t)
~ k~ ~
k(t) k~
= "(k~ )
f (k~ ) k~ k~
"(k~ )(log k(t)
~ log k~ ) (by (6.10)). (6.14)
~
Multiplying through by (log k(t) log k~ ) in (6.11) and carrying out the
di¤erentiation w.r.t. time, we …nd an approximate expression for the growth
~
rate of k;
~
dk(t)=dt k~
gk~ (t) ~
SOCt (k)(log ~
k(t) log k~ )
~
k(t) ~
k(t)
! (k~ )(log k(t)
~ log k~ ) for k(t)
~ ! k~ ; (6.15)
where the convergence follows from the last part of (6.11). We now calculate
the time derivative on both sides of (6.14) to get
y(t) y~(t) d~
y (t)=dt
d(log )=dt = d(log )=dt = gy~(t)
y (t) y~ y~(t)
"(k~ )g~ (t) "(k~ ) (k~ )(log k(t)
k
~ log k~ ): (6.16)
d(log yy(t)
(t)
)=dt d(log yy(t)
(t)
log 1)=dt y
y(t)
= y(t)
SOCt (log ) (k~ ); (6.17)
log log log 1 y
y (t) y (t)
What about the speed of convergence of y(t)=y (t) itself? Here the same
principle as in (6.11) applies. The asymptotic speed of convergence for
log(y(t)=y (t)) is the same as that for y(t)=y (t) (and vice versa), namely
(k~ ):
With one year as our time unit, standard parameter values are: g = 0:02;
n = 0:01; = 0:05; and "(k~ ) = 1=3: We then get (k~ ) = (1 "(k~ ))( +g+n)
= 0:053 per year. In the empirical Chapter 11 of Barro and Sala-i-Martin
(2004), it is argued that a lower value of (k~ ); say 0.02 per year, …ts the data
better. This requires "(k~ ) = 0:75: Such a high value of "(k~ ) ( the income
share of capital) may seem di¢ cult to defend. But if we reinterpret K in
the Solow model so as to include human capital (skills embodied in human
beings and acquired through education and learning by doing), a value of
"(k~ ) at that level may not be far out.
~
k( !) k~ ~ ! ) k~
k(
= =1 !; (6.18)
~
k(0) k~ ~
k(0) k~
~ ~ )
k( !) k~ ~
(k(0) k~ )e (k !
:
log(1 !)
! : (6.19)
(k~ )
Often we consider the half-life of the adjustment, that is, the time it
takes for half of the initial gap to be eliminated. To …nd the half-life of the
adjustment of k;~ we put ! = 1 in (6.19). Again we use one year as our time
2
unit. With the parameter values from Section 6.3.3, we have (k~ ) = 0:053
per year and thus
log 12 0:69
1 = 13; 1 years.
2 0:053 0:053
log 12 0:69
1 = 34:7 years.
2 0:02 0:02
And the time needed to eliminate three quarters of the initial distance to
steady state, 3=4 ; will then be about 70 years (= 2 35 years, since 1 3=4 =
1 1
2 2
).
Among empirical analysts there is not general agreement about the size of
~
(k ). Some authors, for example Islam (1995), using a panel data approach,
…nd speeds of convergence considerably larger, between 0:05 and 0:09. Mc-
Quinne and Whelan (2007) get similar results. There is a growing realization
that the speed of convergence di¤ers across periods and groups of countries.
Perhaps an empirically reasonable range is 0:02 < (k~ ) < 0:09: Correspond-
ingly, a reasonable range for the half-life of the adjustment will be 7:6 years
< 1 < 34:7 years.
2
Most of the empirical studies of convergence use a variety of cross-country
regression analysis of the kind described in the next section. Yet the theoret-
ical frame of reference is often the Solow model - or its extension with human
capital (Mankiw et al., 1992). These models are closed economy models with
exogenous technical progress and deal with “within-country”convergence. It
is not obvious that they constitute an appropriate framework for studying
cross-country convergence in a globalized world where capital mobility and to
some extent also labor mobility are important and where some countries are
pushing the technological frontier further out, while others try to imitate and
catch up. At least one should be aware that the empirical estimates obtained
may re‡ect mechanisms in addition to the falling marginal productivity of
capital in the process of capital accumulation.
~ = s(k(t))f
k(t) ~ ~
(k(t)) ( + g + n)k(t); ~
k(0) = k~0 > 0; given, (6.20)
~
where k(t) K(t)=(A(t)L(t)); A(t) = A0 egt ; and L(t) = L0 ent as above.
~
The Solow model is the special case where the saving-income ratio, s(k(t));
is a constant s 2 (0; 1):
It is assumed that the model, (6.20), generates monotonic convergence,
~ ! k~ > 0 for t ! 1: Applying again a …rst-order Taylor approxi-
i.e., k(t)
~ now may depend
mation, as in Section 3.1, and taking into account that s(k)
on k;~ as for instance it generally does in the Ramsey model, we …nd the
asymptotic speed of convergence for k~ to be
~ = (1
SOC (k) "(k~ ) (k~ ))( + g + n) (k~ ) > 0; (*)
where (k~ ) k~ s0 (k~ )=s(k~ ) is the elasticity of the saving-income ratio w.r.t.
the e¤ective capital intensity, evaluated at k~ = k~ : (In case of the Ramsey
model, one can alternatively use the fact that SOC (k) ~ equals the absolute
value of the negative eigenvalue of the Jacobian matrix associated with the
dynamic system of the model, evaluated in the steady state. For a fully
speci…ed Ramsey model this eigenvalue can be numerically calculated by an
appropriate computer algorithm; in the Cobb-Douglas case there exists even
an explicit algebraic formula for the eigenvalue, see Barro and Sala-i-Martin,
2004). In a neighborhood of the steady state, the previous formulas remain
valid with (k~ ) de…ned as in (*). The asymptotic speed of convergence of for
example y(t)=y (t) is thus (k~ ) as given in (*). For notational convenience,
where the last approximation comes from (6.14). This generalizes Acemoglu’s
Equation (3.10) (recall that Acemoglu concentrates on the Solow model and
that his k is the same as our k~ ):
With the horizontal axis representing time, Figure 6.4 gives an illustration
of these transitional dynamics. As gy (t) = d log y(t)=dt and g = d log y (t)=dt;
(6.22) is equivalent to
d(log y(t) log y (t))
(log y(t) log y (t)): (6.23)
dt
So again we have a simple di¤erential equation of the form x(t)_ = x(t); the
solution of which is x(t) = x(0)e t : The solution of (6.23) is thus
t
log y(t) log y (t) (log y(0) log y (0))e :
The solid curve in Figure 6.4 depicts the evolution of log y(t) in the case
where k~0 < k~ (note that log y (0) = log f (k~ ) + log A0 ). The dotted curve
exempli…es the case where k~0 > k~ . The …gure illustrates per capita income
convergence: low initial income is associated with a high subsequent growth
rate which, however, diminishes along with the diminishing logarithmic dis-
tance of per capita income to its level on the steady state path.
For convenience, we will from now on treat (6.24) as an equality. Sub-
tracting log y(0) on both sides, we get
t
log y(t) log y(0) = log y (0) log y(0) + gt + (log y(0) log y (0))e
= gt (1 e t )(log y(0) log y (0)):
log y (t )
log y *(t )
g
log A0 log f (k *)
Figure 6.4: Evolution of log y(t). Solid curve: the case k~0 < k~ . Dotted curve: the
case k~0 > k~ . Stippled line: the steady-state path.
On the left-hand side appears the average compound annual growth rate of
y from period 0 to period t; which we will denote gy (0; t): On the right-hand
side appears the initial distance of log y to its hypothetical level along the
steady state path. The coe¢ cient, (1 e t )=t; to this distance is negative
and approaches zero for t ! 1: Thus (6.25) is a translation into growth
form of the convergence of log yt towards the steady-state path, log yt ; in the
theoretical model without shocks. Rearranging the right-hand side, we get
t t
1 e 1 e
gy (0; t) = g + log y (0) log y(0) b0 + b1 log y(0);
t t
where both the constant b0 g + (1 e t )=t log y (0) and the coe¢ cient
b1 (1 e t )=t are determined by “structural characteristics”. Indeed,
is determined by ; g; n; "(k~ ); and (k~ ) through (6.21), and y (0) is de-
termined by A0 and f (k~ ) through (6.12), where, in turn, k~ is determined
by the steady state condition s(k~ )f (k~ ) = ( + g + n)k~ ; s(k~ ) being the
saving-income ratio in the steady state.
With data for N countries, i = 1; 2;. . . ; N; a test of the unconditional
convergence hypothesis may be based on the regression equation
where i is the error term. This can be seen as a Barro growth regression
equation in its simplest form. For countries in the entire world, the theoret-
ical hypothesis b1 < 0 is clearly not supported (or, to use the language of
statistics, the null hypothesis, b1 = 0; is not rejected).2
Allowing for the considered countries having di¤erent structural charac-
teristics, the Barro growth regression equation takes the form
In this “…xed e¤ects” form, the equation has been applied for a test of the
conditional convergence hypothesis, b1 < 0; often supporting this hypothesis.
That is, within groups of countries with similar characteristics (like, e.g., the
OECD countries), there is a tendency to convergence.
From the estimate of b1 the implied estimate of the asymptotic speed of
convergence, ; is readily obtained through the formula b1 (1 e t )=t:
1
Even ; and therefore also the slope, b ; does depend, theoretically, on
country-speci…c structural characteristics. But the sensitivity on these do
not generally seem large enough to blur the analysis based on (6.27) which
abstracts from this dependency.
With the aim of testing hypotheses about growth determinants, Barro
(1991) and Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1992, 2004) decompose b0i so as to re‡ect
the role of a set of potentially causal measurable variables,
where the ’s are the coe¢ cients and the x’s are the potentially causal vari-
ables.3 These variables could be measurable Solow-type parameters among
those appearing in (6.20) or a broader set of determinants, including for in-
stance the educational level in the labor force, and institutional variables like
rule of law and democracy. Some studies include the initial within-country
inequality in income or wealth among the x’s and extend the theoretical
framework correspondingly.4
From an econometric point of view there are several problematic features
in regressions of Barro’s form (also called the convergence approach). These
problems are discussed in Acemoglu pp. 82-85.
2
Cf. Acemoglu, p. 16. For the OECD countries, however, b1 is de…nitely estimated to
be negative (cf. Acemoglu, p. 17).
3
Note that our vector is called in Acemoglu, pp. 83-84. So Acemoglu’s is to be
distinquished from our which denotes the asymptotic speed of convergence.
4
See, e.g., Alesina and Rodrik (1994) and Perotti (1996), who argue for a negative
relationship between inequality and growth. Forbes (2000), however, rejects that there
should be a robust negative correlation between the two.
6.5 References
Alesina, A., and D. Rodrik, 1994, Distributive politics and economic growth,
Quarterly Journal of Economics, vol. 109, 465-490.
Cho, D., and S. Graham, 1996, The other side of conditional convergence,
Economics Letters, vol. 50, 285-290.
Perotti, R., 1996, Growth, income distribution, and democracy: What the
data say, Journal of Economic Growth, vol. 1, 149-188.
Michael Kremer’s
population-breeds-ideas model
This chapter relates to Section 4.2 of Acemoglu’s book where two special cases
of the population-breeds-ideas model (Kremer 1993) are presented. Here we
start with a more general version of the model. The point of the model is to
show that under certain conditions, the cumulative and nonrival character of
technical knowledge makes it likely that the Malthusian regime of stagnating
income per capita, close to existence minimum and caused by scarcity of
land, will sooner or later in the historical evolution be surpassed.
99
CHAPTER 7. MICHAEL KREMER’S
100 POPULATION-BREEDS-IDEAS MODEL
In this case the economy never leaves the Malthusian regime of a more or
less constant standard of living close to existence minimum. Takeo¤ never
occurs.
The case 6= 1: Then (7.6) can be written
A_ t = ^ At ; (7.7)
There are now two sub-cases, > 1 and < 1: The latter sub-case leads
to permanent but decelerating growth in knowledge and population and the
Malthusian regime is never transcended (see Exercise III.3). The former
sub-case is the interesting one.
A0
t
0 tˆ t*
Figure 7.1: Accelerating growth in A when the feedback parameter exceeds one.
It follows from (7.5) and (7.1) that explosive growth in A implies explosive
growth in L and Y; respectively. The acceleration in the evolution of Y will
sooner or later make Y rise fast enough so that the Malthusian population
mechanism (which for biological reasons has to be slow) can not catch up.
Then, what was in the Malthusian population mechanism, equation (7.4),
only a transitory excess of yt over y, will at some t = t^ < t become a
permanent excess and take the form of sustained growth in yt . This is known
as the takeo¤.
Note that Fig. 7.1 illustrates only what the process (7.7), with > 1; im-
plies as long as it rules, namely that knowledge goes towards in…nity in …nite
time. The process necessarily ceases to rule long before time t is reached,
however. This is because the process presupposes that the Malthusian popu-
lation mechanism keeps track with output growth which at some point before
t becomes impossible because of the acceleration in the latter.
In a neighborhood of this point the takeo¤ will occur, featuring sustained
growth in output per capita. According to equation (7.4) the takeo¤ should
also feature a permanently rising population growth rate. As economic his-
tory has testi…ed, however, along with the rising standard of living the de-
mographics changed radically (in the U.K. during the 19th century). The
demographic transition took place with fertility declining faster than mortal-
ity. This results in completely di¤erent dynamics about which the present
model has nothing to say.4 As to the demographic transition as such, ex-
4
Kremer (1993), however, also includes an extended model taking some of these changed
dynamics into account.
number of new ideas per time unit is proportional to the stock of brains,
we have chosen to focus on an intermediate case in order to avoid secondary
factors blurring the main mechanism.
7.5 Appendix
Mathematically, the background for the explosion result is that the solution
to a …rst-order di¤erential equation of the form x(t)
_ = + bx(t)c ; c > 1;
b 6= 0; x(0) = x0 given, is always explosive. Indeed, the solution, x = x(t);
will have the property that x(t) ! 1 for t ! t for some t > 0 where t
depends on the initial conditions; and thereby the solution is de…ned only on
a bounded time interval which depends on the initial condition.
Take the di¤erential equation x(t)
_ = 1 + x(t)2 as an example. As is
well-known, the solution is x(t) = tan t = sin t= cos t, de…ned on the interval
( =2; =2):
7.6 References
Becker, G. S., ...
Kremer, M., 1993, Population Growth and Technological Change: One Mil-
lion B.C. to 1990, Quarterly Journal of Economics 108, No. 3.
107
108 CHAPTER 8. CHOICE OF SOCIAL DISCOUNT RATE
In this calculation the (nominal) discount factor is 1=(1 + i0 ) and tells how
many euro need be invested in the bond at time 0 to obtain 1 euro at time
1. When the interest rate in this way appears as a constituent of a discount
factor, it is called a (nominal) discount rate. Like any interest rate it tells
how many additional units of account (here euros) are returned after one
period of unit length, if one unit of account (one euro) is invested in the
asset at the beginning of the period.2
A payment stream, z0 ; z1 ;. . . ; zt ;. . . , zT ; where zt (? 0) is the net payment
in euro due at the end of period t; has present value (in euro as seen from
the beginning of period 0)
z0 z1 zT 1
P V0 = + + + ; (8.1)
1 + i0 (1 + i0 )(1 + i1 ) (1 + i0 )(1 + i1 ) (1 + iT 1 )
where it is the nominal interest rate in euro on a one-period bond from date
t to date t + 1, t = 0; 1; : : : ; T 1:
_
The average nominal discount rate from date T to date 0 is the number
i 0;T 1 satisfying
_
1=T
1 + i 0;T 1 = ((1 + i0 )(1 + i1 ) (1 + iT 1 )) : (8.2)
The corresponding nominal discount factor is
_ 1
T
(1 + i 0;T 1) = : (8.3)
(1 + i0 )(1 + i1 ) (1 + iT 1)
And as above, if i is constant, the nominal discount factor takes the simple
form e iT :
Instead of the nominal interest rate, the proper discount rate is now the real
interest rate, rt ; on a one-period bond from date t to date t + 1: Ignoring
indexed bonds, the real interest rate is not directly observable, but can be
calculated in the following way from the observable nominal interest rate it :
Pt 1 (1 + it ) 1 + it
1 + rt = = ;
Pt 1+ t
where Pt 1 is the price (in terms of money) of a period-(t 1) consumption
good paid for at the end of period t 1 (= the beginning of period t) and
t Pt =Pt 1 1 is the in‡ation rate from period t 1 to period t:
The consumption discount factor (or real discount factor) from date t + 1
to date t is 1=(1+rt ): This discount factor tells how many consumption goods’
worth need be invested in the bond at time t to obtain one consumption
good’s worth at time t+1. The stream c0 ; c1 ;. . . ; ct ;. . . , cT could alternatively
represent an income stream measured in current consumption units. Then
the real interest interest rate, rt ; would still be the relevant real discount rate
and (8.7) would give the present real value of the income stream.
The average consumption discount rate and the corresponding consump-
tion discount factor are de…ned in a way analogous to (8.2) and (8.3), respec-
tively, but with it replaced by rt : Similarly for the continuous time versions
(8.4), (8.5), and (8.6).
At the other side we …nd a series of opinions that are not easily lumped
together apart from their scepticism about the descriptive approach (in its
narrow sense as de…ned above). These “other views”are commonly grouped
together under the labels normative or prescriptive approach. This termino-
logical partitioning has become standard. With some hesitation we adopt it
here (the reason for the hesitation should become clear below).
One reason that the descriptive approach is by some considered inappro-
priate is the presence of market failures.4 Another is the presence of con‡ict-
ing interests: those people who bene…t may not be the same as those who
bear the costs. And where as yet unborn generations are involved, di¢ cult
ethical and coordination issues arise.
Amartia Sen (1961) pointed at the isolation paradox. Suppose each old
has an altruistic concern for all members of the next generation. Then a
transfer from any member of the old generation to the heir entails an exter-
nality that bene…ts all other members of the old generation. A nation-wide
coordination (political agreement) that internalizes these externalities would
raise intergenerational transfers (bequests etc.) and this corresponds to a
lowering of the intergenerational utility discount rate, , cf. (8.8).
More generally, members of the present generations may be willing to
join in a collective contract of more saving and investment by all, though
unwilling to save more in isolation.
4
Intervening into the debate about the suitable discount rate for climate change
projects, Heal (2008) asks ironically: “Is it appropriate to assume no market failure in
evaluating a consumption discount rate for a model of climate change?”.
Other reasons for a relatively low social discount rate have been pro-
posed. One is based on the super-responsibility argument: the government
has responsibility over a longer time horizon than those currently alive. An-
other is based on the dual-role argument: the members of the currently alive
generations may in their political or public role be more concerned about
the welfare of the future generations than they are in their private economic
decisions.
Critics of the descriptive approach may agree about the relevance of ask-
ing: “To what extent will investments made to reduce greenhouse gas emis-
sions displace investments made elsewhere?”. They may be inclined to add
that there is no guarantee that the funds in question are set aside for invest-
ment bene…tting generations alive two hundred years ahead, say.
Another point against the descriptive approach is that the future damages
of global warming could easily be underestimated. If nothing is done now, the
risk of the damage being irreparable at any cost becomes higher. Applying
the current market rate of return as discount rate for damages occurring
say 200 years from now on may imply that these damages become almost
imperceptible and so action tends to be postponed. This may be problematic
if there is a positive albeit low probability that a tipping point with disastrous
consequences is reached.
The reason for hesitation to lump together these “other views” under
the labels normative or prescriptive approach is that the contraposition of
“descriptive” versus “normative” in this context may be misleading. In the
…nal analysis also the descriptive approach has a normative element namely
the view that the social discount rate ought to be that implied by the market
behavior of the current generations as re‡ected in the current market interest
rate - the alternative is seen as paternalism. Here the other side of the debate
may respond that such “paternalism”need not be illegitimate but rather the
responsibility of democratically elected governments.
Anyway, in practice there seems to be a kind of convergence in the sense
that elements from the descriptive and the prescriptive way of thinking tend
to be combined. Nevertheless, there is considerable diversity across coun-
tries regarding the governments’o¢ cial “social consumption discount rate”
(sometimes just called the “social discount rate”) to be applied for public
investment projects. Even considering only West-European countries and
Western O¤shoots, including the U.S., the range is roughly from 8% to 2%
per year. An increasing fraction of these countries prescribe a lower rate for
bene…ts and costs accruing more than 30-50 years in the future (Harrison,
2010). The Danish Ministry of Finance recently (May 2013) reduced its social
consumption discount rate from 5% per year to 4% per year for the …rst 35
years of the time horizon of the project, 3% for the years in the interval 36 to
69 years, and 2% for the remainder of the time horizon if relevant.5 Among
economists involved in climate policy evaluation, there is a wide range of
opinions as to what the recommended social discount rate should be (from
1.4% to 8.0%).6 An evaluation of the net worth of the public involvement
in the Danish wind energy sector in the 1990s gives opposite conclusions
depending on whether the discount rate is 5-6% (until recently the o¢ cial
Danish discount rate) or 3-4% (Hansen, 2010).
This diversity notwithstanding, let us consider some examples of social
cost-bene…t problems of a macroeconomic nature and with a long time hori-
zon. Our …rst example will be the standard neoclassical problem of optimal
capital accumulation.
Tt = T0 egt ; (8.10)
5
Finansministeriet (2013) .
6
Harrison (2010).
is satis…ed.
By taking logs on both sides of (8.16) and di¤erentiating w.r.t. t we get
du0 (ct )=dt u00 (ct ) _t
= c
_ t = g= (f 0 (k~t ) );
u0 (ct ) u0 (ct ) t
where the term ( u00 (ct )=u0 (ct )) > 0 indicates the rate of decline in marginal
utility when consumption is increased by one unit. So the right-hand side of
(8.19) exceeds when c_t > 0:
A technically feasible path satisfying both (8.19) and the transversality
condition (12.33) with t = Tt u0 (ct ) will be an optimal path and there are no
other optimal paths.8
The optimality condition (8.19) could of course be written on the stan-
dard Keynes-Ramsey rule form, where c_t =ct is isolated on one side of the
equation. But from the perspective of rates of return, and therefore discount
rates, the form (8.19) is more useful, however. The condition expresses the
general principle that in the optimal plan the marginal unit of per capita out-
put is equally valuable whether used for investment or current consumption.
When used for investment, it gives a rate of return equal to the net marginal
productivity of capital indicated on the left-hand side of (8.19). When used
for current consumption, it raises current utility. Doing this to an extent
just enough so that no further postponement of consumption is justi…ed, the
required rate of return is exactly obtained. The condition (8.19) says that
in the optimal plan the actual marginal rate of return (the left-hand side)
equals the required marginal rate of return (the right-hand side).
Reading the optimality condition (8.19) from the right to the left, there is
an analogy between this condition and the general microeconomic principle
that the consumer equates the marginal rate of substitution, MRS, between
any two consumption goods with the price ratio given from the market.
In the present context the two goods refer to the same consumption good
delivered in two successive time intervals. And instead of a price ratio we
have the marginal rate of transformation, MRT, between consumption in
the two time intervals as given by technology. The analogy is only partial,
however, because this MRT is, from the perspective of the optimizing agent
(the social planner) not a given but is endogenous just as much as the MRS
is endogenous.
ct
rtSP = + (ct ) ; (8.20)
ct
where (c) cu00 (c)=u0 (c) > 0 (the absolute elasticity of marginal utility of
consumption). For a given (ct ); a higher per capita consumption growth rate
implies a higher required rate of return on marginal saving. In other words,
the higher the standard of living of future generations compared with cur-
rent generations, the higher is the required rate of return on current marginal
saving. Indeed, less should be saved for the future generations. Similarly, for
a given per capita consumption growth rate, ct =ct > 0; the required rate of
return on marginal saving is higher, the larger is (ct ): This is because (ct )
re‡ects aversion towards consumption inequality across time and generations
(in a context with uncertainty (ct ) also re‡ects what is known as the rela-
tive risk aversion, see below). Indeed, (ct ) indicates the percentage fall in
marginal utility when per capita consumption is raised by one percent. So a
higher (ct ) contributes to more consumption smoothing over time.
So far these remarks are only various ways of interpreting an optimality
condition. Worth emphasizing is:
The required marginal rate of return (the right-hand side of (8.20)) at
time t is not something given in advance, but an endogenous and time-
dependent variable which along the optimal path must equal the actual
marginal rate of return (the endogenous rate of return on investment
represented by the left-hand side of equation (8.20)). Indeed, both
the required and the actual marginal rates of return are endogenous
because they depend on the endogenous variables ct and c_t and on
what has been decided up to time t and is re‡ected in the current value
of the state variable, k~t . As we know from phase diagram analysis in
~ c=T ) plane, there are in…nitely many technically feasible paths
the (k;
satisfying the inverted Keynes-Ramsey rule in (8.20) for all t 0: What
is lacking up to now is to select among these paths one that satis…es
the transversality condition (12.33).
In the present problem the only discount rate which is decided in ad-
vance is the utility discount rate, . No consumption discount rate is
part of either the objective function or the constraints. We shall now
see, however, that a long-run consumption discount rate applicable to
(less-inclusive) public investment problems comes out as a by-product
of the steady-state solution to the problem.
Steady state
To help existence of a steady state we now assume that the instantaneous
utility, u(c); belong to the CRRA family so that (c) = ; a positive constant.
Then
c1 1
; when > 0; 6= 1;
u(c) = 1 (8.21)
ln c; when = 1:
We know that if the parameter condition n > (1 )g holds and f
satis…es the Inada conditions, then there exists a unique path satisfying the
necessary and su¢ cient optimality conditions, including the transversality
condition (12.33). Moreover, this path converges to a balanced growth path
with a constant e¤ective capital-labor ratio, k~ ; satisfying f 0 (k~ ) = + g:
So, at least for the long run, we may replace ct =ct in (8.20) with the constant
rate of exogenous technical progress, g: Then (8.20) reduces to a required
consumption rate of return that is now constant and given by the parameters
in the problem:
rSP = + g: (8.22)
This rSP is the prevalent suggestion for the choice of a social consumption
discount rate. Note that as long as g > 0; rSP will be positive even if
= 0: A higher will imply stronger discounting of additional consumption
in the future because higher means faster decline in the marginal utility of
consumption in response to a given rise in consumption. So with g equal to,
say, 1.5% per year, the social discount rate rSP is in fact more sensitive to
the value of than to the value of : Note also that a higher g raises rsp and
thereby reduces the incentive to save and invest.
Now consider a public investment project with time horizon T ( 1)
which comes at the expense of an investment in capital in the “usual” way
as described above. Suppose the project is “minor” or “local” in the sense
of not a¤ecting the structure of the economy as a whole, like for instance
the long-run per capita growth rate, g: Let the project involve an initial
investment outlay of k0 and a stream of real net revenues, (zt )Tt=0 , assuming
that both costs and bene…ts are measurable in terms of current consumption
3. Global problems like the climate change problem has an important in-
ternational dimension. As there is great variation in the standard of
living, c; and to some extent also in g across developed and develop-
ing countries, it might be relevant to include not only a parameter, 1 ;
re‡ecting aversion towards consumption inequality over time and gen-
erations but also a parameter, 2 ; re‡ecting aversion towards spatial
consumption inequality, i.e., inequality across countries.
In connection with the climate change problem we shall in the next section
apply a brief article by Arrow (2007)10 to illustrate at least one way to deal
with the problems 4 and 5.
10
Arrow won the Nobel Prize in Economics in 1972.
is not whether we can a¤ord to act, but whether we can a¤ord not to act”
(Stiglitz, 2007).
Let us now consider Arrow’s reasoning.
Figure 8.1: The density function of the per capita consumption loss X in year
2200.
Let x0 denote the certainty-equivalent loss, that is, the number x0 satis-
fying
u((1 x0 )c1 ) = Eu((1 X)c1 ) = Eu(c0 ): (8.24)
This means that an agent with preferences expressed by u is indi¤erent be-
tween facing a certain loss of size x0 or an uncertain loss, X; that has density
function f .
The condition (8.24) is illustrated in Figure 8.2. The density function for
the stochastic BAU consumption level, c0 , is indicated in the lower panel of
the …gure by a reversed coordinate system. If the utility function is speci…ed
and one knows the complete density function, then Eu((1 X)c1 ) is known
and the certainty-equivalent BAU consumption level (1 x0 )c1 , can be read
o¤ the diagram.
The instantaneous utility function, u(c); chosen by Arrow as well as Stern
is of the CRRA form (8.21). Arrow proposes the value 2 for ; while the Stern
Review relies on = 1 which by many critics was considered “too low”from
a descriptive-empirical point of view. As mentioned above, in a context of
uncertainty, not only measures the aversion towards consumption inequality
across time and generations but also the level of relative risk aversion.
The problem now is that the loss density function f (x) is not known.
The Stern Review only reports an estimated mean of 0:138 together with
estimated 5th and 95th percentiles of 0.03 and 0.34, respectively. This does
not su¢ ce for calculation of a good estimate of expected utility, Eu((1
X)c1 ): At best one can give a rough approximation. Arrow’s approach to
this problem is to split the probability mass into two halves and place them
on the 5th and 95th percentiles, respectively, assuming this gives a reasonable
approximation:
that there always is a small risk of extinction of the human race due to for
example a devastating meteorite or nuclear war. Based on this view, Stern
chooses a value of close to zero, namely = 0:001.14
As Arrow argues and as we shall see in a moment, this disagreement as
to the size of is not really crucial given the bene…ts and costs involved.
Regarding ; which measures the (absolute) elasticity of marginal utility of
consumption and thereby aversion to consumption variation, both across
time and across alternative uncertain outcomes, we follow Arrow and let
equal 2 (while, as mentioned, Stern Review has = 1):
where g0 is the (constant) per capita consumption growth rate under BAU
policy.
Let the value of the social welfare function under the “mitigation now”
policy be denoted W1 : According to the numbers mentioned above, the latter
policy involves a cost whereby c(0) is replaced by c(0)0 = 0:99c(0) and a
14
This is in fact a relatively high value of in the sense that it suggests that the
probability of extinction within one hundred years from now is as high as 9.5% (1 P (X <
x)) = 1 e 0:1 = 0:095): But as the Stern Review (p. 53) indicates, the term “extinction”
is meant to include “partial extinction by som exogenous or man-made force which has
little to do with climate change”.
15
To avoid confusion with our previous c0 ; appearing in (8.24), we write initial per capita
consumption as c(0) rather than c0 :
16
The transversality condition holds and the utility integral W0 is convergent if n
> (1 )g0 : In the present case where = 0:001; = 2 and g0 = 0:012; W0 is thus
convergent for n < (1 )g0 = + g0 = 0:013: This inequality seems likely to hold.
(0:99c(0))1 1
W1 = :
1 n (1 )g1
Since the bene…ts of the “mitigation now”policy come in the future and
the costs are there from date zero, we have W1 > W0 only if the e¤ective
utility discount rate, n; is below some upper bound. Let us calculate the
least upper bound in this regard. With = 2; we have
1 1 1 1
W1 = (0:99c(0)) > W0 = (c(0))
n + g1 n + g0
1 1
) <
0:99( n + g1 ) n + g0
) 0:99( n + g1 ) > n + g0
) 0:99g1 g0 > 0:01( n)
) 0:00087 > 0:01( n)
) n < 0:087 or n < 8:7% per year.
17
By taking g1 = 0:013 > g0 also after year 2200, we deviate a little from both Arrow
and Stern in a direction favoring the Stern conclusion slightly.
18
Possibly the di¤erence between Arrow’s 8.5% and our result is due to the point men-
tioned in the previous footnote. Another minor di¤erence is that Arrow seemingly takes n
to be zero since he speaks of the “pure rate of time preference” rather than the “e¤ective
rate of time preference”, n.
19
See for example: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Stern_Review#cite_ref-5
8.5 Conclusion
In his brief analysis of the economics of the climate change problem Arrow
(2007) …nds the fundamental conclusion of the Stern Review justi…ed even
if one, unlike the Stern Review, heavily discounts the utility of future gen-
erations. In addition to discounting, risk aversion plays a key role in the
argument. A signi…cant part of the costs of mitigation is like an insurance
premium society should be ready to pay.
The analysis above took a computable risk approach. For more elaborate
treatments of the uncertainty issues, also involving situations with systematic
uncertainty, about c1 for instance, increasing with the length of the time
horizon, as well as fundamental uncertainty, see the list of references, in
particular the papers by Gollier and Weitzman.
We have been tacit concerning the di¢ cult political economy problems
about how to obtain coordinated international action vis-a-vis global warm-
ing. About this, see, e.g., Gersbach (2008) and Roemer (2010).
Nicholas Stern, who is still involved in climate change research and policy,
said in an interview at the World Economic Forum 2013 in Davos: “Looking
back, I underestimated the risks. The planet and the atmosphere seem to
be absorbing less carbon than we expected, and emissions are rising pretty
strongly. Some of the e¤ects are coming through more quickly than we
thought then”(interview in the Guardian, January 26, 2013).
Figure 8.3: The case of symmetric density. Comparison of linear and strictly
concave utility function.
estimate of x0 equal to 0:138; that is, we get a lower value for the certainty-
equivalent loss than with a symmetric density function.
Now let us consider the “true” utility function, u(c). In Figure 8.3 it is
represented by the solid strictly concave curve u(c0 ). Let us again imagine
for a while that the density function is symmetric. As before, half of the
probability mass would then be to the right of the mean of c0 , (1 0:156)c1 ,
and the other half to the left. The density function might happen to be such
that the expected utility is just the average of utility at the 5th percentile
and utility at the 95th percentile, that is, as if the two halves of the prob-
ability mass were placed at the 5th and 95th percentiles of 0.03 and 0.34,
respectively; if so, the estimated certainty-equivalent loss is the x^0 shown in
Figure 8.3.
This would just be a peculiar coincidence, however. The probability mass
of the symmetric density function could be more, or less, concentrated close
to EX = 0:156: In case it is more concentrated, it is as if the two halves of
the probability mass are placed at the consumption levels (1 0:156 + a)c1
and (1 0:156 a)c1 for some “small” positive a; cf. Figure 8.3. The
corresponding estimate of the certainty-equivalent loss is denoted x^00 in the
…gure and is smaller than x^0 so that the associated c0 is larger than before.
Finally, we may conjecture that allowing for the actual right-skewness
of the density function will generally tend to diminish the estimate of the
certainty-equivalent loss.
The conclusion seems to be that Arrow’s procedure, as it stands, is ques-
tionable. Or the procedure is based on assumptions about the properties of
the density function not spelled out in the brief article. Anyway, sensitivity
analysis is called for. This could be part of an interesting master’s thesis by
someone better equipped in mathematical statistics than the present author
is.
8.7 References
Arrow, K. J., W. R. Cline, K. G. Mäler, M. Munasinghe, R. Squitieri, and
J. E. Stiglitz, 1996, “Intertemporal Equity, Discounting, and Economic
E¢ ciency”. In: Climate Change 1995. Economic and Social Dimen-
sions of Climate Change: Contribution of Working Group III to the
Second Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate
Change, ed. by J. P. Bruce, H. Lee, and E. F. Haites. Cambridge, UK:
Cambridge University Press, 125–44.
http://www.bepress.com/ev/vol4/iss3/art2/
Dasgupta, P., 2001, Human well-being and the natural environment, Oxford:
Oxford University Press.
Gersbach, H., 2008, A new way to address climate change: A global refund-
ing system, Economists’Voice, July.
Gollier, C., 2008, Discounting with fat-tailed economic growth, J. Risk and
Uncertainty, vol. 37, 171-186.
Goulder, L.H., and R.C. Williams, 2012, The choice of discount rate for
climate change policy evaluation, Resources for the Future, DP 12-43.
Groth, C., and P. Schou, 2007, Growth and non-renewable reources: The
di¤erent roles of capital and resource taxes, Journal of Environmental
Economics and Management, vol. 53, 80-98.
Harrison, M., 2010, Valuing the future: The social discount rate in cost-
bene…t analysis, Productivity Commission, Canberra.
Heal, G. F., 1998, Valuing the Future: Economic Theory and Sustainability,
Columbia University Press, New York.
Hepburn, C., 2006, Discounting climate change damages: Working note for
the Stern Review, Final Draft.
Lind, R.C., ed., 1982, Discounting for time and risk in energy policy, The
Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore.
137
CHAPTER 9. HUMAN CAPITAL, LEARNING TECHNOLOGY,
138 AND THE MINCER EQUATION
My personal opinion is that for most issues the approach in the lower-
right corner of Table 1 is preferable, that is, the approach treating human
capital as a distinct capital good in a life cycle perspective. The viewpoint
is:
First, by being embodied in a person and being lost upon death of this
person, human capital is very di¤erent from physical capital. In addition,
investment in human capital is irreversible (can not be recovered). Human
capital is also distinct in view of the limited extend to which it can be used
as a collateral, at least in non-slave societies. Financing an investment in
physical capital, a house for example, by credit is comparatively easy because
the house can serve as a collateral. A creditor can not gain title to a person,
however. At most a creditor can gain title to a part of that person’s future
w = w^ h; (9.3)
where w^ is the real wage per unit of human capital per working hour. Indeed,
if have
Y = F~ (K; hL; t); (9.4)
under perfect competition we can write
@Y
w= = F~2 (K; hL; t)h = w^ h:
@L
Under Harrod-neutral technical progress, (9.4) would take the form
Y = C + IK + IH ;
K_ = IK K K; K > 0;
_
H = IH H H; H > 0; (9.6)
where IK and IH denote gross investment in physical and human capital, re-
spectively. This approach essentially assumes that human capital is produced
by the same technology as consumption and investment goods.
From the time series for IH , an estimate of H , and a rough conjecture about
the initial value, Ht T ; we can calculate Ht+1 : The result will not be very
sensitive to the conjectured value of Ht T since for large T the last term in
(9.7) becomes very small.
In principle there need not be anything wrong with this approach. A
snag arises, however, if, without further notice, the approach is combined
with an explicit or implicit postulate that q(h) is proportional to the “stu¤”,
h; brought into being in the way described by (9.6). The snag is that the
empirical evidence does not support this when the formation of human capital
is modelled as in (9.6). This is what, for instance, Mankiw, Romer, and Weil
(1992) …nd in their cross-country regression analysis based on the approach
in equation (9.6). One of their conclusions is that the following production
function for a country’s GDP is an acceptable approximation:
where B stands for the total factor productivity of the country and is gener-
ally growing over time.2 De…ning A = B 3=2 and applying that H = hL; we
can write (9.8) on the form
That is, we end up with the form Y = F (K; q(h)AL) where q(h) = h1=2 ; not
q(h) = h. We should thus not expect the real wage to rise in proportion to
h; when h is considered as some “stu¤” formed in a way similar to the way
physical capital is formed.
2
The way Mankiw-Romer-Weil measure IH is indirect and questionable. In addition,
the way they let their measure enter the regression equation has been criticized for con-
founding the e¤ects of the human capital stock and human capital investment, cf. Gemmel
(1996) and Sianesi and Van Reenen (2003). It will take us too far to go into detail with
these problems here.
H_ IH
h_ = ( n)h = ( H + n)h: (9.9)
H L
(In the derivation of (9.9) we have …rst calculated the growth rate of h
H=L; then inserted (9.6), and …nally multiplied through by h.)
spends in school at age : This allows the individual to go to school only part-
time and spend the remainder of non-leisure time working. If ` denotes the
fraction of time spent at work, we have
0 s +` 1:
The fraction of time used as leisure (or child rearing, say) at age is 1 s ` :
If full retirement occurs at age , we have s = ` = 0 for .
We measure age in the same time units as calendar time. As a slight
generalization of Acemoglu’s equation (10.2),3 where leisure is not considered,
we assume that the increase in h per unit of time (age) generally depends on
four variables: current time in school, current time at work, human capital
already obtained, and current calendar time itself, that is,
dh
h_ = G(s ; ` ; h ; t); h0 0 given. (9.10)
d
The function G can be seen as a production function for human capital
in brief a learning technology. The …rst argument of G re‡ects the role of
formal education. Empirically, the primary input in formal education is the
time spent by the students studying; this time is not used in work or leisure
and it thereby gives rise to an opportunity cost of studying.4 The second
argument of G takes work experience into account and the third argument
allows for the already obtained level of human capital to a¤ect the strength of
the in‡uence from s and ` : Finally, the fourth argument, current calendar
time allows for changes over time in the learning technology (organization of
the learning process).
Consider an individual “born”at date v t (v for vintage). If still alive
at time t; the age of this individual is t v. The obtained stock of human
capital at age will be
Z
h = h0 + G(sx ; `x ; hx ; v + x)dx:
0
Here time spent in school is more e¢ cient in building human capital the more
human capital the individual has already. Work experience does not add to
human capital formation. The parameter enters to re‡ect obsolescence (due
to technical change) of skills learnt in school.
EXAMPLE 2 Growiec (2010) and Growiec and Groth (2013) study the
aggregate implications of a learning technology speci…ed this way:
Here measures the e¢ ciency of schooling and the e¢ ciency of work ex-
perience. The e¤ects of schooling and (if > 0) work experience are here
proportional to the level of human capital already obtained by the individ-
ual (a strong assumption which may be questioned).5 The linear di¤erential
equation (9.11) allows an explicit solution,
R
( sx + `x )dx
h = h0 e 0 ; (9.12)
a formula valid as long as the person is alive. This result has some a¢ nity
with the “Mincer equation”, to be considered below.
1 for 0 < S;
s = (9.13)
0 for S:
We further simplify by ignoring the e¤ect of work experience (or we may say
that work experience just o¤sets obsolescence of skills learnt in school). The
learning technology is speci…ed as
h_ = 1
s ; > 0; h0 0, (9.14)
5
Lucas (1988) builds on the case = 0:
If < 1, it becomes more di¢ cult to learn more the longer you have already
been to school. If > 1, it becomes easier to learn more the longer you have
already been under education.
The speci…cation (9.13) implies that throughout working life the individ-
ual has constant human capital equal to h0 + S : Indeed, integrating (9.14),
we have for t S and until time of death,
Z Z S
h = h0 + h_ x dx = h0 + x 1
dx = h0 + x jS0 = h0 + S : (9.15)
0 0
So the parameter measures the elasticity of human capital w.r.t. the num-
ber of years in school. As brie‡y commented on in the concluding section,
there is some empirical support for the power function speci…cation in (9.15)
and even the hypothesis = 1 may not be rejected.
workers, each with 2 units of human capital. In human capital theory this
questionable assumption is called the perfect substitutability assumption or
the e¢ ciency unit assumption (Sattinger, 1980). If we are willing to impose
this assumption, going from micro to macro at a given point in time is con-
ceptually simple. With h denoting individual human capitalR 1 and f (h) being
the density function at a given point in time (so that 0 f (h)dh = 1); we
…nd average
R1 human capital in the labor force at that point in time to be
h = 0 hf (h)dh and aggregate human capital as H = hL; where L is the
size of the labor force. To build a theory of the evolution over time of the
density function, f (h); is, however, a complicated matter. Within as well as
across the di¤erent cohorts there is heterogeneity regarding both schooling
and retirement. And the fertility and mortality patterns are changing over
time.
If we want to open up for a distinction between di¤erent types of jobs
and di¤erent types of labor, say, skilled and unskilled labor, we may replace
the production function (9.4) with
0 when t v + S or t > v + T;
`t v (S) =
` when v + S < t v + T;
Z v+T
r(t v)
HW (v; S) = 0 + Ev wt (S)`e dt
Zv+S
1
= 0 + Ev wt (S)`t v (S)e r(t v) dt
v+S
Z 1
= Ev (wt (S)`t v (S)e r(t v) )dt;
v+S
R1
as in this context the integration
P1 operator v+S
( )dt acts like a discrete-time
summation operator, t=v : Here we have introduced the risk-free interest
rate r which is the relevant rate of discount for future labor income condi-
6
If T denotes the uncertain age at death (a stochastic variable) and m is a nonnegative
number, the mortality rate (or “hazard rate” of death) at the age ; denoted m( ); is
de…ned as m( ) = lim !0 1 P (T + j T > ):
In the present model this is assumed equal to a constant, m. The unconditional prob-
ability of not reaching age is then P (T ) = 1 e m F ( ): Hence the density
0 m
function is f ( ) = F ( ) = me and P ( < T + ) me m .R So, for = 0;
1
P (0 < T ) m = m if = 1: Life expectancy is E(T ) = 0 me m d
= 1=m: All this is like in the “perpetual-youth” overlapping generations model by Blan-
chard (1985).
In writing the present value of the expected stream of labor income this
way, we have assumed that:
A1 The risk-free interest rate, r; is constant over time.
A2 There is no educational fee.
We now introduce two additional assumptions:
A3 Labor e¢ ciency (human capital) of a person with S years of schooling
is h(S); h0 > 0, so that
wt (S) = w^t h(S);
where w^t is the real wage per unit of human capital per working hour
at time t.7
A4 Owing to Harrod-neutral technical progress at a constant rate g 2
[0; r + m) 0, w^t = w ^0 egt : So technical progress makes a given h
more and more productive (there is direct complementarity between
the technology level and human capital as in (9.5) above).
Given A3 and A4, we get from (9.18) the expected “lifetime earnings”
conditional on a schooling level S :
Z 1
HW (v; S) = w^t h(S)`e (r+m)(t v) dt (9.19)
v+S
Z 1
gv
= w^0 e h(S)` e[g (r+m)](t v) dt
v+S
[g (r+m)](t ) 1
gv e e[g (r+m)]S
= w^0 e h(S)` = w^0 eg h(S)` :
g (r + m) +S r+m g
From now on we chose measurement units such that the “normal” working
time per year is 1 rather than `:
The next question is: how do students make a living while studying?
7
Cf. Example 4 of Section 9.2.
w^t h(S) is the size of that investment in the sense of the opportunity cost of
staying in school one more year.
In an optimal plan the actual net rate of return on the marginal invest-
ment equals the required rate of return, r + m: The required rate of return is
what could be obtained by the alternative strategy, which is to leave school
already after S years and then invest the …rst years’s labor income in life
annuities paying the net rate of return, r + m; per year until death. That is,
the …rst-order condition can be seen as a no-arbitrage equation. (As is usual,
our interpretation treats marginal changes as if they were discrete.)
Suppose S = S > 0 satis…es the …rst-order condition (9.21). To check
the second-order condition, we consider
@ 2 HW
(v; S )
@S 2
@HW h0 (S ) h(S )h00 (S ) h0 (S )2
= (v; S ) (r + m g) + HW (v; S )
@S h(S ) h(S )2
S S
h0 (S )
h00 (S ) h(S )
h0 (S ) 0
= HW (v; S ) h (S ); (9.22)
S h(S )
since the …rst term on the right-hand side in the second row vanishes due to
(9.21) being satis…ed at S = S . The second-order condition, @ 2 HW=@S 2 < 0
at S = S holds if and only if the elasticity of h w.r.t. S exceeds that of
h0 w.r.t. S at S = S : A su¢ cient but not necessary condition for this is
that h00 0: Anyway, since HW (v; S) is a continuous function of S; if there
is a unique S > 0 satisfying (9.21), and if @ 2 HW=@S 2 < 0 holds for this
S ; then this S is the unique optimal length of education for the individual.
If individuals are alike in the sense of having the same innate abilities and
facing the same schooling technology h( ), they will all choose S :
Figure 9.1: The semi-log schooling-wage relationship for …xed t. Di¤erent coun-
tries. Source: Krueger and Lindahl (2001).
The di¤erence in S is due to r and m being higher and g lower in the poor
country.
The above example follows a short note by Jones (2007) entitled “A sim-
ple Mincerian approach to endogenizing schooling”. The term “Mincerian
approach” should here be interpreted in a broad sense as more or less syn-
onymous with “life-cycle approach”.
Often in the macroeconomic literature, however, the term “Mincerian
approach”is identi…ed with an exponential speci…cation of the learning tech-
nology:
h(S) = h(0)e S ; > 0: (9.23)
This exponential form can at the formal level be seen as resulting from a
combination of equation (9.11) from Example 2 and equation (9.13) from
Example 3.11 The sole basis for an exponential relationship is empirical
11
One should be aware, however, that the present simple framework does not really em-
brace an exponential speci…cation of h. Indeed, the second-order condition (9.22) implied
by the “perpetual youth” assumption of age-independent mortality and no retirement, is
dwt (S)=dS
=r+m g r~ for all S 2 0; S : (9.24)
wt (S)
incompatible with the strong convexity implied by the exponential function. Of course,
this must be seen as a limitation of the “perpetual youth” setup (where there is no con-
clusive upper bound for anyone’s lifetime) rather than a reason for rejecting apriori the
exponential speci…cation (9.23).
12
As I see it, Acemoglu (2009, p. 362) makes the logical error of identifying a …rst-order
condition, (9.26), with a di¤erential equation, (9.24).
13
The slopes are in the interval (0:05; 0:15).
Outlook
Final remark
Our formulation of the schooling length decision problem in Section 9.3 con-
tained several simplications so that we ended up with a static maximization
problem in Section 9.3.3. More general setups lead to truly dynamic human
capital accumulation problems.
This chapter considered human capital as a productivity-enhancing fac-
tor. There is a complementary perspective on human capital, namely the
Nelson-Phelps hypothesis about the key role of human capital for technology
adoption and technological catching up, see Acemoglu, §10.8, and Exercise
Problem V.3.
average number of years of schooling in the working-age population, taken for instance
from the Barro and Lee (2001) dataset. This means that complicated aggregation issues,
arising from cohort heterogeneity and from the fact that individual human capital is lost
upon death, are bypassed. For discussion, see Growiec and Groth (2013).
9.6 Literature
Barro, R.J., and J. Lee, 2001, International data on educational attainment,
Oxford Economic Papers, vol. 53 (3), 541-563.
Ben-Porath, Y., 1967, The production of human capital and the life cycle
of earnings, Journal of Political Economy 75 (4), 352-365.
Bils, M., and P. J. Klenow, 2000. Does schooling cause growth? American
Economic Review, 90 (5), 1160-1183.
Caselli, F., 2005, Accounting for cross-country income di¤erences. In: Hand-
book of Economic Growth, vol. IA.
Cervellati, M., and U. Sunde, 2010, Longevity and lifetime labor supply:
Evidence and implications revisited, WP.
Cohen, D., and M. Soto, 2007, Growth and human capital: good data, good
results, Journal of Economic Growth 12, 51-76.
Cunha, F., J.J. Heckman, L. Lochner, and D.V. Masterov, 2006, Interpret-
ing the evidence on life cycle skill formation, Handbook of the Eco-
nomics of Education, vol. 1, Amsterdam: Elsevier.
Growiec, J., and C. Groth, 2013, On aggregating human capital across het-
erogeneous cohorts, Working Paper, http://www.econ.ku.dk/okocg/Forside/Publications.htm
Hazan, M., 2009, Longevity and lifetime labor supply: Evidence and impli-
cations, Econometrica 77 (6), 1829-1863.
Heckman, J.J., L.J. Lochner, and P.E. Todd, 2003, Fifty years of Mincer
earnings regressions, NBER WP 9732.
Hendry, D., and H. Krolzig, 2004, We ran one regression, Oxford Bulletin
of Economics and Statistics 66 (5), 799-810.
Jones, B.,
Krueger, A. B., and M. Lindahl, 2001. Education for growth: Why and for
whom? Journal of Economic Literature, 39, 1101-1136.
Miles, D., 1999, Modelling the impact of demographic change upon the
economy, Economic Journal 109, 1-36.
Mincer, J., 1974, Schooling, Experience, and Earnings, New York: NBER
Press,
Ortigueira, S., 2003, Equipment prices, human capital and economic growth,
Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control 28, 307-329.
Psacharopoulus, 1994,
Rosen, S., 2008. Human capital. In: The New Palgrave Dictionary of
Economics, 2nd ed., ed. by S. N. Durlauf and L. E. Blume, available
at
http://www.econ.ku.dk/english/libraries/links/
Sattinger, M., 1980, Capital and the Distribution of Labor Earnings, North-
Holland: Amsterdam.
Sianesi, B., and J. Van Reenen, 2003, The returns to education: Macroeco-
nomics, Journal of Economic Surveys 17 (2), 157-200.
161
CHAPTER 10. KNOWLEDGE CREATION AND HUMAN CAPITAL
162 IN A GROWING ECONOMY
ht is average human capital in the labor force, LY t and LAt are inputs of
labor in manufacturing and R&D, respectively, Ct is aggregate consumption,
At is the stock of technical knowledge, and Lt is aggregate labor input, all at
time t. The size of population is denoted Nt and so per capita consumption
is ct Ct =Nt :
Comments: As to (10.5), ht LAt is the total input of human capital per
time unit in R&D and A't is the productivity of this input at the aggregate
level. The parameter ' measures the elasticity of research productivity w.r.t.
the level of the available stock of technical knowledge. The case 0 < ' < 1
represents the “standing on the shoulders” case where knowledge creation
becomes easier the more knowledge there is already. In contrast, the case
' < 0 represents the “…shing out” case, also called the “easiest inventions
are made …rst” case. This would re‡ect that it becomes more and more
di¢ cult to create the next advance in technical knowledge. Note also that
the productivity of man-hours (LAt ) in R&D depends on the level of human
capital, ht : As to (10.5), the strict and weak inequalities are motivated by the
view that for the system to be economically viable, there must be activity in
the Y -sector whereas it is of interest to allow for and compare the cases
LAt > 0 and LAt = 0 (active versus passive R&D sector).
The population growth rate is assumed constant:
Nt = N0 ent ; n 0; N0 > 0 given. (10.6)
We assume a stationary age distribution in the population. Although details
about schooling are postponed, we already here assume that schooling and
retirement are consistent with the labor force being a constant fraction of
the population:
Lt = (1 )Nt ; (10.7)
where 2 (0; 1). Then, by (10.6) follows
Lt = L0 ent ; n 0; L0 > 0. (10.8)
We let the growth rate at time t of a variable x > 0 be denoted gxt . When
writing just gx , without the time index t, it is understood that the growth
rate of x is constant over time.
A_ t
gAt = A't 1 ht LAt = 0, with > if and only if LAt > 0: (10.11)
At
We shall …rst consider the case of active R&D:
ASSUMPTION (A1): LAt > 0 for all t 0:
This assumption implies gAt > 0 and so the growth rate of gAt is well-de…ned.
By log-di¤erentiation w.r.t. t in (10.11) we have
g_ At
= (' 1)gAt + ght + gLA t : (10.12)
gAt
where the positivity is due to the assumption (A1). For the formula (10.13)
to be consistent with balanced growth, gLA t must be a constant, gLA ; since
otherwise gA and ght could not both be constant as they must in balanced
growth, by de…nition. Moreover, we must have gLA = n: To see this, imagine
that gLA < n. Then, in order for the growth rate of the sum LY t + LAt
to accord with (10.8), we would need gLY t > n forever, which would imply
LY t + LAt > Lt sooner or later. This is a contradiction. And if instead we
imagine that gLA > n while still being constant, we would, at least after
some time, have LAt > Lt ; again a contradiction. We conclude that gLA = n:
For LY t + LAt to accord with (10.8), it then follows that also gLY t must be
a constant, gLY ; and equal to n: We have hereby proved that along a BGP
with R&D,
gLA = gLY = n: (10.14)
It follows that LA =L is constant along a BGP with R&D.
Given the accumulation equation (10.2) and the assumption (A3), it fol-
lows by the Balanced Growth Equivalence Theorem of Chapter 4 that
gC = gY = gK
along a BGP. From (10.9), together with (10.7) and the de…nition c C=N ,
then follows that along a BGP,
gc = gy = gY n = gT + gK + (1 )(gh + n) n
= gT + (gK n) + (1 )gh = gT + gk + (1 )gh ; (10.15)
where the last equality comes from k K=LY and gLY = n: As gK = gY and
gLY = gL ; we have gk = gy : Then (10.15) gives
gT gA
gy = + gh = + gh ; (10.16)
1 1
in view of (10.10).
Education
Let the time unit be one year. Suppose an individual “born”at time v (v for
“vintage”) spends the …rst S years of life in school and then enters the labor
market with a human capital equal to h(S); where h0 > 0. We ignore the
role of teachers and schooling equipment in the formation of human capital.
The role of work experience for human capital later in life is likewise ignored.
Moreover, we assume that S is the same for all members of a given cohort
and also until further notice the same across cohorts. So
h = h(S); h0 > 0: (10.17)
After leaving school, individuals work full-time until either death before
age R or retirement at age R where R > S; of course; life expectancy is
assumed the same for all cohorts. Assuming a stationary age distribution in
the population, we see that in (10.7) represents the constant fraction of
the population consisting of people either below age S, i.e., under education,
or above age R; i.e., retired people ( will be an increasing function of S and
a decreasing function of R):1
1
A complete model would treat S as endogenous in general equilibrium. In a partial
gy = gT + gk = gT F P + gk ; (10.19)
From this inequality we see that existence of a BGP with R&D requires
ASSUMPTION (A4): n > 0
to hold.
equilibrium analysis one could possibly use an approach similar to the one in Chapter 9,
Section 9.3. We shall not enter into that, however, because the next step, determination
of the real rate of interest in general equilibrium, is a complex problem and requires a
lot of additional speci…cations of households’characteristica and market structure. Fortu-
nately, it is not necessary to determine S as long as the focus is only on determining the
productivity growth rate along a BGP.
Let every member of cohort v 0 spend S(v) years in school, thereby leaving
school with human capital h(v) = S(v) : Then the growth rate of h of the
cohort just leaving school is
Hence,
S 0 (v)
= ! 0 for v ! 1:
S(v) S0 + v
On this background the projection will be that also average human capital,
ht ; will be growing over time but at a rate, gh ; approaching 0 for t ! 1: This
gives no chance that the gh in the formula (10.13) can avoid approaching nil.
So our model rules out exponential per capita growth in the long run when
n = 0 and h(v) = S(v) :
As a thought experiment, suppose instead that the schooling technology
is exponential:
h = h(S) = e S(v) ; > 0: (10.25)
Then the growth rate of the human capital of the cohort just leaving school
is
dh(v)=dv e S(v) s0 (v)
= = S 0 (v) > 0: (10.26)
h(v) e S(v)
Assume arithmetic growth in life expectancy as well as schooling length,
the latter following (10.24). Then S 0 (v) = ; a positive constant. My
conjecture is that also average human capital, ht ; will in this case under
certain conditions grow at the constant rate, ; at least approximately (I
have not made the required demographic calculus).
Let us try some numbers. Suppose life expectancy in modern times
steadily increases by years per year and let schooling time and retirement
age be constant fractions of life expectancy. Let the schooling time fraction
be denoted !: Then S 0 (v) = = ! and gh = S 0 (v) = ! . With = 0:2;
! = 0:2; and = 0:10; we get gh = 0:004:7 Suppose n = 0:005 and ' = 0:5
7
As reported by Krueger and Lindahl (2001), in cross-section studies is usually
estimated to be in the range (0:05; 0:15):
9
Although distinguishing between human capital and knowledge creation, the approach
by Dalgaard and Kreiner (2001) is very di¤erent from the one we have followed above and
has a¢ nity partly with Lucas and partly with Mankiw et al. (1992).
In the above analysis we have ignored the role of scarce natural resources
for limits to growth. We will come back to this issue in chapters 13 and 16.
We have ruled out ' = 1 because in combination with n > 0 it would
tend to generate a forever growing productivity growth rate, a feature not
in accordance with the actual economic evolution of the industrialized world
over the last century. We have ruled out ' > 1 because in combination
even with n = 0; it would tend to generate economic “explosion” in a very
dramatic and implausible sense: in…nite output in …nite time! Jones (2005)
argues that the empirical evidence speaks for ' < 1 in modern times.
The above analysis simply tells us what the growth rate must be in the
long run provided that the system considered converges to balanced growth.
On the other hand, speci…cation of the market structure and the household
sector, including demography and preferences, will be needed if we want to
study the adjustment processes outside balanced growth or determine an
equilibrium real interest rate or similar.
It is due to the semi-endogenous growth setting (the ' < 1 assumption)
that one can …nd the long-run per capita growth rate from knowledge of
technology parameters and the rate of population growth alone. How the
market structure and the household sector are described, is immaterial for
the long-run growth rate. These things will in the long run have “only”level
e¤ects.
Only if economic policy a¤ects the technology parameters or the popu-
lation growth rate, will it be able to a¤ect the long-run growth rate. Still,
economic policy can temporarily a¤ect economic growth and in this way af-
fect the level of the long-run growth path.
10.7 References
Arias, E., 2004, United States Life Tables 2004, National Vital Statistics
Reports, vol. 56, no. 9.
Groth, C., K.-J. Koch, and T. M. Steger, 2010, When economic growth is
less than exponential, Economic Theory, vol. 44 (2), 213-242.
Krueger, A. B., and M. Lindahl, 2001. Education for growth: Why and for
whom? Journal of Economic Literature, 39, 1101-1136.
Quah, D.T., 1996, The Invisible Hand and the Weightless Economy, Occa-
sional Paper 12, Centre for Economic Performance, LSE, London, May
1996.
AK and reduced-form AK
models. Consumption taxation.
Thus there are constant returns to capital, not diminishing returns, and
labor is no longer a production factor. This section provides a detailed proof
that when we embed this technology in a Ramsey framework with perfect
competition, the model generates balanced growth from the beginning. So
there will be no transitional dynamics.
175
CHAPTER 11. AK AND REDUCED-FORM AK
176 MODELS. CONSUMPTION TAXATION
A > : (A1)
Reordering gives
r = gc + > gc + n; (11.4)
where the equality is due to (16.27).
Solving the linear di¤erential equation (16.27) gives
where a(t) is per capita …nancial wealth at time t: Recalling the No-Ponzi-
Game condition,
lim a(t)e (r n)t 0; (NPG)
t!1
where we have inserted (12.24). The solution to this linear di¤erential equa-
tion is (cf. Appendix to Chapter 3)
c(0) c(0)
k(t) = k(0) e(r n)t
+ egc t ; r A : (11.7)
r n gc r n gc
In our closed-economy framework with no public debt, a(t) = k(t): So the
question is: When will the time path (11.7) satisfy (TVC) with a(t) = k(t)?
To …nd out, we multiply by the discount factor e (r n)t on both sides of (11.7)
to get
c(0) c(0)
k(t)e (r n)t = k(0) + e (r gc n)t :
r n gc r n gc
Thus, in view of the assumption (A2), (11.4) holds and thereby the last term
on the right-hand side vanishes for t ! 1: Hence
c(0)
lim k(t)e (r n)t = k(0) :
t!1 r n gc
From this we see that the representative household satis…es (TVC) if and
only if it chooses
c(0) = (r n gc )k(0): (11.8)
This is the equilibrium solution for the household’s chosen per capita con-
sumption at time t = 0. If the household instead had chosen c(0) < (r n
gc )k(0); then limt!1 k(t)e (r n)t > 0 and so the household would not satisfy
(TVC) but instead be over-saving. And if it had chosen c(0) > (r n gc )k(0);
then limt!1 k(t)e (r n)t < 0 and so the household would be over-consuming
and violate (NPG) (hence also (TVC)).
Substituting the solution for c(0) into (11.7) gives the evolution of k(t)
in equilibrium,
c(0)
k(t) = egc t = k(0)egc t :
r n gc
So from the beginning k grows at the same constant rate as c. Since per
capita output is y Y =L = Ak; the same is true for per capita output.
Hence, from start the system is in balanced growth (there is no transitional
dynamics).
The AK model features one of the simplest kinds of endogenous growth
one can think of. Growth is endogenous in the model in the sense that there
is positive per capita growth in the long run, generated by an internal mecha-
nism in the model (not by exogenous technology growth). The endogenously
determined capital accumulation constitutes the mechanism through which
sustained per capita growth is generated. It is because the net marginal pro-
ductivity of capital is assumed constant and, according to (A1), higher than
the rate of impatience, ; that capital accumulation itself is so powerful.
De…ne
~
K(t) K(t) + H(t) = “broad capital”.
Then
K(t)
~
K(t) ( + 1)H(t) = (k^ + 1)H(t):
H(t)
Isolating H(t) and inserting into (11.9) gives
1 ~ ~
Y (t) = K(t) B K(t):
k^ + 1
So at the abstract level it is conceivable that “broad capital”, de…ned as the
sum of physical and human capital, can be meaningful. Empirically, however,
there is no basis for believing this concept of “broad capital to be useful, cf.
Exercises V.4 and V.5.
Anyway, a reduced-form AK model ends up with quite similar aggregate
relations as those in the simple AK model. Hence the solution procedure
1
The mentioned initial phase is left unnoticed in Acemoglu. In our notation k K=L
and k^ K=H; while Acemoglu’s text has k K=H:
to …nd the equilibrium path (see Chapter 12) is quite similar to that in the
simple AK model above. Again there will be no transitional dynamics.
The nice feature of AK models is that they provide very simple theoretical
examples of endogenous growth. The problematic feature is that they may
simplify the technology description too much and at best constitute knife-
edge cases. More about this in Chapter 13.
units of account (in real terms) per capita. Thus, spending ct per capita per
time unit results in the per capita consumption level
1
ct = (1 + t) ct : (11.10)
c1t 1 (1 + t)
1 1
ct 1
u(ct ) = = :
1 1
In our standard notation the household’s intertemporal optimization prob-
lem, in continuous time, is then to choose (ct )1
t=0 so as to maximize
Z 1
(1 + t ) 1 ct1 1 ( n)t
U0 = e dt s.t.
0 1
ct 0;
a_ t = (rt n)at + wt + xt ct ; a0 given,
R1
(rs n)ds
lim at e 0 0:
t!1
From now, we let the timing of the variables be implicit unless needed for
clarity. The current-value Hamiltonian is
1 1
(1 + ) c 1
H= + [(r n)a + w + x c] ;
1
where is the co-state variable associated with …nancial per capita wealth,
a: An interior optimal solution will satisfy the …rst-order conditions
@H 1 1
= (1 + ) c = 0; so that (1 + ) c = ; (11.11)
@c
@H _ +(
= (r n) = n) ; (11.12)
@a
and a transversality condition which amounts to
R1
(rs n)ds
lim at e 0 = 0: (11.13)
t!1
_ c _
( 1) = = r:
1+ c
By ordering, we …nd the growth rate of consumption spending,
c 1 _
= r+( 1) :
c 1+
c_ c _ 1 _ _ 1 _
= = r+( 1) = (r ):
c c 1+ 1+ 1+ 1+
No! As the above example as well as business cycle theory suggest, maintain-
ing tax rates constant (“tax smoothing”), and thereby allowing government
de…cits and surpluses to arise, will generally make more sense. In itself, a
budget de…cit is not worrisome. It only becomes worrisome if it is not accom-
panied later by su¢ cient budget surpluses to avoid an exploding government
debt/GDP ratio to arise. This requires that the tax rates taken together
have a level which in the long run matches the level of government expenses.
There are two popular alternative versions of the model. The distinguish-
ing feature is whether the learning parameter (see below) is less than one or
equal to one. The first case corresponds to (a simplified version of) a model
by Nobel laureate Kenneth Arrow (1962). The second case has been drawn
attention to by Paul Romer (1986) who assumes that the learning parameter
equals one. These two contributions start out from a common framework
which we now present.
183
CHAPTER 12. LEARNING BY INVESTING:
184 TWO VERSIONS
“each new machine produced and put into use is capable of chang-
ing the environment in which production takes place, so that
learning is taking place with continually new stimuli” (Arrow,
1962).2
the same for all firms in the economy. That is, in this specification the firms
producing consumption-goods benefit from the learning just as much as the
firms producing capital-goods.
The parameter indicates the elasticity of the general technology level,
with respect to cumulative aggregate net investment and is named the
“learning parameter”. Whereas Arrow assumes 1 Romer focuses on the
case = 1 The case of 1 is ruled out since it would lead to explosive
growth (infinite output in finite time) and is therefore not plausible.
subject to ̇ = − Here and are the real wage and gross
investment, respectively, at time , is the real interest rate at time and
≥ 0 is the capital depreciation rate. Rising marginal capital installation
costs and other kinds of adjustment costs are assumed minor and can be
ignored. It can be shown that in this case the firm’s problem is equivalent
to maximization of current pure profits in every short time interval. So, as
hitherto, we can describe the firm as just solving a series of static profit
maximization problems.
We suppress the time index when not needed for clarity. At any date firm
maximizes current pure profits, Π = ( ) − ( + ) − This
leads to the first-order conditions for an interior solution:
Behind (12.3) is the presumption that each firm is small relative to the econ-
omy as a whole, so that each firm’s investment has a negligible effect on
= ̄ = ≡ = 1 2 (12.5)
3
Recall that a function ( ) defined in a domain is homogeneous of degree if for
all ( ) in ( ) = ( ) for all 0 If a differentiable function ( ) is
homogeneous of degree then (i) 10 ( ) + 20 ( ) = ( ) and (ii) the first-order
partial derivatives, 10 ( ) and 20 ( ) are homogeneous of degree − 1.
( )
̃ = = (̃ 1) ≡ (̃) 0 0 00 0 (12.8)
We can now write (12.6) as
= 0 (̃ ) − (12.9)
12.2.1 Dynamics
From the definition ̃ ≡ () follows
·
̃ ̇ ̇ ̇ ̇ ̇
= − − = − − (by (12.2))
̃
− − ̃ − ̃ − ̃
= (1 − ) − = (1 − ) − where ̃ ≡ ≡
̃
̇ 1 1³ 0 ´
≡ = ( − ) = (̃) − − (12.11)
Defining ̃ ≡ now follows
̃ ̇ ̇ ̇ ̇ ̇ − − ̇
= − = − = − = − (̃ − ̃ − ̃)
̃ ̃
1 0
= ( (̃) − − ) − (̃ − ̃ − ̃)
̃
Multiplying through by ̃ we have
∙ ¸
· 1 0
̃ = ( (̃) − − ) − ((̃) − ̃ − ̃) ̃ (12.12)
̃
Phase diagram
·
Figure 12.1 depicts the phase diagram. The ̃ = 0 locus comes from (12.10),
which gives
·
̃ = 0 for ̃ = (̃) − ( + )̃ (12.13)
1−
·
where we realistically may assume that + (1 − ) 0 As to the ̃ = 0
locus, we have
· ̃ 0
̃ = 0 for ̃ = (̃) − ̃ − ( (̃) − − )
̃
= (̃) − ̃ − ≡ (̃) (from (12.11)). (12.14)
·
Before determining the slope of the ̃ = 0 locus, it is convenient to consider
the steady state, (̃∗ ̃∗ ).
c
c 0
A
c*
E
k 0
B
k
0 k* kGR k
Steady state
In a steady state ̃ and ̃ are constant so that the growth rate of as well
as equals ̇ + i.e.,
̇ ̇ ̇ ̇
= = + = +
Solving gives
̇ ̇
= =
1−
Thence, in a steady state
̇
= −= −= ≡ ∗ and (12.15)
1− 1−
̇ ̇
= = = ∗ (12.16)
1−
The steady-state values of and ̃ respectively, will therefore satisfy, by
(12.11),
∗ = 0 (̃∗ ) − = + ∗ = + (12.17)
1−
To ensure existence of a steady state we assume that the private marginal
product of capital is sufficiently sensitive to capital per unit of effective labor,
1 00 (̃) 1
0 (̃) = 0 (̃) − − (̃ + ) 0 (̃) − − (12.19)
since 00 0 At least in a small neighborhood of the steady state we can
sign the right-hand side of this expression. Indeed,
1 1
0 (̃∗ )−− ∗ = +∗ − ∗ = + − = −−(1−) 0
1− 1− 1−
(12.20)
by (12.15) and (A2). So, combining with (12.19), we conclude that 0 (̃∗ ) 0
By continuity, in a small neighborhood of the steady state, 0 (̃) ≈ 0 (̃∗ ) 0
·
Therefore, close to the steady state, the ̃ = 0 locus is positively sloped, as
indicated in Figure 12.1.
Still, we have to check the following question: In a neighborhood of the
· ·
steady state, which is steeper, the ̃ = 0 locus or the ̃ = 0 locus? The slope
of the latter is 0 (̃) − − (1 − ) from (12.13) At the steady state this
slope is
1
0 (̃∗ ) − − ∗ ∈ (0 0 (̃∗ ))
c Groth, Lecture notes in Economic Growth, (mimeo) 2015.
°
12.2. The arrow case: 1 191
· ·
in view of (12.20) and (12.19). The ̃ = 0 locus is thus steeper. So, the ̃ = 0
·
locus crosses the ̃ = 0 locus from below and can only cross once.
The assumption (A1) ensures existence of a ̃∗ 0 satisfying (12.17). As
Figure 12.1 is drawn, a little more is implicitly assumed namely that there
exists a ̂ 0 such that the private net marginal product of capital equals
the steady-state growth rate of output, i.e.,
̇ ̇ ̇
0 (̂) − = ( )∗ = ( )∗ + = += (12.21)
1− 1−
·
where we have used (12.16). Thus, the tangent to the ̃ = 0 locus at ̃ = ̂
is horizontal and ̂ ̃∗ as indicated in the figure.
Note, however, that ̂ is not the golden-rule capital intensity. The latter
is the capital intensity, ̃ at which the social net marginal product of
capital equals the steady-state growth rate of output (see Appendix). If ̃
exists, it will be larger than ̂ as indicated in Figure 12.1. To see this, we
now derive a convenient expression for the social marginal product of capital.
From (12.7) we have
= 1 (·) + 2 (·) −1 = 0 (̃) + 2 (·) ( −1 ) (by (12.8))
= 0 (̃) + ( (·) − 1 (·)) −1 (by Euler’s theorem)
0 0 −1
= (̃) + ((̃) − (̃)) (by (12.8) and (12.2))
(̃) − ̃ 0 (̃)
= 0 (̃) + ((̃) −1 − 0 (̃)) = 0 (̃) + 0 (̃)
̃
in view of ̃ = ( ) = 1− −1 and (̃)̃− 0 (̃) 0 As expected, the
positive externality makes the social marginal product of capital larger than
the private one. Since we can also write = (1 − ) 0 (̃) + (̃)̃
we see that is (still) a decreasing function of ̃ since both 0 (̃) and
(̃)̃ are decreasing in ̃ So the golden rule capital intensity, ̃ will be
that capital intensity which satisfies
à !∗
0
(̃ ) − ̃ (̃ ) ̇
0 (̃ ) + − = =
̃ 1−
To ensure there exists such a ̃ we strengthen the right-hand side inequal-
ity in (A1) by the assumption
à !
0
(̃) − ̃ (̃)
lim 0 (̃) + + (A3)
̃→∞ ̃ 1−
00
This, together with (A1) and 0, implies existence of a unique ̃ , and
in view of our additional assumption (A2), we have 0 ̃∗ ̂ ̃ as
displayed in Figure 12.1.
Stability
have ̇ 0 in the long run.4 In line with this, ∗ 0
The key role of population growth derives from the fact that although
there are diminishing marginal returns to capital at the aggregate level, there
are increasing returns to scale w.r.t. capital and labor. For the increasing
returns to be exploited, growth in the labor force is needed. To put it differ-
ently: when there are increasing returns to and together, growth in the
labor force not only counterbalances the falling marginal product of aggre-
gate capital (this counter-balancing role reflects the direct complementarity
between and ), but also upholds sustained productivity growth via the
learning mechanism.
Note that in the semi-endogenous growth case, ∗ = (1 − )2 0
for 0 That is, a higher value of the learning parameter implies higher
per capita growth in the long run, when 0. Note also that ∗ = 0
= ∗ that is, in the semi-endogenous growth case, preference parameters
do not matter for the long-run per capita growth rate. As indicated by
(12.15), the long-run growth rate is tied down by the learning parameter,
and the rate of population growth, Like in the simple Ramsey model,
however, it can be shown that preference parameters matter for the level of
the growth path. For instance (12.17) shows that ̃∗ 0 so that more
patience (lower ) imply a higher ̃∗ and thereby a higher = (̃∗ )
This suggests that although taxes and subsidies do not have long-run
growth effects, they can have level effects.
by (12.6),
= 1 ( ) − = 1 (1 ) − ≡ ̄
where we have divided the two arguments of 1 ( ) by ≡ and
again used Euler’s theorem. Note that the interest rate is constant “from the
beginning” and independent of the historically given initial value of 0 .
The aggregate production function is now
= ( ) = (1 ) constant, (12.22)
and is thus linear in the aggregate capital stock.5 In this way the general neo-
classical presumption of diminishing returns to capital has been suspended
and replaced by exactly constant returns to capital. Thereby the Romer
model belongs to the class of reduced-form AK models, that is, models where
in general equilibrium the interest rate and the aggregate output-capital ratio
are necessarily constant over time whatever the initial conditions.
The method for analyzing an AK model is different from the one used for
a diminishing returns model as above.
12.3.1 Dynamics
The Keynes-Ramsey rule now takes the form
̇ 1 1
= (̄ − ) = (1 (1 ) − − ) ≡ (12.23)
which is also constant “from the beginning”. To ensure positive growth, we
assume
1 (1 ) − (A1’)
And to ensure bounded intertemporal utility (and thereby a possibility of
satisfying the transversality condition of the representative household), it is
assumed that
(1 − ) and therefore + = ̄ (A2’)
Solving the linear differential equation (12.23) gives
= 0 (12.24)
where 0 is unknown so far (because is not a predetermined variable). We
shall find 0 by applying the households’ transversality condition
lim −̄ = lim −̄ = 0 (TVC)
→∞ →∞
5
Acemoglu, p. 400, writes this as = ˜()
F1 (1, L )
F ( K , L)
F (1, L)
F (1, L)
K
1
Figure 12.2: Illustration of the fact that for given, (1 ) 1 (1 )
First, note that the dynamic resource constraint for the economy is
and directly given as (1 ) and ̄ respectively. In turn, ̄ determines the
(constant) equilibrium growth rate through the Keynes-Ramsey rule
̇ 1
= ( (1 ) − − ) ≡ (12.34)
In view of (12.32), in an interior optimal solution the time path of the adjoint
variable is
= 0 −[( (1)−−]
where 0 = −
0 0 by (12.31) Thus, the conjectured transversality condi-
tion (12.33) implies
lim −( (1)−) = 0 (12.36)
→∞
7
The proviso implied by saying “guess” is due to the fact that optimal control theory
does not guarantee that this “standard” transversality condition is necessary for optimality
in all infinite horizon optimization problems.
that is, grows at the same constant rate as “from the beginning” Since
≡ = (1 ) the same is true for Hence, our candidate for the social
planner’s solution is from start in balanced growth (there is no transitional
dynamics).
The next step is to check whether our candidate solution satisfies a set of
sufficient conditions for an optimal solution. Here we can use Mangasarian’s
theorem which, applied to a problem like this, with one control variable and
one state variable, says that the following conditions are sufficient:
(a) Concavity: The Hamiltonian is jointly concave in the control and state
variables, here and .
(c) TVC: The candidate solution satisfies the transversality condition lim→∞
− = 0 where − is the discounted co-state variable.
(1 − )( + )
per unit of capital per time unit; (ii) financing this subsidy by a constant
consumption tax rate
Let us first find the size of needed to establish the SP allocation. Firm
now chooses such that
| fixed = 1 ( ) = (1 − )( + )
By Euler’s theorem this implies
where ≡ which is pre-determined from the supply side. Thus, the
equilibrium interest rate must satisfy
1 ( ) 1 (1 )
= − = − (12.38)
1− 1−
again using Euler’s theorem.
It follows that should be chosen such that the “right” arises. What is
the “right” ? It is that net rate of return which is implied by the production
technology at the aggregate level, namely − = (1 )− If we can
obtain = (1 )− then there is no wedge between the intertemporal rate
of transformation faced by the consumer and that implied by the technology.
The required thus satisfies
1 (1 )
= − = (1 ) −
1−
so that
1 (1 ) (1 ) − 1 (1 ) 2 (1 )
=1− = =
(1 ) (1 ) (1 )
In case = ( )1− 0 1 = 1. . . this gives = 1 −
It remains to find the required consumption tax rate The tax revenue
will be and the required tax revenue is
defining (̃) in the obvious way. The first-order condition for the problem,
0 (̃) = 0 is equivalent to (̃) = 0 After ordering this gives
Remark about the absence of a golden rule in the Romer model. In the
Romer model the golden rule is not a well-defined concept for the following
reason. Along any balanced growth path we have from (12.29),
̇ 0
≡ = (1 ) − − = (1 ) − −
0
because (= ) is by definition constant along a balanced growth path,
whereby also must be constant. We see that is decreasing linearly
from (1 ) − to − when 0 0 rises from nil to (1 ) So choosing
among alternative technically feasible balanced growth paths is inevitably a
choice between starting with low consumption to get high growth forever or
starting with high consumption to get low growth forever. Given any 0 0
the alternative possible balanced growth paths will therefore sooner or later
cross each other in the ( ln ) plane. Hence, for the given 0 there exists no
balanced growth path which for all ≥ 0 has higher than along any other
technically feasible balanced growth path. So no golden rule path exists.
This is a general property of AK and reduced-form AK models.
Perspectives on learning by
doing and learning by investing
This chapter adds some theoretical and empirical perspectives to the dis-
cussion in Chapter 12 and in Acemoglu, Chapter 11 and 12. The contents
are:
(a) On terminology
(b) Robustness of simple endogenous growth models
(c) Weak and strong scale effects
(d) Discussion
205
CHAPTER 13. PERSPECTIVES ON LEARNING BY DOING
206 AND LEARNING BY INVESTING
Here both and are learning parameters, reflecting the elasticities of learn-
ing w.r.t. the technology level and labor hours, respectively. The higher the
number of human beings involved in production and the more time they
spend in production, the more experience is accumulated. Sub-optimal in-
gredients in the production processes are identified and eliminated. The
experience and knowledge arising in one firm or one sector is speedily dif-
fused to other firms and other sectors in the economy (knowledge spillovers
or learning by watching), and as a result the aggregate productivity level is
increased.2
1
In his Chapter 20, Section 20.4, on industrialization and structural change Acemoglu
considers a model with two sectors, an agrarian and a manufacturing sector, where in the
latter learning by doing in the form (13.2) with = 1 plays an important role.
2
Diffusion of proficiency also occurs via apprentice-master relationships.
overlapping generations set-up.4 And at least in the first case the growth
rate will be the same whatever the size of the preference parameters (the
rate of time preference and the elasticity of marginal utility of consumption).
Moreover, only if economic policy affects the learning parameters or the pop-
ulation growth rate (two things that are often ruled out inherently by the
setup), will the long-run growth rate be affected. Still, economic policy can
temporarily affect economic growth and in this way affect the level of the
long-run growth path.
where is aggregate net investment. This is the hypothesis that the economy-
wide technology level is an increasing function of society’s previous ex-
perience, proxied by cumulative aggregate net investment.6 The Arrow and
Romer models, as described in Chapter 12, correspond to the cases 0 1
and = 1 respectively.
In this framework, where the “growth engine” depends on capital accu-
mulation, it is only in the Arrow case that we can calculate the per-capita
5
After the information-and-communication technology (ICT) revolution, where a lot of
technically advanced consumer goods have entered the scene, this traditional presumption
may be less compelling.
6
Contrary to the dynamic learning-by-doing specification (13.3), there is here no good
reason for allowing 0
growth rate along a BGP without specifying anything about the household
sector.
= = = − = −
( − 1) + = 0
Figure 13.1: Man-hours per vessel against cumulative number of vessels completed
to date in shipyard 1 and shipyard 2, respectively. Log-log paper. Source: Searle
(1945).
Figure 13.2: Average man-hours (over ten shipyards) per vessel gainst calendar
time. Four different vessel types. Source: Searle (1945).
Both studies used data on the production of different types of cargo vessels
during the second world war. Figures 1 and 2 are taken from Lucas’ review
article, Lucas (1993), but the original source is Searle (1945). For the vessel
type called “Liberty Ships” Lucas cites the observation by Searle (1945):
= 1 Figure 13.1 suggests a log-linear relationship between this
variable and the cumulative output:
That is, as cumulative output rises, the required man-hours per unit of output
declines over time in this way:
=
Let 2 be the later point in time where cumulative output has been doubled.
Then at time 2 the required man-hours per unit of output has declined to
Hence,
7
For more elaborate studies of empirical aspects of learning by doing and learning by
investing, see Irwin and Klenow (1994), Jovanovic and Nyarko (1995), and Greenwood and
Jovanovic (2001). Caballero and Lyons (1992) find clear evidence of positive externalities
across US manufacturing industries. Studies finding that the quantitative importance of
spillovers is significantly smaller than required by the Romer case include Englander and
Mittelstadt (1988) and Benhabib and Jovanovic (1991). See also the surveys by Syverson
(2011) and Thompson (2012).
Although in this lecture note we focus on learning as an externality, there exists studies
focusing on internal learning by doing, see, e.g., Gunn and Johri, 2011.
an average rate of 003 per year in the period 1950-1990, cf. the “Price”
curve in Figure 13.3.9 As the “Quantity” curve in Figure 13.3 shows, over
the same period there has been a secular rise in the ratio of new equipment
investment (in efficiency units) to GNP; note that what in the figure is called
the “investment-to-GNP Ratio” is really “quality-adjusted investment-to-
GNP Ratio”, not the usual investment-income ratio, .
Moreover, the correlation between de-trended and de-trended
is −046 Greenwood et al. interpret this as evidence that technical advances
have made equipment less expensive, triggering increases in the accumulation
of equipment both in the short and the long run. The authors also estimate
that embodied technical change explains 60% of the growth in output per
man hour.
where is gross investment at time Here the experience that matter has
its basis in cumulative gross investment. An upper bound, ̄ for the learning
parameter is introduced to avoid explosive growth. The hypothesis (13.14)
seems closer to both intuition and the original ideas of Arrow:
(1 − )(1 + )
= (13.16)
1 − (1 + )
= (13.17)
1+
1
= (13.18)
1+
= = − = (13.19)
1 − (1 + )
implying that it is cumulative quality-adjusted gross investment that matters, cf. Green-
wood and Jovanovic (2001). If combined with the production function (16.21) the appro-
−
priate upper bound on the learning parameter, ̃ is ̃ = 1 −
− ( − ̇ )
= (13.20)
where − ̇ is the true economic depreciation of the capital good per time
unit. Since = 1 (13.17) and (13.16) indicate that along a BGP the
relative price of capital goods will be declining according to
(1 − )
= − 0
1 − (1 + )
∗
The case = (1 − ) and = 0
When = (1 − ) we have (1 + ) = 1 and so the growth formulas
(13.16) and (13.19) no longer hold. But the way that (13.17) and (13.18)
are derived (see Appendix A) ensures that these two equations remain valid
along a BGP. Given = (1 − ) (13.17) can be written = (1 − )
which is equivalent to
= 1−
where
1 + 2 =
There are sector-specific learning-by-doing externalities in the following form:
saying that the value of the (constant) marginal productivity of labor in each
sector equals the wage. Hence,
2 1
= 1 or = (13.26)
1 2
saying that the relative price of the two goods is inversely proportional to
the relative labor productivities in the two sectors. The demand side, which
is not modelled here, will of course play a role for the final allocation of labor
to the two sectors.
Taking logs in (13.26) and differentiating w.r.t. gives
goods. Since this is the sector with a low growth potential, economic growth
is impeded or completely halted. The relative productivity level 1 2 does
not decrease. Hence, the scenario with ̄ 1 2 sustains itself and persists.
Low or zero economic growth is sustained. The static comparative advantage
in sector-1 goods remains and the country is locked in low growth.
·
If instead ̄ is time-dependent, suppose ̄ 0 (by similar arguments as
for the closed economy). Then the case 2 scenario is again self-sustaining.
The point is that there may be circumstances (like in case 2), where
temporary protection for a backward country is growth promoting (this is a
specific kind of “infant industry” argument).
̇1
= 1 1 (13.27)
1
̇2
= 2 2 (13.28)
2
by (13.22) and (13.23). Thus, the model implies scale effects on growth, that
is, strong scale effects.
An alternative specification introduces limits to learning-by-doing in the
following way:
̇1 = 1 11 1 1
̇2 = 2 22 2 1
̇1
= 1 11 −1 11 (13.29)
1
̇2
= 2 22 −1 22 (13.30)
2
Now the problematic strong scale effect has disappeared. At the same time,
since 1 − 1 0 and 2 − 1 0 (13.29) and (13.30) show that growth peters
out as long as the “diminishing returns” to learning-by-doing are not offset
by an increasing labor force or an additional source (outside the model) of
technical progress. If 0 we get sustained growth of the semi-endogenous
type as in the Arrow model of learning-by-investing.
Yet the analysis may still be a basis for an “infant industry” argument. If
the circumstances are like in case 2, temporary protection may help a back-
ward country to enter a higher long-run path of evolution. Stiglitz underlines
South Korea as an example:
with high learning potential can from an economic point of view circumvent
the curse to a blessing. It is not the natural resources as such, but rather
barriers of a political character, conflicts of interest among groups and social
classes, even civil war over the right to exploit the resources, or dominance
by foreign superpowers, that may be the obstacles to a sound economic de-
velopment (Mehlum et al., 2002). An additional potential obstacle is related
to the possible response of a country’s real exchange rate, and therefore its
competitiveness, to a new discovery of natural resources in a country.12
Summing up: Discovery of a valuable mineral in the ground in a country
with weak institutions may, through corruption etc. have adverse effects on
resource allocation and economic growth in the country. But: “Resources
should be a blessing, not a curse. They can be, but it will not happen on its
own. And it will not happen easily” (Stiglitz, 2012, p. 2).
13.5.1 On terminology
How terms like “endogenous growth” and “semi-endogenous growth” are de-
fined varies in the literature. Recalling the notation ≡ and ≡ ̇
in this course we use the definitions:
parameters matter for long-run growth. This suggests, at least at the theoret-
ical level, that taxes and subsidies, by affecting incentives, may have effects
on long-run growth (cf. Chapter 12). On the other hand, a fully-endogenous
growth model need not have this implication. We saw an example of this in
Section 13.1, where the “law of motion” of technology makes up a subsystem
that is independent of the remainder of the economic system.
In any case, fully-endogenous growth is technologically possible if and
only if there are non-diminishing returns (at least asymptotically) to the
producible inputs in the growth-generating sector(s), also called the “growth
engine”. The growth engine in an endogenous growth model is defined as
the set of input-producing sectors or activities using their own output as
input. This set may consist of only one sector such as the manufacturing
sector in the simple AK model, the educational sector in the Lucas (1988)
model, or the R&D sector in the Romer (1990) model. A model is capable
of generating fully-endogenous growth if the growth engine has CRS w.r.t.
producible inputs.
No argument like the replication argument for CRS w.r.t. the rival in-
puts exists regarding CRS w.r.t. the producible inputs. This is one of the
reasons that also another kind of endogenous growth is often considered in
the literature. This takes us to “semi-endogenous growth”.
Semi-endogenous growth is present if growth is endogenous but a posi-
tive long-run per capita growth rate can not be sustained without the
support by growth in some exogenous factor (for example exogenous
growth in the labor force).
For example, the Arrow model of learning by investing features semi-
endogenous growth. The technical reason for this is the assumption that
the learning parameter, is less than 1 which implies diminishing marginal
returns to capital at the aggregate level. Along a BGP we get
= = = (13.31)
1−
If and only if 0 can a positive constant be maintained forever. When
the learning mechanism is assisted by population growth, it is strong enough
to over time endogenously maintain a constant average productivity of cap-
ital. The key role of population growth derives from the fact that at the
aggregate level there are increasing returns to scale w.r.t. capital and labor.
For the increasing returns to be sufficiently exploited to generate exponen-
tial growth, population growth is needed.13 Note that in this case
13
Of course the model shifts from featuring “semi-” to featuring “fully-endogenous”
growth if the model is extended with an internal mechanism determining the population
= 0 = that is, preference parameters do not matter for long-run
growth (only for the level of the growth path). This suggests that taxes and
subsidies do not have long-run growth effects. Yet, in Arrow’s model and
similar semi-endogenous growth models economic policy can have important
long-run level effects.
Strangely enough, some textbooks (for example Barro and Sala-i-Martin,
2004) do not call much attention to the distinction between fully-endogenous
growth and semi-endogenous growth. Rather, they tend to use the term
endogenous growth as synonymous with what we here call fully-endogenous
growth. But there is certainly no reason to rule out apriori the parameter
cases corresponding to semi-endogenous growth.
In the Acemoglu textbook (Acemoglu, 2009, p. 448) “semi-endogenous
growth” is defined or characterized as endogenous growth where the long-
run per capita growth rate of the economy “does not respond to taxes or
other policies”. As an implication, endogenous growth which is not semi-
endogenous is in Acemoglu’s text implicitly defined as endogenous growth
where the long-run per capita growth rate of the economy does respond to
taxes or other policies.
We have defined the distinction between “semi-endogenous growth” and
“fully-endogenous growth” in a different way. In our terminology, this dis-
tinction does not coincide with the distinction between policy-dependent
and policy-invariant growth. Indeed, in our terminology positive per capita
growth may rest on an “exogenous source” in the sense of deriving from
exogenous technical progress and yet the long-run per capita growth rate
may be policy-dependent. In Chapter 16 we will see an example in connec-
tion with the Dasgupta-Heal-Solow-Stiglitz model, also known as the DHSS
model.
There also exist models that according to our definition feature semi-
endogenous growth and yet the long-run per capita growth rate is policy-
dependent (Cozzi, 1997; Sorger, 2010). Similarly, there exist models that
according to our definition feature fully-endogenous growth and yet the long-
run per capita growth rate is policy-invariant (Section 13.1.2 above shows
an example).
A word of warning before proceeding. The distinction between an ex-
ogenous or endogenous per capita growth rate is only meaningful within a
given meta-theoretical framework. It is always possible to make the meta-
theoretical framework so “broad” that the per capita growth rate must be
considered endogenous within this framework. From the perspective of so-
ciety as a whole we can imagine many different political and institutional
growth case is that it has much simpler dynamics. Then the question arises
to what extent a fully-endogenous growth model can be seen as a useful ap-
proximation to its semi-endogenous growth “counterpart”. Imagine that we
contemplate applying the fully-endogenous growth case as a basis for making
forecasts or for policy evaluation in a situation where the “true” case is the
semi-endogenous growth case. Then we would like to know: Are the impulse-
response functions generated by a shock in the fully-endogenous growth case
an acceptable approximation to those generated by the same shock in the
corresponding semi-endogenous growth case for a sufficiently long time hori-
zon to be of interest?16 The answer is “yes” if the critical parameter has a
value “close” to the knife edge value and “no” otherwise. How close it need
be, depends on circumstances. My own tentative impression is that usually
it is “closer” than what the empirical evidence warrants.
Even if a single growth-generating mechanism, like learning by doing,
does not in itself seem strong enough to generate a reduced-form AK model
(the fully-endogenous growth case), there might exist complementary factors
and mechanisms that in total could generate something close to a reduced-
form AK model. The time-series test by, for instance, Jones (1995b) and
Romero-Avila (2006), however, reject this.17
1
= = = (1 (1 ) − − )
From this follows not only standard results for fully-endogenous growth mod-
els, such as
0 0
but also18
1
= 12 (1 ) 0 (13.32)
This is because in this model the rate of return, 1 (1 ) − depends (posi-
tively) on Interpreting the size (“scale”) of the economy as measured by
18
Here we use that a neoclassical production function ( ) with CRS satisfies the
“direct complementarity condition” 12 0
the size, of the labor force, we call such an effect a scale effect. To distin-
guish it from another kind of scale effect, it is useful to name it a scale effect
on growth or a strong scale effect.
Scale effects can be of a less dramatic form. In this case we speak of a
scale effect on levels or a weak scale effect. This form arises when the learning
parameter is less than 1. We thus see from (13.31) that in Arrow’s model
of learning-by-investing the steady state growth rate is independent of the
size of the economy. Consequently, in Arrow’s model there is no strong scale
effect. There is, however, a (positive) scale effect on levels in the sense that
along a steady state growth path,
0 (13.33)
0
This says the following. Suppose we consider two closed economies char-
acterized by the same parameters, including the same 19 The economies
differ only w.r.t. initial size of the labor force. Suppose both economies are
in steady state. Then, according to (13.33), the economy with the larger
labor force has, for all larger output per unit of labor. The background is
the positive relationship between the labor efficiency index, and aggregate
cumulative (net) investment,
=
which is due to learning and knowledge spillovers across firms. Thus, a given
level of per capita investment increases labor productivity more in a larger
economy (where ̇ will be larger) than in a smaller economy.
More generally, the fundamental background is that technical knowledge
is a non-rival good − its use by one firm does not (in itself) limit the amount
of knowledge available to other firms.20 In a large economic system, say an
integrated set of open economies, more people benefit from a given increase
in knowledge than in a small economic system. At the same time the per
capita cost of creating the increase in knowledge is less in the large system
than in the small system.
To prove (13.33), note that along a steady state path
where
≡ ̃ = ̃∗ = ̃∗
19
Remember that in contrast to the Romer model, Arrow’s model allows 0
20
By patent protection, secrecy, and copyright some aspects of technical knowledge are
sometimes partially and temporarily excludable, but that is another matter. Excludability
is ignored in our simple learning-by-doing and learning-by-investing models.
13.5.4 Discussion
Are there good theoretical and/or empirical reasons to believe in the existence
of (positive) scale effects on levels or perhaps even on growth in the long run?
Let us start with some theoretical considerations.
Theoretical aspects
From the point of view of theory, we should recognize the likelihood that
offsetting forces are in play. On the one hand, there is the problem of limited
natural resources. For a given level of technology, if there are CRS w.r.t.
capital, labor, and land (or other natural resources), there are diminishing
returns to capital and labor taken together. In this Malthusian perspective,
an increased scale (increased population) results, everything else equal, in
lower rather than higher per capita output, that is, a negative scale effect
should be expected.
On the other hand, there is the anti-Mathusian view that repeated im-
provements in technology tend to overcome, or rather more than overcome,
this Malthusian force, if appropriate socio-economic conditions are present.
Here the theory of endogenous technical change comes in by telling us that
a large population may be good for technical progress if the institutions in
society are growth-friendly. A larger population breeds more ideas, the more
so the better its education is; a larger population also promotes division of la-
bor and larger markets. This helps the creation of new technologies or, from
Empirical aspects
First of all we should remember that in view of cross-border diffusion of ideas
and technology, a positive scale effect (whether weak or strong) should not be
seen as a prediction about individual countries, but rather as pertaining to
larger regions, nowadays probably the total industrialized part of the world.
So cross-country regression analysis is not the right framework for testing
for scale effects, whether on levels or the growth rate. The relevant scale
variable is not the size of the country, but the size of a larger region to which
the country belongs, perhaps the whole world; and multivariate time series
analysis seems the most relevant approach.
Since in the last century there has been no clear upward trend in per
capita growth rates in spite of a growing world population (and also a growing
population in the industrialized part of the world separately), most econo-
mists do not believe in strong scale effects. But on the issue of weak scale
effects the opinion is definitely more divided.
Considering the very-long run history of population and per capita income
of different regions of the world, there clearly exists evidence in favour of
scale effects (Kremer, 1993). Whether advantages of scale are present also
in a contemporary context is more debated. Recent econometric studies
supporting the hypothesis of positive scale effects on levels include Antweiler
and Trefler (2002) and Alcalá and Ciccone (2004). Finally, considering the
economic growth in China and India since the 1980s, we must acknowledge
that this impressive performance at least does not speak against the existence
of positive scale effects on levels.
Acemoglu seems to find positive scale effects on levels plausible at the
theoretical level (pp. 113-114). At the same time, however, later in his book
he seems somewhat skeptical as to the existence of empirical support for this.
Indeed, with regard to the fact that R&D-based theoretical growth models
tend to generate at least weak scale effects, Acemoglu claims: “It is not clear
whether data support these types of scale effects” (Acemoglu, 2009, p. 448).
My personal view on the matter is that we should, of course, recognize
that offsetting forces, coming from our finite natural environment, are in play
and that a lot of uncertainty is involved. Nevertheless it seems likely that at
least up to a certain point there are positive scale effects on levels.
Policy implications If this holds true, it supports the view that inter-
national economic integration is generally a good idea. The concern about
congestion and environmental problems, in particular global warming, should
probably, however, preclude recommending governments and the United Na-
tions to try to promote population growth.
Moreover, it is important to remember the distinction between the global
and the local level. The in the formula (13.31) refers to a much larger
region than a single country; we may refer to this region as “the set of
knowledge-producing countries in the world”. No recommendation of higher
population growth in a single country is implied by this theoretical formula.
When discussing economic policy from the perspective of a single country, all
aspects of relevance in the given local context should be incorporated. For a
developing country with limited infrastructure and weak educational system,
family-planning programs and similar may in many cases make sense from
both a social and a productivity point of view (cf. Dasgupta, 1995).
13.6 Appendix
= 1− 0 1 (13.37)
= − (13.38)
̇ = − (13.39)
µZ ¶
= 0 ≤ ̄ (13.40)
−∞
= 0 ≥ 0 (13.41)
̇ 1
= − + = 0
(1 − )(1 + )
=
1 − (1 + )
which is (13.16). In view of = = = ( + ) = (1 + ) the
results (13.17), (13.18), and (13.19) immediately follow.
=
= = 1 + ' 0
̇ ≡ = 0 1 (0) = 0 0 given (13.44)
We see that not only is ̇ 0 for all ≥ 0 but ̇ is increasing over time
since is increasing. So, for sure, → ∞ but how fast?
One way of answering this question exploits the fact that ̇ = is
a Bernouilli equation and can be solved by considering the transformation
= 1− as we do in Chapter 7 and Exercise III.3. Closely related to
that method is the approach below, which may have the advantage of being
somewhat more transparent and intuitive.
To find out, note that (13.44) is a separable differential equation which
implies
− =
By integration,
Z Z
−
= + C ⇒
−+1
= + C (13.45)
1−
where C is some constant, determined by the initial condition (0) = 0 For
= 0 (13.45) gives C = 0−+1 (1 − ) Consequently, the solution = ()
satisfies
0 1− ()1−
− = (13.46)
−1 −1
As increases, the left-hand side of this equation follows suit since ()
increases and 1 There is a ̄ ∞ such that when → ̄ from below,
() → ∞ Indeed, by (13.46) we see that such a ̄ must be the solution to
the equation µ 1− ¶
0 ()1−
lim − = ̄
()→∞ −1 −1
Since µ ¶
0 1− ()1− 0 1−
lim − =
()→∞ −1 −1 −1
we find
1 0 1−
̄ =
−1
To get an idea about the implied order of magnitude, let the time unit be
one year and = 01 0 0 = 01− = 2 and = 105 Then ̄ = 400 years.
So the Big Bang ( = ∞) would occur in 400 years from now if = 105
As Solow remarks (Solow 1994), this arrival to the Land of Cockaigne
would imply the “end of scarcity”, a very optimistic perspective.
In a discrete time setup we get an analogue conclusion. With airframe
construction in mind let us imagine that the learning parameter is slightly
above 1. Then we must accept the implication that it takes only a finite
number of labor hours to produce an infinite number of airframes. This is
because, given the (direct) labor input required to produce the ’th in a
sequence of identical airframes is proportional to − the total labor input
required to produce the first airframesPis proportional to 11 +12 +13
+ + 1 Now, the infinite series ∞
=1 1 converges if 1 As a
consequence only a finite amount of labor is needed to produce an infinite
number of airframes. “This seems to contradict the whole idea of scarcity”,
Solow observes (Solow 1997, p. 8).
13.7 References
Antweiler and Trefler, 2002, , AER.
Greenwood, J., and B. Jovanovic, 2001. Accounting for growth. In: New
Developments in Productivity Analysis, ed. by C. R. Hulten, E. R.
Dean, and M. J. Harper, NBER Studies in Income and Wealth, Chicago:
University of Chicago Press.
Groth, C., T. M. Steger, and K.-J. Koch, 2010. When economic growth is
less than exponential, Economic Theory 44, 213-242.
Ha, J., and P. Howitt, 2007, Accounting for trends in productivity and R&D:
A Schumpeterian critique of semi-endogenous growth theory, Journal
of Money, Credit, and Banking, vol. 39, no. 4, 733-774.
Jones, C. I., 1994. Economic Growth and the Relative Price of Capital.
Journal of Monetary Economics 34, 359-382.
Jones, C. I., 1995b. Time series tests of endogenous growth models. Quar-
terly Journal of Economics, 110 (2), 495-525.
Jones, C. I., 1999, Growth: With or without scale effects , American Eco-
nomic Review, vol. 89, Papers and proceedings, May, 139-144.
Jones, C. I., 2005. Growth and ideas. In: Handbook of Economic Growth,
vol. 1B, ed. by P. Aghion and S. N. Durlauf, Elsevier: Amsterdam,
1063-1111.
Mehlum, H., K. Moene, and R. Torvik, 2002, Institutions and the resource
curse, WP, Oslo.
Rapping, 1965,
Romero-Avila, D., 2006, Can the AK model be rescued? New evidence from
unit root tests with good size and power, Topics in Macroeconomics,
vol. 6 (1), Article 3.
Searle, 1945.
Thornton and Thompson, 2001, Learning from experience and learning from
others: An exploration of learning and spillovers in wartime shipbuild-
ing, AER, Dec.
243
244 CHAPTER 14. THE LAB-EQUIPMENT MODEL
3. The R&D sector inventing new technical designs and operating under
conditions of perfect competition and free entry.
where is the total supply of intermediate goods, all of which are used up
in the production of basic goods. Apart from introducing a specific symbol,
for this total supply of intermediate goods, our notation is the same as
Acemoglu’s, Chapter 13. Yet, to help intuition, we think of variety as some-
thing discrete rather than a continuum and use summation across varieties
as in (14.1) and (14.4) whereas Acemoglu’s uses integrals.
3
By an “intermediate good” is meant a non-durable means of production (like materials
and energy) used up in the single production process while "capital” means a durable
means of production (like a machine).
= − + − + ̇ −
= − + − + ̇ − = − (14.7)
where the last equality comes from ̇ − = 0 in equilibrium due to the
way sector 3 is described. Since there is no capital that depreciates in the
economy, gross national product and net national product are the same.
Notice that the production function for is a production function neither
for nor even for value added in sector 1, but simply for the quantity
of produced goods in that sector. It is typical for a multi-sector model with
non-durable intermediate goods that the production functions in the different
sectors do not describe value added in the sector but the produced quantity.
The income side There are two kinds of income in the economy, wage
income and profits. The time- real wage per unit of labor is denoted
and the profit per time unit earned by each monopoly firm in sector 2 is
denoted (in equilibrium it turns out to be the same for all the monopoly
firms). Profits are immediately paid out to the share owners. Owing to
perfect competition and CRS in both sector 1 and sector 3, there is no profit
generated in these sectors. The income side of NNP is thereby
= +
+ = +
The uses of NNP By (14.7) and (14.4), final output can be written
per time unit. Let denote per capita consumption A household
chooses a plan ( )∞
=0 to maximize
Z ∞
1− −
0 = s.t.
0 1−
≥ 0
̇ = + − 0 given,
lim − 0
≥ 0 (14.9)
→∞
=
because the only asset with market value in the economy is equity shares in
the monopoly firms the value of which equals the market value per technical
design multiplied by the number of technical designs available. As accounted
for in Section 14.3.3, the risk-averse households (00 0) can fully diversify
any risk so as to obtain the rate of return, with certainty on all their
saving.
The first-order conditions for the consumption-saving problem lead to the
Keynes-Ramsey rule
̇ 1
= ( − ) (14.10)
The necessary transversality condition is that the No-Ponzi-Game condition
(14.9) is satisfied with equality.
There is perfect competition and complete real wage flexibility in the labor
market. For every the supply of labor is a constant. The demand for
labor, comes from the basic-goods sector (as the two other sectors do not
use labor). In equilibrium,
= (14.11)
and
and where the discount discount rate is the risk-free interest rate.
where is the R&D investment (in terms of basic goods) and is “research
productivity”. What is the microeconomic story behind this?
There is a “large” number of R&D labs and free entry and exit. All R&D
labs operate under the same conditions with regard to “research technol-
ogy”. The following simplifying assumptions are made. The random R&D
outcomes are:
The “no memory” assumption, (i), ignores learning over time within the
lab which seems a quite drastic assumption; indeed, innovation should be
considered a cumulative process. Assumption (ii) seems drastic as well, since
some learning across R&D labs is likely. In combination, the assumptions
(i), (ii), and (iii) sum up to what is called “ideosyncratic” uncertainty. The
“no overlap” assumption, (iv), amounts to assuming that inventions can go
in so many directions that the likelihood of different research labs chasing
and making the same invention is negligible. So we can find the aggregate in-
crease in “knowledge” simply by summing the contributions by the individual
research labs.
= 0 (14.23)
Appealing to the law of large numbers, we replace “≈” by “=” ignore indi-
visibilities, and take limits:
(R&D payoff | ∆) ≈ ∆ + 0 · (1 − ∆) = ∆ (14.26)
≤ 1 (14.27)
= 1 (14.28)
It follows from Claim 2 that when the market value of inventions satisfy
(14.28), the cost of doing R&D is on average exactly covered by the expected
payoff. In return for putting one unit of account at the disposal of a research
lab, the household gets a payoff of if the research turns out to be successful
and zero otherwise. In expected value the payoff per time unit is one unit
of account. It is as if the household buys a lottery ticket offered by the
R&D lab to finance its current R&D costs. The lottery prize consists of
shares of stock giving the right to the future monopoly profits if the current
research is successful within one time unit. The lottery is “fair” because the
cost of participating equals the expected payoff. In spite of being risk averse
(00 () 0) the households are willing to participate because the uncertainty
is “ideosyncratic” and the economy is “large”. This allows the households to
avoid the risk by spreading their investment over a variety of R&D labs, i.e.,
by diversifying their investment.
What ensures that household saving and R&D investment match each
other? Let aggregate financial wealth at time be denoted A Then, in an
equilibrium with 0,
1
≡ A = =
̇ ∆ = ∆
From then on, holding diversified shares in the monopolies supplying the
newly invented intermediate goods gives the normal rate of return in the
economy, A fraction of the R&D labs have not been successful in the time
interval considered (and the financing to them has thereby been lost). But
others have been successful and made an invention. The unequal occurrence
of failures and successes across the many different R&D labs is neutralized
when it comes to the payout to the customers, i.e., the households who have
deposits in the mutual funds.
As an alternative financing setup, suppose that the R&D labs offer project
contracts of the following form. A contract stipulates that the investor pays
9
In this model households’ gross saving equals their net saving since there are no assets
that depreciate.
the lab 1 units of account per time unit until a successful research outcome
arrives. The corresponding liability of the lab is, when achieving success and
becoming an entrepreneur in sector 2, to let the subsequent permanent profit
stream earned on the invention go to the investor. By Claim 1, such R&D
contracts have no market value. But after a successful R&D outcome there
is a capital gain in the sense that the contracts become shares in the hands of
the investors giving permanent dividends equal to per time unit and thus
having a market value equal to = 1 forever.
Note that as the model is formulated, there is no value added in the R&D
sector, as was also mentioned in connection with (14.7) in Section 14.1.2.
Instead, the value that at the aggregate level comes out as ̇ is just a
cost free one-to-one instantaneous transformation of which is a part of
the value added created in the basic-goods sector. It is ultimately this value
added that households’ saving pays for.
so that µ ¶
̇
≡ = ̄ −
As = this implies
= (̄ − ) ,
for all ≥ 0 Hence, the until now unknown initial per capita consumption is
0
0 = (̄ − )
Labour productivity can be defined as
hence = =
Thus the model generates fully endogenous balanced growth and there are
no transitional dynamics. What makes fully endogenous growth possible is,
as usual, that the “growth engine” of the economy features constant returns
to scale w.r.t. producible inputs. Generally, as defined in Chapter 13.5, the
growth engine of a model is the set of input-producing sectors using their own
output as an input. After having derived the aggregate production function
in sector 1 as expressed in (14.21), sector 2 can be considered integrated in
sector 1. On this basis, sector 1 and sector 3 constitute the growth engine in
the model. Basic goods, = ++ and technical knowledge, represented
Stochastic erosion of
innovators’ monopoly power
263
CHAPTER 15. STOCHASTIC EROSION OF INNOVATOR’S
264 MONOPOLY POWER
where , and denote output of the firm, labor input, and input of
intermediate good , respectively, where = 1 2 . This sector, as well
as the labor market, operate under perfect competition.
The aggregate output of basic goods is used partly for replacing the basic
goods, used in the production of intermediate goods used up in the pro-
duction of basic goods, partly for consumption, and partly for investment
in R&D, . Hence, we have
= + + (15.2)
In the intermediate-goods sector, sector 2, at time there are monopoly
firms, each of which supplies a particular already invented intermediate good.
Once the technical design for intermediate good has been invented in sector
3, the inventor enters sector 2 as an innovator. Given the technical design,
the innovator can instantly transform a certain number of basic goods into a
proportional number of intermediate goods of the invented specialized kind.
That is,
it takes units of the basic good to supply units of intermediate good
(15.3)
where is a positive constant. The transformation requires no labor. Thus,
is both the marginal and the average cost of supplying the intermediate
good . This transformation technology applies to all intermediate goods,
= 1 2 , and all . Hence, the in (15.2) satisfies
X
≡ ≡ (15.4)
=1
where is the total supply of intermediate goods, all of which are used up
in the production of basic goods.
For a limited period after the invention has been made, through secrecy
or imperfect patenting the inventor maintains monopoly power over the com-
mercial use of the invention. The length of this period is uncertain, see below.
̇ ≡ = 0 constant, (15.5)
where, as noted above, is the aggregate R&D investment in terms of basic
goods delivered to sector 3 per time unit. As also noted above, after an
invention has been made, the inventor enters sector 2 as an innovator and
begins supplying the new intermediate good to firms in sector 1.
for a short time. The model assumes, however, that all uncertainty is idio-
syncratic, that is, the stochastic events that an R&D lab is successful in a
certain time interval and that an innovator looses her monopoly position in a
certain time interval are uncorrelated across R&D labs, innovators, and time
and are in fact not correlated with anything in the economy. Assuming a
“large” number of both R&D labs and intermediate-goods firms still being
monopolies, investors can eliminate any risk by diversifying their investment
as described in Chapter 14. Of course, this whole setup is an abstraction and
can at best be considered a benchmark case.
As labor supply is a constant, clearing in the labor market implies
= We insert this into the production function (15.1) of the repre-
sentative firm in sector 1. Maximizing profit, at time this firm then de-
−1
mands ( ) = ((1 − ))1 units of intermediate good per time
unit, = 1 2 . As long as innovator is still a monopolist, she faces
this downward-sloping demand curve with price elasticity −1 and sets the
price, such that = (marginal revenue = marginal cost). With
the basic good as our numeraire, this amounts to
1
(1 − ) =
1
1
= (1 + markup) · = ≡
1−
= ( − ) () = ( − )() = () ≡ () (15.7)
1− 1−
for = 1 2 . The formulas for () and () are the same as those for
and respectively, in Model I, cf. Chapter 14.
where () and () are given in (15.6) and (15.8), respectively.
()
where is the number of intermediate good types that at time are still
()
supplied under monopolistic conditions and is the number of intermedi-
ate good types that have become competitive. For each we have
() ()
= + (15.11)
There are now two state variables in the model. There is therefore scope for
transitional dynamics, as we shall see soon.
()
Aggregate output is seen to depend on If the dynamics are such that
()
tends to a positive constant, then will tend to be proportional to
the produced “input”, since () is a constant, cf. (15.6). Therefore,
the model is likely capable of generating fully endogenous growth, driven by
R&D. We come back to this below.
()
In the case of universal and perpetual monopoly power, = 0 and
()
so (15.12) reduces to = (() )1− ≡ which is the equilibrium
output of basic goods in Model I. Substituting this into the expression (15.12),
we see that
" #
()
() ()
= 1 + ((1 − )−(1−) − 1) (15.13)
()
While in Model I, the Poisson expiration rate, is nil, hence = 0 for
()
all here wqe have 0 so that 0 This means that a fraction of
the intermediate goods are supplied at a price equal to marginal cost thus
inducing efficient use of these. Thereby productivity is enhanced and we
()
get as shown by (15.12) (where (1 − )−(1−) 1 in view of
0 1)
where is the time- profit flow, now a stochastic variable as seen from
time :
½ ()
if firm is still a monopolist at time
=
0 otherwise.
This market value is the same for all intermediate goods which at time
still retain monopoly. The expression (15.16) gives the market value in a
certainty-equivalent form. On the one hand the integral in (15.16) “treats”
the monopoly profit stream as if it were perpetual, on the other hand this
future potential profit is discounted at an effective discount rate, +
taking into account the probability, −( −) that at time the ability to
earn this profit has disappeared. The in (15.16) is an observable variable
given that the firm is still a monopoly (otherwise it has market value equal to
nil). The uncertainty is about profits in the future and the discount rate for
these equals the risk-free interest rate plus a risk premium, here equal to
which is the approximate conditional probability that the monopoly status
breaks down in the time interval ( + 1] given it is retained up to time
2
At this point we face the question: how is the risk-free interest rate,
determined? To approach an answer, it is useful to derive the no-arbitrage
condition which is implicit in (15.14). It may help intuition to think of as
the interest rate on a market for safe loans.
By differentiating (15.16) w.r.t. using Leibniz’s’ formula,3 we get
(+)
() + ̇
= + (15.17)
2
This is known from the theory of a Poisson process.
3
See Appendix A.
(+)
where ̇ is the conditional capital gain, that is, the increase per time
unit in the market value of the monopoly firm at time , conditional on its
monopoly position remaining in place also in the next moment. This formula
equalizes the instantaneous conditional rate of return per time unit on shares
in monopoly firms to the risk-free interest rate plus a premium reflecting the
risk that the monopoly position expires within the next instant.
Alternatively we may derive the no-arbitrage condition (15.17) without
appealing to Leibniz’s’ formula (which may not be part of the reader’s stan-
dard math toolbox). This alternative approach has the advantage of being
more intuitive. Let
≡ the firm’s earnings in the time interval ( + ∆), given that the
firm is still a monopolist at time .
There will be no opportunities for arbitrage if the expected instantaneous
unconditional rate of return per time unit on shares in the monopoly firm
equals the required rate of return which is the risk-free interest rate, This
amounts to the condition
lim∆→0 (∆ ∆)
= (15.18)
The firm’s earnings in the time interval ( + ∆] is approximately ∆
This is a stochastic variable and its expected value as seen from time is
(+)
( ∆) ≈ ∆(− ) + (1 − ∆)( () + ̇ )∆ (15.19)
Indeed, is the capital loss in case the monopoly position ceases and ∆ is
the approximate probability that this event occurs within the time interval
( + ∆], given that at time it has not yet occurred. Similarly, 1 − ∆ is
the approximate probability that a monopoly position retained up to time
(+)
remains in force at least up to time + ∆ And ( () + ̇ )∆ is the total
return in that case. Now, (15.19) can be written:
(+) (+)
( ∆) ≈ −∆ + ( () + ̇ )∆ − ( () + ̇ 2
)(∆)(15.20)
(+) (+)
= ( () + ̇ − )∆ − ( () + ̇ )(∆)2 ⇒
( ∆) (+) (+)
≈ () + ̇ − − (() + ̇ )∆
∆
(+)
→ () + ̇ − for ∆ → 0
Hence, the condition (15.18) implies the no-arbitrage condition
lim∆→0 (∆ ∆) (+)
() + ̇ −
= = (15.21)
Reordering, we see that this is the same condition as (15.17).
= () − = () − ≡ ∗ ≡ () − () ≡ () (15.23)
1−
where () is the equilibrium interest rate that would apply in case of per-
petual monopoly as in Model I.
Like in Model I, the equilibrium interest rate in Model II is thus from the
beginning a constant, ∗ . In view of 0 (15.23) shows that ∗ ()
Because of the limited duration of monopoly power in our present model, the
expected rate of return on investing in R&D is smaller than in the case of no
erosion of monopoly power as in Model I.
The description of the household sector is as in Model I, except that now
per capita financial wealth is
()
=
() ()
Indeed, now only = − firms have positive market value, namely
the firms that supply intermediate goods under monopolistic conditions. The
households’ first-order condition lead to the Keynes-Ramsey rule
̇ 1 ∗ 1
= ( − ) = (() − − ) ≡ ∗ () (15.24)
()
where is the per capita consumption growth rate from Model I, the case
of perpetual monopoly.
In order to have a model with growth, we assume parameters are such
that ∗ 0 In addition, to avoid unbounded utility and help fulfillment of
4
A more detailed argument is given in Chapter 14.
respectively, where () ≡ (1 − )−1 () 0 (from (15.7)), with () ≡
1
(((1 − )2 )) 0 (from (15.6)). The set of parameter combinations
satisfying these two conditions is not empty. Indeed, for arbitrary values of
and the parameters entering () choose for instance = 0 and 0 so
that (A1) is satisfied. Then ∗ 0 and (A2) is satisfied for any 1
(A1) requires that the “growth engine” of the economic system, as deter-
mined in particular by and , is “powerful enough” for growth to arise.
Below we return to what exactly constitutes the growth engine in this model.
Suffice it to say here that increases in and augment the strength of
the growth engine (thereby making (A1) more likely to hold) while a rise in
reduces the strength of the growth engine (thereby making (A1) less likely
to hold).5
we get
()
−
= () − = ()
− = (−1
− 1) −
− ( + ) R 0
= −1 for Q (15.26)
+
where the second equality is implied by (15.25).
The general law of movement of is given by (15.5), which, together
with (15.2) and (15.13) and the definition ̃ ≡ implies that
n o
() ()
̇ = = ( − − ) = − ( () + () ) −
(Ã ! )
()
() () ()
= 1 + ((1 − )−(1−) − 1) − (( − )() + () ) −
( )
()
= (1 + ((1 − )−(1−) − 1) ) − () + (() − () ) ) − ̃
©¡ ¢
= 1 + ((1 − )−(1−) − 1) (() )1− − ()
£ ¤ ª
+ () − (1 − )−1 () ) − ̃ (by (15.8))
©
= (() )1− − ()
£ ¤ ª
+ ((1 − )−(1−) − 1)(() )1− − ((1 − )−1 − 1)() − ̃
≡ (1 + 2 − ̃ )
where the constants 1 and 2 are implicitly defined. The growth rate of
can thus be written
= (1 + 2 − ̃ ) (15.27)
We now construct the implied dynamic system in the endogenous vari-
ables and ̃ From (15.26) follows ̇ = − ( + ) which combined
with (15.27) yields
∗ = (15.30)
+ ∗
A social planner
Letting () denote the growth rate under perpetual monopoly as in Model
I, we have µ ¶
∗ () 1 ()
= − (15.32)
1−
where () is the competitive supply of each intermediate-good type, defined
in (15.8), and is the optimal growth rate from the point of view of an
“all-knowing and all-powerful” social planner with the same criterion function
as that of the representative household. The first inequality in (15.32) was
shown above and the second is shown in Exercise VII.4. While the formal
derivation of the social planner’s solution is dealt with in that exercise, here
we shall consider the issues in more intuitive terms.
The first policy problem is that in the market economy, the invented
specialized intermediate goods are, at least to begin with, priced above the
private marginal cost, which is also the social marginal cost. Consequently,
under laissez faire, these goods are not supplied and used up to the point
where their marginal productivity equals their social marginal cost. A “free”
potential productivity gain is left unexploited in the economy.
A second problem is that this “static distortion” leads to a “dynamic
distortion”. Indeed, the fact that “too little” of the specialized intermediate
goods is demanded means that the market for each variety is “too small”.
This results in too little profits to the suppliers of these goods, hence too
little market value of inventions, that is, too little remuneration of the R&D
activity. Consequently, there is too little incentive to do R&D, and even the
growth rate () in model I ends up smaller than the social optimum. On
top of this comes in Model II that the imperfect protection of innovations
reduces the incentive to do R&D further, and the growth rate ends up even
lower than in Model I.
Returning to the static distortion, from the social planner’s point of view
the aggregate production function in the basic-goods sector can in the re-
duced form be written
where the last equality comes from (15.8). This shows that society should, as
expected, supply each of the intermediate good types in the competitive
()
amount () rather than supply of them in the amount () () as in
Model II or, even worse, supply all intermediate good types in the amount
() as in Model I.
Policy instruments
To counteract the monopolist price distortion and encourage demand for
monopolized intermediate goods, a subsidy at constant rate to purchases of
monopolized intermediate goods will work. By setting = the monopoly
pricing is exactly neutralized from the point of view of the buyer who will
have to pay (1 − ) = (1 − )(1 − ) = which is the marginal cost of
supplying the good. This solves the static efficiency problem.
In Model I, solving this problem can be shown to automatically solve,
indirectly, also the dynamic efficiency problem. In Model II, solving the static
efficiency problem will also encourage R&D but, because of the imperfect
protection of innovations, not to the extent needed to get the optimal (first-
best) solution. A second policy instrument is needed. A direct stimulus in
the form of a subsidy to R&D investment is called for.
By comparing with the social planner’s allocation, it is possible to find
exact formulas for this R&D subsidy rate as well as non-distortionary financ-
ing such that the social planner’s allocation is implemented in a decentralized
way. Taxation on consumption and labor income are workable in these mod-
els.
Going outside the present specific model, there are many further aspects
to take into account, e.g., spill-over effects of R&D and intensional knowledge
sharing, which we shall not consider here. A survey is contained in Hall and
Harhoff (2012). We end this chapter by a citation from Wikipedia (07-05-
2015):
15.9 Appendix
A. Deriving (15.17) on the basis of Leibniz’s formula
We shall apply Leibniz’s formula 6 which says:
Z ()
() = ( ) =
()
Z ()
0 0 0 ( )
() = (() ) () − (() ) () +
()
()
= () = 0 − + − ( +) ( + )
= −1 + ( + ) () = −1 + ( + ) ()
6
For details, see for instance Sydsæter et al. (2008).
Reordering gives
(+)
() + ̇
= +
which is the no-arbitrage condition (15.17).
B. Stability analysis
The Jacobian matrix, evaluated in the steady state, is
" #
̇ ̇̃
∗ = · ·
̃ ̃̃ |(̃)=(∗ ̃∗ )
∙ ¸
−( + + 2 ∗ ) ∗
=
−2 ̃∗ ̃∗
Hence, the eigenvalues are of opposite sign and the steady state is a saddle
point. A possible configuration of the phase diagram is sketched in Fig. 15.1.
In the steady state the TVC of the households is satisfied in that
() () ()
∗
∗ ∗ − −∗
− = − =− =
∗
(1 − ) −∗ (1 − ∗ )0 −∗
= = → 0 for → ∞
since ∗ ≡ () − so that (A2) combined with (15.24) implies ∗ ∗ The
TVC is therefore also satisfied along the unique converging path.
15.10 References
Barro, R. J., and X. Sala-i-Martin, 1995, Economic Growth. Second
edition, MIT Press: New York, 2004.
Hall, B.H., and D. Harhoff, 2012, Recent research on the economics of
patents, Annual Review of Economics, 4, 18.1-18.25.
Jones, C.I., and Williams, 1998, ... , Quarterly Journal of Economics.
Sydsæter, K., P. Hammond, A. Seierstad, and A. Strøm, 2008, Further
Mathematics for Economic Analysis, vol. II, Prentice-Hall: London.
Tirole, J., 1988, The Theory of Industrial Organization, MIT Press: New
York.
c
s 0
c 0
c * E
s0 s
s* 1
In this course, up to now, the relationship between economic growth and the
earth’s finite natural resources has been touched upon in connection with: the
discussion of returns to scale (Chapter 2), the transition from a pre-industrial
to an industrial economy (in Chapter 7), the environmental problem of global
warming (Chapter 8), and the resource curse (in Chapter 13.4.3). In a more
systematic way the present chapter reviews how natural resources, including
the environment, relate to economic growth.
The contents are:
The first two sections aim at establishing a common terminology for the
discussion.
281
CHAPTER 16. NATURAL RESOURCES AND ECONOMIC
282 GROWTH
1.1 Physical inputs like processed raw materials, other intermediate goods,
machines, and buildings.
2.2.1 Renewable resources, that is, natural resources the stock of which can
be replenished by a natural self-regeneration process. Hence, if the
resource is not over-exploited, it can be sustained in a more or less
constant amount. Examples: ground water, fertile soil, fish in the sea,
clean air, national parks.
2.2.2 Non-renewable resources, that is, natural resources which have no nat-
ural regeneration process (at least not within a relevant time scale).
The stock of a non-renewable resource is thus depletable. Examples:
fossil fuels, many non-energy minerals, virgin wilderness and endan-
gered species.
(from below), the two goods become perfect substitutes (in that → ∞).
The smaller is the less substitutable are the two goods. When 0 we
have 1 and as → −∞ the indifference curves become near to right
angled.3 According to many environmental economists, there are good rea-
sons to believe that 1, since water, basic foodstuff, clean air, absence of
catastrophic climate change, etc. are difficult to replace by produced goods
and services. In this case there is a limit to the extent to which a rising ,
obtainable through a rising per capita income, can compensate for falling
At the same time the techniques by which the consumption good is cur-
rently produced may be “dirty” and thereby cause a falling . An obvious
policy response is the introduction of pollution taxes that give an incentive
for firms (or households) to replace these techniques (or goods) with cleaner
ones. For certain forms of pollution (e.g., sulfur dioxide, SO2 in the air) there
is evidence of an inverted U-curve relationship between the degree of pollu-
tion and the level of economic development measured by GDP per capita −
the environmental Kuznets curve.4
So an important element in sustainable economic development is that the
economic activity of current generations does not spoil the environmental
conditions for future generations. Living up to this requirement necessitates
economic and environmental strategies consistent with the planet’s endow-
ments. This means recognizing the role of environmental constraints for eco-
nomic development. A complicating factor is that specific abatement policies
vis-a-vis particular environmental problems may face resistance from interest
groups, thus raising political-economics issues.
As defined, a criterion for sustainable economic development to be present
is that per capita welfare remains non-decreasing across generations. A sub-
category of this is sustainable economic growth which is present if per capita
welfare is growing across generations. Here we speak of growth in a welfare
sense, not in a physical sense. Permanent exponential per capita output
3
By L’Hôpital’s rule for “0/0” it follows that, for fixed and
£ ¤1
lim + (1 − ) = 1−
→06=0
So the Cobb-Douglas function, which has elasticity of substitution between the goods equal
to 1, is an intermediate case, corresponding to = 0. More technical details in Appendix
A, albeit from the perspective of production rather than preferences.
4
See, e.g., Grossman and Krueger (1995). Others (e.g., Perman and Stern, 2003) claim
that when paying more serious attention to the statistical properties of the data, the
environmental Kuznets curve is generally rejected. Important examples of pollutants ac-
companied by absence of an environmental Kuznets curve include waste storage, reduction
of biodiversity, and emission of CO2 to the atmosphere. A very serious problem with the
latter is that emissions from a single country is spread all over the globe.
growth in a physical sense is of course not possible with limited natural re-
sources (matter or energy). The issue about sustainable growth is whether,
by combining the natural resources with man-made inputs (knowledge, hu-
man capital, and physical capital), an output stream of increasing quality,
and therefore increasing economic value, can be maintained. In modern times
capabilities of many digital electronic devices provide conspicuous examples
of exponential growth in quality (or efficiency). Think of processing speed,
memory capacity, and efficiency of electronic sensors. What is known as
Moore’s Law is the rule of thumb that there is a doubling of the efficiency
of microprocessors within every 18 months. The evolution of the internet
has provided much faster and widened dissemination of information and fine
arts.
Of course there are intrinsic difficulties associated with measuring sustain-
ability in terms of well-being. There now exists a large theoretical and applied
literature dealing with these issues. A variety of extensions and modifications
of the standard national income accounting GNP has been developed under
the heading Green NNP (green net national product). An essential feature
in the measurement of Green NNP is that from the conventional GDP (which
essentially just measures the level of economic activity) is subtracted the de-
preciation of not only the physical capital but also the environmental assets.
The latter depreciate due to pollution, overburdening of renewable natural
resources, and depletion of reserves of non-renewable natural resources.5 In
some approaches the focus is on whether a comprehensive measure of wealth
is maintained over time. Along with reproducible assets and natural assets
(including the damage to the atmosphere from “greenhouse gasses”), Arrow
et al. (2012) include health, human capital, and “knowledge capital” in their
measure of “wealth”. They apply this measure in a study of the United
States, China, Brazil, India, and Venezuela over the period 1995-2000. They
find that all five countries over this period satisfy the sustainability criterion
of non-decreasing wealth in this broad sense. Indeed the wealth measure
referred to is found to be growing in all five countries − in the terminol-
ogy of the field positive “genuine saving” has taken place.6 Note that it is
sustainability that is claimed, not optimality.
5
The depreciation of these environmental and natural assets is evaluated in terms of
the social planner’s shadow prices. See, e.g., Heal (1998), Weitzman (2001, 2003), and
Stiglitz et al. (2010).
6
Of course, many measurement uncertainties and disputable issues of weighting are
involved; brief discussions, and questioning, of the study are contained in Solow (2012),
Hamilton (2012), and Smulders (2012). Regarding Denmark 1990-2009, a study by Lind
and Schou (2013), along lines somewhat similar to those of Arrow et al. (2012), also
suggests sustainability to hold.
In the next two sections we will go more into detail with the challenge
to sustainability and growth coming from renewable and non-renewable re-
sources, respectively. We shall primarily deal with the issues from the point
of view of technical feasibility of non-decreasing, and possibly rising, per-
capita consumption. Concerning questions about appropriate institutional
regulation the reader is referred to the specialized literature.
We begin with renewable resources.
MSY
G( S )
G (S ) R
O S
S (0) SMSY S (0)
S
G (S ) R
O S
SMSY S (R )
G ( S ) MSY
R
Figure 16.1: The self-generation function (upper panel) and stock dynamics for a
given = ̄ ∈ (0 ] (lower panel).
further growth in the fish population. The reason may be food scarcity,
spreading of diseases because of high population density, and easiness for
predators to catch the considered fish species and themselves expand. Pop-
ular mathematical specifications of (·) include the logistic function ()
= (1 − ) where 0 0 and the quasi-logistic function () =
(1 − )( − 1) where also 0 In both cases ̄(0) = but (0)
equals 0 in the first case and in the second.
The value indicated on the vertical axis in the upper panel, equals
max (). This value is thus the maximum sustainable yield per time unit.
This yield is sustainable from time 0 , provided the fish population is at time
0 at least of size = arg max () which is that value of where ()
= The size, of the fish population is consistent with maintaining
the harvest per time unit forever in a steady state.
The lower panel in Figure 16.1 illustrates the dynamics in the ( ̇)
plane, given a fixed rate of resource extraction = ̄ ∈ (0 ]. The
arrows indicate the direction of movement in this plane. In the long run, if
= ̄ for all the stock will settle down at the size ̄(̄) The stippled
curve in the upper panel indicates () − ̄ which is the same as ̇ in the
lower panel when = ̄. The stippled curve in the lower panel indicates the
dynamics in case = . In this case the steady-state stock, ̄( ) =
, is unstable. Indeed, a small negative shock to the stock will not lead
to a gradual return but to a self-reinforcing reduction of the stock as long as
the extraction = is maintained.
This condition is satisfied in Figure 16.2 where the value ̄ has the property
(̄ ̄ 0) = ̄ Given the circumstances, this value is the least upper
bound for a sustainable capital stock in the sense that
if ≥ ̄ we have ̇ 0 for any 0;
if 0 ̄ we have ̇ = 0 for = ( ̄ 0) − 0
For such a illustrated in Figure 16.2, a constant = ( ̄ 0) is main-
tained forever which implies non-decreasing per-capita income, ≡ ,
forever. So, in spite of the limited availability of the natural resource, a non-
decreasing level of consumption is technically feasible even without technical
progress. A forever growing level of consumption will, of course, require
sufficient technical progress capable of substituting for the natural resource.
8
That is, marginal productivities of the production factors are positive, but diminishing,
and the upper contour sets are strictly convex.
Y
K
F ( K , L, R , 0)
O K
K K
question: what are the technological conditions needed to avoid falling per
capita consumption in the long run in spite of the inevitable decline in the
use of non-renewable resources? The answer is that there are three ways in
which this decline in resource use may be counterbalanced:
1. input substitution;
curve, i.e., the percentage rise in the - ratio that a cost-minimizing firm
will choose in response to a one-percent rise in the relative factor price, ̂
Since we consider a CES production function, this elasticity is a constant
= 1(1 − ) 0 Indeed, the three-factor CES production function has the
property that the elasticity of substitution between any pair of the three
production factors is the same.
First, suppose 1 i.e., 0 1 Then, for fixed and →
¡ ¢1
1 + 2 0 when → 0 In this case of high substitutability the
resource is seen to be inessential in the sense that it is not necessary for a
positive output. That is, from a production perspective, conservation of the
resource is not vital.
Suppose instead 1 i.e., 0 Although increasing when decreases,
output per unit of the resource flow is then bounded from above. Conse-
quently, the finiteness of the resource inevitably implies doomsday sooner or
later if input substitution is the only salvage mechanism. To see this, keeping
and fixed, we get
∙ ¸1
− 1
= ( ) = 1 ( ) + 2 ( ) + 3 → 3 1 for → 0
(16.11)
since 0 Even if and are increasing, lim→0 = lim→0 ( )
1
= 3 · 0 = 0 Thus, when substitutability is low, the resource is essential
in the sense that output is nil in the absence of the resource.
What about the intermediate case = 1? Although (16.10) is not de-
fined for = 0 using L’Hôpital’s rule (as for the two-factor function, cf.
¡ ¢1
Appendix), it can be shown that 1 + 2 + 3 → 1 2 3
for → 0 In the limit a three-factor Cobb-Douglas function thus appears.
This function has = 1 corresponding to = 0 in the formula = 1(1−)
The circumstances giving rise to the resource being essential thus include the
Cobb-Douglas case = 1
The interesting aspect of the Cobb-Douglas case is that it is the only
case where the resource is essential while at the same time output per unit
of the resource is unbounded from above (since = 1 2 3 −1 → ∞
for → 0).12 Under these circumstances it was considered an open question
whether non-decreasing per capita consumption could be sustained. There-
fore the Cobb-Douglas case was studied intensively. For example, Solow
(1974) showed that if = = 0, then a necessary and sufficient condition
that a constant positive level of consumption can be sustained is that 1 3
12
To avoid misunderstanding: by “Cobb-Douglas case” we refer to any function where
enters in a “Cobb-Douglas fashion”, i.e., any function like = ̃ ( )1−3 3
(c) population growth, implying more mouths to feed from limited nat-
ural resources, exacerbates the drag on growth implied by a declining
resource input; indeed, as seen from (16.15), the drag on growth is
3 ( + )(1 − 1 ) along a BGP
where is input of the renewable resource and the corresponding stock,
while is input of the non-renewable resource to which corresponds the
We allow for a positive depreciation rate, to take into account the possi-
bility that as technology advances, old knowledge becomes obsolete and then
over time gradually becomes useless in production.
Extraction of the non-renewable resource is again given by
where is the stock of the non-renewable resource (e.g., oil reserves) and
is the depletion rate. Since we must have ≥ 0 for all there is a finite
upper bound on cumulative resource extraction:
Z ∞
≤ 0 (16.20)
0
= 0 ≥ 0 0 0 given.
Uncertainty is ignored and the extraction activity involves no costs.
We see that the setup is elementarily related to the simple lab-equipment
model (Chapter 14) since by investing part of the manufacturing output
new knowledge is directly generated without intervention by researchers and
similar.17 Note also that there are no intertemporal knowledge-spillovers.
16.5.2 Analysis
We now skip the explicit dating of the variables where not needed for clarity.
The model has three state variables, the stock, of physical capital, the
stock, of non-renewable resources, and the stock, of technical knowl-
edge. To simplify the dynamics, we will concentrate on the special case
17
An interpretation is that part of the activity in the manufacturing sector is directly
R&D activity using the same technology (production function) as is used in the production
of consumption goods and capital goods.
=
The initial stocks, 0 and 0 are historically given. Suppose 0 0
as in Figure 16.3. Then, initially, the net marginal productivity of capital is
larger than that of knowledge, i.e., capital is relatively scarce. An efficient
economy will therefore for a while invest only in capital, i.e., there will be a
phase where = 0 This phase of complete specialization lasts until =
a state reached in finite time, say at time ̄, cf. the figure. Hereafter,
there is investment in both assets so that their ratio remains equal to the
efficient ratio forever. Similarly, if initially 0 0 then there will
be a phase of complete specialization in R&D, and after a finite time interval
the efficient ratio = is achieved and maintained forever.
Balanced growth
Log-differentiating (16.21) w.r.t. gives the “growth-accounting equation”
Result (ii) Along a BGP, policies that decrease (increase) the depletion
rate (and only such policies) will increase (decrease) the per capita
growth rate (here we presuppose ̃ 1 the plausible case).
Introducing preferences
To be more specific we introduce household preferences and a social planner.
The resulting resource allocation will coincide with that of a decentralized
competitive economy if agents have perfect foresight and the government has
introduced appropriate subsidies and taxes. As in Stiglitz (1974a), let the
utilitarian social planner choose a path ( )∞
=0 so as to optimize
Z ∞ 1−
0 = − 0 (16.26)
0 1 −
subject to the constraints given by technology, i.e., (16.21), (16.22), and
(16.19), and initial conditions. The parameter 0 is the (absolute) elas-
ticity of marginal utility of consumption (reflecting the strength of the desire
for consumption smoothing) and is a constant rate of time preference.21
Using the Maximum Principle, the first-order conditions for this problem
lead to, first, the social planner’s Keynes-Ramsey rule,
1 1
= ( − − ) = (̃ − − ) (16.27)
̃ ̃
second, the social planner’s Hotelling rule,
()
= ( − ) = (̃ − ) (16.28)
̃ ̃
The Keynes-Ramsey rule says: as long as the net return on investment in
capital is higher than the rate of time preference, one should let current be
19
This is a reminder that the distinction between fully endogenous growth and semi-
endogenous growth is not the same as the distinction between policy-dependent and policy-
invariant growth.
20
These aspects are further explored in Groth and Schou (2006).
21
For simplicity we have here ignored (as does Stiglitz) that also environmental quality
should enter the utility function.
low enough to allow positive net saving (investment) and thereby higher con-
sumption in the future. The Hotelling rule is a no-arbitrage condition saying
that the return (“capital gain”) on leaving the marginal unit of the resource
in the ground must equal the return on extracting and using it in produc-
tion and then investing the proceeds in the alternative asset (reproducible
capital).22
After the initial phase of complete specialization described above, we
have, due to the proportionality between and ̃ that = =
̃ = ̃ ̃ Notice that the Hotelling rule is independent of prefer-
ences; any path that is efficient must satisfy the Hotelling rule (as well as
the exhaustion condition lim→∞ () = 0).
Using the Cobb-Douglas specification, we may rewrite the Hotelling rule
as − = ̃ ̃ − Along a BGP = = + and = − so
that the Hotelling rule combined with the Ramsey rule gives
(1 − ) + = − (16.29)
Result (iv) Population growth is good for economic growth. In its absence,
when 0 we get 0 along an optimal BGP; if = 0 = 0
when = 0.
A pertinent question is: are the above results just an artifact of the very
simplified reduced-form AK-style set-up applied here? The answer turns out
to be no. For models with a distinct research technology and intertemporal
knowledge spillovers, this is shown in Groth (2007).
Clearly YES:
• A finite planet!
• The amount of cement, oil, steel, and water that we can use is limited!
Clearly NO:
An aim of this chapter has been to bring to mind that it would be strange
if there were no limits to growth. So a better question is:
The answer suggested is that these limits are determined by the capability
of the economic system to substitute limited natural resources by man-made
goods the variety and quality of which are expanded by creation of new ideas.
In this endeavour frontier countries, first the U.K. and Europe, next the
United States, have succeeded at a high rate for two and a half century. To
what extent this will continue in the future nobody knows. Some economists,
e.g. Gordon (2012), argue there is an enduring tendency to slowing down of
innovation and economic growth (the low-hanging fruits have been taken).
and lower growth (in the plausible case ̃ 1) Further, in the log-utility case ( = 1) the
depletion rate equals the effective rate of impatience, − .
26
Inspired by Sterner (2008).
Others, e.g. Brynjolfsson and McAfee (2014), disagree. They reason that the
potentials of information technology and digital communication are on the
verge of the point of ubiquity and flexible application. For these authors the
prospect is “The Second Machine Age” (the title of their book), by which
they mean a new innovative epoch where smart machines and new ideas are
combined and recombined - with pervasive influence on society.
16.8 Appendix
16.8.1 A. The CES function
The CES (Constant Elasticity of Substitution) function is used in consumer
theory as a specification of preferences and in production theory as a specifi-
gives
1
̃( ) = ≡ (16.35)
1−
27
See, e.g., Arrow et al. (1961).
1
1
K 0
0 1
L
L
Figure 16.4: Isoquants for the CES production function for alternative values of
= 1(1 − ).
on the coordinate axes. Then neither capital, nor labor are essential inputs.
Empirically there is not complete agreement about the “normal” size of the
elasticity of factor substitution for industrialized economies. The elasticity
also differs across the production sectors. A recent thorough econometric
study (Antràs, 2004) of U.S. data indicate the aggregate elasticity of substi-
tution to be in the interval (05 10).
£ ¤ 1− ³ ´1−
= = + (1 − )− =
which of course equals in (16.33). We see that the CES function
violates either the lower or the upper Inada condition for , depending
on the sign of Indeed, when 0 (i.e., 1) then for → 0 both
and approach an upper bound equal to 1 ∞ thus violating the
lower Inada condition for (see the right-hand panel of Figure 2.3 in
Chapter 2). It is also noteworthy that in this case, for → ∞, approaches
y y
A 1/
A 1/
1/
A(1 )
A(1 )1/
k k
0 (0 1) 0 ( 1)
Figure 16.5: The CES production function for 1 (left panel) and 1 (right
panel).
an upper bound equal to (1 − )1 ∞. These features reflect the low
degree of substitutability when 0
When instead 0 there is a high degree of substitutability ( 1).
Then, for → ∞ both and → 1 0 thus violating the upper
Inada condition for (see the right-hand panel of Figure 16.5). It is
also noteworthy that for → 0, approaches a positive lower bound equal
to (1 − )1 0. Thus, in this case capital is not essential. At the same
time → ∞ for → 0 (so the lower Inada condition for the marginal
productivity of capital holds).
The marginal productivity of labor is
= = (1 − )( + 1 − )(1−) ≡ ()
from (16.33).
Since (16.32) is symmetric in and we get a series of symmetric results
£ ¤1
by considering output per unit of capital as ≡ = + (1 − )()
In total, therefore, when there is low substitutability ( 0) for fixed input
of either of the production factors, there is an upper bound for how much
an unlimited input of the other production factor can increase output. And
when there is high substitutability ( 0) there is no such bound and an
unlimited input of either production factor take output to infinity.
The Cobb-Douglas case, i.e., the limiting case for → 0 constitutes in
several respects an intermediate case in that all four Inada conditions are
satisfied and we have → 0 for → 0 and → ∞ for → ∞
Generalizations
The CES production function considered above has CRS. By adding an elas-
ticity of scale parameter, , we get the generalized form
£ ¤
= + (1 − ) 0 (16.38)
where it is understood that not only the output level but also all , 6= , ,
are kept constant. Note that = In the CES case considered in (16.39),
all the partial elasticities of substitution take the same value, 1(1 − )
= 0 implies = 0 (16.45)
From now we omit the dating of the time-dependent variables where not
needed for clarity. Recall that in the context of an essential non-renewable
resource, we define a balanced growth path (BGP for short) as a path along
which the quantities and are positive and change at constant
proportionate rates (some or all of which may be negative).
Lemma 1 Along a BGP the following holds: (a) = 0; (b) (0) =
− (0) and
lim = 0 (16.46)
→∞
by definition of a BGP.
R ∞ Hence, R∞
= since 0 by definition. For any
constant we have 0 = 0 0 If ≥ 0 (16.44) would thus be
violated. Hence, 0 (b) With = 0 in (16.42), we get ̇0 0 = −0 0
= the last equality following from (a). Hence, 0 = − 0 Finally, the
solution to (16.42) can be written = 0 Then, since is a negative
constant, → 0 for → ∞ ¤
Define
≡ ≡ and ≡ (16.47)
We may write (16.42) as
= − − (16.48)
Similarly, by (16.42),
≡ − (16.49)
Let ̂ ≡ 2 and ̂ ≡ 3 Let ̂ and ̂ denote the output elasticities
w.r.t. ̂ and ̂ i.e.,
2 3
≡ ̂ ≡ ̂ ≡
(2 ) (3 )
̇
≡ = + ̂ ( 2 + ) + ̂ ( 3 + )
= + ̂ ( 2 + ) + (1 − − ̂ )( 3 + ) (16.52)
= 3 − ( 2 + ) 0 (16.56)
16.9 References
Antràs, 2004, ...
Brock, W. A., and M. Scott Taylor, 2005. Economic Growth and the Envi-
ronment: A review of Theory and Empirics. In: Handbook of Economic
Growth, vol. 1.B, ed. by ...
Brynjolfsson, E., and A. McAfee, 2014, The Second Machine Age, Norton.
Groth, C., and P. Schou, 2002, Can nonrenewable resources alleviate the
knife-edge character of endogenous growth? Oxford Economic Papers
54, 386-411.
Heal, G., 1998. Valuing the Future. Economic Theory and Sustainability.
Columbia University Press: New York.
Krautkraemer, J., 1985, Optimal growth, resource amenities and the preser-
vation of natural environments, Review of Economic Studies 52, 153-
170.
Popp, D., 2002, Induced innovation and energy prices, American Economic
Review 92 (1), 160-180.
Seierstad, A., and K. Sydsaeter, 1987, Optimal Control Theory with Eco-
nomic Applications, North Holland, Amsterdam.
Sinclair, P., 1994, On the optimum trend of fossil fuel taxation, Oxford
Economic Papers 46, 869-877.
Smil, V., 2003, Energy at the crossroads. Global perspectives and uncertain-
ties, Cambridge Mass.: MIT Press.
Solow, R.M., 1973, Is the end of the world at hand? Challenge, vol. 16, no.
1, 39-50.
Sterner, T., 2008, The costs and benefits of climate policy: The impact of
the discount rate and changing relative prices. Lecture at Miljøøkonomisk
konference 2008 in Skodsborg, see http://www.dors.dk/graphics/Synkron-
Library/Konference%202008/
Keynote/Sterner_Copenhagen_SEPT08.pdf
Stiglitz, J., 1974a, Growth with exhaustible natural resources: Efficient and
optimal growth paths, Review of Economic Studies 41, Symposium
Issue, 123-137.
Stiglitz, J., A. Sen, and J.-P. Fitoussi, 2009, Report by the Commission
on the Measurement of Economic Performance and Social Progress,
www.stiglitz-sen-fitoussi.fr.
Stiglitz, J., A. Sen, and J.-P. Fitoussi, 2010, Mismeasuring Our Lives. Why
the GDP Doesn’t Add Up, The New Press: New York.
Suzuki, H., 1976, On the possibility of steadily growing per capita consump-
tion in an economy with a wasting and non-replenishable resource, Re-
view of Economic Studies 43, 527-35.
Tahvonen, O., and S. Salo, 2001, Economic growth and transitions between
renewable and nonrenewable energy resources, European Economic Re-
view 45, 1379-1398.
Weitzman, M., 2003, Income, Wealth, and the Maximum Principle, Harvard
Univ. Press: Cambridge (Mass.).
18/2 2015
LN 4, p. 65, first line of (ii): "g > 0" should read "g ≥ 0".
16/3
LN 8, p. 120, eq. (8.21): delete "- 1" on the right-hand side of the equation (to obtain
consistence with the formulation at p. 116 (the middle) and p. 127-29.
29/3
LN 9, p. 140, line 2: "if have" should read "if we can write".
- , - , line 4: "we can write" should read "we have".
- , p. 147, footnote 6, line 1-2: "and m is a nonnegative number" should be deleted.
30/3
LN 9, p. 150, line 14: Delete the complete line, that is, delete "effective discount rate
appearing on the right-hand side of (9.21), namely the".
- , p. 153, line 1-2: "Figure ??" should read "Figure 1".
- , p. 154, line 3: "is then unknown" should read "is the unknown".
- - , line 5 from below: "Figure ??" should read "Figure 1".
20/4
LN 11, p. 178, line 9-8 from below: "...+1)H(t)." should read "...+1)H(t) along the
balanced gorwth path."
- - , line 7 from below: "Y(t) = ... " should read "Y(t) = f(k_hat*) ...".
4/5
LN 14, p. 248, in the formula at the middle of the page, beta should be replaced by 1-beta and
1-beta should be replaced by beta.
- , p. 253, line 5 from below: "the research flow z_jt" should read "the research
investment z_jt".
- , p. 256, line 3: "putting one unit of account at the disposal" should read "putting
finance at the disposal".
- , - , line 4: "the household gets" should read "the households get".
- , - , line 5: "the payoff per time unit" should read "the payoff per time unit per
unit of account invested".
- , - , line 6: "the household buys a lottery ticket" should read "the households
buy lottery tickets".
9/5
LN 14, p. 256, right before Section 14.3.4 begins addition of the following paragraph may help
understanding what is meant by "loan market" and "interest rate" in the model:
1
We see that the obligation of the "borrowing" R&D lab to pay back the principal (possibly with
interest) to the investors (the households) is conditional on R&D success. In case of R&D success,
the investors get the gross return V_(t), to be shared between them in proportion to their investment.
Although such a contract does not fit the notion of a loan in everyday language, in the economics
vocabulary it is considered a specific form of a loan and the market for such contracts a specific
kind of a "loan market". By diversification, the households can with certainty get the expected rate
of return, r_(t), in this market on their saving. We label this rate of return "the interst rate" because
it is as if there were a market for safe loans with r_(t) as the interest rate.
18/5
LN 16, p. 315, line 1: Delete "with CES production function".
2
142 CHAPTER 4. A GROWING ECONOMY
Y = r^K + wL;
where r^ = r + is the cost per unit of capital input and w is the real wage,
i.e., the cost per unit of labor input. The labor income share is
w=^
r
wL f (k) kf 0 (k) w(k) wL k
= SL(k) = = ;
Y f (k) f (k) r^K + wL 1 + w=^
k
r
where the function SL( ) is the share of labor function and w=^ r is the factor
price ratio.
Suppose that capital tends to grow faster than labor so that k rises over
time. Unless the production function is Cobb-Douglas, this will under perfect
competition a¤ect the labor income share. But apriori it is not obvious in
what direction. If the proportionate rise in the factor price ratio w=^ r is
greater (smaller) than that in k; then SL goes up (down). Indeed, if we let
E`x g(x) denote the elasticity of a function g(x) w.r.t. x; then
w
SL0 (k) R 0 for E`k R 1;
r^
respectively.
Usually, however, the inverse elasticity is considered, namely E`w=^r k: This
elasticity, which indicates how sensitive the cost minimizing capital-labor
ratio, k; is to a given factor price ratio w=^r, coincides with the elasticity of
factor substitution (for a general de…nition, see below). The latter is often
denoted : Since in the CRS case, will be a function of only k; we write
E`w=^r k = (k): We therefore have
wL w=T w~
= :
Y Y =(T L) y~
Immigration
~
Here is another example that illustrates the importance of the size of (k):
Consider an economy with perfect competition and a given aggregate cap-
ital stock K and technology level T (entering the production function in
the labor-augmenting way as above). Suppose that for some reason, im-
migration, say, aggregate labor supply, L; shifts up and full employment is
maintained by the needed real wage adjustment. In what direction will ag-
gregate labor income wL = w( ~ L then change? The e¤ect of the larger
~ k)T
L is to some extent o¤set by a lower w brought about by the lower e¤ective
~ k~ = kf
capital-labor ratio. Indeed, in view of dw=d ~ 00 (k)
~ > 0; we have k~ #
implies w # for …xed T: So we cannot apriori sign the change in wL: The
following relationship can be shown (Exercise 4.??), however:
@(wL) ~
(k)
= (1 )w R 0 for (k)
~ Q (k);
~ (4.26)
@L ~
(k)
Saddle-point stability
2. one of the two endogenous variables is predetermined while the other is a jump
variable;
3. the saddle path is not parallel to the jump variable axis; and
4. there is a boundary condition on the system such that the diverging paths are ruled
out as solutions.
Thus, to establish saddle-point stability all four properties must be veri…ed. If for
instance point 1 and 2 hold but, contrary to point 3, the saddle path is parallel to the
jump variable axis, then saddle-point stability does not obtain. Indeed, given that the
predetermined variable initially deviated from its steady-state value, it would not be
possible to …nd any initial value of the jump variable such that the solution of the system
would converge to the steady state for t ! 1: