case

W04C79
February 19,
2016

Uber and the Sharing Economy: Global

Market Expansion and Reception
Alexander Cooper,i head of Asia expansion for Uber Technologies, Inc., was sitting in a Tesla
that he did not own. The Tesla showed up for his Uber ride to the meeting he was about to
have with Travis Kalanick, Uber’s CEO, and Ryan Graves, head of Global Operations. It was
morning in San Francisco, California, but the sun was setting in China where the action had
occurred. Cooper checked for updates on the new petition they had launched to keep Uber
running in Hong Kong, where days before five Uber drivers and three office staffers had
been arrested in a police raid. 1 Hong Kong was a new market for Uber, and its success or
failure there could define the company’s next move, not only in Asia, but globally. Uber had
posted bail to release the drivers and employees, but the situation was still developing. The
drivers would be due in court in several months on charges of operating without car permits.
For Cooper, this represented another challenge to Uber’s growth. As he mentally prepared for his
meeting, he knew that Kalanick and Graves, while concerned about the situation in Hong Kong,
would have broader and more significant questions related to Uber’s quest for global expansion
and leadership role in growing the sharing economy. What should be Uber’s next move? How would
the company handle the challenges presented by their competitors around the world? What
strategies should Uber implement? Should it leave its challenging global markets and simply
focus on the U.S. market?

The Sharing Economy

Evolution and History
Broadly speaking, the sharing economy, also referred to as collaborative consumption, can
be defined as an economic model that allows individuals to borrow or rent assets owned by
other individuals.2 The concept of the sharing economy had existed for thousands of years, but
the development of the Internet allowed the peer-to-peer rental market to expand hugely,3 and
in 2011 collaborative consumption was identified by Time Magazine on its list of “10 Ideas That
Will Change the World.”4 By 2015, the sharing economy had emerged as a serious economic
model; five key sectors using this model were travel, car sharing, finance, staffing, and music and
video streaming. A PricewaterhouseCoopers report projected that these five key sharing

sectors would likely increase global revenues from $15 billion in 2015 to $335 billion by
2025.5
i Alexander Cooper is a pseudonym and a fictional character created for class discussion purposes and is not meant to
depict a specific person within the Uber organization.
Published by WDI Publishing, a division of the William Davidson Institute (WDI) at the University of Michigan.
©2016 Qingxu Jin (Bill), Carl Spevacek, Nasreddine El-Dehaibi, and Whitney Johnson. This case was written under
the supervision of Andrew Hoffman (Holcim Professor of Sustainable Enterprise) at the University of Michigan’s Ross

This document is authorized for use only by Muzaffar Abasov ([email protected]). Copying or posting is an infringement of
copyright. Please contact [email protected] or 800-988-0886 for additional
copies.
 School of Business by graduate students Qingxu Jin (Bill), Carl Spevacek, Nasreddine El-Dehaibi, and Whitney Johnson.
This case was designed for academic purposes to simulate a scenario that could occur in the business world. While
secondary research was performed to accurately portray information about the featured organization, this is a
hypothetical scenario, and company representatives were not involved in the creation of this case.

This document is authorized for use only by Muzaffar Abasov ([email protected]). Copying or posting is an infringement of
copyright. Please contact [email protected] or 800-988-0886 for additional
copies.
 Uber and the Sharing Economy: Global Market Expansion and W04

The sharing economy was considered an alternative to conventional business models

because it prioritized access to goods, resources, and services, rather than ownership of
them.6 This new collaborative consumption model offered economic advantages over
traditional business models. Providers generated revenue by utilizing underused assets, and
users had increased access to goods and services at lower prices than with traditional
providers.7 Sharing economies maximize a good’s capacity, saving time and money for both
the producer and consumer.8

Driving Forces
The development of information technology significantly expanded the sharing economy.
Smartphones and social media created increased and continuous access to information for
consumers, allowing new users to discover and quickly adapt products and services within the
sharing economy.9 Sharing in the economy had existed long before and could be thought of as
a collaborative economy, but the Internet created a new platform on which the sharing
economy could operate. The Internet transformed the sharing economy and enabled it to grow
significantly in a short period of time within multiple sectors (see Exhibit 1).10

Exhibit 1
The Sharing Economy in Almost Every Sector

Source: Owyang, Jeremiah. “Collaborative Economy Honeycomb 2 – Watch It Grow.” Web-strategist.com. Accessed 6 Jan. 2016.
<http://www.web-strategist.com/ blog/2014/12/07/collaborative-economy-honeycomb-2-watch-it-grow/>.

Another driver of the sharing economy was the financial crisis of 2008. The sharing
economy emerged as a response to the economic downturn and instability that followed the
2008 financial crisis, resulting in networking and pooling of resources.11

Cultural shifts also helped nurture the development of the sharing economy. In the U.S.,
car ownership had long been a sign of independence and many people could not imagine their
world without owning a car. This was not true for younger generations, however. A survey
conducted by the technology and research firm Gartner found that 46% of adults between ages
18 and 24 would prefer to have Internet over a car, while only 15% of baby boomers
answered the same.12
2
This document is authorized for use only by Muzaffar Abasov ([email protected]). Copying or posting is an infringement of
copyright. Please contact [email protected] or 800-988-0886 for additional
 Uber and the Sharing Economy: Global Market Expansion and W04

Sustainability and Sharing Economy

There is also a sustainability case to be made for sharing economies. Using goods to
their maximum capacity can reduce waste.13 Additionally, proponents of the sharing economy
argued that increased utilization of underused resources could reduce the carbon footprint of a
good.14 For example, a Fast Company business editorial focusing on innovation claimed that
“when measuring carbon emissions, home sharing is 66% more effective than hotels” and “car
sharing participants reduce their individual emissions by 40%.” 15 Peers, a community that helps
individuals find independent work opportunities and benefits, stated that car sharing could
potentially reduce up to 72% of U.S. CO 2 emissions.16 By enabling more sustainable
consumption, the sharing economy was compatible with economic growth, while
simultaneously diminishing environmental impacts through reduced waste and efficient use of
existing resources at the level of an individual consumer.17 At a broader societal level, the
sharing economy had the potential to push whole communities toward shrinking their
carbon footprints.

Social Benefit
Sharing economies also create social benefits. The growth of sharing economies can be
described by the “Sharing S-Curve” (see Exhibit 2).18 Generally, sharing economies develop at
a local scale, and start- up companies fulfill a niche role. Therefore, sharing economies
promote interactions among individuals at this local level, which strengthens communities.19
Although seemingly insignificant, peer-to-peer interactions create meaningful connections
between people, and some research even showed psychological and neurological benefits
from participating in sharing transactions.20

Exhibit 2
The S-Curve of the Sharing Economy

Source: PricewaterhouseCoopers. “The Sharing Economy – Sizing the Revenue Opportunity.” Accessed 7 Dec. 2015.
<http://www.pwc.co.uk/issues/megatrends/collisions/ sharingeconomy/the-sharing-economy-sizing-the-revenue-opportunity.html>.

This document is authorized for use only by Muzaffar Abasov ([email protected]). Copying or posting is an infringement of
copyright. Please contact [email protected] or 800-988-0886 for additional
 Uber and the Sharing Economy: Global Market Expansion and W04

This document is authorized for use only by Muzaffar Abasov ([email protected]). Copying or posting is an infringement of
copyright. Please contact [email protected] or 800-988-0886 for additional
 Uber and the Sharing Economy: Global Market Expansion and W04

Trust and Transparency

Sharing economies depend heavily on trust and transparency. Companies within a
sharing economy emphasize the importance of creating a reputation and building a
relationship with their consumers.21 Consumers must trust that providers will provide a worthy
product or service, and providers need to trust that consumers will pay and respect the product,
as someone else will use the product again in the future.22 Thus, trust is required by both
providers and consumers to make sharing economies successful.

Technology Innovation
The development of the sharing economy was also driven by value shifts among both
service providers and consumers. Rachel Botsman, a professor at Oxford University’s Saïd
Business School and widely considered a global leader providing insights into the
collaborative economy, argued that technological innovations increased the connectivity of
societies, which led to changing views on ownership and sharing.23

Challenges
Despite all the benefits accompanying the sharing economy and the presence of
significant driving forces, there were significant obstacles to this system. Sharing
economies worked well on local scales and sometimes across municipalities. However, it
remained unclear if the benefits could be maintained in worldwide sharing economies.24

Regulatory barriers present perhaps the biggest obstacle and threat to success for the
sharing economy. The innovative business models and practices of sharing economy
companies such as Airbnb and Uber generated uneasiness among regulators, specifically
related to the issues of market competition, consumer protection, and legality of operations.25
Citing negative consequences for citizens and governmental units, regulators feared that the
ability of these and similar companies to generate a competitive advantage by offering
lower prices to a consumer than traditional service providers, such as hotels or taxis, could
ultimately displace these established industries. Uber, for example, was not subject to the
same safety and tax regulations as traditional taxis or car services. 26 Furthermore, these
companies operated in a legally gray area. For example, Uber defined itself not as a taxi or
transportation company, but as a technology platform.27 This definition pushed forward by
lawyers at Uber had effectively protected Uber from complying with the Americans with
Disabilities Act.28 Uber was sued several times, prompting it to provide more handicap-
accessible vehicles. Governmental regulation or self-regulation by the company could
therefore positively or negatively affect the potential market share of sharing economy
companies.

Lack of trust was another setback to the sharing economy. A study by Carbonview Research
showed that trust contributed 67% to the reason why individuals were hesitant to
participate in the sharing economy (see Exhibit 3).29

The other factors that held people back, including effort and quality, related to the price
point of the goods and sharing prices.

Transportation Sharing Economy

Within the automobile transportation sector several services fell under the umbrella of the
sharing economy. These services ranged from traditional public transportation providers, such as
taxis and buses, to the relatively new car- and ride-sharing providers, which included companies

This document is authorized for use only by Muzaffar Abasov ([email protected]). Copying or posting is an infringement of
copyright. Please contact [email protected] or 800-988-0886 for additional
 Uber and the Sharing Economy: Global Market Expansion and W04

such as Uber, Lyft, and Zipcar. New peer-to- peer ride-sharing platforms were providing an
alternative for traditional public transportation options.30 Uber specifically set out to offer an
alternative to poor cab infrastructure and low service standards (i.e. dirty cabs,

This document is authorized for use only by Muzaffar Abasov ([email protected]). Copying or posting is an infringement of
copyright. Please contact [email protected] or 800-988-0886 for additional
 Uber and the Sharing Economy: Global Market Expansion and W04

late cars, and the lack of credit card acceptance).31 Therefore, Uber and other transportation sharing
platforms came to thrive on the fact that traditional service providers were falling short of
consumer needs.

In 2015 only 8% of all adults had participated in some form of automotive sharing, 32
indicating significant room for growth within this sector. Even more encouraging for the
innovators, studies showed that consumers wanted the sharing economy to succeed in the
automotive sector over all other sectors, and were prepared to accept a culture shift away
from car ownership and toward increased ride-sharing.33

Exhibit 3
Why People Hesitate to Participate in the

Sharing Economy
Source: Olson, Kristine. “National Study Quantifies Reality of the ‘Sharing Economy’ Movement.” 8 Feb. 2012. Accessed 6 Jan. 2016.
<http://www.campbell-mithun. com/678_national-study-quantifies-reality-of-the-sharing-economy-movement>.

Uber: The Company

History
Uber Technologies, Inc., was founded in 2009 in San Francisco by Garrett Camp and Travis
Kalanick with
$200,000 of seed funding.34 During a discussion in Paris at Loic and Geraldine LeMeur’s LeWeb
conference, Kalanick and Camp came up with the idea of a limo timeshare service in San Francisco,
Kalanick’s and Camp’s place of residence, that would allow the two founders private access
to a personal driver that could be accessed through an iPhone application. Camp developed the
application prototype, while Kalanick’s original role was chief incubator, which involved
temporarily running the company, developing the company through the prototype stage, which
officially launched in 2010, and finding a general manager. In 2010, Ryan Graves, a former GE
employee, was hired.35 Graves ultimately became head of Global Operations, while Kalanick
served as CEO36 and Camp was appointed chairman.37

In addition to seed funding, between 2009 and 2015 Uber received 12 rounds of

This document is authorized for use only by Muzaffar Abasov ([email protected]). Copying or posting is an infringement of
copyright. Please contact [email protected] or 800-988-0886 for additional
 Uber and the Sharing Economy: Global Market Expansion and W04

funding from 52 investors to raise a total of $6.61 billion.38 Investors included Lowercase
Capital, First Round, Menlo, Benchmark, Goldman Sachs, and Google Ventures. 39 The most
recent investment, totaling $1.2 billion led by the Chinese search engine Baidu, was raised
specifically to pursue the Asian market.40 In 2015, Uber

This document is authorized for use only by Muzaffar Abasov ([email protected]). Copying or posting is an infringement of
copyright. Please contact [email protected] or 800-988-0886 for additional
 Uber and the Sharing Economy: Global Market Expansion and W04

made Business Insider’s 50 Most Powerful Companies list,41 and was valued at almost $51
billion.42 However, despite all the investments and high valuation, leaked documents showed
the company was actually losing money, with losses totaling $56 million in 2013 and over
$160 million by the second quarter of 2014.43

Business Model
Uber provided a technology platform to allow customers to receive easy and reliable
access to a ride using the tap of a button. An Uber board member described Uber as a
marketplace through which customers connected with drivers who were considered
“independent agents.”44 Uber also boasted clear pricing, direct charges to a credit card for
convenient pay, and the opportunity to split a fare with other riders. Furthermore, on the application
riders could see the estimated time of arrival for pickup, as well as the route and estimated time to
their destination. Following the ride, both the rider and the driver had the opportunity to rate
each other and provide feedback on their experience. 45 For Uber, creating a value proposition
for consumers was all about offering a premium experience. Kalanick told an audience at an
early Uber event: “You get that experience of like…‘I pushed a button, and a car showed up,
and now I’m a pimp.’”46 In addition to a technology and a transportation company, Uber was
seen as a lifestyle company.47

Uber offered a variety of car types to cater to different demands as well as surge pricing, 48
a demand- response pricing model through which rates increased at times of peak demand,
such as rush hour. These aspects made Uber’s business model unique compared to
competitors.

Additionally, Uber sought to distinguish itself from competitors by diversifying its service
offerings. For example, Uber offered specialized services, such as UberHealth, 49 through which
individuals could order a nurse to administer a flu shot; UberAssist,50 designed for senior
citizens or people with disabilities requiring special assistance; and UberRush,51 a delivery
service. Uber also experimented with providing alternative modes of transportation, including
boats, helicopters, and motorcycles. Importantly, these distinguishing features were
available only in select geographic locations.52

Uber’s pricing comprised an important component of its business model. Early in its
history, Uber provided rides at a cost roughly 50% higher than traditional taxis.53 However, by
2015 Uber claimed to offer rides using the UberX option, the least expensive of available cars,
at rates up to 40% cheaper than a taxi.54 Although operating at lower margins, Uber was able
to lead the market at different price points (i.e. for different car service options), with the
ultimate goal of enhancing customer experience across a broad range of consumers.55
Furthermore, Uber’s surge pricing technology was so important that Uber applied for a U.S.
patent on it.56

Uber’s primary appeal to potential drivers was that they could earn extra money as an
independent contractor using their own vehicle, create a flexible personalized work schedule,
and receive weekly payments. An Uber board member stated that over 80% of gross fares
went to the drivers.57 In addition, Uber offered advantages over other driving opportunities,
such as taxis, chauffeuring, limos, buses, heavy trucks, and delivery or courier vehicles. Uber
claimed to offer higher hourly payments than all these other sectors, while having fewer
licensing requirements. Only a standard driver’s license, background check, and insurance
(provided by the driver or offered through an Uber plan) were required.58

This document is authorized for use only by Muzaffar Abasov ([email protected]). Copying or posting is an infringement of
copyright. Please contact [email protected] or 800-988-0886 for additional
 Uber and the Sharing Economy: Global Market Expansion and W04

Expansion Strategy
Uber’s expansion strategy centered on raising money for expansion projects and then
implementing city-by-city launches in target areas. Upon launching in a given city Uber would
offer free rides in an effort to generate a strong impression. Uber then relied on its service to
market itself, and for its initial customers to spread its use to new consumers by word of
mouth.59 Therefore, little marketing investment was needed.
6

This document is authorized for use only by Muzaffar Abasov ([email protected]). Copying or posting is an infringement of
copyright. Please contact [email protected] or 800-988-0886 for additional
 Uber and the Sharing Economy: Global Market Expansion and W04

Benchmark partner Bill Gurley, an investor in Uber, explained that “the product is so good, there
is no one spending hundreds of thousands of dollars on marketing.”60

Uber faced varying expansion challenges at local scales. Although Uber’s business model
and expansion strategy had success in the U.S., results on foreign soil were mixed and the end
results remained to be seen.

Competitors
Domestic
At its inception in 2009, Uber was the first company of its kind and essentially created the
ridesharing market. Since then several companies have entered the ridesharing business, with
Lyft representing the biggest competitor in the United States.61 Uber faced competition from
other markets as well, including car rental companies, car-sharing companies like Zipcar,
and the taxi industry. As Uber continued to grow it took market share from taxis while car
rental companies appeared to be mostly unaffected (see Exhibit 4). 62

Exhibit 4
2014/2015 Uber, Taxi, and Car Rental U.S. Market

Share
Source: Certify, Inc. “Sharing the Road: Business Travelers Increasingly Choose Uber.” Accessed 8 Dec. 2015. <http://www.certify.com/infograph-sharing-
the-road.aspx>.

Lyft
Lyft, a ride-sharing company and smartphone application with a business model very similar
to Uber’s,
was founded in 2012 and by 2015 operated in 65 cities with no international presence.63 The
key difference between Uber and Lyft was the company culture; Uber was more of an upscale
professional service, while Lyft focused on providing casual and friendly service. For example,
Lyft riders were encouraged to sit in the front seat and greet their drivers with a “fist
bump.”64

Uber grew six to seven times faster than Lyft in terms of ride numbers and 10 to 11 times

This document is authorized for use only by Muzaffar Abasov ([email protected]). Copying or posting is an infringement of
copyright. Please contact [email protected] or 800-988-0886 for additional
 Uber and the Sharing Economy: Global Market Expansion and W04

faster in terms of revenue (see Exhibits 5 and 6).65

This document is authorized for use only by Muzaffar Abasov ([email protected]). Copying or posting is an infringement of
copyright. Please contact [email protected] or 800-988-0886 for additional
 Uber and the Sharing Economy: Global Market Expansion and W04

Exhibit 5
Uber vs. Lyft in Revenue Growth Rate

Source: Nicholson, Chris. “Study: Uber Pulls Ahead of Lyft in Riders and Revenue with 12x Lead in U.S.” 11 Sep. 2014. Future Advisor. Accessed 8 Dec.
2015.
<http://blog.futureadvisor.com/study-uber-pulls-ahead-of-lyft-in-riders-and-revenue-with-12x-lead-in-u-s/>.

Exhibit 6
Uber vs. Lyft in Rides Growth Rate

Source: Nicholson, Chris. “Study: Uber Pulls Ahead of Lyft in Riders and Revenue with 12x Lead in U.S.” 11 Sep. 2014. Future Advisor. Accessed 8 Dec.
2015.
<http://blog.futureadvisor.com/study-uber-pulls-ahead-of-lyft-in-riders-and-revenue-with-12x-lead-in-u-s/>.

Zipcar
Zipcar, a car-sharing company, was founded in 2000 and acquired in 2013 by Avis for $500
million. Its business model was fundamentally different from that of Uber in that the customer
was the driver rather than a passenger. Cars were parked in designated spots and users
gained access from a card reader on the windshield. The car had to be reserved ahead of time in
order for it to unlock and the user was then billed by the hour or day for the allotted reservation
time. Customers paid an annual subscription fee for the service while the company covered

This document is authorized for use only by Muzaffar Abasov ([email protected]). Copying or posting is an infringement of
copyright. Please contact [email protected] or 800-988-0886 for additional
 Uber and the Sharing Economy: Global Market Expansion and W04

insurance and gas.66

8

This document is authorized for use only by Muzaffar Abasov ([email protected]). Copying or posting is an infringement of
copyright. Please contact [email protected] or 800-988-0886 for additional
 Uber and the Sharing Economy: Global Market Expansion and W04

As a move to better compete with ride-sharing services like Uber, Zipcar introduced
“One>Way” service in late 2014, which allowed users to pick up a car from one location and
return it at another. The company operated across the nation and more than doubled its
customer base in the span of 3.5 years (see Exhibit 7).67 Zipcar also operated in Austria,
Canada, France, Germany, Spain, the United Kingdom, and Turkey.68

Exhibit 7
Zipcar Membership Size
Zipcar customers: Number of people using Zipcar as car rental company within the last 12 months in the United States (USA) from spring 2008 to spring 2015 (in millions)
1

0.8
0.8
0.72

0.6
0.54 0.54

0.47
0.42
0.4
0.4 0.37

0.2

AutumnSpringAutumnSpringAutumnSpringAutumnSpring 20112012201220132013201420142015

Source: Additional Information:

© Statista 2015 United States; approx. 204,000; 18 years and older

Source: Statista. “Customers of Zipcar in the USA, 2015.” Accessed 8 Dec. 2015.
<http://www.statista.com/statistics/295919/zipcar-customers-usa/>.

Taxis
Since its introduction, Uber had become the largest competitor to the taxi industry. 69 A
study on the share of total paid car rides shows that business people are increasingly
shifting toward Uber as an alternative to taxis (see Exhibit 8).70 A major Uber advantage was
its lower cost compared to taxis (see Exhibit 9)71 although the taxi industry still maintained
a leading market share.72

One advantage for taxis was that they were perceived to be safer than Uber. 73 It was
reported that an Uber driver ran over and killed a 6-year-old girl in San Francisco. 74 Royale
Simms, a business agent for the Washington, D.C., Taxi Drivers Association, was quoted by US
News & World Report as saying “People with criminal histories have been approved as
drivers for these companies. You can’t do that as a taxi in the city.”75 Taxi drivers had to go
through a rigorous licensing process that Uber drivers could bypass.

International
Europe
Due to heavily regulated markets in Europe and the strong presence of trade unions, Uber
did not grow there as quickly as it did in the U.S.76 Taxi drivers, seeing lost business,
accused Uber of bypassing local licensing and safety laws. Protests against the ridesharing
service were staged across Europe and Uber’s budget service, UberX, was banned in most of
Western Europe as a result.77 Competing with Europe’s trade unions therefore proved to be a
daunting task for Uber and significantly hindered its growth on the continent.

This document is authorized for use only by Muzaffar Abasov ([email protected]). Copying or posting is an infringement of
copyright. Please contact [email protected] or 800-988-0886 for additional
 Uber and the Sharing Economy: Global Market Expansion and W04

This document is authorized for use only by Muzaffar Abasov ([email protected]). Copying or posting is an infringement of
copyright. Please contact [email protected] or 800-988-0886 for additional
 Uber and the Sharing Economy: Global Market Expansion and W04

Competitors in Europe included GetTaxi and Hailo, both of which used a slightly different
business model than Uber’s. As opposed to connecting passengers with pre-approved drivers, the
competitor apps connected passengers specifically with taxi drivers. 78 This allowed customers to
request a ride with a click of a button while still benefiting the local taxi drivers and avoiding
challenges with local regulations.

Exhibit 8
Uber’s Market Growth in the U.S.

Source: Certify. “Sharing the Road: Business Travelers Increasingly Choose Uber.” Accessed 7 Dec. 2015. <http://www.certify.com/infograph-sharing-the-
road.aspx>.

Exhibit 9
Cost of Uber vs. Taxi Service

Source: Certify. “Sharing the Road: Business Travelers Increasingly

Choose Uber.” Accessed 7 Dec. 2015. <http://www.certify.com/infograph-
sharing-the-road.aspx>.

This document is authorized for use only by Muzaffar Abasov ([email protected]). Copying or posting is an infringement of
copyright. Please contact [email protected] or 800-988-0886 for additional
 Uber and the Sharing Economy: Global Market Expansion and W04

10

This document is authorized for use only by Muzaffar Abasov ([email protected]). Copying or posting is an infringement of
copyright. Please contact [email protected] or 800-988-0886 for additional
 Uber and the Sharing Economy: Global Market Expansion and W04

China
In China, Didi Dache and Kuaidi Dache shared the same business concept and service
model as Uber. The two companies together controlled more than 99% of China’s ridesharing
market in 2014.79 By the end of that year, the market surged to 154 million users. 80 The
companies were both heavily funded, with $700 million of Didi Dache coming from Temasek
and others and $600 million of Kuaidi Dache raised by SoftBank.81 They developed a series of
strategies to prevent Uber from significantly slicing into their market. The two companies tried
to give large discounts to maintain the market share. In just the first half of 2014, they
spent more than $400 million offering discounts to users. 82 In early 2014, people who used
their apps could get free rides.83

In 2015, Didi Dache and Kuaidi Dache agreed to merge to deal with Uber, the cash-rich
invader.84 After the merger, the new company, Didi Kuaidi, received $2 billion in private equity
investment from companies including Capital International Private Equity Fund, Ping An
Ventures, Alibaba, Tencent, Temasek, Coatue Management and other existing shareholders.85
By collaborating with WeChat, the most popular messaging app in China with almost 650
million monthly active users by the third quarter of 2015,86 Didi Kuaidi received an average of
700,000 bookings per day via the service.87 Additionally, Didi Kuaidi heavily invested in Uber’s
competitors in other markets, including $680 million to Uber’s biggest rival in the U.S.,
Lyft, and $500 million to the India ridesharing company Ola. 88 The Wall Street Journal reported
that Lyft “discussed ways to work with its Chinese investors to compete strategically with
Uber, including sharing product plans.”89 Didi Kuaidi was the first company legally allowed to
provide online private-booking ride-sharing service in Shanghai, one of China’s biggest
markets.90 Meanwhile, Uber’s operation in Hong Kong was facing charges of providing illegal
private rides. In 2015, Didi Kuaidi was providing 13 million rides per day in comparison with 1
million rides per day from Uber China (see Exhibit 10).91

Exhibit 10
Uber’s Daily Rides Far Behind Didi Kuaidi’s in

Daily completed rides (approximate), Uber China vs. Didi Kua

Daily completed rides

Didi Kuaidi (total) Didi Kuaidi (taxi) 7 million

Didi Kuaidi (private cars) 3
Uber China 3

China
Source: Horwitz, Josh. “Uber’s Biggest Asian Competitors Have Already Raised about $7 Billion--and Could Soon Merge.” Quartz. 28 Sep. 2015. Accessed 4
Jan. 2016.
<http://qz.com/509913/ubers-%E2%80%8Bbiggest%E2%80%8B-asian-competitors-have-already-raised-about-7-billion-and-could-soon-
merge/>.

India
In India, OlaCab, also known as Ola, was the most popular mobile app that provided a
similar service to Uber. With seven rounds of investments, Ola raised $1.18 billion from 19
investors, including Didi Kuaidi, DST Global, Falcon Edge Capita, SoftBank, and Tiger Global

This document is authorized for use only by Muzaffar Abasov ([email protected]). Copying or posting is an infringement of
copyright. Please contact [email protected] or 800-988-0886 for additional
 Uber and the Sharing Economy: Global Market Expansion and W04

Management.92

While Uber poured resources into India’s market, Ola was building strategies to defend its
turf in India. Ola did not plan to expand globally. 93 With 33,000 cabs in 19 cities, Ola’s main
focus was to recruit more drivers.94 Ola, together with leading financial institutions, provided
financial support to prospective drivers
11

This document is authorized for use only by Muzaffar Abasov ([email protected]). Copying or posting is an infringement of
copyright. Please contact [email protected] or 800-988-0886 for additional
 Uber and the Sharing Economy: Global Market Expansion and W04

to purchase their cars, and training to ensure drivers were able to deliver a quality and safe
experience for passengers.95 Culturally, Ola addressed the various needs of the Indian
population by providing three tiers of car services to suit different budgets — luxury sedans,
mid-range, and Ola Mini, which was priced on the same level as the humble auto rickshaw.96
Ola also extended its service into delivering goods such as sweets during the Diwali holiday.97
Besides offering price flexibility, Ola addressed the issue of payment service by allowing cash
payments, and encouraged use of its standalone in-app payment service, Ola Money.98 The
company also provided carpooling services, mobile wallets, and more.99 With all the strategies
implemented, Ola sold 750,000 rides per day while Uber sold only 280,000 (see Exhibit
11).100

Exhibit 11
Uber’s Daily Rides Trailed Ola’s in India

Daily completed rides in India (approximate), Uber vs Ola

Daily completed rides
Uber280,000
Ola (includes auto rickshaws)750,000

Source: Horwitz, Josh. “Uber’s Biggest Asian Competitors Have Already Raised about $7 Billion — and Could Soon Merge.” Quartz. 28 Sep. 2015. Accessed
4 Jan. 2016.
<http://qz.com/509913/ubers-%E2%80%8Bbiggest%E2%80%8B-asian-competitors-have-already-raised-about-7-billion-and-could-soon-
merge/>.

Conclusion

Cooper knew that Kalanick and Graves wanted answers and insights for the company’s next
move. Cooper knew Uber’s business model, core competencies, and objectives inside and out.
He also understood the benefits of and challenges to the expansion of the sharing economy.
Ultimately, he wanted Uber to lead the push for expanding that economy, but he had his
doubts about whether he and his team could accomplish this task with financial success. What
should Cooper suggest? How could Cooper, Kalanick, and Graves ensure that Uber is successful
in Hong Kong? What did they need to do to ensure their success in China and India? How would
their Asian methods vary from Uber’s approach in Europe or in the U.S.? Should Uber work with
governments or work around them as it expands? What are the pros and cons of each
approach? How should Uber protect its business model? Will patents be enough? How should it
handle competitors and imitators in international markets?

This document is authorized for use only by Muzaffar Abasov ([email protected]). Copying or posting is an infringement of
copyright. Please contact [email protected] or 800-988-0886 for additional
 Uber and the Sharing Economy: Global Market Expansion and W04

12

This document is authorized for use only by Muzaffar Abasov ([email protected]). Copying or posting is an infringement of
copyright. Please contact [email protected] or 800-988-0886 for additional
 Uber and the Sharing Economy: Global Market Expansion and W04

Endnotes
1
Shu, Catherine. “Hong Kong Police Raid Uber Offices, Arrest Drivers.” Tech Crunch. 11 Aug. 2015. Accessed 4 Jan.
2016. <http:// techcrunch.com/2015/08/11/hong-kong-uber-raid/>.
2
Investopedia. “Definition of ‘Sharing Economy’.” 11 July 2014. Accessed 4 Jan. 2016.
<http://www.investopedia.com/terms/s/ sharing-economy.asp>.
3
Investopedia.
4
Walsh, Bryan. “10 Ideas That Will Change the World.” Time Magazine. 17 Mar. 2011. Accessed 4 Jan. 2016.
<http://content.time. com/time/specials/packages/article/0,28804,2059521_2059717_2059710,00.html>.
5
PricewaterhouseCoopers. “The Sharing Economy.” 2015. Accessed 7 Dec. 2015.
<http://www.pwc.com/us/en/industry/ entertainment-media/publications/consumer-intelligence-
series/assets/pwc-cis-sharing-economy.pdf>.
6
Entrepreneurial Insights. “An Introduction to Sharing Economy.” 5 Mar. 2015. Accessed 4 Jan. 2016.
<http://www. entrepreneurial-insights.com/introduction-to-sharing-economy/>.
7
The Economist. “The rise of the sharing economy.” 9 Mar. 2013. Accessed 4 Jan. 2016.
<http://www.economist.com/news/ leaders/21573104-internet-everything-hire-rise-sharing-
economy>.
8
Rudenko, Anna. “The Collaborative Consumption on the Rise: Why Shared Economy Is Winning Over the
‘Capitalism of Me.’” POPSOP. 16 Aug. 2013. Accessed 4 Jan. 2016.
<http://popsop.com/2013/08/the-collaborative-consumption-sharing-wins-over-ownership/>.
9
Entrepreneurial Insights.
10
Owyang, Jeremiah. “Collaborative Economy Honeycomb 2 – Watch it Grow.” Web-strategist.com. Accessed 6 Jan.
2016. <http:// www.web-strategist.com/blog/2014/12/07/collaborative-economy-honeycomb-2-watch-it-
grow/>.
11
Castells, Marcaell. “Aftermath: The Cultures of the Economic Crisis.” Journal of Global Academic Institute, Business &
Economics, 1(2). Barcelona, 2012. Accessed 7 Dec. 2015.
<www.globalacademicinstitute.com/wp-content/uploads/jgaibe_vol_1_no_2. pdf#page=48>.
12
Kaiser, Tiffany. “U.S. ‘Driving Age’ Teenagers/Young Adults Prefer Internet Over Cars.” Daily Tech. 29 Nov. 2011.
Accessed 4 Jan. 2016.
<http://www.dailytech.com/US+Driving+Age+TeenagersYoung+Adults+Prefer+Internet+Over+Cars/
article23391.htm>.
13
PricewaterhouseCoopers. “The Sharing Economy.”
14
Brady, Diane. “The Environmental Case for the Sharing Economy.” Bloomberg. 24 Sep. 2014. Accessed 4 Jan. 2016.
<http://www. bloomberg.com/bw/articles/2014-09-24/the-environmental-case-for-the-sharing-
economy>.
15
Scorpio, Jessica. “What’s the Future of the Sharing Economy?” Fast Company. 4 June 2012. Accessed 4 Jan. 2016.
<http://www. fastcoexist.com/1679964/whats-the-future-of-the-sharing-economy>.
16
Rudenko.
17
Brady.
18
PricewaterhouseCoopers. “The Sharing Economy – Sizing the Revenue Opportunity.” Accessed 7 Dec. 2015.
<http://www.pwc. co.uk/issues/megatrends/collisions/sharingeconomy/the-sharing-economy-sizing-the-
revenue-opportunity.html>.
19
Rudenko.
20
Walsh.
21
Entrepreneurial Insights.
22
Green, Charles. “Trusting and Being Trusted in the Sharing Economy.” Forbes. 2 May 2012. Accessed 4 Jan. 2016.
<http://www. forbes.com/sites/trustedadvisor/2012/05/02/trusting-and-being-trusted-in-the-sharing-
economy/2/>.
23
Botsman, Rachel. “The Sharing Economy Lacks a Shared Definition.” Rachelbotsman.com. Accessed 7 Dec.
2015. <http:// rachelbotsman.com/work/the-sharing-economy-lacks-a-shared-definition-fastco-
exist/>.
24
Parsons, Adam. “The Sharing Economy: A Short Introduction to Its Political Evolution.” Open Democracy. 5 Mar.
2014. Accessed 4 Jan. 2016. <https://www.opendemocracy.net/transformation/adam-parsons/sharing-economy-
short-introduction-to-its-political- evolution>.

This document is authorized for use only by Muzaffar Abasov ([email protected]). Copying or posting is an infringement of
copyright. Please contact [email protected] or 800-988-0886 for additional
 Uber and the Sharing Economy: Global Market Expansion and W04

25
Zrenner, Alexandra. “The Ethics of Regulating the Sharing Economy.” The Keenan Institute for Ethics at Duke
University. Accessed 7 Dec. 2015. <http://kenan.ethics.duke.edu/wp-content/uploads/2012/08/Sharing-
Economy-2015.pdf>.
26
Zrenner.
27
Uber. “Legal.” 8 Apr. 2015. Accessed 4 Jan. 2016. <https://www.uber.com/legal/usa/terms>.
28
Lapowsky, I. “Uber’s Business Isn’t Built to Help Disabled People.” Wired.com. 14 Aug. 2015. Accessed 4 Jan.
2016. <http:// www.wired.com/2015/08/uber-disability/>.

13

This document is authorized for use only by Muzaffar Abasov ([email protected]). Copying or posting is an infringement of
copyright. Please contact [email protected] or 800-988-0886 for additional
 Uber and the Sharing Economy: Global Market Expansion and W04

29
Deucher, Gioia. “Forget Owning, Let’s Share.” Nextrends. 14 Aug. 2012. Accessed 4 Jan. 2016.
<http://nextrends. swissnexsanfrancisco.org/forget-owning-lets-share/>.
30
Khazanah Research Institute. “The Sharing Economy: An Alternative Mode of Transport? – Part 2.” 5 Oct. 2015.
Accessed 4 Jan. 2016. <http://www.krinstitute.org/kris_publication_Urban_Transportation.aspx>.
31
Khabra, Dee. “How Does Uber Market Itself?” Quora. 23 Mar. 2015. Accessed 4 Jan. 2016.
<https://www.quora.com/How-does- Uber-market-itself>.
32
PricewaterhouseCoopers. “The Sharing Economy.”
33
PricewaterhouseCoopers. “The Sharing Economy.”
34
Crunchbase. “Uber.” Accessed 8 Dec. 2015. <https://www.crunchbase.com/organization/uber#/entity>.
35
Kalanick, Travis. “Uber’s Founding.” Uber Newsroom. 22 Dec. 2010. Accessed 4 Jan. 2016.
<https://newsroom.uber. com/2010/12/ubers-founding/>.
36
Uber. “The Company.” Accessed 8 Dec. 2015. <https://www.uber.com/about>.
37
Forbes. “America’s Richest Entrepreneurs Under 40.” Accessed 4 Jan. 2016. <http://www.forbes.com/profile/garrett-
camp/>.
38
Crunchbase.
39
Uber. “The Company.”
40
Rao, Leena. “Uber Closes on $1.2 Billion in Funding for China.” 7 Sep. 2015. Accessed 4 Jan. 2016.
<http://fortune. com/2015/09/07/uber-china/>.
41
Loudenback, Tanza. “The 50 Most Powerful Companies in America.” Yahoo! Finance. 28 Sep. 2015. Accessed 4 Jan.
2016.
<https://sg.finance.yahoo.com/news/50-most-powerful-companies-america-150200135.html>.
42
Macmillan, Douglas, and Telis Demos. “Uber Valued at More Than $50 Billion.” The Wall Street Journal. 31 July
2015. Accessed 4 Jan. 2016. <http://www.wsj.com/articles/uber-valued-at-more-than-50-billion-
1438367457>.
43
Biddle, Sam. “Here Are the Internal Documents that Prove Uber is a Money Loser.” Gawker. 5 Aug. 2015. Accessed 4
Jan. 2016.
<http://gawker.com/here-are-the-internal-documents-that-prove-uber-is-a-mo-1704234157>.
44
Gurley, Bill. “A Deeper Look at Uber’s Dynamic Pricing Model.” Above the Crowd. 11 Mar. 2014. Accessed 4 Jan.
2016. <http:// abovethecrowd.com/2014/03/11/a-deeper-look-at-ubers-dynamic-pricing-model/>.
45
Adhika, Gia. “Your Safety, Our Priority.” Newsroom.uber.com. 19 Oct. 2015. Accessed 6 Jan. 2015.
<https://newsroom.uber.com/ indonesia/en/your-safety-our-priority/>.
46
Weise, Karen. “This Is How Uber Takes Over a City.” Bloomberg. 23 June 2015. Accessed 4 Jan. 2016.
<http://www.bloomberg. com/news/features/2015-06-23/this-is-how-uber-takes-over-a-city>.
47
Mangalindan, J.P. “The Trials of Uber.” Fortune. 2 Feb. 2012. Accessed 4 Jan. 2016.
<http://fortune.com/2012/02/02/the-trials- of-uber/>.
48
Uber Help. “What Is Surge Pricing?” Accessed 8 Dec. 2015. <https://help.uber.com/h/6c8065cf-5535-4a8b-9940-
d292ffdce119>.
49
Verena, Meghan. “Outsmart the Flu with UberHEALTH.” Uber Newsroom. 17 Nov. 2015. Accessed 4 Jan. 2016.
<https://newsroom. uber.com/2015/11/uberhealth/>.
50
Uber Newsroom. “Introducing UberASSIST.” Accessed 6 Jan. 2016.
<https://newsroom.uber.com/la/2015/07/introducing- uberassist-la/>.
51
Uber Rush. “Meet Your On-Demand Delivery Fleet.” Accessed 8 Dec. 2015. <https://rush.uber.com/how-it-works>.
52
Deep, Ajay. “How Uber Works: Insights into Business & Revenue Model.” Next Juggernaut. 24 Sep. 2015. Accessed 4
Jan. 2016.
<http://nextjuggernaut.com/blog/how-uber-works-business-model-revenue-uber-insights/#!prettyPhoto>.
53
Kessler, Andy. “Travis Kalanick: The Transportation Trustbuster.” The Wall Street Journal. 24 Jan. 2013. Accessed 4 Jan.
2016.
<http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424127887324235104578244231122376480>.
54
Uber. “Uber for Business.” Accessed 8 Dec. 2015. <https://www.uber.com/business>.
55
Gurley.
56
Deep.
57
Gurley.
58
Uber. “Driving Jobs vs. Driving with Uber.” Accessed 8 Dec. 2015. <https://www.uber.com/driver-jobs>.
59
Khabra.

This document is authorized for use only by Muzaffar Abasov ([email protected]). Copying or posting is an infringement of
copyright. Please contact [email protected] or 800-988-0886 for additional
 Uber and the Sharing Economy: Global Market Expansion and W04

60
Dillet, Romain. “Benchmark’s Bill Gurley: ‘Uber Is Growing Faster Than eBay Did.’” 29 Apr. 2013. Accessed 8 Dec.
2015. <http:// techcrunch.com/2013/04/29/benchmarks-bill-gurley-uber-is-growing-faster-than-ebay-
did/>.
61
Rogowsky, Mark. “Uber Is Winning.” 10 June 2014. Accessed 8 Dec. 2015.
<http://www.forbes.com/sites/quora/2014/06/10/ whos-winning-right-now-in-the-competition-between-
lyft-and-uber/>.
14

This document is authorized for use only by Muzaffar Abasov ([email protected]). Copying or posting is an infringement of
copyright. Please contact [email protected] or 800-988-0886 for additional
 Uber and the Sharing Economy: Global Market Expansion and W04

62
Certify, Inc. “Sharing the Road: Business Travelers Increasingly Choose Uber.” Accessed 8 Dec. 2015.
<http://www.certify.com/ infograph-sharing-the-road.aspx>.
63
Kosoff, Maya. “We Talked to Lyft’s Investors – Here’s How It Will Compete with Uber’s Crazy Fundraising Efforts.”
26 Feb. 2015. Accessed 7 Jan. 2016. <http://www.businessinsider.com.au/how-lyft-can-take-on-uber-2015-
2>.
64
Stokes, Natasha. “Uber vs. Via, Lyft & Sidecar: Who’s the Best Car Service?” 5 Aug. 2015. Accessed 7 Jan. 2015.
<http://www. techlicious.com/tip/uber-via-lyft-sidecar-best-car-service/>.
65
Nicholson, Chris. “Study: Uber Pulls Ahead of Lyft in Riders and Revenue With 12x Lead in U.S.” Future Advisor.
11 Sep. 2014. Accessed 8 Dec. 2015. <http://blog.futureadvisor.com/study-uber-pulls-ahead-of-lyft-in-riders-
and-revenue-with-12x-lead-in- u-s/>.
66
The Economist. “The Connected Car.” 4 June 2009. Accessed 7 Jan. 2016.
<http://www.economist.com/node/13725743>.
67
Statista. “Customers of Zipcar in the USA, 2015.” Accessed 8 Dec. 2015.
<http://www.statista.com/statistics/295919/zipcar- customers-usa/>.
68
Zipcar. “Zipcar Overview.” Accessed 7 Jan. 2016. <http://www.zipcar.com/press/overview>.
69
Collaco, Conrad. “Uber vs. Taxi: Why the Taxi Industry Will Never Be the Same.” 18 Aug. 2015. Accessed 7 Dec.
2015. <http:// www.cbc.ca/news/canada/hamilton/news/uber-vs-taxi-why-the-taxi-industry-will-never-be-
the-same-1.3194893>.
70
Certify.
71
Certify.
72
Certify.
73
Lafrance, Adrienne and Rose Eveleth. “Are Taxis Safer Than Uber?” The Atlantic. 3 Mar. 2015. Accessed 7 Dec. 2015.
<http://www. theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2015/03/are-taxis-safer-than-uber/386207>.
74
Constine, Josh. “Uber’s Denial of Liability in Girl’s Death Raises Accident Accountability Questions.” Tech Crunch. 2
Jan. 2014. Accessed 7 Dec. 2015. <http://techcrunch.com/2014/01/02/should-car-services-provide-insurance-
whenever-their-driver-app-is- open/>.
75
Longardner, Tara. “Report: Uber, Lyft as Safe as Taxis.” U.S. News & World Report. 11 Feb. 2015. Accessed 7 Dec.
2015. <http:// www.usnews.com/news/articles/2015/02/11/report-uber-lyft-as-safe-as-taxis>.
76
Campbell, Harry. “Will Uber Ever Dominate the International Rideshare Market?” Forbes. 13 May 2015. Accessed 7
Dec. 2015.
<http://www.forbes.com/sites/harrycampbell/2015/05/13/will-uber-ever-dominate-the-international-rideshare-
market/>.
77
Reuters. “Legal Troubles – Including 173 Lawsuits in the U.S. – Threaten Uber’s Global Push.” Business Insider. 5
Oct. 2015. Accessed 7 Dec. 2015. <http://www.businessinsider.com/r-legal-troubles-market-realities-threaten-
ubers-global-push-2015-10>.
78
Carey, Scott. “The Taxi App War: As Lyft, Gett and Hailo Try to Take on Uber, Can Any of Them Actually Win?” Tech
World. 18 Nov. 2015. Accessed 7 Jan. 2016. <http://www.techworld.com/startups/taxi-app-war-who-will-win-
3629784/>.
79
Custer, C. “China’s Taxi App Market Breaks 150 Million Users, and It’s Totally Dominated by Two Apps.” Tech in
Asia. 5 Nov. 2014. Accessed 4 Jan. 2016. <https://www.techinasia.com/chinas-taxi-app-market-breaks-150-million-
users-totally-dominated-apps/>.
80
Custer.
81
Gannes, Liz. ”China’s Two Leading Uber Competitors, Kuaidi Dache and Didi Dache, Agree to Merge.” Recode. 13
Feb. 2015. Accessed 6 Jan. 2016. <http://recode.net/2015/02/13/chinas-two-leading-uber-competitors-kuaidi-
dache-and-didi-dache-agree- to-merge/>.
82
Cendrowski, Scott. “China Has a New Taxi App Monopolist – and It Isn’t Uber.” Fortune. 16 Feb. 2015. Accessed 4 Jan.
2016.
<http://fortune.com/2015/02/16/china-has-a-new-taxi-app-monopolist-and-it-isnt-uber/>.
83
Cendrowski.
84
Chen, Liyan. “Meet Uber’s Mortal Enemy: How Didi Kuaidi Defends China’s Home Turf.” Forbes. 23 Sep. 2015.
Accessed 6 Jan. 2016. <http://www.forbes.com/sites/liyanchen/2015/09/23/meet-ubers-mortal-enemy-how-didi-
kuaidi-defends-chinas-home- turf/>.
85
Wang Yue. “Chinese Taxi-Hailing App Didi Kuaidi Readies New Funds As It Battles With Uber.” Forbes. 8 July
2015. Accessed 4 Jan. 2016. <http://www.forbes.com/sites/ywang/2015/07/08/chinese-taxi-hailing-app-didi-
kuaidi-readies-new-funds-as-it- battles-with-uber/>.

This document is authorized for use only by Muzaffar Abasov ([email protected]). Copying or posting is an infringement of
copyright. Please contact [email protected] or 800-988-0886 for additional
 Uber and the Sharing Economy: Global Market Expansion and W04

86
Millward, Steven. “WeChat’s Growth Continues, Hits 650 Million Users.” Tech in Asia. 10 Nov. 2015. Accessed 8 Jan.
2016.
<https://www.techinasia.com/wechat-650-million-monthly-active-users/>.
87
Millward.
88
Crunchbase. “Didi Kuaidi.”
89
The Wall Street Journal. “China’s Didi Kuaidi Gets License to Ride in Shanghai.” 8 Oct. 2015. Accessed 4 Jan. 2015.
<http://www. wsj.com/articles/chinas-didi-kuaidi-gets-license-to-ride-in-shanghai-1444288510>.

15

This document is authorized for use only by Muzaffar Abasov ([email protected]). Copying or posting is an infringement of
copyright. Please contact [email protected] or 800-988-0886 for additional
 Uber and the Sharing Economy: Global Market Expansion and W04

90
The Wall Street Journal. “China’s Didi Kuaidi Gets License to Ride in Shanghai.”
91
Horwitz, Josh. “Uber’s Biggest Asian Competitors Have Already Raised about $7 Billion — and Could Soon
Merge.” Quartz. 28 Sep. 2015. Accessed 4 Jan. 2016. <http://qz.com/509913/ubers-%E2%80%8Bbiggest
%E2%80%8B-asian-competitors-have- already-raised-about-7-billion-and-could-soon-merge/>.
92
Crunchbase. “Ola.” Accessed 4 Jan. 2016. <https://www.crunchbase.com/organization/ani-technologies#/entity>.
93
Gore, Dipti. “How Ola Cabs Is Competing with Global Giants by Using Localization Strategy!” Tech Story. 11 Nov.
2014. Accessed 4 Jan. 2016. <http://techstory.in/olacabs/>.
94
Gore.
95
Gore.
96
Gore.
97
Gore.
98
Russell, Jon. “Ola, the Company Beating Uber in India, Raises $500M at a $5B Valuation.” Tech Crunch. 17 Nov.
2016. Accessed 11 Jan. 2016. <http://techcrunch.com/2015/11/17/ola-the-company-beating-uber-in-india-lands-
500m-in-fresh-investment/>.
99
Russell.
100
Horwitz.

This document is authorized for use only by Muzaffar Abasov ([email protected]). Copying or posting is an infringement of
copyright. Please contact [email protected] or 800-988-0886 for additional
 Uber and the Sharing Economy: Global Market Expansion and W04

16

This document is authorized for use only by Muzaffar Abasov ([email protected]). Copying or posting is an infringement of
copyright. Please contact [email protected] or 800-988-0886 for additional
 Uber and the Sharing Economy: Global Market Expansion and W04

Notes

17

This document is authorized for use only by Muzaffar Abasov ([email protected]). Copying or posting is an infringement of
copyright. Please contact [email protected] or 800-988-0886 for additional
 Uber and the Sharing Economy: Global Market Expansion and W04

Notes

18

This document is authorized for use only by Muzaffar Abasov ([email protected]). Copying or posting is an infringement of
copyright. Please contact [email protected] or 800-988-0886 for additional
 Uber and the Sharing Economy: Global Market Expansion and W04

Notes

19

This document is authorized for use only by Muzaffar Abasov ([email protected]). Copying or posting is an infringement of
copyright. Please contact [email protected] or 800-988-0886 for additional
 The Erb Institute is committed to creating a socially and
environmentally sustainable society through the power of business.
Building on nearly two decades of research, teaching, and direct
engagement, the Institute has become one of the world’s leading
sources of innovative knowledge on the culture, technologies,
operations and governance of business in a changing world.
http://erb.umich.edu

Established at the University of Michigan in 1992, the William Davidson

Institute (WDI) is an independent, non-profit research and educational
organization focused on providing private-sector solutions in emerging
markets. Through a unique structure that integrates research, field-based
collaborations, education/training, publishing, and University of Michigan
student opportunities, WDI creates long-term value for academic
institutions, partner organizations, and donor agencies active in emerging
markets. WDI also provides a forum for academics, policy makers, business
leaders, and development experts to enhance their understanding of these
economies. WDI is one of the few institutions of higher learning in the United
States that is fully dedicated to understanding, testing, and implementing
actionable, private-sector business models addressing the challenges and
opportunities in emerging markets.

This document is authorized for use only by Muzaffar Abasov ([email protected]). Copying or posting is an infringement of
copyright. Please contact [email protected] or 800-988-0886 for additional
This document is authorized for use only by Muzaffar Abasov ([email protected]). Copying or posting is an infringement of
copyright. Please contact [email protected] or 800-988-0886 for additional