si Village at War

An Account of Revolution —
TH Vietnam

James Walker Trullinger +

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Village at War
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 Village at War
An Account of Revolution
in Vietnam

James Walker Trullinger, Jr.

LONGMAN
New York and London
 ALLEN COUNTY PUBLIC LIBRARY
FORT WAYNE, INDIANA

VILLAGE AT WAR
An Account of Revolution in Vietnam

Longman Inc., New York

Associated companies and branches, and
representatives throughout the world.

Copyright © 1980 by Longman Inc.

All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be

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Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data

Trullinger, James Walker,

Village at war.

Bibliography: p.
1. Vietnamese Conflict, 1961-1975—Vietnam—Thon
My Thuy. 2. Thon My Thuy, Vietnam—History.
I. Title.
DS559.9.T48T78 959.704'31 79-25406
ISBN 0-582-28181-4

Manufactured in the United States of America

2.8 9 %. 5 ee
 Acknowledgments

Excerpt from the poem ‘‘Adam”’ on page xi from Collected Earlier Poems
of William Carlos Williams. Copyright © 1938 by New Directions Pub-
lishing Corporation. Reprinted by permission of New Directions Publish-
ing Corporation.

‘*Vietnam Message’ on page xii from Other Things and the Aardvark by
Eugene J. McCarthy. Copyright © 1970 by Eugene J. McCarthy. Re-
printed by permission of Doubleday & Company, Inc.

Quotations in Chapter 5 from ‘‘Vietnam: A Family Goes to War’’ by

James Walker Trullinger, Jr. Reprinted by permission of The Asia Mail.
Quotation on page 92 from Vietcong: The Organization and Techniques of
the National Liberation Front of South Vietnam by Douglas Pike.
Copyright © 1966 by the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Re-
printed by permission of the M.I.T. Press.
Quotation on page 138 from The Winter Soldier Investigation: An Inquiry
into American War Crimes by the Vietnam Veterans Against the War.
Copynght © 1972 by the Vietnam Veterans Against the War, Inc. Re-
printed by permission of Beacon Press.
Quotations on pages 135 and 177 from Screaming Eagle by the 10Ist
Airborne Division Association. Reprinted by permission of the 101st Air-
borne Division Association.
Quotations on pages 196-7 from The New York Times. Copyright © 1975
by The New York Times Company. Reprinted by permission.
Photo entitled ‘‘Captured Communist Weapons,’ number 68-0221-A, by
The Pacific Stars & Stripes. Reprinted by permission of The Pacific Stars
and Stripes.
Photo entitled ‘‘Beaucoup Vee-Cee Hue,’ by Dick Hughes, circa 1968-
1969. Reprinted by permission of Dick Hughes.

All other photos by James Walker Trullinger, Jr.

Dedicated to Vietnam's and America’s
children. May theirs be a prosperous,
free, and peaceful world.
 Contents

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 Contents

PEOSCEY CIN Gers a de eee re tas eles

Bront Community oo css ne on we ny
MNEs bWO- BamMilies, aehicweoht
cee eae
7.4 if9% 6 ¢ ieee rr aa ere ne ys
Taken esontheaManies: cov te eee
Tet OienSivovrss aw wie bara eras eee
10 FIGHTING THE EAGLE .............
GRC Pm oysteht ea cue aero ae
Stratesica Withdrawal. «i. ..2 yeas sean
11 QUIET WAR: 3.04 sae A Se ee fore) (muro fe/iteil's, YeMiwhieh te) triode! elfva:

Building RESENIMENG noctarecr ane oe

AMEHCAN AGVISOIS! 22). fe-ocdanta
oe tans
12 VIETNAMESE VS. VIETNAMESE .....
AITOY OL-HORCES, Gates icon aornree ee
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13
(CeaAseatires War ose iyo eet as ee
VillapecBaltlelines= «ne tac o r uses ernie.
Hope, Protest, Despair os... seme.
Victors andr Victims: 441 cee
EPILOGUE: WHAT KIND OF PEACE?
Bibliography
Index
 Foreword

Underneath the whisperings

of tropic nights
there is a darker whispering
that death invents especially
for northern men... .

William Carlos Williams

Village at War is a report, a history of a Vietnam village, of its people,

surprised and startled victims, first of twentieth-century colonialism by
the French, then of Japanese occupation during World War II, followed
by the post-war effort of the French to hold at least half of Vietnam, and
finally of the American armed forces, who picked up where the French
failed and carried on a war without clear definition of purpose, and with
little or no understanding of the people against whom they were fighting.
The book is essentially a case study of disruption, showing how the
series of intruders destroyed the order of village life. It concerns the
economy which had never been more than marginally above subsistence
level, but which met the limited material needs of the people, their need
for security in property, and their right to work. Village at War also shows
the disruption in family life, in community relationships, and in politics
and government.
When the information in Village at War is added to the reports of
misjudgment of persons and misunderstanding of political realities at high
levels of government, both in Vietnam and in Cambodia, additional ques-
tions are raised as to how or why those Americans who advocated, who
conducted and directed our military and political programs in those coun-
tries, could have been either so misinformed or so arrogant in their power.
Their folly is clear now, as it was to Doris Fleeson, a columnist, now
dead, who wrote almost at the beginning of American military interven-
Xi
xii Foreword

tion that our intervention would not, could not, work. ‘‘We were,’’ she
said, ‘‘too big, too wasteful, too destructive. Our garbage, alone, would
be too much for the Vietnamese to handle.”’
Village at War sustains the judgment of those who opposed the war
from the beginning or soon after, when it became evident, as events
showed time and time again, that those who were conducting the war did
not know what was happening or what was going to happen. It sustains
their recommendation to President Nixon that he end the war, and that.if
he did, no matter how badly things turned out, they would not criticize
him. The book also sustains and underlines an answer I gave to that
ultimate press question, the one which was to silence critics of the war, as
to what one would do or say about Vietnam if elected President of the
United States. I replied that I would send this message to them (essen-
tially as it is in this poem) and act upon it:

Vietnam Message
We will take our corrugated steel
out of the land of thatched huts.

We will take our tanks

out of the land of the water buffalo.

We will take our napalm and flame throwers

out of the land that scarcely knows
the use of matches.
We will take our helicopters
out of the land of colored birds
and butterflies.

We will give back your villages and fields

your small and willing women.

We will leave you your small joys

and smaller troubles.

We will trust you to your gods,

some blind, some many-handed.

Eugene J. McCarthy
 Preface

The village was a Vietnamese arena of intense human drama. It suffered a

long, bloody, and devastating confrontation between two rival political
forces. Those forces fought and fought hard, within the boundaries ofthe
village itself.
During the fight, the village also had two names. Followers of one side
called it Thuy Phuong, ‘‘Place of the Waters,’ while those on the other
side gave it the name My Thuy, *‘ Beautiful Waters.’’ For years there was
ambivalence, so it is simply easier to think of the village as having a
composite name, My Thuy Phuong, ‘Place of Beautiful Waters.”’
In this book, I focus on My Thuy Phuong’s long war—on continuity
and change, sorrow and joy, life and death. I include profiles and the
actual words of numerous villagers. There are many on my ‘‘cast of
characters,’ real people like Binh the struggling peasant, Tri the
warehouseman, Truong the grassroots revolutionary, Nghi the rice mer-
chant, Minh the organizer, Phuoc the fanatical officer, and Te the village
leader.
My purpose is to present the Vietnam War primarily as these and other
villagers experienced it. For that reason, I include no theoretical discus-
sion or comparisons with other villages, countries, or studies. It is my firm
belief that if Iwere to aim for a global sweep or attempt to reach conclu-
sions for social science, the village would be lost in a maze oftheories, the
voices of its people muted.

My interest in Vietnamese affairs stems from employment during

1969-1972, as a refugee relief worker in Danang, where my major preoc-
cupation was assistance to homeless Vietnamese children, mostly
shoeshine boys.
In 1974, I returned to Vietnam and decided to undertake a study of war
in a contested village—My Thuy Phuong. I gathered most of the data for
this study in the village itself, during the period November, 1974 through
March, 1975. I left the village in late March because of chaos in the area
and a desire to preserve research notes and films.
xiii
xiv / Preface

During the next five months, I conducted library and archival research
at Cornell University, in Washington, D.C., and at a military base in
Kentucky. I did most of the writing in Honolulu, Hawaii during 1975-
1976, and some in Seoul, Korea during 1978-1979.
My Thuy Phuong was suggested as a research site by Vietnamese
friends who described it as atypical of most Vietnamese villages in size,
location, history, and so forth, but who nevertheless asserted that there
was much to learn from its experience. I now share their view. :
After initial introductions, walking tours of the village, and informal
family visits, I conducted formal interviews and had informal conversa-
tions with villagers of all political stripes, provincial and local officials,
and with some leaders of the local insurgent organization. All told, I had
about 175 such interviews and conversations of varying lengths, and in
some cases, extending over many days. I spoke with about fifty leaders
and followers of the then incumbent regime, thirty-five on the insurgent
side, thirty-five who seemed politically uncommitted, and forty-five
whose political allegiance I could not determine. To capture important
comments verbatim, I took notes during most of the formal interviews and
immediately after many informal encounters.
I assured my contacts that in quoting I would not directly attribute
anything they told me and not construct identifying family case histories
without permission. However, I did tell them that I intended to identify
quotes by profession of the speaker. Further, I assured the small number
of villagers who agreed to in-depth profiles or family case histories that
only pseudonyms would appear in the text. I wrote this book with all
these assurances firmly in mind—and in force. This ‘“‘ground rule’’ is
behind the book’s apparent paradox of many identified characters from
the 1930s but few from recent years. Simply, many villagers were willing
to talk specifically of individuals long gone, but feared personal complica-
tions if speaking in detail of those from the 1960s and 1970s.
I attempt to maintain balance throughout much of the text by including
quotes which reflect divergent views on various subjects. In most cases,
how representative the quotes are should be clear from context. And I
repeatedly use the terms ‘‘villagers’’ and ‘‘people’’ in making small
generalizations. The terms reflect consensus by at least two individuals I
consider reliable, informed, and representative sources.

A comment now on social research in Vietnam. For most ofthe period

1965-1975, the Vietnamese and their war held the attention of numerous
social scientists. During those years, many Vietnamese on both sides of
the conflict grew to correctly understand that a great deal of that research
was sponsored by the U.S. Government, and suspicion of all social scien-
tists became widespread. To many Vietnamese the arms of the C.I.A.
seemed very long indeed, and it was logical to distrust all foreign ‘‘re-
searchers” as possible agents of that organization.
Identifying myself as a ‘‘social scientist writing about village life and
 Preface | xv

the war,’ I encountered this obstacle of distrust and suspicion in My

Thuy Phuong, but began to overcome it through identification in the vil-
lage as a part-time volunteer teacher of twelfth-grade English in its
school. That position also helped me overcome another initial suspicion,
that I was a ‘“‘bounty hunter,’ searching for remains of or clues about
American soldiers missing in action.
Most villagers’ reverence for teachers meant that many in My Thuy
Phuong, especially the youth, viewed me as a very different sort of
American—one who actually played a minor but respected role in their
community. Another advantage in teaching was that students often ac-
companied me on walks through the village, and invited me into their
homes, enabling me to make many valuable contacts.
I also gained access to many villagers through ‘understandings’? with
both sides in the war. Luckily, the former Republic of Vietnam province
chief liked the idea of my research, and wrote me a letter of introduction
to provincial, district, and village officials, most of whom fully cooperated
with me. I won the trust of those officials and most oftheir followers in the
village simply by assuring them of my desire to tell the truth about the
war. When they asked for my opinions on Vietnam issues, I made vague,
general replies. But such queries were infrequent and perhaps considered
unnecessary because of the province chief’s introductions.
I approached the revolutionary side with complete openness. After
meeting with and presenting a written request and character references to
a diplomat (serving in Laos) of the former Democratic Republic of Viet-
nam, and making assurances of honest analysis, the former Provisional
Revolutionary Government of the Republic of South Vietnam apparently
decided to ‘‘take a chance”’ on my research: insurgent forces never re-
stricted or threatened my movement in the village or elsewhere, and I was
able to meet with many supporters of the local insurgent organization. In
conversations with those individuals, I honestly expressed my opposition
to most American policies in their country. Note that insurgent followers
were aware of my contacts, in offices and homes, with Republic of Viet-
nam officials. Those officials, incidentally, may have known of my con-
tacts ‘‘on the other side,’’ but never revealed as much to me.
I necessarily arranged all my meetings with leaders of the village insur-
gent organization outside village boundaries. Sites of those informal con-
versations were my home just outside of Hue, city market cafés, soup
stands, public parks, sampans, moving motorcycles, shells of abandoned
buildings, and mountain retreats. Careful arrangements insured that the
meetings were undisturbed. Those interviewed and I frequently shifted
sites, took circuitous and confusing approaches to meeting places, and
took care that passers-by did not hear snatches of “incriminating” con-
versations.
Finally, I assured My Thuy Phuong’s politically uncommitted about
my research intentions through introductions from a number of generally
neutralist or apolitical Buddhist monks and lay leaders, who knew me
xvi / Preface

through introductions from a prominent monk in Danang, a long-time

friend. Among those I met within village boundaries, frank conversations
and interviews on political questions were possible after about two
months of discussions on relatively mundane matters. All told, those
conversations and interviews were long, and touched on many aspects of
village life. Villagers patiently described and explained even the most
mundane details of daily existence, usually with frankness and vividness,
and often humorously. One-to-one, usually open-ended conversations -in
the fields, in private homes, or around tables of public refreshment stalls,
touched on people’s experiences, values, dreams, and fears.
To summarize, my identification as a teacher, the ‘‘understanding”’ of
both sides in the war, introductions from Buddhist leaders, and a large
measure of good luck permitted me to gain the trust of many villagers, and
to hear many versions of My Thuy Phuong’s story. In addition, the mili-
tary activity throughout the area kept most villagers distracted, and al-
lowed me to continue the last months of my research with little interfer-
ence,
To supplement what I learned during interviews and conversations, I
have amassed and drawn upon some documentary evidence. Involved
here are very few documents from the village itself, but many Viet-
namese, French, and American documents describing conditions in the
province of which the village is a part. I obtained most of the Vietnamese
and French documents in Hue and at the Cornell University Library.
Most American documents came through the Freedom of Information
Act, which gives citizens some access to classified U.S. Government
documents. I include most references to the U.S. materials in the foot-
notes, so readers interested in official views on some matters should look
there. And for those who might want to obtain copies of the U.S. docu-
ments, such as province advisory reports, I have listed complete data on
whereabouts in the bibliography.

I hasten to add a word now on my values and this study. Like most
social scientists, | understand just how difficult it is to achieve total ob-
jectivity in social research, for human values can influence perceptions
and tilt research findings one way or another. I believe, however, that we
can minimize value biases of various sorts if we make values clear at the
outset, or even attempt to test them. In that spirit, I acknowledge that I
opposed most U.S. policies in Vietnam, and in general prefer social,
economic, and political policies which benefit the many rather than the
few. | recognize that those values may have influenced my research in the
village.
Another value that may have affected this study’s objectivity was my
belief that Vietnam’s major political forces in 1974-1975 were the incum-
bent regime and the insurgency, and not the body of politically uncommit-
ted, neutralists, and pacifists. Similarly, I believe that extended families,
hamlets, and factions were relatively unimportant forces in the village.
 ‘e Preface | xvii

While I include in the book some information on the ‘‘middle group’’ as it

appeared in My Thuy Phuong and on extended families, my major focus is
on the two contending sides in the war and their effects on village life.
There was simply too high a level of violence and too clear a left-right
polarization for me to avoid emphasizing violence and the two combatant
sides. I feel, however, that such an emphasis did not lead me too far from
the truth about My Thuy Phuong, and that my recognition of the values
mentioned above actually forced me to ask tougher questions of villagers,
and of myself.

I would like now to acknowledge the assistance of many who made this
study possible. Acknowledgment goes first to my friends in the village,
whose names I will not mention. Especially helpful were my English
language students of the Huong Thuy High School, who numbered about
seventy. The Vietnamese visa sponsor was Dr. Le Thanh Minh Chau, the
former Rector of Hue University, who secured the visa through his gov-
ernment’s Ministry of Education. A high-ranking monk of the Danang
Buddhist Association provided many important introductions and infor-
mal sponsorship in Hue. Many friends generously helped me get estab-
lished in Hue, including several of Hue’s shoeshine boys who shared my
home, brought me great joy, and were informal guides. All shall remain
anonymous here.
Ex-Colonel Nguyen Huu Due, the former Republic of Vietnam’s mili-
tary and administrative chief for Hue and Thua Thien Province, provided
introductions to provincial, district, and village officials. A friend with the
Saigon-based Buddhist Youth for Social Service helped me with invalu-
able advice and introductions in the Hue area. Three professors, one at
Dalat University and two at Van Hanh University, also offered advice.
The former first secretary of the former Democratic Republic of Vietnam
Embassy in Laos was the individual who conveyed messages for me to
the former Provisional Revolutionary Government of the Republic of
South Vietnam.
There were many other research sponsors, whose names I can men-
tion. Mr. Richard Hughes, of the Shoeshine Boys Foundation, helped
with encouragement, advice, and living accommodations in Saigon. Two
officials of the former U.S. Mission/ Vietnam, Messrs. George Jacobson in
Saigon and Albert Francis in Danang, helped with introductions to Viet-
namese officials. My University of Hawaii doctoral committee members,
Professors Robert Stauffer (chairman), Glenn Paige, Benedict Kerkvliet,
Ben Finney, and the East-West Center’s Dr. Gary Hansen offered
considerable professional advice, encouragement, and assistance writing
this study. Several staff members of the East-West Center were especially
helpful, including Dr. Manuel Alba, Mrs. Mendl Djunaidy, Dr. Louis
Goodman, and Miss Jennie Miyasaki.
A former teacher of mine at Cornell University, Professor George
xviii / Preface

Kahin, offered professional advice and encouragement both before and

after the field work. Others at Cornell who provided research support
included Mr. Giok Po Oey of the Cornell Library and Professor Frank
Golay, Mrs. Peggy Lush, and Mrs. Helen Swank of the Southeast Asia
Program. Several Cornell graduate students also assisted: Miss Hoang Thi
Thanh Giang translated Vietnamese documents for me; Messrs. James
Hinde and Louis MacKenzie translated French documents; and Mr.
Paresh Majmudar drew the village maps. Dr. Jeffrey Race in.Bangkok and
Dr. Gerald Hickey at Cornell gave me suggestions for research ap-
proaches.
Several in Washington, D.C. assisted with introductions and gather-
ings of archival materials, including Dr. Richard Hatcher of the U.S.
Army Adjutant General’s Office, Mr. Frederick Brown of the U.S. De-
partment of State, and Mr. David Cordingly, a businessman. And at Fort
Campbell, Kentucky, Public Affairs Officer Mrs. Laura Chamberlain and
Post Historian First Lt. R. Cody Phillips arranged several useful inter-
views with American soldiers and gave me access to military archives.
I would like to extend warm thanks to all those mentioned above.
Special thanks and appreciation go to my family and to friends not
mentioned above for so many kind thoughts and so much encouragement
and patience. Finally, credit for whatever strengths this study may have
goes to all who helped, while blame for its weaknesses is mine alone.

James Walker Trullinger, Jr.

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xix
 1
The Village
SETTING

The village of My Thuy Phuong (see Figure 1) lies about seven miles
southwest of the Central Vietnamese city of Hue. It is in the lowlands
between the mountains and sea of Huong Thuy District, in the former
Thua Thien Province.! The village area is about 10.5 square miles, includ-
ing extensive ricefields in the eastern section, flat drylands in the center,
and rolling, sandy hills in the western area.7 My Thuy Phuong is bisected
by a railroad and by Highway One, a heavily travelled, asphalt, two-lane
north-south line of commerce and military supply. French soldiers used to
call part of this route ‘‘The Street Without Joy.” Americans later named it
‘‘The Avenue of Horror.”
According to 1975 figures, over 7,600 people, all ethnic Vietnamese,
live in My Thuy Phuong, and there has been steady population growth
over the years.? There are about 1,300 separate households, and over 50
percent of the population is under 18 years of age—meaning that the
village is demographically young. Population density is greatest in the
central area of My Thuy Phuong, near the highway. Along that route,
immediately to the north and south, lie two other villages, similar topo-
graphically and demographically to My Thuy Phuong. Most homes in the
village consist of two or three rooms, and are of cement and wood con-
struction, with metal roofs. Fences or hedgerows surround nearly every
home.
 N
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Figure |
 as The Village | 8

My Thuy Phuong’s ricefields, about 1,161 acres in total area, are di-
vided into rectangular plots of different sizes by narrow, slippery earthen
barriers. These double as walkways. When rice seedlings are ready to
transplant, or during harvests, the fields come alive. Hundreds of men and
women work long hours, plowing, weeding, spreading fertilizer, worrying
about the crop.
Numerous waterways crisscross the fields and wind through the inhab-
ited sections ofthe village. Small boats carry people along the streams and
canals, children play by their banks, and women wash clothes in their
water.
Bamboo dips and sways with the breeze along paths that wind through
the village’s inhabited areas. Most of the paths are of dirt, but one ina
low-lying area is completely ‘“‘paved’’ with expended American artillery
shells. Shade trees are abundant, surrounding homes and shrines, creep-
ing up the low hills in the western part of the village, and making green My
Thuy Phuong’s predominant color. Only one small part of the village is
drab. That is the congested, built-up area near the intersection of the
highway and a road that runs southwest through the village. It is dusty,
full of barbed wire and other junk of war, and has few shade trees.

In 1974-1975, about 67 percent of the village’s total land area was

communally held, including about 82 percent of the riceland. As detailed
in subsequent chapters, control of communal land has shifted back and
forth over the years, but the amount of such land has not varied much.
This fact sets My Thuy Phuong apart from many other Vietnamese vil-
lages, which have seen large reductions in communal land areas.
About 80 percent of My Thuy Phuong’s people earned livings from rice
cultivation during 1974-1975. For generations, villagers have tilled,
planted, fertilized, cultivated, and harvested the ricefields in two annual
crops. The spring crop accounts for about 75 percent of total local rice
production, and people consider it more delicious than fall rice.* Produc-
tion and taste differences are due mainly to the higher rainfall during the
spring growing period. The cool, rainy weather from November through
March is more suitable for rice than the scorching days of summer, when
the fall crop is growing. Weeding and fertilizing are periodically necessary
during both growing cycles—weeding three or four times per cycle, and
fertilizing once. The rice production schedule is as follows:

Spring Crop Fall Crop

Seeding November April 15-June
Transplant December 15—January May 15—-July
Harvest April 15-May August 15-October

There are sometimes years when the rains come late, and sometimes
there is flooding, but the peasants’ routine rarely changes.° Most
everyone in the village is up before dawn. Then it is to the fields, some-
4 / Village at War

times behind small flocks of ducks which feed in the canals and rice
paddies. The peasants work all day, plowing, weeding, or harvesting. A
few break for lunch and rest, but most cannot, and must work through
until dark. Wives, children, and friends help out when they can, some-
times singing folk songs such as this one: °

The sun in the east,

I carry my hat,
Go to the ricefields,
Pull up the seedlings,
They smile in the sun...

As the peasants go about their work, they use many traditional tools.
For example, one or two peasants at a time sit on a bamboo framework
partly shaded by canvas. Their legs move up and down in a regular,
rhythmic pattern, like they are peddling a bicycle, and small wooden slats
propel in an endless circular motion through a wooden trough. The slats
force water uphill through the trough and into the fields. The mechanism
is not terribly efficient, but it requires little maintenance, works, and has
worked for years.
Water buffalo are among many villagers’ most precious possessions.
When not needed in the fields, young boys herd them. When peasants
need to turn over the soil for a new planting of rice seedlings, their buffalo
pull plows for hours through the mud. Sometimes peasants make up songs
and sing as they plow:

Oh buffalo, dear buffalo,

Are you tired, dear buffalo?
I will go with you, dear buffalo,
I will go with you, dear buffalo...

My Thuy Phuong’s areas of drier, sandier soils support about 104 acres
of vegetable gardens, which bring extra income to many families. As with
rice cultivation, whole families work together planting, weeding, and pick-
ing the vegetables, but only the women are concerned with sale of pro-
duce. Sometimes they sit for hours in the crowded local market, a group-
ing of covered open-air pavilions, just to make the equivalent of 20 or 30
U.S. cents profit for the day.’
The village also has about 50 part-time fishermen. Along a wide, deep
village stream, huge stationary fish nets mounted on wooden stakes are
periodically hoisted by groaning, straining villagers. Men or boys slowly
row or pole small boats along the canals, and their hand nets, thrown or
dragged, haul in a steady catch of eels and minnows. Occasionally in the
nets there are good-sized fish or frogs.
Several hundred others have long worked at nonagricultural jobs.
Some are traditional pursuits, and others more recent responses to chang-
 “” The Village | 5

ing technology or need. For years this group included about 100 people,
25 or 30 of whom were household heads working as officials or soldiers
with both of My Thuy Phuong’s political forces—in and out ofthe village.
The tasks people performed for the two forces are described in later
chapters.
In 1975, about 30 of the very poorest villagers could be seen walking
miles every day to the mountains, where they gathered firewood. They
cut the wood, tied it with palm leaf strands, and sold the bundles in and
outside of My Thuy Phuong for small profits. About 100 of the poorest,
including some wood gatherers, hired themselves out as field laborers or
for work at odd jobs, earning wages equivalent to about 50 U.S. cents a
day. And five to ten others worked in Hue at various heavy labor occupa-
tions, such as loading trucks in rice warehouses.
Also in early 1975, a number of tradesmen sold in shops or out of
homes, two dealing in rice, one in bottled and canned goods, and four in
school supplies. There was one rice wholesaler, who bought from local
peasants. Fifteen tailors ran tiny, one-machine sewing operations, making
nearly all clothing worn in the village, including uniforms for soldiers.
Three families made small dresses and hats of colorful paper, which
people bought for symbolic offerings on family altars to the spirits of
deceased children.
There was a family that cut and sold large slabs of wood, and three
others made cabinets and other furniture. And one enterprising family
constructed little yellow tables and stools from discarded wooden ammu-
nition boxes of American manufacture. Villagers sold most of the furni-
ture made in My Thuy Phuong in the markets or to the shops of Hue.
The village also had many who worked at service occupations. A group
of carpenters and bricklayers built houses on contract. There were also
three rice mills, seven food and drink stalls, three billiard parlors, four
barber stands, and a small beauty shop. Four homes took in laundry for
soldiers. Two nurses gave injections for small fees, and the village had
two midwives. There were four motorcycle repair places. Five three-
wheeled Lambretta vehicles, owned by a few families, hauled people to
Hue for a charge, and about five men took paying passengers by motorcy-
cle on short trips. Three families had vehicles for trucking cut and uncut
firewood to market.
Many of these retail and service operations were small, low-profit
businesses, often run simply to augment incomes from other sources,
such as rice cultivation. Most families survived by simultaneously work-
ing at two or three occupations. For example, one family in 1975 raised
vegetables, sewed, and sold soup from a stall next to the family house, in
addition to tending its rice paddies.
Now that the war has ended in Vietnam, it is probably a safe assump-
tion that there have been some changes in this village occupational profile,
which was made in early 1975. There are probably fewer billiard parlors,
fewer gas-consuming vehicles in use, fewer laundries for soldiers, and
6 / Village at War

fewer prosperous tradesmen. Other changes are sure to come in the years
ahead. However, it is probably also safe to assume that My Thuy
Phuong’s economy remains primarily agricultural, that the nonagricul-
tural sector remains diversified, and that most families continue working
at several tasks to survive.

Most residents of My Thuy Phuong have a special attachment to Hue,

Vietnam’s former imperial capital. A deep pride in the Hue region’s
traditionally important place in the nation is widely shared in the village,
from the youngest school children to the most senior of local elders. It is
so strong that it seems to cut across political, economic, and social differ-
ences. For generations, Vietnam’s poets have described the city of Hue,
and the meaning it has for most Vietnamese, including people in places
like My Thuy Phuong.’ They have written of its beauty, its charm, and its
magic. In Hue, there is the Perfume River, running clear and clean. It
winds through the city, flowing from the southwest, passing very near My
Thuy Phuong. The hills, such as the famous one called Ngu Binh, are
gentle and tall. And ihe landmarks, like the multitiered Thien Mu Pagoda,
or the elaborate tombs of the emperors, are inspirations for many of Hue’s
people, and for many who live in the countryside: !°

Romantic Perfume River

with streets on both banks,
Look at the flow,
so peaceful, so gentle.
The surface is a mirror,
reflecting straight banks,
the crossing bridge... .

Poets overflowing with love,

Sing of waiting river,
Blowing wind,
Waiting mountain,
Hanging moss...

There is something about the Hue region that most of My Thuy

Phuong’s people seem to love. Hue gives them a very special identity, and
it breeds toughness and resiliency: !!

... The people of Hue,

are grave and quiet,
Sad when others are happy,
But full of confidence,
seldom spoken...

Nearly every family in the village maintains a small plot of land for the
remains of family members. The poorest have simple, round mounds of
earth, and some of the more prosperous maintain elaborate cement grave
 The Village | 7

complexes of archways, altars, and protecting walls.'2 Many feel obli-

gated to keep the graves in good condition—weeded, painted, and re-
paired. Families burn incense at the graves, and arrange annual feasts to
honor and remember particularly virtuous ancestors, usually fathers or
grandfathers. In addition, many people make offerings to ancestral spirits
on three specially designated days each year. Every day men, women,
and children may be seen in the graveyards digging, carrying soil, cleaning
up. ‘‘We are here to make the graves beautiful. We want our ancestors to
be proud of us,’ commented an elderly peasant, who once a week came
to the rolling, sandy hills of graves to pull weeds and burn incense at his
family plot. ‘‘I have to come every week,”’ he said with certainty.
There are countless other physical expressions of commitment and
belief, scattered everywhere in My Thuy Phuong—the shrines. Some are
old, crumbling structures, in need of repair or paint. But most are in good
condition, maintained by families or by local committees and associations
which contribute money and labor for their upkeep. Helping coordinate
and officiating at many of the ceremonies at the shrines and in village
homes is the prestigious local Cult Committee. Its six or seven members
were, in 1975, among My Thuy Phuong’s most respected men.
On or next to nearly every home in the village are small covered altars
of wood, about two feet square, set on platforms, and usually full of
offerings of fruit and sweets for the spirits of ancestors and home. Incense
perfumes the air around these tiny shrines, to appease the spirits that most
villagers believe frequent them. Practically every house also has at least
one small indoor altar in the center of the main room. These honor more
recently departed relatives and are usually crowded with photographs,
incense, porcelain vases of plastic flowers, and offerings of bananas or
other fruit.
The larger shrines, which honor hamlets, clans, or family name group-
ings, are sometimes of quite substantial cement and wooden beam con-
struction, usually with graceful pitched roofs of red tile, which are deco-
rated with Chinese-inspired lotus flowers, lions, and dragons.'* Long,
coiled, bouncing wires hold the dragons’ bulging round eyes in place, and
pieces of smashed porcelain dishes, stuck in the cement, give a touch of
chaotic color to it all. Once or twice a year the shrine associations conduct
important celebrations at these places, and people feast.
The most public and frequented of the shrines is a small, drab building
of cement blocks called the dinh, which is a village meeting hall. My Thuy
Phuong has always had a dinh. Villagers organize various types of func-
tions there, such as meetings of peasants to plan improvements in the
ricefields. They also conduct periodic ceremonies at the dinh in honor of
the village spirit, or genie.
There is also a shrine in the middle of the ricefields, consisting of four
slender supports and a roof. It honors the spirits of the soil and the spirits
of rice. A few small trees grow beside it, and birds like to rest in the shade
of its roof. The shrine has a volunteer caretaker. Every night someone
8 / Village at War

goes out by boat to clean the simple structure, light a few sticks of in-
cense, and sometimes leave offerings of fruit or other food. Many believe
that the incense and the offerings bring good luck and good harvests.
At the base of a tree in the western part of My Thuy Phuong, a sort of
banyan, is a small cement and wood shrine—an elaborate box, open in the
front. It honors ‘‘the spirit of the tree,’’ according to an elderly peasant
woman who lives nearby. Every day she picks up fallen leaves around it,
and once a week replenishes the oil supply in the tiny glass lamp that
constantly burns in the shrine. ‘‘If the flame ever goes out,”’ she said, ‘‘we
will have bad luck.”’
The village also has tiny shrines by its hills, by many large rocks, and
by other trees. One honors the road. Another marks a sort of sand dune,
which some think is occupied by ‘‘spirits of death.’’ Most of the shrines
require some involvement—the burning of incense, placing of offerings,
or participation in organized ceremonies or repair projects—and so are
living forces in the lives of most villagers. The shrines provide believers
with a direct and familiar way to communicate with spirits, and help
preserve the logic and balance of forces, natural and supernatural, in their
lives.
There is one other place of spiritual importance. That is the An Quang
Buddhist pagoda, which in 1974 celebrated its renovation with three days
of reconsecration, feasting, and a candle-lighting ceremony. It is actually
a large, rambling collection of pavilions and courtyards, over 200 years
old, located at the base of a hill near the railroad tracks. Four huge pillars
and four lanterns mark the path that leads in from the highway, and trees
shade and protect the pagoda from the elements. In early 1975, there were
no monks living in the compound, and only occasionally did the monk
assigned to Huong Thuy District visit the village, so a group oflocal elders
governed the pagoda. A caretaker living nearby had the task of burning
incense, weeding the pagoda gardens, and sweeping the old ritual hall.
In 1974-1975, an organization linked to the pagoda, the Buddhist Fam-
ily Association, organized camps, hikes, local cleanups, and other ac-
tivities for children and women. Only a few hundred were actively in-
volved in pagoda affairs, but villagers estimated that as many as 90 per-
cent of the populace identified with Buddhism, supported and came to the
pagoda on important occasions such as the 1974 celebration, and some-
times looked to pagoda elders for guidance and leadership. However,
most people did not actually describe themselves as Buddhists, but spoke
of ancestor veneration as their ‘‘religion.”’ And as noted earlier, most
were moved to some degree by various animistic beliefs.

TIES TO THE PAST

To most people in My Thuy Phuong, there are events, personalities,
and patterns of the far distant past that seem important. Let us briefly
survey and discuss some of them in this section.
 ~ The Village | 9

Nearly all villagers know of Vietnam’s most important heroes in the

long anti-Chinese struggle, people like the martyred Trung sisters and the
strategist/emperor Le Loi.'* They also know that when the first Viet-
namese came to the area of My Thuy Phuong, the Chams were already
there. The Chams were an agricultural people of a great and ancient
empire that since the second century A.D. had ruled much of what is now
Central and South Vietnam.'* According to a nineteenth century Viet-
namese treatise, in 1306, Vietnam’s emperor wed his younger sister to the
Cham ruler, and was rewarded with a large area of land that extended
south from the present city of Hue.'® The Chams farming there were few,
and were edged off the land, including the area that is now My Thuy
Phuong, by the more aggressive Vietnamese.
Joseph Buttinger writes that the earliest of those Vietnamese settlers
arrived in the fifteenth century, marking the beginning of a southward
expansion from the crowded areas of what is now northern Vietnam.!’
The pioneers, who were mostly youngsters and veterans of the imperial
army, later sent for parents and others who had stayed behind. Eventually
entire families pulled up stakes in the north and settled the My Thuy
Phuong region.'® Official records contain no information at all about vil-
lage origins, and no one is sure just which section of northern Vietnam to
claim as his family’s. Most people cannot trace back genealogies beyond
four or five generations, after which vagueness and fogginess prevail.!?
Illustrative is this statement by a peasant: ‘‘My great-great-great grand-
father’s father came from somewhere in the north.”

Most villagers also understand that the rule of Vietnam’s emperors

deeply affected life in My Thuy Phuong. In the early days, the village was
merely a collection of hamlets, which bore the names Gia Le, Gia Le
Thuong, Thanh Lam, Lang Xa, Tho Vuc, Phuong Lam, Dong Hoi, and
Loi Nam Gia Le Ha. (See Figure 2.) In 1975, these names remained in
popular use. The emperor’s court first officially touched the village in the
sixteenth century, when it issued a proclamation that incorporated the
hamlets into the rapidly expanding empire of Vietnam.
People like those of theMy Thuy Phuong area were governed in the old
days by local councils of ‘‘notables,’’ usually five to ten men of greatest
wealth, age, and education in each locality. In My Thuy Phuong itself, the
council was chosen by consensus of men on the village rolls. According to
Nguyen Khac Vien, the most important council members, and local lead-
ers in their own right, were the scholars, men who aspired to the em-
peror’s exclusive governing group, the mandarinate. But they could not
pass the rigorous entrance test, given every three years.*® The schol-
ars acted as teachers, advisers, and men of ritual, and in many ways
grew close to the people.”! In My Thuy Phuong they taught in four tiny
schools of thatched bamboo construction. These schools, totally sup-
ported by local contributions, brought a high rate of literacy to the vil-
lage.*?
 TRADITIONAL HAMLET
BOUNDARIES

THANH - LAM MY - THUY - PHU’ONG

 ” The Village | 11

One of the major tasks village councils performed was collection of

taxes for the emperor. Ngo Vinh Long writes that these amounted, at
most, to 6 percent of the annual value ofthe rice harvests.** Other duties
of the councils included finding recruits for the imperial army or laborers
for public works projects, settling disputes, and distributing land.24
The council did not perform these tasks in the belief that all in the
village were equal. In fact, My Thuy Phuong’s social structure was very
hierarchical. Notables were at the top, along with the elderly. Several in
My Thuy Phuong confirmed Ellen Hammer’s contention that people in
such positions in the social order were free of taxation.?5 At a slightly
lower level were men of learning and wealthy individuals not on the
council. Everyone else was lower, ranked on the basis of landholdings
and length of residence in the village. At the very bottom were newcomers
to the village with no land.
There is a wide belief in My Thuy Phuong that the traditional council
operated more or less fairly and consistently within the expected bounds
of hierarchy. That is, villagers asserted that it never demanded in taxes
more than what people, perhaps in patient submission, accepted as obliga-
tion. And most important, villagers contended, the council respected and
protected everyone’s position in the ‘pecking order,’ giving residents a
feeling of belonging—psychological security.

In 1974, there was a family in My Thuy Phuong which kept a small box
labeled Xua—‘‘the old days.’ In the box was a carefully wrapped,
crumbling brown piece of paper that was the oldest extant local record. It
was acopy ofa still older document, and it revealed that in about 1765 the
emperor had his eye on one My Thuy Phuong hamlet:

Two soldiers were transferred to the district to assist in tax collection in Gia Le,
which had not paid all of its taxes that year.

This document suggests that something might have been going wrong
for the emperor in the village. In fact, not long after the soldiers were sent
there to collect taxes, the Vietnamese court faced a serious threat in
nearly every corner of the empire. The year was 1773. Beginning in the
village of Tay Son, far south of My Thuy Phuong in the province later
called Binh Dinh, people rose up.*° The rebellion spread everywhere,
including the My Thuy Phuong area, and military successes destroyed the
ruling Nguyen Dynasty and eventually the Trinh Dynasty to the north. A
new regime came into being.
But in 1801, that regime fell to Vietnam’s legendary unifying emperor,
Gia Long. According to Alastair Lamb, Gia Long’s victory was primarily
based on small but significant amounts of advice, money, and materials
supplied by the French, and on loss of peasant involvement in the Tay Son
cause.27 By 1802, this new Nguyen emperor had unified Vietnam, re-
created much of the old dynasty, and in 1805 began to build the new
12 | Village at War

capital of Hue. In Central Vietnam, where the Tay Son movement had its
deepest roots, the experience left a rich legacy. Many of My Thuy
Phuong’s people, like those throughout the area, look back to the Tay Son
rebellion and draw the conclusion that revolt and revolution are some-
times necessary.

On a more mundane level, many villagers also know that during “‘the
old days,’ a number of important physical changes came to My Thuy
Phuong. Many of the changes are recorded in a nineteenth-century Viet-
namese study. First, in about 1815, hundreds of corvée laborers dug a
canal and dike system.”8 Second, there were bridges. Laborers built these
simple structures, of durable wooden construction, where village path-
ways approached streams and canals.?? Third, the court directed that a
secondary road be built in the village, at a time when a network of such
roads grew all over Central Vietnam. Throughout the network lay trams,
stations in a message-relay system that the court established to carry
letters and decrees by horse and runner to different parts of the empire.*°
This was the Victnamese version of the ‘‘pony express.’’ It is unclear
precisely when the court established the message-relay system, but the
trams themselves were built in 1804.3! My Thuy Phuong’s road in the
tram system cut through the village west into the hills, and to this day
people call it “‘the tram road.’ In about 1835, laborers built three mar-
kets, simple covered pavilions, in the My Thuy Phuong hamlets of Thanh
Lam, Gia Le, and Lang Xa.*? Finally, there were improvements to the
local schools.

This was where My Thuy Phuong stood in the mid-nineteenth

century—physically changing, but at peace. In following chapters atten-
tion focuses on what happened in the village during a long test of its
people's strength and determination. The test was brought on by the
fundamental changes set in motion after white men came to Vietnam, and
meant a bloody, devastating confrontation in the village, and throughout
the nation, between forces of revolution and repression.
The purpose of this book is to spotlight that confrontation primarily as
villagers experienced it—not to turn My Thuy Phuong into a testing
ground for theories and strategies. In other words, this book is mainly for
those who may have seen Vietnam on the 7:00 news and wondered,
perhaps more than casually, ‘‘What’s it like to live through hell?”’

NOTES
1. This book is based on a dissertation submitted in 1977 to the Graduate
Division of the University of Hawaii in partial fulfillment of the requirements
for the doctoral degree in Political Science. Readers interested in examining
more complete quotations, notes, and other supporting documentation
gathered for the book should see the dissertation, located in and available
through the University of Hawaii Library, Honolulu, Hawaii.
 ~ The Village | 13

bho The population of Huong Thuy District in March, 1974, was 119,324, accord-
ing to Robert Jones II, formerly of the U.S. Embassy/Saigon. As of De-
cember, 1970, there were 738,498 residents in all of Thua Thien Province,
including 203,627 in Hue, according to ‘‘42 Thua Thien’’ (Vietnam: National
Geographic Directorate, 1971), map. Note that this map, along with most
other documents from Thua Thien/Hue, is in the author’s possession.
There are three major soil types in the village. To the east of Highway
One, dividing the village, there are primarily undifferentiated alluvial soils
(the ricefields), and regosols on white and yellow dune sand. Topography is
flat. To the west of the highway there are red and yellow podzolic soils on
acid rocks, and some white and yellow dune sand. Topography is flat to
rolling, with one large hill. [Based on author’s observations and ‘‘General
Soil Map” (Dalat, Vietnam: National Geographic Service, 1961).]
While the village’s population has grown in the last 300 years or more, there
have been recent population shifts in the hamlets. Recent figures are shown
here for each of the hamlets. (These figures were made available by Robert
Jones III.)
Date Dong Tam Dong Tien Dong Luc Dong Loi
(Thanh Lam, (Gia Le 1, 2) (Gia Le 3, 4, (6 Gia Le
Tho Vuc) Lang Xa) Thuong, Loi
Nam Gia Le Ha)

Jan. 1968 3499 3926 906 evacuated

Jun. 1968 3499 3926 906 evacuated
Dec. 1968 2559 3456 759 evacuated
Jun. 1969 2554 3725 904 evacuated
Dec. 1969 2559 3926 904 evacuated
Nov. 1970 2335 3324 825 390 at
Dong Tien
Jan. 1972 2490 3709 727 602
Mar. 1974 2700 SOT 677 Thaw

Total rice production figures for the village are not available. For Huong
Thuy District, however, there was a per peasant production level in 1960 of
296 Ib., and in 1966 of 323 lb. (These numbers were obtained by dividing the
total paddy production for the district for each year by total number of
peasants, taken at 30 percent of the district residents.) In 1965, My Thuy
Phuong peasants reportedly had yields averaging 400-800 kg. per hectare.
[See Vo Luan Han, **Thua Thien Agricultural Development Problems and
the Result of Investigations of 411 Thua Thien Farmer Households” (Saigon:
Joint Development Group, 1967), pp. 11, 18; a publication of a U.S. Gov-
ernment contract agency, available in Cornell Library.]

There exists a ten-month record of rainfall in the village, prepared by the

U.S. Army in 1968-1969. See **After Action Report, Offensive Operations
17 May—28 February 1969" (Camp Eagle: Headquarters, 2nd Brigade, 101st
Airborne Division, March 5, 1969), p. B—1—3; available in 101st Airborne
Museum, Fort Campbell, Ky.

This also appears in Thai Van Khiem, Co-Do Hue (The Old Capital of Hue)
(Saigon: Ministry of Education, 1960), p. 255.
In this book, most Vietnamese piaster amounts are converted to their ap-
proximate U.S. dollar equivalents. There is imprecision in these figures be-
cause villagers have often forgotten exact piaster amounts and because of
14 / Village at War

wide fluctuations in the value of the piaster. Many villagers, for example,
used 1974’s piaster value (about V.N.$700 to U.S.$1) when describing ex-
penses or salaries in the 1930s or later decades. In any case, amounts cited
by villagers are stated here, unless other sources contradict and seem more
reliable.
The only available piaster-dollar exchange rates on the free market are as
follows: (From ‘‘ Annual Statistical Bulletin,’ U.S.A.I.D./Vietnam, no. 16,
December, 1973, p. 13; available in East-West Resource Systems Institute
Library, Honolulu, Hawaii)
Year Piaster/Dollar
1962 97
1963 97
1964 ied
1965 146
1966 180
1967 164
1968 190
1969 223
1970 397
1971 388
Tome 439

‘‘Vietnam’’ is the name used in this book to describe the country, although
before 1804 numerous names were used—including Nam Viet, Dai Viet, Dai
Nam, etc.

The two best collections of Hue area poems the author has seen are Thai Van
Khiem, op. cit., and Vu Huong, Kieu Khe, Thanh Tung, Co-Do Hue (The
Old Capital of Hue) (Hue: Sao Mai, 1971).

Hongiet ales Op clin ips):

Khiem, op. cit., p. 246.

See ‘‘Tombeaux Annamites dans les Environs de Hue’ (Annamite Tombs

From the Environs of Hue), Bulletin de la Societe des Etudes Indochinoises,
no. 1&2, 1958, pp. 130-134; available in Cornell Library. For an excellent
source of information on art and design in the Hue area, including My Thuy
Phuong, see L’Art a Hue (Hue Art) (Hanoi: Association des Amis du Vieux
Hue, undated); the same text is reproduced in Bulletin des Amis du Vieux
Hue, January—March, 1919.

There are three major name groupings in the village. *‘Nguyen Duy”? is the
largest; next is ““Nguyen Dinh;’’ the smallest is ‘“‘Nguyen Viet.”’

Joseph Buttinger, Vietnam: A Political History (New York: Praeger, 1968),

pp. 30-31; Nguyen Van Thai & Nguyen Van Mung, A Short History of
Viet-Nam (Saigon: Times Publishing Company, 1958), pp. 22-23.

See Buttinger, op. cit., p. 9; Khiem, op. cit., p. 11; and ‘‘Dia-Phuong Chi;
Tinh Thua-Thien’’ (Local Guide; Thua Thien Province) (Hue: Vietnam In-
formation Service, undated), pp. 2-3, manuscript.

‘**Dai-Nam Nhat-Thong-Chi; Thua-Thien Phu’’ (General Geography of Dai

Nam; Thua Thien Province) (Saigon: Ministry of Education, 1961), no. 10, p.
23. (This is a treatise written between 1864 and 1875 for the emperor named
Tu Duc, and contains extremely detailed information on flora, fauna, geo-
graphic features, cultural attractions, etc., of Thua Thien.)
 x The Village | 15
li. See Buttinger, op. cit., p. 46.

18. See ibid.; also see Frances FitzGerald, Fire In The Lake: The Vietnamese
and the Americans in Vietnam (New York: Atlantic-Little, Brown, 1972), p.
45.

Cf. Gerald Hickey, Village in Viet-Nam (New Haven: Yale University Press,
1964), pp. 82-91.

Nguyen Khac Vien, Tradition and Revolution in Vietnam (Berkeley: In-

dochina Resource Center, 1974), p. 17.
Nhahtahon |e Sak

bide pee:

Ngo Vinh Long, Before The Revolution: The Vietnamese Peasants Under
the French (Cambridge: M.I.T. Press, 1973), p. 56.

For illustrative directives to villages from the Hue court, see Muc Luc Chau
Ban Trieu Nguyen (Complete Table of Contents Nguyen Dynasty), Tap Thu
I, Trieu Gia Long (Part I, Reign of Gia Long) (Hue: Uy-Ban Phien-Dich
Su-Lieu Viet-Nam Vien Dai-Hoc Hue, 1960), pp. 4, 11, 18; available in
Cornell Library.
Ellen Hammer, Vietnam; Yesterday and Today (New York: Holt, Rinehart
and Winston, 1966), p. 217.

Thai & Mung, op. cit., pp. 202-215.

Alastair Lamb, The Mandarin Road to Old Hue: Narratives of Anglo-

Vietnamese Diplomacy from the 17th Century to the Eve of the French
Conquest (Hamden, Conn.: Archon Books, 1970), pp. 145, 179-182.

‘*Dai-Nam Nhat-Thong-Chi.. .”’, p. 62.

MaGh., (Os MUI,

Tbid., pp. 103-104.

Ibid.

Ibid., pp. 138, 140. Today in the village there is only one market, of cement
and sheet metal construction, along Highway One in the Gia Le area of the
village.
 2
The Coming of White Man
DIVIDE AND RULE

In the late nineteenth century My Thuy Phuong’s people saw their first
white men. The French were becoming commercially and militarily active
in Central Vietnam, part of their worldwide efforts to gain wealth and
influence.
One of the earliest Frenchmen to visit the village was an explorer
named Camille Paris. The year was 1885, and Paris was on a mission for
the telegraph company. He went by palanquin, a sort of man-borne ham-
mock, to Tourane (now known as Danang). In his journal, Paris wrote of
the hamlets in My Thuy Phuong called Gia Le and Thanh Lam: !

.. . October 23, 1885, entrusted with a mission for the telegraph company, | left
Hue in a palanquin at three o'clock in the afternoon, accompanied by ten
infantrymen commanded by a corporal: Thirty coolies carried my bags and
those of the escort. Our little troupe walked sprightly, rifles over the shoulder,
ears attentive: the route was less known [then] than today, and one could count
in those days the Europeans who had gone that way. Prudence was therefore
called for on our part; memories of the Hue incident were still fresh. I forgot
about, as being a member of my escort, a mandarin from the citadel.

This functionary appeared very concerned about our promiscuity and [looked]
quite prepared to take off at the very first sight of a suspect lance... .

At 6:30 we arrived at the village of Ya-Le [Gia Le], chance took us straightaway
to the mayor s house. The weapons were immediately piled up, [and] the cor-
poral placed a sentry at the door... .

16
 ~ The Coming of White Man | 17

The Annamites ran up from the surrounding areas to see our bivouac and
streamed in. We had happened across them fifteen minutes earlier for they had
bedded down in the rice paddies. But one of their group showed hospitality;
consequently, they had nothing more to fear. It is a parade of pseudo-mayors, of
quasi-literates, of so-called mandarins.

As it always came down to, at the risk of mistrusting their intentions, I made
them all leave and gave a serious order to the sentinel... .

After a troubled night of ‘‘mosquitos and preoccupations,’ Paris and

his entourage resumed their journey on the morning of October 24, 1885: ?

The route is beautiful, shady, bordered with huts surrounded like that of the
chief of Ya-Le. The natives take on a well-to-do air, their coats are clean and
untorn. They own buffalo and farm yards. After a half-hour’s walk, we arrive at
Tham-Lam [Thanh Lam], a !arge village on the Arroyo River that one crosses
by ferry. The market, called Cho-Vuc, is situated on the other side. But the
ferrymen turned the corner of the alley at our approach and it is one of my
coolies who mans the stern-oar.

It is impossible to know why the ferrymen fled. They were perhaps

simply startled by the unusual sight of Frenchmen in the village, but there
might have been other reasons for their flight. Perhaps they ran in fear, or
because of hatred so deep that they wanted no contact of any kind with
the Frenchmen.
It is clear only that France, at the time of Paris’ procession through the
village, was beginning to tighten its grip on the area. Until the late
nineteenth century France had viewed Central Vietnam, which colonial
administrators called Annam, as an area of little economic potential, not
worth concerted commercial efforts or very much French ‘“‘development’’
capital. Central Vietnam was poor and remote from the burgeoning com-
mercial center of Saigon, the densely populated Mekong and Red River
Deltas, and most of the profitable French plantations, so France at first
left it to the mandarins and to its own traditions.
But in 1882, French ships moved on Hanoi and after some fighting
defeated the emperor’s forces there.* The next year a French fleet fired
upon Hue, and French troops landed at the emperor’s fort near the en-
trance to the Perfume River. The position quickly changed hands.* Out of
it all came an 1883 agreement, signed with a group of mandarins in the
Hue court, to make the French “‘protectors” of Central and Northern
Vietnam. This was France’s carte blanche for years of commercial and
military activity in those regions.°
In 1885, the Vietnamese reacted. They unsuccessfully attacked the
French garrison in Hue, and French troops retaliated by sacking the city.
When word of the fighting reached the Central Vietnam populace, people
rose up and attacked every French garrison and convoy in the area.
Buttinger writes that the rebellion grew, at times reaching “‘the propor-
tions of a truly national war of liberation.”’ © The exiled Emperor Ham
18 / Village at War

Nghi and a group of his mandarins led the fight, which ended in defeat in
1888.7 Resistance from then on was mainly under the leadership of schol-
ars, but it too was unsuccessful, ending in 1895.8
Though this early resistance to the French ended disastrously for the
Vietnamese, many in My Thuy Phuong, even in 1975, spoke proudly ofit.
And several elderly villagers were able to recite from memory long sec-
tions of an epic poem about the resistance, “‘Fall of the Capital.” ’
To consolidate their position, the French at first installed an emperor,
named Dong Khanh, then dominated his successor, Thanh Thai, who was
tolerant of the white men and their colonial cause.'!° The arrangement
with ‘‘their’’ emperors permitted the French to freely proceed with com-
mercial, cultural, political, and military adventures while they largely
preserved the illusion of Vietnamese sovereignty. And then in 1897, the
French ended this illusion by replacing the emperor’s governing body
with a council of ministers, which was headed by a Frenchman. Buttinger
writes that ‘‘the final blow’’ came in 1898, when the French took over all
tax collection and mandarins at all levels ‘‘merely became poorly paid
employees of the French.”’ !!
From then on, according to Ngo Vinh Long, France gradually consoli-
dated its control in Central Vietnam, in the hope that commercial ventures
there—such as banks, rice exporting firms, plantations, and retail enter-
prises of various types—could become at least marginally profitable.!2
But that hope was never realized. French activities in Central Vietnam
had to be supported by grants from the Ministry of Colonies and from the
southern region, or Cochinchina, budget. People in places like My Thuy
Phuong paid and paid, but it was never enough.

Several elderly villagers spoke of the changes brought by colonial rule,

especially during the 1920s. People then were so impoverished they could
not afford water buffalo. ‘‘My father was very poor,”’ said a peasant. ‘‘He
and my mother, and all of my brothers and sisters had to pull the plow. I
had to help too, even when I was very small. In the old days, people did
the work of water buffalo.”
‘“We had always had enough to eat,’ according to another peasant,
“but then we got poorer every day. We never bought new clothes, and
none of our children could go to school. Everyone had to work. Also,
there was no longer enough food.’’ A peasant woman remembered, ‘‘Oh,
the old days when the French were here were very hard. So many people
were hungry, and did not have enough land. Taxes and rent were too
high!’ ‘‘It was very difficult for us,’ said a peasant. ‘‘When it rained
everyone would be sick. We did not eat enough. My father did not have
enough money for warm clothes or for medicine. Two of my little brothers
died.”
To understand these complaints, we must examine methods of French
rule in the Central Vietnam countryside. Early this century, Hue court
mandarins governed the region’s villages for the ‘‘mother country.’ Dur-
 “” The Coming of White Man | 19

ing those same decades, however, the French established commercial

ventures in Hue and other Central Vietnamese cities, French bureaucrats
arrived in considerable numbers, and a resident colonial administration
began to grow, assuming more and more functions of government, and
encroaching on the traditional village bastions. A French colonial official
named Paulin Vial comments on mandarinal rule: '3

That is the only system that is compatible with our security, since it divides the
natives by recognizing the autonomy ofthe village, a subject of great concern.
The system has been experimentally introduced.

The system has had good results. It gives satisfaction to the Vietnamese, and
security to the French authorities, and will not permit the people to unite against
us in a general action.

And in 1910, Louis Cury wrote these words on the impact of colonial
commercial ventures in the area: '4

. capital money penetrated further and further into the community, and the
equality which existed in the families before our arrival was broken. The demo-
cratic Annamite community evolved more and more into a plutocratic state.
The social equilibrium. . . therefore changed and new elements... . [came]...
to superimpose themselves upon those which formed the older Annamite soci-
ety.

Many major changes in ‘‘social equilibrium’’ came through the village

council. As the colonial apparatus and French commercial involvement
grew, the council gradually changed, a fact which had many conse-
quences for nearly everyone.'> First, the six or eight councilmen gradu-
ally became conscious that abuses oftheir traditionally defined authority
would be tolerated by the French, and by the Hue mandarins, who were
themselves growing corrupt. According to an elderly peasant, **They saw
councilmen in other places getting rich, so they thought, ‘Why not me?’ *’
One or two councilmen who apparently resisted the temptation to
abuse their positions resigned from the body, only to be replaced by
individuals primarily interested in personal financial advantage. As other
councilmen died and retired, the council was gradually filled over the
years with four or five of the village’s larger landholders, a few prosperous
local tradesmen, and others who seemed opportunistic ome even more
profit oriented than their predecessors.
The French levied heavy taxes on ricelands through the council.
People said they paid as much as 20 percent of their harvests’ value to the
French, the same percentage Ngo Vinh Long says was collected through-
out Vietnam.'® On top of that, they paid a “‘head tax” for every member
of every family.'’
Several elderly villagers confirmed Ellen Hammer's contention that
the French administration imposed taxes based on estimates of the total
20 / Village at War

number of adult men in the village—regardless of their ability to pay. This

was a change from the earlier, traditional system, whereby taxes were
levied only on those listed on the village rolls.'* The precolonial council
had controlled those rolls, so there had been some defense against taxa-
tion. But under the French, the tax burden weighed heavily.
Along with other financial pressures (discussed below) the heavy taxes
forced many families to abandon their traditional practices of bartering
harvests and only occasionally using money for purchases: of family
supplies. People began selling crops through local tradesmen to French
commercial enterprises, and sometimes borrowed money against antici-
pated harvests to pay taxes or meet other financial obligations. As
monetization of the region’s and the village’s economies proceeded, a
new local class of tradesmen emerged and grew prosperous. Peasants
became vulnerable, as never before, to international fluctuations in com-
modity prices, and profit windfalls for peasants became rarer.
The village council’s role in land management also forced many finan-
cial adjustments. About 67 percent of the total cultivated area was then
communal land.'? This included about 82 percent of the ricefields and 44
percent of the cultivated drylands. The council traditionally distributed
communal land for renting, for periods of two to three years, on the basis
of number of children and need in each peasant family. The council di-
vided the land into parcels of about 5000 square meters (or 1.24 acres)
called mau, and mau into units of 10 called sao. Traditionally, the council
favored larger and poorer families in the distribution system, and few
families farmed more than one mau of communal land, in addition to
whatever land they owned themselves or rented from other individuals.”°
According to several elderly villagers, the council had honestly and fairly
performed the land distribution and rent collection tasks for many genera-
tions. But as the membership of the council changed in the 1920s and
1930s, its members began renting the choicest and largest parcels of com-
munal land to themselves, or to relatives and friends. And the council
rented land to the majority of villagers at a high price. That is, individual
councilmen pocketed excessive rents, and demanded bribes for land dis-
tribution. Also in the 1920s and 1930s, four or five families represented on
or linked to the council pressured small landowners to sell out, and pur-
chased their land at low prices. How this occurred in the 1920s is not
clear, but details on such land pressure during the early 1940s are included
below—possible clues to what happened in earlier decades.
Further complicating life in My Thuy Phuong, ownership of a few of
the larger parcels of land shifted out of the village. For many peasants,
rents increased at a far higher rate than income during the early decades of
this century, and the few resident and absentee landlords lost some of
their old sympathy for tenants, especially in years of bad crops or unex-
pected expenses. Furthermore, the landlords began cutting back on extra
services, such as provision of farm tools to tenants.
Accumulation of the village’s limited wealth in the hands of council-
 a The Coming of White Man | 24

men and their local allies accelerated when the French built up their
colonial bureaucracy in Hue during the 1920s and 1930s, and lucrative
“‘understandings’’ evolved between councilmen and bureaucrats. The
council granted the four or five well-to-do families linked to the council
large communal land parcels, with bribes to bureaucrats probably in-
volved. And the majority in the village found mounting pressure to pay
bribes to councilmen for lower tax assessments and larger communal land
allocations. Several elderly peasants recalled that by the mid-1930s bribes
became nearly unavoidable.*! Those same peasants also recalled that
family budgets grew strained in the 1920s and 1930s, an assertion sup-
ported by Pierre Gourou’s research in the Hue area.?* The peasants indi-
cated, first, that increasing rents, bribes, and taxes forced most families to
seek new sources of income. Some became paid field laborers. Others
opened small local retail operations, such as soup stalls. And still others
sought employment in Hue’s shops, warehouses, and other commercial
establishments.
Several villagers said that ‘“‘many’’ frequently went hungry, almost
never bought new clothing, and could not afford repairs to homes or
purchases of agricultural tools. These were major changes from earlier
decades, when such things were at least occasionally feasible. Tight
budgets meant also that moneylenders, some not resident in the village,
began to gain in influence, and credit terms tightened. With family budget
problems, people who for generations had existed reasonably comfortably
and happily at or above the subsistence level in the early decades of this
century found themselves slipping below the line. Many then turned to the
village’s traditional institutions, the groups and individuals that had al-
ways before helped them survive. But they sadly found this traditional
route transformed by some of the same forces that had touched the local
council.
Traditionally, poorer villagers had turned to protecting patron figures
in times of need, men almost invariably from higher status positions.
Before the French, these were usually local notables, large landholders,
or sometimes rich kinfolk. They provided dependent clients with favors
and protection, such as loans, use of land, employment, and introductions
in exchange for free labor, words of praise to others, and loyalty in local
village groupings, such as kinship shrine associations.*> Here are some
examples of such patron-client relationships:

1. Early this century a flash flood devastated My Thuy Phuong’s ricefields, which
had just been planted. The event pushed many peasant families close to finan-
cial insolvency, but all managed to borrow for reseeding from several wealthy
men in the area. Eventually, all the families recovered from the flood and
repaid the interest-free loans. According to several elderly peasants, the
families revered their patrons and for years voluntarily labored on the wealthy
men’s land at harvest time.
. During the same period a family fell into debt, owing to the extended illness of
bho

the household head and a bad harvest. The family was rescued by a wealthy
22 | Village at War

neighbor, a member ofthe village council, who lent them a large supply of rice
for sale, barter, and personal consumption. After the family head got back on
his feet he repaid the loan in kind, and offered the patron his labor and respect.

Ww In about 1910, a peasant got into a dispute over irrigation rights with someone
from a neighboring village. He received help from a local councilman he had
long assisted at harvest time. The patron introduced him to a powerful district-
level official, who listened to the complaint and eventually settled the dispute in
the peasant’s favor.

These were reassuring relationships, beneficial to patron and client

alike. But with the rise of the French bureaucracy and commercial institu-
tions in the 1920s and 1930s, some of that changed. Illustrative are these
comments, by a peasant:

There was arich family protecting my family for many years. Even before I was
born they rented us land very cheaply, and gave us money when we had cele-
brations, like at Tet. But during the French time they raised the rent so high it
was ridiculous. It was sad.

Another peasant recalled that his father suddenly changed his mind
about a man he had long respected. ‘*This was a member of the council,”
the peasant said. ‘‘My father had long been his friend, and he lent us rice
when we needed it. But then the man said, ‘No more. Now you must pay
like everyone else.’ ’’ A tradesman thought back on the time his father
was an influential patron in the village:

There were many people here who liked to take advantage of my father and
grandfather. My family owned much riceland then, and many farming people
tried to borrow money and cheaply rent land from my family. For a long time
my family did that to help the farming people, but then my father saw that he
was losing too much money that way, so he stopped. Then he had to rent out the
land like a businessman.

These and other comments suggest that local patron figures, many of
whom sat on or were closely linked to the council, saw that their interests
lay with the new political and commercial establishment. Despite con-
tinued lip service to village traditions, patrons began to abandon their
clients and reap large financial gains at clients’ expense. By the late 1930s,
there were few if any of the original patron-client patterns evident in My
Thuy Phuong. The prosperous and influential manipulated village land for
profit, corrupted the local dispute resolution process, profited hugely on
rice bought and sold in the village, lent at high interest rates, and exploited
rather than helped peasants through contacts outside village boundaries.
Precisely how they did these things is a topic of Chapter 3.
During the early decades of this century, the other side of the coin for
most people was that local self-help groups found efforts less and less
 ¥ The Coming of White Man | 23

fruitful. The changes in these essentially redistributive welfare groups

may be explained by the French-imposed drain of resources out of the
village and by the natural process of population growth. There was simply
too little to redistribute, and too many who needed it.24 Three examples
follow:

1. There had long been four or five credit pools in My Thuy Phuong. Each ofthese
consisted of about 10 families which pooled small sums and lent them at low
interest and for short periods within the group. But during the 1920s, financial
pressure meant that most families lacked extra funds and could no longer afford
these credit contributions. Most of the pools went out of existence.
to . Voluntary groups linked to the local Buddhist pagoda had long helped care for
the aged and infirm. But early in this century dwindling contributions and lack
of volunteers forced cutbacks in these activities—at the very time many
families were beginning to feel critical needs for such assistance.

3. Several elderly villagers commented that as financial pressure worsened during

the 1920s, less money circulated within extended families, and people gave less
financial help to kin beyond nuclear family circles. Despite this, kinship ties
remained strong, so of all the self-help practices in the village those within kin
groups were about the last to be affected by changing economic and political
conditions.

Another important change brought by colonial rule related to educa-

tion of village children. Prior to the 1930s, several small schools had
operated in My Thuy Phuong, supported by local contributions. But as
family budgets tightened, contributions fell off, and _ village
councilmen—most of whose children studied in Hue—seemed to lose
interest in the schools. During the 1930s the schools closed, and most
children had to depend on preoccupied, illiterate or barely literate parents
for whatever education they received.

In summary, the early decades of this century were disastrous for most
of My Thuy Phuong’s residents, who had subsisted for generations in a
world of production, tradition, and dependence. The changes brought by
the French colonial regime forced upon them adjustments that were both
far-reaching and, under France, irreversible. For decades the people en-
dured it ail, clinging to all they had left—weakened local traditions,
families, and a hope that things would somehow improve.

FIVE MEN

It was in a milieu of dissatisfaction that a revolutionary movement

emergéd in My Thuy Phuong. A few ofthe village’s most elderly residents
remembered that at first hardly anyone dared openly criticize the colonial
regime, or bring complaints to the village council. In fact, during the 1930s
there were only five or six occasions when people brought complaints
24 | Village at War
rs before
about land manipulation and other abuses by procolonial neighbo
instance , council men dismiss ed the complai nts,
the council. In every such
suffered reprisa ls—such as evictio n from rented
and complainants often
police.
land, rent increases, or even detention on false charges by colonial
e to official channel s was futile, most everyon e grew
Sensing that recours
quiet, for that was the safer course. .
But despite the general quiet of the 1930s, there was some whispered
criticism. People identified the chief critics as five men, of varied
backgrounds and interests. Gradually, during several years of conversa-
tions and developing friendships, these individuals together, and perhaps
at first unwittingly, laid the groundwork for the day when a revolutionary
movement would emerge in My Thuy Phuong.
The most distinguished of the five men was Nghi, who in the late 1930s
was about 50 years old and who was a member of the prestigious Cult
Committee, mentioned in Chapter 1. Nghi was a tradesman who operated
a tiny shop in one room of his home near the market. He had never
attended school but had been taught in the closing years of the nineteenth
century by an elderly man, a traditional scholar, who tutored a small
number of children in his home.
Another of the five men was Thi, who at the time was about 35 or 40
years old. Thi served as a low-paid clerk in the French provincial offices in
Hue, and every day commuted by bicycle from My Thuy Phuong into the
city. In the village, his family farmed a small plot of land, lived in a small,
simple wooden house, and had very few material possessions. People
remembered that Thi was well educated, and as one peasant said, ‘“‘al-
ways full of opinions on everything.”
They also recalled a third man, who in the late 1930s was considerably
younger than either Nghi or Thi. This was Minh, then about 30, who was
the son of one of the village’s larger landholders. Minh was somewhat
estranged from his father, and for some reason rejected his father’s wishes
that he behave as a subservient son, loyal to the large landholding class.
Minh had received some schooling, perhaps at a private school in Hue.
He was good-humored and, in the words of a peasant related to him,
‘frighteningly intelligent.”
Villagers described Minh in terms of a contrast between father and
son. One elderly peasant said, *‘ His father was a typical rich man, and did
not care much about the people. But the son was completely different. He
seemed to be interested in the poor people, and always had ideas about
how poor people could live better.’ Minh left home in his mid-twenties,
married, and found work as a tradesman in Hue and the village area. He
bought and sold local produce, moving from one market to another to take
advantage of price variation. In his travels Minh developed friendships in
many other villages, and became aware that his home village’s economic
and social problems were not unique.
The next of the five was Truong, who owned about three mau of
riceland, and farmed it with the help of his several sons. In the
late 1930s,
 ~
The Coming of White Man | 25

Truong was about 40 years of age, and was a middle-level peasant in terms
of income and landholdings. He was illiterate, but maintained a lively
interest in current affairs, and reveled in the long, rambling conversations
that he sought out and often dominated in the village. Many remembered
Truong’s inquiring mind and quick sense of humor.
Finally among the five men was Tu, about 40 years old in the late
1930s. He too was a peasant, cultivating about one or two mau of com-
munal riceland. People remembered Tu because of his association with
the above four individuals, and also because of his active role in mainte-
nance of the Buddhist pagoda and organization of celebrations and cere-
monies both there and at one or two local shrines. Tu had never attended
school, but like Truong had been tutored by a local scholar. Tu spent most
of his energy working the fields, but all of his free time went to the pagoda,
to the shrines, and to the conversations and friendships with the other
four men.
Usually the conversations among the five men were after dark, when
work was done, and when gatherings were not as obvious to the un-
friendly eyes of colonial security agents. The men met over small glasses
of rice wine, beer, or tea. They all gathered as frequently as possible, but
often only two or three could come. Those who attended passed on opin-
ions and reactions to those who could not or dared not attend. A peasant
described the conversations among the five:

First they talked about the problems and difficulties of life—like taxes, land
problems, and corruption among local authorities. They talked about their own
personal problems, their families’ problems. But that was not all! After a little
while they also talked about the village, then later about problems outside this
place. They talked so much, and after much talk they clearly understood all
about the Westerners. They knew what France was doing in our fatherland.
They understood why Westerners were here.

In other words, the five spoke at first of mutual frustrations, and of

how life had gradually become more difficult in the village. They spoke of
most of their own families’ difficulties—of lost income, reduced economic
opportunities, and personal tragedies. It was not long, however, before
this personal focus gave way to ‘‘larger’’ issues. Slowly, the plights of the
village, region, and the nation became subjects of conversation. Accord-
ing to people who recalled those discussions, they were exciting,
horizon-expanding experiences for the participants. ‘Those five men kept
talking about bigger and bigger matters,’ said a tradesman. “‘The more
they talked, the more interested they became in important political mat-
ters.
Joining the men in some oftheir conversations, often merely as listen-
ers, were many men, women, and children. One peasant, who as a child
was present for some of the conversations, recalled the exchange of new
ideas:
26 / Village at War
beginning to
Everyone knew that there were people in our village who were
everybody knew that it was dangerous. But we
criticize the Government, and
were glad that somebody was doing it. It gave some of the people hope just to
think that some people cared about their problems.

At the time, most villagers remained preoccupied with the daily strug-
gle for subsistence. However, many were seemingly fascinated by first-,
second-, and third-hand reports of the five men’s conversations. A peas-
ant recalled the local mood in the late 1930s:

Many people heard new ideas against the Government. These were matters that
were very dangerous at the time. We knew that a few people were passing ideas,
and talking about what was going to be done to oppose the French. We also
began to hear about movements in other parts of the country, but we did not
know very much. We had a small idea that things were beginning to change, and
everybody was happy that change was coming.

Another peasant commented, ‘‘It was an exciting time. It was exciting

because people were actually speaking criticism against the French. Al-
though they did not do it too loudly, they were speaking, and people were
beginning to listen. And to agree.” There are indications that the early
discussions came under the scrutiny of local colonial security forces. On
one occasion in about 1939, police arrested Minh and Truong, and took
them to a police compound in Hue. There the police held them at the Thua
Phu provincial prison for five or six months. When finally freed, they
returned home, where many viewed them as heroes.

To better understand local reactions to Minh, Truong, and the other

three men, it is useful to know what ordinary people looked for in local
leaders, and how they saw themselves as followers. So let us briefly
digress and examine comments made by villagers in 1974 and 1975 on
leaders and followers, reflecting views which, many suggested, had not
appreciably changed for decades.
According to a peasant, “‘A leader is a man who is honest, and who
must be well educated, and close to the people. He must have qualities
that we admire, and he must be strong.’’ Another peasant added, “‘I only
admire leaders who are men of purpose. Their purpose must be to serve
the people, and they must do it in a way that helps the people. They must
be honest, and they must try to get the support of the people.’ Still
another peasant spoke: ‘*The leader must be a man who is educated but
who does not act like he is a king. He must be a man we can respect for
many reasons.”’ The image of the traditional mandarin was distasteful to
many villagers. A tradesman said, ‘‘There was nothing good about the
mandarins. These were usually men who were selfish and stupid. We want
leaders who are good people, and who work only for the people, and who
are not corrupt.”
Another tradesman stated:
 ~
The Coming of White Man | 27

Too many ofour leaders act like kings. They are simply stupid. They think we
are stupid and simple, and think we do not see how corrupt they are in front of
us. They are men who are not dedicated to the people. The leader must be a
good man, and must act in a strong way only for the people.

And a peasant spoke of leaders and followers:

We will support programs that help us, and we will support a government that
has good programs and leaders. Most important, we think, are the leaders. How
can We support a government that is led by bad men?

A young soldier had this comment:

Why do we follow a political party or a government? We do it because we think

itis best for us, but we also do it because the leaders are good. Leaders are very
important in Vietnam. Without good leaders in every position in the govern-
ment, the government cannot be good.

And according to a teacher:

The Vietnamese people always look for good leaders, because we feel that a
government with good leaders must be a good one. We also feel that a govern-
ment with bad leaders is a bad government. I do not mean only the leaders in
Saigon. I mean leaders in the provinces, in the army, and even in the villages.
Without good leaders a government cannot succeed.

If these and other comments from 1974-1975 are indeed as applicable

to earlier decades as villagers suggested, we might conclude that tradi-
tional leaders were competent, had just, good purposes in their lives, lived
guided by those purposes and yet remained sensitive to others, discrete,
and humble. Leaders were also intelligent, and had common sense and
courage of conviction. People combined all of these characteristics in a
traditional concept called uy tin, which we might view as a Vietnamese
combination of prestige, charisma, chutzpa, and raison d’etre. In general,
villagers far preferred men of wy tin as leaders. The comments quoted
above and in later chapters also suggest that people enthusiastically fol-
lowed such men, but only when doing so seemed to serve individual,
family, and community interests.
Note that villagers often described the five early critics of colonial rule
as men of wy tin. They seemed to naturally attract followers by their
intelligence, personal abilities, and actions.

PARTY CELL

The five men had for years been aware of a shadowy organization
which was trying to mount resistance throughout Indochina to the colo-
nial regime. This was the Indochinese Communist Party, or I.C.P.
28 | Village at War

According to published Vietnamese accounts, throughout the 1930s

organize
the Thua Thien/Hue branch of the party actively endeavored to
and rural resident s against the French. It set up 16 party cells
both urban
in the area. Accordi ng to a Hanoi publicat ion, 500 members of under-
ground youth and women’s organizations and trade unions supported 76
active I.C.P. members, there were a number of anti-French student and
peasant demonstrations, and the party began to circulate several small
newspapers it published in the area.?* Some elderly villagers and Hue
residents confirmed that there were indeed some such party activities at
the time, but suggested that they came sporadically. Newspapers, for
example, were irregular in publication.
During 1936-1939, the I.C.P. belonged to an umbrella organization of
anticolonial groups, the Indochinese Democratic Front. According to Hue
residents, the Front never had much political impact in the Thua Thien/
Hue area, primarily because barriers of distrust divided its members,
making coordinated political actions difficult to accomplish. In My Thuy
Phuong, the Democratic Front had no discernable impact at all, for people
recall nothing of it, and the five local leaders rarely if ever spoke of it.
It was in about 1939 that the I.C.P. first touched the village. Some party
pamphlets and newspapers reached the hands of the five men. The mate-
rials took a Marxist-Leninist perspective, focusing on class warfare and
imperialism, describing other successful revolutionary movements, and
calling for such a movement in Vietnam. At first, the men kept the litera-
ture among themselves, passing it back and forth, reading it, and thinking
about it. Then they began to meet covertly to discuss the ideas in the
literature.
At about the same time the men were beginning to study the tenets of
Marxism-Leninism, one or two I.C.P. members visited the village. People
were not sure who those men were or exactly when it was in the late 1930s
that they first appeared. One peasant suggested that perhaps they were
related to someone in the area, or worked with some villager, such as Thi,
the French civil servant. Another peasant stated that Minh and Truong
were the ones who first brought I.C.P. organizers to My Thuy Phuong—
men they had met in prison. Others confirmed that Minh and Truong had
indeed become acquainted with party members while imprisoned, but
were unsure whether this contact led to the first visit of Communists to
the village. It is clear only that after the party members visited My Thuy
Phuong, the five men became associated with the party. Minh actually
became an I.C.P. member: the other four did not officially join, but began
to support the party just as actively as Minh.
. Beginning in about 1939 or 1940, the five men began to receive publica-
tions and very general guidance from the I.C.P. They began to draw
inspiration from party pamphlets, especially those about revolution and
the French, quoting from them first among themselves, and then to their
neighbors. Gradually the five men became more and more involved in
the
workings of the 1.C.P. Their contacts with party members in Hue and
in
 The Coming of White Man | 29

other villages near My Thuy Phuong became frequent, and the party
selected one of them, Minh, to attend special training meetings, organized
covertly in Hue. The meetings, according to villagers who knew Minh
well, focused first on ideological matters—Marxist-Leninist tactics and
I.C.P. positions. But of most immediate importance to the village, the
party trained Minh in Communist organizational techniques. When he
completed the I.C.P. training, Minh and his four closest friends began to
organize for revolution in My Thuy Phuong.
Their first step was to establish a party cell in the village. The cell was,
in effect, a formalization of the five men’s position as emerging revolutio-
nary leaders, for they were its members.** Many years later, one of the
five men told two friends that the five had considered themselves equals
within the cell, but that Minh had served as chief contact man with district
and provincial I.C.P. organizations.
Each cell in Thua Thien Province operated independently, although
the party occasionally assisted and loosely coordinated all cells. That is,
I.C.P. leaders at provincial level occasionally passed general messages to
the cells, including printed materials for political discussions and
guidelines on organizational techniques. However, more explicit I.C.P.
influence over its My Thuy Phuong followers was difficult, according to
villagers’ brief comments, owing to the party’s own organizational prob-
lems in Thua Thien/Hue. It suffered pressure from colonial security agen-
cies. Many I.C.P. members in the province had personal and ideological
weaknesses. And many throughout the area were suspicious ofthe party.
My Thuy Phuong’s cell members, with but general tactical guidance
and help with printed materials from higher I.C.P. levels, undertook an
organizational effort in the village. The cell became a proselyting unit,
focusing on individual members’ families, friendships, and contacts. In
the years 1939 through about 1942, the cell members sparked a large-scale
duplication of the same phenomenon that had initially drawn them to the
party.
Villagers illustrated the I.C.P. proselyting strategy during that period
by describing one cell member’s activities. That individual was Truong,
the middle-level peasant. Proselyting targets were two men Truong knew
well, neighbors who were peasants. According to a peasant related to one
of the targets:

My uncle was a very good friend of that man [Truong]. They were neighbors,
and had grown up together as boys, so my uncle trusted him like a brother. |
don’t know how they became involved at first, but I do remember my uncle
used to say that before he understood politics he trusted only that man
[Truong]. So it was because they were friends that my uncle followed.

Gradually, Truong acquainted his two companions with the ideals and
programs of the party, educating them first on the realities before their
eyes. The peasant just quoted had this additional comment:
30 / Village at War

My uncle used to come home and tell us, first, about some of the bad things
happening here, about the people being slaves of the French. He only talked
about this local place, and some of the things that were important to all of us.
Later, he understood what was happening in all of Vietnam, and understood the
bad things the French were doing all over the country.

The peasant’s term ‘‘bad things’’ referred to excessive local rents and
taxes, councilmen’s land manipulation, and corruption. It also meant the
majority's growing impoverishment and loss of influence in local affairs.
In effect, Truong guided his two fellow villagers in rapidly grasping and
accepting I.C.P. positions and tactics. He did so in almost the same step-
by-step, gentle fashion that he had himself experienced, beginning with a
focus on subsistence problems—or ‘“‘life and death’’ issues.

NOTES

1. H. Cosserat. **La Route Mandarine de Tourane a Hue’ (The Mandarin

Route From Tourane to Hue), Bulletin des Amis du Vieux Hue, January—
March, 1920, pp. 67-69. Note that in many of the French, Vietnamese, and
American documents quoted in this book there appear occasional spelling
and grammatical errors. While the author recognizes that such errors are
distracting, so is frequent use of the expression sic. The errors are thus
included without comment.
tr Ibid.

3. Joseph Buttinger, Vietnam: A Dragon Embattled (New York: Praeger, 1967),

jor, AOR.

4. Auguste A. Thomazi, La Conquete de Il’Indochine (Paris: Payot, 1934), pp.

162-163, 165-166; available in Cornell Library.

5. Forasummary of terms of the 1883 agreement, see ibid., p. 166. The text of
the agreement is included in Georges Taboulet, ed., La Geste Francaise en
Indochine (Paris: A. Maisonneuve, 1955-1956), pp. 807-809; available in
Cornell Library.

6. Buttinger, op. cit., p. 127.

We Mevial.., joi WOES.

8. Ibid., pp. 128-130.

9. See Nguyen Khac Vien, ed., Vietnamese Studies, Hanoi, no. 23, p. 428:
hereafter, issues of this journal are cited as ‘‘ Vien, no. 23,’ ‘‘ Vien, no. 37,”’
etc.: none of the issues is dated.

10. Buttinger, op. cit., pp. 440-441, n. 22.

Le ibid. "pe lise

12. Long, Before The Revolution, p. 102.

13. Quoted (without indication of original source) in Toan Anh, Lang Xom
Viet-Nam (Vietnamese Villages) (Saigon: Phuong Quynh, 1968), p. 107.
 ~ The Coming of White Man | 31
Louis Cury, La Societe Annamite; Les Lettres—Les Mandarins —Le Peuple
(Annamite Society; Letters—Mandarins—People) (Paris: Faculte de Droit
de L’Universite de Paris, Jouve & Co., 1910), p. 108.
See Anh, op. cit., pp. 95-97, 116-119.

The most comprehensive study in English of the French impact is Long, op.
cit. (see pp. 67-68). An excellent Vietnamese language source is Pham Cao
Duong, Thuc-Trang Cua Gioi Nong-Dan Viet-Nam Duoi Thoi Phap Thuoc
(The Situation of Vietnamese Peasants Under the French Period) (Saigon:
Khai Tri, 1967); available in Cornell Library. Also see Samuel Popkin,
“Corporatism and Colonialism; the Political Economy of Rural Change in
Vietnam,’ Comparative Politics, April, 1976, pp. 431-464.

Nfs See lone) Op» Gii.,, pp. 63—64-

18. See Hammer, Vietnam: Yesterday and Today, p. 115.

19% See Nguyen Van Vinh, Les Reformes Agraires au Viet-Nam (Agrarian Re-
forms in Vietnam) (France: Librairie Universitaire Uystpruyst, 1961), p. 34.
Also note that in 1974-1975 the amount and use of communal land in the
village was about the same as in the 1930s, despite the trend in some other
areas involving transformation of communal land into private plots.

According to villagers, distribution also varied with soil quality. Each sao
was divided into 10 parts, and councilmen distributed the land under compli-
cated formulae. In determining family size, only those over 15 years of age
were counted. Determinations of family wealth were apparently much more
subjective; there was no set formula. A family of 10 (all over 15) would be
rented about one or two mau. Each ofthe village’s three major name group-
ings was also given a parcel of land (several mau each, at most), so people
could also rent from this source.

See Long, op. cit., pp. 68-71 for a general discussion of local corruption.

See Pierre Gourou, L’ Utilisation du Sol en Indochine Francaise (Soil Utili-

zation in French Indochina) (Paris: Centre d'Etudes de Politique Etrangere,
Travaux des groupes d’Etudes, Paul Hartman, 1940), pp. 412-414.

See Phuong, Tran, et al., Cach Mang Ruong-Dat o Viet-Nam (Land Revolu-
tion in Vietnam) (Hanoi: Nha Xuat-Ban Khoa-Hoc Xa-Hoi Viet-Nam, 1968),
pp. 9-48; available in Cornell Library.

Cf. Long, op. cit., pp. 92-97.

Vien, no. 37, pp. 50-54.

People asserted that all five men belonged to the cell, despite the fact that
only one of them was actually a party member—a puzzling assertion, and
possible indication of the I.C.P.’s lack of influence in the province during the
1930s.
 3
Rule and Revolution
BUILDING THE VIET MINH

Dissatisfaction and occasional agitation turned into organized resistance

in 1941. That was the year the anticolonial Viet Minh organization
emerged in My Thuy Phuong and elsewhere. '
These are the words of a peasant who at age 15 began to help the Viet
Minh:

When did I follow the Viet Minh? Oh, that was when my father told me to join
him. He said, ‘‘Son, it is your duty to come with me.”’ I didn’t know for sure
what he meant, but I went with him because he was my father. That’s the way it
is in Vietnam. The family is very important.

Others told similar stories, suggesting that family ties attracted many in
My Thuy Phuong to the revolutionary movement. Another peasant re-
called:

My uncle helped start the Viet Minh in this area, and he came to us first. We
respected him, so listened carefully to him. I didn’t know about politics, but
everyone in our family always had respected him, so my mother and father
didn't stop me when I went with my uncle. After a year or two, my father came
too!
Reflecting on the colonial regime and the Viet Minh, still another peas-
ant looked back:

32
 ~ Rule and Revolution | 33

Many people here used to be protected by rich relatives or big men in the
village. But that was a long time ago. Under the French that became very
difficult. . . Some of us [later] became very loyal to some of the Viet Minh
leaders. These were men who could not help us with money too much, because
these were men who were poor. But they could help us with opinions, and as
friends, and we went to them for guidance and help.

Several others commented on changing political attitudes in the vil-

lage. According to a small tradesman, **For many years the people had no
power. But with the Viet Minh the people began to see their own
strength.’’ A peasant stated, ‘*The big men always controlled everything.
We were sometimes very afraid of them. But we saw that begin to change
when the Viet Minh began to become active. We saw how afraid they
were of the Viet Minh and of the poor people who followed the Viet
Minh.”’
Another small tradesman recalled:

Slowly we began to understand everything better. But first of all we studied our
local area. We saw how the French used the village chief and the rich people to
get richer. We saw that the French did only bad things in the village. We saw
how the rich, who liked the French, had more land, and we saw how the poor
were exploited.

Members of My Thuy Phuong’s I.C.P. cell took the lead in organizing

the Viet Minh. They tried to attract men of prestige and influence to
anticolonial ranks.
One early supporter was a local small tradesman, widely respected
because people considered his prices fair, and because he served on the
Cult Committee and was active in pagoda affairs. The tradesman said he
joined the Viet Minh because he “‘hated the French,” and through his
friendship with Thi, one of the five men described in Chapter 2. He re-
membered:

I felt that my love of country had to come before any selfish desire for money,
so I joined the Viet Minh. There were so many people who joined for the same
reason. Many of us knew that there were Communists in the Viet Minh, but the
Viet Minh was not a Communist organization. If it was Communist, then there
were too many of us who did not like Communism who were members.

Thi invited the tradesman to join the local Liberation Committee, the
small group which set Viet Minh policy for the community.’ The trades-
man shared in decisions about political meetings, leaflets, and other Viet
Minh activities. Several others became local Viet Minh leaders. Included
were three young men from prosperous families. ‘““These young men were
very idealistic,’ according to a peasant. “‘They worried about the future
of our country, and said that they were joining the Viet Minh to fight for a
free and independent Viet Nam.”’ The three began to spend long periods
34 / Village at War

away from their families, assumed humble, softspoken manners, and vis-
ited homes of young people to recruit for the Viet Minh struggle. Through
such visits, and despite their wealthy origins, the three became well
known and popular in the village, and their evident nationalism and devo-
tion to the Viet Minh cause inspired many young people. The example—
and the wy tin—of the three attracted many to the movement.
As the local Viet Minh leadership group began to take shape in 1942,
the party cell members welcomed into leadership positions three or four
others who might have been expected to support the pro-Japanese colo-
nial administration, but who did not. Included among these converts were
three colonial civil servants, two of whom were village councilmen. Prior
to the formation of the Viet Minh, I.C.P. followers regarded such men as
enemies, but between 1942 and 1945 local Communists welcomed all who
opposed colonial rule to Viet Minh ranks.
The civil servants’ ties to the Viet Minh were of necessity covert, as
they continued working in their official positions. One among them, who
worked in a colonial office in Hue, took advantage of his position to gather
intelligence on French and Japanese activities. The two sympathizers on
the village council did likewise. All these individuals helped set Viet Minh
policy for the village, sharing with most other Viet Minh members a deep
and burning feeling of nationalism. A peasant close to the local leaders
indicated that ideological differences separated the leaders, but such dif-
ferences never really surfaced: ?

The Communist [Party] cadres during that time did not talk much about Com-
munist ideas of socialism. They only said, **We are all nationalists. We must
unite to fight the French.”’ They did not want to frighten the people. But, you
know, they never forgot their Communist ideas.

To the peasant, ‘‘Communist ideas”’ referred partly to concepts from

class analysis and imperialist theory that the local leaders had learned
through early study of I.C.P. pamphlets and newspapers—such as calls
for a socialist revolution and worldwide struggle against imperialism.
Other *‘Communist ideas”’ related to land redistribution and reform ofthe
village council. Before 1945, all of these concepts were soft-pedalled in
My Thuy Phuong as the Viet Minh reached out for broad support.

BURDEN OF EMPIRE

“They had to be servants of the French, and who respects such

people?’ These were the words of a peasant who was discussing local
councilmen. During the 1940s, most of the councilmen came from the
same families which had grown influential during the 1930s. They repre-
sented only about 3 to 5 percent of My Thuy Phuong’s people. And it was
mainly the profit motive that brought them to the council. Another peas-
 od Rule and Revolution | 35

ant recalled, ‘‘Councilmen did nothing except take our money and get
rich.”’ Still another peasant said, ‘‘They always looked down on us and
took advantage. Only bad men and stupid men wanted to be councilmen.
The good men would not do it.”’
During the 1940s, the growing dependence of councilmen on the cen-
tral bureaucracy was obvious to many in the village. ‘‘Who were these
men?’ asked a tradesman. ‘‘They certainly were not Vietnamese,’’ he
answered, ‘‘even though they looked like us. But they were not French-
men either. They were both, but they were neither.’’ To understand these
complaints concerning the village council, it is necessary first to focus
briefly on activities of the French administration which collaborated with
the Japanese in Vietnam during 1940-1945. Beginning in about 1942, con-
trol over villages tightened, part of Japan’s efforts—administered by the
French collaborators—to tap Vietnam’s human and natural resources for
the war effort. During those years, My Thuy Phuong residents had to pay
higher taxes, give a larger percentage of rice harvests for outright gov-
ernmental use, and provide conscripts to labor on construction projects,
such as fortifications or roads. According to villagers, some conscripts
perished. In addition, inflation devastated the local economy, clothing
was in short supply, and food shortages developed.
The colonial bureaucracy also set specific requirements for village
council elections and qualifications for candidacy. Beginning in 1942,
people elected members of My Thuy Phuong’s council from lists of candi-
dates approved by the bureaucracy. The authorities did not permit men
insufficiently ‘‘in touch’’ with governmental policies for the area to stand
for election, and often required bribes of approved candidates. According
to Toan Anh, the authorities also began to appoint all village chiefs.*
Villagers indicated that this practice continued until 1945—when colonial
authorities again permitted people to select their own chiefs, but only
from lists of approved candidates. Finally, the authorities usually re-
moved or sometimes even arrested World War II-era councilmen and
village chiefs who differed too dramatically with governmental policies.

Through the 1940s, a central issue in My Thuy Phuong related to land.

As noted in Chapter 2, during the early decades of this century, communal
and privately owned land became vulnerable to unfair manipulation by
those who served on the village council. More such manipulation oc-
curred after 1940. First, there was corruption in the collection of taxes on
the village’s major product of the land—rice. Councilmen pocketed
a portion, occasionally as much as 5 or 10 percent, of local rice tax
revenues.’ They did so with little fear of censure or prosecution by
colonial bureaucrats, who apparently tolerated such practices as one of
the necéssary costs or ‘‘evils’’ of empire. Possibly they even shared in the
taxes.
Many councilmen continued after 1940 to award larger parcels of
communal land to themselves, or to relatives and friends, for renting.
36 / Village at War

Others simply took more than their fair share. Where one or two mau
might have been due them under the traditional formula, councilmen
sometimes took ten or more mau. There are no land records remaining to
verify these allegations about land abuse, but several estimated that after
1940 and continuing until 1954, 90 percent of My Thuy Phuong’s peasants
were ‘‘poor,”’ cultivating 40 to 50 percent of the communal and privately
owned land, in plots averaging one mau or less. Roughly 8 or 9 percent
were more prosperous ‘‘middle peasants,’’ with about 10‘percent of-the
land and larger plots. And about 1 or 2 percent were ‘rich owners,”
cultivating about 30 to 40 percent of the land in parcels of many mau.°®
As in the 1920s and 1930s, corruption of the village’s traditional land
system meant that people who for generations had depended upon com-
munal lands to bring in extra money no longer had that income.’ Peasants
asserted that rents rose on communal and privately owned land, from an
estimated 1920s level equivalent to about one-twentieth the value of the
harvest to a figure after 1940 sometimes reaching one-fifth harvest value.
In making these post-1940 estimates, peasants included calculations to
reflect the higher bribes required to rent communal land. However, note
that various scholars offer far higher figures for colonial-era taxes.* To
make matters worse, after 1940 the village council more often than not
settled land disputes in favor of councilmen and their relatives and
friends. Extra income and additional influence in the village thus flowed to
the small procolonial group.
Members of the colonial Svreté, policemen assigned to Huong Thuy
District, enforced decisions of councilmen and other governmental au-
thorities. Usually one or two policemen worked in the district at a time,
and over the years about ten rotated through Huong Thuy police assign-
ments. In the village, these policemen wielded considerable infiuence.
With the help of councilmen, they collected taxes, and could charge indi-
viduals with crimes, arrest, and detain. They could also draw upon police
personnel assigned elsewhere for assistance in the village, and they occa-
sionally did so.
A peasant recalled:

The policeman came around with the landlords to force us to pay the rent. Once
we had a very bad flood, and the crop was lost, but the policeman came anyway.
He said that if we didn’t pay he would arrest us, or take the land and rent it to
someone else.

Another peasant claimed that he was arrested when he could produce

no money for rent of his ricefields:

| was held for a week in the [village] office. They made me sit in the corner, and
my family had to bring me potatoes to eat. Finally, my son borrowed some
money from friends, and they let me go. But I had to give the policeman some
money for himself, even after I paid the rent.
 - Rule and Revolution | 37

Local policemen were arbitrary and cruel in collection of taxes, and in

forcing compliance with governmental decrees. A few former landlords
and officials of the colonial apparatus hinted at landlord-police coopera-
tion, and many people were sure it existed, although no one could prove
allegations that it did. However, it does seem likely that the enthusiasm
policemen evidently had for their work grew out of some form of self-
interest. Even without illegal monetary rewards, policemen learned that
promotion, power, and prestige within the colonial bureaucracy accrued
when they effectively performed assigned tasks. Like councilmen, they
learned that the bureaucracy permitted those who helped manage colonial
affairs in the village to reap ample rewards. Most were evidently dedi-
cated to the colonial apparatus.
Such dedication and involvement extended beyond a handful of
policemen and councilmen. There were a number of others in and of the
village who supported the colonial cause. Among them were five or six
large landholders, each of whom owned up to about 30 mau of riceland.
They were not excessively wealthy, but certainly much more prosperous
than the vast majority of their neighbors. Most of them lived in substantial
homes, ate and dressed well, and often sent their children to private Hue
schools. Most of the large landholders were also members of or closely
tied to the village council, through which they found support for manipu-
lation of land.
Peasants described an instance of land manipulation from the 1940s
which illustrates how such manipulation occurred during the entire period
from the 1930s to the 1950s. The peasants recalled how two or three large
landholders, with adjacent pieces of land, decided in about 1944 to coop-
erate in a move to increase holdings of ricefields. To do this, they aban-
doned their long-standing practice of permitting freedom of movement
along paths that wound across their fields. For many decades, the large
landholding families had permitted other families to reach their own
smaller parcels of land by these routes, and they could herd water buffalo
through for plowing. But that year the large landholders, who actually had
sharecroppers working their land, erected barriers by the paths. They
effectively fenced out those who worked land on the “‘interior.”’
As people recalled it, there were loud protests by peasants of the then
restricted zone, who filed brief written appeals with the village council.
But as the protesting peasants probably expected, the council upheld the
large owners’ right to control movement along the paths, and directed the
police to arrest and fine trespassers. The effect of the fences and of the
council rulings was extreme. There was immediately further impoverish-
ment of the small landholders and their tenants, about 10 percent of My
Thuy Phuong’s residents. Later, the inevitable occurred. The small own-
ers sold out at low prices to the large landholders. Then they returned to
their land, but only as tenants, and their former tenants became share-
croppers under them or the large landholders.
Most large tradesmen, who bought and sold products and supplies in
38 / Village at War

the village, during the 1940s joined the large landholders in supporting the
colonial apparatus. Several of them actually resided in the village, and
others lived in Hue or nearby villages. However, all of them had ties to
the commercial and governmental institutions of Hue, all found support in
those institutions for money-making activities, and all reaped considera-
ble profits from the peasants of My Thuy Phuong. These were profits after
deduction of the various colonial market taxes and license fees.
As indicated in Chapter 2, by the 1920s and 1930s the tax and rent
burden had become onerous for the peasants, and the tradesmen sensed
an opportunity. They began to manipulate the price of rice and other
products of the land. In the 1940s, this manipulation by large tradesmen
continued. There is little mystery to the tradesmen’s modus operandi, for
to maximize profits they simply relied upon supply-demand fluctuations
for products such as rice. Moreover, they depended upon peasants’ lack
of knowledge of and access to alternative, nonlocal commercial channels.
When prices were high, they sold existing stocks through commercial
outlets in Hue. When harvests were in and abundant supply drove prices
down, they replenished stocks through large purchases.
There were other large tradesmen who operated in My Thuy Phuong.
One man, who lived in the village, sold fertilizer to the peasants. He too
waited until the demand for the product was greatest, and sold it at sub-
stantially inflated prices. Even a few of the smaller tradesmen reached for
excessive profits, such as those who sold necessary household items.
They also set high prices whenever possible. One small tradesman. for
example, raised the price of patent medicines to extremely high levels
during one particularly severe rainy season in the 1940s, when influenza
was sweeping the village.
Among those closely aligned with the colonial apparatus in and around
My Thuy Phuong after 1940 were, finally, the moneylenders. As noted in
Chapter 2, these individuals became active when traditional patrons and
self-help lending institutions failed to save villagers from increasing finan-
cial burdens. Without exception, the moneylenders did not live in the
village, but came from Hue or adjacent villages. Among them were a few
Chinese. Like the rice and fertilizer dealers, they preferred to operate
when peasants were most pressed by debts and had little cash, such as
during the long months between harvests, when savings usually dwindled
and incomes fell off.
Few of these individuals actually went around to the peasants, but
waited at home for the needy to come to them. The amounts they lent
varied widely—sometimes enough to pay a few months’ overdue rent, or
for purchase of land, equipment, or even water buffalo. The money-
lenders, according to villagers, were unconcerned with where the money
went, but only that people repaid them, and with substantial interest.
Monthly interest averaged 12 or 15 percent of the original amount bor-
rowed, so profits for the lenders were enormous.
 ~ Rule and Revolution | 39

Through the 1930s and into the 1940s, village councilmen, large land-
holders, prosperous tradesmen, and other members of the procolonial
group grew more aware than in preceding decades of shared economic
and social interests. And awareness of common political interests
emerged as well. As illustrated above, cooperation among members of the
procolonial group became common, taking the forms of collusion in tax
and rent collection and resolution of land disputes, of price fixing, and of
selective law enforcement. Complementing these financial ‘‘partner-
ships,” friendships among such villagers grew.
Ties between members of the procolonial group also assumed a cul-
tural dimension. Western ideas that appeared with the colonialists deeply
affected many of the village councilmen, tradesmen, and large landhol-
ders. Several studied at French-curriculum schools in Hue or elsewhere,
and found themselves attracted to ‘‘modern’’ ideas they encountered in
classes, in French books, and in occasional meetings with Westernized,
urban Vietnamese. Many became convinced that Western culture was
superior to Vietnam's, and that those who reflected Western culture were
inherently superior to those who did not. They accepted, in other words,
most of the premises of France’s mission civilisatrice—its ‘‘civilizing mis-
sion.”
A former rice dealer named Nghi, who in 1974 was 65 years old and
living in Hue, illustrates the background, lifestyle, and type of thinking
that motivated most members of the procolonial group. Nghi’s early years
were spent in a variety of French-supported schools, where teachers
employed French language for instruction. He studied the French classics
and European history, but learned very little about his own country’s
literature or history. Nghi worked for many years for his family’s rice
firm, which though based in Hue, bought exclusively in My Thuy Phuong
and other nearby villages. He knew the village well, and several of his
closest friends were village councilmen.
Nghi traveled occasionally to Saigon and Hanoi to meet with represen-
tatives of other firms. ‘‘When I visited those cities, | was very impressed
with the efficiency of the French,”’ he said. ‘“‘They were very modern, and
better than the Vietnamese.’ Slowly, Nghi grew convinced of the
superiority of practically everything French over Vietnamese practices,
products, and institutions. ‘‘French culture and history is so much higher
than Vietnam’s,’’ he said. ‘‘That’s why I have always wanted to go to
Europe. We Vietnamese are very undeveloped in the cultural area, you
know, even though Vietnam does have a few good poets and musicians.”’
The tradesman’s fascination with Western culture led him to furnish
his house in what he considered a Western ‘‘vogue.’’ Light weight, vinyl-
covered furniture of what approximated Western design cluttered the
main reom of his house. A large clock, which he said was ‘‘beautiful with
the furniture,’ and other treasured momentos—a radio, a table cigarette
lighter, a few small French language books, and an empty cognac
40 / Village at War

bottle—were on display in a glass-fronted case in that room. Next to the

case was a small refrigerator, unplugged, with a blue plastic doily on top.
But much more important than home furnishings and general cultural
preferences is Nghi’s attitude—which he said has never changed—toward
the rural people of his country. ‘‘The people need strong leadership,”’ he
said. ‘‘They do not understand business and must be told how to save
money and spend it wisely.’ And what of the West? ‘‘I learned that
European culture is superior to Vietnamese culture,’’ Nghi recalled. “‘It is
modern, but it always depends on a small number of highly educated men
to lead the poor, and to help them understand modern things.”’

EVE OF REVOLUTION

World War II gave the Viet Minh valuable time to lay more
groundwork for revolution.
My Thuy Phuong fit the pattern seen throughout the province and
other parts of Vietnam.’ Insurgent leaders at provincial level passed in-
structions for various types of actions to the village branch. Usually such
instructions came in secret written messages or by word of mouth, and
were very general in nature—such as ‘“‘increase recruiting efforts’’ or
‘heighten political efforts among the people.’ This left great flexibility to
local movement leaders. These were the five men associated with the
I.C.P., the tradesman, the three young men, and the three colonial civil
servants. The leaders discussed and collectively interpreted instructions
from above. However, sometimes they ignored instructions, depending
upon prevailing conditions in the village. If police operations were fre-
quent, for example, they did not “‘heighten political efforts.”
During World War II, only about 5 percent of My Thuy Phuong’s
people, mainly prosperous villagers, supported the central government.
But there was also a small number of financially hard-pressed people
included in the 5 percent. The regime or its prosperous supporters paid
such needy villagers for loyalty and services to the council, police, and
individual families. Another 15 to 25 percent of the people were during
World War II committed to neither central government nor Viet Minh.
These were mainly apolitical peasants—individuals very concerned with
subsistence problems, but hesitant to look for political solutions to them.
Such avoidance of politics meant that the uncommitted were often vul-
nerable to pressures from both the local procolonial group and the Viet
Minh, a fact which eventually prompted many to make commitments,
usually to the revolution. Finally, during the World War II years 70 to 80
percent of My Thuy Phuong’s people supported the Viet Minh. About 50
percent of such people were very firm, active supporters. They frequently
attended Viet Minh meetings. The other 50 percent consisted of passive
supporters, less likely to participate in local Viet Minh activities, but still
generally supportive of the Viet Minh cause.
 a Rule and Revolution | 441

To spark interest during 1940 to 1945, the Viet Minh circulated leaflets
and newspapers, organized political meetings, and tapped informal local
communication channels. The leaflets, newspapers, and political meetings
focused almost without exception on colonial rule, and on the twin themes
of injustice and independence. They identified the Viet Minh with the
Allied objectives of defeating Japan and Germany. The leaflets and news-
papers were usually printed on flimsy, inexpensive paper, sometimes on
the backs of sheets already used for other purposes, but were neverthe-
less popular. They were so popular, in fact, that many of My Thuy
Phuong’s illiterate had relatives or friends read the materials to them.
There are available no Viet Minh leaflets or newspapers previously circu-
lated in My Thuy Phuong, but people recalled two specific leaflets. One
was two pages in length, and listed a number of anticolonial actions in
different parts of Vietnam ‘‘to support the Allied struggle.’’ The other was
a one-page discussion of Vietnam’s long struggle against Chinese domina-
tion, drawing parallels with the anti-French struggle.
The meetings organized during the early Viet Minh years were of two
types: formal and informal. The formal meetings were less common,
chiefly because of the presence in the village of a variety of threatening
security agents. But when they occurred, they were at night. Groups of as
many as SO villagers gathered in tocal shrines or other public places.
People heard of the meetings through friends, neighbors, or relatives. Viet
Minh leaders usually organized the meetings hastily, to lessen the chances
of colonial police finding out and stopping them. Over the years before
1945-1946, there were five or six large meetings, only one of which was
disrupted by police.
Typically, a local Viet Minh leader chaired the meetings. They began
with a series of introductory remarks on subjects of national or regional
interest. Usually after the general remarks, there were questions and
answers and informal discussion on local and national issues. A trades-
man said:

Sometimes people who came to the meetings did not seem to understand the
discussions about politics, or the leaders’ speeches about politics, so during the
discussion period we tried to explain some of those matters. You must re-
member that very few of the people then could read or write, so their knowledge
about the world was not very high, and sometimes their questions were about
very simple matters. We always tried to answer if someone asked a question like
that, because we knew that it was not that person’s fault that he did not know.

Sometimes in the discussion phase of these meetings people raised

specific questions about the Viet Minh. According to a peasant who at-
tended many of the meetings, ‘‘The people would ask about what the Viet
Minh was going to do about the Japanese, for example, or what the Viet
Minh hoped to do about taxation. There were many questions the Viet
Minh cadres could not answer.’’ Other questions posed by people during
42 / Village at War

the meetings concerned possible Viet Minh responses to corruption by

village councilmen, excessive rents, and price manipulation by large
tradesmen in the area.
The meetings stimulated informal political discussions everywhere in
My Thuy Phuong. A peasant woman commented on the mood of the
village as the movement began to gain strength:

Everybody was talking all the time about the Viet Minh. In the market we
usually knew who to trust, so we would give those women little opinions about
the Viet Minh. We had to be careful, because sometimes the police might hear,
so we never said that we agreed with those ideas, and we never said that we
liked the Viet Minh. We only said, ‘‘This is a new idea, and it is different,
something new. What do you think about it?”

The ‘‘new ideas’’ discussed in the market and elsewhere involved such
matters as local land distribution, corruption of the village council, and
France’s economic exploitation of the entire nation. One of the village’s
Viet Minh organizers asserted that insurgent strength increased slowly in
the early 1940s:

It was like the people were waiting for an answer. When they heard the new
ideas of revolution, they thought to themselves, *‘This is a good thing. This will
get rid of the French, and mean independence and democracy and a better life
for us.”’ The people were thinking those things, and speaking. First they just
thought to themselves, then spoke more and more, and finally it was very free
and open. Nearly everybody supported us, and the government men knew that
everyone was against them. They did not dare do anything about it.

A teacher, who during that period was a student in Hue, often visited
his parents in My Thuy Phuong. He remembered the mood of the village.
‘It happened in about one or two years,” he said. ‘“‘The Viet Minh sud-
denly became very strong and very popular. They had almost everyone on
their side. It was very exciting.’
The Viet Minh organizers built on this excitement, letting it feed on
itself. Many were receptive to Viet Minh ideas, and with that the local
leaders’ boldness and confidence grew. And as the pro-Japanese colonial
regime increased its pressure for taxes and conscripts, the Viet Minh
simply gained ground. Among its more popular acts were those connected
with the ‘‘Storm The Rice Stocks, Relieve The Famine’’ campaign of
early 1945. While My Thuy Phuong villagers did not participate, many
other Viet Minh branches in the region seized rice warehouses and redis-
tributed rice to families hardest hit by a severe famine.!° A peasant com-
mented on the mood of his village on the very eve of revolution, 1944—
1945:

We knew the war was coming to an end, and we knew the Japanese were going
to be defeated by the Americans. We were also sure that the Americans would
not let the French come back to Vietnam. We were all hopeful that Vietnam
would be independent soon.
 Rule and Revolution | 48

A peasant woman said:

I was a little girl at the time. But I can still remember how much everyone liked
the Viet Minh. In my family, my mother and sisters and I spent our time late at
night making little Viet Minh flags. We worked on them together. We sewed all
the red flags with the yellow star, because we knew that the people would want
them to celebrate the Viet Minh victory. And we were pretty sure that the Viet
Minh was going to take over the country.

The Viet Minh appeals, especially early appeals focusing on subsis-

tence issues, psychologically prepared many to demand radical solutions
to the local social and economic difficulties created by decades of colonial
rule. But there are indications that during World War II My Thuy
Phuong’s few I.C.P. members and other more radical Viet Minh leaders
deemphasized such demands to concentrate on nationalistic, anti- Fascist
appeals. These came in meetings, pamphlets, and through conversations
among friends and neighbors. Such appeals attracted people of varied
political persuasions to the Viet Minh’s broad nationalistic umbrella. In
fact, some joined who otherwise felt threatened by calls for redistribution
of social and economic power.
During World War II, the Viet Minh movement thus went further than
the French colonial regime had ever gone toward creation of a strong
political force in the village. As noted above, during the war years about
70 to 80 percent of My Thuy Phuong’s people supported the Viet Minh
cause—a reflection of similar strength throughout the entire area.

NEW COURSE
For the Viet Minh, a major change came with the end of the war. The
Japanese surrendered on August 15, 1945. After that event, the Viet Minh
moved boldly. It proclaimed independence, established Hanoi as the capi-
tal of the new Democratic Republic of Vietnam, and named Ho Chi Minh
President. In the days after the Japanese surrender, the Viet Minh took
over My Thuy Phuong and other rural parts of Thua Thien Province.!!
People recalled that it was on about August 18 that local Viet Minh leaders
set up a temporary People’s Committee in the village.'? Somewhat later,
the Viet Minh set up a provincial revolutionary committee in Hue."?
In My Thuy Phuong, according to a peasant, ‘Everyone took a holiday
for a few days when Hue was liberated by the Viet Minh. Everyone tried
to go into the city to see how beautiful everything was with the new Viet
Minh flag.’’ A small tradesman recalled that all the schools were closed in
celebration, saying, ‘‘Our teachers were so happy. They told us we must
go out to celebrate our independence day. They said that when we are old
men we will remember this day, and we must remember it as a day of
celebration, not as a day of studying.’’ Many in the village, however,
continued to work in the ricefields and vegetable gardens, and at other
professions. Foremost among those who stayed at work were the local
Viet Minh leaders. One of them said:
44 / Village at War

We were very happy, but we were also full of worries. We knew that we were
going to be very tired in the next few years, because the revolutionary govern-
ment had very little money, and the people expected us to do many ofthe same
things the French had done. We knew we had to set up a revolutionary ad-
ministration, and we knew that it would require hard work.

The 1945 backdrop against which the local movement leaders began to
operate must be elucidated. With the end of the war, there began a period
of extensive diplomatic maneuvering, involving the Viet Minh, France,
Japan, Britain, Chinese Kuomintang forces, and America. Japanese
forces remained in Vietnam waiting to surrender; France insisted on a
reassertion of its claim to Indochina; the British, Americans, and Chinese
played minor roles: and the Viet Minh attempted to hold onto the country
it had won. As Vietnam’s future was being negotiated between France
and the Viet Minh, and as the Viet Minh began emasculation of rival
political groups, the Nationalist and Dai Viet Parties, a Viet Minh gov-
ermment emerged.!4
In the village, among the first Viet Minh acts after the declaration of
independence was to organize several large meetings in and around the
dinh, the communal hall. Nearly every man, woman, and child willingly
attended these gatherings, which were marked by speeches by local Viet
Minh leaders, attempts to explain what had happened in Vietnam, and
evocations of what one colonial-era councilman called ‘‘a cooperative
spirit.”’
At the first of these meetings Viet Minh leaders also announced that
villagers soon would choose a new local ruling body, the People’s Village
Assembly, and should begin thinking about personnel choices for that
body. At subsequent meetings, the leaders outlined assembly electoral
procedures. They required villagers interested in assuming the 20 or so
assembly positions to submit their names to the temporary committee.
When election day came, villagers discovered that the only candidates
were incumbent ‘‘temporary’’ council members and those who had been
active in or openly sympathetic to the Viet Minh cause. The local au-
thorities seemed to honestly administer the balloting and vote count. The
resultant assembly in turn chose a five-to-six member Village Administra-
tive Committee from its members. Those selected for this key executive
body were My Thuy Phuong’s most important Viet Minh leaders. Several
in the village described the assembly and its administrative committee in
quite positive terms. For example, a peasant said, ‘‘It was one of the most
popular councils we ever had.”’
One of the reasons for that popularity was that a number ofprestigious
unelected individuals, such as members of the Cult Committee, regularly
sat in on assembly meetings as ex officio members. The new assembly’s
and administrative committee’s chief function was to widely popularize
revolutionary government policies. A peasant recalled:

The assembly was sort of like the old councils, because it was not too free, and
took orders from the higher levels. But its orders were to help the people, so we
 Rule and Revolution | 45
all supported it. It was better than the old councils because it was very demo-
cratic. People could talk and discuss very many matters.

This comment was typical of several others, and suggests that the
principle of democratic centralism—wide-ranging discussion on policies
set at higher levels to build consensus on those policies—marked assem-
bly and administrative committee deliberations.

It was not long before the Viet Minh began to set a new course for the
village. Directives from higher revolutionary government levels reached
the village during 1945-1946, reflecting the new government’s interest in
supporting village assemblies as both symbols and the substance of its
authority in the countryside.'* However, local Viet Minh leaders had to
depend almost entirely on indigenous resources as they began governing.
“All the Viet Minh government had was the support of the people and
new ideas,’ commented a peasant. ‘‘At that time the Viet Minh had no
money, and did not know how to administer programs, so their problems
were very large.’
In the first open Viet Minh village meeting, the leaders outlined in
general terms the program they hoped to follow. According to a trades-
man, “‘They told the people that the Viet Minh government was a gov-
ernment of the people, and that sacrifice was needed. They said that all
the people must unite to support the government.’ A man who was a
councilman during the late 1940s recalled, ‘“‘The Viet Minh said their
program was for continuing revolution.’’ The new administrative commit-
tee moved immediately to encourage wide participation in local affairs. As
implied above, local leaders especially encouraged discussion among vil-
lage assemblymen during assembly proceedings. Large village meetings,
open to all, came as often as twice weekly, and also became forums for
participation, where Viet Minh leaders encouraged open discussion.
The new government organs operated for only one and one-half years
before being forced into exile. During their brief period of operation, there
were no acts of reprisal against former Viet Minh enemies. But the local
Viet Minh structure attempted to spark significant local social and
economic changes. Here are the main accomplishments of the 1945-1946
government:

1. There were adjustments in local land tenure practices. The assembly lowered
rents it considered excessive, and redistributed communal land overconcen-
trated in the hands of certain families. It gave landless peasants first priority in
the redistribution, followed by peasants with little land, and full-time village
Viet Minh activists with little land of their own. However, the rent adjustment
and the redistributions were not as extreme as some might have wished, possi-
bly a function of what villagers described as the local leaders’ desire to attract
wide support, even from former opponents.'®
Some of the local land tenure changes came at the recommendation of a
Farmers’ Committee of about five peasants, formed by the village assembly.
This cell-like functional group, which several described as ** popular’ and *‘ac-
tive,’ helped involve peasants in local revolutionary government affairs.'”
46 / Village at War
to _ Reform of the tax structure was more drastic. The village’s Viet Minh leaders
received word that the new government had abolished the head tax and taxes
on small landholdings, moves that were quite popular.'*
_ The new authorities endeavored to control area moneylenders. District and
village-level officials attempted to regulate interest rates. One peasant recalled
that the authorities set annual interest ceilings of about 30 percent on amounts
borrowed from private individuals. Others noted that at one point in 1946 the
local assembly actually began making small, low-interest loans to the neediest.
. The Viet Minh attempted to control corruption. ‘‘I remember one time the Viet
Minh found a cadre who had been corrupt,’ said a peasant. ‘‘They made him
confess in front of all the people and say he was sorry. Everyone knew that no
cadre dared be corrupt.’’ Some villagers differed on the nature of Viet Minh
rule during this period, but none disagreed that the anticorruption efforts were
effective and popular.

Nn . Finally, My Thuy Phuong’s assemblymen organized the young people, through

a local committee similar to that of the peasants. One peasant recalled:

At that time I was about 15 years old. I remember that they organized many
young people in the area. We had political study meetings, and participated
in demonstrations for the revolution. There were also occasions to sing and
hear speeches. But the most important activity was in education. Many
young people taught children who were not in school, and some young
people taught adults how to read. There were many free classes at that time,
and the Viet Minh let the young people do all the organizing and teaching.

With the few exceptions noted above, people’s comments on these

revolutionary programs were brief. According to a peasant, ‘The people
liked the Viet Minh government very much, because it was honest.’ A
small tradesman said, ‘*‘Everyone supported the Viet Minh at that time.
Everyone liked to have a democratic government.’’ And a peasant stated,
‘That was the best administration we ever had here. It was a short time,
but many people were happy to support the Viet Minh. The Viet Minh was
close to the people.’

NOTES

For background on the Viet Minh, see Buttinger, Vietnam: A Dragon.

The term ‘Liberation Committee’’ was used during the World War II period.

Others stated that Viet Minh messages also emphasized anti-Japanese ideas.

Anh, Lang Xom, pp. 116-119.

a) Taxes collected for the French were of several types. There were real estate
taxes, taxes on products of the land, and a ‘“‘head tax’’ and corvée tax on
residents. See Paul Cordier, Notions d’Administration Indochinoise (In-
dochinese Administrative Notions) (Hanoi: Imprimerie d’ Extreme Orient,
 Rule and Revolution | 47

Cf. Yves Henry, Economie Agricole de Indochine (Indochina’s Agricul-

tural Economy) (Hanoi: Gouvernement General, 1932), quoted in Long, op.
cit., p. 27. In 1952-1953, the colonial government reported that in Central
Vietnam (Annam) 53 percent of the families were landless, and 47 percent
had some land (see Vinh, Les Reformes, p. 45).

The most comprehensive studies in English on the French impact are Long,
op. cit., and Truong Chinh & Vo Nguyen Giap, **The Peasant Question
(1937-1938)” (Ithaca: Southeast Asia Program, Department of Asian
Studies, Cornell University, January, 1974), data paper no. 94.

See, for example, Anh, Op. Cl.

Cf. Hue Anh-Dung Kien-Cuong (Heroic and Strong Hue) (Hanoi: Ban
Lien-Lac Dong-Huong Thanh-Pho Hue, 1971), p. 27.

Cf. Tran Van Dinh, *‘The Vietnam People’s Army,” Indochina Chronicle,
(Berkeley) no. 31, February 28, 1974, p. 9.

See Truong Chinh, **Mot So Van-De ve Cach-Mang Thang Tam’’ (A Number

of Problems Concerning the August Revolution), Hoc-Tap (Study-Practice),
September, 1963; a North Vietnamese publication, quoted in ibid.

A committee at district level supervised the village committees; above it was

the provincial committee. Also see John McAlister, Vietnam: The Origins of
Revolution (New York: Knopf, 1969), pp. 264-265.

See Vien, no. 37, pp. 60-61; also see ‘‘Thirty Years of Struggle of the Party”
(Hanoi: Democratic Republic of Vietnam, undated), p. 95, cited in McAlis-
TCL Os (Clic pe lOS:

See Buttinger, Vietnam: A Political History, pp. 218-271; also see Douglas
Pike, Vietcong: The Organization and Techniques of the National Liberation
Front of South Vietnam (Cambridge: M.I.T. Press, 1966), pp. 43-46.

The Viet Minh’s national policy toward village councils is described in Anh,
op. cit., p. 121; also see McAlister, op. cit., pp. 265-266.

Cf. Buttinger, Vietnam: A Political History, p. 233.

Cf. McAlister, op. cit., pp. 263-264.

See Buttinger, ibid.

 4

Battle
UNDERGROUND

A protracted colonial reassertion in Thua Thien/Hue began in March,

1946, when 750 French soldiers and a large number of French civilians
arrived in Hue.! The Frenchmen had come to ‘‘relieve’> Kuomintang
forces, which were there to arrange for the surrender of Japanese forces.
During long months of indecisive French-Viet Minh negotiation, the
French gradually and with difficulty usurped the Viet Minh regime’s for-
mal authority in Thua Thien/Hue, replacing it first with their own, and
later with a royalist administration they completely dominated.’
By late 1946, the Viet Minh provincial administration was in ‘“‘exile,”’
from which it directed revolutionary activities in Thua Thien/Hue, retain-
ing much informal authority within the populace.* This was a strategic
retreat, a Viet Minh attempt to avoid an immediate fight with French
security forces, and a way of preparing for battle. The same pattern held
for My Thuy Phuong. By late 1946 or early 1947, the Viet Minh assembly
was no more, and the administrative committee for the village was under-
ground. Aboveground was an eight-member council, composed chiefly of
villagers sympathetic to the colonial cause. The Viet Minh administrative
committee became, in effect, the guiding organ for anti-French activities
in the village, and people called it The Resistance Committee.4
The colonial reassertion was fraught with difficulties, owing to wide-
spread anti-French sentiment. So it depended upon outright force. That
meant many thousands of American-equipped French troops appeared in
Central Vietnam after 1946.° Augmenting them were African Foreign
Legionnaires and Vietnamese soldiers serving in French ranks. There had

48
 5 Battle | 49

long been colonial troops in Thua Thien/Hue, based in small garrisons

near the mouth of the Perfume River and in the emperor’s walled citadel.
But after 1946, the French military presence in the area increased sub-
stantially, as did the French commitment to training Vietnamese ‘‘ volun-
teers.’’ ° The French constructed a military installation near Hue, and
colonial units based elsewhere in Vietnam undertook operations in the
area. From the late 1940s until 1954, there were extensive colonial mili-
tary operations in the region, such as sweeps in the coastal lowlands north
of Hue, near Highway One—Bernard Fall’s ‘‘Street Without Joy’’ area.’
And military operations even occurred in and around My Thuy Phuong.
According to villagers and others who had knowledge of French mili-
tary activities, the operations came periodically to the village. Those were
joint operations by French troops, non-French Legionnaires, Vietnamese
soldiers, and colonial police. More often, French troops passed through
the village in supply convoys or on their way to battle elsewhere. And
occasionally soldiers on leave visited. A woman had this memory:

Bastille Day was the day we feared most, because the French and Africans
always got very drunk to celebrate. I was in school then, and our teacher made
the boys escort the girls home. Sometimes the Frenchmen tried to rape the girls,
so we had to be very careful.

In the face of colonial pressure in the village and elsewhere in the area,
provincial Viet Minh leaders began to plan their battle. In 1945, they had
not been ready to fight the colonialists. But in 1946-1947, the situation
was different. On March 25, 1947, the Viet Minh organized a provincial
conference of resistance cadres, which some Viet Minh leaders from the
village probably attended. After the conference, the Viet Minh issued a
document that summarized the anti-French strategy. It resolves: ®

To continue the armed resistance, resolutely fight the rural puppet authorities
and traitors, strengthen the people’s confidence in the Government, the Party
and the national resistance following the line: a long resistance of all the people
in all fields.

To step up production, practice thrift, conceal food and belongings, establish

resistance bases for a long struggle.

The cadres of various levels should go back to their bases, return to the plains,
and cling to the population; holding firmly to the resistance bases.

To consolidate the leadership of the Party, the Front, the administration,

simplify organization, maintain steady communication in order to guarantee the
effectiveness of the directives, decisions and policies issued.

To reorganize the army, militia, guerrilla units, security services, restore mili-
tary activities within a short time, put the accent on guerrilla warfare while
creating conditions favorable to mobile warfare.
50 / Village at War

The Viet Minh battle strategy, in other words, was to have essentially
two phases. First, the Viet Minh was to continue efforts to broaden and
deepen loyalty to the movement. Second, and complementing the first
phase, the Viet Minh was to mount a direct assault against the local
colonial apparatus, involving noncooperation with the colonial authorities
and steadily mounting military pressure against French forces. The direct
assault actually began in the province before the March, 1947
conference—in the early morning hours of December 20,.1946.? ~ .
People described the first phase of the Viet Minh battle plan as it
affected My Thuy Phuong—the Viet Minh attempts to win their political
allegiance. A peasant stated:

The Viet Minh were very clever at propaganda. They kept telling us many,
many times that they were going to win, and that victory would soon be theirs,
and would be a victory of all the people. We heard this from our friends and
neighbors, and from everyone.

Others also indicated that anti-French messages came again and again
in Viet Minh leaflets and discussions, most of which people believed and
accepted. Especially popular were those that focused on high French
taxes, corruption, and land distribution. Such ‘‘subsistence messages,”
however, were overshadowed by nationalistic, anti-French appeals—
which aimed at broadening the Viet Minh’s base of support in the village.
There were also continued Viet Minh political meetings. Because of
the danger of informers, the open community meetings that had marked
the 1945-1946 independence period were no longer possible. Instead, two
or three times weekly the Viet Minh organized smaller meetings, similar
to those of the period 1939-1941. On one or two occasions, police swept
into the village to break up gatherings, sometimes arresting Viet Minh
leaders. Despite the dangers, the meetings persisted. And meetings be-
came more interesting as the years went on. That is, local leaders became
more adept at delivering speeches and organizing discussions, and higher
Viet Minh echelons provided better written and more detailed ‘‘study
materials.”

As noted earlier, the second phase of the Viet Minh battle strategy
partly involved a noncooperation movement. Here targets were the same
procolonial villagers and the same types of local abuses and inequities
that had been so oppressive in earlier years. Under colonial police and
military protection, the small minority again grew ascendant, at least in an
economic sense.
Through meetings and informal contacts, Viet Minh leaders focused on
people’s relationships with the French-supported village council, colonial
tax collectors, and recruiters for the colonial army. ‘Nobody wanted to
help the French,’ remembered a peasant woman. ‘“Nobody wanted to
Support the rich men in this place. Nobody wanted to pay taxes. So what
 - Battle / 51

we did was pay as little money as possible.’’ Another peasant added,

‘The Viet Minh did not have to force us to do this. None of us wanted to
help the French.’ Viet Minh followers thus withheld cooperation from
the colonial apparatus, except when absolutely unavoidable.
Paralleling the noncooperation movement was a concerted Viet Minh
effort to discredit those who cooperated with the colonial regime. The
Viet Minh accomplished much of that in the political meetings, which on
occasion aired specific local complaints against specific individuals, usu-
ally men of local authority or wealth, such as large landholders, local
military officers, or influential councilmen. There is also some evidence
that the Viet Minh employed rumors to discredit procolonial individuals
and others regarded as possible opponents. For example, in the late
1940s, the Viet Minh began a specific denunciation campaign aimed at the
colonial police. According to a peasant, ‘‘They attacked a policeman by
name, and said he was a cruel agent, a puppet of the French, and that he
was corrupt. They said that he had had his own mother arrested, killed,
because she criticized him.’’ The policeman’s mother had indeed died
very suddenly and unexpectedly, so some in My Thuy Phuong believed
the rumor.

DIRECT ATTACK
The most important part of the Viet Minh attack was the military effort. In
the village that effort consisted primarily of small guerrilla operations
which slowly intensified over the years. Villagers said that ‘‘several”’
from My Thuy Phuong departed for duty in the main force Vietnam
People’s Army, but for most people the military struggle was in the village
itself.
What eventually became a highly effective guerrilla force began as a
group of people interested in causing the French some trouble. The guer-
rilla force originated in about 1945, when the Viet Minh village committee
responded to a directive from the provincial command ordering estab-
lishment of a village-level “‘defense force.’’ '° Several peasants emerged
as the backbone of that new local force. Those men, who had little knowl-
edge of weapons or of military tactics, went into the jungles of Thua Thien
Province for about a month of intensive training, presumably with guer-
rilla teachers. The men, in turn, attempted to convey what they had
learned to others in the village, and slowly built a local force of about 20
full-time guerrillas and ‘‘many”’ part-time armed supporters. In addition,
hundreds of unarmed men, women, and children over the years assisted
guerrilla activities as runners, lookouts, and providers of food and hiding
places. A tradesman, whose father was a poor peasant in the 1940s,
stated:

When I was only 10 or 11, | remember how exciting it was to join them. All of
my friends and many relatives were fighting, and I wanted to go. But they had a
52 / Village at War

rule. They said that you had to be so big to be a guerrilla, so if you reached a
certain measurement on their bamboo pole they said you could go. I was so
afraid I was too short, but I was lucky. I was tall enough.

Others confirmed that the Viet Minh set high standards for height. That
was to insure that no harm came to the youngest children. The first sev-
eral guerrillas began to work closely with local leaders in training self-
defense members at a jungle ‘‘classroom.”’ Training lectures stressed the
overall military strategy, which was to drain French resources through
small annoyance attacks, gradually isolate the enemy, and in the end
destroy him. A peasant recalled, ‘‘Everything they said was very politi-
cal. ‘The guerrilla is fighting for a political reason,’ they said. They taught
the men why they were fighting.”’
Over the years, there were three clear instances of Viet Minh pressure
against people allied with the colonial regime. The first of these involved
one of the area’s more infamous moneylenders, a man far from sympa-
thetic to the Viet Minh cause. According to a peasant, ‘‘The Viet Minh
shot that man, and everyone was very surprised. The Viet Minh said that
he died because he was a servant of the French, and did not work for the
people.’’ Another of the Viet Minh victims was a Vietnamese soldier
serving in French colonial ranks, a sergeant. People knew him for his
corruption, and for his cruel temper. He actually lived in the adjacent
village, but spent a great deal of his time helping coordinate police opera-
tions in My Thuy Phuong and the surrounding area. A Viet Minh sniper
gunned down the sergeant as he pedaled his bicycle through the village.
In a third instance, the Viet Minh gave a warning to one of the village
councilmen, who was a large landholder. They viewed the man, well
known for his influential role in council deliberations, as a major local
enemy. One night an explosive charge leveled the front part of the man’s
house. The councilman was unhurt by the blast, but deeply frightened.
Shortly thereafter, he resigned his council seat, moved to Hue, and rented
his land to several local peasants. The Viet Minh then had one less oppo-
nent in the village.

The main north-south highway through My Thuy Phuong presented

many tempting targets of opportunity for the local guerrillas: French mili-
tary vehicles. Throughout the anti-French war, action along the highway
constituted the major Viet Minh military thrust in the village. According
to a peasant, “‘It happened so often. The road was never safe for French
soldiers."’ The Viet Minh guerrillas, usually in groups of two or three,
sniped at French jeeps and trucks from concealed positions along the
highway. The Viet Minh carefully planned the sniping forays. Usually
snipers stayed close to one another, often on the same side of the high-
way. They were adept at careful but rapid selection of targets. As a
French truck came into view on the horizon, the guerrillas had only a
matter of seconds to decide whether or not to shoot.
 e Battle | 53

The sniping incidents were frequent along the highway, and became so
frequent, in fact, that the French periodically organized large military
operations in My Thuy Phuong to destroy guerrilla units. Villagers re-
membered that in about 1949 there was a one-day operation. They have
forgotten or never knew its precise dates, numbers of soldiers, and unit
names. But they described it as typical of others the French organized in
and around My Thuy Phuong during the years 1946-1954. Here is a recon-
struction of the operation.
Before sunrise, several hundred French and African infantrymen,
heavily armed with carbines, grenades, and knives, came in open trucks
to the village. They immediately fanned out along Highway One, and
proceeded to cross the ricefields, using the narrow paths dividing rice
plots. They moved out to the furthest extremity of the village, the hamlets
set in the ricefields. When the French forces reached the edges of the
hamlets, they formed what they called a ‘‘perimeter.’’ That is, they
moved to completely encircle the area, to prevent movement out by any
residents. When the troops were in place, other armed men began to move
in, including more Frenchmen and African Legionnaires, Vietnamese sol-
diers, and a few Vietnamese policemen.
These soldiers and policemen moved quietly from house to house,
apparently trying to cause as little commotion as possible. They entered
homes without knocking, and pulled residents out of bed. Their next step
was to demand identification papers, search all cabinets and drawers, and
pry loose floor boards. They also searched clothing, and with fixed
bayonets probed the large jugs that stored family rice supplies. The sol-
diers and policemen looked for concealed weapons and any types of
printed materials, such as anticolonial leaflets or books, that might have
linked people to the local revolutionary movement. They also looked
carefully for concealed entrances to tunnel complexes, pretty good signs
of resident Viet Minh sympathizers or possibly guerrillas. While soldiers
and policemen were searching homes, most people did not dare resist or
even complain about the inconvenience of it all. According to an elderly
peasant, ‘‘We always were very still and didn’t speak much when the
French troops came, because you could never know how they would
misunderstand your words. It was very frightening!”
During the operation that day, colonial forces detained about 50 men,
women, and children as they moved through the village. Colonial soldiers
moved the detainees under armed guard to a central part of the village,
and later took them away, probably to a French base camp for interroga-
tion. The soldiers did not bind hands, but closely guarded the detainees,
and occasionally nudged them with rifle butts. People who attempted to
move through the barricade of armed French soldiers around the hamlets
ran a high risk of being shot, and several met that fate. A peasant remem-
bered, ‘‘My brother did not know we had to stay home, and he was shot
going out to the ricefields. He was carrying a hoe, so maybe they thought
he had a gun.”
54 / Village at War

But that day others with weapons considerably more lethal than hoes
tried to penetrate the French perimeter. Four or five local guerrillas,
armed with carbines, decided to flee rather than risk arrest in the house-
to-house search. Their plan was probably to kill one or two Frenchmen,
then flee through the hole created in the military line. The guerrillas crept
slowly past houses and fences up to within about 10 yards of the French
line. Soldiers stood about 10 yards apart along the edge of a path. One
guerrilla took aim and pulled off a shot. A French soldier screamed*and
collapsed where he had stood. The guerrilla then fired at a second
Frenchman nearby, who was by then crouching. He fired again and again,
but could not find his mark.
Time soon began to run out for the guerrillas, who probably felt that
escape was difficult, and perhaps impossible, as long as that second
French soldier remained alive. Hearing shouts from other parts of the
French line, two of the guerrillas decided to risk it: they ran toward the
French perimeter. The shooting had alerted other Frenchmen, and the
area swarmed with alert, advancing troops. It is unclear precisely how it
happened, but there was a fierce exchange of gunfire, and the two guerril-
las were killed. Soldiers of the perimeter then immediately captured, dis-
armed, and detained the remaining guerrillas, who had chosen not to run
the gauntlet of death. Colonial soldiers dragged the guerrillas off, probably
to their base camp, and no one in the village ever saw them again.
After the death and capture ofthe guerrillas, the search ofthe ricefield
hamlets proceeded uneventfully. By late afternoon, the French lifted
their perimeter, and the troops left. The colonialists undoubtedly mea-
sured and expressed their results that day as statistics—numbers killed or
detained, and numbers of weapons and documents seized. But the Viet-
namese viewed the day’s military activities very differently. First, the
military operation had many small costs in the village. There was an entire
work day lost while it proceeded, and small losses of personal property to
thieving colonial soldiers. Second, the death of the guerrillas during the
operation deeply affected many in the village. ‘‘We all knew them,”’ a
peasant remembered, ‘‘and they were friends. We were sad to see them
dead.’ Several spoke also of the ways village life began to change after
the first large French military operations. According to a peasant woman,
‘“We could never be sure about the French, they were so cruel. We were
afraid they would come back, but never knew when they would.”” Terror
and uncertainty thus began to haunt the village.
Sensing the change in mood between 1946 and 1954, local landlords,
large tradesmen, and councilmen used threats of additional operations to
increase their personal wealth and influence in the community. Threats
“to bring the French soldiers’? accompanied shakedowns by local officials
or pressures by tradesmen or landlords. And councilmen and policemen,
citing “‘security requirements,’’ discouraged meetings and other coopera-
tive efforts by groups of people, including groups that traditionally
brought in harvests or built and repaired community facilities, such as
 oe Battle | 55

irrigation canals or the dinh. The significance of such moves was not lost
on one peasant, who commented, ‘‘The big men and the Westerners were
afraid the people would unite against them. And their profits were larger if
the people were divided.’

STAND AND FIGHT

In 1948, three local Viet Minh leaders travelled far from the village boun-
daries. The Viet Minh provincial organization had selected them for train-
ing at a resistance base camp in the hilly Hoa My jungle area. The men
journeyed to the camp on foot, travelling by jungle trail, and occasionally
pausing along the way at preestablished rest points. A North Vietnamese
publication included a description of the base camp, and oftwo others like
it in the Binh Tri Thien region of Quang Binh, Quang Tri, and Thua Thien
provinces: !!

Relying on remote and difficult mountains, the resistance bases were the seats
of the leading organs and the liaison services with the central government and
the places where important meetings were held. Gradually army workshops,
logistic departments, pharmacies (manufacturing medicines on the spot for the
army) and military hospitals were set up there, and, along with them, cadres’
training schools, and workshops for printing pamphlets, newspapers, docu-
ments, books... .

The supply of food to the base was made by local agricultural farms, which grew
rice, maize, sweet potatoes, cassava and vegetables and practiced animal breed-
ing, fishing and hunting.

Army units came there for training, relaxation and replenishing their forces and
attending political courses. From there they returned to the plains and other
theatres of operation.

At the camp, the men joined a military study group, formed to train
other leaders from other villages. The training sessions lasted about two
months, and were organized by main force Vietnam People’s Army sol-
diers, who fought the large battles against colonial forces. Trainees slept
in lean-to jungle structures, or in hammocks, and ate the simple fare of the
People’s Army. Typically, the training sessions included lectures on Viet
Minh doctrines and blackboard talks on military strategy and local leader-
ship techniques. Experienced Viet Minh soldiers also provided training in
actual combat techniques.
When the three men returned to the village from the base camp, they
found that pressure from French security agencies had increased in Thua
Thien/Hue. Throughout the province, colonial forces had killed or jailed
many*Viet Minh guerrillas and other followers. And provincial Viet Minh
leaders found that village-level revolutionaries in the area were often so
preoccupied with colonial police and military efforts that they ignored
instructions from above.
56 / Village at War

In the village, colonial forces arrested and killed a number of Viet Minh
followers during the late 1940s. This pressure caused some less committed
Viet Minh supporters to abandon the movement for safer, uncommitted
political stances. In addition, Viet Minh leaders lost some freedom of
movement in the village. However, in the village and throughout most of
the province, the Viet Minh effectively adjusted to most of the setbacks
brought by colonial pressure. In later sections of this cate we discuss
those adjustments.

When My Thuy Phuong’s Viet Minh leaders returned from their train-
ing in 1948, they found more than problems in the local movement. They
also discovered that in their absence an important new leader had
emerged, a man named Te. Let us now focus on that new leader, for his is
partly the story of My Thuy Phuong’s revolutionary movement.
We must first briefly return to the early 1940s, when Te was about 25
years of age. He was married and had two young children. The Te family
lived in the southern part of the village, near the bridge, in a modest
two-room home of cement and wooden walls and red tile roof. The home
had been built by Te’s father, who in the 1920s and 1930s was a modestly
successful tradesman dealing in cloth. Te neither owned nor rented any
riceland, nor did he have business holdings. His home was simply fur-
nished, and his family lived frugally. Despite the comfortable inherited
home, the Te’s were financially only slightly better off than most other
villagers. In social and cultural terms, however, they differed dra-
matically. The difference can be attributed to Te’s educational
background and chosen profession. In the 1930s, he attended a French-
supported secondary school and graduated near the top of his class. His
favorite subjects were literature and history. In the late 1930s, Te returned
to My Thuy Phuong, fully imbued with an interest in Western literature,
and especially in poetry. He secured a teaching position in the small
district school, located outside the village. He taught lessons in European
history and literature, and earned a small but adequate salary. To augment
that income, he also taught part-time in a private elementary school in
Hue, and his wife tended a small vegetable garden near their home.
Te had been greatly influenced by many of the Western treatises,
novels, and poems he had read in high school, and thought of himself as
something of a Vietnamese ‘‘renaissance man.’’ Like many other Viet-
namese students of French schools, he loved the richness and depth of
Western literature and contrasted it with Vietnam’s traditional literature,
which he began to think of as ‘‘poems for the emperors.’’ But a number of
Western ideas about democracy and national self-determination also
struck him, and he grew aware that Vietnam had been denied these
“aghten
Over the course of a few years, Te’s awareness of social conditions in
the village area heightened considerably. Although the colonial regime’s
curriculum outlines were supposed to guide his literature and history
 ~ Battle | 57

lessons, he began to slant his teaching. According to one of his former

students, this was ‘‘to make the students think about freedom and democ-
racy.”
Outside the classroom, students and neighbors began to visit him, to
seek out advice and opinions, and Te began to find an important place for
himself in the village. Gradually, he slipped into the role of advisor and
informal ‘‘advocate’’ for some ofthe village’s disadvantaged. As his repu-
tation spread, as a young man of education who for some reason wanted
to help the poor, many brought their problems to him. ‘‘They told him
about landlords who were raising rent, about the Government taking
taxes, and about how poor they were,’ his wife recalled. She and Te’s
friends emphasized that in the late 1930s, Te never advocated revolt or
noncooperation as ways for the poor to deal with the local colonial ap-
paratus. But despite that hesitance, word of his interest in the poor soon
reached the local authorities, and repercussions followed.
Two or three members of the local council visited Te at home and
suggested that he consider running for that body. But Te hesitated, claim-
ing that his duties as teacher kept him too busy. The councilmen then
dropped strong suggestions that his talks with the peasants were causing
them problems in the village. A peasant recalled:

The men told him that some of the farmers had come to the council and asked
for their rent to be lowered, and those farmers had mentioned his name. The
councilmen said he should be careful what he told people, that new ideas were
dangerous when the people did not really understand them.

Te apparently understood the significance of the invitation to join the

council, and the warnings. His wife stated, however, that, ‘‘The people
were suffering, and he could not make them go away.”’ In 1941, colonial
authorities dismissed Te from his position as teacher in the district school,
and soon thereafter he lost his part-time job in Hue. According to those
who knew him, Te understood clearly what had happened to him, and saw
a period of coming financial readjustment. He rented an additional small
parcel of land, and his wife increased the area under vegetable cultivation.
Te himself began occasionally tutoring the sons and daughters of a few
wealthy families in Hue and Huong Thuy District, and his family adjusted
satisfactorily to the drop in income.
Te’s wife said that the local procolonial group was ‘‘killing’’ her hus-
band, for those villagers feared him as a threat, or saw him as one of their
own who had somehow lost all sense. During most of the 1940s, Te main-
tained his vegetable plots and continued to offer advice to peasants and
former students. Te’s wife stated:

He was very interested in the Viet Minh. Once he went to a Viet Minh meeting.
But his philosophy was just to live a simple life and not participate in politics.
After many years, however, he changed his mind. He saw that just giving
58 / Village at War

opinions to people was not as good as working for them and fighting the West-
erners. He also saw that the Viet Minh was very good, and very strong, so he
followed the revolutionary side.

Te made that decision in 1948. Because of his reputation as a man of

compassion and intelligence, local Viet Minh leaders welcomed him to the
Viet Minh ranks, and soon invited him to join the covert Viet Minh village
council. Te concentrated on recruitment to revolutionary ranks of the
peasants he had been helping over the years. Some of his recruits became
trusted, dedicated guerrillas.

As their abilities improved, the Viet Minh guerrillas augmented sniping

attacks by organizing several ambushes along the highway. Some of these
involved many guerrillas and local Viet Minh supporters. Two peasants
described how the insurgents organized an ambush of a convoy one day in
about 1948. Ten or twelve guerrillas took up positions in the predawn
hours on both sides of the highway. This was in the section of the village
where the route is bounded by ricefields on one side and by the slightly
elevated railroad bed and a small strip of rice paddies on the other. Guer-
rillas divided into four groups of two or three men, two groups per side of
the highway, and separated by several hundred yards. On both sides the
guerrillas dug small, shallow trenches for extra protection from the ex-
pected hail of French bullets.
Several unarmed individuals cooperated to support the ambush. Three
or four women carrying market baskets took up positions near the high-
way, at the north and south ends of the intended ambush corridor. The
guerrillas expected that several minutes before the French targets crossed
the range of fire the women would begin stopping pedestrians and those
travelling by bicycle. Their job was to prevent injury to innocent
passers-by. Two children played crucial roles during the operation. One
boy, no older than seven or eight, sat on top of his family’s water buffalo
south of the ambush strip, but near the highway. His task was to wave his
arms in a certain pattern when he spotted the expected target approaching
through the adjacent village. He was the advance lookout. Another boy
ten or twelve years old, sat by the roadside some distance to the north,
and had been instructed to wave if danger appeared in the forms of ap-
proaching police, army patrols, or convoys from the north.
A peasant who assisted the guerrillas said, ‘‘The little boy on the water
buffalo gave the signal, and the women had done their job, too. There was
nobody on the road who might have gotten hurt.’’ The guerrillas appar-
ently knew precisely when to begin firing, and at what. A convoy came
into sight—about 10 trucks, equally spaced, and moving at a high rate of
speed. Within seconds the first trucks had entered the ambush corridor.
and were approaching its center, but the guerrillas held their fire.
The peasant recalled:
 = Battle | 59

The Viet Minh waited until the trucks were about half way up the road. Then
everyone began firing at the first two trucks. The first two trucks were hit very
hard, and had to stop. One of them went off the road, and you could see that one
French soldier was dead inside. All the other trucks then had to stop.

The guerrillas then concentrated their fire on the tires of the stalled
trucks, and on any French soldiers who were riding on them. Many of
those soldiers tried to take cover in and around the trucks or in the ditches
off to the side of the road, where accurate guerrilla fire cut some of them
down. Hiding was practically impossible.
People did not know how many Frenchmen died that day in the village,
nor was it clear whether there were casualties on the Viet Minh side. The
peasants quoted above recalled only that most of the damage occurred in
a minute or two, after which the guerrillas retreated. According to others,
guerrilla results that day were a hopelessly immobilized French convoy, a
heightened sense of pride and accomplishment, and enhanced reputation
in My Thuy Phuong as a powerful fighting force.

Under mounting Viet Minh pressure, the French came up with a “‘solu-
tion’? for Vietnam in 1949. They signed an agreement with Emperor Bao
Dai permitting him to establish a government and an army. But it was a
government in name only, for under the agreement the French retained
military and civil control, leaving little but opportunities for corruption to
Bao Dai and his administrators.'* In effect, the Bao Dai regime was only a
cover for French colonial rule.!> My Thuy Phuong’s proximity to Bao
Dai’s home town of Hue and most people’s deep affection for the old
capital seemingly had little effect on political attitudes.
As a peasant put it, ““‘No one here respected Emperor Bao Dai. He was
just a playboy and a puppet of the Westerners. When he tried to make a
new government, everyone knew it was really the French behind him.”’
Many others knew absolutely nothing of Bao Dai’s political moves, indi-
cating that they brought no new programs, personnel, or political mes-
sages to the village. The only significant changes were entirely
negative—heightened activities by security agencies and rampant price
inflation. And during the Bao Dai years, the same sorts of abuses by the
same procolonial minority that had existed for years continued apace. To
most villagers, Bao Dai and the French were one, local enemies un-
changed.

Beginning in about 1949, a major Viet Minh military intensification

complemented the highway ambush and sniping tactics.'* To support that
intensification, in the late 1940s or early 1950s two or three men informally
called tax collectors began operating in the village. These individuals,
who were close to local Viet Minh leaders, attempted to gather contribu-
tions from every sympathetic or potentially sympathetic family. Usually
collectors paid nocturnal visits to homes, but they rarely used the word
60 / Village at War

‘‘tax.”’ Instead, the men asked for ‘‘donations.’’ Tax collectors usually
said they needed the money to buy supplies, especially food and weapons,
for local guerrillas. While on their rounds, collectors generally reminded
people of the Viet Minh struggle and were not coercive. In response,
villagers usually gave small sums of money and sometimes stocks of food,
such as uncooked rice.
Related to the nationwide expansion and improvement ofthe Vietnam
People’s Army and to a Viet Minh shift to a more aggressive *‘annihilat-
ing’’ phase of attack, in about 1950, the village’s 15 or 20 guerrillas began
to stand and fight in response to French military probes. Two peasants
recalled the local response to a French military/police operation in about
1951. They described that guerrilla attack as typical of others organized in
the early 1950s. According to the peasants, the strength displayed by the
local Viet Minh forces during that day’s encounter was in part due to the
extremely effective Viet Minh intelligence system. Word arrived by way
of a secret courier that at a certain time, on a certain morning, a certain
number of French military and police units could be expected in the
ricefield hamlets. The Viet Minh hierarchy instructed the local organizers
simply to ‘‘prepare.’’ There was only about two days’ advance notice, but
that was more than enough time for the guerrillas. First, they hauled in
weapons and stocks of ammunition from a hidden arms cache. Then local
Viet Minh leaders began to plot strategy.
The ijeaders set a meeting of local guerrillas for a place in the hills
southwest of the village. Children notified guerrillas of the evening ren-
dezvous in messages they brought to guerrilla homes and places of hiding.
All attended the session, during which local leaders thoroughly explained
what they had planned. The battle itself went almost predictably. On
schedule, the French forces arrived, and began the long trek out through
the ricefields toward the hamlets, which frightened, forewarned residents
had almost completely evacuated. The Viet Minh guerrillas had com-
pletely hidden themselves at different points throughout the rice paddies
near the path being followed by colonial soldiers. As the French were
moving through the ricefields, the guerrillas opened fire. From every side
guns blazed, and all along the French line soldiers dropped. In panic, the
colonial soldiers began returning the fire, but shot wildly, unsure where to
direct their fire. Within minutes the French forces pulled back, leaving
behind about 10 dead. The heavy French barrage following the initial Viet
Minh attack lightly wounded one guerrilla and no guerrillas were cap-
tured.
The final intensification of the Viet Minh military thrust brought local
guerrillas to the point of attacking a French outpost at a place called Hoa
Da Tay, about five miles southeast ofthe village. The outpost was actually
a heavy cement aboveground fortification, occupied by what villagers said
was **a small number’’ of Vietnamese colonial soldiers. On three separate
occasions most of My Thuy Phuong’s guerrillas joined others from Huong
Thuy District area in assaults against that point. One night in about 1953,
guerrillas surrounded the fortification. Barbed wire and mines completely
 * Battle / 61

ringed it, but those proved minor obstacles to several of the guerrillas—
highly trained sappers. Armed with grenades, satchel charges, wire cut-
ters, and other tools, the sappers quietly cut and worked their way
through the barbed wire and past the mines, creeping unnoticed close to
the base of the fort. There they placed the satchel charges, then slithered
back by the same route they had taken to enter. Some minutes later the
charges exploded, a signal that unleashed a hail of bullets and mortars
from the waiting guerrillas.
That night—and during the two other attacks at Hoa Da Tay—heavy
gunfire from the outpost defenders, who were apparently well armed and
numerous, answered the guerrilla onslaught. However, guerrillas did not
attempt to capture the outpost. They only blanketed it with fire. Here is
what one peasant said about the attacks:
There were Vietnamese soldiers in that place. Can you understand how
frightened they were during the attacks? We did not mind. We did not want to
capture that place, but only to scare the puppet troops. We knew that if any of
them died, the other puppet troops would find out about it, and they would be
sad, and there would be deserters. We knew that those who were not killed
would be very afraid, and would talk to others about how strong the Viet Minh
was. So we felt that this would weaken the French army, and would help to
make the French leave Vietnam.
Paralleling stepped-up guerrilla actions in the early 1950s were inten-
sified Viet Minh political thrusts. The Viet Minh’s frequent use of class-
oriented messages in the village, which several attributed to a local in-
crease in I.C.P. influence, sparked several incidents related to land. On
two occasions Viet Minh leaders organized groups of 20 to 30 peasants to
protest village council corruption in land distribution, which was occur-
ring in the same ways as in the 1940s. The leaders operated covertly, not
even as representatives of the Viet Minh ‘‘farmers’ affairs committee,”
and got the peasant groups to file petitions with the councils. The protest-
ing peasants also spoke at small Viet Minh gatherings against colonial land
policies. On another occasion in about 1951, the Viet Minh supported
about five or six tenant farmers who were facing stiff rent increases. Local
insurgent leaders simply sent word to the landlord that the increases were
too high and would not be paid. There was of course an implied threat in
the message, and the landlord replied by rescinding the increases.
The training and expansion ofthe local Viet Minh leadership group and
continuation of Viet Minh proselyting attracted most villagers to the
movement. People variously indicated that after 1945 ‘‘everyone followed
the Viet Minh,’ ‘‘95 percent liked the Viet Minh,’ *‘the Viet Minh was
very popular,’’ and ‘‘this was a Viet Minh village.’ These comments and
other evidence indicate that between 1945 and 1954, about 5 percent of the
village*s people supported the colonial cause, about 80 percent supported
the Viet Minh, and the remaining 15 percent assumed uncommitted posi-
tions but leaned toward support of the revolutionary movement. An esti-
mated half or more of the Viet Minh followers were reliable, active sup-
porters, and the remainder were not as reliable, so might be considered
62 / Village at War

passive supporters ofthe insurgency. And My Thuy Phuong’s uncommit-

ted felt pressures from politically committed neighbors similar to those
which uncommitted people experienced during the World War II period.
It is also noteworthy that as the Viet Minh grew strong throughout the
province, including the village, there were changes in the role played by
the I.C.P. within the movement. According to Hue residents knowledge-
able about I.C.P. history in the region, party discipline generally improved
between 1950 and 1954, and the party began to play a more:dominant role
within the Viet Minh. Under I.C.P. pressure, Viet Minh proselyting efforts
became more explicitly class-oriented, and most top Viet Minh
decision-makers in the province were party members. This last fact partly
resulted from several purges of Viet Minh ranks in the area. Several Hue
and village residents indicated that after 1950, the Viet Minh command
removed about 20 Viet Minh leaders throughout the area, ranging from
guerrilla commanders to village and regional officials. The command may
have killed or ‘‘made available’? to French security forces one or two of
those removed. However, most were simply stripped of rank and allowed
to remain active in the movement.
In the village, to make explicit what is implied above, the I.C.P. was
quite influential, operating as it did through its members—who led the
Viet Minh locally. Party policies were reflected in the village through the
actions of those men and the local Viet Minh branch. Villagers suggested
that beginning in the early 1950s, I.C.P. influence became more pro-
nounced locally, reflecting the region-wide pattern mentioned above. As
noted earlier, there were subtle shifts in Viet Minh political messages
away from those solely nationalistic in content and toward those with a
focus on class struggle. Further, the village’s Viet Minh branch purged
three men and one woman. Two of those purged were guerrilla leaders
suspected of harboring ‘‘rightist thoughts.’ The local Viet Minh com-
mand reduced them in rank. These were men of relatively prosperous
families, who apparently never captured the full trust of the village’s Viet
Minh leaders. The other man and the woman purged were husband and
wife, both responsible for ‘‘farmers’ affairs.’’ Several indicated that their
error was failure to aggressively exploit peasants’ dissatisfaction with the
pro-French council’s corruption in communal land distribution. The
couple's purge came at the direction of the village’s Viet Minh leaders,
probably a result of I.C.P. directives to more aggressively exploit politi-
cally volatile land issues in the anti-French struggle. The man and woman
were removed from their positions and lost influence in the movement,
but remained active, especially in supporting local guerrilla actions. There
were never purges within the village’s small group of I.C.P. members, and
no purges within the Viet Minh branch beyond the five just mentioned—
two more indications of the movement's great strength in My Thuy
Phuong.

In 1954, many deeply felt that strength. A peasant noted, ‘‘When we

heard that Ho Chi Minh had agreed to negotiate in Geneva, we were all
 ~
Battle / 63

happy, because we knew that it would mean victory over the French.’ A
peasant who was formerly a Viet Minh guerrilla said, ‘‘We knew that the
French were losing and wanted to leave Vietnam. So we began to get
ready to welcome the victory.’’ And another peasant described the mood
of My Thuy Phuong with these words: ‘‘Everyone was so sure that the
French were going to leave. It was so happy. None of us thought that the
Americans would make things so difficult for us. None of us thought that
the Americans would start to fight the war the French had lost.”’

NOTES
ViennOwsie pe OOF

ie) Villagers did not know the exact date of French reoccupation of Hue. It
likely occurred between March 6 and December 19, 1946. (See Vien, no. 23,
(ly PASO, W545, 2413}0))

It is stated in a North Vietnamese publication that the Viet Minh administra-

tive offices were transferred from Hue to the countryside between March 6
and December 19, 1946. (See Vien, no. 23, pp. 216-217.)
Throughout all Vietnamese villages, this name was later changed to **Com-
mittee for Resistance and Administration” and ** Military and Administrative
Committee.” (See Pike, Vietcong, p. 47.)

See The Pentagon Papers, As Published by the New York Times (New York:
Bantam, 1971), p. 15; The Senator Gravel Edition; The Pentagon Papers;
The Defense Department History of United States Decisionmaking on Viet-
nam (Boston: Beacon, 1974), p. 9.

See The Marines in Viet-Nam; 1954-1973; An Anthology and Annotated

Bibliography (Washington, D.C.: History & Museums Division, Headquar-
ters, U.S. Marine Corps, 1974), p. 9; Vien, no. 37, pp. 68-69, 75, 95.

See Bernard Fall, Street Without Joy (New York: Schocken Books, 1972),
pp. 144-173.

Vien, no. 37, pp. 71-72.

Buttinger, Vietnam: A Political History, p. 269.

See Tran Van Dinh, *“‘The Vietnam People’s Army,” p. 8.

Vien O. os) Da doe

Buttinger, Vietnam: A Dragon, pp. 667-734.

Ibid., p. 762.
See Vien, no. 37, pp. 68-69, 81. In 1949, a Binh Tri Thien division was
formed to ‘‘coordinate its actions with those of other divisions operating all
over the country with the aim of raising the level of battles of annihilation.”
(Vien, no. 37, p. 87.) By 1954, besides the Binh Tri Thien division, there was
a regiment of regulars in Thua Thien, and another in Quang Tri, one or two
companies in each district, and *‘from one platoon to one company of sufh-
ciently armed guerrillas in each village.”’ (Vien, no. 37, p. 103, 88-89, 90-95,
97-99.)
 5
Two Families
Let us break the chronology in our story of revolution in My Thuy Phuong
and briefly return to about 1950. We do this to trace the lives of two
typical village families, another way of ‘‘charting’’ the Viet Minh rise.
Here are the family cases.

THE BINH FAMILY

The first family consisted of nine people. For years they lived in a two-
room wooden house in the central part of the village near the highway. In
1950, the family head, Binh, was 50 years old. He owned about three mau
of riceland, and rented about one and one-half mau of communal land. His
wife, who was 40 years old, occasionally worked as a field laborer for
other villagers, making the equivalent of about 30 U.S. cents for a day’s
work of harvesting or cultivating. She also took care of the six children
living at home, who ranged in age from two to seventeen. Another child, a
girl, was married and living with her husband’s family.
During the 1940s, Binh had gradually managed to save and borrow
enough to purchase his riceland. But he remained heavily in debt, depen-
dent upon bountiful harvests to pay all the bills. To bring in a bit of extra
money, Binh worked at odd jobs in the village, occasionally helping a
group of men erect frames of houses on contract, or hiring himself out to
labor in others’ vegetable gardens or ricefields.
None of Binh’s children ever studied higher than elementary school. In
1950, the two sons who had finished school worked with their father in the
fields, and themselves looked for odd jobs. The younger children attended

64
 ~ Two Families | 65

a local elementary school, which was supported by local contributions

and the colonial government.
Once or twice a week the two older sons walked several miles up into
the hills west of the village to cut firewood. They tied it in bundles, and
carried huge loads back to the village for later sale. The work was
exhausting and dirty, but the extra income helped the family stay afloat
financially, and even put aside small amounts for savings. As Binh de-
scribed it, about two-thirds of his family’s income during the 1940s came
from rice production, and the rest from odd jobs family members could
find, such as field work or wood-gathering. Expenditures were many.
Rent and taxes, according to Binh, amounted to almost half of what the
family grossed every year. And purchases of fertilizer and other farming
supplies drained off another quarter of the gross. The remainder went for
living expenses, one quarter of gross family income. Binh was acutely
aware of his high fixed expenses—the taxes, rent, fertilizer and supply
costs—and worried about having enough left for family living expenses in
years of drought, floods, or high inflation. ‘‘We always had to pay the rent
and taxes first of all,’’ Binh noted, ‘‘and if we didn’t, we would get in
much trouble.”
Binh recalled that in 1950, trouble came on several fronts. First of all,
that was a year of heavy floods, which came just after rice seedlings had
been transplanted to the fields. Floodwaters swept away most of the
seedlings, and Binh lost valuable growing time and money because the
flood forced him to reseed. To complicate matters that year, there was a
searing, scorching drought during the dry season. ‘‘There was no water
for anything to grow,” he said, ‘‘and most of the crops died. Even wells in
the village were dry, and we had to go far away to carry in drinking
water.’ The Binh family’s income dropped sharply that year, and was
further drained by the serious illness during the rainy season of two or
three of his children. Medicine was expensive, but Binh felt he had to buy
it at any cost. ‘‘The year before one of our babies had died ofa bad cold,”
he remembered, ‘‘and I didn’t want that to happen again... .”
To put the Binh family’s 1950 experience in perspective it is important
to understand that people in Vietnam, as in many agricultural countries,
have for generations faced the risks of natural calamities, and have usu-
ally demonstrated great resiliency recovering from such blows. For the
Binh’s the difference in 1950 was that the family was denied some of the
advantages its ancestors had possessed when faced with floods, droughts,
or illnesses. In 1950, some members of My Thuy Phuong’s procolonial
group saw and moved to exploit Binh’s misfortune, and self-help institu-
tions were too weak and potential patrons too disinterested to help. A
generation earlier that probably would not have been the case.
Binh remembered what happened when taxes and rent for the com-
munal land came due. ‘‘Councilmen came around for the rent,’’ he said,
‘‘and told me that they wanted the same amount as usual. But they came
right after I had bought some seed and supplies, and I had no money.
66 / Village at War

How could I pay them?’ Like others before him Binh then felt compelled,
under pressure from creditors, to seek a loan. “I knew no one in the
village with extra money,’’ Binh said, ‘‘so I had to go to a moneylender to
borrow. He gave me enough for the rent and the taxes, but I had to repay
at a very high rate.’’ That monthly interest charge was about 12 to 15
percent of the total originally borrowed. The initial loan apparently
satisfied the village officials, and it gave Binh time to recover his losses.
But when the summer drought almost wiped out his harvest, Binh found
the pressure from creditors unbearable. He recalled, ‘*The moneylender
wanted his money, food was more expensive, and I had more expenses
coming up.’’ The burden of debt finally brought Binh to the point of selling
his land. But even that drastic step invited and brought financial exploita-
tion by some procolonial neighbors.
Other peasants in the village had found themselves in similar circum-
stances that year, so many were interested in selling out. The price of land
dropped and the chief buyers, the village’s already large landholders,
profited handsomely from the misfortunes of families like the Binh’s. *‘I
had no choice,’ Binh recalled. ‘‘We needed the money so badly, and I
knew the police would make me pay the taxes and land rent on time, so I
had to sell my land. If Ihadn’t sold, we would have been very hungry.”
Binh indicated that he was unable to borrow money for taxes and rent, for
he was already heavily in debt. He also said that resisting the police
demand for taxes and rent would have brought arrest for him and prob-
lems for his family.
The year 1950 was thus a turning point for Binh and his family. Natural
calamities and exploitation by members of the procolonial group trans-
formed the Binh’s from marginally successful small landowners to a fam-
ily of tenant farmers. ‘‘After we sold the land,’ Binh said, ‘‘I had to rent
land, and we never had as much money as before.’’ That lack of money
affected the family in other ways. Its diet, which had occasionally in-
cluded meat and other more expensive food items, became less varied and
less balanced. The Binh’s almost completely eliminated meat from family
meals, and reduced portions in size.
There were other significant changes for the family. Two of the older
children dropped out of school. Books, writing supplies, and school cloth-
ing simply cost more than they could afford, and Binh needed extra help in
the fields. Binh’s wife reduced the already infrequent purchases of cloth
for clothing, and the family drastically cut expenditures for annual feasts
honoring ancestors. In short, many necessities and important ‘‘extras”’
drained out of the family’s life. And for Binh himself, deepening cynicism
and resignation about future prospects tempered and replaced his earlier
happiness and optimism. ‘‘I began to feel that there was nothing I could
do for my family, to make life better for them,”’ Binh said. ‘**The harder I
worked, the poorer we became, and the richer and more powerful the
politicians became.’ To Binh, the ‘‘politicians’’ were members of the
village council, policemen, and others loyal to the colonial regime.
 7 Two Families | 67

Binh’s son recalled that over the years his father was gradually ex-
posed to anticolonial ideas. They came to him through friendships with
the teacher/leader Te and fellow peasants. Slowly, the questions of family
economics expanded in Binh’s mind to the larger questions of French
control over the village and country. He listened to Te and his friends, and
in the early 1950s finally joined the Viet Minh. Binh became involved in
small activities directed against the French, carried messages for the Viet
Minh, and sometimes served as a lookout during Viet Minh military oper-
ations. His son spoke of Binh’s political activity during those years:

My father was very happy to be helping the Viet Minh. He told us that if the Viet
Minh wins, Vietnam will be independent, and there will be a better life for
everyone. He helped the revolution in many ways. You could see how very
happy he was to be a very small part of the revolution.

Binh and other villagers had an uncomplicated vision of a ‘‘better life.”’

It meant economic prosperity and peace in the countryside.

THE TRI FAMILY

In 1950, a man named Tri lived with his family in one of the hamlets in the
ricefields. He was then 47, his wife 39, and their 8 children ranged in age
from 1 to 20. The family occupied a wooden house on a small fenced
parcel of land. Tn’s parents lived with him, occupying a simple one-room
house directly alongside the Tri home. Two children had by 1950 moved
away from home—the eldest son to join a unit of the colonial army, and a
daughter to marry. None ofthe children except the son in the military had
ever attended school.
Owning no land of his own, Tri depended for income almost exclu-
sively on rented ricelands. He rented about one maw of village communal
land, and jointly rented another mau of privately owned land. The joint
venture was with one of his neighbors, who shared the labor and the
profits. To supplement what the family made growing rice, Tri’s wife
operated a tiny soup stand in front of the family home. She sold noodle
soup, as well as small pastries and soft drinks, and made daily profits
equivalent to about 25 or 30 U.S. cents.
In the 1940s, high taxes, high rents, and steady inflation began forcing
the Tri’s into a cycle of indebtedness and sacrifice. When the drought of
1950 occurred the cycle broke, and the Tri family faced disaster. ‘I had
already borrowed a lot of money,” Tri said, “‘so could not borrow any
more. When they wanted me to pay the rent for the land, I just had
nothing left.’’ By that point the large Tri family was living on the tiny
earnings of the soup stand. It provided just enough money for one family
meal per day, a sort of rice porridge served with sauted greens and occa-
sionally fish. Tri’s wife prepared a tiny snack of rice in the mornings for
68 / Village at War

the smaller children. There was rarely any money left for ‘‘extras,’’ such
as medicine for sick children or cloth for clothing.
With pressure from creditors becoming unbearable, Tri made what he
described as ‘‘the saddest decision of my life.’’ He decided to give up his
land. He did so under considerable pressure from the landlord and village
councilmen, all of whom were unmoved by his pleas for compassion and
time. Within a week of failure to meet his payments Tri relinquished the
land, and a week later the council and his former landlord rented it to
someone else. The fact that Tri had recently planted and fertilized the land
compounded his financial loss and heartbreak, so his final investment of
time and money bore no return at all.
At first Tri was shocked to see new tenants farming the land he knew
and loved, but soon grew wiser about his plight. Tri began to understand
for the first time that his financial future probably did not lie in My Thuy
Phuong. ‘‘I saw that I could no longer be a farmer,’’ he remembered. On
that day of painful realization, life suddenly changed for the man named
Tri. He took a bus that very afternoon into Hue and wandered through the
downtown commercial section. Somehow Tri discovered that a Chinese-
owned shipping firm was hiring laborers, and he applied. The next day he
found himself loading trucks with huge, heavy sacks of rice and other
commodities. Tri earned a daily wage, the equivalent of about 30 U.S.
cents, and he endured dehumanizing discomforts. To save money he
often slept on the warehouse floor, and he worked six and sometimes
seven days a week. But Tri claimed he grew to endure the hardships and
even ‘‘like’’ the job. Working in the warehouse, he could at least maintain
his family at a subsistence level, and for the first time in years feel rela-
tively free of My Thuy Phuong’s landlords and councilmen.
There were 10 or 20 other family heads like Tri in the village—driven
off the land and into the city, separated from families by forces beyond
their control. About 50 or 60 others remained in the village, also deprived
of land but working as field laborers or wood gatherers. Most other villag-
ers experienced the same intense economic and social pressures, and had
to make many of the same financial sacrifices, but somehow managed to
meet tax and rent payments and thus keep their land.

Like the tenant farmer Binh, Tri was involved in the slow process that
brought many to the Viet Minh revolution. Beginning in the early 1950s,
Tri was exposed to new ideas from several sources. First, in his
warehouse work he met several covert Viet Minh agents long active in
Hue. One of them, according to Tri, was an articulate and intelligent man
who belonged to the I.C.P., and who took great interest in the political
views of his fellow warehouse workers. According to Tri’s son:

My father kept telling us about the new ideas at the place he worked, and about
his new friendship with a man he said was a Communist. My father began to talk
 a Two Families | 69

about how the French were using the people in the cities to get rich, and doing it
by using the Chinese and small numbers of rich Vietnamese families.

In his weekly visits home, Tri was able to see the growing popularity
and strength of the Viet Minh through conversations with two neighbors,
his brother-in-law and nephew, who in about 1950 had become members
of the local guerrilla force. Tri supported their struggle with occasional
donations from his wife’s small soup stand. His guerrilla relatives, accord-
ing to Tri, did not ‘directly pressure him to join or support their cause.
“*They only talked about the need for the people to unite to fight the
Westerners,’ Tri said. Tri also recalled that he began to pay closer atten-
tion during those informal political conversations.
One day, neighbors invited Tri and his wife to attend a Viet Minh
political study meeting in the village. They went with some trepidation.
But later Tri told his son that the meeting was ‘‘interesting’’ and ‘‘full of
good ideas.’ In 1952 or 1953, after many more conversations and a few
more meetings, Tri decided to actively support the revolution. He occa-
sionally carried small Viet Minh messages between Hue and My Thuy
Phuong—small, crumpled pieces of paper, stuffed into the linings of ciga-
rette packs. Tri also spread Viet Minh ideas in chats with fellow
warehouse workers, and with neighbors. And he continued making con-
tributions of food to local guerrillas. By the time of the 1954 Geneva
Agreement, Tri was one of the village’s most active Viet Minh followers.
His son thought back and put it this way: ‘‘My father said the Viet Minh
was the best thing for our country, and he said that we must all struggle
hard to support the cause of independence.”
 6
Ebb Tide, Rising Tide
PILGRIMAGE OF REVOLUTION

Following the 1954 national partition, which ended the Indochina war for
France, two regimes emerged in Vietnam. Ho Chi Minh headed one in the
north, while in the south a regime led by Ngo Dinh Diem came into being.!
Partition brought a definite ebb in revolutionary activity in My Thuy
Phuong, as throughout the country. It ushered in a period of quiet waiting
for most former Viet Minh followers, who expected their movement to
gain power in the nationwide plebiscite promised for 1956 by the Geneva
Agreement.
But a number of former Viet Minh left My Thuy Phuong and headed
north across the seventeenth parallel line of partition. They took a long,
roundabout route by jungle and mountain trails established during the
anti-French struggle. At the time, according to Douglas Pike, 30,000 to
100,000 Viet Minh supporters from all parts of the south journeyed to the
north, which they regarded as a safe haven.* It is unclear, however,
precisely how many left the village. Most indicated only that ‘‘some”’ or
‘“a few’? made the journey, while others said that there were about six
who made the pilgrimage of revolution to the north.
One of those who departed was the man Te, the former teacher who
had become a local Viet Minh leader. He and his companions joined a
political proselyting unit of the Vietnam People’s Army. During the
months of training, one event occurred that one of the trainees later
described to his son as “the most thrilling moment of my life.” That was

70
 ‘of Ebb Tide, Rising Tide | 71

when Ho Chi Minh visited the military unit and spoke briefly with each of
the trainees. The son, now a peasant, stated:

My father told us later that meeting Ho Chi Minh was an exciting time, and
something he would never forget. In fact, he carried with him for most of his life
a small photograph of Ho Chi Minh. He covered it with plastic so that it would
not get wet, and sometimes he took it out for strength.

According to the ‘man just quoted, many of his father’s friends found
similar strength and sustenance in vivid memories of that meeting with the
bearded revolutionary, and many of them carried photographs of Ho.
More likely than not, Te and the others anticipated short stays in North
Vietnam, perhaps a year or so, after which they would return home in
time for the 1956 plebiscite. But the men most likely failed to anticipate
Diem’s cancellation of the electoral contest. Te stayed in North Vietnam
for nearly five years. Some others from the village stayed as long, but
most left after about two years.
North Vietnamese and exiled South Vietnamese ‘‘trainers’’ constantly
showed Te and the others examples of leaders to emulate. A peasant who
was close to the leaders explained:

They [the trainers] wanted those men to turn into leaders just like Ho Chi Minh
or General [Vo Nguyen] Giap. They wanted them to become very strong Com-
munist Party members, and to understand everything about Communism. All of
the men studied those things, even the low-level guerrillas.

A few of the men who journeyed north, especially those previously

associated with the I.C.P., had long been conscious of Marxist-Leninist
ideas. To strengthen the ideological grasp of those few and broaden the
political consciousness of the others, individuals directing the training
frequently organized political study sessions. One or two northern or
exiled southern ‘‘political cadres’’ usually led such meetings, which con-
sisted of lectures and discussions of pamphlets on political ideas. One of
the men who returned from the north had these summarizing remarks
about the training:

It was a very interesting time for us in the northern part of Vietnam. We had
always been very strong fighters for the Viet Minh, and we always admired Ho
Chi Minh and the other Viet Minh leaders. The trip to North Vietnam was very
difficult and very long, but we did not ever complain, because we knew the
difficulties were for the revolution.

Our training in North Vietnam was also difficult. Sometimes the food was not
good. Sometimes we were very lonely and wanted to go home to see our
families and friends. But we learned after a while not to be lonely, and learned
to find strength in our revolutionary struggle. We learned not to think much
about our families any more. We learned not to miss our families any more—like
Ho Chi Minh.
72 =| Village at War

Others similarly indicated that throughout the entire period of rev-

olutionary activity in My Thuy Phuong, most insurgent leaders and guer-
rillas were more devoted to their cause than to families. However, they
did not completely sever all family ties. For example, they made occa-
sional covert visits to their families’ homes, and often recruited or prose-
lyted among relatives.
In summary, the northern journey made better revolutionaries of
those who went—improving organizational and guerrilla techniques,
strengthening their nationalistic feelings, thoroughly imbuing them with
ideas of class struggle, and permitting their devotion to revolution to grow
stronger than devotion to families. If not before, then certainly after the
northern training, the men from My Thuy Phuong viewed north and south
as explicit ideological as well as geographical entities. The northern ex-
perience, however, did not mean the men somehow surrendered their
claims as local insurgent leaders to North Vietnamese or became involved
in a North Vietnamese movement of conquest or subversion. As one
peasant who knew the leaders remarked, ‘‘They were southern revolu-
tionaries above all, not puppets of the North.’’ The northern trip simply
taught those who went to look for inspiration in Hanoi as they organized
My Thuy Phuong’s branch of a southern Vietnamese insurgency.

FAMILIAR ABUSES

For about its first year, the Diem Government offered some villagers the
promise of a nationalistic regime that would somehow bring pride, pros-
perity, and peace to all of South Vietnam. But after the regime took
shape, promise bore little relation to reality. ‘‘Mr. Diem’s government
began with much hope, and much nationalism and love of country,”’
recalled a retired Diem-era soldier. ‘‘But later we understood that every-
thing we wanted was not to be.’ An elderly peasant, who in 1975 was a
member of the Cult Committee, had these words:

My happiest day, the happiest day in my whole life, was when I saw two
truckloads of French soldiers leaving Hue for the last time. They drove by my
house, and they looked so sad. But I was happy. We were very happy to see the
French go, and see a nationalist government take over.

But then we saw that the government of Mr. Diem was sometimes very cruel
and sometimes just like the French.

‘Why did we support Mr. Diem?’’, asked a peasant woman. ‘‘At first
he promised peace, and promised a government of honesty. But later we
saw that there was no peace, and that the leaders were not honest. So how
could we continue to support that man?”’
What had happened to so drastically change attitudes? In short, the
Diem Government, with heavy diplomatic and financial support from the
 o Ebb Tide, Rising Tide | 73

U.S., had become fiercely anti-Communist, and the Catholic Diem family
suspicious of those who did not share its views. Under direction from the
top, the Government attempted to ‘‘neutralize’’ dissenters—revolu-
tionaries of all stripes, and many others, including anti-Communists, who
opposed its policies.
In Thua Thien/Hue, the Government’s programs were directed by a
Diem family member, the autocratic Ngo Dinh Can. His word carried the
force of law throughout the region, and under Can’s direction Govern-
ment rule meant regimentation and oppression—the pattern throughout
South Vietnam. Can’s most infamous program involved the so-called
‘strategic hamlets.’’ These were heavily defended and highly organized
groupings of families, established throughout the region, but never in My
Thuy Phuong, ostensibly to ‘‘check’’ revolutionary influence. According
to Hue residents who saw the hamlets, they resembled small concentra-
tion camps.
Under Diem, Government policies became unbearable for many indi-
viduals and groups of citizens in Thua Thien/Hue, and there were pro-
tests. Most notable were the several Struggle Movements of the early
1960s, led by Buddhist monks and lay leaders and widely supported. The
early Struggle Movements are examined in the following chapter. Suffice
it to say at this point that the Government’s strong response to the move-
ments earned it the bitter hatred of most Thua Thien/Hue residents, a
hatred which extended to anyone viewed as a Government ally—
including members of the favored Catholic minority, high Government
administrators, and even officials in places like My Thuy Phuong.

In the village itself, most of the same families which had supported the
French colonial cause constituted the pro-Government group. These were
primarily the extended families of four or five large landholders, two large
tradesmen, and several civil servants. Continuity within that group did
not mean, however, that under the colonial and Diem regimes exactly the
same individuals were sitting on the village council and dominating
economic life in the village. Rather, between 1954 and 1963 it was often
sons, brothers, or cousins of procolonial group members who assumed
council positions and cooperated with each other and with Government
authorities to gain wealth and influence for their extended families. Under
both the colonial and the Diem regimes those families constituted no more
than 3 to 5 percent of My Thuy Phuong’s people—and largely the same 3
to 5 percent. In about 1958, for example, three of the village’s four ap-
pointed councilmen were large landholders, and the fourth was a local
large tradesman. All were prosperous, pro-Government, and had opposed
the Viet Minh.
Another parallel with the colonial era was that during the Diem years
the pro-Government group failed to attract many followers in the village.
There were a dozen or so poorer people, retainers and clients of the
group, who endorsed Government rule. But most of those forced to de-
74 =| Village at War

pend on the pro-Government group’s largesse did so out of sheer

economic or political necessity. There was little willing enthusiasm for the
group, few or none of the strong traditional patron-client ties, and little or
none of the security such relationships formerly offered clients. Instead,
most villagers remembered the popularity of local Viet Minh leaders and
programs, compared memories with the realities of the Diem period, and
grew bitterly resentful. The reasons for that resentment are illustrated
below. ; :
During the Diem years a small number of pro-Government families
controlled about 30 to 40 percent of My Thuy Phuong’s land and many of
the important local commercial activities—including rice purchasing and
milling and sale of farm supplies. This was the same control pattern as in
1940-1954. Most families of the pro-Government group lived in substan-
tial homes of cement and wood construction, unlike the majority of villag-
ers, who lived in simple makeshift structures, often of roughly cut wood.
In addition, most pro-Government families ate and dressed better than
their neighbors, and often sent their children to private schools in Hue.
That was an avenue of advancement effectively barred to poorer children.
Besides economic and other factors setting most pro-Government vil-
lagers apart, there were cultural divisions nearly identical to those that
had divided the village during the colonial era. After 1954 many pro-
Government individuals continued to consider France, and to a degree
America, as sources ofinspiration. They also preferred Western furniture
designs and clothing as ‘‘modern’’ and ‘‘beautiful,’” and sometimes as-
sociated with Westernized Vietnamese in Hue. Furthermore, most such
villagers—or about 4 percent of the local population—converted to
Catholicism, since it had become the quasi-official state religion. Before
that time there had been only one Catholic family in the village. The
conversions occurred despite the strong anti-Government and by implica-
tion anti-Catholic identification of the village’s active Buddhist groups. In
about 1957, several pro-Government families built a small Catholic church
in one of the ricefield hamlets, and with help from Hue Catholics, built a
much larger one along Highway One. With the presence of these
churches, and when a priest began regular visits to say mass, Catholicism
strengthened. The converts’ grasp of their new religion grew slowly,
further widening the already wide cultural gap between themselves and
the masses of villagers.

Between 1956 and 1963, Government district authorities appointed My

Thuy Phuong’s three to five village councilmen, the number of whom had
earlier stood at six to eight.* The authorities took care to select politically
loyal individuals for the council, including ‘‘village representatives,’ a
“police councilor,’ and a ‘‘finance councilor.’’ 4+The number of village
representatives varied between one and three individuals during the
course of the Diem regime. Authorities took similar care in selection of a
village clerk, who assisted councilmen but who was not formally a council
 ~ Ebb Tide, Rising Tide | 75

member.* The selection procedures, in short, did not significantly differ

from those of the French colonialists in terms of their impact on the
village council and the village. The procedures insured that the council-
men came from a wealthy and self-interested minority.
Under Diem the Government took a number of other measures to
strengthen its influence in the village. First, there were local boundary
changes. The Government expanded the physical area and population of
council authority to include hamlets outside the central village area, and it
gave the village the name Thuy Phuong—*‘Place of the Waters.’’ Gov-
ernment presence was strengthened, second, by special public adminis-
tration training courses for all village councilmen and other local officials.
Most such courses were in Hue, and amounted to all-day meetings of
several hundred civil servants from throughout the province to hear
speeches by provincial and sometimes Saigon officials. To supplement
these training programs, the Government assigned personnel from district
headquarters for on-the-job training of My Thuy Phuong’s civil ser-
vants.

Many abuses of council authority common in the village under the

French regime became virtually routine during the Diem years. The
abuses occurred as council authority expanded in several areas, including
the execution of laws and regulations, tax collection, compilation of vital
statistics, health, justice, public works, and so forth. As the council work-
load increased, there were continued inequities in tax and rent collection,
continued unjust settlement of local disputes, and continued unfair dis-
tribution of communal lands.
Throughout the period, councilmen let it be known that such land,
limited and in great demand, was available only to those willing to involve
themselves in an informal ‘“‘arrangement.’’ This pattern was similar to that
informally in effect during the colonial period. The council rented com-
munal land only to those willing to pay slightly more than the amount
officially set by local regulations. The village policemen collected rent
payments. And the council simply ignored and forgot peasants in need of
extra land but unwilling or unable to pay the extra rent—which went
directly into councilmen’s pockets. During the Diem years, councilmen
had to compile population and other census data. This was another activ-
ity touched by corruption. A peasant spoke:

When the police and council officials came around to our house to ask about our
family, we knew why they were really coming. That information was for family
taxes, and we knew the smaller the number of people reported for our family,
the smaller would be the tax we had to pay. Everybody knew it. Everybody.

So whén they came, we knew it was best to cooperate. Sometimes we would

give them a little bit of money, maybe just 100 piasters. Not much. We knew the
money would go right into their pockets, and stay there. But we also knew that
because of this corruption we would save money on taxes.
76 =| Village at War

Villagers discovered that one form of corruption led to another, and

corruption became so deep and widespread that it was virtually unavoid-
able. The case of the local dispensary is illustrative. In about 1959, the
Government built a small district dispensary near the village’s section of
Highway One. It was supposed to be open to all district residents for first
aid and inoculations, and even for maternity care. But these services were
available only to those willing to meet the monetary demands of the nurse
who worked at the facility. There was a schedule of small fees, to cover
costs of services offered at the dispensary. But the fees people actually
had to pay were considerably higher than those listed on the schedule. A
peasant woman described the day in 1961 when her son fell from a tree he
was climbing, and twisted and broke his arm. The woman rushed the boy
to the dispensary and found there a nurse willing to help, but only at a
price. The nurse demanded a small amount of money before tending to the
boy.
Corruption also came to dispute-resolution. Law and local custom
dictated that the village council fairly settle local disputes, but the alliance
of local councilmen, large tradesmen, and large landholders brought de-
parture from tradition and the letter of the law. Once a man who earned
his living working as a laborer on others’ land protested that he had been
underpaid and overworked by a large landholder. The council heard the
case and witnesses attested to the truth of the allegations, but the laborer
lost.
There were many other instances of injustice in village dispute settle-
ment. Looking back on the Diem years, people recalled that the council
never resolved complaints against members of the pro-Government group
in favor of complainants not from that minority. Two men who were
councilmen during the Diem era actually confirmed this. There is also
evidence that the majority of villagers over a course of years grew wise
about their chances of obtaining fair hearings before the council, so
brought fewer and fewer complaints. ‘‘Many bad things happened in this
place,’ said a peasant, ‘‘and the council did nothing about them. The
people lost faith in the council, and knew that it belonged to the big
men.

In addition to expanding administrative responsibilities, the council

assumed a more overt political role in local affairs after 1955. As Diem
consolidated power, he established a quasi-official political party, the Per-
sonalist Labor Party, known as the Can Lao.® The party received heavy
governmental support and became, in effect, an extension of the Govern-
ment. Can Lao dedicated itselftoDiem’s philosophy of ‘‘Personalism.”’ It
directed members to serve the best interests of the people through en-
lightened, benevolent, and strong rule. In the village, councilmen became
the most visible and locally influential Can Lao representatives. In that
capacity councilmen endeavored, first of all, to attract members to the
party. They saw to it that as many civil servants and soldiers as possible
 a Ebb Tide, Rising Tide | 77

joined the Huong Thuy District Can Lao branch. However, few joined
besides the soldiers and civil servants.
The councilmen’s second major party task was to insure Can Lao
success in the periodic elections for the National Assembly. There is
evidence that this was reflected, first, in pressure on voters to support
particular party candidates. Electoral control was rarely expressed as
‘instruction,’ but rather as “‘guidance.’’ Councilmen simply spread the
word in informal conversations that support for certain candidates was
desirable. Villagers understood that if they did not vote as expected there
could be deep trouble, even arrest. ‘‘Everybody knew that the elections
were dishonest,’ recalled a peasant, ‘‘and everybody voted for the Gov-
ernment men because we had to.’” Another peasant said, “‘It would be
much trouble for me if Ivoted the wrong way. I might be arrested, or get
trouble with paperwork. So it was easiest to agree with the Government.”
Councilmen assured Can Lao electoral success, second, through outright
ballot-box stuffing. *‘The province authorities in Hue told us this was
alright,’ said a Diem-era councilman, ‘‘so we did it.”’ The former coun-
cilman added that Can Lao candidates usually received upwards of 90 or
95 percent—and sometimes even 100 percent—of the votes cast in My
Thuy Phuong.
Complementing the council’s Can Lao support function was its in-
volvement in numerous Government-sponsored associations and commit-
tees in the village, which involved a wide range of people. One such group
was the Huong Thuy Farmers Association, which established a village
branch in the late 1950s. Another committee, which attempted to assist
and advise the village council in settlement of local and landlord-tenant
disputes, was the Agricultural Affairs Committee. There was also a group
called the Local Development Committee, designed to provide the coun-
cil with assistance on economic development and public works projects in
the village. Another local organization was the Parents of Students As-
sociation. Still another was Young Women of the Republic, inspired by
Diem’s sister-in-law, and aiming at involvement of women in support of
various Government activities. And then there was Republican Youth,
which emerged as an unofficial branch of Can Lao, and was a local
paramilitary force.
Participation in these and other local ‘‘people’s organizations” was
coerced and hardly enthusiastic. For example, peasants understood that
the Government expected them to belong to the Farmers’ Association, so
most grudgingly attended the occasional meetings. The Young Women of
the Republic operated in similar fashion. Women had to join. Periodically,
the Government organized and marched or trucked members from the
village to sites of large rallies. There officials lined the women up, and told
them to cheer at appropriate points during speeches by local, provincial,
and sometimes national women’s leaders.
Republican Youth organized nearly all of the young people over the
age of about 15 for essentially the same sorts of events, and trained some
78 | Village at War

in paramilitary functions. Again, membership was required. In the village,

there were 20 or 30 of the paramilitary Combat Youth, part-time and
poorly armed. Led by teachers, Government ‘youth and sports cadres,”’
and local military officials, young people belonging to Republican Youth
participated in rallies, sporting events, talent contests, and village
cleanups, and assisted militiamen in static defense functions. Always
these activities bore the mark of the Government, for Republican Youth
leaders made clear to the young people that they expected attendance’and
enthusiasm at the special events, and that they would interpret nonin-
volvement and neglect of paramilitary duties as an anti-Government sign.

My Thuy Phuong’s people had many other tales of manipulation and

corruption by local councilmen, large landholders, tradesmen, and others.
They are tales of a local pro-Government group that remained confident
and powerful through the 1950s and into the 1960s. The group was confi-
dent because of the entire governmental system behind it, including the
laws, regulations, and security forces which in general reinforced its
domination of village life. And the group was powerful because for many
years it and the Government succeeded in cowing political opponents—at
least until the early 1960s, when a new revolutionary movement grew
strong.

REFOCUSED MOVEMENT
During the early years of the Diem regime, many perceived the ‘‘rem-
nants’ of the Viet Minh village leadership in a new fashion. The ‘‘rem-
nant’’ leaders began to seem indecisive, perhaps because some other local
revolutionaries had departed for the north, or because of widespread
bewilderment at the fate of the Viet Minh. One peasant recalled that the
Diem years were frustrating ones for him:

When our country was divided after the Geneva Agreement we all hoped that
there would be a unified country very soon under the Viet Minh. But when that
did not happen, we were sad that the Viet Minh seemed so weak. They seemed
unable to do anything about that. They seemed to be very afraid of the Govern-
ment. Many people here would have helped the Viet Minh if the Viet Minh had
tried to continue struggling, but the Viet Minh was very quiet, and the national
army and police operated very strongly.

It was not until about 1960 or some year at about that time that the Liberation
Front began to operate here. So before the Liberation began, it was a difficult
time. Many of us did not know what to do.

Another peasant put it this way:

Why did the Viet Minh do so much for us, and then stop? Why did they do so
much to make our people into revolutionaries, and then leave us? The Com-
 * Ebb Tide, Rising Tide | 79

munists are very tricky. They did it because they knew that after a few years
living under Mr. Diem and the Americans that we would be stronger revolution-
aries than before. Ah, the Communists are very tricky!

This man’s use of ‘‘tricky’’ was intended to convey respect, and bore
no intended negative connotation. Still another peasant commented,
“The 1950s were very difficult, and many people remembered the Viet
Minh because it was something that we all supported. It made us proud.
But when the Viet Minh no longer operated we had to wait for something
new to take its place.”

By the late 1950s or 1960-1961, the men who had journeyed north were
back in My Thuy Phuong—or at least in the hills west of the village. ‘‘ For
sO many years they had been away in North Vietnam,’’ remembered a
peasant, ‘‘and when they came back we couldn’t believe it. Some of us
thought that they had died. We were surprised to see them return, and we
were very happy to hear them say that they wanted to organize the Liber-
ation in the area.”’
On December 20, 1960, at a time of rising dissatisfaction in many parts
of Vietnam, a variety of individuais, many of whom had been linked to the
Viet Minh, founded the National Liberation Front of South Vietnam.’ Its
main objective, according to a Front publication, was to “‘overthrow the
disguised colonial regime of the U.S. imperialists and the dictatorial Ngo
Dinh Diem administration—lackey of the United States—and to form a
national democratic coalition administration.’ § The Front began its ac-
tivities with no nationwide organization of its own, but before long built
one. In late 1961, the Front set up committees—at first just on paper—for
Huong Thuy District, and then for My Thuy Phuong.’ The village commit-
tee, called the Administrative Liberation Association, consisted of about
seven to ten men, all of whom had been active in the Viet Minh. One or
two of them belonged to the People’s Revolutionary Party, which accord-
ing to George Kahin and John Lewis was an ‘‘unconcealed communist
element within the Front.’ '° Kahin and Lewis also write that Com-
munists dominated the Front from its inception, and imply that this came
through the party.'!
Village committee members named Te, the former teacher, and Minh,
the large landholder’s son, as chairman and vice-chairman respectively.
The committee also placed the son of the peasant Truong in charge of
Farmers’ Affairs, and assigned others responsibility for Economy and
Finance, Youth, and Security. In their new positions, Te, Minh, and many
of their former Viet Minh colleagues began to build a new local political
force. Their initial efforts were marked by essentially the same tactics that
had been employed so successfully during the Viet Minh years. In the
early years Front leaders moved through My Thuy Phuong mainly during
hours of darkness. Sometimes carrying weapons, they made frequent
visits to different parts of the village. The men approached families or
80 / Village at War

small groups of family representatives, and talked with them about local
conditions and the aims of the Front. A peasant recalled:

I remember in the years right after Viet Cong became active—before Mr. Diem
was overthrown—they came at night, usually just a few of them, and made our
families listen to their propaganda. Those Viet Cong never threatened us. They
never did anything bad to us, but we were a little bit afraid of them, because we
did not know anything about them. So we all went, and listened, and usually did
not say anything.

Sometimes, also, people who were our friends and who were with the Viet Cong
came to our house. Often they would tell us to join them. They said, ‘‘We are
friends. You should join.”* They came to our house so often, and it happened to
almost everybody here.

The Front’s local leaders distributed flyers, leaflets, discussion sheets,

posters, and occasionally newspapers. There were also Front radio pro-
grams, broadcast from clandestine stations in remote mountainous parts
of South Vietnam.'? While Front publications and broadcasts were tech-
nically unsophisticated compared with the Government’s, their messages
were imaginative and effective. There were a number of pamphlets issued
by the Thua Thien/Hue Front organization which reached My Thuy
Phuong. These addressed specific regional problems, citing specific inci-
dents involving the Government and its opponents, and describing
specific Front activities in specific places.
Front leaders began to portray their movement in all their conversa-
tions with villagers as the chief opponent of the Government, and as the
chief hope for relief from the political oppression people increasingly
associated with the Government. Those conversations concerned general
national issues, dwelling at length on American aid to the Diem regime
and the Government’s pro-Catholic, anti-Buddhist orientation. Further-
more, local Front leaders and Front leaflets and broadcasts reported de-
tails of demonstrations and other anti-Diem activities in different parts of
Vietnam.
After the first few months of Front activity, revolutionary messages
began to flow once again in My Thuy Phuong. A peasant likened the
village mood to the late 1940s, when the Viet Minh was taking root.
Then we had to be a little bit afraid of French police, and French spies,”’
he said. “‘It was the same under Mr. Diem. We had to speak very care-
fully, and sometimes speak in strange ways, not really saying what we
wanted to say, but only giving a little idea of the meaning we wanted.”
The peasant paused, thought for a moment, then flashed a quick smile.
‘What I mean to say,’* he concluded, *‘is that we were testing each other,
testing new political ideas.”
 ~ Ebb Tide, Rising Tide / 81

NOTES
Among the best of many books focusing on this period is George McT. Kahin
& John W. Lewis, The United States in Viet-Nam (New York: Dial Press,
1967).
i) Pike, Vietcong, p. 53.

See Nguyen Thai, /s South Vietnam Viable? (Manila: Carmelo & Bauer-
mann, 1962), pp. 68-70; available in East-West Resource Systems Institute
Library, Honolulu, Hawaii. For a detailed discussion of the Diem-era civil
service system, with qualifications for employment, salaries, etc. included,
see Dale Rose, The Vietnamese Civil Service System (Saigon: Michigan
State Advisory Group, 1961); available in East-West Resource Systems In-
stitute Library, Honolulu.
Cf. Nghiem Dang, Viet-Nam; Politics and Public Administration (Honolulu:
East-West Center Press, 1966), p. 154.

tn After May, 1963, the Government again slightly increased the number of
council members, and it ordered councilmen chosen by members of hamlet
administrative councils and by local voluntary group leaders. Because these
hamlet and group leaders were themselves elected by the people, village
councilmen were chosen, in effect, by indirect suffrage. Also see ibid., p.
156.
This was short for Can-Lao Nhan-Vi Dang.

The Pentagon Papers, pp. 74-78.

South Viet-Nam National Front for Liberation; Documents (South Vietnam:

Giai Phong Publishing House, 1966), p. 19; available in Cornell Library.

Gee Vienanones-1p soll:

Kahin & Lewis, op. cit., p. 132; also see Pike, op. cit., pp. 136-153.

Kahin & Lewis, ibid.

Some villagers said the broadcasts began as early as 1961. Others indicated
they began in 1962.
 i
Struggle
RENEWED BATTLE

Establishment of My Thuy Phuong’s Front committee in 1961-1962 coin-

cided with the beginning of local guerrilla warfare.' At the time, there
were 15 or 20 guerrillas in the village, remnants of the earlier Viet Minh
struggle, and officially members of the Liberation Army.” Local Front
leaders organized guerrillas into three-man cells, and in 1962-1963 formed
one or two squads.
The guerrillas needed no refresher course in military tactics, and suf-
fered no particular lack of weapons. During those early years, in fact,
guerrillas obtained weapons from a variety of sources, often fashioning
their own. Knives, for example, were readily available, and guerrillas
sharpened them into deadly weapons. They also manufactured hand gre-
nades from a variety of available materials. Guerrillas had to obtain only
explosive charges from outside the village. Front agents actually pur-
chased some weapons, such as American carbines, from Government
soldiers in need of pocket money. Among the most important of weapons
were punji sticks, small sharpened stakes of bamboo used in traps. And
the strangest guerrilla weapons of all were facsimile rifles, carved from
wood.?
Several villagers commented that during the early 1960s—as during the
Viet Minh period—they were frequently exposed to guerrillas, sometimes
daily. They also noted that the guerrillas operating in My Thuy Phuong,
like their Viet Minh predecessors, projected an image of simplicity. First,
guerrillas dressed in the scantiest of clothes. They usually wore black

82
 ~ Struggle | 88

shorts, along with shirts of heavy-duty material. Guerrillas avoided con-

spicuous colors and patterns or marks of rank. Occasionally they went
barefoot, but more often than not wore sandals made of old tires, with
soles of hard outer tire layers, and the supporting straps of inner tubes.
These were the so-called Ho Chi Minh or Binh Tri Thien sandals, which
had an added advantage when guerrillas strapped them on backwards.
Worn in that fashion, the sandals left prints in mud or sand that misled
trackers.
When guerrillas journeyed far from the village, each man carried, in
addition to weapons and ammunition, a small plastic or metal rice bowl, a
spoon, and chopsticks. In each squad or attack group one man carried a
small pot and a cooking spoon. Guerrillas prepared and ate all of their
food with these simple utensils. For sanitary reasons, they used an un-
usual eating method called ‘‘chopsticks two ends.”’ The guerrillas served
food to themselves with one end of the chopstick set and ate with the
other.
Villagers’ comments suggest, in summary, that the simple clothes and
eating utensils not only identified guerrillas with the poor and enhanced
their image as men making great sacrifices, but were highly practical,
giving them greater tactical mobility than those they fought.

After 1954, a gradual Government military buildup occurred in the

immediate vicinity of My Thuy Phuong. Army units occupied former
colonial garrisons, and the Government constructed new Army camps in
Thua Thien/Hue. It staffed the Huong Thuy District headquarters with
about a company of soldiers, and used the headquarters as a command
point for military activities throughout the district. Occasionally over the
years between 1954 and 1963, larger numbers of troops from distant mili-
tary installations came for operations to the village area. And soldiers
from district headquarters paid frequent visits to the small building used
by the village council and other civil servants.
Over the years, Army units organized operations to ‘“‘neutralize’’ dis-
sident influence in the village. Such operations came frequently, and they
were more frequent and intense than local operations by French military
units. The operations mainly involved Army troops from outside the dis-
trict, along with a number of local military and paramilitary units. Here is
a description of a typical operation, which people remembered primarily
because it came at the time of the 1962 commemoration of Buddha’s
Birthday. As the description unfolds, it is important to remember that
about 10 similar operations came to My Thuy Phuong between 1955 and
1963.
When several former Government soldiers who were actual partici-
pants in the operation looked back on it, they noted that it occurred about
a week following a serious breach of security: local guerrillas had am-
bushed a military convoy moving through My Thuy Phuong. The opera-
tion also came at a time of mounting anti-Government agitation in the
84 / Village at War

province. Buddhist leaders were becoming more vocal in their criticism of

Diem’s policies, and had focused attention on celebration of Buddha’s
Birthday. Hue’s An Quang Buddhist leaders had requested Government
permission to organize massive public prayer meetings and processions,
but the Government had refused the request. Government suspicions of
the Buddhists, and nervousness about increased guerrilla activity, led
local Government authorities to organize military operations throughout
Thua Thien/Hue at about the time of Buddha’s Birthday. According to a
Catholic priest from Huong Thuy District, ‘‘It was to show the V.C. that
the Government was strong, and to make the opponents of the Govern-
ment afraid.’
The operation in My Thuy Phuong that day began quietly. In command
was an Army major, who was assisted by a captain and several lieuten-
ants, and who actually accompanied his troops. About one battalion of
regular Army personnel was involved, and was augmented by a number of
local units—one or two platoons of policemen, a platoon or two of local
forces soldiers, and some village militiamen. While some villagers knew in
advance about the operation, most did not. The sweep began about 5:00
A.M., when people were just beginning to stir. Men and older boys were
preparing for a day in the fields and women were brewing tea and starting
the day’s rice pots. A peasant described how it all began: **We were just
getting ready to go to work, as usual, when the soldiers came. There were
so many of them, with guns and radios. They were ina line, like they were
hunting wild pigs, and searched everywhere.’ The soldiers passed
through the area of the peasant’s house—searching, probing, questioning.
‘*When the soldiers came to my house,” the peasant remembered, ‘‘they
divided in two. One group asked for our identification papers, and asked
us many questions, and the other group searched the house.” The soldiers
detained any adult without complete identification, and anyone deemed
suspicious met a similar fate. According to soldiers who were on the
operation, Government forces detained 25 or 30, mostly adult males, and
turned them over to Government district authorities for ‘*processing.”’
That usually meant detention of at least three or four days, interrogation,
possibly torture, then release or imprisonment with or without trial.
There are indications that Government soldiers undertook the house
searches with considerable energy. ‘‘They looked at everything,’’ said a
peasant woman. ‘‘They searched everything, and we did not dare com-
plain.’ During the operation, soldiers engaged in widespread and system-
atic looting. The soldiers vied for the house-searching assignments, and
seemed to prefer operations in densely populated, relatively prosperous
villages like My Thuy Phuong, where they considered looting prospects
better. People had many looting tales from that day’s operation. Looting
occurred during the course of house searches, and many types of loot
interested the soldiers. One peasant woman claimed that three soldiers
carried off six of her ducks. Another peasant woman said that a small
stash of money disappeared during the search of her home—the equiva-
lent of about US$10, which she had set aside for family emergencies.
 ~ Strugele | 85

Another peasant family lost a bicycle, while a tradesman’s family saw its
sewing machine carried off. A pattern emerged as the looting proceeded.
Nearly all of the low-ranking soldiers in the search parties stole, favoring
items that could be resold easily. And they looted most houses along the
path of the sweep.
Many people, who may or may not have been associated with local
guerrillas or other anti-Government groups, fled the searchers, and a
static line of soldiers caught some who fled. The soldiers that day lined
Highway One. Other soldiers moved toward the static line through the
westward portion of the village. Several who wandered out toward the
highway and the line of soldiers were detained. Three men who were
members of the local guerrilla force fled from the advancing soldiers out
toward the highway. The three carried carbines. As they approached the
highway they probably sensed danger and grew cautious, for they began
crawling through a small ricefield. It is unclear precisely what happened
next, but the outcome is indisputable: the three guerrillas were killed.
Like the French operation described earlier, the 1962 Buddha’s Birth-
day operation unsettled the rhythm of village life, inconvenienced and
brought loss to many, and tarnished the Government’s reputation. *‘Ev-
ery time the Army came they made more friends for the V.C.,”’ noted a
peasant. Another peasant added, ‘*Cruel like the French.”’

As the events of that 1962 operation unfolded, people were probably

most aware of the role played by soldiers of the Army, for there were
many of them, they were most heavily armed, and they did most of the
looting. But police and other military units also assumed important roles
that day—and many other days—in the village. During the Diem years,
the police contingent in Huong Thuy District increased substantially,
from a 1954 district-wide level of about seven men to a high in 1963, of
fifteen to twenty. The Government assigned full-time policemen to My
Thuy Phuong and other villages, and others to district headquarters, from
which they could be drawn for operations and other special requirements.
Police personnel received Government training in traditional police
functions—levying of fines for petty infractions, settlement of local dis-
putes, and the like—but also in several security functions even more
sophisticated than those performed by district police under the French.
While the colonialists had established intelligence nets of some complex-
ity in the My Thuy Phuong area, the Government succeeded in duplicat-
ing that feat and improving on it.
Policemen also assumed other specialized tasks after 1954. They 1s-
sued and later checked the required family and individual identification
papers. As before, they collected taxes and sometimes rents, and en-
forced decisions of local authorities, including the village council. And as
in the instance just described, policemen assisted in military actions
which came to the village. Suffice it to add at this point that most Diem-era
policemen in the area were corrupt. Their wide-ranging assignments, the
lack of constant, honest supervision, and association with dishonest and
86 / Village at War

opportunistic individuals in and out of the Government meant that corrup-

tion came almost inevitably.

But other units besides police supported the activities of Army regu-
lars. There were the local forces, consisting in Huong Thuy District of one
company of Civil Guard soldiers, most of whom were from local villages.
And in each village of Huong Thuy, including My Thuy Phuong, there
were part-time militiamen, who also performed security functions. The
village had only about 20 or 25 militiamen, all of whom received some
weapons training, and whose loyalties to the Government were generally
strong.
The Civil Guard had a defensive mission. It guarded the Government
district compound, important bridges within the district, and other impor-
tant points in Huong Thuy. Militiamen guarded village offices, protected
local councilmen, and patrolled village paths. Sometimes, as in the Bud-
dha’s Birthday operation, local-force soldiers and militiamen accom-
panied nonlocal Army units and policemen, and sometimes even partici-
pated in various aggressive thrusts into the villages. More often, how-
ever, local forces assisted in static or defensive phases of such operations.
For example, they often served in blocking forces along perimeters of
areas being searched.
Civil Guard soldiers, according to many sources, were not as well
trained or as reliable as the Army regulars, and even less motivated to
fight. And their desertion rate was high. ‘‘ At least a third of my men were
usually gone at any one time,’ said a former Civil Guard sergeant. ‘‘I
should have punished them, but didn’t like to,’ he added. Typically,
soldiers deserted once every month or two. Desertion usually involved
relatively short periods—five to seven days—and nearly everyone in local
forces enlisted ranks practiced it. People considered local militiamen
something of a joke. Their generally poor training and rag-tag appearance
prompted one peasant to comment, ‘‘They could not even protect them-
selves, their training was so bad. How could they protect the people?
What ridiculous representatives of Mr. Diem. Not cruel, just ridiculous.”’
It should be noted in passing that there were only about 50 men from
My Thuy Phuong serving at any one time as Army regulars or Civil Guard
members, meaning that during the Diem era military service did not take
too many away from previous occupations or transform the village’s work
force. And desertions were actually minor economic stabilizing factors
locally, as many who left units for short periods often aided relatives in
the fields. Not helping much were the salaries paid Diem-era soldiers,
which were so low that they added little to families’ wealth and had almost
no impact on the village economy.

The Diem years provided the people of My Thuy Phuong with ample
and clear evidence that the Government’s various security branches were
strong in terms of weaponry and firepower, but weak in command, or-
ganization, and motivation. Many laid much of the blame for these weak-
 . Struggle | 87

nesses at the feet of about 10 Government military officers, who were

widely known in the area. These soldiers, several of whom are briefly
profiled here, held middle-echelon command positions, were chiefly re-
sponsible for Government security operations, and were indirectly re-
sponsible for administration in Huong Thuy of the entire Government
program. They found themselves deeply involved with members of the
village’s pro-Government group in supporting Government programs for
the village. In effect, these 10 officers and the pro-Government minority
joined forces.
Few of these locally influential soldiers were from the area. Without
exception, however, they were veterans of the French colonial armed
forces, and in most cases were imbued with Western military strategies
and cultural preferences. One of them was a man named Phuoc. From
about 1958 to 1963, he was an Army lieutenant assigned to Huong Thuy
District. To know Phuoc is to begin to understand how the apparatus for
which he worked operated in My Thuy Phuong. So here is his story.
Lieutenant Phuoc was born and raised in a suburb of Hanoi. His father
had been a tradesman, and he was brought up as a devout Catholic. When
Phuoc was a young man, according to a relative, he volunteered for the
French colonial armed forces and trained for a year or two in France itself
before serving for about 10 years as a field artillery officer. When the
Geneva Agreement partitioned Vietnam, Phuoc was among the thousands
of refugees who journeyed from the northern to southern portions of the
country. Phuoc voluntarily joined the Army in about 1956. ‘‘He wanted to
fight the Communists again,”’ said his relative. After being shifted around
from unit to unit and from province to province, in about 1958 Phuoc was
assigned to Huong Thuy District. He remained there until 1963, and in the
course of a few years rose in rank to first lieutenant. Phuoc’s advance-
ment through the ranks was paralleled by an increase in his personal
influence throughout the district, including My Thuy Phuong.
Phuoc was dedicated to suppressing anti-Government dissenters.
Charged by the district chief with partial responsibility for security of the
area, Phuoc became directly involved in military and police operations.
He spent many hours every week organizing coordinated military and
police antiguerrilla operations in the villages. In this connection, Phuoc
spent much of his time setting up, supporting, and coordinating intelli-
gence networks. People knew him best for this phase of his work.
There had been intelligence networks functioning in the area during the
colonial era, but between 1954 and 1963, the Government gave such net-
works greater emphasis than ever before for suppression of dissent.
Phuoc worked individually with the informers who constituted these net-
works, emphasizing in discussions his interest in several types of informa-
tion. He wanted names of local guerrillas and information on people heard
or suspected of criticizing the Government, including those not connected
with the Front or, previously, with the Viet Minh. He also was interested
in information on guerrilla activities, such as meetings, military plans, or
taxation schedules.
88 / Village at War

There were about five informers working for Phuoc in My Thuy

Phuong. Several who remembered him said that Phuoc grew elated when
more detailed, ‘‘higher quality’’ intelligence came his way. This was in-
formation which was from reliable sources, and which concerned specific
activities by specific individuals in the area. When he received such intel-
ligence, Phuoc rarely delayed before acting. Once in 1961 or 1962, an
informer presented Phuoc with a report that a particular peasant family in
My Thuy Phuong had been assisting local guerrillas. Phuoc’s immediate
response was to arrest the whole family, except its youngést children.
Phuoc held them as ‘‘ Viet Cong suspects,’’ despite their denials of guilt.
While being held they were threatened and tortured, and Phuoc was in
charge of the interrogation/torture sessions.
A peasant long active in Buddhist Family Association affairs offered
another example of Phuoc’s security function in the village. The peasant
thought back to 1962-1963, when the An Quang Buddhist organization
was rallying opposition to the Government’s anti-Buddhist policies, and
described Phuoc during that period as a ‘‘very busy man.’’ According to
the peasant and others, in early 1963, when nationwide anti-Government
protests by Buddhists were intensifying, Phuoc learned that two local
teachers, who were active in village Buddhist organizations but commit-
ted to neither Government nor Front, had gone to Hue for a meeting of
Buddhist youth leaders. Phuoc ordered their immediate arrest. Police
brought the two men to the Government district headquarters, and they
appeared before Phuoc. According to one of them, Phuoc was at first
deferential and polite, but soon his intentions became clearer. ‘‘He told
us, very politely, that he had the authority to hold us indefinitely without
charges,’ the teacher said, ‘‘and then he told us what he wanted.’’ Phuoc
was interested in obtaining the names of all those who had attended the
meeting in Hue, and wanted a list of all Buddhist activists in the village.
‘‘They beat us and threatened our families with arrest,’’ said the teacher,
‘‘but we decided to be strong and tell him nothing. We thought we were
surely going to be killed.’’ When the threats and beatings did not work,
Lieutenant Phuoc sent the two teachers off to prison in Hue, where they
remained until the fall of Diem.
These two vignettes demonstrate the role of one influential Govern-
ment military officer in the village area. Phuoc’s efficiency, loyalty, and
enthusiasm in carrying out his security functions earned him the respect
and favor of his superiors in the Government bureaucracy, and had a
powerful effect in the village. That is, Phuoc’s preoccupation with intelli-
gence networks, and his involvement in more overt security operations
meant inconvenience, arrest, jail, and in some cases even death to many
of the village’s anti-Government dissenters.
Lest his role be misunderstood, we should view Phuoc as only the
most infamous of many influential Government soldiers assigned during
1954-1963 to the My Thuy Phuong area. In addition to Phuoc, there was a
sergeant named Minh, who in 1962-1963 often led squads of soldiers into
the village. According to a teacher, ‘‘Once in 1963 he helped beat up a
 Struggle | 89

group of Buddhist high school students. They were preparing for a dem-
onstration in Hue.’’ Another soldier was Hung, also a sergeant, whose job
between about 1960 and 1963 was to train village officials in implementa-
tion of regulations and decrees. However, Hung’s major involvement in
My Thuy Phuong and elsewhere did not relate very directly to training.
Rather, he was more interested in getting a share of the rents and taxes
collected in the villages. ‘‘That man was so corrupt that he didn’t even
hide it,’ remembered a peasant. **He often took part of our rent money as
he stood right in front of us.”
And then there was Tu, the lieutenant from a devout Catholic family,
who people remembered as ‘‘strongly anti-Communist.’’ He was the
officer under Phuoc who had direct responsibility for interrogation of
detainees. Many heard that Tu displayed inhuman cruelty and sadism
during the interrogation sessions, so gave him a special nickname: Tu the
Dog.

As part of their general response to Government security forces, vil-

lage guerrillas engaged in sniping and arranged ambushes along My Thuy
Phuong’s branch of Highway One. Just as Viet Minh guerrillas had done,
Front snipers fired on military patrols moving through the area, and they
occasionally targeted trucks in ambushes.?
A major guerrilla tactic practiced in My Thuy Phuong during the early
1960s involved the use of punji sticks. Here guerrillas depended upon
support from the people for the tactic to succeed, for Front supporters,
especially the relatives of guerrillas, were involved in punji stick produc-
tion. In their free time, guerrillas and their supporters retreated to the hills
west of the village or to ‘‘safe’> homes, carrying with them a quantity of
bamboo. The sticks were easy to make—sometimes even children helped
cut them—and villagers produced them in huge quantities. After making
the sticks, guerrillas and their supporters dug shallow trenches on either
side of paths used by Government patrols in the village. They placed
hundreds of punji sticks, sometimes tipped with human feces, in the
trenches, pointed in toward the paths themselves. They then laid thin
layers of grass and leaves on top ofthe sticks to conceal them. Guerrillas
left the punji traps unattended, or retreated to sniping positions near-
by.
In one instance, the snipers’ wait was not long. In about 1962, a Civil
Guard patrol approached along a village path. When the patrol reached
the point of the punji traps, Front snipers opened fire, and several Gov-
ernment soldiers jumped to the sides of the path, immediately impaling
themselves on the sticks. Seeing their success, the snipers faded away by
tunnel, and the Government soldiers quickly retreated with their
wounded. People recalled that particular punji incident because of the
strong reaction it brought from the Government. A day after the incident,
there was a company-size Civil Guard operation in the hamlet nearest the
trap. Soldiers searched all homes in the area, arrested a few residents, and
did some looting. A peasant who helped make punji sticks recalled:
90 / Village at War

When the Government military operation came, the Government soldiers be-
haved very badly, and were very cruel to the people. So people began to think
to themselves that everything they had heard about the Government being bad
was true. Maybe they supported the Communist side after that.

Others suggested that few felt anger with the Front after such Gov-
ernment retaliatory operations. There were three main reasons for that.
First, many had actually been involved in or at least knew in advance of
the Front actions. Second, Front guerrillas and local leaders conducted
themselves in a generally polite and humble fashion. And third, those
same leaders often warned and psychologically prepared people in ad-
vance of Government operations. The simple weapons of punji sticks
were thus connected to the Front’s political strategy, for not only did the
tactic serve to undermine Government credibility and effectiveness, but
the harsh Government response it elicited may have actually caused sup-
port for the Front to heighten.

During the first years of Front activity, guerrillas often brought pres-
sure to bear against pro-Government villagers. A peasant recalled one
instance:

There was a man on the village council who was very bad, and who everyone
thought was taking money for himself. So one night the Communists began to
put up papers all through the area near that man’s house. The papers gave his
name, and said that he must change his bad ways, or the people of the revolu-
tion would kill him. The papers were a warning.

There were other instances of such warnings by paper, but sometimes

warnings took another form—destruction. A peasant commented on what
happened to a corrupt policeman. “‘One night a very large bomb exploded
in front of that man’s house,’ he recalled. ‘‘It did not hurt anybody, but I
think it made him very afraid.’’ After the explosion, the policeman
slightly changed his demeanor, becoming more cautious and not as bla-
tantly corrupt.
Of more immediate importance to villagers were the attacks against
some of the larger landholders. A peasant explained how Front personnel
directed warnings against them:

When the rich landowners tried to collect rent, we let them know that we did not
agree. We told the people to say, ‘No, we will not pay you so much. We will
give you some, but not so much.”

The landlords were afraid of us, so they had to agree. The people were so
happy then, and they thanked us. We always said, ‘‘No, do not thank us. We
were just doing our duty. We work for the people.”
 Struggle / 91

DEEPENING COMMITMENT
‘“There were so many people here who supported the Communists,”’ a
tradesman recalled, *‘that sometimes I had the idea everybody supported
that side.’ He was speaking of the period 1962-1963. It was then that
Government security activities intensified and resulted in the arrest or
death of about 20 insurgents in My Thuy Phuong. And the Front met force
with force. As guerrillas grew more active, there was a deepening of
commitment to the Front in the village. Speaking of 1962-1963, a peasant
had these words:

It was an important weapon of the Liberation to organize as many people as

possible. It did so because the Liberation depended on the people. Liberation
means the support of as many people as possible, because if the people are not
happy, then the military struggle can never be successful. The people are the
most important, and at that time all the people here helped the Liberation.

Others said that at least 75 percent of My Thuy Phuong’s people sup-

ported the Front, about 5 percent supported the Government, and the
remaining 20 percent were uncommitted. About half the Front supporters
were actively involved in assisting Front leaders and guerrillas, and the
other half passively supported the insurgent cause. Speaking of the un-
committed, a small tradesman asserted, ‘‘They did not want to fight. They
didn’t care about politics.’ Others indicated that, as during the Viet Minh
era, many of the uncommitted came under intense pressure from both
Government and insurgent forces. And by the mid-1960s, many shifted to
pro-Front stances—a phenomenon examined in Chapter 8.
People assisted Front guerrillas both directly and through an emerging
network of runners and lookouts, and supplied reports concerning Gov-
ernment activities, some of which proved useful in planning attacks. As
noted earlier, others helped guerrillas prepare punji traps, and still others
volunteered to work digging the tunnels which honeycombed drier sec-
tions of the village. These manpower drafts, it should be emphasized,
were entirely voluntary, though some volunteers may have helped due
more to family or peer-group pressure than devotion to the Front cause.
Drafts for the local guerrilla force are discussed below.
Finally, commitment to the Front was reflected in the willingness of
many to give contributions to Front tax collectors. As during the Viet
Minh period, there were no set ‘‘taxation schedules”’ for the village, nor
tax-collection agents designated as such. The collectors usually identified
themselves as members of the Finance/Economy Section of the local
Front committee. Monetary contributions varied with the wealth of the
families, and with the military activities of village guerrillas. In other
words, collectors encouraged larger contributions from more prosperous
families and during periods of heightened guerrilla attack. Many people
who could afford no monetary donations, or who only gave token
amounts of money, sometimes donated various types of food to the Front.
92 | Village at War

Most commonly they gave small stocks of uncooked rice. Occasionally

men carried small amounts of rice and other food with them to the
ricefields, ostensibly for their own consumption. Sometimes in broad day-
light, they turned the food items over to local guerrillas—a fact which
came to the attention of the Government, and which prompted it to pro-
hibit the carrying of food to the ricefields.

A word on revolutionary organizations. In their recollections of early

Front efforts in the village, people identified only the functional organiza-
tions mentioned above. They noted that only the Finance/Economy and
Security sections were active. The functional liberation associations for
peasants and youth did virtually nothing during 1961-1963. And with few
exceptions local leaders did not use titles associated with the Front
groups. They simply called themselves ‘‘cadres’’ or ‘‘older brothers.”’
There was little perceptible People’s Revolutionary Party activity in
the village during the early Front years. As noted earlier, only one or two
local Front leaders were party members. There is no evidence that party
membership gave those men special responsibilities in the village—only
enhanced prestige among village leaders, who viewed party membership
as very desirable. The party’s covert organization for the province from
time to time supplied its members in the village with political pamphlets,
but during the early Front years the party formally had nothing to do with
local Front organizations or policies.
The Front organization for Thua Thien Province most likely contained
five sections, which were identified by Pike: (1) social movement organi-
zation and propaganda; (2) propaganda; (3) military proselyting; (4) train-
ing and indoctrination; and (5) Liberation Army provincial staff headquar-
ters. In Huong Thuy District, the Front’s District Central Committee was
similarly organized, and operated from the hills of Thua Thien Province
under the close control of the Front provincial organization. The district
committee, in turn, maintained touch with village committees. Some went
so far as to suggest that local Front activities were totally controlled by
district personnel, but most people with opinions on this subject
suggested that control was loose. They said that Front district personnel
simply passed along general policy guidelines to Front leaders in My Thuy
Phuong, leaving most tactical decisions to those men.

By 1962-1963, the Front was extremely powerful throughout South

Vietnam, mounting larger operations against Government troops, and
utilizing more sophisticated weaponry. There was also considerable dis-
satisfaction with the Government and support for the Front in Thua
Thien/Hue, despite—or perhaps in part because of—extensive Govern-
ment military and police activities. And there are indications that in My
Thuy Phuong the Front began to employ new methods. First, people who
in 1962-1963 hesitated to support the Front began to feel pressure from an
informal network of neighbors. Some of the more enthusiastic Front sup-
 ~
Struggle | 93

porters did not hesitate to use ridicule and malicious rumors to persuade
uncommitted neighbors. One villager, then a prosperous large tradesman,
recalled what happened to him: °

I hated the Viet Cong in those days, because the Viet Minh had killed my
brother, and the Viet Cong and the Viet Minh were the same. So everyone knew
that I would never join the Viet Cong. A few people came to me and told me that
I should support them, and that if Idid not support them I should be quiet, and
not speak against the Viet Cong.

Later, many people began to say bad things about me—that I was corrupt, and
that I was a spy for the Government. But they knew that was not true. I was just
selling things at my store.

Others indicated that rumors occasionally circulated, most likely origi-

nated by Front followers, to discredit people who were allied with the
Government, or who were committed to neither side. The rumors against
pro-Government individuals were sometimes vicious, but there are indi-
cations that rumors concerning the noncommitted were sometimes just as
strong. There were instances when rumors spread that people hesitant to
support the Front were, in fact, active Front members. Then to add credi-
bility to the rumors, one or two local Front leaders or guerrillas some-
times made surprise nocturnal visits to the ‘‘targets.”’ They made sure
neighbors saw their visits, or later leaked word to them. After such visits,
rumors of Front membership often became fact. Target villagers were
isolated by pro-Government neighbors, and gradually Front followers
won their friendship. Later, attendance at Front political meetings and
conversations with new friends often led to complete transformations.
Uncommitted or perhaps even hostile villagers became active, sometimes
enthusiastic Front supporters.
Others in the village, especially able-bodied men, during 1962-1963
experienced mounting pressure to join the guerrilla force. Several people
not aligned with the Government, but indifferent to the Front, were in
early 1963 ‘‘invited’’ to join a Front military unit. The recruitment tactic
here involved considerable pressure from family members and friends
who might have already begun to support the Front. In a few cases where
such tactics failed, Front personnel employed more direct methods. There
are indications that a few were actually taken from their homes by armed
parties of guerrillas, escorted to the hills west of the village, and told that
they had joined Front forces. Government and American authorities usu-
ally reported such individuals as “‘kidnap victims.’” However, there are
indications that many ‘‘victims’’ gradually overcame their initial indiffer-
ence about the insurgency. They willingly remained with the guerrillas.

A Word now on the Front’s attitude toward religion—and especially

toward Buddhism. As noted earlier, the An Quang Buddhist organization
carried much weight throughout Thua Thien/Hue, including My Thuy
Phuong. In the province there were many effective An Quang leaders,
94 / Village at War

mostly monks, and in the village the Buddhist pagoda was active and had
wide support. As the pro-Catholic Diem regime undertook its repression
of the Buddhists in the early 1960s, there were many Buddhist-led demon-
strations against Diem in Thua Thien/Hue. Many journeyed from the
village to Hue for the marches, rallies, and prayer sessions, and there was
minor Buddhist-led agitation within My Thuy Phuong itself—including
circulation of anti-Government pamphlets and anti- Conc eimeDs prayer
meetings at the pagoda. .
The Buddhist movement attracted wide support in the village and
throughout the region primarily because of the Government’s anti-
Buddhist policies. Another factor was the wy tin of movement leaders.
These were the numerous Buddhist monks, nuns, and laymen in Hue and
in many villages who assumed active, highly visible roles in organizing
prayer meetings, and so forth. My Thuy Phuong’s major movement lead-
ers were two local pagoda elders, respected members of the Cult Commit-
fee
The final major reason for the Buddhist protests’ popularity in the
village—and probably throughout the province—was the wide initial feel-
ing that the Front was to some degree anti- Buddhist, that it had ‘‘missed”’
on an important, timely issue. This point and the Front’s changing re-
sponses to the Buddhist movement are discussed below.
It should first be noted that in village meetings, Front leaders had
words of harsh criticism for Catholics, because of close Government-
Catholic Church ties. But always the leaders held out hope to local
Catholics. Front messages urged those of all faiths, specifically including
Catholics, to join the struggle against Diem. In response, a few Catholics
joined the insurgency, but most remained firm Government support-
ers.
In 1961-1962, Front leaders in the village mildly criticized the provin-
cial Buddhist movement, which then was beginning to gain strength.
They accused the Buddhists of dividing the anti-Diem forces, which the
leaders said consisted of people from all religions and most economic
classes. Their special criticism focused on the Buddhist philosophy—
which they described in meetings as passive rather than dynamic and not
oriented to social change. A student put it this way: ‘‘At first, the V.C.
thought the Buddhists were not strong enough revolutionaries.’* But as
the Buddhists began to mount an effective, broadly based challenge to
Diem, the Front leaders changed what they were saying. People began to
hear from the leaders that the Buddhist movement was an important part
of the anti-Diem struggle. However, they also heard the leaders charac-
terize the Front as the ‘leading element” in that struggle, and as the only
element with military forces to back up its demands. It is not clear
whether this conciliatory attitude toward the Buddhist movement was an
indication of Front policy for the region or nation, but in My Thuy Phuong
it clearly represented a realistic reaching out by insurgent leaders for new
supporters and an attempt to hold on to old ones.
 “ Struggle | 95

Two men described the local Front shift in emphasis toward class
warfare. First, a peasant remembered:

The Front was very much against Mr. Diem, and explained why we should fight
Mr. Diem using the same words that the Viet Minh had used before. But they
also began propaganda about the power of the people, and how the people had
to destroy the rich. This was the Communist idea, just like in North Vietnam or
in Communist China. This was the type of idea they had for their struggle.

Another peasant said:

During the Viet Minh movement the enemy was very clear. Everybody opposed
the French and hated the French, but under Mr. Diem it was not as clear as
before.

In other words, the Liberation had to show the people why they had to fight. It
had to show them why they as the poor class were being used by the upper class
and by the Americans... .

In summary, despite setbacks caused by Government military and

police pressure, and despite the rise of the Buddhist movement, the local
Front leaders devoted the years 1961-1963 to building a strong revolu-
tionary base. The general thrust of the movement at first differed little
from that of the Viet Minh, for nationalism was the main rallying cry. But
gradually ideas related to class struggle began to complement nationalistic
appeals. Eventually, about 75 percent of the people joined the Front, in
part because of patriotism, in part because they hoped the movement
would work out answers to complicated problems of life in the village.

NOTES
1. People indicated that a ‘‘security cadre’’ on the Front committee coordinated
guerrilla activities in the village, but did so with the help of the entire commit-
tee:
2. See Pike, Vietcong, pp. 232-252.
3. On one occasion, wooden facsimile rifles played an important part in a guer-
rilla operation: during a period when weapons were scarce, guerrillas carrying
such rifles paid a nocturnal visit to a local civil servant. A peasant recalled,
‘*When he saw so many guerrillas carrying so many [facsimile] guns, he was
very afraid.”
4. During 1945-1975, guerrillas often placed mines to interdict the railroad run-
ning north-south through Vietnam, but never along the section of track in the
village.

Se Pikey One Glin Dae 2h wk

6. The brother of that man quoted in the text had served the French colonial
army as a low-ranking foot soldier. He died of gunshot wounds while on an
operation against Viet Minh units in 1950.
 8
Ascendancy
NEW CONDITIONS

My Thuy Phuong’s guerrillas were inactive in the immediate aftermath of

the coup d’etat that brought down Diem in 1963. There was no letup,
however, in the Front’s proselyting efforts. In broadcasts on the clandes-
tine Liberation Radio and in meetings in the village, the Front claimed
credit for the coup. A peasant had this comment:

It was so happy after Mr. Diem was gone, because our country had been
suffering for so long. Everyone was happy, and was sure that life would be
better. We all supported the national government, and especially the Army. It
was a new revolutionary government of the military, and we became very
united behind the Army.

Another peasant recalled:

The Communist propaganda was that the Front had led the fight against Mr.
Diem, and they said they were the ones who killed him. This was on the
Liberation Radio, and this was what some people who I knew liked the Com-
munists said to me also. But we did not believe that, and we felt that the
Communists had lost their strength.

Others made similar statements, suggesting that Front credibility suf-

fered after Diem’s death. And a few hinted that the coup caused some
confusion within local Front ranks, and some indecision by local leaders.
This was possibly because the leaders had no instructions about what to
do or say under such suddenly changed circumstances, and their chief
enemy was gone.

96
 ~ Ascendancy | 97

But these were short-run problems. In early 1964, the leaders began to
reassert the nationalistic, anti-American ideas they found easiest to ex-
press. Through the informal network of Front supporters in the village, a
message began to spread that the fight against the Americans had simply
entered a new phase, and that the generals in control of the Government
were no more representative of popular aspirations than any of the
Diem-era leaders had been. Reflecting the views of many, a peasant de-
scribed what happened:

The Liberation Front had to begin speaking again about some of our old ideas.
We had to talk to the people about the puppet army and puppet administrators in
the cities and countryside. At first, the people were happy, and did not want to
listen very much, but then they listened, and they agreed with everything we
said. The people joined the revolution again.

PROSELYTING

During 1964-1967, the Front took advantage of its years of preparation,

and weakness on the Government side to bid for total control of South
Vietnam. With the Government crippled by instability in its top leadership
and related paralysis of most security programs, 1964-1965 saw the Front
nearly take over the country, mounting sustained attacks in hundreds of
locations. According to the Pentagon Papers, in February 1965 American
intelligence agencies reported the presence in South Vietnam of the first
North Vietnamese troops.' And 1964-1965 also saw the arrival of the first
large contingents of American combat troops.’
The arrival of U.S. Marines in Thua Thien/Hue meant increased pres-
sure on the Front throughout the province. In My Thuy Phuong, Govern-
ment and American forces killed and jailed a number of Front leaders and
followers, and Front leaders faced some new problems—setbacks dis-
cussed in Chapter 9. However, 1964-1967 was generally a period of con-
siderable local Front influence and Government weakness in the village.
In fact, My Thuy Phuong was in some ways close to being what the
Marines called a‘‘V.C. village.’’ What kept it out of that classification was
the fact that the pro-Government group remained in control of the land
and other resources, and could call in police and soldiers. Those most
closely linked to the Government apparatus were the same individuals, or
from the same families, who had been active supporters of the Diem
regime, and before that of the French. They constituted between 3 and 5
percent of the populace, mostly large landholders and prosperous trades-
men; half were Catholics. They found association with the Government
personally profitable. Those who did not steal local funds or pressure
people into paying bribes profited on imported goods sold locally. Or they
benefited through favoritism (identical to that described in preceding
chapters) in land distribution or dispute resolution.
98 / Village at War

But the Front had the people. A peasant commented, *‘The Liberation
was the only political group that really loved the people. We learned that
the Government did not.’’ What could have been behind this comment?
Perhaps in part it was recollection of the different political messages em-
phasized by Front leaders during their proselyting efforts in the village.
These were the same types of meetings, training sessions, and conversa-
tions that had marked the 1960-1963 period of Front activity. Though the
leaders deliberately intertwined many ideas in their proselyting, attention
here focuses separately on each major message. Note that many villagers
of all political stripes discussed the messages, which are presented below
in no particular rank order.
With the arrival of American combat troops in Vietnam, the most
important Front messages were those which opposed the Americans. A
peasant recalled, ‘‘The Viet Cong during that period did nothing but talk
to us about the Americans. All the time. They told us how the Americans
were destroying our country, how they were controlling the Govern-
ment.’ In discussing Front proselyting, many others similarly focused on
the frequency of anti-American messages. And one of the most common
Front slogans repeated in meetings, leaflets distributed in My Thuy
Phuong, and in broadcasts, went like this: ‘‘Unite The People, Oppose
The Americans, Save The Nation.’ * Reactions to these messages varied
from outright rejection of them by most pro-Government villagers to en-
thusiastic agreement by many Front supporters. The majority, however,
was generally receptive to and in agreement with them. A peasant’s com-
ment is illustrative:

We often heard the Communists tell us about America. They said America was
an imperialist country. They said America was destroying our fatherland. They
said everyone must unite to fight the American army. Well, I'd say that almost
everyone agreed with them. I did.

Some may have disagreed about how to fight the Americans and not known
whether to follow the Communists. But I think almost everyone agreed that the
Americans had to go and that the Communists were the strongest ones to fight
them.

Second, there were messages concerning the history of the revolution

in Vietnam and in the province. Discussions in the village, leaflets, and
broadcasts focused on ideas of revolt and resistance, with an emphasis on
the recent Viet Minh struggle. Many of these 1964-1967 messages pre-
sented a class interpretation of Vietnamese history.* Complementing the
historical messages were those focusing on revolution and struggle in the
world. Front leaders often spoke of a world class struggle and of workers
around the world uniting to oppose capitalist classes and imperialist na-
tions. It is unclear how villagers reacted to the messages on revolution in
Vietnam and elsewhere, but those messages no doubt widened horizons
and perhaps changed world views of at least some.
 “< Ascendancy | 99

Another Front focus was on the history of the village revolution. Here
messages concerned the changes the French, Diem, and post-Diem re-
gimes had brought to the village, on the impoverishment and loss of power
by so many people, and on the local history of the Viet Minh and Front
movements. Front leaders mentioned four revolutionary classes in dis-
cussions of local history—peasants who are landless, poor or proletarian,
and middle class; workers; petite bourgeoisie of small tradesmen; and the
national bourgeoisie of larger tradesmen. However, the leaders described
peasants as the most important revolutionary force.
Despite some simplification on the question of Front origins, there are
indications that messages on the local movement were far more under-
standable to large numbers of villagers than those focusing on the larger
issues of Vietnamese and world struggle against class and national
enemies. A peasant said:

They kept talking about what it was like to live here, and they kept explaining to
us what different things in our life meant in terms of Communist ideas. Some of
us resisted those ideas, but they kept talking, and then people began to see that
there were many things correct about Communist ideas. We could see, for
example, that there were corrupt men in the area, and we could see them getting
rich before our eyes.

Another peasant agreed, and added:

The Liberation had answers for all of the most important problems that we all
knew. They had an answer about land reform, which was that they would give
land to the poor people. They had an answer about high taxes. They said that
the Liberation would spend the taxes only for the people, and would collect
them without corruption. They also said that they would help the poor, and this
was something else that made them popular, because many people in the village
were very poor.

Still another peasant said:

At first very few people seemed to understand the revolutionary ideas, and did
not understand some of the problems that were right in front of our faces.

In the study sessions the comrades and the people talked about power. We said
that the ones who had power in our society were ones who were puppets of the
Americans, who were a rich class. The most important idea was that the poor
class people listened to these ideas and agreed with them.

Next were those messages on enemies of the revolution. They directly

and indirectly related to all the messages mentioned above. The chief
enemiés were the Americans and the ‘“‘puppet’’ nations—such as South
Korea and Thailand—which had sent military forces to Vietnam. But
Front leaders also emphasized enemies much more visible to the people of
the village. There were first the local puppets, or civil servants and sol-
100 / Village at War

diers serving in Government ranks. There was an element of compassion

in discussions of the lower ranking of these individuals, for the leaders
described them as unknowing—people who failed to understand the polit-
ical implications of their Government service. But the Front reserved less
compassion for those who served as police agents, Government infor-
mers, and some ofthe more infamous or corrupt local officials. Sometimes
attacks on specific individuals marked Front political meetings. For
example, there was the case of a Government village chief, aman noted
for his corruption and incompetence. Front leaders characterized him as a
‘‘monster’’ in political sessions and repeatedly accused him of being
exploitative.
As part of the Front effort to develop the people’s class consciousness,
the proselyting effort focused on the most successful local landholders,
and on their manipulation of land, including communal land. Again Front
leaders singled out specific individuals in the meetings and attacked them
by name. Similarly, the leaders attacked tradesmen who overcharged for
goods and moneylenders who profited ‘‘excessively.’’ Local reactions to
the messages naturally varied. Many members of the pro-Government
minority grew fearful as they, their friends, and families were the very
enemies the Front had singled out. But most people were quite excited
with what they heard. For example, a peasant noted:

We began to agree that all the rich men in the area were doing nothing to help
the people. We saw, for example, that the landlords were very close to the local
authorities, and got richer under the protection of the local authorities. Some-
times, for example, they had policemen help them collect rent.

So we began to think of all these men as enemies, and we became very brave
and very strong. We did things we had always been afraid to do before. We
talked about these men as enemies and said their names. They had to change
their ways.

Many very general Front messages touched on the promise of a better

life. The movement leaders, broadcasts, and leaflets simply repeated that
defeating the Americans and the Government would bring improvements
in life. There were few specific ideas on Front plans for that better life.
Instead villagers heard only general statements concerning rights to land,
the wider sharing of political power, the Front’s responsiveness to
“people's problems,’ and other general benefits of Vietnam ‘‘at peace.”
When that peace came, the Front messages suggested, all the people
would live happier, more productive, secure lives. It is unclear how
villagers received these general promises. Certainly they heard similar
messages from the Government, which promised a better life for the
people after defeating the Front. However, a peasant noted:

lhe Communists kept saying, “If you fight for the revolution you will have a
good life.”” They said that to always be struggling would bring more prosperity
and happiness to all the people. We thought that the Communist policy would be
 ~ Ascendancy | 101

good, that new social policies would be good, because that would mean
everyone would share more in the economic development.

And another peasant stated, ‘The Liberation men said that all the
people had to fight the Americans and the puppets because when we did
that there would be peace, and it would be a happy time again. We knew
that everyone would not be rich under the Liberation policy, but we
hoped that life would be better.”’
Next were messages concerning the People’s Revolutionary Party,
which the Front presented to villagers as the ‘‘vanguard’’ of the move-
ment. Only two or three in the village actually belonged to the party, but
Front messages characterized an invitation to join as a high honor. The
party accepted people as members only on the recommendation of one or
two long-term members, and only after the prospective members had
demonstrated dedication to the movement by supporting guerrilla ac-
tivities, proselyting in the village, or taking other actions to assist the
Front. Front messages described the party as receiving moral encourage-
ment and inspiration from the Labor Party of North Vietnam, and pre-
sented it as the purest expression of the people’s will—the soul of the
Front. Most villagers held the party in high regard because of these mes-
sages, though few thought they would ever be permitted to join. But for
local Front leaders, it was different: the ideal of party membership served
as an extra incentive to work hard. A leader commented, “‘The cadres
were always very proud. They always worked hard, and they knew that
the best of them, those who worked hardest for the revolution and are
most intelligent, could become party members. It was one of the things
that made them struggle so hard.”
An eighth major message focused on sacrifice and struggle to support
the movement. This was related to the messages on world, Vietnamese,
and local history, which emphasized the elements of class struggle. A
peasant recalled a Front meeting that focused explicitly on sacrifice and
struggle:

The meeting was of about 10 people, and the comrade was a member of the
Liberation Front. He asked us all to talk about our own work for the revolution.
One man got up and said he had given some money to the revolution. Another
man Said that he had helped the guerrillas in an attack. A few others said that
they were giving valuable information to the Front. I said that I had told the
Front about an Army operation that might be coming.

So the cadre listened to all these things and said, ‘Well, these things are good,
but they are not enough. You must all sacrifice more and struggle harder for the
revolution.’ He said that we are letting others sacrifice for us, and he said that
the people’s struggle would never be finished until all the people united together
to struggle against the Americans and puppet government.

These admonitions were well received in My Thuy Phuong, but it is

difficult to evaluate their effectiveness. It is clear only that many made
risky sacrifices and struggled persistently to aid the Front.
102 / Village at War

Ninth of the major messages concerned heroes of the revolution. The

printed and spoken Front messages contained a set of role models for
people to emulate—men, women, and even children who contributed sig-
nificantly to the movement, and in their contributions revealed heroic
personal characteristics. The most shining hero mentioned repeatedly was
Ho Chi Minh, whose life, accomplishments, and ideas Front leaders,
leaflets, and broadcasts described and analyzed for villagers. In the mes-
sages special emphasis focused on Ho’s closeness to the peasant masses,
and on Ho as a wise, guiding uncle. Two villagers recalled the discussion
of Ho as fatherly leader and fighter. A peasant said:

Many ofthe [Front] cadres respected and loved Ho Chi Minh very much. A few
of them said they had met Ho, and some of them carried his photograph with
them. They all said they admired Ho Chi Minh for leading the struggle, and liked
him because of his bravery, and because he was in the highest position in the
Communist organization. They all tried to tell the people these things, and to
make Ho the leader of all the people.

And a student discussed Ho:

Ho Chi Minh was always our leader. He always was in our minds, and always
was the most important person in all the Liberation propaganda. He was very
high. But we were told that we could be as good and as strong as Ho Chi Minh
by dedication, sacrifice, and by hard study. All of those ways we could fight
imperialist America just like Uncle Ho.

A minority of villagers, mostly pro-Government individuals, did not

share the student's respect for Ho Chi Minh. They feared and often
despised him. But the majority reacted quite positively to the Front mes-
sages about Ho. They venerated him and said they wanted to be like him.
Ho Chi Minh was certainly the loftiest of the heroes discussed in the
village. However, people heard about a few other heroes of national sta-
ture. One of these was Nguyen van Troi, the young Front sympathizer
who in 1964 tried to assassinate Robert McNamara, then Secretary of
Defense, during an official visit to Saigon. Troi’s attempt failed, and Gov-
ernment forces captured and later executed him. Many Front messages
eulogized Troi and hailed his act, deeply impressing at least several young
people. But most of the Front heroes were from backgrounds similar to
those of ordinary villagers, and Front leaders, documents, and broadcasts
pictured them as heroic because of small revolutionary acts that anyone
could conceivably have performed. In other words, they were model
heroic followers.
For example, there were the ‘*American-killing’’ heroes. The Front
heavily complimented individuals and guerrilla units able to kill Ameri-
cans. In fact, it established a schedule of awards for ‘*‘American-killing
units’’ and individual ** American-killers.’’ Similarly, the Front honored
units and individuals that performed effectively in military engagements.
 Ascendancy | 103
~

Stories of such units from other parts of Vietnam and from the province
were important parts of the hero messages. But the most important heroes
of all were ordinary men, women, and children who were neither full-time
guerrillas nor leaders in their local communities. Several recalled hearing
about the following supposedly real heroes:

Two young women who tempted some U.S. soldiers to lay down their weapons
with promises of sex, who then killed the Americans.

An old woman who assisted guerrillas in setting up an ambush against Ameri-

can soldiers.

A young boy who befriended some U.S. soldiers, and then led them into a
Front ambush.

An old man who led his village in resistance to a powerful landlord.

A Government soldier who deserted his unit for the Front, carrying with him
several weapons and stolen documents, and who encouraged two or three of
his fellow soldiers to go with him.

A schoolboy who secretly spread the teachings of Ho Chi Minh among his
classmates.

The Front usually presented these heroic vignettes in clandestine radio

broadcasts, in small meetings of Front leaders and guerrillas in the hills
west of the village, or in periodic small gatherings throughout My Thuy
Phuong. In addition, Front pamphlets carried such heroic follower im-
ages. None of the Front pamphlets definitely read in the village is pres-
ently available, but a few pamphlets containing probably similar heroic
descriptions are available from other areas. For example, one pamphlet
dated 1964 contains the story of three women from a Thua Thien hamlet
called Duc. The women distracted three Government soldiers long
enough for other Front members to kill them. Later they supposedly
poisoned to death 30 more soldiers.* Finally, several students mentioned
a foreigner they most admired, an American ‘“‘hero”’ and ‘‘friend of Viet-
nam’’ they heard of in Front broadcasts. This was a man named Norman
Morrison, who on November 2, 1965, sat on the Pentagon steps and
burned himself to death to protest American policy in Vietnam.
There were widely varying reactions to the hero messages. Members
of the pro-Government minority rejected them in toto. As noted earlier,
most people responded well to the Ho Chi Minh messages. But they
selectively received the other hero messages. For example, women re-
sponded well to the messages about heroic women, and children drew
inspiration from the vignette about the schoolboy spreading Ho Chi
Minh’s teachings. In general villagers often identified with and tried to
emulate the model heroic followers from backgrounds most like their
own.
Intertwined with the above messages on revolution, class enemies,
struggle, and heroes is a tenth and final major message, the role of the
104 / Village at War

people in the movement. Front proselyting efforts, especially the informal

contacts between leaders, guerrillas, and ordinary villagers, made people
aware of the many ways they could assist the Front’s difficult struggle to
achieve power through a General Uprising.® First, there was emphasis on
cooperation with the local guerrilla force as the most important way in
which they could assist the revolution. A peasant remembered:

This was the most important part of the Front propaganda. All. of the other
things were important, because the people had to agree with the Communist
political beliefs, but it was most important for the people to cooperate. The
people had to give the guerrillas support, or they [the guerrillas] would be dead.

Front leaders told people how to assist as lookouts, runners, and spies
within the Government apparatus, and urged them to hide guerrillas, do-
nate labor to dig tunnels, transport supplies for the guerrilla force, and
directly assist attacks. The Front also encouraged villagers to join the
guerrilla force. Here the Front closely tied appeals for struggle and
heroism to a specific appeal for able-bodied men to take up arms with the
Front. For most people, the most impressive bearers of the recruitment
messages were guerrillas, who, in effect, presented themselves as living
examples of dedication and sacrifice. The recollection of one peasant is
illustrative:

One time Viet Cong [guerrillas] came to my house. At first, we were all very
afraid, but the Viet Cong told us that we should not be afraid. They said that
they came only to visit us, to talk with us about the village and the war. They
said that all the people had to join the revolution, and that the men of our family
should be first. They talked about what a difficult life it was, but they did not
mind the danger and the difficulties, because they knew they were fighting for
the freedom of Vietnam.

The Front also encouraged people to support guerrillas in other ways.

A peasant remembered:

They told us that to give money and food to the Viet Cong was a way of
supporting the revolution. They told us that everyone had to sacrifice, by giving
a little bit of money or rice to the Viet Cong guerrillas, and money to the Viet
Cong tax cadre.

Many responded by contributing money and rice to the Front. Such

contributions during 1964-1967 were quite similar to those of the early
Front years, coming as they did at the request of local guerrillas or of men
known as tax collectors, and varying with wealth of families and needs of
the Front organization. In retrospect, it is clear that during 1964-1967 the
Front succeeded in its proselyting to secure support for guerrilla ac-
tivities, as many villagers aided the local attack—the subject of Chapter 9.
The proselyting even affected those who supported the Government or
remained politically uncommitted, for it left all with strong impressions of
 Ascendancy | 105

a guerrilla force close to the people, dependent on local support for its
very survival.
The Front also discouraged people from cooperating with the Govern-
ment. Again tied to the Front’s emphasis on enemies and a history of
revolutionary struggle in the area, the Front described noncooperation as
an effective way offighting the Government. It should be noted, however,
that the Front generally took care to maintain ‘‘legal’’ status vis-a-vis the
Government for as many of its followers as possible, so urged noncooper-
ation when feasible and minimal cooperation at all other times. When the
Government organized elections, for example, the Front urged people to
either sabotage or boycott the balloting, if they could do so without arrest.
The Front treated the Government’s few and ineffective development
programs in similar fashion. And those who assisted Government security
branches in any but token and begrudging fashions earned the title ‘‘be-
trayer of the revolution.”

FRONT COMMUNITY

The Front brought significant changes to village life during 1964-1967.

These came because of the movement’s own strengths, because of weak-
ness on the Government side, and despite occasional setbacks brought
mainly by the U.S. Marines—a subject of Chapter 9. A peasant com-
mented on one change:

The Liberation taught us that everyone had to cooperate, and that we were all
struggling for freedom and independence. The Liberation idea is that all people
must cooperate. For example, if one family is very poor, or has something that
is bad luck happen to it, then we will all cooperate to help that family.

Also, we all cooperate, without ever asking for money, in the planting and
harvesting of rice. Those are just a few examples of the people helping each
other. Before the Liberation, the people were very divided and suspicious, and
always trying to get money from each other.

A Government village official stated:

The Communists had the idea that everyone must work together for revolution,
to fight together, to help even the poorest people in the area. This is the greatest
strength of that side. You know, they really do work closely with the people.
They are close to the people, and encourage the people to cooperate, which is
something that gives them great strength. And it is something that our republi-
can government cannot do too well.

There were many manifestations of this cooperation among Front fol-

lowers. Villagers noted that people began to cooperate in time of need,
such as after family tragedies or during harvest and planting times. A
student from a peasant family gave an example of such cooperation:
106 / Village at War

There was a woman whose husband had been in the [Government] Army and
was killed. This widow had four little children, and she was very poor. The only
land she had was a small piece of land for vegetables. Her children needed food
and sometimes needed medicine when they were sick. All of the people began to
help her in different ways. We gave her small amounts of money. A few people
gave her rice. One family gave her a small piece of land to grow more vegeta-
bles, and some of the men fixed the roof of her house.

As the Front’s proselyting efforts began to focus explicitly on class

issues and point out local class enemies, people occasionally cooperated
to solve common economic problems. For example, in about 1965, a
tradesman who operated a small shop in the village became the target ofa
boycott. People knew the man, who was closely aligned with the village
council, for his high prices and links with local moneylenders. Most
villagers simply stopped buying at his shop. A peasant recalled:

It was a very happy matter, because everyone was united opposing that man.
After a few weeks of no one buying from him, he began to lower his prices, and
influenced the moncylenders to lower their interest rates a bit. The people were
very happy, and they understood that they had won because they had united.

A minority of civil servants and people strongly committed to the

Government asserted that cooperation among villagers during the mid-
1960s grew out of widespread fear of the Front—assertions which such
individuals possibly based on their own fears. However, most who com-
mented on the years 1964-1967 echoed the notion of widespread and
enthusiastic cooperation among those aligned with the Front. As coopera-
tive bonds among the people strengthened, many became involved in a
wide variety of Front activities, including formal study meetings and other
gatherings, and the informal discussions and conversations sparked by
Front members. All of this brought out the 10 intertwining messages
already discussed. Normally no more than 40 or 50 came to political study
meetings at a time. A peasant described his neighbors’ reactions to the
meetings:

It started as a very slow thing, you know. The Communists came to us and said
that we had to support them by going to meetings. Well, at first nobody wanted
to, but we all went when our neighbors encouraged us to go. At first many of us
did not understand the meetings, and there were ideas that we did not really
understand. But after some time the political ideas of the Viet Cong seemed
clear, and many people began to agree with those ideas.

Another peasant described people’s attitudes in these words:

The people liked to go to study. We did it because everyone went, and because
we knew that not to go was to hurt the revolution. Many people had strong ideas
of their own, and some of them gave those ideas at the meetings.
 Ascendancy | 107

The meetings were interesting, and people liked to go. It was just like the old
days in Vietnam, when people went to the dinh. . . . You know, the dinh is
very important, and just like at the dinh the spirit of the people is very high at
the Viet Cong meetings... .

When people occasionally spoke up at the meetings, it was usually to

comment on corruption by local civil servants, on high rents, or on police
repression.

During the mid-1960s, My Thuy Phuong’s Front leaders, like their Viet
Minh predecessors, were men of very special qualities. Those qualities
drew many to the movement. The leaders numbered about 10 in all, and
were the same men who led the insurgency during 1961-1963. All had
served with the Viet Minh, two as local leaders. The other Viet Minh
leaders were dead, in jail, or too physically weak to fight.
For local leaders as well as guerrillas, important opportunities to
strengthen revolutionary resolve were the ‘‘self-criticism’’ sessions,
which often occurred in the village during 1965-1967. The leaders often
organized such sessions at meetings of the local Front committee, and
also at many gatherings of guerrillas.* A guerrilla recalled:

The self-criticism meetings for cadres were about once a month. One of the
leaders was in charge, like a chairman. At some of the sessions, just about
everyone stood up and told about their backgrounds, and about their ideas of
revolution, and then they told what they had done to help the revolution in their
work... .

Then they would tell about their mistakes and weaknesses. For example, if a
man had treated a woman badly, if he had thought of himself for only one
minute and forgotten the people’s revolution, then he would tell that, and he
would have to explain why he had a minute of weakness.

The self-criticism sessions were rarely forums for accusation or

rumor-mongering. Front leaders encouraged all present to participate in
discussions, and most did so. They told those who said nothing to think
about themselves, and be prepared to speak about personal strengths and
weaknesses at future sessions. And the meetings were sometimes deep
emotional experiences for those in attendance. They served to reinforce
the bonds of commitment to the movement of both leaders and guerrillas.

Beginning in about 1964, a number of changes in the local Front or-

ganization also reinforced those bonds, and the bonds of many others to
the movement. First, the Front extended its formal committee structure
to My Thuy Phuong’s hamlets. Local leaders and followers chose four or
five individuals per hamlet through a series of small meetings in each
hamlet. There was no balloting for the selections, only recommendations
from the leaders, some discussion, and ‘‘agreement”’ from Front follow-
108 / Village at War

ers. The hamlet committees performed many of the same types of func-
tions as the village committee—collection of money and food, proselyt-
ing, support of guerrilla attacks, and so forth—and were closely con-
trolled by the village leaders. Note that those leaders retained their flexi-
bility in local implementation of Front policies set at higher levels, which
usually came to them in the forms of general directives. And the People’s
Revolutionary Party had some indirect influence through a few local lead-
ers, the only party members in My Thuy Phuong. The members devoured
the pamphlets they occasionally received from party contacts and incor-
porated ideas from the pamphlets in local proselyting. The only other
evidence of significant party influence in the village was noted above—
Front leaders’ tendency to work harder in the hope of someday gaining
party membership.
In about 1964, the Front began to expand what Pike characterizes as
the ‘‘all-important’’ Front organizational units below village and hamlet
levels, the liberation association cells.? A peasant said:

The cells usually had three to five people. The Liberation let the people join
them, and did not force anyone. They were important, because every time there
was a political message from the leaders, or an announcement of some political
activity, we learned about it through the cells. It was a good method, because if
one person in a cell was told something he would surely tell the other people. A
very strong method.

The cell structure, in other words, was a formalization of the long-

existent covert insurgent network. It permitted people to better share
Front ideas and share in Front activities, including the guerrilla attack. It
also enabled local insurgent leaders to more effectively influence their
followers. The Front also tried to promote its most important functional
organization, the Farmers’ Liberation Association. But no more than 20
peasants ever joined this group’s one or two cells, and its only activity
consisted of passing class-related political messages among peasants. It
should also be noted that there were no local Front organizations for
women, children, or other functional categories of people. Most villagers
were formally tied to the Front only through the cell structure just de-
scribed.!°
During the informal Front gatherings and conversations, including con-
tacts among cell members, most everyone felt relaxed—a contrast with
the formal gatherings, where few talked without prompting. A university
student said:

When the people were talking to each other in families or with their friends, they
were never afraid of anything. They talked about a lot of ideas, and they could
never give good speeches. But they talked using common words about many
ideas. Very often many people would take an idea that they had heard from the
Communists and talk about it with their friends. They would talk a little while
about that idea, then talk about something else, tell a story or a joke or some-
The village under rocket attack, March 1975.

Sea evacuation from Danang, March 1975.

Government election day. February 1975.

A guerrilla dead by Highway One. March 1975,

A traditional dance.
 Sens

\n irrigation device.
 A typical home.

s Pee,

A Buddhist pagoda.
The government office.

QOS

Camp Eagle view. (U.S. Army photo)

 a \
: | '
| ' Lt
\ : ny | : ;

Camp Eagle view. (U.S. Army photo)

* se

Miss Black America at Camp Eagle. (U.S. Army photo)

101st soldiers display enemy weapons. captured in
1968. (Pacific Stars & Stripes photo)

A government militia member.

Guerrillas eat ata Thua Thien base camp. (N.L.F. photo captured by U.S. Army)

ee ete
U.S. soldiers waiting
\ guerrilla meeting in Thua Thien. Weapons hang left rear. (N.L.F. photo
captured by U.S. Army)
A typical villa 5Sgo ep ath.

An ammunition tr u ck passin tepeas a pe asant returns from the fields.

The rice fields.

The railway through the village.

 Ascendancy | 109

thing like that. But they would often return to that first idea and try to under-
stand it.

As people discussed Front ideas throughout My Thuy Phuong, they

applied some of them to the realities of life in the village. For example, a
peasant observed:

The people would always talk, eat, and drink together. They talked about some of
the new ideas. Some-of them [the people] came from the Communist side, and
they talked and talked a lot about how these ideas could change their lives.

For example, if they had heard something about the Communist land reform
policy, they would talk about how the Communists’ policy might affect their
land, or how they might get more land from the policy.

It should be noted, incidentally, that of all Front policies, land policy

was most popular in the village, most likely owing to the local land abuses
by members of the pro-Government minority. Front leaders never spelled
out their land policy in detail, but the people understood that the Front, in
general, stood for fairness in land distribution.
Although fear of informers caused some to hold back during the infor-
mal contacts with friends, neighbors, and relatives, most people were able
to relax, speak their minds, and take the risk of argument. According toa
peasant:

Of course Vietnamese like to talk to other Vietnamese. They talk about every-
thing. They talk about family, friends, the problems of the world, and the
problems of the nation. So when the Liberation Front’s ideas about revolution
and fighting the Americans and the puppet government were brought to this area
by the cadres, the people began to talk about them.

And, you know, the people really enjoyed talking, because when they talked
they became loyal to the Communists. They also saw with their eyes that the
Communist cadres were trying to be close to them. They saw that the cadres
came to them, and talked to them, listened to them, and asked questions of
them. So they knew that the cadres cared.

Many others stated that local Front leaders indeed seemed sincerely
interested in the welfare of the common man, and tried hard to be ‘‘close
to the people.”

As formal and informal proselyting efforts continued in My Thuy

Phuong, the Front leaders’ challenge was to overcome some people’s
deep-seated feeling that commitment to revolution could become incon-
venient.and lead to danger and family tragedy. This was partly simple
reluctance to form political commitments of any kind, and partly many
people’s desire to hedge their bets—two related tendencies which of
course also affected Government programs. By making commitments to
110 / Village at War

neither combatant side, many hoped to avoid the costs of commitment,

the main cost being vulnerability to attack as one side’s enemy.
The hedging of bets meant giving both sides indications of support,
such as payment of taxes to both Government and Front, or having sons
join one army or another. Such moves usually placated both sides, espe-
cially if neither found out about the help to the other, and bought time for
the uncommitted. But as might be expected, all too often these villagers
were unable to conceal their hedging of bets, and came under general
suspicion and pressure from both sides. ;
Over the years, these tendencies were in evidence during the extended
periods of political uncertainty about local balance of power, but when
that balance clearly shifted in favor of one side, there were corresponding
shifts among the uncommitted—and sometimes among the committed,
too. Many began to support the side which appeared stronger, sometimes
abandoning support for the seemingly weaker side. As noted earlier, one
such shift occurred during the years when the Viet Minh in effect ran the
village. Another occurred during the early Diem years, and still another
during the period under consideration here, 1964-1967. As noted in Chap-
ter 7, villagers classified about 20 percent of My Thuy Phuong’s people in
the uncommitted group for 1962-1963. During 1964-1967, the uncommit-
ted dropped to 10 to 15 percent. To win them over, Front leaders endeav-
ored during 1964-1967 to create the sense of a fast-approaching General
Uprising and sure victory. They urged everyone to support the
revolution—immediately and totally. A few commented in general on the
effectiveness of these Front efforts. For example, a peasant noted:

Many people were at first afraid to do much to help the Liberation Front. But
after a while they saw how strong the Liberation was in the whole area. They
felt, ““Now we must help. They are going to win. We are going to help.”’

Another man, who worked as a Government civil servant, had these

words:

The Vietnamese people are very quiet, and don’t like to talk much about politics
[with foreigners], and so probably very few would tell you this. You know that
the people in this area were very strong supporters of the Communists for a few
years around 1965. Almost the whole area was a Communist area, and Com-
munists controlled Gia Le, especially at night.

The people thought that the Communists were going to win, and so they sup-
ported them very strongly, and accepted all the Communist ideas because they
felt that the Communists had the best future for them.

So it was a challenge for the Government to give the people an answer to the
Communists. In those years, the Government gave no answer, so almost
everyone followed the Communists. The people were waiting for the Govern-
ment to become strong, and then they would support the Government.
 Ascendancy | 111

What happened to one peasant family, to which we shall give the name
Hung, illustrates what it was like to be politically uncommitted during
1964-1965. The Hung’s had actively assisted the Viet Minh struggle but
remained politically inactive during the Diem years. To maintain that
neutrality, beginning in 1962, Hung and his wife gave small sums of
money and some rice to Front cadres and guerrillas, but also paid Gov-
ernment taxes and fees. In 1964-1965, Hung and his eldest son helped
Front guerrillas dig holes for rice caches, and that son joined the Govern-
ment provincial forces. Hung commented, ‘‘When my son entered the
military, the Government had less reason to suspect us, but some other
families who supported the Liberation side did not like us for that. They
spoke badly about us.’ Such criticism came especially from the families
of local guerrillas.
Finally in late 1965, the Hung family tilted toward full support of the
Front. It increased contributions to guerrillas and local cadres, almost
eliminated contributions to the Government, and began actively assisting
the local struggle. Two sons assisted guerrilla operations, and the son in
the provincial forces helped out when he could by providing the Front
with intelligence reports. Hung noted that his family’s shift in 1965 to an
actively pro-Front stance came because by that year the movement was
overwhelmingly influential in the village. He added, ‘“‘When my family
began to help the Liberation more and more, we did not worry so much.
The Liberation guaranteed our lives.”

A small minority of villagers, most of whom were members of the

pro-Government group, had different explanations for insurgent strength.
A representative statement is this one, by a local councilman:

The Viet Cong often had meetings and study sessions concerning political mat-
ters to which they forced the people to go. They told them that if they did not go
they would be killed or given fines, and they said very bad things about people
who did not go. To make people afraid and force them to go, the Viet Cong
sometimes denounced people to their faces.

As noted earlier, many who argued that Front strength was based on
fear were themselves fearful of the insurgents, perhaps due to the widely
known label they bore—‘‘enemies of the people.”
Despite the minority emphasis on fear, most villagers suggested, in
summary, that during 1964-1967 the Front’s meetings and self-criticism
sessions and the informal chats and other contacts among neighbors
brought most everyone into the movement. That included about half of
the previously uncommitted. The Front imbued its followers with ideas of
antiimperialism, class struggle, nationalism, and mutual cooperation. By
1964-1965, about 80 to 85 percent of the local populace supported the
Front, and about 5 percent the Government. The remaining 10 to 15
112 / Village at War

percent attempted to stay politically uncommitted, sometimes experienc-

ing intense pressure from both sides. And about 60 percent of the Front
supporters regularly helped Front leaders and guerrillas. The others were
passive supporters of revolution. In other words, most villagers were at
least as deeply committed to the Front during 1964-1967 as they had
earlier been to the Viet Minh.

THE TWO FAMILIES

Among those who supported the Front during the mid-1960s were the
Binh and Tri families introduced in Chapter 5. Through the early 1960s,
the two families experienced many of the difficulties and frustrations that
had caused widespread dissatisfaction with the Government. And both
families drifted, seemingly naturally, into affiliations with the Front.
Binh, the tenant farmer who had served as a lookout and general
supporter of the Viet Minh guerrillas, became one of the more active
Front members. He did not join the guerrilla force, but often participated
in small military actions which the Front classified as self-defense opera-
tions. Binh said he participated most enthusiastically in the actions di-
rected against large landholders, especially the man who in 1950 had
forced him to sell his land. He helped scatter leaflets and place explosives
near the home of another large landholder, and commented, ‘‘The man
was very bad. He got rich from many of us, and took our land when we
were very poor. So it made me very happy to help struggle against him.’
On his affiliation with the Front, Binh said:

Supporting the Liberation was difficult for me, but I felt I had to do it. I think
probably I did not make much money during the years I was supporting the
Front, but the important thing is that I was helping in the revolution, and that
made me very happy.

Binh and many others were enthusiastic about assisting guerrilla oper-
ations, and many used the word ‘‘happy”’ to describe feelings about such
help.
During the 1960s, the warehouseman Tri also supported the revolution.
He participated in local Front meetings, occasionally gave donations of
food to Front guerrillas, and emerged as an important member of the
network of local Front supporters. Tri commented on his political conver-
sations: “‘I always liked to talk to other people, my friends and relatives,
about political questions, and I always would give them a position that
opposed the Government and supported the Liberation.”’ Tri’s exposure
to urban working conditions and numerous friendships with people from
other villages meant that he was a man of wider experience than many of
his neighbors. In conversations many looked to him for insight and guid-
ance. Tri recalled:
 Ascendancy |/ 113

The talks we had were very interesting. People would ask me what the workers
felt, and whether the Liberation was having success in other villages and the
city.

The people had heard many things about other places—a lot of propaganda and
ideas. But often the people were not sure. These were people, you must re-
member, who always stayed in one village, and did not know much about the
outside. Sometimes I tried to explain things to them, and it made me happy to
do that.

Both Binh and Tri involved other members of their families in the
insurgency. Their wives and some oftheir older children began to help the
movement in small ways. They passed messages, contributed food, and
spread pro-Front ideas among friends and schoolmates. By the mid-1960s,
Binh and Tri were active, enthusiastic Front supporters. They were prod-
ucts of a long evolutionary process—from apolitical, reasonably happy
subsistence existences; through a period of economic loss, psychological
upset, groping, and initial receptivity to new political ideas; to full in-
volvement in the Viet Minh and then Front movements.

During 1964-1967, the vast majority of villagers joined the Binh and Tri
families in supporting the cause of revolution.'' Most did so from the
heart. ‘‘Support’’ had many meanings for many people—ranging from
active involvement in the local Front network to sympathy for but not
assistance to the cause. To summarize, the Front repeated the Viet Minh
accomplishment. It built a revolutionary movement in My Thuy Phuong.
The movement had leaders who cared, institutions tied to the people, and
messages which held promise for the future. It united 80 percent or more
of the villagers in a community of sharing and sacrifice.

NOTES

1. The Pentagon Papers, p. 409.

2. Ibid., pp. 382-509.

3. Cf. Robert Shaplen, The Road From War; Vietnam 1965-1970 (New York:
Harper & Row, 1970), p. 23: FitzGerald, Fire In The Lake, pp. 169-172.

4. See, forexample, Liberation Radio Broadcast, December 10, 1970, in ** Daily

Report; Asia & Pacific’’ (Springfield, Virginia: National Technical Informa-
tion Service, Foreign Broadcast Information Service, U.S. Department of
Commerce, December 11, 1970), p. L2; hereafter referred to as ‘Daily Re-
port.”

nH “Ten Years Battle Against the United States’ (South Vietnam: National
Liberation Front of South Vietnam, 1964), pp. 53-54, in Douglas Pike, ed.,
‘Documents on the National Liberation Front of South Vietnam, 1959-
1966, item 710, Wason microfilm 1562, Cornell University Library.

6. For background on *‘General Uprising,” see Pike, Vietcong, pp. 76-77.

114 / Village at War
Cf. Alexander Woodside, Community and Revolution in Modern Vietnam
(Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1976).
See FitzGerald, op. cit., pp. 203-208.

Pike, Vietcong, pp. 229-230.

Some indicated, however, that the Front organized a ‘**Youth Liberation

Association”’ in Thua Thien, and some village youngsters joined, especially
during 1964-1967. This group’s only activity in the village was an occasional
leaflet distribution. : .

Possible indications of the loyalty of Front followers in the province to the

movement are the relatively small numbers of people who deserted North
Vietnamese Army units and Front civil and military organizations. During
1963-1965, only 406 deserted those ranks, in 1966 there were 206, and during
the first eight months of 1967 there were 236. Complete figures for later years
are not available, but Thua Thien/Hue Government officials told the author
that there were never large numbers of so-called hoi/chanh deserters. See
‘Province Report, Department of the Army, Thua Thien Province, I CTZ,
MACY Advisory Team 18, APO 96258,”’ September 3, 1967, p. 7: available
in the U.S. Army Center for Military History, Washington, D.C.; this is the
monthly advisory report, which was filed under that title from 1967 to 1973.
Before 1967, the reports were called **Report For Month Ending. . .”’, and
were filed by the U.S.A.I.D. Reports Officer, Thua Thien Province: the
entire 1966 record is available in **Thua Thien Papers, 1966,’° folder 10, box
10, Center for Military History. Hereafter, all these documents are referred
to as “*Thua Thien Report.”
 9

Attack!
TAKING ON THE MARINES

The first Americans came to the village in 1965. That was when President
Lyndon Johnson sent a combat unit of the U.S. Marine Corps to Thua
Thien/Hue, part of America’s efforts to shore up the Government and
defeat the Front.'! The Marines initially based themselves at a place called
Phu Bai, which is about four miles south of My Thuy Phuong. From their
new base, Marine units began extensive operations throughout Thua
Thien and in Quang Tri, to the north.’ Battles raged all around My Thuy
Phuong during the Marine years, 1965-1967. Here are highlights of a few
major operations:

On February 27, 1966, a Government regiment alerted the Marines that it

needed help in Phu Thu District, which lies very close to the village, to the east.
In response a large number of Marine assault helicopters departed Phu Bai—
the beginning of Operation New York. The Marines attacked and continued to
do so for four days with wave after wave of helicopters, artillery, and soldiers
on the ground. According to Marine statistics the final tally for the four-day
period was 122 Vietnamese killed.*

In the area immediately west of My Thuy Phuong, a three-battalion operation

called Fremont ranged over the countryside between July 10 and October 31,
1967. When it ended the Marines reported 17 American and 123 Vietnamese
fatalities, with 260 American soldiers wounded.*

Throughout much of the period of Marine activity in the area, a special com-
posite military group, Task Force X-Ray, had the mission of protecting the Phu
Bai base, screening the western approaches to Hue, and keeping open High-
way One.* X-Ray operations, which varied in size, almost certainly came
directly to My Thuy Phuong.

Ws
116 / Village at War

These operation summaries and statistics reflect the mounting war near
the village.° And in My Thuy Phuong itself there was a mounting war, too,
with one side clearly taking the initiative. A peasant spoke of the years
1964-1965:

The Communists were very strong during that time. Communist guerrillas freely
attacked Government soldiers, in places where the Government had check-
points and outposts. Many ofthe people supported them. The people told them
where the soldiers were, told them what time to attack, and helped them to
escape. The Communists were very strong. There were also many attacks
against American and Government vehicles on Highway One, and against the
police and Army operations.

Another peasant recalled:

It seemed that everybody supported the Liberation during that time. This was
the time that the American army was just coming to fight in Vietnam. Every-
body liked the Liberation Front, and supported all of the policies of the Libera-
tion. The most important policy they supported was the revolutionary war. The
people had learned about the struggle, and knew that the guerrillas needed their
support. So everyone sacrificed and struggled along with the guerrillas.

Despite these and other people’s comments that many supported guer-
rilla operations during 1964-1965, there are indications that during those
years only five or six actually joined the local full-time guerrilla force,
which consisted of about twenty men and few if any women. People
implied that family obligations discouraged most from becoming full-time
guerrillas, for to do so meant giving up farming or other occupations. It
also meant exposing family members to pressures from Government secu-
rity agencies, and increasing the chances of untimely death, which would
mean family difficulties. Most local guerrillas were thus without pressing
family obligations—including holdovers from the Viet Minh era whose
families had adjusted to their absence, and young unmarried men whose
families could survive without them. During the entire period of Front
activity, 1961-1975, there was variation in the support guerrillas received
locally, but little change in guerrilla recruitment patterns.
There were many small guerrilla operations in My Thuy Phuong during
1964-1965, most of which involved unarmed men, women, and children
assisting in various ways. A peasant commented:

Everyone liked to help the revolutionary struggle in every way possible. Some
of us did simple things like giving information to the Front on the Government
Army, or on police activities. Other people gave guerrillas food and money.
Other people helped guerrillas hide. Some other people helped guerrillas make
traps and guns. Everyone liked to do it. We were happy to help.

A low-ranking Government soldier looked back on the mid-1960s,

when he was still in high school:
 ~ ALTACK 9 w ailir

Oh, yes, the Viet Cong was very strong at that time. That was when everyone
was tricked by the Viet Cong, and supported what they called the ‘‘people’s
revolution.” Everybody took large dangerous chances to help the Viet Cong,
even when there were attacks against the nationalist soldiers in this area. I can
remember once when I was a little boy I helped the Viet Cong carry a message.

Finally, a local civil servant summarized the period 1964-1965: ‘‘At

that time this was a Viet Cong village, controlled by day through all areas
all the way up to both sides of the road. At night even the road was
controlled by the Viet Cong.’ Many others described insurgent influence
as extensive and several also spoke ofthat influence in geographic terms.

Most operations conducted by the U.S. Marines during 1964-1967

were in the lowlands and mountain areas outside of My Thuy Phuong. But
the Marines came near enough that villagers felt a disruptive ripple effect
of war. For example, convoys of Marine trucks traveled My Thuy
Phuong’s branch of Highway One and made it dangerous for those on
foot, bicycle, or motorcycle. A peasant woman tearfully recalled what
one convoy brought her:

I was walking along the road with my son, who was wearing a hat. There was a
string to hold the hat to his chin. One of the American soldiers grabbed the hat,
and pulled my son up and under the wheels of the truck. The truck stopped, but
it was too late.

Seeing her son grabbed away and crushed before her eyes shattered
the woman’s life. She said, ‘‘He was my only son, and my sadness is so
deep that it will never end.”
A peasant described another problem along Highway One:

The American soldiers went by in their trucks and shot as many water buffalo as
they could. They liked to see the animals fall, | think. They killed so many that
after a few years we felt to have water buffalo was very dangerous. One time a
boy was hit in the leg when an American soldier tried to kill the water buffalo he
was sitting on.

Several thought of the convoys and spoke of C-rations, the small green
cans of meat and other foods distributed to American combat soldiers on
operations. In the village C-rations became dangerous weapons in the
hands of U.S. Marines, who often threw them from passing convoys at
buildings and people. ‘‘The American soldiers threw the cans very hard,
and very fast,’’ remembered a high school student. A healed gash on the
boy’s forehead was his reminder of the Marines and of the day a hail of
little green cans stopped a group of students bicycling to school.
As they launched their offensive operations in Thua Thien/Hue, the
‘Marines not only passed along the highway through the village, but liter-
ally passed overhead as well. My Thuy Phuong’s airspace bustled with
118 / Village at War

Marine helicopters ferrying soldiers into battle, hauling equipment, or

rushing out casualties or prisoners of war. The choppers brought noise
and swirling, choking dust storms to the village. But there were some-
times other problems connected with the choppers. A peasant recalled an
encounter he had:

One day I was walking back home from the ricefield, carrying tools on my
shoulder. Then behind me I heard a large, loud noise. A very bad noise. I looked
back and saw an American helicopter following me, shooting down the path
toward me. I was very scared, so jumped into the water by the side. Just one
moment later, the bullets went right by. So scary.

During those years, no large-scale Marine activities, with the likely

exception of X-Ray operations, came directly to the village. However,
many grew concerned. A peasant’s comment on the Marines was typical
of many others: ‘‘When the American Marines came everyone began to
worry more and more. We could see the war getting bigger and bigger.
And we worried about heavy fighting coming here.” ’

Shortly after the Marine Corps began military operations in Thua

Thien/Hue it launched a program called Combined Action. The Marines
presented this as a new and innovative approach to the military require-
ments of Vietnam.® It came to My Thuy Phuong in the form of a Com-
bined Action Platoon, or C.A.P. In theory, the C.A.P. integrated a Gov-
ernment platoon of local Popular Forces soldiers with a squad of Ameri-
can Marines.’ In August of 1965, the C.A.P. began its operations in the
village.'° It consisted of about 30 Vietnamese soldiers and 15 Marines.
They lived in a U.S.-constructed building along Highway One, near the
center of the village. The compound bore an American stamp, for Marine
supply personnel had thoroughly equipped it. Even the food was **‘Made
in UES Ae
A retired Vietnamese C.A.P. soldier said that most of the Marines
stayed very close to the compound—except when ambushes or patrols
called.'' Those operations came nearly every night, and sometimes during
daylight hours as well. A peasant commented on a C.A.P. ambush:

One time I was going out to the ricefields early in the morning, about 5 o'clock,
walking with my son. Just when we were crossing into the ricefields someone
shouted, **Don’t move!” They fired their guns once or twice to scare us. And
then the soldiers, and two Americans following them, asked us for our papers,
asked us why we were out so early, and asked us where we were going. We
were very afraid that they were going to arrest us, but finally they let us go.

Others remembered the C.A.P. and spoke of death. A village council-

man said:

One night there was frightful shooting, so much ofit, out in the ricefields. They
were shooting back and forth for about 20 minutes. When we got up the next
 ~ Attack! / 119

day, we saw the Americans and the soldiers bringing in two bodies, carrying
them ina raincoat. We knew the dead men. But the soldiers said they were V.C.

Some familiar problems cropped up during C.A.P. operations. For

example, once in 1967 a daytime C.A.P. patrol moved through the western
portion of the village. The soldiers converged slowly on a small home,
completely surrounded it, then entered. The owner, a peasant, recalled
that Vietnamese soldiers on the C.A.P. stole some money during their
house search. Another vignette illustrates the type of on-the-job training
the Marines brought their allies through the C.A.P. A retired Vietnamese
C.A.P. member said that once in 1966, C.A.P. officers organized a night
patrol near the ricefield hamlets. About five Marines and a squad of Viet-
namese soldiers proceeded into the ricefields along narrow paths, heading
toward the hamlets. Suddenly heavy fire from two or three directions
blanketed them. Two C.A.P. soldiers were hit. A Vietnamese died in-
stantly when a bullet ripped through his head, and an American was
lightly wounded in the shoulder. During the cross fire Vietnamese soldiers
helped call in artillery and air support. Casualties during the contact were
very one-sided. C.A.P. soldiers found no evidence the next morning that
any members of the ambushing guerrilla force had been wounded or
killed. There were no bodies or blood trails. But the operation was not a
total waste of time, according to the retired Vietnamese soldier: ‘‘Opera-
tions like that made us better soldiers. The Americans were so brave that
we became brave, too. We learned to call for support from headquarters.”
The C.A.P. remained until March or April of 1970.'* It brought the
village frequent small unit operations, in some ways probably helped
improve fighting abilities of Government soldiers, and had an undeter-
mined effect on My Thuy Phuong’s insurgent force. But like the large
Marine operations, the C.A.P. also brought disruption and fear to village
life.

By 1965-1966, American military activity throughout the province was

causing the Front some problems. Illustrative are several captured docu-
ments from the area, which include admissions of problems. In one of
them a Front commander writes, ‘“‘the enemy has implemented the policy
of terrorism and the demagogical policy.’ He asserts that Government
information efforts ‘‘created dissention among our forces and various
religious sects, [and] aroused nostalgia among our soldiers and
cadres. .. .’'3 The commander also reports: 4

Generally speaking, the reason why shortcomings rose to a high degree was
because of the enemy’s stepped-up activities in various fields and because our
cadres were not deeply concerned with the welfare of the people in the liberated
area. Because of the above shortcomings our cadres were incapable of control-
ling the people and restoring security in the liberated area... .
120 / Village at War

Another document is an ‘‘absolute secret’’ resolution of the First Con-

ference of the Tri Thien Hue Military Region Party Committee, held on
September 15-19, 1966. In part, it reads: '°

The guerrilla warfare development is not homogeneous, not strong enough. The
guerrilla strength is still low (not even 1 percent of the population). Women are
still disregarded and are not recruited by the guerrilla force. The military and
political training of the personnel is low. Many Party members have not, yet
joined the guerrilla force. The ratio of covert guerrillas is fairly high (47 per-
cent), but their activities are few. Many liberated hamlets have no guerrillas.
The basic militia corps has not been established.

Generally speaking, guerrillas are still weak in fighting. Their forms of activity
are limited. They are still weak in counter-sweep operations and in communica-
tion warfare. Their political struggles have not been satisfactorily combined
with military and enemy proselyting. They have not satisfactorily performed
fighting, protection of the villages, people and agricultural production. They
have not carried out the role of being a backbone of the people’s political
struggle and of the resupply of concentrated units. Full-time agricultural pro-
duction members are still too numerous. There is an acute shortage of cadre
(there are only 276 hamlet unit cadres in 475 liberated hamlets).

In My Thuy Phuong the establishment of the C.A.P. and some Gov-

ernment security activities brought the death of two or three Front lead-
ers. Police arrested and jailed for varying terms one or two other leaders,
along with twenty or thirty Front supporters. In addition Government and
American forces killed and captured about five of the village’s estimated
twenty guerrillas, while causing a few pro-Front families, fearful of arrest
and heightened danger, to begin withholding support from guerrilla opera-
tions.
Despite the new problems there are indications that throughout the
province during the mid-1960s the Front began to resist heightening Gov-
ernment and American military pressure. For example, on July 7, 1966, a
district committee of the Thua Thien People’s Revolutionary Party
adopted a resolution calling for indoctrination and reindoctrination. Part
of it reads: '¢

All Party committee members must improve their ideology in order to under-
stand the general situation of the various battlefields, clearly understand the
guidelines and policy of the Party, and also correct the wrong, rightist ideology.

And during 1965-1967, My Thuy Phuong’s Front leaders attended

meetings organized by the Front branch in Huong Thuy District. The
sessions focused on ideology, and on specific tactics to meet heightened
military and police pressure. In turn the leaders organized meetings of
village guerrillas to discuss political goals and tactics, and held conversa-
tions with residents to pass on the messages. They also explicitly urged all
cell members to be alert for informers and if arrested not to reveal Front
 ” Attack! / 121

members’ names. In other words, Front leaders tried to strengthen their

ties to the people. And the people’s comments, included in the preceding
chapter, suggest that the leaders succeeded, for the ties became strong
indeed.
But the Front had another response to heightened military pressure:
upgrading of its armed forces. In about 1964-1965, it began a nationwide
shift toward *‘mobile warfare,’ which involved buildup of main and local
force maneuver units.'’ In the special military zone called Tri Thien Hue,
which included Quang Tri and Thua Thien/Hue, the Front built up battal-
ions and regiments of its main forces.'® There was also a buildup of the
Thua Thien local forces, the battalions and companies controlled by the
provincial and district structures.'? According to Front followers, when
the insurgency organized main and local force military units for the shift
toward mobile warfare a number of men long active in the local guerrilla
force joined those units. Ten men, about half of the village’s most experi-
enced guerrillas, departed for training at Front base camps, and for future
combat throughout Tri Thien Hue.’° Their departure required another
upgrading response. Local leaders recruited about 10 people serving in
the so-called self-defense force of guerrilla supporters—loosely organized
and usually unarmed individuals who assisted the Front in various ways,
such as spreading leaflets or serving as lookouts—as replacement mem-
bers of the local guerrilla force. Two of the recruits were women.?! Vet-
eran guerrillas personally trained the former self-defense members, trying
to pass on the lessons of many years’ experience.
As a further response to heightened military pressure, snipers became
more active along the highway.’? The Front also organized more am-
bushes, placed more booby traps, and directed more attacks against Gov-
ernment troops. Local guerrillas, like their predecessors of the Viet Minh
period and early anti-Diem years, enjoyed almost unhampered movement
and control through most sections of the village. Government soldiers
were generally safe only in their compounds and by other heavily guarded
points, and had only some daytime control in other sections of the vil-
lage.73
Beginning at about the same time the Front provided guerrillas with
better weapons, including Chinese AK-47 rifles, grenades, and explo-
sives, many of which likely came through North Vietnamese Army chan-
nels. There is even one indication, not mentioned by villagers, that guer-
rillas received special uniforms. An American report from 1966 includes
this passage: 7+

The V.C. have organized in the Huong Thuy District, a V.C. “‘sapper’’ squad
comprised of twelve persons and at present they are believed to be active in the
Thuy. Phuong village. Of increased concern, is the fact that this group is known
to operate in uniforms similar to those worn by the National Police. It may be
the white shirt and grey trousers or jungle uniforms similar to the police field
forces. All are armed with carbines and/or sub-machine guns. Limited identities
and descriptions are known to the National Police.
122 / Village at War

Also in about 1966, guerrillas and some of their supporters improved

the complex of tunnels dug in 1962-1963. Most of the improved tunnels
stretched over huge areas, had two or three entrances, and consisted of
interconnected passages of many shapes and functions. Guerrillas hid
themselves, their weapons, and rice stocks in the underground maze, and
used tunnels, as in previous years, for escape after attacks. A student put
it this way: ‘‘I’ve heard that in America there are very big subway sys-
tems in the cities. Well, the guerrillas had their own subway system, too!’
There were occasional attacks during the mid-1960s against American
trucks moving along the highway through the village, and American mili-
tary patrols, possibly part of the Marines’ Task Force X-Ray, also came
under attack. A peasant discussed the Front’s strategy:

Let me tell you how we fought the Americans. We knew that we did not have
the weapons to fight them in the open, so we had to fight another way. We used
tunnels to move in the areas where there were American soldiers on operations.
That would let us escape quickly.

So we would put many pieces of sharp bamboo in the ground near the paths they
walked on. Very many pieces! Then we would shoot at the Americans when
they were on the paths. They jumped on the bamboo and got very hurt!

When that happened, the Americans always did the same thing. They would be
very angry, and might kill some people, or shoot up some houses, or have a big
operation in the area. They never found us, but made many enemies when they
did those things. This is the way to fight Americans.

On October 19, 1966, there was an incident on Highway One that

caught the attention of American advisors, and which several villagers
remembered. That evening Front snipers took up positions along the
highway. A small truck approached the center of the village, guerrillas
opened fire, and the truck came to a halt. A peasant remembered, *‘Right
away the guerrillas saw that it was not an American vehicle, but a vehicle
driven by a Frenchman who worked for the [French-contracted] power
company.’ The peasant would have concurred with the U.S. Govern-
ment telegram on the incident: **

SNIPER ATTACKED VEHICLE ON ROUTE 1 GIA LE AREA HUONG

THUY DISTRICT DRIVEN BY MANAGER OF HUE ELECTRIC COM-
PANY, GEORGE TANVILLE FRENCH CITIZEN. VICTIM SHOP IN
STOMACH AND HANDS, AFTER ATTACK V.C. GAVE VICTIM FIRST
AID WHO IS NOW IN HUE HOSPITAL.

According to an American advisory file, between July and December

of 1967 there was extensive Front military activity throughout Thua
Thien/Hue.*° Front activity for Huong Thuy District is summarized in
Table 9.1.°7 Included in the file for the same period are these My Thuy
Phuong incidents: 75
 - Attack! | 123

TABLE 9.1. Front Activity in Huong Thuy District,

July-December, 1967 *

Type Number Number Number Number Structures

Incident Incidents Killed Wounded Missing Damaged

Assassination 5) 6 = = ==
Abduction 7 —- aa 26 —
Mortar Attack 3 1 if — =
Road Mining 2 2 2 = =
Demolition 2 1 2 — bridge,
house
Small Arms Attack — — ae —_— =
Leaflets — — — — =
Booby Traps = — — = =

Totals 19 10 4 26 2

* See *‘Thua Thien Terrorist Activity, 1967-1968" (U.S.A.I.D./Viet Nam, Public Safety
Division), folder 60, Box 19, 19/66:23-7, Center of Military History.

August 14, 1:00 A.M.—One V.C. squad infiltrated into Dong Tam hamlet, Thuy
Phuong village, Huong Thuy District and shot to death one civilian... .

September 5, 5:50 A.M.—Unknown strength of V.C. blew out a bridge within

Thuy Phuong village, Huong Thuy District. The bridge damaged 80%, one P.F.
{Popular Forces soldier] and one civilian wounded.

September 9, 3:30 P.M.—Unknown strength of V.C. entered Dong Tam ham-

let, Thuy Phuong village, Huong Thuy District and blew up a civilian house.
One three-year-old child killed.

October 24, 8:00 P.M.—Military jeep running between Phu Bai and Hue
detonated a V.C. mine within Thuy Phuong village Huong Thuy District. ARVN
[Government Army] KIA [killed in action] one captain one soldier and one
civilian WIA [wounded in action].

In about 1967, the Combined Action Platoon came under attack.

Nearly all local guerrillas were involved in the C.A.P. attack, together
with guerrillas from other parts of Huong Thuy District. A guerrilla de-
scribed it:

One time, before Tet Mau Than [Tet of 1968], we attacked that Marine base, the
house. There was about a company of us. We snuck in at night, and fired on
them very heavily. We fired and fired all night, and they tried to shoot back.
They called in helicopters to try to kill us, but that didn’t help much. I don’t
know how many we killed, but I heard there were many. Only two or three of us
died.

This incident, which was one of the largest guerrilla attacks ever con-
ducted in My Thuy Phuong, left a strong impression on many. A student
contended, ‘‘The people were very happy after they saw how brave the
124 / Village at War

Liberation Front guerrillas could be in such an attack against the Ameri-

cans. Many of us thought to ourselves, secretly, that we must support the
Liberation Front.’’ And a retired Government soldier who fought
alongside the Americans during the C.A.P. attack, said, ‘‘That attack
scared everybody for years. From then, we could not be sure about the
defenses of the army. I will never forget it.’ This man was frequently
reminded of the Front’s display of strength during the C.A.P. confronta-
tion. He wore a plastic leg, a replacement for one blown off during. the
attack. :
In addition to its sniping, ambushes, and other military attacks against
American and Government security activities, the Front also launched a
fierce attack against a wide range of local pro-Government individuals,
including civil servants, prominent military officers, large landholders,
moneylenders, and some tradesmen. Attacks against such people came
after small Front meetings in My Thuy Phuong and surrounding villages,
where people discussed ‘‘class enemies’’ and possible actions to oppose
them.2? As during the Viet Minh period and early 1960s, Front followers
directed various types of warnings at enemies—including leaflets, rumors,
and sometimes harmless bomb blasts. These were the first part of the
attack.
People did not agree on how many such attacks there were over the
years. Some suggested that there were four or five incidents, and others
said there were more. Most concurred that the majority of the attacks
occurred between 1965 and 1967, and that many Government allies during
those years lived in constant fear, daring not to sleep in the village.*° To
illustrate, people described the killing of aGovernment village chief, who
many regarded as corrupt. In 1967, the Front circulated leaflets addressed
to the village chief, stating that if he did not improve his behavior he
would be ‘“‘punished by the people.’’ Eventually, Front leaders decided to
have him killed. A small number of people began to observe his comings
and goings over a period of several weeks, to find out what time he went
home, whether he traveled alone or with others, and whether he was
armed. When a complete picture of the man’s activities was ready, the
guerrillas moved. They shot the village chief dead.?!

When people discovered Government informers, local insurgent lead-

ers chose from a variety of responses. They usually decided to kill those
intelligence agents deemed most dangerous, often in ambushes or late-
night visits to the agents’ homes. Usually warnings preceded the
killings—leaflets, rumors, or explosions timed to go off near the inform-
ers’ homes or places of business. If the warnings failed to deter, then
killings often followed. And sometimes when the leaders learned of Gov-
ernment agents in or near the village they tried to use them against the
Government itself! That is, Front supporters passed false information to
the agents to drain Government resources and destroy the informers’
credibility. Several recalled one incident with amusement and even fond-
 » Attack! | 125

ness. That was the time Front supporters passed a piece of information
that appeared important to an informer. The false information concerned
reorganization of the Front committee for Huong Thuy District, and in-
cluded names of supposed Front agents in the area. A peasant described
what happened:
They gave the information to that man they knew was a spy, and he took it to
the Government intelligence agency. The information was the names of impor-
tant cadres in this area. They were real names, but none of them was a member
of the Liberation. The names were those of Government men. These were men
who had always been against the Front.

So when the Government received this information a few days later, they ar-
rested some of those men. Everybody was very happy, because we knew they
had the wrong people, and we knew that maybe even those men would begin to
hate the Government.

As the Front attack intensified during 1965-1967, many in the prov-

ince, including My Thuy Phuong villagers, became involved in large
anti-Government demonstrations called Struggle Movements. Led mainly
by An Quang Buddhist activists and students, these movements aimed at
changing certain Government policies to improve democracy and free-
dom. The demonstrations also had strong anti-American overtones, and
in 1966 caused most Americans to evacuate Hue. Demonstrators also
sacked and burned Hue’s American Cultural Center.*?
Some villagers, especially students, went to Hue to join the main dem-
onstrations. But the most dramatic local contribution to the movement
involved people placing family altars on Highway One. Many carried
altars out to the highway, and placed burning incense, fruit, and other
offerings on them—all to slow Government troop movements. Eventually
the Government, with American advisory help, crushed the 1966 Struggle
Movement.** Troops removed the altars from the highway, soldiers who
had deserted returned to their units, and the Government reestablished a
semblance of control.*4
During the Struggle period, the Front conducted few military ac-
tivities. Its strategy was to win converts among those angered by Gov-
ernment suppression of the demonstrations. Insurgent leaders in the vil-
lage and clandestine radio broadcasts characterized the 1966 movement as
but the latest expression of revolutionary struggle, and tried to identify
the Front as a leading anti-Government struggling force. There were few
indications of how people received these claims. One man, a Government
soldier, stated:

Everybody was opposing the Government. It was as if all the people were
united against the Government policy, and everybody demanded that the
Americans do something to change the Government, to make democracy real in
Vietnam. When the Struggle Movement did not succeed, everyone was angry at
the Government. I don’t think that anybody supported the Government. Maybe
the people liked the Communists more after that. Who knows?
126 | Village at War

A man who thought he did know was a peasant, a part-time guerrilla.

He recalled:

The Struggle Movement was very good for our side. It made the people think
about the most important struggle—the one against the Americans. Many of the
people who supported the revolution grew very strong during that period, and I
think some new people began to follow the Liberation.

This and many other comments suggest, in summary, that Government

suppression of the Struggle Movement brought heightened anti-
Government feelings and perhaps made easier the Front’s intensified at-
tack. And the Government’s tough responses to later demonstrations,
especially those that opposed the elections of 1967, had similar effects
upon attitudes.

TET OFFENSIVE

The Front and North Vietnamese attacks of February, 1968, brought

extensive fighting to nearly every section of South Vietnam, including the
village of My Thuy Phuong.?> The Front began careful preparations in the
region for the Tet Offensive during the days before January 31, 1968.%°
The lineup of military forces committed to battle by the North Vietnamese
in the province included an operational staff, two assault infantry regi-
ments, and two reinforcing infantry regiments.*’ Closely supporting the
North Vietnamese main forces was the entire Front provincial organiza-
tion. According to a U.S. Army study, the Front ‘created an extremely
favorable environment for the Offensive by collecting intelligence, plan-
ning routes, storing food, and controlling the populace in the lowlands
around Hue.’’ 38
During the last days of January, 1968, North Vietnamese and Front
units were moving rapidly through the region. On the night of January 28,
1968, two days before Tet, a number of heavily armed sapper groups in
battalion strength infiltrated Hue. In a published report, Government
analysts suggest that part of the infiltration route was very close to, if not
through, My Thuy Phuong.??
As the North Vietnamese forces moved into position around Hue, and
as the sappers began infiltrating the city, Front guerrillas began their
preparations for attack. In the village, word of the coming offensive
reached Front leaders a few weeks before it occurred. A guerrilla com-
mented:

| remember that the comrades told us that something very big and very impor-
tant was going to happen soon. They told us that soon there would be a General
Uprising to drive the Americans out of Vietnam, and to destroy the puppet
government. They told us all to get ready for a hard struggle, and for much
sacrifice.
 ag Attack! | 127
The Front directed its attacks in the village at many of the old targets.
Beginning on January 31, coinciding with the coordinated North Viet-
namese assault on the Hue Citadel and actions by local guerrillas and
sympathizers throughout Hue and other parts of the province, insurgents
launched a variety of attacks in the village. These aimed primarily at
weakening local Government and American forces. The attacks brought
the temporary collapse of the local Government apparatus, for civil ser-
vants and soldiers deserted nearly en masse. When the offensive began,
soldiers and civil servants serving in and around the village simply disap-
peared, and did not reappear for a week or 10 days. During the offensive,
there was sniping along Highway One directed at Government and U.S.
troops, and Government installations in the village came under intermit-
tent small arms fire. Guerrillas targeted nearly every military vehicle mov-
ing through the village. Snipers hit a jeep carrying a group of Government
officers, killing one of them, and they wounded an American sitting in an
open U.S. Army truck.
The guerrillas also stepped up terrorist actions against Government
officials and other enemies in the immediate village area. They threw at
least two satchel charges at homes of Government civil servants, and
there were two or three direct confrontations with old enemies. A low-
ranking Government soldier recalled what happened to his neighbors:
‘*The Viet Cong came on the first day of Tet, and came to the house ofthe
man living next to me. He was Catholic, and had been a supporter ofthe
Government. They took him away. He was captured, and his family never
saw him again.’ 4° Others confirmed this incident and related it to a
concerted Front effort to attack long-time enemies. Five others disap-
peared from their homes during the first two days of the offensive, and
only two returned.
There were no other major guerrilla military activities in the village,
and only one significant Front proselyting activity: Front followers dis-
tributed a large number of leaflets. The message of the leaflets was that a
General Uprising had come, and that it was time for all the people to unite
in a fight against the Americans and the Government. The Government
radio station, the most important source of Government information for
the province, carried a few news reports during most ofthe offensive, but
much patriotic music. Some people listened to Front broadcasts. For
example, the insurgency broadcast the following message in the province
on February 12, 1968:4!

The golden opportunity to completely triumph over the U.S. aggressors has
come. We have won and are winning. Let the army and people of Thua-Thien-
Hue rush forward on the impetus of victories, resolutely smash the puppet
army, overthrow the puppet administration, crush the American bandits’ ag-
gressive designs, and together with the army and people of South Vietnam
advance to achieve final victory.
128 / Village at War

Within a few days of the beginning of the offensive, Government and

U.S. military units began to respond. The Government’s First Infantry
Division, which had been surprised by the attacks, reorganized some of
its forces, recaptured parts of Hue, and reasserted Government influence
in the countryside.*?2 The First Division was heavily buttressed in this
attempt by American units, which directed very intensive air and ground
operations against North Vietnamese and Front forces. Some U.S. bombs
and artillery fire fell in the areas west, southwest, and northwest of the
village. Because there had been Front military activity in the villages of
Phu Thu District, east of My Thuy Phuong, there was some shelling and
bombing there as well, but none in My Thuy Phuong itself.
On about February 6 or 7, 1968, the first American and Government
patrols reappeared in the village. Guerrillas did not attempt to directly
confront any of them, although sniping and punji stick traps continued to
hamper the operations. Instead, guerrillas and their supporters simply
retreated into homes, tunnels, and the hills. The Tet Offensive in the
province did not lead to the General Uprising that the Front had pre-
dicted.4*? However, it did bring about the total but temporary collapse of
the Government apparatus in both city and countryside—at a high cost in
casualties and property destruction.44 An American advisor reported on
post-Tet conditions in the province: ‘‘The Tet offensive in late January
disrupted all efforts in the countryside, and effectively destroyed all
semblance of G.V.N. rule until late February.’’ 45 Without a doubt, that is
precisely what happened in My Thuy Phuong.

An Army captain assigned to the village reflected the most common

reaction of the pro-Government group to the Tet Offensive:

The Viet Cong had a big loss during Tet Mau Than. The people all clearly saw
how cruel the Viet Cong were in Hue, and the Viet Cong had to retreat because
the people did not join their attack and instead were afraid of them and ran away
from them.

A peasant said:

The Government side was at first very weak. The soldiers ran away, and the
Communists walked right in. In this area, the Viet Cong was very strong, and
was free to move anywhere through the area. They had always been strong
here, but during Tet Mau Than they were very much in the open.

A civil servant stated:

We began to worry about the Americans, and wondered how determined the
Americans wereto help us. Did you know that not one American base was
attacked by the Viet Cong? They attacked only Vietnamese bases. Now why
was that? I think, and many people think, that it was because the Americans had
made a secret arrangement with the Communists.
 ~
Attack! / 129

Several other pro-Government individuals expressed similar beliefs

about American foreknowledge of the Tet attacks.
A peasant summed up what many politically uncommitted people were
thinking during the offensive:

There are many people in Vietnam who stand in the middle. During Tet Mau
Than the people in the middle had a difficult time. On the one hand we saw the
Communist side being very strong. They killed many people. But we saw that
the Government side was very weak, and needed to have the Americans to
support them.

I think everyone respected the Communist side more because so many of the
guerrillas died in the attacks. The important thing about Tet Mau Than is that
the Communists made the Government very weak.

And the numerous local Front supporters hoped for a Front victory
during the offensive. A peasant described the period in these words:

There were many people who liked the Liberation Front who were worried, and
who didn’t know what was going to happen after Tet Mau Than. They were
afraid that the revolution might have been lost, because the Americans and the
Government Army seemed very strong.

But I think they knew that the Liberation Front was even stronger, and that it
had pulled back from the cities and the villages to the mountains. The people
knéw that if the American planes had not been there, and if the American Army
had not come to hit very strongly, the Front would have won.

So I think many of them looked on Tet Mau Than and were sad about all the
dead and all the trouble. But I think they thought it was a victory for the
revolutionary movement.

A student who often spread leaflets for the Front recalled:

Yes, Tet Mau Than was a very important time for the Liberation. It was a great
struggle against the Americans, and I think it was a victory for the Liberation,
even though the Liberation had to retreat from Hue. It was a very strong
victory. It showed the people that the Americans could be defeated.

In retrospect, we must conclude that the scope of the Tet attacks in the
province, and the harshness of attacks in the village itself left an indelible
mark on minds in My Thuy Phuong: the offensive reminded everyone of
the Front’s power.*® For the estimated 5 percent of the people who were
Government supporters, Tet of 1968 intensified hatred of the Front, and
for some planted seeds of doubt concerning American dependability as an
ally. The 10 to 15 percent who were politically uncommitted remained so,
but were deeply impressed by the Front’s strength. And My Thuy
Phuong’s Front supporters, an estimated 80 to 85 percent of the people,
were left with proud memories ofthe boldest strikes yet against the Gov-
ernment and its ally.
130 / Village at War

NOTES

See ‘‘U.S. Marine Corps Civic Action Effort in Vietnam; March 1965—March
1966" (Washington, D.C.: Historical Branch, Headquarters, U.S. Marine
Corps, 1968), p. 17.
See The Marines in Vietnam, 1954-1973, p. 47.

ltXiah, (x 33k
Tbid., pp. 85, 97.

(Wexeh (d~ OU.

Also see Appendix IV, item 1, ‘‘Agricultural Production for the Support of
VC/NVA Troops in MR V,”’ dated 1965, cited in ** Viet Cong Loss of Popula-
tion Control; Evidence From Captured Documents,”’ in Douglas Pike, ed.,
Captured Documents (Saigon: U.S. Mission, circa 1968-1969), vol. 5, p. 6:
Vietnamese original not cited; available in Cornell University Library.

In light of such comments by villagers, a statement in a Marine publication

seems curious. When the Corps transferred a Marine unit from the My Thuy
Phuong area in {965, Marines reported that ‘‘people were sad and heartbro-
ken,’ and they ‘‘lined the road for 300 meters watching .. . the Marines
leave. The Marines noted that many of the people were crying... .” [See
‘*U.S. Marine Corps Civic Action’? p. 58; emphasis in original.]

Ibid., p. 39; also see ‘U.S. Marine Corps Civic Action Effort in Vietnam;
April 1966—April 1967” (Washington, D.C.: Historical Branch, Headquar-
ters, U.S. Marine Corps, 1970), p. 10.

See ‘Fact Sheet on the Combined Action Force’’ (Danang: III Marine Am-
phibious Force, March 31, 1970), p. 1; available in Histories and Museums
Division, Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, Washington, D.C.
“U.S. Marine Corps Civic Action (1968),”” p. 39.

The only mention of My Thuy Phuong’s C.A.P. in available records is in

‘‘Thua Thien Report,’’ December 5, 1967, p. 11.
The departure date is according to Col. Charles W. Dyke, who was assigned
to the 101st Airborne’s Camp Eagle from September 26, 1968 to June 2, 1970.
He served in a variety of assignments, ranging from battalion commander to
officer in charge of plans, training, and personnel functions at Eagle. He
likely served in the village longer than any other American. (Interviewed at
Fort Campbell, Ky., September 25, 1975.)

‘Summary Communique on the Enemy and Friendly Situation During the

First Six Months of 1966,’’ document captured in November, 1966 by the
101st Airborne Division, cited in Pike, Captured Documents, p. 4.
Waidal. jek, Se

“Viet Cong Recruitment; Data From Captured Documents,’ dated De-

cember, 1967, in ibid., pp. 7, 8; Vietnamese original not cited.

“Indoctrination and Reindoctrination,”’ dated January, 1968, in ibid., p. 1;

Vietnamese original not cited.

These were the Regional Forces (Bo-Doi Dia-Phuong) and Main Force
(Quan-Doi Chu-Luc). Also see Pike, Vietcong, pp. 236-240.
 ~ Attack! | 181
See “‘Thua Thien Report,’’ September 3, 1967, p. 4. Also see ‘‘The Viet
Cong Infrastructure; A Background Paper’? (Saigon: U.S. Mission, 1970),
pp. 3, 8; available in Cornell University Library.

See “Viet Cong Recruitment; Data From Captured Documents,”’ pp. 2, 10.

See ‘‘Thua Thien Report,’’ August 3, 1967, p. 2.

Prior to the recruitment of these women, few local guerrillas were women,
although numerous women aided guerrilla operations in various ways. Ac-
cording to villagers, Front leaders rarely tried to recruit women for the
guerrilla force.

American advisors reported, ‘Occasional V.C. sniper activity still exists in

the Gia Le area (Huong Thuy District) constituting a hazard while traveling
on route #1 between Hue and Phu Bai.” [“‘Thua Thien Report,’ October 4,
1966, p. 18a.]
Government compounds sometimes came under Front attack. People said
that sniper fire and mortar rounds *‘sometimes’’ fell on the compounds. U.S
advisors reported that a polling place in My Thuy Phuong came under mortar
attack during the September, 1966 Constituent Assembly election. [“‘Thua
Thien Report,” October 4, 1966, p. 18a.]

‘“Thua Thien Report,’ December 31, 1966, p. 18a.

U.S.A.1.D./Hue telegram to Public Safety, U.S.A.I.D./Danang, in ‘‘Thua

Thien Weekly and Monthly Report, 1966,’ folder 35, box 17, no. 71A5365,
Center of Military History.
An earlier mention of Front strength in Thua Thien/Hue is a document dated
July, 1966: U.S. advisors reported that the insurgency controlled 70 percent
of Thua Thien by day, and 73 percent by night, versus Government control
by day 11 percent and 8 percent by night; in terms of population, however,
the Front was said to control 7 percent by day and 56 percent by night, and
the Government 53 percent by day and 25 percent by night. [See ““G.V.N.
and V.C. Control of Area’ (Hue: U.S.A.I.D., July, 1966), one page, in ibid.
Also see “‘Thua Thien Report,’ January 25, 1966, p. 2b; Vien, no. 20, p. 117:
Shaplen, The Road From War, pp. 90-120; Vien, no. 8, pp. 156, 168.]

See ‘‘Thua Thien—Terrorist Activity, 1967-1968” (Public Safety Division,

U.S.A.1.D.), folder 60, Box 19, 19/66:23-7, 71A5365, Center of Military
History.

Excerpts of August 17, September 6, September 12, and October 27, 1966
reports in ibid., with military time notations converted to conventional
times.
Some suggested that the Front’s provincial organization had to approve all
such attacks.

30. Many took refuge at night with friends and relatives in Hue.

Bile Villagers did not agree on where the village chief was shot, at home or on the
road. There is, however, confirmation of the killing: anthropologist Gerald
Hickey learned that the village chief died the day after Hickey’s visit to My
Thuy Phuong in 1967. [From a conversation May 29, 1975 at Cornell Univer-
sity.]

See Shaplen, op. cit., pp. 48-73; FitzGerald, Fire In The Lake, pp. 276-291;
‘Civil Unrest in Thua Thien and Quang Tri 10 March thru 30 April 1966”
132 / Village at War

(U.S.A.I.D./Hue, May 3, 1966), enclosure 5, in **Thua Thien, Weekly and

Monthly Report, 1966.”

We1S) See the June 24, 1966 monthly Public Safety report for Thua Thien, in **Thua
Thien, Weekly and Monthly Report, 1966.”

According to several, the 1967 Struggle Movement brought no such demon-

strations to My Thuy Phuong.

ies)tn For a good account ofthe Tet Offensive nationwide, see Don Oberdorfer, Ter
(Garden City: Doubleday, 1971). An interesting analysis of news coverage of
the offensive can be found in Peter Braestrup, Big Story; How the American
Press and Television Reported and Interpreted the Crisis of Tet 1968 in
Vietnam and Washington (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1977).

See Douglas Pike, War, Peace, and the Viet Cong (Cambridge: M.1.T. Press,
1969), pp. 126-131.
See Pham Van Son et al, ed., The Viet Cong ‘‘Tet’’ Offensive (1968) (Saigon:
Printing and Publications Center, Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces, 1968),
p. 284: ‘‘ Special Intelligence Study NR 33-68 on the Hue Tet Offensive . . .”’
(Camp Eagle: 101st Airborne Division, December 29, 1968), pp. 1, 5, avail-
able in the 10ist Airborne Division Museum.

“Special Intelligence Study,” p. 6.

See Son et al, op. cit., pp. 252, 285, 288.

Most villagers assumed that the man was dead, and in 1974-1975 his remains
had not yet been found.

Liberation Radio broadcast, February 12, 1968, in ‘‘Daily Report,’’ Feb-

ruary 13, 1968, p. KKK3.

See “Synopsis of the Battle of Hue’’ (Camp Eagle: 101st Airborne Division,
January 10, 1969), p. 2; available in 101st Airborne Museum.

43. Front confidence was so great during the offensive that on February 14, 1968,
it established a People’s Revolutionary Committee for the province. (See
Vien, no. 22, pp. 43-44.) That committee issued a lengthy analysis of the Tet
Offensive in April, 1968. (See *‘Daily Report,’ April 18, 1968, pp. L1-L3.)
See also ‘‘Information on the Victory of our Armed Forces in Hue From 31
January to 23 March 1968,” translation of a captured document, the authen-
ticity of which was never confirmed, made available to the press in April,
1969, by the U.S. Mission/Saigon.
44, There are widely varying estimates of the number of casualties during the
offensive. See ‘““Synopsis of the Battle,’ p. 2; “‘One Year Later ... The
Rebirth of Hue” (Saigon: U.S. Information Service, Vietnam Feature Ser-
vice, TCB—037, circa 1969), p. 1, available in the 101st Airborne Museum;
Douglas Pike, **The Viet Cong Strategy of Terror’ (Saigon: U.S. Mission,
1970), pp. 41-64: Vien, no. 37, pp. 122, 126; Gareth Porter, “‘The 1968 ‘Hue
Massacre,’ © Indochina Chronicle, June 24, 1974, no. 33, pp. 2-13: Alje
Vennema, The Viet Cong Massacre at Hue (New York: Vantage Press,
1976).

45. “Thua Thien Report,” April 4, 1968, p. 1.

46. Official analysts on both sides of the conflict shared villagers’ fixation on the
power of the offensive. See, for example, Son et al, op. cit., p. 248, and Hue
Anh-Dune, pp. 54, 57, 61.
 10
Fighting the Eagle

THE CAMP

A major turning point for My Thuy Phuong’s people came in early 1968:
the landing of Camp Eagle. With that event, American disruption of vil-
lage life began to accelerate. As part of the U.S. Army buildup in the
province, about two companies of American soldiers came to the village
on January 28 and 29, 1968.' The companies belonged to the 10Ist Air-
borne Division (Airmobile)—the ‘‘Screaming Eagles.’’ The 101st came to
share major combat responsibilities in Thua Thien/Hue with the Marine
Corps.” There is no available information on just why the village was
selected for Camp Eagle, nor is it clear who made the selection. It is clear,
however, that the camp literally changed the face of My Thuy Phuong,
and at its peak supported more Americans—10,000 at a time—than there
were Vietnamese in the village.?
Personnel from the 10Ist constructed Camp Eagle in a section of My
Thuy Phuong called Gia Le 5, a sparsely inhabited area of rolling, sandy
hills in the western part of the village. Before the camp, Gia Le 5 had a
few homes, many acres of vegetable gardens, and numerous graves. The
first people directly affected by Eagle were the two or three families who
lived in Gia Le 5. Government officials ordered them to relocate, and gave
them one month to do so.
People spoke with resignation about relocation of the families, and loss
of the garden area to Camp Eagle, but anger replaced resignation when
they discussed another subject—the graves of Gia Le 5. Before construc-
tion began on the camp, bulldozers destroyed many of the graves. Neither

133
134 / Village at War

101st nor Government officials gave notice of what was about to happen,
so people had no chance to relocate graves or to protest. Colonel Charles
Dyke, who spent nearly two years at Eagle, denied that his unit damaged
any graves, but the consensus of many villagers was that the bulldozers
destroyed between twenty-five and thirty graves.* The 10Ist left other
graves standing, and simply constructed buildings over and around
them.*
After breaking ground, about two companies of U.S. soldiers brought
Camp Eagle to life with a frenzy of construction activity.® The first objec-
tive was to secure Eagle’s boundaries. Tons of barbed wire arrived, and
soldiers strung it around the camp. They also constructed metal recon-
naissance towers, and dug bunkers, fortifying them with sandbags. And
construction began on Camp Eagle’s most dominant and important fea-
ture, a massive helicopter takeoff and landing zone. The next stage in-
volved construction of more durable buildings and other facilities around
Eagle’s 3,150 acres. Soldiers laid roads and walkways throughout the
camp, built barracks, mess halls, a chapel, a command headquarters, put
up an elaborate gate at the camp entrance, and placed small signs around
the camp. One sign over a wooden walkway leading from the helicopter
landing zone read, “If You Want It Done, Ask The 101.” ’

Camp Eagle presented an image of bustling activity. U.S. soldiers

provided ammunition, equipment, men, food, and artillery support for a
string of 101st firebases throughout the province—like Firebase Bastogne
and Firebase Birmingham—and for ground operations organized from
Eagle and other major installations. A stream of trucks and helicopters
transported requested supplies to the firebases.®
Incidents along the highway became virtually daily occurrences. With
convoys moving more regularly than ever before, the bullets and
C-rations continued to fly, and water buffalo to fall. Air transport of
equipment and men, which with the 101st Airborne meant choppers,
greatly raised the noise level in the village. An average of 45,000 to 50,000
takeoffs and landings occurred every month under the supervision of
Eagle Tower.’
Another important Eagle function involved training. American soldiers
instructed both 101st and Vietnamese soldiers within the boundaries of
Eagle, and at nearby Firebase Birmingham. These were refresher courses
for American soldiers recently arrived from the U.S., and first-time train-
ing courses for Vietnamese soldiers.!°

Although most of Eagle’s soldiers kept busy at duty assignments,

many had low morale. Several Americans formerly based at Eagle as-
serted that the morale problem was mainly related to antiwar sentiment
and homesickness, and its most dangerous expression involved alcohol
and drug abuse.'! To their credit, Eagle’s commanders did not allow
 Fighting the Eagle | 135

prostitutes on base—a “‘solution”’ to the morale problem adopted at many

other U.S. installations. But there were quite a few other ‘‘ morale boost-
ers.’ The doors of many Eagle hootches—buildings for 20 or 30 men
each—had illustrations of a gun-toting Screaming Eagle soldier and the
gently prodding words, **What Have You Done For Him Today?’’ '!? The
101st also created eight clubs for its different units, and for the different
ranks of American soldiers on base.
There were films every night at Eagle, and frequent steak and chicken
barbecues. Intramural sports involved many men. A television station
broadcast from a trailer in Hue.'? And occasionally the 101st brought
stage productions to the outdoor ‘‘Eagle Entertainment Bowl.’’ On
Christmas Day, 1969, for example, the Bob Hope Show arrived. Connie
Stevens, astronaut Neil Armstrong, Miss World, Les Brown and the Band
of Renown, and ‘‘a Chinook-full of great looking girls’’ appeared before
an enthusiastic audience estimated at 18,500.'* On the camp, Hope joked,
‘‘In my honor, they changed it to Camp Chicken. I’m under the command
of Colonel Sanders. Hope the enemy doesn’t find out I’m finger-lickin’
good.” '5

One Vietnamese, a Government officer, was unimpressed with Camp

Eagle’s activities: ‘‘America is a very rich country, and came to Vietnam
to support the Vietnamese, so of course it must use everything it has to
support us.’ But others in the village were not so blasé. A peasant re-
called, ‘‘When I heard about and saw the activities on that camp, I
couldn’t believe it. It was like another world to us.”’
The images of American superabundance and movement, Americans
at work, and Americans at play baffled many others. But some, though
perhaps baffled, sought jobs at the base. Very little information is avail-
able on the number of Vietnamese hired to work at Eagle.'® It is clear only
that in 1970 the three major installations in the province—Camp Evans,
the Phu Bai base, and Camp Eagle—employed about 4,700 Vietnamese to
support different branches of the 101st Airborne. The 101st paid Viet-
namese employees an average monthly wage equivalent in 1970 to about
U.S.$23, which is about what blue collar workers earned in Hue in civilian
jobs.!"
In My Thuy Phuong, relatively few—between 50 and 75—sought jobs
on the base. This was partly due to Front pressure to steer clear of the
Americans, and also because of a conscious effort by the 101st to discour-
age job-seekers from the immediate vicinity. According to Colonel Dyke,
residents of the village were in a better position, because of proximity to
the camp, to assist guerrillas in reconnaissance, stake-outs, and attacks.
So the 101st considered them security risks and therefore undesirable
employees.!®
Every morning hundreds of Vietnamese men and women, some from
the village, waited outside the main gate. Eagle headquarters set daily
hiring requirements, and U.S. soldiers had to choose from among the
136 / Village at War

crowds of waiting, anxious laborers. All of the jobs were menial, and
some even demeaning, but the Vietnamese were anxious to work. A small
number of them, including some from the villlage, worked in the camp
laundry, a Korean contract operation, or in the mess halls or post ex-
change. Others worked picking up papers and garbage. Still others dug
ditches and performed other maintenance tasks. Finally, there were men
and women American soldiers called ‘‘shit-burners,’’ whose job it was to
dispose of feces from Camp Eagle’s latrines.'”
Others profited from the camp but did not work theres Although the
101st declared the village off limits to American soldiers, violations of the
ban were frequent enough to permit off-base ‘‘services’’ to emerge. Some
small shops opened on the road leading into Eagle, selling soft drinks and
beer. Most of these shops were also black market currency exchange
points, and they sold marijuana and other drugs. Others along the road
specialized in same-day laundry service, so some houses were literally
covered with drying American uniforms and undergarments. Several prof-
ited handsomely from illicit contacts with 101st soldiers. One man, at the
time a Government soldier, lived along the road, and tried to cultivate
friendships with U.S. soldiers. Through such friendships, he bought soft
drinks and beer from the post exchange, and sold those items on the local
market, splitting profits with the Americans. Another man, a Government
soldier, worked as a pimp.

And then there was Tony. The case of the young boy who took an
American name illustrates how exposure to Camp Eagle changed a dozen
or so young men and boys in the village. At about age 12, Tony left his
impoverished mother, wandered onto Camp Eagle, and simply stayed.
There U.S. soldiers informally adopted him, and for about two years he
rarely left Eagle’s boundaries. The boy picked up military slang, and
learned the heavily accented English language of the southern U.S. He
grew to love American food and appreciate American rock musical
groups, especially the Creedence Clearwater Revival. After two years at
Eagle someone then decided to put Tony to work. The boy began travel-
ling with a 101st military police unit. ‘‘They would drive me into the
village,’’ Tony remembered, ‘‘and when I saw anybody selling things on
the black market I would get out ofthe jeep, give a signal, and they would
have a Vietnamese policeman arrest that person.”
At age 15, Tony for some reason turned on his American benefactors.
He recruited two or three others his age from the village and nearby Phu
Bai, and began to steal from open-top U.S. trucks. Typically, the boys
waited near the intersection in My Thuy Phuong where the trucks had to
stop. One of the boys would climb up onto the trucks and toss boxes to
friends waiting below. Later, when the trucks slowed, the boys tossing
boxes would climb down and escape by waiting motorcycle. Periodically,
Americans driving the trucks caught Tony. But usually the boy’s ‘‘ten-
der’ age worked in his favor, as did his command of English. The Ameri-
cans never jailed him.
 Fighting the Eagle | 137

Many other children and some village women became Camp Eagle’s
garbage-pickers. South of the camp, just across the village border, there
was a garbage dump, which served Eagle and other nearby installations.
Open trucks hauled garbage to this spot and dumped it. The dump was a
veritable gold mine of abundance for the garbage-pickers. They found
numerous usable or resalable items there, including packing materials,
office supplies, uneaten food, and castoffs from individual soldiers. Every
day about 12 children and women from the area could be seen at the
dump. Sometimes their eagerness for ‘‘good’’ garbage was so great that
they climbed unloading trucks, and sometimes there were tragedies: a few
children were buried under avalanches of dumped garbage.

Then there were Camp Eagle’s combat activities. These did far more
than heighten tensions and bring social and economic changes to the
village, for they caused significant physical damage as well.
First, there was perimeter defense. As part of the defensive arrange-
ment, throughout Eagle there were various types of bunkers, partly un-
derground structures of metal and sandbags for use in event of attack. The
perimeter itself consisted of a maze of tanglefoot and concertina wire
surrounding the camp. Throughout the perimeter area, 101st soldiers scat-
tered claymore mines and gas cannisters, set with trip fuses.?° The entire
area, it should be noted, was completely devoid of vegetation, a result of
chemical defoliation.?!
But the bunkers, the wire, the claymores, and the gas were not enough,
in the estimation of 10Ilst commanders. Every night, and often during
daylight hours as well, fifteen or sixteen patrols of four to twenty men
each moved outside the perimeter. They ranged as far as about two miles
from the camp, crisscrossing My Thuy Phuong and surrounding vil-
lages.?? In addition, Eagle commanders sent small groups of five to nine
soldiers armed with M-16 rifles, grenade launchers, and various types of
mines on nightly ambush missions.”* Sometimes with faces greased black
for concealment, the soldiers proceeded two to three hundred yards in all
directions from the perimeter. Ambush parties waited low and patiently
for Vietnamese to wander near the camp.
Many in the village, especially those who lived in sections closer to
Eagle, had numerous stories of the perimeter. Most felt that to approach
the camp from any direction, day or night, was risky, for patrols and
ambushes seemed to be everywhere, and bunker guards were alert and
always looking for targets. A peasant described what happened once
when he tried to visit his family cemetery plot, in an area within sight of
Camp Eagle:

I came during the day, and was carrying a few tools with me. My son came up
behind me with a wheelbarrow, to carry dirt. But when we got to the graves,
there was much firing coming from the American camp. And | heard one or two
bullets hit around us.
 138 / Village at War

Many others spoke of the foot patrols and ambushes, and still others
described a gas which from time to time filled the air around Eagle and
drifted into the village. This was C.S. tear gas, which the Army used for
riot control and other military purposes. A 101st document describes the
gas, which has a nauseating effect when inhaled, as effective for ‘‘areas
where the enemy is intermingled with the civilian population.”’ ?* Accord-
ing to a peasant woman, ‘‘I can remember so many times when the gas
would come out from the American camp. And I can remember choking
and not being able to see because of the gas.’
Bullets from Eagle’s defenders frequently rained on the village. ‘The
Americans were always shooting up flares to illuminate the ground, and
they fired at nothing at all,’’ remembered a tradesman. ‘* You would think
that the American camp was always under attack.’’ Others concurred in
this, and suggested that it was a rare night indeed when the crackle of
small arms fire did not sound at Camp Eagle. Adding to the racket were
the tremendous, piercing concussions of artillery pieces, fired from Eagle
to support military operations in the province.?>
Several contended that sometimes there was a veritable frenzy of firing
around the camp. A former 101st soldier called such episodes ‘‘mad min-
utes.’” He described them: 7°
¢
> Our mad minutes ... were at the perimeter fence. Every once in a while at
Camp Eagle, every two months or so, the order would just come down, ‘‘Okay
guys go to it.’’ You got a mad minute. And everybody picks up a weapon with
both hands, both feet, and they shoot. They don’t care what they shoot at, just
as long as it’s away from the base area. That’s a lot of fun too. All those sickies. °

A peasant recalled that on several occasions he observed a ‘‘wall of

fire’’ around the camp. The American explained this phenomenon: 2’

On our perimeter we had . . . what’s known as Fugas. . . . It’s flammable, and

they put it in barrels. What they do to it is they explode the barrel over an area
and this flaming jell-like substance lands on everything, if it’s people or animals
or whatever. And you can’t get it off. It just burns, and you rub it and it sticks
on. You just spread it all around.

From the standpoint of the 101st commanders, Eagle’s perimeter de-

fense was far from the most important American military activity in the
village. And from the standpoint of the people, it was far from the most
disruptive. Over the years, patrols of U.S. soldiers crisscrossed the vil-
lage, sometimes in combination with Vietnamese soldiers. The patrols
usually came every day, day and night, and often involved house-to-
house searches for suspects or weapons. Choppers sometimes ferried
men out to village ricefields, and American air strikes and artillery occa-
sionally supported ground operations.
There was also continued dislocation of village residents by the camp.
Sometime in 1969, Government officials, at the request of 101st comman-
ders, ordered several families living along the camp access road to move
 a Fighting the Eagle | 139

their houses back several yards from the road. They cited security re-
quirements, and promised restitution payments. The families complied
with the request, despite great reluctance to do so and some futile protests
to American and Government authorities.
The 101st employed nearly every tactic in the book in My Thuy
Phuong, and there were some tactical aberrations. The recollections of
many people permit reconstruction of three illustrative incidents involv-
ing 10Ist soldiers:
,

1. In early 1968, just after establishment of Camp Eagle, 20 or 30 choppers raced

to the village ricefields, hovered low over the swirling, rippling rice stalks and
unloaded their passengers, about 150 fully equipped U.S. soldiers. The troops
quickly proceeded to round up three or four peasants, who had no time to flee.
The Americans tied the peasants’ hands behind their backs and looped ropes
around their necks and between them. When the Americans pushed or pulled
One among their prisoners, all the tied men suffered. The 101st soldiers led the
peasants to a small bridge over a canal, where five or six Americans forced
them to sit. The captors then took turns punching and kicking the captives, and
swore and spat at them. According to one ofthe peasants held that day, ‘‘They
were So insane and angry that we were certain they were going to kill us."’ One
American urinated on two of his captives. Later, after the beatings and humili-
ations had reduced the men to semiconsciousness, the Americans wandered
off, leaving their tied captives on the bridge.
2. Another day in 1968, so-called ‘“‘death on call’’ Cobra choppers and spotter
planes circled low over My Thuy Phuong.?* ‘**We had never seen so many at
one time before,’ said a peasant. *‘There was a big operation, and lots of
gunfire.’ The Americans apparently felt threatened by something that day, for
they called in an air strike. Two or three bombs fell from a fighter plane on one
run over the village. ‘‘It was frightful,’ said a peasant woman. “‘I shook all
over, and was very afraid.’’ The bombs landed in the ricefields, and damaged
the walls of an irrigation canal. A spark or shrapnel from the explosions
touched off a fire in a nearby house, and the flames consumed three peasants.
Two of the victims were children.

3. One night sometime in 1969, a squad of U.S. soldiers patrolled the hamlet
closest to Camp Eagle. The soldiers were armed with M-16 automatic rifles,
pistols, knives, and grenades. They moved cautiously along a sandy, winding
footpath, lined on either side by vegetable plots and shade trees. They entered
a peasant house, a small wooden structure. One soldier remained in front and
another moved behind it to stand guard. The others entered the door and saw a
small family group huddled fearfully in front of them. There was an old man,
his wife, a 14-year-old boy, and two high school age daughters. In pidgin
Vietnamese, but mostly in English, one of the 101st soldiers ordered the Viet-
namese to stand. The soldiers searched the old man and the boy, and pushed
them to acorner, where an American stood over them with a threatening M-16.
Clearly the villagers were prisoners in their own home. Choking with emotion
as she spoke, the mother recalled what happened next: “‘They pushed us
around and attacked my daughters. They pushed them to the ground, and raped
them again and again.”

Although many spoke of American patrols, bombing, and artillery

strikes as if they occurred daily, it is uncertain how often the air strikes,
choppers, artillery strikes, and American patrols came to the village.
140 / Village at War

However, one phase of the 101st Airborne’s activity stands out. People
pointed to 1968-1970 as the years of heaviest direct American involve-
ment in their midst. No one seemed aware of the name 101st commanders
gave their increased military actions during part of this period—Operation
Nevada Eagle.
Nevada Eagle occurred in 1968-1969, and was a 288-day series of
military operations throughout Thua Thien’s lowlands, and later its moun-
tains and valleys. It came again and again to the village. Details of numer-
ous specific military incidents from the Nevada Eagle period were clear in
many individual villagers’ minds, but no one had an overall view of all
local Nevada Eagle operations. There remains, however, a detailed rec-
ord of Nevada Eagle in the 101st Airborne archives. That document
shows that the operation involved extensive daily fighting, with large
numbers of casualties.
Nevada Eagle activities in the village were primarily by company-sized
101st units. The operations, according to the official battle record, came
frequently, and they took a high toll. American soldiers killed, wounded,
and detained many villagers, including some local insurgents. They also
seized rice and guerrilla supplies, and destroyed guerrilla tunnels. Opera-
tions were particularly intense in the area of the ricefield hamlets, which
had long been Front strongholds. Nevada Eagle and other operations of
early 1968 prompted people living in those hamlets to abandon homes and
move into more central parts of the village, where they remained until
172
The exact frequency of Nevada Eagle operations in the village cannot
be determined from the battle record, for the 101st only reported opera-
tions with ‘“‘contacts.”’ The probably large number of uneventful,
‘“‘routine’’ operations went unrecorded. It is impossible to determine
whether the 10lst exaggerated battle statistics, or whether it failed to
report tactical aberrations, such as summary executions of prisoners.
Even if flawed by exaggeration or underreporting, the battle record
nevertheless verifies villagers’ statements about frequent, intense, and
destructive U.S. military operations near their homes. That record is
summarized in Table 10.1.7?

There was one other significant American military effort in My Thuy

Phuong—the programs called Civic Action. U.S. Marines had the first
Civic Action program, which they said aimed at helping the Vietnamese
people. Marine medical aid teams occasionally paid visits to the village for
treatment of minor ailments, and one or two Marines taught English in a
local elementary school.?° Marines also distributed C-rations to families
they considered needy, clothes to village children, and soap to people of
all ages.*' And in one reported instance, Marines helped clear rubble from
an area of the village that had been bombed, presumably by American
aircraft.??
While the Marine program was fairly modest, the 101st Airborne ap-
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proached Civic Action in a big way. Its projects in the village included
four classrooms and numerous wells.2? Camp Eagle personnel occasion-
ally distributed different foodstuffs, clothing, and presents, often to com-
memorate Christmas or Vietnamese holidays. In addition, the 101st or-
ganized medical visits to the village.
But Civic Action also had an outright political side. First, American
soldiers became involved in information activities to support the Gov-
ernment. The 101st sometimes sent ground loudspeaker and audiovisual
teams to the village, to publicize intelligence programs and a program
called Chieu Hoi, which aimed at encouraging desertion from insurgent
ranks. Second, Civic Action personnel became heavily involved in direct
support of Government intelligence and police activities. In December of
1969, the 101st command approved construction of a police station for My
Thuy Phuong.34 The Civic Action group became involved in extensive
leaflet drops throughout the province, including the village. It also under-
took local operations called ‘‘ground nostalgia/fear campaigns,”’ involving
assignment of ground loudspeaker teams to combat units.*>
When asked, most villagers were unaware of the Civic Action efforts.
As one peasant put it, ‘‘How can I remember anything good about the
Americans when they did so much bad?”’ The peasant and nearly all his
neighbors associated the U.S. Marines and 101st Airborne only with mili-
tary operations in and around the village. In a publication, the 10Ist
claimed that Civic Action led to ‘‘the closest and best rapport with Viet-
namese Officials and citizens of any military region in South Vietnam.’’ 7°
However, villagers’ ignorance of Civic Action suggests that the efforts did
little if anything to help people or to create rapport. In fact, the evidence
from official records just presented suggests that in many instances Civic
Action directly supported the very activities which brought greatest dis-
ruption to village life.

STRATEGIC WITHDRAWAL

The coming of Camp Eagle marked a major turning point for the Front in
My Thuy Phuong. Not even the Tet Offensive had brought such
changes.*’ A peasant recalled what happened. ‘‘The Liberation Army had
to take its guerrillas and its cadres out of the village,’’ he said, ‘‘because
they would have been killed if they had remained behind. Many people
who supported the revolution were sad at that, and the Liberation cells
became weak.” Several confirmed this contention about the cells, and
noted that between 1968 and 1972, the People’s Revolutionary Party had
no influence in the village, and the Front functional groups no activities.
Party and functional group messages, which in earlier years had never
reached many, simply stopped flowing, a function ofintensified American
military pressure throughout the region on party and Front organizations.
A guerrilla said that what had long been a friendly environment for
insurgents began to change after the establishment of Camp Eagle:
 p Fighting the Eagle | 143

When the Americans came to Gia Le with their base, many people became very
afraid, and did not help the revolutionary side as much as before.

Most of the revolutionary cells died, and the people became divided. They were
afraid to tell us much about the American or puppet troops, and they were a
little bit afraid to talk to the cadres who were still in the local area.

Villagers estimated that after establishment of Eagle through 1972,

Front support decreased to roughly 50 percent of all villagers, about 30
percent of whom assisted guerrillas and remained active in the local insur-
gent network. The remaining 70 percent were passive Front supporters.
Villagers also suggested that the number of Government supporters, pas-
sive and active, increased to about 10 or 15 percent of the people, and the
remaining 35 to 40 percent were politically uncommitted.
These shifts from the 1964-1967 support patterns were expressions of
the widely shared tendency, mentioned earlier, to tilt toward support of
overwhelmingly strong political forces. However, note that during 1968—
1972 the shifts were mainly from the Front to the politically uncommitted
group—from which shifts back to the Front could be made with relative
ease. There was only a slight increase in number of Government support-
ers, due mainly to people’s dislike of Government and American security
activities. And there is no evidence of improved perceptions of the local
pro-Government group. Most villagers continued to resent what they felt
as the group’s oppression.
It is interesting to compare villagers’ perceptions of political loyalties
and trends with those of American advisors. The computerized U.S.
evaluation system rated each of Vietnam’s hamlets as to its overall degree
of security. ‘‘A’’ was the highest rating, meaning a virtual Government
bastion, while *‘E’’ meant a place with strong Front influence; *‘B’’, “*“C”’
and *‘D’’ were hamlets somewhere in between. The worst possible rating
was ‘*‘V’’, meaning complete Front control—a ‘‘V.C. hamlet.’ Here is
how My Thuy Phuong looked to the Americans during 1968-1972: 38

Date Dong Tam Dong Tien Dong Luc Dong Loi

(qinaniayarmnie a(Gtay erie Zin (Gialkersie4: (6 Gia Le
Tho Vuc) Lang Xa) Thuong, Loi
Nam Gia Le Ha)

Jan. 1968 B C D unsafe at night

Jun. 1968 D E E unsafe at night
Dec. 1968 C C C unsafe at night
JU 1969 B B B unsafe at night
Dec. 1969 B B B unsafe at night
SU WA B B B unsafe at night
Jan. *972 B C C C
Dec. 1972 C C Cc Cc

Note that in American eyes the village was for the most part a **B”’ or
‘*C’’ area. Such ratings meant ‘‘secure’’ or ‘‘relatively secure’’—a gener-
144 / Village at War

ally favorable environment for the Government, with only some insurgent
influence. Interestingly, the only month which came reasonably close to
villagers’ own assessments of political tendencies for the entire period
1968-1972 was June of 1968, when My Thuy Phuong averaged out at “‘E.”’

Although Front popularity dipped during 1968-1972, the insurgent mili-

tary attack persisted and constituted the major Front activity in the vil-
lage. There were ambushes, sniping incidents, attacks against Govern-
ment soldiers, such as those guarding bridges, and occasionally pressure
against local pro-Government villagers. However, because of American
and Government military pressure, guerrillas had to launch most of their
attacks from the hills west of My Thuy Phuong. They had less local help in
the attacks, and many attackers were killed or captured, especially during
Operation Nevada Eagle. In fact, between 1968 and 1972 over half of the
village’s guerrillas died or were jailed. And the Front replaced few of
them—for most people saw the heightened military pressure and hesitated
to join the guerrilla force.
Continued Front guerrilla pressure in the village against the Govern-
ment and its foreign ally must be viewed as but part of the pressure
brought by insurgent forces throughout the province.*? For Huong Thuy
District, an American advisory report includes information found in Table
10.2 on insurgent activity during April-December, 1968.4°

TABLE 10.2. Front Activity in Huong Thuy District,

April-December 1968 *
Type Number Number Number Number
Incident Incidents Killed Wounded Missing

Assassination 4 4 — —
Abduction 5 — — 19
Mortar Attack 6 3 9 —
Small Arms Attack 2 3 8 —
Taxation 2 — — —

Totals: 19 10 17 19

* See ““Thua Thien—Terrorist Activity, 1967-1968.”

And a 10Ist Airborne study of Front activity in Huong Thuy District

during 1970 gives another and later indication of the context of continued
guerrilla activity in the village. According to the study, there were 36
Front-initiated incidents in the district, representing 9 percent of all inci-
dents reported for the province during 1970. The incidents in Huong Thuy
consisted mainly of collections of rice and money and attacks against
Government installations. There was an average of three incidents per
month that year.*!
Guerrillas focused squarely on Camp Eagle. U.S. Army combat rec-
ords contain many references to attacks against the base.*? And villagers
 ~
Fighting the Eagle | 145

described numerous instances of sniping, mortaring, and sapper attacks

against Eagle, all involving small numbers of guerrillas. However, Col-
onel Charles Dyke recalled an attack that involved many guerrillas, the
time in May of 1968 when a sapper force attacked the Eagle perimeter.*3
According to Dyke, the sappers were North Vietnamese soldiers, most of
whom wore shorts and had blackened their faces and greased their bodies.
Villagers contended that about half of the sappers were North Viet-
namese, and the rest were nonlocal Front guerrillas. ‘‘They were fana-
tics, Dyke commented. He stated that American soldiers killed about
100 sappers “‘inside the wire’ of the base. Four U.S. soldiers were killed
in the action, and fifteen wounded. Another man who served at Eagle,
Sergeant Major Michael Collins, noted that one of the sappers was some-
how able to hide for several days within the camp before being discovered
and shot.*4

As American and Government security efforts intensified in the village

and throughout the region during 1969-1971, Front and North Vietnamese
forces gradually reduced the scope and frequency oftheir operations.*> A
peasant commented on the period:

Many people had supported the Front for so many years, and then the Ameri-
cans came and killed many of them and made them [i.e., Front leaders] leave.
So then we had to follow the Government, and we thought the Government side
was not as good.

Another peasant recalled:

Life became very difficult under the Government. They began to take more and
more people into the Army... . We were all sad, and many of us thought that
under the Liberation, when the Government was weak and the Liberation was
strong, then it was a better life for the people.

There are indications that during the years 1968-1972 insurgent leaders
were not often seen in the village. The men lived in the jungle, and only
occasionally returned to My Thuy Phuong. They spent considerable time
simply moving around, to avoid military blows like Operation Nevada
Eagle. But despite great difficulties, the leaders continued to carefully
plan and coordinate guerrilla attacks, allowing for the harsh new reality of
fewer active supporters.
About six of the estimated ten local leaders were killed or captured
during 1968-1972. They were replaced by younger, less experienced, less
popular men. People claimed little knowledge ofthis ‘‘new generation” of
leaders, possibly a reflection of the leaders’ withdrawal to the jungle.
However, many did claim that the newest leaders were intelligent and
highly dedicated, aware of insurgent strategy and local history. Most of
them had in effect served low-profile apprenticeships to early Front lead-
ers, helping out and learning all the time. Several were actually related to
146 / Village at War

the deceased leaders. All had been close to them, often sitting in on
important meetings and in some cases helping organize leafletings and
other small local actions. In general, the 1968-1972 leaders, like the
movement they represented, had ties to the village and a revolutionary
past. Camp Eagle did not break the ties, only strained them.

Despite military and leadership changes on the insurgent side, weaken-

ing of the cell structure, and less involvement of people in Front activities,
revolutionary messages continued to reach My Thuy Phuong. During
1968-1972, there was some Front use of the old tactics of spreading
rumors and periodically distributing leaflets. And Front messages con-
tinued to reach people by word of mouth and clandestine radio broad-
casts. Throughout that period the messages remained timely and to the
point. For example, a 1970 broadcast included a message from the Tn
Thien Hue Liberation Front Committee, part of which reads: *°

Our people and people throughout the world continue to condemn the U.S.
imperialists for their war acts against the Democratic Republic of Vietnam.
Upon hearing that the U.S. aggressors have again bombed the north and have
committed towering crimes against our people, the Tri Thien Hue Liberation
Front Committee sent a message to the sworn brotherhood Quang Binh-Vinh
Linh Fatherland Front Committee exposing the Nixon clique’s bellicosity and
stubbornness... .

Other Front messages accused the American military of damaging fruit

trees through defoliation. This was actually a valid charge, since defolia-
tion damage in Huong Thuy District was ‘*‘widespread,’’ according to a
U.S. Government report.*’ People indicated that they were ‘‘very much
interested’ in this message, which came in leaflets, conversations, and
broadcasts. And then there was a Front leaflet directed at children. It
urged them to befriend American and Government soldiers and assist the
Front by gathering information on military activities, by overcharging for
soft drinks and turning profits over to the Front, and by stealing weapons
and military supplies.** This message also came from some local insur-
gents. However, there is no evidence that children actually heeded it.
Front messages calling for noncooperation began to focus on Camp
Eagle. According to a peasant, ‘‘The Viet Cong warned everyone not to
work there. They said to work there would help the Americans and hurt
the revolution.’’ Many confirmed this assertion and indicated that mainly
due to Front pressure, relatively few from the village worked at Eagle.
And some who did were actually Front agents, assigned to gather infor-
mation on the Americans. The 101st was thus partly correct in regarding
My Thuy Phuong residents as security risks!
Finally, there was continued Front emphasis on heroes, the most im-
portant of whom remained Ho Chi Minh. Several recalled that when Ho
died in 1969, Liberation Radio carried a message from the provincial
Front organization, including this passage: 4?
 ~ Fighting the Eagle | 147

With respect to the Tri Thien Hue people, President Ho had closely followed
and guided us in every phase of struggle, and advised and encouraged us in our
victories as well as in our difficulties. In the most recent letter addressed to
cadres, people, and armed forces of Tri Thien Hue, he asked us not to be proud
of our victories, not to be discouraged faced with difficulties, and to firmly hold
to the class standpoint. He advised us to constantly resort to criticism and to
continuously improve our revolutionary virtues.

To his soul, the cadres, combatants, and compatriots of Tri Thien Hue pledge to
develop their victories, to overcome all difficulties, to correct shortcomings, to
develop strong points, to unite closely to dash forward to fulfill their task, and to
strictly carry out his advice.

In summary, Camp Eagle brought a dramatic shift for the Front in My

Thuy Phuong. Through the camp’s entire range of disruptive and often
destructive activities, it forced Front leaders and guerrillas into retreat,
killed some of them, and caused some Front followers to drift away. As
noted earlier, Front support fell from over 80 to about 50 percent of the
populace. But the insurgents made tactical changes, kept up their military
pressure, and continued to circulate word of their struggle. In effect, the
Front adjusted to the Eagle.

NOTES

1. The arrival date was provided by Command Sergeant Major Michael Collins,
a 101st Airborne soldier who served at Camp Eagle. [Interviewed at Fort
Campbell, Ky., September 26, 1975.]

2. For data on unit deployment in Thua Thien/Hue, see Commander in Chief,

Pacific, Report On War In Viet-Nam (Washington, D.C.: Government Print-
ing Office, 1968).
3. Screaming Eagle, March-April, 1972, p. 21; a publication of the 101st Air-
borne Division Association, Greenville, Texas, available at the Public Affairs
Office, Ft. Campbell, Ky.

4. See note 12, Chapter 9.

5. See Vietnam Veterans Against the War, The Winter Soldier Investigation:
An Inquiry Into American War Crimes (Boston: Beacon Press, 1972), p. 79.

6. See note 1.

7. The sign appears in a photograph provided by the Public Affairs Office, 101st
Airborne Division, Ft. Campbell, Ky.

8. 101st Airborne Press Release, no. 10-58-71, Camp Eagle; all press releases
cfted are available in the 101st Airborne Museum, Fort Campbell, Ky.
Hereafter they are cited as ‘‘Press Release.”
9. Screaming Eagle, September-October, 1970, p. 21.

10. Press Release, no. 10—-3-71.

148 / Village at War

See Richard Boyle, Flower of the Dragon; The Breakdown of the U.S. Army
in Vietnam (San Francisco: Ramparts Press, 1972).

SEE MONE I.
Screaming Eagle, February 1, 1972, p. 8.

Screaming Eagle, March-April, 1970, p. 3.

Ibid.
Col. Charles Dyke remembered only that ‘‘between one and six or seven
thousand’’ Vietnamese worked on the base, with a hiring peak in 1969. (See
note 12, Chapter 9.)
‘*Economic Impact of 101st Abn Div (Ambl)’’ (Camp Eagle: 101st Airborne,
October 14, 1970); available at 101st Airborne Museum.

18. See note 12, Chapter 9.

iI); A pattern found on other American military bases did not emerge at Eagle.
There were no ‘“‘hootch maids,’’ women who worked for individual U.S.
soldiers cleaning clothes, shining shoes, and cleaning up. The soldiers per-
formed these tasks themselves. Col. Charles Dyke asserted that the bans on
maids and on prostitutes were strictly enforced, and people in My Thuy
Phuong corroborated the claim. (See note 12, Chapter 9.)

See note 12, Chapter 9, and note 1, this chapter.

‘Senior Officer’s Debriefing Report’’ (Camp Eagle: 101st Airborne, May 11,
1970), p. 13; available in 101st Airborne Museum. Also see Frank Browning
& Dorothy Forman, eds., The Wasted Nations (New York: Harper & Row,
IS), > 2A
See note 12, Chapter 9, and note 1, this chapter. For an excellent account of
what it was like to serve in the U.S. military in Vietnam, see Philip Caputo, A
Rumor of War (New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 1977).

See “‘Combat Notes Number 10°’ (Camp Eagle: 101st Airborne, March 5,
1968), pp. 3, 5; ““Operational Notes Number 7°’ (Camp Eagle: 101st Air-
borne, November 10, 1969). Both documents available at 101st Airborne
Museum.

‘Senior Officer's Debriefing Report,” p. 13.

See “Operations Note Number 10—Field Expedient Target Locator’ (Camp

Eagle: 101st Airborne, April 1, 1970); available in 101st Airborne Museum.
Also see Vietnam Veterans, op. cit., pp. 79-80.
Vietnam Veterans, op. cit., p. 80.

bid.

Rendezvous With Destiny, Summer-Fall, 1971, p. 4; 101st Airborne publica-

tion available at Public Affairs Office, Ft. Campbell, Ky.

“Combat Operations After Action Report’? (Camp Eagle: Ist Battalion,

501st Airborne Infantry, 101st Airborne Division, March 1, 1969), pp. 142-
190 [entries listed chronologically]; see also ** After Action Report (Offensive
Operations 17 May—28 February 1969)’ (Camp Eagle: 2nd Brigade, 10Ist
Airborne, March 5, 1969). Both these documents, reports from different
units, are available in the 101st Airborne Museum.
 - Fighting the Eagle | 149
30. “U.S. Marine Corps Civic Action’’ (1968), attached map.
aie Ibid., p. 27.
32) ‘‘Thua Thien Report,’’ December 31, 1966, p. 12a.
a3: AC of S, G-S, ‘‘G-S Activities’’ (Camp Eagle: 101st Airborne, November 5,
1969), p. 5; available in 101st Airborne Museum.
34, AC of S, G-S, ‘‘Civic Action Priority List’? (Camp Eagle: 101st Airborne,
December 14, 1969), p. 8; available in 101st Airborne Museum.
SB). See AC of S, G-S5, “‘G-5 Activities’? (Camp Eagle: 101st Airborne, De-
cember 25, 1970), p. 2; available in 101st Airborne Museum.
36. Rendezvous With Destiny, Summer-Fall, 1971, p. 9.
a0, The intensity of the post-Tet military attack against the North Vietnamese
and Front forces was such that even some of the main force North Viet-
namese units operating in the Tri Thien Hue zone apparently began to ex-
perience problems of morale. See ‘‘Press Release’’ (Saigon: U.S. Mission,
no. 197-68, October 12, 1968), pp. 1-2, in Pike, ed., Captured Documents.
In 1969, American advisors wrote of the Front’s ‘‘many problems and
frustrations.’’ (See ‘‘Thua Thien Report,’ August 3, 1969, p. 4.) Note that in
late 1968 or early 1969 the local Front committee’s name was changed to
‘‘Revolutionary People’s Committee.’ It consisted of several of the same
men who led the local Front movement through the early 1960s, minus
several who were dead or in jail, plus several younger leaders, most of whom
were related to the older leaders.

38. Information provided by Robert Jones III.

39: See Vien, no. 22, p. 286.

40. This data was gleaned by the author from the file ‘““Thua Thien—Terrorist
Activity, 1967—1968;”’ see note 27, Chapter 9.
41. ‘‘Analysis of V.C./V.C.I. Related Activity in Thua Thien—1970” (Camp
Eagle: 10ist Airborne, February 21, 1971), p. 3; available in 101st Airborne
Museum.

42. See ‘‘Significant Activity Since January 1970’ (Camp Eagle: 101st Air-
borne); chronological file (no page numbers); available in 101st Airborne
Museum.

43. See note 12, Chapter 9; ‘‘Thua Thien Report,’’ June 4, 1968, p. 4; Vien, no.
3h, (D5 WSs
44, See note 1.

45. North Vietnamese and Front forces, however, continued to claim great suc-
cess on the Tri Thien Hue battlefields. (See Vien, no. 33, p. 165.)

46. Liberation Radio, December 5, 1970, in ‘“‘Daily Report,’’ December 7, 1970,

p. L-2.

47. Huong Thuy District report, one page, attached to ‘‘Thua Thien Report,”
September 4, 1968.

48. See also ‘‘Thua Thien Report,’ July 3, 1968, pp. 5-6.

49. Liberation Radio, September 18, 1969, in ‘‘Daily Report,’ September 19,
1969, p. L2.
 11
Quiet War
BUILDING RESENTMENT

‘‘Revolution does not originate with peasants with a high standard of

living and full stomachs.’’! These words, in a report by an American
advisor in Thua Thien/Hue, perfectly sum up the philosophy behind the
most important civil programs initiated by the Government in My Thuy
Phuong—those related to economic development.
There were other programs in the civil realm, too. These involved a
process called political development. Here the Government aimed at fos-
tering political loyalty to its leaders and institutions, and undermining
such loyalties on the insurgent side. A colonel of the U.S. Marine Corps,
who served as a high-ranking advisor in the province, perhaps uninten-
tionally illustrated the sort of thinking associated with Government politi-
cal development efforts:

If you build a schoolhouse in a village, what have you done? You’ve built a
schoolhouse, right? Why’d you build a schoolhouse? Just so you’d have a
schoolhouse? Hell, no!

You build a schoolhouse because, hopefully, the Vietnamese people ofthis little
hamlet will say, ‘What a wonderful government we have. Let us fight for our
government.’ This is what you're trying to get across to them—this is why you
build a schoolhouse. To win this war, you've got to get the people behind their
government... .

These quotes from American officials reveal one side of the civil pro-
grams. Let us now briefly examine the other side—people’s reactions to
the programs in My Thuy Phuong. In discussing the programs, most

150
 ~ Quiet War / 151

villagers dwelt but superficially on the nuts and bolts of program opera-
tions. They emphasized instead the general manner in which programs
were controlled by the local pro-Government minority and the wide-
spread resentment they engendered. The discussion here follows that
lead.
There were, first, the economic programs.* The most important of
them aimed at increasing agricultural production and agricultural
mechanization. To achieve the first of these objectives, the Government
introduced what peasants locally called ‘‘I.R.’’ rice varieties. I.R. rice,
which was developed in the Philippines, provides higher yields than indig-
enous Vietnamese rice if properly fertilized, irrigated, and treated with
pesticides.* In the early 1970s, the Government clerk in charge of agricul-
tural matters in the village persuaded about 30 local peasants to plant the
new variety. The I.R. seeds, fertilizer, and pesticides were at first avail-
able through local retailers, and at reasonable prices. Peasants planted
about sixty-two acres with the new variety, and had about two years of
reasonable yields. But then there came a change.
* “Suddenly everything doubled or tripled in price,’’ stated a peasant.
‘‘The retailers were making huge profits, especially on the pesticides,
which only a few places sold, and which we needed most of all.’ To make
matters worse, the peasants began to get lower prices for their products.
“There was an arrangement between the buyers and the fertilizer and
pesticide retailers, the man added. ‘‘They divided the profits. They were
making so much, and we made less than before.’’ The Government ag-
ricultural cadre in the village office had set these conditions. People sus-
pected that the cadre had made a deal with local retailers and rice
wholesalers to share in the profits from supply purchases and resale of
I.R. harvests. The arrangement brought high profits to the retailers and
wholesalers, and probably money to the cadre. People were uncertain
about amounts of money involved. It also created an illusion of change
and progress in the village, and the agricultural cadre probably reported
that his efforts had brought ‘‘agricultural development.’’ A peasant who
was involved in the I.R. program said:

Many people here did not care much about politics. We only wanted to plant
rice and live happily. | am an example of that. But when we saw the cadre and
the businessmen getting rich on that program we became angry at the Govern-
ment. We saw clearly how corrupt the Government was, and we began to
support the Liberation.

Another peasant, himself not a cultivator of I.R. rice, recalled, *‘We

watched that program carefully and saw the rich men get richer and the
poor men just stay the same. It was a very bad situation.”’ And a univer-
sity Student said, **The program made people hate the Government.”
Others made similar statements, indicating that they saw the I.R. program
as an attempt to exploit the desperation and poverty of a few, and they
grew resentful of the Government for promoting it.
152 / Village at War

Another agricultural program encouraged vegetable and fruit produc-

tion for American military units in the province. In March of 1969, peas-
ants from Thua Thien/Hae were selling produce to U.S. forces at three
major installations, including Camp Eagle, at the rate of U.S.$42,000 per
week. At that time, military demands still exceeded supply, so the Ameri-
can military and the Government began a coordinated effort to increase
supplies of corn, lettuce, tomatoes, watermelon, pineapples, and other
items. In areport, an American aid official wrote that such buying *‘places
badly needed development funds into the hands of the farmers who will
now be able to buy pigs, chickens and cement to improve their living
standards.’ 5 In My Thuy Phuong, however, the reality of agricultural
production for American units did not exactly fit this description. A peas-
ant commented on the program:

I began producing lettuce and tomatoes to sell to the Americans. But I had to
give to one rich man, and he was the one who actually gave it to the Americans
and got money. He gave me some, of course, and it was a higher profit than I
could get in the Vietnamese market. But most of the profit went to that man.
Many other people here have had the same thing happen.

This comment and others suggest that middlemen began operating in

the village, buying produce from peasants and turning it directly over to
American supply channels. But due to language, cultural, and legal bar-
riers, the peasants could not deal directly with the American soldiers, and
most profits went to the middlemen. While exact figures on profit margins
are unavailable, it is clear that many had strong negative opinions about
the program. This peasant’s comment Is typical:

Many people here got angry about this program. We saw a few people get rich
from the program, but most did not earn that much more money. The people
were angry at the Government and at the Americans for having that program.
Maybe some joined the V.C. because of it.

There was another agricultural program that had a similar effect on

attitudes. As noted earlier, many ofthe village’s poorest residents—about
100 in all—had long made extra money through work as agricultural
laborers, often for large landholders, each of whom controlled between 15
and 30 mau. Usually such work involved harvesting, cultivating, or ir-
rigating the fields. In 1970, a Government agricultural mechanization pro-
gram touched the lives of these laborers. Two years earlier the American
aid program had begun importing mechanical cultivators and pumps, and
it distributed over 200 small tractors free to villages in Thua Thien.® In
1970, American officials presented a tractor to the village council in My
Thuy Phuong, which on the day of the turnover organized a ceremony and
demonstration of the machine. The council decided that one of its mem-
 a Quiet War / 153

bers, a large landholder, would be caretaker of the machine, a decision

which almost immediately meant lost jobs for five men working as cul-
tivators on the councilman’s land. The tractor thus enabled the council-
man to save most of the money he usually spent on salaries for laborers. It
should also be noted that the councilman occasionally lent the tractor to
two or three fellow large landholders, with similar consequences for a few
other laborers. And since all local land was under cultivation, the tractor
did nothing to increase agricultural production.
While the tractor directly affected very few, many were aware of its
impact, perhaps because of the fanfare with which it came to the village.
A peasant had this comment, typical of many others:

The Americans bring their machinery over here, and sell it to the Vietnamese at
a profit. Then an American company comes and sells us gas. Then another
American company comes and sells us parts and tools to repair the tractor. All
this does is make the American companies richer, and make people like us, who
have to work with their hands, poorer.

A number of Japanese water pumps had a similar impact. In this in-

stance, the pumps did not come as direct U.S. aid. Rather, in the late
1960s, large landholders and a few village tradesmen purchased about 10
of them from Hue businesses cooperating with another American aid
effort—the Commodity Import Program, discussed below. Some of the
landholders and tradesmen rented their pumps to peasants, unquestion-
ably saving the peasants time and money they might otherwise have spent
irrigating their ricefields. They would have paid that money to many ofthe
village’s agricultural laborers, who used traditional wooden pedal devices
of the sort described in Chapter | to irrigate fields. ** At first we saw them
and thought they were very nice,’ commented one ofthe laborers. **‘But
then we realized that those machines were going to take our jobs and
make us poor.’ Others indicated that the arrival of the water pumps
affected between 10 and 20 laborers, many of whom lost income to the
machines. There is no sign that the pumps in any way increased agricul-
tural production. And as with the tractor, the economic impact of the
pumps, albeit small, brought resentment of Government programs and
personnel.
The Commodity Import Program was a U.S.-supported attempt to
stimulate the retail sector of the South Vietnamese economy through
complicated foreign exchange guarantees, keeping money flowing to
Vietnamese tradesmen.’ Although none of the village’s tradesmen di-
rectly participated in this program, many indirectly did so. Hue busi-
nesses imported the subsidized goods, and sometimes resold them to the
tradésmen. Many villagers bought imported goods in Hue or in local
shops. During the years after 1963, there was an increase in the number
and range of imported goods owned by My Thuy Phuong residents. Many
154 / Village at War

bought Japanese motorcycles, radios, bicycles, cloth for clothing, and

agricultural supplies. While everyone enjoyed having these imported
goods, and few understood that the U.S. had subsidized the imports,
many noticed Hue and local tradesmen growing prosperous. Exact in-
come figures for the tradesmen are unavailable, but people noticed that
many of them built nice homes, acquired ricefields, and sent their children
to private schools. A student had this comment: *‘The Vietnamese people
like all of these [material] things. But we hate the men who'sell them to us,
and we oppose the Government for protecting them.”’ }
A final Government economic activity was the Village Self-
Development Program, which emphasized small construction projects in
villages.’ Under this program, the Government formed local ‘‘people’s
organizations’ to make specific recommendations for and plan projects,
and granted the organizations money to complete the projects. District
and village authorities monitored construction progress, which usually
involved labor donated free by the people.
Under the program, villagers dug several wells, but all the wells were
located near homes of councilmen. In 1966, they reexcavated two irriga-
tion canals, but noticed that the canals brought water mainly to ricefields
owned by two wealthy councilmen.’ A peasant spoke of local reactions to
the irrigation project:

When the Government made us work on projects like this one, it did not know
that many people were angry, but afraid to say anything against the Govern-
ment. If we said anything, they would arrest us and say, ‘* Viet Cong.”’

Many of us, while we were digging, talked and said that the Government men
and the rich men should come to dig too. When we finished the project many of
us felt angry. And we were more united to oppose projects like this one.

There were other Self-Development projects, including repair of the

market and a small bridge, construction of a culvert/dam, and improve-
ments on the local Government office and on the district dispensary within
village boundaries.'° As these projects proceeded, people noticed several
abuses, including favoritism and corruption by councilmen, and suggested
that councilmen’s profits were heaviest on the projects involving con-
struction or repair of public structures like the market or dispensary.
Villagers could not estimate how high those profits were, but were
nevertheless certain they were substantial.
On the program as a whole, a tradesman said, ‘“‘It was very badly
administered. The people could see the men in charge being corrupt, and
they thought that the Government was protecting the corrupt men.’’ A
student noted, ** Very bad. Ridiculous. The only ones helped by the Self-
Development program were the Government followers, not the people.”’
These and other remarks suggest, in summary, that the Self-Development
program brought My Thuy Phuong a few physical improvements, includ-
ing new and repaired community facilities. But like the other economic
 Quiet War / 155

programs mentioned above, Self-Development activities brought few

benefits to the people. Such benefits as there were accrued mainly to
corrupt officials and others of the pro-Government minority. The majority
saw the inequities of all the economic efforts, and grew bitter about the
programs—and about the Government.

The Front sometimes tried to benefit from the bitterness. It waged a

sort of *“‘quiet war’ against the programs. A peasant recalled this instance
from the 1960s:

The Government cadre wanted to build irrigation ditches to carry water to the
fields, and came to us to try to get the people to give their labor free for the
project. But then everybody heard from the Communists that the program was
bad, that it would help only the rich men, and that we should not do it.

Of course we saw that, and we also thought the same thing. We thought it was
ridiculous to work with that program, but the Government made us help the
proyect, and we had to do it. So the new water ditches were dug, but many
people were angry with the Government.

A student from a peasant family had this comment:

The Front sometimes told us about the economic programs [at political study
sessions], but there was very little that we did not already know about those
programs. The [Front] cadres directed us in speaking about those programs. We
talked about them as programs that hurt the poor people, and we all agreed. The
only question was on the best way to save money and not have to worry about
the programs.

Concurring with this was a peasant, who added:

The Government program for rural development was bad. It had always been
bad, but it was worst during the years after Ngo Dinh Diem was killed. We all
knew that we had to escape from those programs.

The V.C. were very clever. They showed the people how to unite, and to escape
from the programs by uniting with the Viet Cong.

Another reaction was this one, by a low-ranking Government soldier

from a peasant family. “‘It was very happy. The people were united, and
we were fighting together against something we did not like. It was like
when we were all opposing the French.’ There were similar reactions to
other Government activities. For example, several spoke of a mid-1960s
immunization campaign for water buffalo, organized by the Government’s
Agricultural Service to fight an outbreak of some livestock disease. Gov-
ernment immunization teams began touring the villages of Thua Thien
Province, giving free injections to all water buffalo. The Front response
was to promote a rumor that the inoculations would kill the cattle, and
156 / Village at War

that the Government was trying to hurt the peasants because of their
support for the cause of revolution. Insurgent leaders urged peasants not
to permit inoculations, and to ignore the warnings about livestock disease.
As a result, villagers did not permit inoculation of even one water buffalo
in My Thuy Phuong, and the agricultural cadres left in frustration.'!
A local school administrator told a similar story. Also in the mid-1960s,
Public Health Service personnel tried to inoculate children in a village
school to protect them from some disease. But a rumor began-to circulate
that the inoculations would render the children infertile 50 years hence—a
‘‘punishment”’ for local support of the Front. After hearing the rumor,
very few parents agreed to have their children inoculated, and their suspi-
cions of Government intentions and sincerity heightened. A peasant
commented on the incident: ‘‘Sometimes we fought the Government in
very clever ways. The health program to give the children shots was
destroyed by our rumor. It was part of the struggle against the puppet
government.”

Another part of the ‘‘quiet war’’ involved the Government’s political

development efforts. The most important of these programs were de-
signed to create a national electoral system. At the lowest level, this
meant election of hamlet and village officials. Between 1963 and 1975,
Government district authorities administered such elections, held a veto
power in nomination of candidates, and dominated the elections them-
selves. Nominees for all local positions had to pass security checks. That
is, district authorities barred candidates they viewed as anti-Government
or ‘‘pro-Communist.’> Domination of the elections, many asserted, came
through ballot box-stuffing or outright fraud in vote-counting.
A village council election in February of 1975 typified many that had
preceded it. For that contest, district authorities had approved fifteen
candidates for the eight four-year council positions, including six incum-
bent councilmen, one local policeman, one soldier, five Army veterans,
and two civil servants. These individuals came from a variety of
backgrounds, but all were strong Government supporters. Most owned or
rented at least three to five mau of riceland, an above-average amount,
and in a few cases twenty or more mau. Some were prosperous tradesmen
or corrupt officials.
The district chief, an Army major, repeatedly visited the village during
the balloting that day. He commented:

We want to make sure that we have at least 90 percent of the voters voting, and
to do that each voter is approached by the inter-family heads in the village, and
is urged to come. In the afternoon, when closing time at the polls is coming
near, and if anyone has not voted, we will send the inter-family heads around
again to urge him to come.

So inter-family chiefs got out the vote. They were the lowest-level
Government officials, all appointed and unsalaried, and responsible for
 ~ Quiet War / 157

keeping census and voting records on all families in small sections of the
village. There were 102 such individuals.
Over 90 percent ofthe eligible voters came to the polls that day in 1975.
An elderly peasant commented, ‘‘We know we have to vote, because they
mark our papers, and if they know we have not voted, later on they cause
us trouble.”’ The election results surprised no one. Although it is uncer-
tain how honest the ballot count was, only the incumbent council chair-
man lost, reportedly because he had fallen out of favor with the district
chief. In other words, all but one of the incumbents were reelected.
Over the years, the Government organized many village and hamlet
elections in My Thuy Phuong, most of which were like that just described.
A small number of people, mostly Government officials who organized the
elections, described them as successes. These remarks by a village coun-
cilman are illustrative of such minority views:

The people always supported the elections very strongly. They were proud and
happy to See that our Government was supporting democracy like that. And so
on election day they went with happy hearts to vote, and they were very
interested in getting the [election] results. The people were very happy to be
able to elect representatives to the village council, and they supported the
Government very strongly.

But a peasant said, “‘It was the same for years. Everyone had to vote,
and we had to vote for Government men. If we did not, we knew there
would be trouble.’’ Many others had similar recollections, reflecting what
was certainly the majority view.
There were other elections in the village. In 1967, the Government
drafted a constitution, which provided for a two-house legislature, a pres-
ident and vice president, and a provincial-level council. Over the years,
My Thuy Phuong voters helped elect people to all these positions. Elec-
tions came and went, leaving many villagers with suspicions about elec-
toral honesty and fairness. In all the elections, Government officials kept
the pressure on to vote, and to vote ‘“‘correctly’’—for pro-Government
candidates. There were many voting irregularities connected with village
council elections, and pro-Government slates always won. There was
some rigging of provincial council and national legislative elections, but
not in all cases. For example, during the upper house elections of 1970,
and in the lower house elections the following year, anti-Government An
Quang Buddhist-endorsed candidates carried My Thuy Phuong and all of
the province, possible indications of at least honest vote counts.'?
Several were able to remember details of one clear instance ofelectoral
irregularity in the village. That came in October of 1971, during the one-
man election-referendum, when the Government asked voters to say yes
or no en President Nguyen van Thieu and his policies. Before that elec-
tion, villagers experienced intense pressure to vote from council mem-
bers, other civil servants, and the inter-family heads. Several commented
that on election day clerks assigned to the polling station instructed them
158 / Village at War

to mark ballots for Thieu—and to do so in the clerks’ presence. Others

contended that they witnessed soldiers and civil servants voting re-
peatedly, and a few said they saw policemen destroying ballots before
counting began. Thieu received more than 90 percent of the votes cast in
the village, according to the village chief. *‘It was an honest election,’ he
said. ‘‘The people here support our President almost 100 percent.”
There were other comments, mostly by Government officials and stri-
dently anti-Communist individuals, that the elections were fair and popu-
lar, and reflected strong support for the Government. There were many,
however, who disagreed. For example, a peasant said, ‘‘The elections are
just trouble for us. The Government forces us to vote, and the candidates
are usually men who the Government approves. But the people do not
approve of them.’ A student said, “‘Don’t ask me about the elections.
That’s the Government activity that we hate most of all. What we hate is
the Government forcing people to vote, then saying, ‘All the people are
supporting the Government by going to vote.’ *’ And a peasant com-
mented, ‘‘The elections are cruel, because they are not the true voice of
the people, only the voice of a cruel government.’’ Another peasant re-
called how the Front network in the village brought him a message about
Government programs, and especially its electoral system:

Many people who followed the Liberation were always talking politics... .
Often they talked about the Government and the way the Government was
trying to fight the war. Most people thought that the Government was very
bad... . So everybody was talking about these things all the time. Sometimes
the [Front] cadres gave ideas, but usually it was the people themselves, and the
people got the idea that becoming involved in Government politics could be
very bad.

An agency called the Information Service brought Government politi-

cal messages to My Thuy Phuong. Information Service cadres from the
district headquarters, or the man assigned that function in the village
itself, occasionally organized local study sessions. They required each
family to send one representative to these events. Inter-family heads
made it clear to all that families not represented would be in for problems.
The sessions were usually in the early evening at the communal hall,
the dinh. Almost invariably, the meetings consisted of readings by infor-
mation cadres of political statements prepared in Saigon, including
speeches by Thieu or the Minister of Information, statements on foreign
affairs, or statements denouncing the Front. Sometimes information
cadres added their own interpretations to the prepared documents, read
documents prepared in Hue, or made comments on regional or even local
issues. And very infrequently there were readings of material from Huong
Thuy District headquarters, usually reports of Government activities in
the area. In a 1972 study session in the village, for example, cadres quoted
from a document called Huong Thuy Newsletter. It includes this pas-
sage: |3
 ~ Quiet War | 159
With a correct plan, with enthusiastic hands, and with love for the fatherland
and villages as abundant as rivers, mountains, and oceans, Huong Thuy’s
cadres continue to advance hand-in-hand, despite thousands of difficulties, to
beautify the villages, and to bring happiness to the people in a big Huong Thuy
District holiday.

The Government organized such study sessions about once a month in

the village. Much less frequent were special information events, such as
showings of films on‘outdoor screens. A peasant had this comment on the
study sessions:

Usually we went to these meetings tired from working all day. Sometimes they
would talk to us so long about politics, and sometimes it was interesting, but
usually it was not. Sometimes we were like prisoners, but we did not dare say
anything.
‘

And a tradesman had these recollections:

They made the people go to the study sessions and listen to speeches about
democracy in Vietnam. ... But we knew that the men who spoke were Gov-
ernment men, so we did not respect them very much. But we listened and
usually did not say anything or ask any questions.

If attendance was unavoidable at political study meetings, people often

tried to feign busyness, ignorance, tiredness, or illness to avoid deep
involvement. In other words, most everyone tried to maintain postures of
disinterest.
Leaflet drops constituted another information tactic employed in the
village. Over the years, American military units trained Vietnamese in
mass production and distribution by airplane of small political leaflets,
which time and time again fell on My Thuy Phuong with messages like
thisare

All cadre and soldiers in the Communist ranks,

It is time for you to ponder carefully this thought: There is not any reason for
you to die in a conflict that sooner or later will be resolved at the conference
table.

Now is the time for you to think about your future life as well as your family’s.

You should follow the good example of your cadre and comrades. Return to the
national just cause; you will have a good chance again to build your life in a
generous nation where ‘‘iove replaces hatred.”

There were other expressions of the Government’s political develop-

ment strategy. For example, there were periodic meetings of the village’s
militia, discussed in Chapter 12, where local information cadres and sol-
diers gave speeches urging involvement of members in the organization,
160 / Village at War

and urging loyalty to the Government. A wall newspaper at a 1973 militia

meeting, which people said was similar to other newspapers of earlier
years, expresses it this way:!>

To return to the matter of Gia Le women, the majority of this group have
husbands, and the majority, like all women in Vietnam who have husbands,
sacrifice themselves for the fatherland. In that way, in truth, the Gia Le
women’s love of country is less than no one’s. They encourage their husbands
to be eager for military service, for if they did nothing, what would be left of the
army?

The men and boys of Gia Le are in general not different from males anywhere
else, with hair, ears, throat, and heart, and also ‘‘that special thing.’’ So every
rank of the men and boys, like the girls of Gia Le, lives in the ricefields, growing
up in their place of origin and taking from it a way of life—so they are very
strong and healthy. And because they are very strong and healthy their expres-
sions of emotion are also strong and huge. The males of Gia Le also strongly
love their country, and because of that invite exploitation, so, the two words
Gia Le have a strong personal pull on us. A lot of the people of Gia Le do not
follow the Communists as it is believed! There is proof that the people of Gia Le
village sacrifice themselves for the nationalist cause more than anything
CISG, os ¢

The schools also brought explicit political messages. Teachers fre-

quently delivered pro-Government lectures, organized their students for
Government demonstrations and projects, and had them sing the national
anthem and salute the flag. Even curricula carried strong political mes-
sages. A fifth grade reader used in the village, for example, contains many
pro-Government passages. Below an illustration of a day-dreaming boy
are the following words: !°

Ban lies down on the bamboo bed, anxiously waiting for the sunrise so he can go
to join the army. Through the window moonlight falls on the bed, spreads to the
middle of the house, and shines dimly on the silent furniture... .

Ban draws back the blanket to cover his chest, dreamily looking up into the
black sky. A small cloud passes by the window, and he imagines the parachutes
of the red beret angels [i.e., Government paratroopers] slowly flying in the
wind, and landing in a wild forest or an immense green field.

Ban thinks about the peaceful life of people in the village: The carefree, inno-
cent children playing on the pathways: hardworking, simple peasants working
safely under the protection of the patriotic young men.

Unfortunately for the Government, people reacted to appeals such as

the foregoing and militia meetings about as they did to the political study
sessions. A young Buddhist leader in the village put it this way: ‘‘The
Government tried hard to propagandize, but it was not very successful.
Nobody noticed. Nobody listened. Nobody cared.”
 ea Quiet War | 161

A local Government office administered nearly all the economic and

political development programs described above.'!? The number of per-
sonnel working there increased from about 10 in 1963, including village
councilmen and a few extra clerks, to about 20 in 1972.'§ Councilmen, as
noted earlier, were the products of elections manipulated and dominated
by district authorities. Similarly, those authorities appointed most civil
servants working in the village from among those they considered politi-
cally reliable. The Government periodically trained all the local civil ser-
vants, sometimes at district headquarters, but more frequently in Hue.
Training usually consisted of lectures by local or sometimes visiting
bureaucrats. Much more occasional were special training sessions, some-
times lasting several weeks, at the National Training Center in Vung Tau.
Three or four of the village’s civil servants had been there.
As Thieu’s Democracy Party emerged in the one-man election-
referendum of 1971, the Government gave a choice to civil servants with
ties to the three other political parties. ‘‘They told us that no one could
belong to any party but Democracy,’ said a former village chief. But the
training and enforced party membership did not lessen the problem of
local corruption. In fact, most civil servants took bribes, even including
low-ranking clerks. Some villagers suggested that such corrupt activities
were part of a larger network of shakedowns and payoffs involving district
officials. A former village chief had this rather daring statement:

None of us liked to have anything to do with bad money practices, but we had
to. A soldier who worked for the district chief came to every village chiefto tell
us that we had to instruct all our clerks and policemen that a certain amount of
money was expected from our village every month. This was to go first to the
district chief, and then, above him, to the province chief.

Some in positions of authority in the village grew prosperous as a

direct result of bribes received or by manipulation of Government funds
and local resources, including communal land, Self-Development funds,
and other programs involving money or material. As repeatedly noted
above, no figures are available on resource transfers to civil servants and
other local pro-Government individuals. However, there is some solid
evidence. Most civil servants had large, relatively comfortable homes—
usually of cement and heavy wood beam construction, as opposed to most
villagers’ wood panel homes. On low salaries, there was simply no way
the civil servants could afford such homes without substantial supplemen-
tal income. Corruption very likely paid for civil servants’ more abundant
and higher quality personal possessions, including motorcycles, nice
clothing, and comfortable home furnishings. And many people wondered
how civil servants could afford to send their children to Hue’s private
schools if they were not dishonest.
A peasant’s comment on the civil servants summarizes the feelings of
many: ‘‘The Government cadres did not listen. They only caused the
people trouble. They became like our enemies.’ The peasant was
162 / Village at War

generalizing about ail civil servants in this statement—including the hand-

ful of honest, filial, or hard-working individuals assigned by the Govern-
ment to My Thuy Phuong. Resentment ran too deep for the peasant or
most others to differentiate ‘‘good’’ people from ‘‘bad’’ in that village
office. And of course the Front made its position on the civil servants
clear to all, playing on the resentment and on most villagers’ commitment
to the movement. A peasant recalled:

The Liberation always told us that we should not help the Government in any
way. They told us that the Government men were puppets, and were corrupt.
We knew that they were corrupt, and we knew that they often got rich in their
positions. Many people understood that if we helped those men we would be
hurting the revolution.

AMERICAN ADVISORS
Supporting the Government’s economic and political development efforts
in the village were many American advisors.'? In the years after 1963, and
especially after 1967, such Americans played crucial roles throughout
South Vietnam. They were involved, first, in actual planning of the Gov-
ernment programs. Second, escalating American involvement in Vietnam
led the U.S. Government to create an advisory apparatus in every prov-
ince and every district. After 1967, this structure included both American
military and civilian personnel, and was called Civil Operations Rev-
olutionary Development Support, or C.O.R.D.S. For the province,
C.O.R.D.S. offices were in a large compound in Hue, and a succession of
U.S. Army colonels and civilian Foreign Service Officers directed
C.O.R.D.S. activities as so-called senior advisors. At its peak in the late
1960s, dozens of Americans staffed the C.O.R.D.S. operation in the prov-
ince, and assisting were large numbers of Vietnamese, Filipinos, and even
some Chinese.
The advisory presence became so large, in fact, that once a
C.O.R.D.S. senior advisor apparently grew frustrated at the large number
of Americans in his province. He reported, ‘‘Hue is a special place. Spe-
cial support is now especially needed to keep it from being loved to
death.”* °° In Huong Thuy District, there was a large, entirely military
C.O.R.D.S. advisory team based in the district headquarters. A succes-
sion of U.S. Army captains and majors served as Huong Thuy’s senior
advisor, and tried to report on and influence Government activities in all
14 villages of the district, including My Thuy Phuong. But sometimes the
advisors got ridiculously carried away with reporting responsibilities. For
example, once they reported the death of four ‘‘friendly ducks’ in a
military operation.?! The Americans had so much influence over Gov-
ernment activities that their objections or pressure sometimes brought
removal of Government personnel. C.O.R.D.S. even issued a ‘‘Question-
 - Quiet War / 163

naire on Effectiveness of Vietnamese Officials.’’ It sent this classified

,

document to many advisors, probably including the Huong Thuy senior

advisor, to solicit comments on Government officials. Advisors ranked
officials as ‘unsatisfactory,’ ‘*below average,’’ ‘‘average or above,’’ and
‘““very high’ in five areas: (1) honesty; (2) demonstrated leadership: (3)
effectiveness; (4) potential; and (5) recommendation for retention.
Robert Jones III, formerly of the U.S. Embassy/Saigon, remembered a
specific instance of American advisory leverage that affected the village.”3
He stated that once a U.S. Army lieutenant assigned to C.O.R.D.S.
charged that My Thuy Phuong’s village chief was corrupt and ineffective,
and the lieutenant lobbied within C.O.R.D.S. for the man’s removal.
Jones was unclear as to the outcome ofthe case. Villagers, however, said
that once the Government,very suddenly removed a village chief. Ameri-
can pressure may have been behind that particular dismissal.

A peasant commented on the Vietnamese-American relationship:

We knew how much they [civil servants] needed American support for all their
programs. We could understand that, and not criticize that, because we knew
that our country is poor. But we also saw that the Americans controlled the
Government, and used the Government for American policies. So how could we
really respect those men?

A Government soldier said:

Do you know what it means to lose face in Vietnam? That is so important

between our people. Whenever the American advisors went into the Govern-
ment office, or whenever the Americans were seen in public with our village
chief, then the village chief lost face in front of the people. Being with the
Americans proved they were not independent.

According to a peasant, ‘‘Whenever I saw Vietnamese soldiers with

Americans, I felt sorry for them. They lost face.’’ This comment summed
up the feelings of many in the village, including many Government sol-
diers.
In 1969, Thua Thien/Hue’s senior advisor wrote, *‘U.S. advisors are
the key to the entire pacification plan.”’’ ’* In effect, the American advis-
ory apparatus was a parallel government, the closest thing to a colonial
bureaucracy the Vietnamese had seen since the French days. And most in
My Thuy Phuong disliked the similarities.

My Thuy Phuong’s ‘quiet war,’ in summary, touched the lives of

nearly all villagers and was closely tied to the “*hot war” being fought by
armed men and women. Several comments serve to underline and sum-
marize the main problems and divisions in the village. The last Govern-
ment village chief stated, ‘‘The people support the Government 100 per-
cent. They see that it is bringing prosperity to them, and they hate the
164 / Village at War

Communists.’ A councilman said, ‘‘The people here like us very much,

because they see what the Government has brought them. They see that
they are developing.’’ But an elderly peasant asserted:

Many years ago, Emperor Khai Dinh taxed the people, and took people from
the village to work for him. Emperor Minh Mang did the same. But always they
gave us something first, like land, or money, or maybe a new market. It’s the
same now.
Emperor Thieu and his group give us some things, and we have to be his
servants. It’s always the same for people in this village.

Another village councilman, a large landholder with a reputation for

corruption, had these surprising words:

The Communists told the people that they should struggle against corrupt offi-
cials, try to educate policemen and Government cadres, and try to discover the
Government spies. But most important, they told us that we should not pay
taxes unless they force us, we should not help the Government Army, and we
should not vote in the Government elections.

There are many ways that the Communists told the people to support the
revolution, and one of the most important ways was for the people not to
support the Government.

Finally, the councilman explained the Front’s strategy:

The Communists would always talk about the need for resisting the Americans,
and they told us that it was just part of a large struggle. The struggle to resist the
Americans had to come from all the people, and they said that the best way to
do that was to resist Government activities in this area.

Many people began to like the Communists very much, and were very happy to
unite against the Government.

The councilman spoke these words somewhat sorrowfully, slowly.

Then suddenly he looked up, startled. He smiled, perhaps savoring the
irony.

NOTES
1. °*Thua Thien Report,’ May 1, 1966, p. 19.

2. “Debrief of aCORDS Deputy Province Senior Advisor: Thua Thien and An

Xuyen Provinces: Vietnam; 1967-1968" (Honolulu: Asia Training Center,
UH/AID, no. 9682, undated), p. 34; available in University of Hawaii Li-
brary.

3. For Vietnamese figures on U.S.A.I.D. assistance, see ‘‘Economic and Social

Assistance to the Republic of Viet Nam” (Saigon: Government of the Repub-
 al Quiet War / 165
lic of Vietnam, 1973), p. 26; available through U.S.A.1I.D., Washington, D.C.
For Thua Thien budget figures, see **Thua Thien Report,’ November 30,
1966, p. 21. U.S.A.1.D. figures on project aid are reported in ‘‘ Annual Statis-
tical Bulletin” (Saigon: U.S.A.I.D., 1973); available in East-West Resource
Systems Institute Library, Honolulu.

In 1971, U.S. advisors reported that I.R. rice grown in Thua Thien provided
2.5 metric tons per hectare, compared to 1.44 metric tons for local rice. In
1972, the figures were 3.0 and 1.2 metric tons, respectively. (See ‘‘Thua
Thien Report,’ June 3, 1972, p. 5.)
“Thua Thien Report,’’ April 3, 1969, p. 7.
Ibid., January 2, 1970, p. 2.

See “Economic and Social Assistance,’ p. 26; Hearings, Mutual Develop-

ment and Cooperation Act of 1973 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing
Office, Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. House of Representatives,
93rd Congress, Ist Session), p. 186.
The only budgetary figures available, for 1972, indicate that the equivalent of
about U.S.$120,355 was spent in Thua Thien on Village Self-Development.
By 1971, the program made the equivalent of about U.S.$1000 available
annually to My Thuy Phuong. [See Dac-San Xuan (Spring Yearbook) (Hue:
Thua Thien Information Service, Spring, 1973), p. 32.]
In 1966, the Government’s Public Works Service undertook an extensive
drainage project in My Thuy Phuong, not part of the Village Self-
Development Program. Work proceeded under contract; some people al-
leged that this project, too, disproportionately benefitted a small number of
large landholders. (See “‘Thua Thien Report,’’ March 25, 1966, p. 10.)
See ‘‘Thua Thien Report,” July 31, 1966, p. 3a; December 31. 1966, p. 3.
Villagers also indicated that no livestock disease outbreak occurred that
year.
See “Special Report on Senatorial Election” (Hue: P.D.D./C.O.R.D.S., un-
dated), p. 3. Also see J.R. Trinchera, ‘‘Results of Provincial Council Elec-
tion’? (Hue: PAA/CDO/PDD/C.O.R.D.S., June, 1970), one page. Both
documents available in 101st Airborne Museum.
Ban-Tin Huong-Thuy (Huong Thuy Newsletter), August 12, 1972, p. 2: a
publication of the Huong Thuy Information Service.
Leaflet made available through the Huong Thuy Information Service.

From the single extant page of the 1973 wall newspaper, made available by
the Huong Thuy Information Service.
Quoc-Van; Lop 5 (Literature; Grade 5) (Saigon: Canh Hong Publishers,
1974), p. 199: purchased by the author in Hue.
For a comprehensive description of Government civil service policies, see
Francis X. McCarthy, ‘‘The Civil Service System of the Republic of Viet-
Nam: A Description and Assessment” (Saigon: U.S.A.1.D., 1969); available
*in Resource Systems Institute Library.
Under Government regulations of 1966, 1969, and 1971, villagers elected
nine village councilmen, who shared various administrative functions with a
166 / Village at War
gradually increased number of appointed civil servants. (See Huong-Thuy,
yearbook issued by Huong Thuy District headquarters, early 1975, pp. 1-10:
obtained by author.)
See Documenting the Post-War War (Philadelphia: National Action/
Research on the Military Industrial Complex, American Friends Service
Committee, 1974), p. 210, for data on support for the Government for
calendar-year 1973.

‘‘Thua Thien Report,’ June 3, 1969, p. 8.

[bid., December 29, 1965, p. 1.

The questionnaire was known as MACCORDS Form 15, and dated August
28, 1968. It is attached to a file called ‘“‘Rating of GVN Officials—I CTZ;
1968,’ which is in folder 1, box 9, no. 71A9237; 19/75:45-3, Center of Mili-
tary History.
Also see ‘“‘Thua Thien Report,’ May 4, 1968, p. 7.
24. ‘‘Thua Thien Report,’ March 3, 1969, p. 7.
 12
Vietnamese vs. Vietnamese
ARRAY OF FORCES

Government secunity forces at first supplemented and eventually replaced

the U.S. Marine Corps and the U.S. Army—in terms of activities on the
ground, and as targets for Front forces. Here we briefly examine each
Government security branch and reactions to it in My Thuy Phuong.
First was the Government’s Army, which in the province consisted of
two major branches. There was the main force First Infantry Division,
which engaged in widespread operations throughout Central Vietnam.
Then there were the provincial forces, consisting of the Regional Forces
and Popular Forces. Both were under the control of the province chief.
The first of these conducted operations against local guerrillas, while the
second guarded strategic installations, such as bridges and important
offices. Several Popular Forces platoons operated full-time in the village,
guarding strategic points, and sometimes cooperating with Regional
Forces on local operations.' As noted in Chapter 9, it was Popular Forces
soldiers who participated in the Combined Action Platoon, or C.A.P. All
provincial forces soldiers served in their home districts, and like main
force soldiers were poorly paid.
About 5 percent of the village’s draft-age men, usually from more
prosperous or prominent pro-Government families, were able to avoid
military service through educational, medical, or ‘‘family support” draft
deferments. Most such deferments required payment of bribes to Gov-
ernment officials in Hue, the district, and sometimes the village. Another
5 to 10 percent of the draft-age men avoided Government service by

167
168 / Village at War

joining the Front guerrilla force. A few of the 5 to 10 percent group

deserted Government units and joined the guerrillas, something that
nearly all could do at any time. But because of unattractive alternatives,
most young men joined and remained in the Government Army. This was
because police arrested and jailed those who refused to serve, and joining
the local guerrilla force meant even more certain dangers and interruption
of education and family life—sacrifices that few wanted to share. Those
who joined the Army were overwhelmingly from poor peasant families,
and many were from families which supported the Front but which could
not make the sacrifices just mentioned.
A word on the economic impact of the Government draft. The rapid
Army buildup in the late 1960s and early 1970s deeply affected 85 to 90
percent of the village’s young men and most families. Men who would
have otherwise been joining parents in family occupations were, in effect,
taken out ofthe local labor force. While the low Army salaries somewhat
offset these losses for most families, significant adjustments were usually
necessary. First, field work had to be handled primarily by men over the
mid-forties draft age limit, by more women than before, and by children.
Most other occupations experienced similar changes. Second, more
women than in previous years independently entered the labor force to
provide additional family income. Some tried to become small entre-
preneurs, buying and selling produce and various dry goods in different
markets for small profits. Many others secured jobs at Camp Eagle.
Seventy to eighty percent of those who joined the Army from the
village directly entered the First Division, and some went into the newer
Third Division, which fought in Quang Tri and later in the Danang area.
With few exceptions, these men had very low rank and served in danger-
ous combat assignments. Draft-age men preferred service in the provin-
cial forces to duty with main force units, for the provincial forces had
relatively low casualty rates and permitted service close to home. But
because the provincial forces had limited openings, only about 20 percent
of the village’s Government soldiers could join, and men seeking such
assignments usually had to pay entrance bribes to recruiters.?
Corruption extended to many Army activities. Important officers of
both the First Division and provincial forces assigned enlisted personnel
and made many promotions only after receiving bribes. Many officers
required bribes for most home leave passes and other special privileges.
And even many routine military services required small bribes within the
division. Officers often waited for payment before providing military
equipment, food, or trucks for units on operations. According to soldiers,
First Division personnel on operations often had to pool money to secure
such battlefield necessities.
Most Government soldiers, despite their military training, failed to
overcome their locally induced dislike for Government policies. Some
villagers asserted, in fact, that corruption within military ranks deepened
the dislike. As a result, morale within those ranks was poor, and low-
 Vietnamese vs. Vietnamese | 169

ranking soldiers, especially those of the main forces, frequently deserted

units to return to families. When they deserted, families protected and
shielded them, and felt no shame about doing so. Nearly every soldier of
low rank from the village deserted every month or two, for family visits of
two to seven days. They called such visits ‘‘vacations.”’
Others sought escape from the military through intellectual efforts.
Some kept long diaries, wrote poems, or read novels of romance and
adventure. Still others frequented Hue’s cinemas or houses of prostitution
in the district. One young soldier wrote songs and poems, and on visits
home sang to family and friends:

We are all being raised,

As sons of a cruel god.
We are killing our brothers,
We are killing our souls,
As sons of a cruel god.

We are all being raised,

As sons of a cruel god.
Life must go on,
Wars never die.

Before 1972, there were few First Division operations in the village,
but residents recalled that when the operations came there was looting,
rudeness by troops, and excessive use of weaponry and force—
phenomena which many said were related to the soldiers’ bad training.
And off-duty First Division soldiers engaged in armed shakedowns of
local tradesmen, people in the market, and travelers on Highway One.
Much more frequently than First Division soldiers, provincial forces
personnel came to the village on operations. As noted earlier, Popular
Forces soldiers were even assigned there on a full-time basis. Because of
proximity, the strengths and weaknesses of these units were clear. Pro-
vincial forces activities were flawed in ways similar to those of the First’s
‘‘regulars.’’ There was corruption, looting, and excessive, sometimes ar-
bitrary use of force. However, these problems were more pronounced
during First Division operations, a difference they said was due to the
local ties of provincial forces soldiers. Local soldiers were generally more
considerate in performance of military tasks than nonlocals. This was due
to local soldiers’ fear of censure in their home areas for improper be-
havior. Nonlocal soldiers, in contrast, had little fear of censure in com-
munities not their own.
Members of the provincial forces were worse soldiers than First Divi-
sion personnel.* Regional Forces members could rarely hit chosen targets
and preferred to stay close to bases instead of organizing operations. And
Popular Forces soldiers could not be trusted to stay awake or protect
strategic points when under attack. As with First Division operations,
villagers linked these weaknesses to lack of commitment by unwilling
170 / Village at War

soldiers to an unpopular government. For example, a peasant said, ** How

could the Regional Forces be good? None of the soldiers wanted to fight
and die for Mr. Thieu.”’

One Vietnamese, a Government officer, recalled what sometimes hap-

pened when Government military forces came to My Thuy Phuong. “*The
people in this area sometimes were strange,”’ he said. ‘I think they liked
the Viet Cong very much, because when we had operations in some of
these places, the people did very little to help the Army.’’ Here is what he
meant by that:

The people stayed near their homes and answered the questions the soldiers
asked them. They did not fight against us, but I knew that they were not
friendly. They were probably Viet Cong, but we had no way of knowing for
sure.

And this is how the officer acted every time he entered My Thuy
Phuong:

I knew about that place, so I was rather nervous. I never liked to go on military
operations there, but sometimes I had to go. At those times, I always behaved
well and tried not to make any person angry. But, you know, | still had to be
careful. I kept my M-16 ready to fire, and I never took my hand off my pistol,
which I wore at my side.

A tradesman in effect verified the officer’s suspicions about the village:

The [Government military] operations came very often, and were very strong.
Sometimes they arrested people, and searched houses, and did some things like
that. They were looking for the Viet Cong. But, you know, the people did not
tell the soldiers anything, and usually did not do anything to help the soldiers.
The people were quiet.

The people were quiet indeed, except of course when they aided insur-
gent attacks. Such Government military ‘‘successes’’ as there were came
without much help from ordinary villagers. Rather, it was sheer firepower
and coercion that translated into hauls of weapons, suspects, and bodies
for Government forces. In the face of large movements of men through
their village, and because fighting back was not always possible or advis-
able, My Thuy Phuong’s people often followed the course implied
above—minimal cooperation or noncooperation.

There were also various Government paramilitary units in the village.‘

After the Tet Offensive, American and Government planners decided to
form a nationwide paramilitary organization, the People’s Self-defense
Force. Behind this force was the idea that people given guns and some
training would willingly defend their homes and villages, and thus im-
 i Vietnamese vs. Vietnamese | 171

prove security for Government activities. Between 1968 and 1972, My

Thuy Phuong’s Self-defense Force grew to over 2,000 people, including
school children, retired Government soldiers, and even women, young
and old. Government officials gave guns to only several hundred, classify-
ing them ‘‘combat-ready.’’ Most people entered the Self-defense Force
for the same reasons they joined the Army—because of coercion by police
and the unappealing alternatives of jail or joining local guerrillas. Even
though bearing arms for the Government, they were by no means Gov-
ernment supporters or even reliable defenders of Government installa-
tions or personnel.
The Self-defense Force was a motley group indeed. Every night small
groups of defenders met at the village Office, picked up their guns and
small amounts of ammunition, and went on their way to patrol specific
sections ofthe village, or to man fixed checkpoints. Self-defense members
often indiscriminately fired their guns during patrols or guard duty. Card
games impaired their alertness. And their urge to sleep was sometimes
stronger than the call of duty. A youth who belonged to the Self-defense
Force stated:

The People’s Self-defense Force is so much fun. It gives us a chance to see our
friends and play around. Oh, yes. we had some training. We learned how to
shoot all the weapons, and they told us when we should do it. But we all agree
that if the V.C. ever come, we are going to throw down our weapons and run.

Complementing the Army and Self-defense Force in My Thuy Phuong

was the police apparatus. The local police force increased from one in
1963 to two in 1972. In the district, the increase was from 15 to about 30.°
The policemen were all volunteers. Most people regarded police duty
safer than military service, so entrance competition was stiff. There was
an entrance exam, but police recruiters also demanded bribes.
The police structure was thoroughly corrupt. Policemen often took a
share of taxes collected for the Government, or of rent collected for local
landlords. But the corrupt activity that affected most villagers involved
the police function ofissuing official identification papers and permits. A
peasant described what happened when he appeared before a local
policeman to request a required family identification paper:

The policeman said he had many papers he had to take care of, and it might take
me several months to get my paper from him. But I knew that I needed it,
because when they checked my house they always asked for that paper. We all
knew that to give the man maybe 500 piasters we would get the paper right
away. We knew that if we didn’t give the money, we would have to wait a long
time. So I gave the money.

But corruption was but one of the problems brought the village by
policemen. There were also occasional police operations. The only one
mentioned in available records occurred in late 1967, and was called Op-
172 / Village at War

eration Thua Thien 230. Its reported objective was typical of many others
in later years—‘‘to search for storage areas, specifically to find and con-
fiscate enemy ordnance.’’” People suggested that while such operations
were not as disruptive as American or Government military thrusts, they
nevertheless brought inconvenience and uncertainty to village life. In
addition, the police targeted actual and potential critics of the Govern-
ment who were not linked to the insurgency. Over the years, policemen
from time to time arrested a small number of students, Buddhist activists,
and other residents. For example, a student remembered:

There were some anti-Government demonstrations in 1971. We were opposing

Mr. Thieu’s election, and there were some demonstrations in Hue. I came home
to visit my parents during that period, and the police arrested me. They took me
to the district office, and tried to get me to sign a paper that I was a Communist.
I would not sign it. And I told them I was a nationalist, and did not like the
Communists.

So then they tied my hands, and made me lie with my head in a big metal barrel.
Then they hit the barrel with hammers to make it ring and my head hurt. They
did this so many times, but I did not sign the paper.

Eventually the police sent the student to prison in Hue, where he spent
about a year. Some other local anti-Government dissenters disappeared
forever. A peasant described an illustrative incident from 1969:

The police entered my neighbor's house. He had been active in the Struggle
Movement to oppose Mr. Ky. I knew for sure he was not a Communist. The
only thing he ever did was to be active in the Struggle Movement. But the police
went to his house, and took him away. We never saw him again.

Comments by others emphasized police unpredictability and

fearfulness—police terror. These police characteristics were related, in
part, to an intelligence function. Like the French and Diem regimes before
it, the Government created an intelligence apparatus from the late 1960s
linked closely to the police force. It set up sophisticated networks of
intelligence agents in the village under the aegis of a program called
Phuong Hoang, or *‘Phoenix.’’ Behind Phoenix was the C.I.A., which
had proposed it as a way of ‘‘neutralizing’’ the insurgency. Neutralization
could mean several things. First, Front supporters could be killed, or
‘terminated with extreme prejudice,’ as some C.I.A. advisors used to
say. Second, it could mean maintaining pressure on the Front to drive
away followers. Neutralization could also mean disgracing the Front or its
supporters in the village, or forcing insurgent leaders and guerrillas to
withdraw from the village to operate elsewhere. Finally, it could mean
arrest.
It was under the banner of Phoenix that local policemen undertook
many of their corrupt practices, and engaged in the arbitrary exercise of
terror. The Phoenix program, which set monthly neutralization quotas for
 ~ Vietnamese vs. Vietnamese | 173

every village in the province, maintained a so-called Village Intelligence

Operations Coordinating Center in My Thuy Phuong.*
Exact figures are unavailable for Phoenix operations in the village, and
most people did not differentiate between arrests, detentions, and mur-
ders by police versus those committed by military units. They spoke of
many incidents, however, that were probably connected with Phoenix.
The police arrested a few, charged them with ‘‘contact with Com-
munism, > gave them court hearings, and jailed them. A peasant who
attended one of those hearings indicated that written statements by ‘‘se-
cret witnesses from the village’’ brought conviction and a hefty prison
sentence for one man, a peasant who allegedly was a local Front official.
Others asserted that there were times when people in the village were
simply killed, usually by small arms or grenades. According to a peasant,
‘Always these killings were reported as ‘acts of the V.C.’ But we all knew
that the V.C. usually killed for political reasons, and the V.C. had no
reason to kill these people.’’ Such killings—as many as 10 or 20 over the
years—bore the unmistakable mark of Phoenix, for most of those killed
came from families with close blood ties to the Front. The Phoenix pro-
gram also meant extortion schemes. A tradesman asserted:

The policemen threaten people with Phoenix. They go to the people who are
poor, and who are most afraid of them, and say, ‘‘ You are under arrest for
suspicion, or, *‘You are under arrest for contact with Communism.’ If the
people give the police money they are not arrested. If they do not give money,
they know they will surely be arrested. The police are so cruel.

Complementing the Phoenix program was an effort called the Provin-

cial Reconnaissance Unit, or P.R.U. This C.1I.A.-funded and directed pro-
gram supported networks of informers in all parts of the province, includ-
ing My Thuy Phuong, to draw up black lists of suspected Front support-
ers, and to act directly on information supplied by the informers.? When
informer reports reached the P.R.U. compound, not far from the village,
P.R.U. agents went into action. The agents were tough and cruel, and well
paid by their American supervisors. One of them, born and raised in My
fhuy Phuong, was a vehement anti-Communist. ‘‘My brother was killed
by the Communists,’ he said, ‘‘and I want to kill as many Communists as
I can. Whenever I heard about Communists, I was happy to kill them.”
The P.R.U. agents’ sometimes demented enthusiasm for their work meant
killing was the preferred form of neutralization, and meant killings were
not uncommon in the village. ‘‘We killed at least 20 here,’ recalled the
agent.

The Front had several responses to all these intelligence activities. At

least Several Front sympathizers who lived in homes near Government
installations were constantly alert to comings and goings, and made lists
of people who entered those piaces. Insurgent leaders studied the lists for
possible informers. The Front also uncovered informers through its own
174 | Village at War

local network. According to a peasant, ‘‘The Liberation was able to know

about spies in the area. We knew who was working for the Americans,
and who was working for the C.I.A. and the Government agencies. We
always found out.’’ Villagers disagreed on the number of such agents the
local Front branch exposed. Some indicated that Front followers ferretted
out four or five over the years, while one man said the number was as high
as ten.
The Front also used its own intelligence agents. People sympathetic to
the movement working as civil servants in My Thuy Phuong, nearby
villages, in Government district headquarters, and in the Government
military used their positions to gather information about Government in-
telligence and other types of activities in the area. Such individuals often
made verbal reports to local Front contacts in covert meetings, or left
written reports at drops in the village or in Hue.

IN AN AMERICAN IMAGE
As time passed, the range of activity undertaken by Government security
branches increased throughout the province, and the Government pro-
vided better equipment and training to its personnel. This was especially
so after 1969, when President Richard Nixon began to emphasize his
policy of ‘‘Vietnamization.’’ '° Nixon began his American troop with-
drawals in 1969. Between 1969 and 1972, the Government and its Ameri-
can advisors intensified training programs for Government military
forces, and departing American units turned over huge amounts of
equipment to the Vietnamese. The Vietnamization policy had an impact
on My Thuy Phuong, for in and around the village there was an increase in
the number of large and small joint American and Vietnamese military
operations.
Charles Dyke of the 101st Airborne spoke of the ‘‘tremendously close
relationship’> between U.S. and Vietnamese soldiers.!' American and
Vietnamese squads fought side by side and even maintained joint radio
networks. A few Government officers echoed such sentiments. However,
on joint operations, Vietnamese clearly played subordinate battle roles.
According to many Government soldiers, all tactical planning, requests
for artillery and air support, and all transportation requests required
American approval.
To illustrate the realities of the Vietnamization effort, Government
soldiers and villagers reconstructed a large combined Vietnamese-
American military operation, which came to My Thuy Phuong in mid-
1971, at the very height of the Vietnamization period. They indicated that
three or four others like it occurred in the village between 1969 and 1972.
The reconstruction follows.
A joint patrol moved through the village along Highway One. A low-
ranking Vietnamese soldier recalled what happened as the patrol ad-
vanced:
 Vietnamese vs. Vietnamese | 175

The Americans kept yelling, in English, *‘Don’t bunch up, don’t bunch up!” It
made us mad to hear that, so we kept repeating, **Don’t bunch up, don’t bunch
up!’ The Americans got mad, and we laughed. But we had to cooperate with
them for a good operation.

The operation began routinely. Vietnamese soldiers entered homes,

while 101st troops formed an armed circle—which they called a
cordon—around part ofthe village.'? Meanwhile, Vietnamese and Ameri-
can soldiers set up a checkpoint along the highway, stopped all vehicles
approaching the village boundaries, and Vietnamese soldiers and police-
men checked travelers’ identification papers. Government soldiers moved
from house to house, examining residents’ papers, and detaining all men
and teen-age boys. Vietnamese’ soldiers ransacked houses in thorough
searches, seemingly more interested in looting prospects than in assigned
military tasks. ‘They stole our chickens and ducks,’’ a peasant woman
remembered, ‘‘and carried off one of our pigs. Then they found our bags
of rice, and said, ‘Oh, we must take this. It belongs to the V.C.’ ”’
There were about 20 men and boys detained that day. In what might
have been a Vietnamization setback, the Vietnamese soldiers chose not to
bother with the detainees. Instead, they walked away, some laden with
loot, and turned their detainees over to the Americans. A Vietnamese
sergeant assigned as an interpreter to the 10Ist helped the Americans talk
to those being held, who were quiet and quivering with fear. The sergeant
asked detainees their names, addresses, occupations, and whether they
knew anyone with the ‘‘V.C.’’ The Americans, who could not speak
Vietnamese, were totally dependent on the sergeant, who culled a few
detainees from the group. They were then led away, probably to Camp
Eagle.

Many low-ranking Government soldiers living in the village com-

mented on what they learned from the Americans on operations like the
one just described, in actual combat situations, and in special training
sessions. Comments focused on two major areas. Many remarked, first,
on American enthusiasm and combat aggressiveness. ‘‘I wish the Viet-
namese army could be that strong,’ said a Government soldier. **Then we
would win the war, just like the Americans.’ Another soldier said, **They
were very strong, and always went out on operations day and night. We
learned from the Americans that to be good in battle you must have
spirit.”
The second major area of Vietnamization lessons involved military
strategy and tactics. The comments of American and Vietnamese officers
suggest that the close command association of American and Vietnamese
officers meant that many high-ranking Vietnamese soldiers came to un-
derstand American military strategies. Enlisted personnel, however, re-
vealed that the officers incompletely transferred their understanding and
acceptance of strategic concepts to the lower ranks. Few low-ranking
176 Village at War

soldiers, when asked what they had learned from the Americans, could
explain such concepts. Instead, they cited these major lessons about tac-
tics, in their own words: ‘‘carry lots of equipment,’ ‘‘assume the enemy
is everywhere,’ ‘maintain communication and supply ties with the
rear,’ ‘hit with every available weapon,”’ and ‘‘don’t bunch up.”
Something else Vietnamese soldiers learned from Americans was how
to use drugs. As an American advisory report put it, ‘Narcotics, long
considered by the Vietnamese to only be a problem of the U:S. Army, has
begun to surface as an A.R.V.N. problem.”’ '? About a third of My Thuy
Phuong’s soldiers used drugs. A young man who had been drafted into the
First Division from a poor family said, ‘‘I saw so many of my friends die.
The war has no meaning to me. Life has no meaning.”’ Every day for four
or five years this soldier injected a heroin-like substance into his arm, and
he broke into and robbed homes in Hue to pay for the habit. Once in 1975,
he looked at a Government advertisement showing a huge skull dangling a
soldier, rope around the neck, over a pit of drugs. The ad read, *‘The
Army Is Determined To End The Peril Of Narcotics.’’'* The soldier
responded, “‘Ridiculous.”’

In effect, Vietnamization aimed at creating a Vietnamese army in an

American image—equipped as well as the American army, following
American combat strategy, organized in an American fashion, using
American military tactics, and full of soldiers as well trained and moti-
vated as American soldiers. Vietnamization was thus in theory the final
step in a long process, Americanization of an army and of a war. In
practice, however, the Vietnamization program at best created a Gov-
ernment army overdependent on direct and indirect U.S. support, and
failed to overcome that army’s problems of poor training, ineffective lead-
ership, and low morale.

As Vietnamization proceeded, the Front continued guerrilla operations

in My Thuy Phuong, but at a generally low level of intensity, and sup-
ported less frequently than in earlier years by local tax collections. Con-
tributions made in the irregularly timed collections varied greatly over the
years, especially after 1968. In 1970, some suggested, families gave an-
nual contributions equivalent to about U.S.$50.'5 The Front proselyting
focus on Vietnamization was reflected in Front strategy on the ground, as
by 1971-1972 guerrillas subtly shifted the focus of their military opera-
tions away from attacks against Camp Eagle. Guerrillas began to direct
their ambush and sniping attacks and laying of booby traps almost exclu-
sively at Government patrols and vehicles.'®
The Front also spread numerous leaflets in the village on the subject of
Vietnamization. Although none of them is now available, this passage
from a North Vietnamese pamphlet on Hue is probably similar to what
villagers read: '7
 e Vietnamese vs, Vietnamese | 177

The people of Hue have for many years seen the obvious cruelty of the U.S.
imperialists. The American dollar is still used to ‘change the skin color of the
corpses.’ In Nixon’s plundering *‘ Vietnamization’’ campaign a lot of traps are
ready to lure human beings into sin and suffering. All the dirty reactionary
theories of the imperialists build up in the land of the south, of Phu-Xuan [i.e.,
Hue] to drown the people of the south in slavery. But they still cannot destroy
the Hue people’s desire for independence and peace... .

For My Thuy Phuong, Vietnamization ended on January 17, 1972. That

was the date the 101st Airborne formally turned over Camp Eagle to the
Government's First Infantry Division. Weeks before the turnover, a
steady flow of empty trucks entered Camp Eagle, and left with overflow-
ing loads. The 101st was redeploying, and taking with it huge amounts of
equipment. A 101st publication includes this passage: '®

All that could be seen were the clean-up crews that removed everything from
the staples in the walls of buildings to gigantic stores of munitions and equip-
ment. After making sure the area was up to par, the buildings were boarded shut
one by one.

With redeployment, a 10Ist publication notes, ‘Camp Eagle closed in

peace—a symbol of the efforts and sacrifices of thousands of Screaming
Eagles.’ '? But as the last American soldiers left My Thuy Phuong, they
saw a discouraging sign: Vietnamese soldiers looting the camp. On foot,
or using motorcycles, jeeps, or heavy trucks, Government soldiers car-
ried away many items they could use or sell, including roofing, lighting
fixtures, and supplies of various kinds. They hauled the loot out by the
ton, and sold it in Hue and elsewhere. Eventually, commanders of the
Government’s First Infantry Division put a stop to the looting, and took
over the camp as divisional headquarters. They renamed Eagle ‘‘Camp
Gia Le,’’ to honor the hamlet it had replaced.

EASTER OFFENSIVE

A dramatic challenge to the ‘‘ Vietnamized’’ Government forces came in

the spring of 1972. That was the so-called Easter Offensive, which begin-
ning on March 30 again brought a major commitment of North Viet-
namese troops to Tri Thien Hue, and which involved local guerrilla forces
as well. Events moved rapidly. There was tank warfare in Thua Thien and
Quang Tri. The Government shifted commanders. Thousands of refugees
fled southward to Danang, and insurgent forces captured Quang Tri Prov-
ince. The Government lost considerable influence and control in the Thua
Thien countryside.?° Eventually, it reestablished control over the area,
but in so doing had to rely heavily upon U.S. air power.?!
In the village, the 1972 offensive brought several months of uncer-
178 / Village at War

tainty. Many of those most closely allied with the Government, including
most civil servants, joined the southward flow of refugees. Two or three
prominent Government supporters were killed during the offensive in
individual assassinations. In addition, there were a number of small at-
tacks against Government soldiers guarding bridges and local installa-
tions. The strongest memory most people had of the offensive, however,
was not of local insurgent attacks, but of retreating Government soldiers.
With North Vietnamese attacks north of Hue, the Government's inex-
perienced Third Division broke and ran. Its soldiers stripped off uniforms
and fled, first to Hue, and then through My Thuy Phuong to Danang.
A student recalled:

We saw the Third Division soldiers coming through here. Some of them walked,
some of them came by buses, trucks, or motorcycles they stole. It was very
frightening, because those soldiers completely lacked discipline. It made us
think that the Government was losing the war.

A peasant woman spoke of the retreating soldiers:

Two or three of the soldiers of the Third Division came off the road and into my
house. One of them had an M-16, and he said, ‘‘Give me all of your money, or I
will kill you.’ I was very afraid, so I gave him my money.

Another peasant said:

All we heard was that Quang Tri had been lost, and that Hue might be lost very
soon. We also saw around us that the local V.C. had become very active. There
was much shooting here, and the Government soldiers on guard all ran away. It
was a little bit scary, but the Government was not protecting us.

Many listened to Liberation Radio during the Easter Offensive. On

May 3, 1972, for example, they heard an appeal from the Front’s provin-
cial organization, which included this passage: 7

The puppet Ist Division in the area was so badly mauled that it has now lost its
fighting capability. The enemy in Thua Thien/Hue are panic-stricken. This situa-
tion in Tri Thien/Hue occurs at a time when our armed forces and people
throughout the south are launching earth-shaking offensives and uprisings... .
This shows that our people and armed forces’ anti-U.S. national salvation
struggle is entering a new and extremely favorable phase and is surging forward
to score the greatest victories. . . . Our people are launching seething uprising
movements everywhere to punish the cruel villains, to smash the enemy’s bar-
barous coercive machinery and to regain power for the people.

But despite its radio broadcasts and a leaflet distribution in the village,
the Front failed to involve its local followers in the 1972 attack. The
absence of insurgent leaders from the village, and near collapse of the
Front network of followers prevented guerrillas from securing much sup-
 ~ Vietnamese vs. Vietnamese | 179

port for their attacks. Though there were weaknesses on the Front side,
the 1972 offensive, in summary, presented villagers with dramatic images
of Government collapse, retreat, and American rescue. It reminded at
least some of the mid-1960s, when the Front was locally most influential.
The offensive was thus a reassertion ofinsurgent strength that in My Thuy
Phuong set the stage for the struggle that was to follow: the cease-fire
war.

NOTES
1. Inearly 1975, there were four platoons of Popular Forces troops stationed in
My Thuy Phuong.

to The remaining 10 percent of the village’s Government soldiers served with

various “‘elite’’ units, such as the Marines.
3. On looting, see “Debrief of aCORDS Deputy,” p. 41.
4. See ‘Combat Operations After Action Report,’ p. 196; °““Thua Thien Re-
ponte: <Octoberns 1968 p..3*
5. Between 1963 and 1967, the so-called Civil Reserve Rear Force (Hau-Bi
Quan) was small and relied entirely on volunteers to patrol village paths and
guard Government installations, such as the village office. In 1967, there
were only 30 members of the group. (See ““Thua Thien Report,’ August 3,
1967, p. 7.) Also see ‘‘Thua Thien Report,’ February 25, 1966, p. 10.
6. In October, 1966, for example, there were 26 policemen assigned to Huong
Thuy District headquarters, and another 10 village policemen, including one
in My Thuy Phuong. These numbers varied over the years. In July, 1966, for
instance, there were 45 in Huong Thuy headquarters, and 11 in the villages.
(See ‘‘ Disposition of Province Police,» PSD Form 334-15, July and October,
1966; available in **Thua Thien Weekly and Monthly Report, 1966: see note
25, Chapter 9.)
7. From a one-page report on Huong Thuy District, attached to *‘Thua Thien
Report,» November 30, 1967.
8. See ‘‘Thua Thien Report,’ January 2, 1970, p. 3; September 3, 1970, p. 3.

9. For background, see Joseph Treaster, *“The Phoenix Murders,” Penthouse,

December, 1975, pp. 76-168. For a reference to black lists, see Commanding
General, 101st Airborne Division, ‘‘ Briefing’’ (Camp Eagle: 101st Airborne,
1969), section 3, p. 3; available in 101st Airborne Museum.

10. See Guenter Lewy, America in Vietnam (New York: Oxford University
Press, 1978), pp. 162-189.
lle Ssee notes l2 chapter 9:

2 See Commanding General, “Cordon and Search Operations’ (Vietnam: II]

Marine Amphibious Force, November 28, 1968): available in 101st Airborne
Museum.
13. “inva, Wem Ie, dwhy Sil, WAP jos se
180 / Village at War
14. Chien-Si Cong-Hoa (Republican Soldier), November 15, 1973, back cover.
This magazine, published in Saigon, was obtained by the author in Hue, and
is also available in the Cornell University Library.
See ‘‘Thua Thien Report,’’ May 4, 1968, p. 5; July 3, 1968, p. 6.
Casualties among Government and American soldiers continued high
throughout the 1970-1972 Vietnamization years, although a larger percent-
age were related to booby traps. For example, in September, 1971, nearly 72
percent of all Government and American casualties were attributed to booby
traps. (See ‘‘Thua Thien Report,’ September 4, 1971, p. 2-)
Hue Anh-Dung, p. 62.
Screaming Eagle, March-April, 1972, p. 21.
Ibid.; also see Screaming Eagle, September-October, 1971, p. 3.
See ‘“‘Thua Thien Report,’ May 3, 1972, p. 1.

See F. P. Serong, ‘The 1972 Easter Offensive,’ Southeast Asian Perspec-

tives, no. 10, American Friends of Vietnam, Summer, 1974, pp. 32-40. Also
see Vien, no. 39, pp. 65-82.
Liberation Radio, May 3, 1972, in *‘Daily Report,’’ May 4, 1972, p. L-2.
 13

End of the War

CEASE-FIRE WAR

Between January of 1973 and March of 1975, many dramatic events in

Thua Thien/Hue and other parts of South Vietnam affected the lives of My
Thuy Phuong’s people. Some of what happened grew out of the Paris
agreement of January, 1973, which represented a major turning point
in the long Vietnam conflict. For most Americans, the agreement was
important because it led to the withdrawal of the last U.S. troops from
Vietnam and return of prisoners of war.! While many Vietnamese also
hailed the U.S. pullout, for most the agreement represented mainly
an end to the fighting, and the hope of political reconciliation—the hope
of peace.”
The Paris agreement’s immediate effect was to further partition the
country. It recognized vast areas long controlled by insurgent forces—
half or more of South Vietnam—as areas of Front sovereignty, just as it
recognized the cities and most of the heavily populated lowlands as areas
of Government control.* The agreement also established an international
commission to report cease-fire violations. It further provided for negotia-
tion between the two rival South Vietnamese political forces and freedom
of political activity for Vietnamese of all political beliefs. Many through-
out the world hailed the Paris agreement as an important step toward
lasting peace in Vietnam. Within several months of the January 28, 1973
cease-fire, however, it became clear that the agreement was not working.
Areas of alleged violation of the pact included the following:

181
182 / Village at War

The U.S. undertook massive weapons and munitions deliveries before the
agreement's resupply cut-off date. Later, the U.S. resupplied at levels above
the ‘‘one-for-one replacement’’ standard set by the agreement, and sent large
numbers of retired American military personnel to train Government soldiers,
repair helicopters, and assist Government forces in many other ways.*
On the Government side, police restricted, harassed, and sometimes arrested
anti Ubien members of so-called ‘‘Third Force’’ Buddhist, Catholic, and press
groups. 5 Furthermore, the Government did not permit Front ere to en-
gage in open political activity.®
Front guerrillas and small North Vietnamese combat units, for their part, con-
tinued harassing attacks against Government soldiers throughout the country.’
And North Vietnamese civilian and military personnel and enormous amounts
of munitions and materiel continued to flow southward from North Vietnam.*

By 1974, it was clear to most observers that the cease-fire agreement

had succeeded in only one respect: getting U.S. troops out of Vietnam.
Throughout South Vietnam, the fighting continued to bring high numbers
of casualties to both sides, and all three military forces involved in the
war—those of the Government, the Front, and North Vietnam—
continued to consolidate rear areas and stockpile weapons.’

Closer to My Thuy Phuong, throughout the province, large numbers of

Government, Front, and North Vietnamese soldiers continued to fight
andsdie.”
On the Government side, there were some minor alterations in military
strategy during 1973-1974, but basic problems remained.'! For example,
during the cease-fire period corruption seriously weakened Government
military efforts.'? First, buying and selling of unit assignments debilitated
the military personnel system. There was also expansion of black markets
in Weapons, ammunition, gasoline, and all types of support supplies. Cor-
ruption even touched military operations in the province. Many alleged
that Government units on operations had to pay officers at headquarters
for combat support. Seeing the corruption, and seemingly sensing the
absurdity of a cease-fire that meant war, many Government soldiers
began to desert their units for longer periods, sometimes flaunted orders,
and engaged in petty thievery of military supplies.'*? Morale plummetted.
After the 1973 agreement, American civilian advisors continued to
operate in the province, although there were fewer advisors than in previ-
ous years—and none in Huong Thuy District.'* The U.S. expanded the
jurisdiction of the provincial advisory office to include the portion of
Quang Tri remaining in Government hands, and renamed it Office of the
American Consulate Representative. Attached to the office were several
American civilians, including a C.I.A. agent, many Vietnamese, some
Filipinos and Taiwanese, and even a small group of American soldiers,
present under terms of the Paris agreement to search for remains of
Americans missing in action.
On the insurgent side, activity in the province was also intense during
 ~
End of the War | 183

1973-1974. The Front tried to consolidate its control in the vast moun-
tainous sections of Thua Thien. Thousands of North Vietnamese laborers
built a network of all-weather, mostly two-lane roads through this zone of
control, and prepared huge caches of weapons, munitions, and equip-
ment.'* The Front established administrative organs in many of the scat-
tered, sparsely populated villages of the mountain region.'® But of most
importance, guerrillas and Front followers continued to operate in the
populated coastal lowlands and in Hue.
First, small North Vietnamese and Front units launched heavy ground,
artillery, rocket, and mortar attacks against Government defenses north,
west, and south of Hue, some quite near the village. Insurgent forces also
occasionally launched rockets against the city and against installations
like Camp Gia Le in My Thuy Phuong, and the sprawling Phu Bai base.!’
And small guerrilla actions—sniping, ambushes, killings, and so forth—
occurred sporadically throughout the area.
Complementing the Front military actions were continuing political
activities, including small Front meetings, leaflet distributions, and at-
tempts to develop networks of followers in many villages. Clandestine
radio broadcasts continued to reinforce messages carried directly by guer-
rillas and other local Front supporters. Despite guarantees of the 1973
agreement, Front political activity remained mainly covert, but was as
widespread throughout the province as during the years 1968-1972. And
the People’s Revolutionary Party remained largely quiescent, though oc-
casionally party pamphlets circulated through Front channels.
Complicating the pressures most residents of the province felt from the
draft and continuing insurgent activities were increasingly desperate
economic conditions.'® With the closing of the numerous U.S. military
bases in the area, and with a worldwide economic recession, most
everyone in the province began to experience economic difficulties. Un-
employment was high. Inflation forced nearly all families to drastically
tighten budgets.'? And many small sources of extra income, such as part-
time jobs, began to disappear.
This, then, was My Thuy Phuong’s provincial context of cease-fire
war—intense fighting, the Government draft, increased Government
pressure on critics and potential critics, economic recession, and con-
tinued Front political activity.

VILLAGE BATTLELINES

In the village, the period after the 1973 cease-fire brought little alteration
in the local balance of military forces, but there were some political shifts.
Operating out of Camp Gia Le, the First Infantry Division turned nearly
all security responsibilities for the immediate area over to provincial
forces, police, and self-defense units. Various types of Government oper-
ations thus continued to come to the village, but by 1973, very few of them
184 / Village at War

involved main force units. In fact, main force soldiers participated mainly
in defense of the Camp Gia Le perimeter. Like their 101st Airborne
predecessors, First Division soldiers in bunkers and on small patrols and
ambushes around the camp attempted to prevent sapper attacks and
Sniper fire.7"
Four platoons of Popular Forces soldiers, under the command of Gov-
ernment district authorities, guarded local ‘‘strategic’’ points, including
two bridges, a dispensary, the market place, and the village office. Re-
gional Forces soldiers periodically came to My Thuy Phuong on opera-
tions, searching houses, checking papers, and probing for hidden arms
caches or tunnels. Policemen were also active—assisting provincial forces
on operations, checking papers, collecting taxes and sometimes rents, and
generally trying to keep potential and actual opponents under control.
In 1974, the local police contingent maintained a ‘‘Communist Suspect
List’? of 447 names. A Government captain said that these were names of
people ‘‘with any connection with the Communists, including anyone
with sons or brothers who went to North Vietnam in 1954, or who went
into the mountains after 1960.’’ Police periodically questioned those
whose names appeared on the list, sometimes jailing them without trial.
‘“We watch them carefully,’ said the captain. The Government also con-
tinued supporting intelligence networks in the area, consisting of paid and
unpaid informers from the village.
The People’s Self-defense Force continued to expand after the cease-
fire agreement. By early 1975, it officially had about 2,300 members in the
village, but the Government classified only about 300 as combat ready, or
trained and armed.”! The rest were unarmed women, elderly, and young
people trained in first aid and some simple guarding functions—self-
defense ‘“‘supporters’’ who occasionally stood watch and appeared at
Government rallies. Note that the Government maintained tight control of
self-defense weapons, collecting them every morning, and limiting dis-
tribution of ammunition. Local authorities thought it risky to pass out
guns among people they did not fully trust.
After 1973, the Government complemented its security activities in
My Thuy Phuong with an attempt to strengthen the administrative branch
closest to the people—the village office. This came through the so-called
Administrative Revolution, which meant, first, that the Government in-
creased the number of civil servants and soldiers serving in the village.
A few extra civil servants joined the local office. Additional policemen did
so, too, bringing the total local police contingent to eight. Second, the
Government abolished hamlet elections, and the province chief began to
appoint hamlet chiefs. Third, the Government required civil servants and
many soldiers to join Thieu’s so-called Democracy Party—and set up a
party office in a Government compound in the village.?3
Finally, the Administrative Revolution meant assertion of stronger mil-
itary influence over the local Government apparatus. An Army captain
came to the village to coordinate all local security activities. Many Gov-
 ” End of the War | 185

ernment soldiers and villagers noted that the arrival of the captain brought
improvements to the provincial forces patrols, operations, and static
guarding assignments. Government soldiers became more alert on duty
and improved marksmanship. Discipline tightened. Soldiers engaged in
little looting. And desertion became infrequent. But the appointment of
the captain caused resentment among most local civil servants, who re-
garded him as an interloper and threat to their positions.

In 1973-1975, a new Government-sponsored economic development

program affected some villagers. This was the Huong Thuy Agricultural
Bank, founded in 1973 by the Government and a group of private inves-
tors. The bank director said that between 1973 and early 1975 he approved
about 200 loans for My Thuy Phuong residerfts. However, the Govern-
ment village chief contended there were far fewer. In 1974, the bank’s
agricultural loans gathered interest at the rate of 29 percent annually, and
loans for small businesses at 30 percent. The bank calculated interest ona
daily basis, thereby giving borrowers extra incentive to repay the loan
premiums sooner. Actual interest rates were therefore less if borrowers
quickly repaid their loans. The bank permitted maximum loans equivalent
to about U.S.$700. Normally, however, it lent much less.?*
In the village, the bank’s credit policy mainly helped the prosperous.
Borrowers had to put up their homes or land as collateral, and the bank
considered refugees and landless individuals bad risks. This effectively
eliminated many from consideration, including those with the most press-
ing credit needs. If a family met the basic qualifications it then completed
an application, which included specifics on the cost of the proposed proj-
ect, and which required a loan-guarantee signature from the village chief.
Bank employees then visited the family, looked at the proposed project
site, and evaluated the proposal.
The requirement that the village chief guarantee loans prevented many
from securing credit. Many villagers asserted that only prosperous pro-
Government individuals and their friends and relatives received the
needed guarantee signatures. A peasant commented, ‘“‘At first many
people here were happy about the bank’s lending program, but then we
saw that in truth it did not help the poor people. Some people said it
showed the Government was lying about helping the people achieve pros-
perity.”’ A tradesman said, ‘‘The bank is a very good example of a pro-
gram that looks good on paper, but in reality is corrupt and hurts the
people.’’ The Huong Thuy Agricultural Bank was thus similar to most
other Government economic efforts—it helped relatively few, and gener-
ated anti-Government feelings.

Let us briefly pause to examine the ideological and cultural ties which
bound most members of the pro-Government minority during the last
months of their preeminence in My Thuy Phuong. These were for the
186 / Village at War

most part exactly the same people, or from the same families, that had
been prosperous and influential for so many years. They were bound,
first, by anti-Communism. A retired Government village chief said:

At first we didn’t know what Communism was, but we learned quickly. We

learned that if we were to keep our jobs, we had to be anti-Communist. Of
course we wanted to keep our jobs. There were many advantages to us in our
jobs. ‘

Some of those advantages were economic, but others related to power.

The former village chief continued, ‘‘We were anti-Communist because it
was the best way. To be anti-Communist is to be strong. It is very easy to
control people if you are strong and anti-Communist.’’ And just as a tiny
minority of local civil servants refused to engage in corrupt activities, not
all were manipulative and opportunistic in their anti-Communism. A Gov-
ernment clerk from a local prosperous family said, ‘‘My father and
brother were killed by the Communists, and I hate them with all my heart.
I will do anything I can to oppose them.” His relatives had been members
of the French colonial army, and died fighting the Viet Minh. A soldier
who served as a clerk in the Government office, and whose father was a
large landholder, spoke of freedom:

Did you know that in the Communist north there is no freedom? The people are
not allowed to make money. They are not allowed to hold money in their hands,
but must divide it. There is nothing free and fun to do. It is impossible to go and
drink coffee at the cafés, or go to the cinemas, like in the free south. The most
important thing about living in freedom is going to the cinema. Under Com-
munism, that is not possible.

One village councilman had long hated the Front, and the Viet Minh
before it. He spoke:

We must have strength to fight the Communists. Communism is the worst evil in
our land. It takes away freedom and makes us slaves. Everyone here supports a
strong government, because with a strong government the people will be free to
have their land, to work, to have families, and to be happy.

Then there were strong beliefs about leadership. The last Government
village chief gave his definition of leader:

The leader must be an honest, good man. He must make decisions for all the
people, and must think for the people. The leader knows that the people cannot
understand everything about politics, so must make decisions for them.

A tradesman who was a village councilman said, ‘* Vietnam has always

had strong, honest men as leaders. They act for the people, and do it with
strength.’ A large landholder had these words:
 End of the War | 187

There is the mandarin tradition. The mandarin always was respected by the
people, and could live in a richer manner than most of the people, but his own
feelings were always with the people, and he served the people in many ways.
Always the people respected him. Those of us who are lucky enough to have
more money or more land always remember the tradition of the mandarin in
Vietnam. And we always try to be like them.

Historical figures of immense power had long held particular fascina-

tion for several. Illustrative is this statement by the captain charged with
local security:

Many Vietnamese like Hitler very much. Hitler was a strong leader. He was,
above all, a nationalist, and acted in a strong fashion to lead his people. He
destroyed all those who did not agree with him. I think that is good. If Icould be
a good leader like Hitler, | would be very happy.

‘*The people in Vietnam like strength,’ commented a village council-

man long active in local affairs. ‘‘They must have strong, honest men to
lead them, to tell them what is right and wrong.’ Another councilman
observed, ‘‘In America there is President Nixon. He is another man we
admire very much. When everyone was attacking him, he knew what he
was doing was right.”
Members of the pro-Government minority thus shared a preference for
strong, decisive leaders. Many also shared a view of the masses of fellow
villagers. For example, a former Government village chief spoke of the
people:

Living here is very happy for many of the people. . . . They work and work, and
have a good life, and are happy, but have no time to think about politics. . . . So
we leaders must act in a strong way to think for the people. We must represent
the people, and be honest with them. But we must remember that our under-
standing of politics is higher than theirs.

A large landholder said:

I love the people in this area. They are good, simple people. . . . But it is very
true that the people are not interested in politics. Their experience is too simple
for them to understand politics, so they always come to us and ask us, **How
should we vote? Should we join this organization, or that organization?” The
people do not know. They want guidance. Because I love these people, of
course I give them guidance.

Curiously, none of the most important pro-Government villagers ever

mentioned democracy or mass political participation while discussing
leadership. This suggests that these individuals had not modified notions
of paternalistic benevolence to in any way fit the Government's widely
circulated claims that leaders in places like My Thuy Phuong were de-
voted to fostering democracy.
188 / Village at War

On the Front side in the village, the pattern of 1968-1972 generally

persisted during 1973-1974, with people not deeply involved in insurgent
activities. Front functional groups did not exist, and the People’s Rev-
olutionary Party had no activities, though a few party pamphlets reached
local Front leaders. The leaders were for the most part the same men who
held those positions during 1968-1972. They were capable, dedicated, and
experienced, but due to Government security pressure continued to spend
most of their time in the jungle and on the move. For this reason, most
people saw them as shadowy figures and knew little of them. Their in-
frequent visits to the village occurred mainly at night. But despite the
leaders’ absence, they continued to direct insurgent activities. Guerrillas
and other Front personnel sporadically collected money and food contri-
butions, and a number of villagers disappeared—most willingly, and some
forced—to join local guerrillas. Due to arrests and deaths, the number of
guerrillas fell to about 10.
There were also continuing attacks against local civil servants, Gov-
ernment military officers, and their local allies. On at least two or three
occasions during 1973-1974, the Front targeted such individuals. Once a
grenade exploded in front of the home of a local tradesman noted for his
anti-Communist beliefs, and guerrillas fired upon several civil servants.
During the period there were no local Front killings, but most civil ser-
vants slept either in Hue or in guarded compounds in the village. ‘‘It’s just
to make sure we wake up,” said one civil servant. Bullets sometimes fell
on Government installations in the village and on Government soldiers
guarding or patrolling the area. Along the highway, snipers occasionally
harassed military vehicles with gunfire.
There is evidence that during 1973-1974 insurgent leaders brought a
new message to the village, complementing the many intertwining mes-
sages discussed in Chapter 8. The new message concerned continuation of
American aid to Government security forces and alleged Government
violation of the cease-fire agreement. There are indications that the Front
provided its local leaders with copies of the agreement, which they care-
fully studied. ‘‘These days we do not see the Viet Cong cadres very
much,’ said a peasant, “‘but when they come they always talk about the
peace agreement.’

Like those on the Government side, local Front leaders took time out
from their struggle in 1974-1975 to discuss their philosophy of
leadership—and their views of the people. One Front leader said:
Leaders must be men who are close to the people. They must always have the
needs of the people in their minds, and must sacrifice for national liberation. A
leader in Vietnam must have good purpose, and he must be honest. He must
listen to the people, and be close to the people.

The best leaders of Vietnam are men of purpose, and they are wise and good.
Ho Chi Minh is an example. Chairman Ho had a great purpose, he was wise,
and he was close to the people. He is the noblest leader of all.
 ” End of the War | 189

Still another local leader stated:

All of the most able leaders in Vietnamese history were men who were
nationalists, and fought the Chinese and French, and imperialist America. They
were intelligent men, and had very strong beliefs. They always acted very
strongly, and always acted in the correct way. The people knew these men were
doing the best things for them because they listened to the people, explained
their policies to the people, and acted for the people. They were close to the
people, like Ho Chi Minh. The people follow them because they have much wy
Tin.

These and other comments suggest that the village’s foremost Front
members defined leader as an able person, close to the common people, in
touch with their aspirations and fears, and willing to learn from them and
purposefully act in their interest. *
Let us now probe the leaders’ views of people involved in the rev-
olutionary movement—their conceptions of revolutionary ‘‘follower-
ship.’’ One of the leaders said, ‘“‘The people are most important. They
must do what is best for them. The people are very smart, you know.
Many of them cannof read or write, but their intelligence is very great,
and they know what is best.’’ Another of the men noted:

Many [leaders] on the Government side are very bad. They think bad things
about the people. That is one of the important differences between the two
sides. The Liberation is close to the people, and the Government is not. The
Liberation would be dead if not for the people’s support.

Still another leader commented, ‘“‘The revolution is the people. The

people must do it all—and the cadres only direct the strength of the
people.’’ My Thuy Phuong’s insurgent leaders thus emphasized the im-
portance of sparking local involvement in movement activities. Their
statements came, ironically enough, at a time when they remained virtu-
ally absent from the village, except for occasional visits at night.

In summary, the Front had to maintain a low profile during 1973-1974,

due mainly to pressure from Government security branches. The cell
structure and network of supporters for guerrilla activities, which the
Front had so carefully built up in the mid-1960s, remained in disarray.
Guerrillas still launched only sporadic attacks from outside village bound-
aries and continued only low-level proselyting efforts.** But the local
leaders remained devoted to their cause, convinced that the people were
with them. They waited, in the wings.

HOPE, PROTEST, DESPAIR

Feelings ran high during the cease-fire war. For example, a low-ranking
Government soldier had this to say:
190 / Village at War

join the national army. They came to our homes and

Many of us were forced to
said, “‘You must go. You are 18 years old, and you must go.’ We see that the
Government is corrupt, and is doing nothing for the people. So we are in a trap.

Another young soldier asserted, ‘‘The Government is very cruel, be-

cause it has no compassion for the people. The Government only gives
power to Mr. Thieu, and the people are the ones who are suffering.”’ A
tradesman had these words:

The Government’s biggest problem is corruption. Corruption weakens the en-

tire country. There are three problem groups in Vietnam today. First are cor-
rupt Government officials. Second there are corrupt businessmen. Third are
corrupt military officers.

The tradesman lost a son in December of 1974, when Government

forces captured a point southwest of the village, a mountain called Mo
Tau. He added, ‘‘ My son has either been captured or is rotting on Mo Tau.
There has been no investigation. No one has come to tell us anything. No
one has ever said the Government is sorry. My son just never came
home.’’ Many in the village, especially those with sons in the Army,
shared the man’s dissatisfaction with Government performance.
Others discussed their economic problems in relation to the Govern-
ment. For example, a peasant asserted:

We are all so poor, and getting poorer every day. Mr. Thieu wants to raise
taxes, and we can hardly afford to buy food. How can we live like this? The
Government must do something for the people. If it doesn’t, the people will not
forgive it, and will curse it for 1,000 years.

And a peasant member of the Cult Committee stated, ‘‘The situation is

so bad in our country now, and the Government so corrupt, that many
people remember an old saying to gain strength. We say, ‘If we fail, hope
passes to our sons.’ That is the hope for Vietnam.”’

Frustrated by the cease-fire war, two or three villagers became active

in the primarily Catholic People’s Anti-Corruption Movement, which had
a small branch in Hue, and which organized small anti-Government dem-
onstrations, quickly broken up by police.*® A few local Buddhist leaders
joined in meetings at Hue pagodas, demanding an end to corruption and
implementation of the cease-fire accords.”’ Others felt that protest was
futile, so engaged more energetically than usual in traditional pursuits.
They busied themselves improving family graves, shrines, and the village
pagoda. Several peasants indicated that they simply tried to work harder,
for long hours spent tilling ricefields or gathering firewood in the hills
brought temporary distraction along with extra income. And two elderly
men, retired peasants, often got together for several hours to recite Viet-
nam’s long, cherished narrative poem oflove, honor, and struggle—*‘The
 ~
End
of the War | 191

Tale of Kieu.’ One of them said, *‘This story gives us hope that there will
be. peace.’ 2®
Still others felt such despair that they turned to drugs. Several young
people began experimenting with marijuana, and many soldiers continued
occasionally to inject heroin-like substances into their arms. A small
number literally destroyed themselves, as suicide began to take a toll,
including one or two young men approaching draft age and a grieving
young widow. Others found escape in creative endeavors. For example, a
member of the Government’s Self-defense Force composed a poem called
* Our City 22

What do you see inthis city?

After work it’s crowded with cars and people.
They push each other because they're hungry,
because they have so many children.

What do you see in this city?

The children after a drunk American.
They ask for money because they're poor,
because their country is at war.

What do you see in this city?

In the hands of a tired stranger,
she sells her body because she wants to live,
because she doesn’t care for the future.

What do you see in this country?

Dancing clubs, bars and crazy music.
The customers try to laugh,
because they are afraid they will cry,
Their soul will be deserted and bitter.

What do you see in our city?

They say: “Peace will come to our country,”
even though the mines explode every morning,
and at night the sounds of cannon are everywhere.

But there was another response to lingering war in My Thuy Phuong:

renewal of passive support for the Front. As noted above, the Front
continued to operate much as it had during 1968-1972—from a distance
and sporadically. But its ties to the past were clear. One peasant put it this
way:

Many people still remember the Liberation, because when the Liberation was
strongest the people had happy hearts. After the Paris agreement we have not
seen the guerrillas or the cadres very often. Sometimes they come for taxes,
and sometimes for very small meetings. But many people remember them, and
many people think the Liberation ideas are better now than before.
192 / Village at War

Front messages continued to reach many through the occasional visits

by insurgent leaders and guerrillas. Front followers sometimes distributed
leaflets and small flags, and clandestine radio broadcasts continued during
the entire period. Many included timely responses to speeches by Presi-
dent Thieu, or to Government reports on military operations in the prov-
ince. One radio feature reached many in the village every night at 11
o'clock. According to a tradesman, ‘‘The Communists play tapes of cap-
tured soldiers, who give their names, names of parents, and village
names. This is the most popular program.’’ The program was so popular,
in fact, that it brought sales to one local tradesman: many bought small
radio earphones.

‘‘We always remember President Thieu’s words,” said a village

tradesman. ‘‘He said to watch the Communists’ acts, not listen to their
words. We can see how bad the Communists are by looking at their acts.”
A Government soldier contended, ‘‘Every day the people hate the Com-
munists more. They are so cruel in disregarding the Paris agreement.”’
And a student, son of a civil servant, stated, ‘‘No one likes the Viet Cong
side any more. To follow them is to betray our nation and our families.”
But most villagers had different views. For example, a peasant said:

The most important idea the people had after the Paris agreement was that the
Government was very strong. We saw the Government flag everywhere. But we
felt that the Communists were still very strong, and some people knew that the
Communists controlled an important part of the country.

Furthermore, the people began to think that the Americans were becoming very
weak. America had to worry about problems of its economy, and about the
Watergate matter, so more and more people began to think that the Communists
might win.

A low-ranking Government soldier noted:

The people's attitude toward the Viet Cong was very special after the Paris
agreement. Some of the people then thought that the Viet Cong was going to
win. Others did not, but the majority came to think that it might happen.

So the majority began to be very careful about the Viet Cong. Of course the Viet
Cong cadres sometimes came here for taxes and to make propaganda, and so
the people, to guarantee their future, listen and are polite.

A peasant said:

The people know that the Government is bad and is going to lose. The people
have supported the Liberation side for along time. They support the Liberation
100 percent, and after 1973 the support for the Liberation has increased. in
truth, because of the Government's corruption, and because the war continues
without end. So the Liberation ts still strong.
 =
End
of the War | 193

And another peasant noted:

Many of us never really understood what the National Liberation Front meant.
We now understand clearly what it is like under the Government of the Republic
of Vietnam. For the poor people of Vietnam, could it be any worse under the
Liberation side?

In summary, My Thuy Phuong’s revolutionary potential actually

seemed to increase during 1973-1974. Passive support for the Front in-
creased, so altogether about 70 percent of the people favored that side.
And Government supporters and the politically uncommitted dipped to
about 10 and 20 percent, respectively. Pressure of the cease-fire war
brought these changes on, along with increasing corruption of the local
Government apparatus, and people’s memories of Front ascendancy in
the 1960s—memories in some cases perhaps clouded by nostalgia.
A contrast with this picture of Front strength comes in the com-
puterized assessment of Government pacification in My Thuy Phuong. In
March of 1974, the village was classified between ‘*‘B’’ and ‘‘C,’’ meaning
that it was in general a safe place for the Government.*° Curiously, the
hamlets far from the highway in the ricefields, which villagers described
as virtual Front strongholds, were chalked up as ‘‘B’’ by the computers in
Saigon!

VICTORS AND VICTIMS

In early January of 1975, North Vietnamese and Front forces initiated a

massive campaign, the Ho Chi Minh Offensive. It directly and dra-
matically touched My Thuy Phuong.*! Most of the early attacks, how-
ever, were in Phuoc Long Province and other points distant from the
village and Thua Thien/Hue.*? One exception came on February 21, when
the Government organized a village council election. During the voting,
guerrillas set off a large explosion some distance from the polling place,
causing no casualties or property damage. Everyone heard the explosion.
The district chief stated, ‘‘It is a reminder that the Communists do not
approve of the election.”
Another reminder came toward the end of February. Eight high school
students on guard with the local Self-defense Force disappeared—
abducted, according to Government officials, and ‘‘gone to the mountains
with the Liberation,’’ according to several of their friends.*?
By March 9, 1975, military pressure by North Vietnamese and Front
forces was widespread throughout South Vietnam, especially in the Cen-
tral Highlands, and also in the strategic Tri Thien Hue sector.** In Quang
Tri, insurgents launched a heavy attack near the My Chanh river crossing,
Government troops counterattacked, and 3—4,000 refugees fled southward
to Hue, according to an American official’s estimate.**
194 / Village at War

In Thua Thien, the 1975 offensive began in a place called Ap Hoa

Binh—‘‘ Peace Hamlet’’—to the north of Hue near the Quang Tri border.
There a company of Front forces, 60 to 80 guerrillas, came in from the
mountains and attacked Government positions. On the same night, Front
forces attacked two other locations north of Hue, and hit Government
Marine positions with what the New York Times estimated at 1,100 rounds
of mortar, rocket, and artillery fire.*° |
Also on March 9, there began a series of small Front operations south
of Hue, including the village area. For example, small guerrilla forces
entered the village of Thuy Thanh, east of My Thuy Phuong, and Thuy
Phu, to the southwest. Mortars hit Camp Gia Le the same night.?’ It
seems likely that North Vietnamese and Front commanders planned their
widely scattered attacks in the province as tests of Government de-
fenses.28 And it must be emphasized that the early March attacks in Thua
Thien met with vigorous resistance by Government forces, including
Marines, the First Division, and provincial forces.
The Government’s province chief estimated that his forces killed about
150 Front guerrillas in Phu Thu, east of the village. North of Hue, a
variety of Government forces, including about 45 tanks, killed and cap-
tured many more guerrillas. In the Vinh Loc area south of My Thuy
Phuong, provincial forces attacked guerrilla positions, supported by air
and artillery fire.
The initial guerrilla attacks and Government counterattacks drove
many people from their homes into Hue. According to Huong Thuy Dis-
trict officials, about 14,000, mainly from Phu Thu District, sought shelter
in the Thua Thien Stadium. And the fighting brought very wide destruc-
tion to the contested hamlets. In Phu Thu District, there were several
days of heavy bombing and use of helicopter-borne rockets. Commenting
on Phu Thu, photojournalist Jean-Claude Labbé said, ‘‘There is not one
village left.’’ 3°
With heavy fighting very nearby, My Thuy Phuong was far from quiet
during early March, 1975. On March 9, when guerrillas launched attacks
to the south and east, about one company of guerrillas infiltrated the
ricefield hamlet area. These were some of the same guerrillas who had
been operating in the village and other parts of Huong Thuy District for
many years, augmented by numerous North Vietnamese soldiers clad in
guerrilla garb. The guerrillas attacked the provincial forces guard points
by the hamlet bridge, and Self-defense checkpoints in the hamlet. All the
Government defenders fled. From March 9 to 12, Government forces
counterattacked, employing battalion-size provincial forces ground oper-
ations, dropping in paratroopers, and using helicopter support. Eventu-
ally, Government forces drove away or killed all of the guerrillas, but not
before nearly all of the hamlet’s 750 residents fled to other parts of the
village or to Hue. Only a few elderly women stayed behind in the hamlet,
hoping to prevent looting by Government troops.*° After the Government
counterattack, a peasant woman stood by the highway, wringing her
 ~ End of the War | 195

hands in dismay, her head thrown back. ‘‘My son. Oh, my son,’ she
moaned. *‘My life has ended. There is nothing left for me.’’ Her son, a
Regional Forces soldier, died in the Government assault.
On March 13, several of the hamlet’s residents went back to visit
homes, and came out wearing face masks and carrying slings. They bore
the badly mutilated bodies of six guerrillas, including one woman. They
temporarily laid the bodies near Highway One, and buried them that same
afternoon—in unmarked graves. Dozens came to the site, and stood si-
lently watching their neighbors prepare the bodies and dig graves. Front
pressure in the village during the first half of March did not end with the
death of those guerrillas. Early in the morning on March 12, about a dozen
sappers attacked Camp Gia Le’s munitions storage areas. All were killed.
On March 14, several guerrillas wounded two provincial forces soldiers in
a fire fight near the highway.
By mid-March, tensions throughout the province had increased sig-
nificantly. According to the New York Times, about 100,000 Quang Tri
and Thua Thien refugees jammed Hue.*! Fighting, which the Times
characterized as ‘“‘persistent though scattered,’ continued throughout
Thua Thien, especially north of Hue.*? And in the village, guerrillas and
other Front followers grew active—spreading leaflets and telling people
that a General Uprising was near. Local insurgent leaders planned these
and other actions in the area, although they did so under careful direction
of the provincial Front organization and, according to two men close to
the Front, North Vietnamese commanders.
A dramatic Front action came in broad daylight on March 15, when a
guerrilla or guerrillas shot and killed a policeman serving in the village.
The Government's village chief reported that guerrillas had infiltrated the
village and were responsible. The policeman, who had served in the vil-
lage for a few years, had a reputation for corruption and cruelty. Front
leaflets and rumors had repeatedly warned him that his behavior did not
meet with the people’s approval. So no one shed tears when the police-
man fell victim.
The Government responded as it usually did to such incidents of selec-
tive violence. It organized a large combined military-police operation.
Field force police, provincial forces, and Self-defense members from the
village searched every home in the area of the killing. The Government
personnel thoroughly ransacked houses in the search, and frisked people
from head to toe. The troops were disspirited, however, and clearly would
have preferred to be elsewhere. ‘I’m hungry, let’s go home,’ complained
a young soldier shuffling along on the operation, his M-16 slung low on his
shoulder. ‘‘Get your guns up! Guns up!”’ shouted a captain. *‘Act like
soldiers now!”
Early on March 16, those same reluctant soldiers killed a man near the
place the policeman had been shot. Later officers claimed that the man
shot was a guerrilla. The soldiers tied their victim’s feet with rope, and
dragged him out to the highway.*? A retired Government soldier, who
196 / Village at War

often boasted that he had worked for the C.I.A., took up a long vigil by
that spot on the highway, and made little anti-Communist speeches to any
passers-by who would listen. He moved in a slow, trance-like dance
around the corpse. ‘‘This is a V.C. He is from North Vietnam, and he
came here to kill the policeman. Ha, I’m glad we killed him! We are
leaving him here to scare the people. They are all V.C. here, you know.”
The body lay by the highway for two days.

On about March 17, North Vietnamese and Front pressure increased

all around Hue, paralleling a substantial increase in other parts of the
country. As Frank Snepp writes, the North Vietnamese drive against
Government positions in the Central Highlands prompted Thieu to order
withdrawal to Saigon of the Airborne Troops guarding Hue.** This was
part of Thieu’s revised strategy following setbacks in the Highlands,
which in effect wrote off the entire northern section of South Vietnam.
Thieu vacillated when it came to ordering the defense of Hue. One day it
was to be defended at all costs, the next day not.
The Airborne pullout, fighting in the province, and general uncertainty
sparked rumors in Thua Thien/Hue of imminent massive attacks and
Government abandonment. Thousands began packing up personal belong-
ings and heading about 60 miles south to the coastal city of Danang. Most
everyone regarded it as invulnerable to attack.**> Most of those who fled
were Hue residents, residents of Quang Tri refugee camps, and rural
provincial civil servants, police, and military officers, as well as others
allied with the Government. The first to go were people who could afford
commercial air flights or large charter vehicles for carrying belongings.
Among them were the wives and children of high-ranking Government
military officials. Buses, trucks, and taxis—piled high with furniture,
motorcycles, sacks of rice, chickens, dogs, and people—began to move
southward.
Between about March 17 and March 22, Hue residents and Quang Tri
refugees in Hue saw friends and neighbors packing and leaving, and most
seemed gripped with an uncontrollable desire to do the same.*® An elderly
woman said: 47

We began to realize that the government offices were moving away and that the
army was moving out. So the people just started to move, too—government and
soldiers’ families first, and then many others. People just didn’t want to be left
behind, with everyone else going.

“We are leaving because we are afraid of the fighting,’ said another
Hue resident, a tradesman. The man continued, ‘‘We all remember Tet
Mau Than.’ A Government soldier stated, ‘‘We are afraid of the Com-
munists. We must leave and be safe in Danang.’ A man interviewed on
Highway One asserted: 48
 - End of the War | 197

It’s so strange and terrible this time. In the other bad times, in 1968 and 1972,
lots of us became refugees too. But this time there’s no fighting, no reason. Hue
is being shelled a bit now, but that’s not why we are leaving. We are leaving
because the Government is giving our home to the Communists.

And a fleeing taxi driver said, ‘I think the Communists will be all right.
But it’s no good to be caught in the war zone between one side and the
other. That’s where you can be killed.’’ 4° For an elderly Hue tradesman,
the realization that the Americans were leaving came as a shock:

We saw the American advisors closing up their offices and burning papers. Then
we knew that America was betraying our national government, and that it was
giving over Hue and Quang Tri to the Communists without a fight. We knew
then we had to leave.

Contributing to the panic were rumors about a meeting organized

March 18 by the province chief, during which he ‘‘gave permission’’ for
all noncrucial civil servants, women, children, and the old to leave if they
felt it necessary, but urged all others, especially those with weapons, to
stay behind and fight. And apparently few in the province heard or were
convinced by President Thieu’s broadcast of March 20, which assured
that the Government was ‘‘determined to safeguard our territory at all
costs.’ Thieu also characterized rumors about abandonment of the prov-
ince as groundless.°° On that statement, a Hue student said, ‘‘It’s a lie.
They withdrew the airborne division yesterday.’ *!
With the advance of North Vietnamese and Front forces, Government
soldiers and civil servants began tojoin the flow of refugees, with many of
the highest ranking officials the first to run. Among them were the deputy
commander of all Government forces in northern South Vietnam, and the
commander of Camp Gia Le.*? The First Division’s deputy commander
had these words: ‘‘My commanding officer ran away two days ago, but
there were never any orders. No orders to fight, no orders to withdraw. I
don’t even know where my wife is. Why should I care about my unit?’ *3
Hundreds of thousands took to Highway One and headed to
Danang—on every conceivable type of vehicle, including buses, taxis,
jeeps, motorcycles, ambulances, sound trucks, and bicycles. Many hun-
dreds walked, some dragging carts or carrying market baskets loaded with
possessions. The deserting Government soldiers were angry, embar-
rassed, and sometimes desperate. Some commandeered vehicles at gun-
point, while others robbed, looted, and even killed to get money for
passage. Not far south of My Thuy Phuong, a family of four fleeing to
Danang was knocked from its motorcycle and crushed beneath the wheels
of a truck. For a while, refugees moved around the family, too panicky to
stop. Finally, someone laid the four corpses on a mat by the roadside.*?
There were numerous other fatal traffic accidents along Highway One,
especially on the treacherous Hai Van mountain pass between Hue and
198 / Village at War

Danang. Several trucks and a bus overturned. Vehicles lost brakes and
plunged over cliffs.
The refugee movement of 1975 was the largest in Thua Thien/Hue
history, and one of the largest refugee movements of the entire war.
About 95 percent of the permanent residents and Quang Tri refugees
evacuated Hue.°* As the refugee flow continued, military pressure from
insurgent forces increased. Rocket and artillery fire repeatedly hit Hue.
According to Hanoi’s General Van Tien Dung, the 304th, 324th, and 325th
North Vietnamese divisions, including hundreds of tanks and a number of
technical units began advancing on Hue from north and south.*® And in
the villages local guerrillas began positioning themselves and preparing
for their ‘‘opportune moment.’’ Notice of it came on March 22, 1975.
Clandestine transmitters broadcast an appeal of the provincial National
Liberation Front Committee and People’s Revolutionary Committee: *’

Dear compatriots: Although the Americans and Thieu have sustained setbacks
and are in a critical situation, they are still very stubborn and crafty. In many
areas of our province, the enemy is rounding up our compatriots and forcing
them to leave their native land, their ancestors’ tombs and their ricefields,
orchards and homes and go with him to live an extremely miserable wandering
life so that he can continue to carry out pressganging and troop upgrading
activities and use their blood and bones as a shield to protect himself.

Let all of our compatriots resolutely and firmly stay close to their ricefields and
orchards in the liberated areas, refuse to leave, struggle fiercely against the
enemy's people-herding activities, refuse to side with the enemy, build shelters
to protect themselves against enemy bombing and shelling and, together with all
of our people, fight the enemy to protect their villages.

The People’s Liberation Armed Forces is launching a fierce offensive against

the U.S.-Thieu clique’s nibbling troops, giving direct support to our compatriots
who are rising up to liberate their country and win back their right to be masters
and defeating the clique’s people-herding schemes.

Let all of our compatriots rise up in vigorous struggle.

In My Thuy Phuong, guerrillas responded by launching one of the

heaviest attacks in the province. At first, a few random rockets hit Camp
Gia Le, but later hundreds of rounds of rocket, mortar, and artillery fire
rained down on the installation.*® During one attack, a university student
cried out, ‘‘What if they miss! What if they miss!’” But North Vietnamese
and Front gunners were on target and there was little damage done any-
where outside the base.
On about March 20, several guerrillas and other Front followers left
copies of a small flyer near the village market, by wells, and along
paths—places people were sure to find them. The flyers contained words
describing ‘‘the suffering of the people,’’ and calling upon the people to
prepare for the fast approaching ‘‘final liberation of South Vietnam from
the hands of the Saigon puppet authorities.’’ The message was signed
 os End of the War | 199

‘Youth Liberation Forces.’’ 5° It was unclear how people reacted to the

flyer. They were clearly more interested in the rapid flow of events before
their eyes. About 400 reacted to what they saw and heard by packing bags
and joining the refugee movement south. These were civil servants,
policemen, military officers, some panicky enlisted men and students, and
those larger landholders and tradesmen with close ties to the Govern-
ment. With their departure, the Government apparatus effectively ceased
to exist. The date was March 22. The village office stood empty, and no
one guarded strategic points in the village.
Like most other rural residents of Thua Thien Province, about 95
percent of My Thuy Phuong’s people chose to remain close to home.
Many who remained, however, were nervous or fearful, uncertain of what
fighting lay ahead in the village, or of what the retreating Government
soldiers and advancing North Vietnamese and Front soldiers would do.
Several dozen people sat and stood in front of homes, watching the flow of
refugees. Others continued working in the ricefields as usual, and several
men chose the period of panic and Government collapse to work on repair
of an ancestral shrine. Many children continued to play in front of homes
and fish in village streams. A few children even studied lessons, though
schools were closed and teachers gone. And a small number of Govern-
ment personnel remained behind to the end, staying close to families and
choosing not to fight. One of them, a young enlisted man who worked in
the village office, wanted his photograph taken and sent to his parents.
For him, the war was over. He said:

Don’t take my picture in front of the [Government] fiag, and don’t take it in
front of the village office. They have no meaning. Take the picture in front of the
spirit house. Only it has meaning for me now. . . . We are all going to die here.
Try to remember us as good men, and try to tell people we are sorry.

Another who chose not to flee was one of the low-ranking local
policemen. He stayed close to home, loaded a gun, and wrung his hands
nervously: ‘‘America brought this war to Vietnam, and now it is abandon-
ing its responsibility. The Vietnamese people have enough resolve and
strength to fight the Communists. We only need weapons.”’
On March 22, guerrillas or North Vietnamese forces sabotaged the
Truoi Bridge south of the village, and the refugee flow came to a complete
halt.°° According to the last Government province chief, between March
22 and 24, about 10,000 Government soldiers moved south through the
village, most of them on foot.*! Only about 3,000 of them somehow man-
aged to flee the province. The rest crossed Huong Thuy District and
ended up at a distant coastal point called Vinh Loc, which a narrow but
treacherous channel of water separated from the escape road to Danang.
Massing at Vinh Loc, the soldiers grew disorderly, and then came under
mortar attack.°? Finally realizing that escape was impossible, the trapped
soldiers began to move northward back toward home villages. As they
walked, they threw down weapons and shed uniforms.*%?
200 / Village at War

Other residents of the province, including at least several from My

Thuy Phuong, evacuated from a place called Thuan An, on the coast east
of Hue.*+ A small armada of ships waited off the Thuan An beach, picking
up soldiers from an ocean of people.°* Many remembered that there was
much shelling in the area, and that half-crazed soldiers fought each other.
They swam desperately out to waiting boats, clawing over floating corp-
ses. A Government soldier from My Thuy Phuong remembered, ‘‘I got
onto a boat, and the boat was so full that some of the soldiers had to shoot
other soldiers swimming out. Some other soldiers threw grenades. The
water around us was red from the blood.”
‘‘We have fought for 20 years, and our fight will end in a few days,”’
said an elderly peasant. As the Government collapsed around him, the
man, formerly a Viet Minh guerrilla, seemed excited and happy. Another
peasant, who had previously appeared cynical about the war, spoke of the
Front’s ‘‘correct policy for the past 20 years.”’ He was suddenly en-
thusiastic about the cause of revolution. Still another peasant commented,
‘‘Our family never liked the Front, or Mr. Thieu, but now we are happy it
is almost over. Of course we support the Liberation now.”’
As they worked repairing an ancestral shrine, two peasants com-
mented on the change they saw coming. “‘It may make a difference to the
poor people of Vietnam if the Communists win,’ said one man. ‘‘ We will
support them and give them a chance. We will see. It is good that the
fighting and the difficult times are almost over.’’ The other peasant con-
curred and predicted, ‘‘The Liberation Front will form a new government
and will be very good. There will be no more rich group in Vietnam, and
the farming people like us will live better.”’
A man who had a small rice plot near the highway watched the retreat-
ing soldiers as he weeded his land. He said, ‘‘Oh, yes, it looks like the
V.C. is going to win. I always thought they might win. If they win, good,
then there will be peace, and I will be able to work in the ricefields. I will
be happy, like a bird let out of a cage!’ In mock amazement, a student
asked, **How could I be surprised that we won? We were fighting the
Americans, and the puppet Thieu, and we always knew they would lose,
and we would win. We have always known that. Everybody knows that.”’
Another student contended:

The Liberation Front will give the soldiers of the old army a chance to join us.
We will not give any of their big men any important work, and we will watch
them carefully. But if they agree to ask forgiveness for the past, and go to
political study meetings, then there will be no problem.

A peasant concurred, and added that the Front would probably not
long retain Government civil servants, police, and military personnel in
important positions of local authority. ‘‘How can they work like us?’” he
asked. ‘They need to take breaks at least three times a day for tea and
coffee, and they gossip like women!”’
 End of the War / 201

A few had specific ideas for future governmental policies. ‘‘Our gov-
ernment will be a government of the people,’ said a student. ‘‘We will
organize meetings of the people, and ask for ideas from the people on
everything we do. We always want all the people to support us.’’ A
peasant commented: °°

The comrade Liberation fighters always sacrifice for the fatherland, and we
think everyone should do that. I expect that everyone will support the Libera-
tion policies, and help carry them out. Anyone who is lazy, or who opposes the
people, will be in trouble, and Liberation cadres will have to visit him, to talk to
him, to convince him. But the people will all support the Liberation. Definitely.

On March 24, the last battle was clearly over in My Thuy Phuong.
Small numbers of Front guerrillas patrolled freely through the area, and
some of them talked and joked with villagers. A few even stood by the
highway and waved to Government troops shedding uniforms and moving
back to home villages. Along a path near Highway One, someone posted a
handwritten cardboard sign. It read, ‘‘Victory Without Bloodshed.’’ As
the guerrillas prepared to take over, they perhaps joined those quoted
above, and others of the 95 percent who remained in My Thuy Phuong, in
realizing what had happened in their village: Due to many fundamental
weaknesses, the Government apparatus had collapsed before their eyes
and disappeared forever. And most villagers, including those long hesitant
to align themselves with the revolution, were ready to support the victors.

NOTES
1. See Far Eastern Economic Review (hereafter cited as FEER), January 29,
1973, pp. 11-28; Bernard & Marvin Kalb, Kissinger (Boston: Little, Brown,
1974): ‘‘Documentation on the Viet-Nam Agreement’ (Washington, D.C.:
Office of Media Services, Bureau of Public Affairs, U.S. Department of
State, 1973); Gareth Porter, A Peace Denied: The United States, Vietnam,
and the Paris Agreement (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1975);
Tad Szulc, ‘‘How Kissinger Did It: Behind the Vietnam Cease-Fire Agree-
ment,” Foreign Policy, no. 15, Summer, 1974, pp. 21-69; Vien, no. 39.
2. U.S. advisors described the mood of Thua Thien/Hue at the time of the
cease-fire in ‘‘Thua Thien Report,’’ February 1, 1973, p. 1. The New York
Times (hereafter cited as NYT) reported that many in Hue were nervous that
the city and province would be ‘‘given up” to insurgent forces. (NYT, March
24, 1975, p. 6.) Also see James Jones, “‘In the Shadow of Peace,”’ NYT, June
L0OM19735 Vil pb lsrand NYE September 1973 pn 2.
3. See ‘‘The Provisional Revolutionary Government,” Indochina Chronicle,
no. 32, April 17, 1974; NYT, January 24, 1973, p. 1, map.
4. Fred Branfman, ‘Indochina: The Illusion of Withdrawal,’ Harper's
Magazine, May, 1973, pp. 65-76; Documenting the Post-War War. Also
NYT, February 25, 1974, pp. 1, 10; April 18, 1974, p. 2.
202 / Village at War

See Dai Dan-Toc (Saigon newspaper), March 9, 1975; ‘‘The Third Force in
South Vietnam’”’ (Philadelphia: American Friends Service Committee, 1975),
pamphlet. Also NYT, February 18, 1973, p. 3; March 25, 1973, p. 3; Sep-
tember 15, 1973, p. 2; September 27, 1973, p. 39; August 9, 1974, p. 17;
August 18, 1974, pp. 1, 22; August 19, 1974, pp. 1, 12; August 21, 1974, pp. 1,
14: October 10, 1974, p. 11; October 11, 1974, p. 4; October 21, 1974, pp. 1,
13: October 23, 1974, p. 4: November 2, 1974, pp. 1, 5; November 4, 1974, p.
Be
See NYT, January 5, 1974, p. 2; January 29, 1973, p. 1; January 30, 1973, pp.
1, 10; February 11, 1973, p. 6; February 13, 1973, p. 17; February 21, 1973, p.
18; February 27, 1973, pp. 1, 8; March 13, 1973, p. 14; April 7, 1973, p. 8;
June 1, 1973, p. 7; May 15, 1973, p. 3; October 24, 1973, p. 3; January 6,
1974, p. 3: July 15, 1974, p. 2. Also John Spragens, **1974 ‘Communist
Atrocities, °’ Indochina Chronicle, no. 33, June 24, 1974, pp. 14-17:
‘Father Chan Tin’s View of ‘Political Prisoners’: A Case Study of Militancy
Overriding Objectivity’ (Saigon: Department of State Airgram, December
26, 1973), released by Department of State, Washington, D.C.
NYT, January 28, 1973, p. 18; February 18, 1973, pp. 1, 6; February 21, 1973,
p. 18; February 28, 1973, pp. 1, 10; March 29, 1973, p. 18; May 15, 1973, p. 3;
October24, 1973p. 33 JulyalG, 19745 ps 7-

INNA, Ocoee Ls, 7, jos ioe Owliolser sil, W781, jos Wie Wleyelal 2405, IIS), (a), OE
December 14, 1973, pp. 1, 5; May 7, 1974, p. 3.

See NYT, January 27, 1974, pp. 1, 24; January 28, 1974, p. 27.

See NYT, January 1, 1974, p. 6; November 4, 1974, p. 3.

See Nai Mayan lovoeepese

See Tia Sang (Saigon newspaper), December 18, 1974.

NY December IS, 19735 pe ss

For information on Government operations in the province during 1973-
1974, see Dac-San Xuan, 1973 and Dan-Van (Hue: Information Service);
Government yearbooks. For Huong Thuy District data, see Huong Thuy, pp.
52-59. Also see NYT, February 9, 1973, p. 3; March 20, 1973, p. 17; March
Sil, WS, jo,
See NYT, May 6, 1973, pp. 1, 4; May 7, 1974, pp. 1-3; August 24, 1973, p. 3:
January 8, 1974, pp. 1, 4.

16. SceoNoyae Maren sila 19 (4p se

17. See *‘Thua Thien Report,’ February 1, 1973, p. 2. Also NYT, January 29,
1973, p. 12; April 5, 1973, p. 15; April 6, 1973, p. 5; April 7, 1973, p. 8; May 6,
1973, pp. 1, 4; May 19) 1973)-p: 6; May Si, 197350; &June ly 1975 ph 7.
August 18, 1973, p. 6: August 19, 1973, p. 6; August 20, 1973, p. 7; August 22,
1973, p. 14; August 24, 1973, p. 3; August 26, 1973, p. 7; September 7, 1973,
p. 8: September 13, 1973, p. 6; October 14, 1973, p. 8: October 24, 1973, p. 3:
June 22, 1974, p. 8: June 25, 1974, p. 4; July 28, 1974, p. 9: November 3,
1974, p. 3.
Also see Bulletin d'Information (Paris: Service de Presse, Permanent Mis-
sion of the Provisional Revolutionary Government of South Vietnam in
France), September 11, 1974, no. 8, p. 8: October 1, 1974, no. 10, p. 4; April
1, 1975, no. 26, p. 2; in Cornell University Library.
 ~ End of the War | 203

18. See Newsweek, October 15, 1973, p. 48. Also NYT, January 26, 1973, p. 12;
April 7, 1973, p. 10; September 14, 1973, p. 2; April 20, 1974, p. 11.
19. The inflation rate was estimated at 80 percent. (See NYT, May 7, 1974, p. 3.)
20. According to Government civil servants, First Division soldiers had ‘‘opera-
tional authority,’ along with provincial forces, in roughly the southern fifth
of the village.
21. According to district officials, there were 174 male and 118 female ‘‘combat”’
members in the village in early March, 1975, armed with 80 M-1 and 20 M-2
carbines and 38 rifles of various types. The figure of 2,300 self-defense mem-
bers represents most of the able-bodied villagers.
22. See Huong-Thuy, pp. 1-10; NYT, November 28, 1973, p. 2.
23. Also see NYT, March 29, 1973, p. 19; June 12, 1973, p. 3; January 20, 1974,
Dalz
24. This data provided by the director of the Huong Thuy Agricultural Bank.
25. An “‘official’’ view of the village was provided by Robert Jones III, for many
years employed by the U.S. Mission/Vietnam. He offered the following de-
scription ofthe village, based on the April, 1974 computerized H.E.S. evalu-
ation:
“There is a V.C. infrastructure (functioning); portions of populated areas
are penetrated by cadre/guerrillas on a fairly regular basis during hours of
darkness. V.C. taxes are collected from sympathetic households. Police
and some officials travel to neighboring areas to sleep. GVN military con-
trol is total in populated areas day and night; however, political orientation
of population is mixed. NVA/VC military units have safe havens in West-
ern extremity of village, but generally don’t appear except at time of rice
harvest. Least secure hamlet is Dong Tien [i.e., central My Thuy
Phuong].”
District officials provided H.E.S. scores for all villages of the district. As
indicated earlier in the text, the most favorable scores for the Government
are ‘‘A’’. ‘‘B’’ and ‘‘C”’ are progressively less so. The following H.E.S.
scores are as of March 1, 1975:

Hamlet Hamlet Village

Village Ratings Total Overall

A B Cc

Thuy Bieu 1 3 = 4 B
Thuy Xuan 3 5 = 8 B
Thuy Truong 1 1 — 2 A
Thuy Phuoc 1 1 = 2 A
Thuy Van 3 1 — 4 A
Thuy Thanh = 3 = 3 B
Thuy An 2 4 = 6 B
Thuy Duong 1 2 = 3 B
Thuy Chau 2 5 = Uh B
Thuy*Luong 6 3 —— 9 A
Thuy Phu 1 1 = 2 A
Thuy Tan 2 1 — 3 A
Thuy Phu = = 5 5 Cc
204 / Village at War

26. See NYT, September 21, 1974, p. 11: Chinh Luan (Saigon newspaper),
March 4, 1975.

See NYT, October 21, 1974, pp. 1, 13; Doc-Lap (Saigon newspaper), Feb-
ruary 6, 1975.
See Nguyen Du, The Tale of Kieu (New York: Vintage Books, 1973).
The poem was written by a student, and appeared on the single extant page
of a 1973 wall newspaper prepared for a meeting of self-defense members;
obtained from the Huong Thuy Information Service.
Information provided by Robert Jones III.
aie The best book in English on the 1975 offensive is Frank Snepp, Decent
Interval (New York: Vintage Books, 1977). Also see Alan Dawson, 55 Days;
The Fall of South Vietnam (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1977); FEER,
September 12, 1975, pp. 35-39.
For a Vietnamese interpretation of the offensive, see Van Tien Dung, Our
Great Spring Victory (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1977); another
translation of this appears in **Sen Gen Van Tien Dung Article: ‘Our Great
Spring Victory,’ ”’ in **Daily Report,’ supplement, vol. II, July 7, 1976, and
for details on fighting in Thua Thien/Hue, see pp. 48-50. The Vietnamese
language original on Thua Thien/Hue appears in Tin Sang (Saigon newspa-
per), April 28, 1976, p. 6. Vo Tien Dung and Vo Nguyen Giap wrote another
less vivid account ofthe offensive; see Saigon Giai-Phong, July 6, 1975, p. 3:
July 8, 1975, p. 3. Also see NYT, April 26, 1976, pp. 1, 16; April 29, 1976, p.
12: May 31, 1976, p. 2 for English language highlights of the Dung article.

See NY ip December O74 sp. oyDecember 15, 1974, p. 11; December 16,
1974, p. = December 18, 1974, p. 2; December 24, 1974, p. 3; December 26,
1974, p. 5. Also see FEER, September 2, WENSY., 1). isis UetoweVAy 7, WES). \6)8)-
10-12.

Boe Front followers indicated that those who left the village had received assur-
ances that they would not be armed by the Front, but would be sent to a rear
area for political study sessions.
34. The pressure was so intense that the Government issued extremely strict
mobilization orders, ordering more searches for deserters, tightening ofdraft
deferments, etc. In the village, the new orders had a demoralizing effect on
most male high school students—most of whom were over 18 years of age
and thus eligible for the draft under the new regulations. Also see Chinh
Luan, March 4, 1975; Dai Dan-Toc, March 14, 1975.
The official was Roger R. Kelling, senior advisor, Tri Thien Hue; inter-
viewed in Hue on March 10, 1975. The author believes his estimate was
accurate.

36. NYT, March 12, 1975, pp. 1, 12.

Api Information on the Front attacks of early March was provided by former
Government province chief Nguyen Huu Due, and also is based on the
author's observations. (Ex-Colonel Due was interviewed in Birmingham,
Alabama, September 27, 1975.)
Chinh Luan, March 13, 1975, p. 10. Also see NYT, March 12, 1975, pp. 1, 12:
Marchits..197/5, pass
39. This statement was made to the author in Hue on March 16, 1975.
 is End of the War | 205
40. Most residents of the ricefield hamlets returned to their homes on about
March 18, 1975.

NYT, March 14, 1975, pp. 1, 10.

Ibid.

A photograph of a woman and girl passing the corpse, taken by Jean-Claude

Labbe, was published around the world. See Associated Press (hereafter
AP), photograph, Newsday, March 20, 1975, p. 5.
See Snepp, op. cit., pp. 170-216.

For asummary ofevents in and around Hue, see ibid., pp. 205-229; Dawson,
op. cit., pp. 83-150. Also see *‘Sen Gen Van Tien Dung,”’ p. 48.
The March 19, 1975 evacuation of Quang Tri prompted many to leave. See
AFP Hong Kong broadcast (in English) of March 26, 1975, in ‘Daily Re-
port, March 26, 1975, p. L-6.
NYT, March 26, 1975, p. 14.
INVaceMarch 2219751:

NYT, March 26, 1975, p. 14.

Dan-Chu (Saigon newspaper), March 22, 1975.
The withdrawal of this division to Saigon occurred on March 19, 1975, ac-
cording to the author’s observations and NYT, March 20, 1975, p. 18.

This information was provided by the ex-province chief of Thua Thien/Hue.

(See mote 37:)
No Maye25e 975.0 Is pe 36:
See AP, photograph, Newsday, March 22, 1975, p. 1.
On March 24, 1975, the American Broadcasting Co. reported that only
10,000 remained in Hue of an original population of about 200,000. (ABC
broadcast heard in Danang by the author.) The estimate of 95 percent evacu-
ation from Hue was by the former Government province chief. See Dan-
Ghig March 25 1975s

‘*Sen Gen Van Tien Dung,”’ p. 50. Also see *‘ Daily Report,’ March 26, 1975,
p. L-S, and Chinh Luan, March 21, 1975: **Combined News Services,”
Newsday, March 22, 1975, p. 5. For articles on the Thua Thien/Hue military
situation, see Chinh Luan, March 21, 1975, pp. 1, 9: March 24, 1975; March
25, 1975. Also see NYT, March 23, 1975, pp. 1-2: March 24, 1975, pp. 1, 4:
March 26, 1975, pp. 1, 14. Also Trang Den (Saigon newspaper), March 27,
[S7/SeppalesaMarch 3097S. pale Also PEER, September. 975, ps 36)

ihe “Daily Report,” March 24, 1975, p. L-I1.

58. Camp Gia Le was attacked first on March 21, 1975, then repeatedly during
the next several days. See Chinh Luan, March 23, 1975, p. 1: Saigon Post
(Saigon newspaper), March 24, 1975: Trang Den, March 28, 1975, p. 1: also
BBC broadcast, March 22, 1975, heard by the author in Hue.

59); The author has lost the flyer, and cannot recall the entire text, but does recall
the portions quoted.

60. See Chinh Luan, March 25, 1975, p. 1.

 / Village at War

Also see NYT, March 28, 1975, p. 6.

See Tiziano Terzani, Giai Phong! The Fall and Liberation of Saigon (New
York: St; Martin's Press, 1976); p. 31:
See Liberation Radio broadcast, March 25, 1975, in ** Daily Report,’’ March
25, 1975, p. L-9.
See AFP Hong Kong broadcast (in English), March 25, 1975, in *‘Daily
Report, March 25, 1975, p. L-8.

AP, photograph, Miami Herald, March 27, 1975, p..1; NYT; March 27, 1975,
pp. 1, 16; United Press International (hereafter UPI), photograph, Newsday,
March 26, 1975, p. 1.

66. It must be noted that in his final visit to My Thuy Phuong, on March 24, 1975,
the author heard no comments strongly favorable to the Government, unless
the comments of the policeman included in the text might be so construed.
Most strong Government supporters had by then departed, leaving behind
only a few who wanted to flee but could not, the local Front supporters, and
most of those who had previously assumed uncommitted stances.
 Epilogue: What Kind of
Peace?
On March 24 or 25, 1975, North Vietnamese tanks advanced through My
Thuy Phuong toward Hue.' On March 26, a new flag flew over the Hue
citadel, and the Front issued a victory statement and appeal.? Simultane-
ously, North Vietnamese and Front forces advanced on Danang, which
was choked with hundreds of thousands of refugees. The city began to
collapse in a self-inflicted orgy of panic, looting, and killing. On March
29, North Vietnamese and Front forces captured Danang, encountering
no resistance.
By early April, Quang Tri and Thua Thien/Hue refugees, many of
whom were probably apprehensive about life under the new regime,
began the long northward trip back to homes they had abandoned.* As
North Vietnamese forces began pressing down the coast of Vietnam to-
ward Saigon, capturing province after province and city after city, a
Military Management Committee and a People’s Revolutionary Commit-
tee, consisting of military officers and civilians, became Thua Thien/Hue’s
new governing bodies.* With considerable North Vietnamese influence,
the new authorities set up people’s revolutionary committees in all vil-
lages, presumably including My Thuy Phuong.® According to a radio
broadcast from Vietnam, there were rallies of local residents, where offi-
cials éxplained the new regime’s policies.’ The Washington Post reports
that somewhat later the authorities organized people in villages like My
Thuy Phuong into ‘‘solidarity cells’’ of 10 to 20 families each. These
emerged as important institutions for political proselyting and control.®

207
208 / Village at War

Young people joined Liberation Youth Groups, and women joined the
Women’s Liberation Associations.’
There was an emphasis in all of the early official pronouncements on
the correct behavior of North Vietnamese and Front troops. In fact, the
Front established a 10-point code of conduct for its personnel.'® The new
authorities disarmed former Government soldiers, required civil servants
and soldiers of the collapsed Government apparatus to register, con-
ducted a census, and sent some higher ranking former officers for ex-
tended stays at special guarded political study or reeducation centers.!' In
later months, the authorities organized reeducation sessions in schools,
offices, and meeting halls for most former civil servants, soldiers, and for
citizens of all strata in the province.'? Many others were sent to the
reeducation centers, some for terms of three years or longer.
The new regime’s political messages for people in places like My Thuy
Phuong presumably followed the pattern set in other provinces. There
was most likely a heavy dose of anti-Americanism mixed with an em-
phasis on the heroism of Ho Chi Minh. The messages also promoted
revolutionary ideas and emphasized the reunification of Vietnam.'!* Such
messages came in many forms. The official newspaper Giai Phong—
‘‘Liberation’’—began to bring political messages to the Vietnamese
people, certainly including My Thuy Phuong villagers. One article in-
cludes a number of revolutionary folk ballads from Thua Thien: !4

[A ballad] points to the anti-aggression opposition to imperialist America:

When Americans come,

American ghosts are all over the streets.
In the sky the birds rarely twitter.
Instead the helicopters fly... .

Speak up so they can see the struggling spirit of the Vietnamese people, never
slowed before the power of modern weapons brought here with the intention of
conquering and annexing this country:

Americans boast of modern civilization.

Coming to our country,
they get hurt by bamboo spikes.

Schools provided new textbooks to students, probably including stu-

dents in My Thuy Phuong, and the books carried many political messages.
Illustrative is this passage, from a fourth grade mathematics text: !5

On only one day (31-10-1972) there were 50,000 people of the Cuban capital,
10,000 people of the Italian capital, 7,000 people of the Japanese capital, and
8,000 people of the American city of Boston demonstrating to condemn Ameri-
can aggression in Vietnam. How many people in the four above countries do
you calculate demonstrated that day to support the Vietnamese people and
oppose American aggression?
 ~ Epilogue: What Kind of Peace? | 209

In August of 1975, a primarily symbolic Thua Thien/Hue People’s

Congress met and prepared an appeal, which very likely reached many of
My Thuy Phuong’s people. It includes these words: '°

Dear compatriots, cadres, and combatants: The path on which we are advanc-
ing is clear and our future is very bright. The Thua Thien/Hue People’s Con-
gress calls on all the compatriots throughout the province and cadres and com-
batants to initiate an emulation movement to engage in productive labor and
economically build their province and their fatherland. .. .
Let the peasants of both sexes develop their role as the main force troops ofthe
revolution, work hard, increase land productivity, scrupulously implement the
party's land policy, unite and help each other in advancing along the path of
collective work to build their native province as well as a new life.

And a cartoon serial from a privately owned Saigon daily, which prob-
ably reached the My Thuy Phuong area, depicts the struggle of a young
Vietnamese boy against American soldiers. In one day’s strip, the boy
confronts an American, saying in English, ‘‘ You no come Vietnam, V.C.
no shoot you. You go combat over here, V.C. shoot you dead, dead.’ '”
Among the first acts of the new Thua Thien/Hue authorities, according
to the New York Times, was reopening of markets and shops, where they
fixed prices of essential commodities and prohibited excessive profit tak-
ing.'* North Vietnamese and Front troops, police, and new militia-like
units maintained law and order in villages—and, according to a broadcast,
thwarted ‘“‘several attempts at sabotage by the reactionaries.’’ '? The new
authorities also launched campaigns against ‘‘decadent,”’ ‘‘reactionary,”’
and ‘‘depraved’’ culture. They banned many books.?° Male long hair and
flamboyant Western dress came in for criticism.*! Western popular music
was also banned.’* And workers removed information displays of the
former regime.?? Later, schools, banks, medical facilities, and Hue Uni-
versity reopened, and cinemas began to show North Vietnamese films.?4
Free literacy classes began in the area, probably including My Thuy
Phuong. And according to an American journal, there were significant
improvements in health care in Hue.?°
In September, 1975, the Provisional Revolutionary Government intro-
duced a new South Vietnamese currency. People could exchange only
certain amounts of old currency, and credit the value of additional old
piasters to savings accounts in nationalized banks.*° And as reported ina
private Vietnamese newspaper, during 1975—1976 in Huong Thuy District,
presumably including My Thuy Phuong, there was a land redistribution.
The authorities divided at least 8,000 acres of communal land which had
previously been controlled by ‘‘the dishonest and wicked Vietnamese
group.’ Families of war dead and those who aided the Front received top
priority, and large, poor families received extra allocations. Former Gov-
ernment soldiers who had completed reeducation courses and had “‘rees-
tablished their rights as citizens’ were also eligible for land. The average
allocation was .60 mau per family—increasing average landholdings by
about 50 percent.”’ At the same time, the authorities organized peasants
210 / Village at War

in My Thuy Phuong and other villages of the district into hundreds of

production groups, each of which had about 80 members. These began to
bring new land into cultivation and purchase water buffalo and agricul-
tural tools.78
In late 1975, the new authorities combined Thua Thien/Hue, Quang
Tri, and Quang Binh Province of North Vietnam into a single new
province, Binh Tri Thien, and established several new provincial people’s
groups, such as the Ho Chi Minh Youth Workers’ Group.’ In April of
1976, My Thuy Phuong residents participated in Vietnam’s election for a
national assembly. According to Radio Hanoi, they joined more than 99
percent of Binh Tri Thien’s voters in going to the polls.*° In July, 1976,
Vietnam’s new assembly formally reunified the country.*!

But reunification has not brought the period of healing, rebuilding, and
peaceful change that many expected in Vietnam.?? While there are signs
that there has been some redistribution—wider sharing—of economic re-
sources, there have been problems which overshadow that advance. First
of all, the economy is in a shambles and there is simply less to redistrib-
ute. Unemployment is high in cities and towns, commercial activities
everywhere have drastically slumped, and money is tight. Some of those
problems grew out of government efforts to tax profits and eliminate a
separate southern currency. When the government converted old to new
piasters, in one fell swoop it eliminated much wealth, for the conversion
was in effect a 90 percent devaluation of banked savings.*?
Since 1977 in Central Vietnam, there have also been serious natural
calamities—floods and droughts. These have led to costly crop failures
and acute rice shortages. Exacerbating the problem were cuts in special
grain allocations to Central Vietnam, which for years has been a rice
deficient area. It therefore seems likely that the people of My Thuy
Phuong have encountered extraordinary hardships simply finding enough
to eat.
There are also the so-called new economic zones. These are large
tracts, often remote and full of unexploded ordnance, which the govern-
ment is trying to develop for agriculture—and the urban unemployed.
Many thousands from the cities, sometimes unwillingly, have settled the
zones. According to refugee reports, many settlers have faced food, wa-
ter, and housing shortages. The work has been heavy and exhausting.
Diseases have run rampant in some zones, and many have perished.
Then there is the pressure of continuing warfare. With Soviet arms and
financial help, Vietnam has embarked on extensive and destructive mili-
tary activities in Cambodia, Laos, and the Chinese border region. Large
numbers of young Vietnamese have fought and died at those distant
fronts, particularly near the Chinese border. In 1979, China invaded and
temporarily occupied parts of northern Vietnam, supposedly as ‘‘punish-
ment’’ for Vietnamese moves at the border and elsewhere. All these
military involvements led Vietnam to institute a nationwide mobilization
 ~ Epilogue: What Kind of Peace? | 211

and draft, surely touching the lives of young men in My Thuy Phuong.
Among them there have very likely been casualties.
The economic, social, and political adjustments occurring in Vietnam,
plus the draft, have driven many to flee. These are the refugees known as
‘“‘boat people.”’ Since 1975, there have been hundreds of thousands,
mostly ethnic Chinese from the cities, who have paid huge exit bribes to
Vietnamese authorities, hired boats, and fled the country. Their first des-
tinations have usually been Malaysia, Hong Kong, or any other shore
they think will receive them. Thousands have met tragic ends at sea,
victims of storms, unseaworthy boats, or pirates. Most who have finally
landed hope to move on to the U.S. for a new chance.
It is indeed possible that some of My Thuy Phuong’s people have fled
the country, and some may have made it to refugee havens and then the
U.S. But even the village’s most prosperous residents are probably not
prosperous enough to hire boats and pay all the necessary bribes. It is
thus a safe bet that virtually all of My Thuy Phuong’s people have stayed
put and tried to adjust to new conditions, however difficult.
But worries very likely plague the village—worries about shortages,
about social and economic changes, about the draft, and about fighting
that could claim the young men. So true peace, peace of mind, probably
eludes most villagers. In that sense, My Thuy Phuong perhaps remains a
village at war.

NOTES
1. See AFB Hong Kong English language broadcast, March 24, 1975, in “Daily
Report,’ March 24, 1975, p. L-4.
On the loss of Hue, Arthur McTaggart, last director of U.S.I.S./Hue,
commented, “It is embarrassing. The least President Ford could have done
was to issue a statement.’ (Interviewed March 25, 1975 in Danang.) Roger
R. Kelling, senior advisor in Tri Thien Hue, said, “‘It is very tragic. We were
just getting started in Hue. I was just establishing a good relationship with
the province chief. We had just gotten some good projects started. Very
tragic.’ (Interviewed March 29, 1975, in Danang.)
tr There is some disagreement on the date of this event. (See NYT, May 25,
1975, VI, p. 36; Chinh Luan, March 31, 1975.) Also see Liberation Radio
broadcast of March 26, 1975, in *‘Daily Report,’ March 27, 1975, p. L-
14-16.
3. See Saigon Giai-Phong, May 1, 1976, p. 3; May 4, 1976, p. 3.

4. See NYT, March 30, 1975, p. 13: Liberation Radio broadcast, April 7, 1975,
in ‘‘Daily Report,’ April 9, 1975, p. L-14. For an account of conditions
under the new regime in a province in Central Vietnam, see Earl Martin,
Reaching The Other Side (New York: Crown, 1978).

n See Trang Den, March 21, 1975; FEER, September 12, 1975, pp. 35-39:
Liberation Radio broadcast, April 15, 1975, in ‘“‘Daily Report,” April 21,
1975, pp. L-24—L-28; Saigon domestic radio broadcast, May 15, 1975, in
‘‘Daily Report,’ May 16, 1975, p. L-2.
Zui Village at War

Liberation Radio broadcast, March 26, 1975, in **Daily Report,” March 28,
1975; p. L=13; NYT, September 21, 1975; ps B3
See Radio Hanoi broadcast, April 5, 1975, in ** Daily Report,” April 8, 1975,
pp. L-14—L-15: Radio Hanoi broadcast, April 23, 1975, in ** Daily Report,”’
April 23, 1975, p. L-10; Liberation Radio broadcast, April 24, 1975, in
‘Daily Report,’ April 28, 1975, pp. L-16—L-22:; Radio Hanoi broadcast,
May 3, 1975, in ‘‘Daily Report,’ May 5, 1975, p. L-12: Saigon domestic
radio broadcast, May 15, 1975, in **Daily Report,”’ May 16,1975, p. L-2.

Washington Post Service, Sunday Star-Bulletin and Advertiser (Honolulu),

April 25, 1976, pp. B-1, B—4.
See Tin Sang, September 16, 1975, p. 9.
See Liberation Radio broadcast, March 28, 1975, in ‘*Daily Report,’ March
BIOS pale8:
See NYT, March 30, 1975, p. 13; FEER, June 27, 1975, pp. 13-14: Indochina
Chronicle, no. 42, July-August, 1975, p. 23, photograph; Time, February 16,
1976, pp. 30-37; FEER, May 14, 1976, p. 20; Honolulu Advertiser, June 11,
LS76nps CEN Y Tune 2197 On pao:

See Liberation Radio broadcast, April 3, 1975, in *‘Daily Report,” April 3,

1975, pp. L-1—L-2.
See FEER] June 6, 1975) pS, Ausust il 195-5 pp.e20— 2 AlSomIN Yan.
December 295 19/5. p25 January, 205 1976, pr. 5:

Giai-Phong, August 10, 1975, p. 3: available on microfilm from Indochina

Resource Center, Berkeley, Ca.
Toan; Lop Bon; Pho-Thong (Math; Grade 4; Universal) (Vietnam: Nha
Xuat-Ban Giao-Duc Giai-Phong, 1973), p. 71: released by the Provisional
Revolutionary Government of South Vietnam, and in the author’s posses-
sion.
See Hanoi Radio, August 28, 1975, in ** Daily Report,’’ September 2, 1975, p.
1-4.
Tin Sang, November 3, 1975, p. 10.

NY I september 28519754056.

Radio Hanoi, June 27, 1976, in *‘Daily Report,’ June 28, 1976, p. K-12;
Radio Hanoi, August 28, 1975, in *‘Daily Report,’’ September 2, 1975, pp.
L-2—L-5.
Cf. Saigon Giai-Phong article of May 31, 1975, broadcast on domestic radio,
May 30, 1975, in “‘Daily Report,’ June 2, 1975, pp. L-1—L-2.

Chis INCE, Ui? IS, WOT, iets Sie

Radio Hanoi broadcast, April 15, 1975, in *‘Daily Report,’ April 17, 1975, p.
L-12.
Ibid.

According to a newspaper account, banks reopened in the province and

began to emphasize loans to peasants. (TinSang, August 11, 1975, p. 4.) Also
see Giai-Phong Agency report on Radio Hanoi, June 3, 1975, in ‘*Daily
 ~
Epilogue: What Kind of Peace? | 213

Report,” June 13, 1975, p. L—3: Tin Sang, January 21, 1976, p. 4; Radio
Hanoi broadcast, April 15, 1975, in ‘‘ Daily Report,’’ April 17, 1975, p. L-12.
Indochina Chronicle, no. 49, May-June, 1976, pp. 7, 12, 14-16. Also see
Douglas Pike, “‘The Veteran in Vietnam,’ paper for Association for Asian
Studies meeting in New York City, March 27, 1977.

See NYT, September 22, 1975, pp. 1, 11; September 28, 1975, p. 6. Also UPI,
Honolulu Advertiser, October 8, 1975, p. A-16.
See Jin Sang, September 16, 1975, p. 9; October 17, 1975, pp. 1, 10. Also
Tiziano Terzani, ‘‘ Vietnam: The First Year,’ New York Review of Books,
July 15, 1976, p. 6; Hughes Tertrais, *‘Back to the Land,” The Guardian,
February 8, 1976, quoted in Indochina Program Newsletter (Philadelphia:
American Friends Service Committee, no. 35, April 16, 1976), pp. 19-20;
NYT, March 3, 1976, pp. 49, 57.

din’ Sang. October 17, 1975; pp» 15 10:

Tin Sang, July 13, 1976, pp. 3, 8; also see NYT, March 6, 1976, p. 40.

See Radio Hanoi broadcast, June 30, 1976, in ‘Daily Report,’ July 1, 1976,
pp. K=l—=K=2. Tin Sang, May 115 1976, p. 8:
INYa Julies lO 76Npeate
For detailed articles on Vietnam’s tasks of reunification and reconstruction,
see Vietnam Quarterly (Cambridge, Mass.: Spring, 1976). For continuing
coverage of developments in Vietnam, the best sources in English are
FEER, NYT, and *‘Daily Report.”

ies)iS) See INDI, Uulky Ss, Ws jo. ile

 Bibliography
1. Vietnamese Publications

Anh, Toan. Lang Xom Viet-Nam (Vietnamese Villages). Saigon: Phuong Quynh,
1968.
Ban-Tin Huong-Thuy (Huong Thuy Newsletter), 1972. Huong Thuy: Information
Service.
Chien-Si Cong-Hoa (Republican Soldier), 1973. Saigon.

Chinh Luan (newspaper), 1975. Saigon.

Dac-San Xuan (Spring Yearbook). Hue: Information Service, 1973.
Dai Dan-Toc (newspaper), 1975. Saigon.

‘*Dai-Nam Nhat-Thong-Chi; Thua-Thien Phu’’ (General Geography of Dai Nam;

Thua Thien Province). Saigon: Ministry of Education, no. 10, 1961.
Dan-Chu (newspaper), 1974-1975. Saigon.
Dan-Van (Information). Hue: Information Service, undated.

**Dia-Phuong Chi: Tinh Thua-Thien’’ (Local Guide; Thua Thien Province). Hue:
Vietnam Information Service, undated.
Doc-Lap (newspaper), 1974-1975. Saigon.
Duong, Pham Cao. Thuc-Trang Cua Gioi Nong-Dan Viet-Nam Duoi Thoi Phap
Thuoc (The Situation of Vietnamese Peasants Under the French Period).
Saigon: Khai Tri, 1967. Available in Cornell University Library.
“Economic and Social Assistance to the Republic of Viet-Nam.’’ Saigon: Gov-
ernment of the Republic of Vietnam, 1973. Available through U.S.A.I.D.,
Washington, D.C.

214
 - Bibliography | 215
Giai-Phong (newspaper), 1975. Saigon.
Hue Anh-Dung Kien-Cuong (Heroic and Strong Hue). Hanoi: Ban Lien-Lac
Dong-Huong Thanh-Pho Hue, 1971. Available in Cornell University Library.
Huong-Thuy. Huong Thuy: Information Service, 1975.
Huong, Vu et al. Co-Do Hue (The Old Capital of Hue). Hue: Sao Mai, 1971.
Khiem, Thai Van. Co-Do Hue (The Old Capital of Hue). Saigon: Ministry of
Education, 1960.

Muc Luc Chau Ban Trieu Nguyen (Complete Table of Contents Nguyen Dynasty).
Hue: Uy-Ban Phien-Dich Su-Lieu Viet-Nam Vien Dai-Hoc Hue, 1960. Avail-
able in Cornell University Library.
Phuong, Tran et al. Cach-Mang Ruong-Dat o Viet-Nam (Land Revolution in
Vietnam). Hanoi: Nha Xuat-Ban Khoa-Hoc Xa-Hoi Viet-Nam, 1968. Avail-
able in Cornell University Library.
Quoc-Van; Lop 5 (Literature; Grade 5). Saigon: Canh-Hong, 1974.

Saigon Giai-Phong (newspaper), 1975-1976. Saigon.

Saigon Post (newspaper), 1975. Saigon.
Son, Pham Van et al. The Viet Cong ‘‘Tet’’ Offensive (1968). Saigon: Printing and
Publications Center, Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces, 1968.
Song Than (newspaper), 1975. Saigon.
South Viet-Nam National Front for Liberation: Documents. South Vietnam: Giai
Phong, 1966. Available in Cornell University Library.

Tia Sang (newspaper), 1974-1975. Saigon.

Tin Sang (newspaper), 1975-1976. Saigon.

Toan; Lop Bon; Pho-Thong (Math; Grade Four; Universal). Vietnam: Nha Xuat-
Ban Giao-Duc Giai-Phong, 1973.
Trang-Den (newspaper), 1974-1975. Saigon.
Vietnam Bulletin, 1973. Washington: Embassy of the Republic of Vietnam. Avail-
able in East-West Resource Systems Institute Library, Honolulu.
Vietnamese Studies, undated. Hanoi.

2. French Publications (all in the Cornell University Library).

Bulletin des Amis du Vieux Hue, 1916-1919.

Bulletin d’'Information, 1974-1975. Paris: Press Service, Permanent Mission ofthe

Provisional Revolutionary Government of South Vietnam in France.
Chaigneau, Michel. Souvenirs de Hue. Paris: L° Imprimerie Imperiale, 1867.

Cordier, Paul. Notions d’Administration Indochinoise. Hanoi: Imprimerie d’Ex-

treme Orient, 1911.
Cury, Louis. La Societe Annamite; Les Lettres—Les Mandarins—Le Peuple.
Paris: Faculte de Droit de L’ Universite de Paris, Jouve & Co., 1910.
Gourou, Pierre. L’ Utilisation du Sol en Indochine Francaise. Paris: Centre
216 / Village at War

d'Etudes de Politique Etrangers, Travaux des groupes d’Etudes, Paul

Hartman, 1940.
Henry, Yves. Economie Agricole de |’ Indochine. Hanoi: Gouvernement General,
1932.
Taboulet, Georges, ed. La Geste Francaise en Indochine. Paris: A. Maisonneuve,
1955-1956, 2 vols.
Thomazi, Auguste. La Conquete de I'Indochine. Paris: Payot, 1934.
‘‘Tombeaux Annamites dan les Environs de Hue.’ Bulletin de la Societe des
Etudes Indochinoises, no. 1 & 2, 1958.

Vinh, Nguyen Van. Les Reformes Agraires au Viet-Nam. France: Librairie Uni-
versitaire Uystpruyst, 1961.

3. Books and Special Studies.

Betts, Russell. ‘‘ Viet Cong Village Control: Some Observations on the Origin and
Dynamics of Modern Revolutionary War.’ Cambridge: M.I.T. Center for
International Studies, August, 1969.
Boyle, Richard. Flower of the Dragon; The Breakdown of the U.S. Army in
Vietnam. San Francisco: Ramparts Press, 1972.

Browning, Frank and Dorothy Forman, eds. The Wasted Nations. New York:
Harper & Row, 1972.

Burchett, Wilfred. Vietnam; Inside Story of the Guerrilla War. New York: Inter-
national, 1965.

Buttinger, Joseph. Vietnam: A Dragon Embattled. New York: Praeger, 1967.

______. Vietnam: A Political History. New York: Praeger, 1968.

Caputo, Philip. A Rumor of War. New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 1977.
Chagnon, Jacqui and Don Luce. Of Quiet Courage: Poems From Viet-Nam.
Washington: Indochina Mobile Education Project, 1974.
Chinh, Truong and Vo Nguyen Giap. *“‘The Peasant Question (1937—1938).”’
Ithaca: Southeast Asia Program, Department of Asian Studies, Cornell Uni-
versity, data paper no. 94, January, 1974.

Dang, Nghiem. Viet-Nam; Politics and Public Administration. Honolulu: East-

West Center Press, 1966.

Davison, W. “‘Some Observations on Viet Cong Operations in the Villages.’

Santa Monica: RAND Corporation memorandum RM-5267/2-ISA/ARPA,
May, 1968.

Dawson, Alan. 55 Days; The Fall of South Vietnam. Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-
Hall, 1977.

Documenting the Post-War War. Philadelphia: National Action/Research on the

Military Industrial Complex, American Friends Service Committee, 1974.
Donnell, John and Charles Joiner, eds. Electoral Politics in South Vietnam.
Lexington, Mass.: D. C. Heath, 1974.

Du, Nguyen. The Tale Of Kieu. New York: Vintage Books, 1973.
 “ Bibliography | 217
Dung, Van Tien. Our Great Spring Victory. New York: Monthly Review Press,
1977.
Fall, Bernard. Viet-Nam Witness; 1953-66. New York & Washington: Praeger,
1966.
_____. Street Without Joy. New York: Schocken Books, 1972.

Fitzgerald, Frances. Fire In The Lake: The Vietnamese and the Americans in
Vietnam. New York: Atlantic-Little, Brown, 1972.
Halberstam, David. The Best and the Brightest. New York: Random House, 1972.
Hammer, Ellen. Vietnam; Yesterday and Today. New York: Holt, Rinehart and
Winston, 1966.
Han, Vo Luan. *‘Thua Thien Agricultural Development Problems and the Result
of Investigations of 411 Thua Thien Farmer Households.”’ Saigon: Joint De-
velopment Group, 1967. Available in Cornell University Library.
Hayden, Tom. *“‘A Vietnamese View of Human Nature.’ Santa Monica: In-
dochina Peace Campaign, undated.

Henderson, William. Why the Vietcong Fought: A Study of Motivation and Con-
trolin a Modern Army in Combat. Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1979.
Hickey, Gerald. Village in Viet-Nam. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1964.

Hoa, Nguyen Dinh. Vietnamese-English Dictionary. Rutland, Vt. & Tokyo: Tut-
tle, 1966.
Kahin, George and John Lewis. The United States in Viet-Nam. New York: Dial
Press.) 1967.

Kalb, Bernard and Marvin Kalb. Kissinger. Boston: Little, Brown, 1974.

Lamb, Alastair. The Mandarin Road to Old Hue; Narratives of Anglo-Vietnamese

Diplomacy from the 17th Century to the Eve of the French Conquest. Ham-
den, Conn.: Archon Books, 1970.
Lewy, Guenter. America in Vietnam. New York: Oxford University Press, 1978.

Long, Ngo Vinh. Before the Revolution; The Vietnamese Peasants Under the
French. Cambridge: M.I.T. Press, 1973.
Marr, David. Vietnamese Anticolonialism 1885-1925. Berkeley: University of
California Press, 1971.
Martin, Earl. Reaching the Other Side. New York: Crown, 1978.
McAlister, John. Vietnam: The Origins of Revolution. New York: Knopf, 1969.
McAlister, John and Paul Mus. The Vietnamese and Their Revolution. New York:
Harper & Row, 1970.
Meyerson, Harvey. Vinh Long. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1970.
Oberdorfer, Don. Tet. Garden City: Doubleday, 1971.
The Pentagon Papers as Published by the New York Times. New York: Bantam,
SFA
Pike, Douglas, ed. ‘Documents on the National Liberation Front of South Viet-
nam, 1959-1966.°° Wason microfilm 1562, Cornell University Library.
218 / Village at War

. Vietcong: The Organization and Techniques of the National Liberation

Front of South Vietnam. Cambridge: M.1.T. Press, 1966.
. War, Peace, and the Viet Cong. Cambridge: M.I.T. Press, 1969.

.‘'The Veteran in Vietnam.’ Paper for Association for Asian Studies meet-
ing in New York City, March, 1977.
Popkin, Samuel. The Rational Peasant: The Political Economy of Rural Society in
Vietnam. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1979.
Porter, Gareth. A Peace Denied: The United States, Vietnam,
and the Paris
Agreement. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1975.
Race, Jeffrey. War Comes to Long An; Revolutionary Conflict in a Vietnamese
Province. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1972.
Rose, Dale. The Vietnamese Civil Service System. Saigon: Michigan State Advis-
ory Group, 1961. Available in East-West Resource Systems Institute Library,
Honolulu.

Schell, Jonathan. The Village of Ben Suc. New York: Knopf, 1967.
Scott, James. The Moral Economy of the Peasant: Rebellion and Subsistence in
Southeast Asia. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1976.
The Senator Gravel Edition; The Pentagon Papers; The Defense Department
History of United States Decisionmaking on Vietnam. Boston: Beacon, 1974.

Shaplen, Robert. The Road From War; Vietnam 1965-1970. New York: Harper &
Row, 1970.
Snepp, Frank. Decent Interval. New York: Vintage Books, 1977.

Tanham, George. Communist Revolutionary Warfare; From the Vietminh to the

Viet Cong. New York: Praeger, 1967.

Terzani, Tiziano. Giai Phong! The Fall and Liberation of Saigon. New York: St.
Martin's Press, 1976.

Thai, Nguyen. /s South Vietnam Viable? Manila: Carmelo & Bauermann, 1962.
Available in East-West Resource Systems Institute Library, Honolulu.
Thai, Nguyen Van and Nguyen Van Mung. A Short History of Viet-Nam. Saigon:
Times Publishing Co., 1958.

“The Third Force in South Vietnam.”’ Philadelphia: American Friends Service

Committee, 1975.
Vennema, Alje. The Viet Cong Massacre At Hue. New York: Vantage Press,
1976.
Vien, Nguyen Khac. Tradition and Revolution in Vietnam. Berkeley: Indochina
Resource Center, 1974.
Vietnam Veterans Against the War. The Winter Soldier Investigation: An Inquiry
into American War Crimes. Boston: Beacon Press, 1972.
West, F. J. The Village. New York: Harper & Row, 1972.
Woodside, Alexander. Community and Revolution in Modern Vietnam. Boston:
Houghton Mifflin, 1976.
 a” Bibliography | 219
Wolf, Eric. Peasant Wars Of The Twentieth Century. New York: Harper & Row,
1969.
Zasloff, J. “Origins of the Insurgency in South Viet-Nam, 1954-1960.’ Santa
Monica: RAND Corporation, item RM-5163/2-ISA/ARPA, May, 1968.

4. United States Government Documents.

“After Action Report, Offensive Operations 17 May—28 February 1969.°’ Camp

Eagle: Headquarters, 2nd Brigade, 101st Airborne Division, March 5, 1969.
Available in Museum, Ft. Campbell, Ky.

‘Analysis of V.C./V.C.I Related Activity in Thua Thien—1970.’’ Camp Eagle:

101st Airborne Division, February 21, 1971. Available in Museum, Ft.
Campbell, Ky.

‘Annual Statistical Bulletin.”’ Saigon: U.S.A.I.D., 1973. Available in East-West

Resource Systems Institute Library, Honolulu.
‘Briefing.’ Camp Eagle: Commanding General, 101st Airborne Division, 1969.
Available in Museum, Ft. Campbell, Ky.

Captured Documents. Washington: Office of Media Services, Bureau of Public

Affairs, Dept. of State, 1968. Available in Cornell University Library.
“Civic Action Priority List.”’ Camp Eagle: AC ofS, G-5, 101st Airborne Division,
December 14, 1969. Available in Museum, Ft. Campbell, Ky.
“Combat Notes Number 10.’ Camp Eagle: 101st Airborne Division, March 5,
1968. Available in Museum, Ft. Campbell, Ky.
‘Combat Operations After Action Report.’’ Camp Eagle: Ist Battalion (Air-
mobile), SOlst Airborne Infantry, 101st Airborne Division, March 1, 1969.
Available in Museum, Ft. Campbell, Ky.

Commander in Chief, Pacific. Report on War in Viet-Nam. Washington: Govern-

ment Printing Office, 1968.
“Cordon and Search Operations.» Danang: III Marine Amphibious Force,
November 28, 1968. Available in Museum, Ft. Campbell, Ky.
‘Debrief of a CORDS Deputy Province Senior Advisor; Thua Thien and An
Xuyen Provinces; Vietnam; 1967-1968.’ Honolulu: Asia Training Center,
UH/AID, no. 9682, undated. Available in University of Hawaii Library.
‘Disposition of Province Police.’’ Hue: PSD form 334-15, July and October,
1966, in “‘Thua Thien, Weekly and Monthly Report, 1966.’ Available in
folder 35, box 17, no. 71A—5365, Center of Military History, Dept. of the
Army, Washington, D.C.
‘‘Documentation on the Viet-Nam Agreement.’’ Washington: Office of Media
Services, Bureau of Public Affairs, U.S. Department of State, 1973.
‘*Economic Impact of 101st Abn Div (Ambl).’’ Camp Eagle: 101st Airborne Divi-
sion, October 14, 1970. Available in Museum, Ft. Campbell, Ky.
“Fact Sheet on the Combined Action Force.’ Danang: III} Marine Amphibious
Force, March 31, 1970. Available in Historical Branch, Headquarters, U.S.
Marine Corps, Washington, D.C.
220 =| Village at War

‘Father Chan Tin’s View of ‘Political Prisoners’: A Case Study of Militancy

Overriding Objectivity.’ Saigon: Dept. of State Airgram, December 26, 1973.
Available through the Dept. of State, Washington, D.C.
‘“G-5 Activities.”’ Camp Eagle: AC of S, G-5, 101st Airborne Division, 1969-1970.
Available in Museum, Ft. Campbell, Ky.
Hearings, Mutual Development and Cooperation Act of 1973. Washington, D.C.:
Government Printing Office, Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. House of
Representatives, 93rd Congress, Ist session, 1973.
‘Leverage Policy Statement.’ Saigon: COMUSMACV memo, MACCORDS-PP
to Senior Advisor, I CTZ, January 30, 1968. Available at National Records
Center, Suitland, Maryland: no. P & P 0642-67; (CORDS 149), 1/49:23-4,
71A7502.
The Marines In Vietnam, 1954-1973: An Anthology and Annotated Bibliography.
Washington: History & Museums Division, Headquarters, U.S. Marine
Corps, 1974.
McCarthy, Francis. The Civil Service System of the Republic of Viet-Nam; A
Description and Assessment. Saigon: U.S.A.1.D., 1969. Available in East-
West Resource Systems Institute Library, Honolulu.
‘*101st Airborne Division Press Release.’ Camp Eagle: 101st Airborne Division,
1970-1971. Available in Museum, Ft. Campbell, Ky.
‘“One Year Later... The Rebirth of Hue.’’ Saigon: Vietnam Feature Service,
U.S. Information Service, [1969]. Available in Museum, Ft. Campbell, Ky.
‘*Operational Notes Number 7.’’ Camp Eagle: 101st Airborne Division, Novem-
ber 10, 1969. Available in Museum, Ft. Campbell, Ky.
‘*Operations Note Number 10—Field Expedient Target Locator.’’ Camp Eagle:
101st Airborne Division, April 1, 1970. Available in Museum, Ft. Campbell,
Ky.

‘Province Report, Department of the Army, Thua Thien Province, ICTZ, MACV
Advisory Team 18, APO 96258.’ Hue: C.O.R.D.S., 1967-1973. Available in
Center of Military History, Department of the Army, Washington, D.C.
“Rating of GYN Officials—I CTZ: 1968.’’ Danang: C.O.R.D.S., 1968. Available
in folder 1, box 9, no. 71A9237; 19/75:45-3, Center of Military History, De-
partment of the Army, Washington, D.C.

“Report for Month Ending . .”’ Hue: U.S.A.I.D. Reports Officer, 1966. Avail-
able in **Thua Thien Papers, 1966,’ folder 10, box 10, Center of Military
History, Department of the Army, Washington, D.C.
‘Senior Officer's Debriefing Report.’’ Camp Eagle: 101st Airborne Division, May
11, 1970. Available in Museum, Ft. Campbell, Ky.
“Significant Activity Since January 1970.’’ Camp Eagle: 101st Airborne Division,
1970. Available in Museum, Ft. Campbell, Ky.

Sloan, T. for Mr. Cross. *‘Methods of Leverage on G.V.N. Officials.’’ Danang:

Deputy for CORDS/III Marine Amphibious Force, undated. Available at Na-
tional Records Center, Suitland, Maryland, no. CORDS-159, 1/49:23-4,
71A7502.
 ~
Bibliography | 221
“Special Intelligence Study NR33-68 on the Hue Tet Offensive ...’’ Camp
Eagle: 101st Airborne Division, December 29, 1968. Available in Museum,
Ft. Campbell, Ky.
‘Special Report on Senatorial Election.’ Hue: Chief, PDD/CORDS, June, 1970.
Available in Museum, Ft. Campbell, Ky.
“Status of Police Personnel.’ Hue: PSD form 334-1, October, 1966, in ‘‘Thua
Thien, Weekly and Monthly Report, 1966.°° Available in folder 35, box 17,
no. 71A-5365, Center of Military History, Dept. of the Army, Washington,
IDC.
“Synopsis of the Battle of Hue.’ Camp Eagle: 101st Airborne Division, January
10, 1969. Available in Museum, Ft. Campbell, Ky.
“Thua Thien—Terrorist Activity, 1967-1968.’ Danang: U.S.A.I.D., Public
Safety Division, undated. Available in folder 60, box 19, 19/66:23-7, 71A5365,
Center of Military History, Dept. of the Army, Washington, D.C.
“U.S. Marine Corps Civic Action Effort in Vietnam; March 1965—March 1966.”
Washington, D.C.: Historical Branch, Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps,
1968.
“U.S. Marine Corps Civic Action Effort in Vietnam; April 1966—April 1967.”
Washington, D.C.: Historical Branch, Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps,
1970.

5. Serials and Important Articles.

A. Serials.
Daily Report; Asia & Pacific, 1965-1976. Springfield, Va.: National
Technical Information Service, Foreign Broadcast Information Service,
U.S. Dept. of Commerce.
Far Eastern Economic Review, 1971-1976. Hong Kong.

Honolulu Advertiser, 1975-1976. Honolulu.

Indochina Chronicle, 1973-1976. Berkeley.

Indochina Program Newsletter, 1976. Philadelphia: American Friends

Service Committee.
Miami Herald, 1975. Miamt.
Newsday, 1975. Long Island, New York.

Newsweek, 1973. New York.

New York Times, 1960-1979. New York.

Rendezvous With Destiny, 1969-1971. Camp Eagle: 101st Airborne Divi-

sion. Available in Museum, Ft. Campbell, Ky.
Screaming Eagie, 1970-1972. Greenville, Texas: 101st Airborne Division
Association. Available at the Public Affairs Office, Ft. Campbell, Ky.
Sunday Star Bulletin and Advertiser, 1976. Honolulu.

Vietnam Quarterly, 1976. Cambridge, Mass.

222 / Village at War
Important Articles.
Branfman, Fred. ‘‘Indochina: The Illusion of Withdrawal.’ Harper’s
Magazine, May, 1973.
Chomsky, Noam. ‘‘The Remaking of History.”” Ramparts Magazine re-
print (undated). Available through Indochina Program, American Friends
Service Committee, Philadelphia.
Huntington, Samuel. ‘‘The Bases of Accommodation.” Foreign Affairs,
July, 1968. .
Popkin, Samuel. *‘Corporatism and Colonialism; the Political Economy
of Rural Change in Vietnam.’’ Comparative Politics, April, 1976.
Race, Jeffrey. ‘Toward an Exchange Theory of Revolution.’ Peasant
Rebellion and Communist Revolution in Asia. John Lewis, ed. Stanford:
Stanford University Press, 1974.
Scott, James and Benedict Kerkvliet. *‘How Traditional Rural Patrons
Lose Legitimacy: A Theory With Special Reference to Southeast Asia.”
Cultures et Developpement, vol. 5, no. 3, 1973.
. “The Politics of Survival: Peasant Response to ‘Progress’ in
Southeast Asia.’ Journal of Southeast Asian Studies, September, 1973.
Serong, F. ‘‘The 1972 Easter Offensive.” Southeast Asian Perspectives,
Summer, 1974.
Szulc, Tad. ““How Kissinger Did It; Behind the Vietnam Cease-Fire
Agreement. Foreign Policy, Summer, 1974.
Terzani, Tiziano. *‘Vietnam: The First Year.’> New York Review of
Books, July 15, 1976.

Treaster, Joseph. *‘The Phoenix Murders.’ Penthouse, December, 1975.

Vien, Nguyen Khac. **Myths & Realities.’ Bulletin of Concerned Asian

Scholars, December, 1973.
 Index

A.K.—47, 121 Animism, 8

Abductions, 93, 188, 193, 204n. Annam, 17
Administrative Liberation Associa- Anti-American ideas, 97-98
tion, 79 Art, 14n.
Administrative Revolution, 184—
185 Bao Dai, 48, 59
Advisors, 150, 162-163, 182, 211n. Bastille Day, 49
Age, population, | Binh Family, 64-67, 112
Agreement of 1883, 17, 30n. Binh Tri Thien, 210
Agricultural Bank, 185 Black market, 136, 182
Agricultural development ‘*Boat people,’ 211
and Agricultural Bank, 185 Booby traps, 180n.
and I.R. rice, 151 Boyle, Richard, 148n.
mechanization for, 152-153 Braestrup, Peter, 132n.
and post-war regime, 210 Branfman, Fred, 201n.
vegetable production for, 4, 152 Bribes (see Corruption)
Airborne Division, 101st (see Camp Bridges, 12
Eagle) Browning, Frank and Dorothy
Ambushes, 58-60, 89, 121, 137-138 Forman, 148n.
America (see United States) Buddhism (see An Quang Bud-
American Consulate Representa- dhists; Struggle Movements)
tive, 182 Budgets, of families, 21
An Quang Buddhists, 8, 84, 88, Buttinger, Joseph, 9, 14n.-15n.,
193-9512 50157, 17-18, 30n., 46n., 47n., 63n.
Ancestor veneration, 8
Anh, Toan, 30n.-31n., 35), 2Per G.IA. xv. 172-173, 182,. 196
47n. C.O.R.D.S., 162-163

223
224 Village at War

CoS. téar gas, 138 Civil Guard, 86

Cambodia, 210 Civil Reserve Rear Force, 179n.
Camp Eagle Civil Servants
aberrations of, 139-140 and attitudes toward, 161-162
causes dislocation, 133, 138-139 and corruption, 21, 46, 151,
andCivicAction, 140, 142 161-162
civilian workers at, 135-136 Front attacks against, 188
combat activities of, 137-140 Front position on, 162
construction of, 133-134 in 1973-1974, 184
employment at, 168 in reeducation sessions, 208
facilities of, 134-135 statement on, 200
and Front, 142-147 ties to Viet Minh of, 34
guerrillas attack, 144-145 Clothing, 18, 21, 35, 82-83
impact of, 147 Cochinchina, 18
‘‘mad minutes” at, 138 Collins, Michael, 145, 147n.
morale problems at, 134-135 Combined Action Platoon, 118-
and Nevada Eagle operation, 120, 123-124, 130n., 167
140, (table) 141, 145 Commodity Import Program, 153-
services for, 136 154
show at, 135 Communal land
training function of, 134 amount of, 31n.
Vietnamese takeover of, 177 of Diem period, 75
Vietnamization efforts of, 174 distribution of, 20, 31n.
177, 180n. manipulation of, 35-36
Camp Gia Le, 177, 183, 194-195, percent of, 20
197-198 and protests, 61
(See also First Infantry Division) redistributed, 45, 209
Can, Ngo Dinh, 73 Communism, view of, 186
Can Lao, 76-77 (See also Front; Indochinese
Canals, 4, 12 Communist Party; Viet Minh)
Caputo, Philip, 1481. Consulate, American, 182
Catholics, 73-74, 94 Conversions, monetary, 13n.-14n.
Cease-fire war, 179, 181-193 Convoys, 58-59, 117, 134
Cells, 27=29, 31n., 33... 108,. 120, Cordier, Paul, 46n.
142, 146, 189, 207 Corruption
Chams, 9 of Agricultural Bank program,
Chieu Hoi, 114n., 142 185
Children in Army, 182
agricultural tasks of, 4 and civil servants, 21, 46, 151,
and ambush, 58, 60 161-162
enter Viet Minh, 51-52 and communal land, 21, 35-36,
and youth groups, 77-78, 208, 61
210 and councilmen, 19, 21, 30,
China, 210 35-36, 61, 75-76, 78, 161-162
Cho Vue. 17 of Diem period, 75-76, 78
Civic Action, 140, 142 and Government Army, 168-169
 Index | 225

and I.R. program, 151 Democratic Republic of Vietnam

and leaders, 26 (see Vietnam, North)
and leaving Vietnam, 211 Demonstrations
and People’s Anti-Corruption of An Quang Buddhists, 93-95
Movement, 190 of French period, 28
and Phoenix program, 172-173 of People’s Anti-Corruption
of police, 171 Movement, 190
statement on, 190 and Struggle Movements, 73,
and Viet Minh, 46 125-126, 132n., 172
in Village Self-Development Pro- Deserters, 103, 168-169
gram, 154-155 Diem, Ngo Dinh (see Diem Gov-
Corveée labor, 12 ernment)
Cosserat, H., 30n. Diem Government
Council Army of, 83-85
and Communists, 164 attitudes toward, 72
complaints to, 23-24 characterized, 72-73
composition of, 9, 20, 22, 34, created, 70
156-157 in Huevarea, 73
and corruption, 19, 21, 30, 35—36, intelligence nets of, 87-88
61, 75-76, 78, 161-162 officers of, 86-89
of Diem period, 74-78 operation of, 83-85
elections for, 35, 81n., 156-157, organizations of, 77-78
161, 193 supporters of, 73-74, 97
and land distribution, 20-21 Dinh ).445 552107, 158
in 1920s, 19 Dinh, Tran Van, 47n., 63n.
in 1940s, 34-36 Dispute resolution, 76
patron figures on, 22 Dong Khan, 18
protests to, 37 Draft, 167-169, 183, 190-191,
and taxes, 35 204n., 211
and Te. 57/ Drug abuse, 134, 176, 191
and tradesmen, 37-38 Du, Nguyen, 204n.
traditional, 9, 11 Due, Nguyen Huu, xvii, 205n.
and Village Self-Development Dung, Van Tien, 198, 204n.
Program, 154-155 Duong, Pham Cao, 31n.
C-rations, 117, 140 Dyke, Charles, 130n., 134-135,
Credit, 23,185 145, 148n., 174
Cult Committee, 7, 33, 44, 190
Cultural Center, American, 125 Easter Offensive, 177-179
Curry. Louis, 19) 3.1n- Economic development
and Agricultural Bank, 185
Dai Viet Party, 44 agricultural mechanization for,
Dang, Nghiem, 81n. 152-153
Dawson, Alan, 204n.-205n. and Commodity Import Pro-
Defoliation, 137, 146 gram, 153-154
Democracy Party, 161, 184 and Front, 155-156
Democratic centralism, 45 and I.R. rice, 151
226 | Village at War

Economic development (continued) FitzGerald, Frances, 15n., 113n.-

philosophy behind, 150 114n., 131n.
programs for, 150-155 Five men
vegetable production for, 152 conversations of, 25—26, 28
and Village Self-Development and Indochinese Communist
Program, 154-155, 165n. Party, 27-30
(See also Agricultural develop- introduced, 23-27
ment) uy tin of, 27
Economy Flags, 43, 192, 199, 207
monetization of, 20 Floods, 21, 36, 65, 210
in 1973-1974, 183 Folksongs, 4
under post-war regime, 209-211 Followers, 27, 187, 189
statement on, 190 Ford, Gerald R., 21 1n.
Education (see Schools) France
Elections and Bao Dai, 48, 59
for council, 156-157, 165n.-— bureaucracy of, 21
166n., 193 civil servants of, 19
and Democracy Party, 161 and commerce, 16-19
described, 156-158 and emperors, 18
of Diem period, 77 governing methods of, 18-20
and Front attacks, 131n., 193 and Japanese, 40
of 1967, 126 military activities of, 48-49,
of post-war period, 210 53-55
Employment and post-war period, 48-49,
at Camp Eagle, 135-136 53-56
changes in patterns of, 21 protectorate of, 17
in 1973-1974, 183 and training Vietnamese, 49
in post-war period, 210 and United States aid, 48
Enemies Front
of Front, 99-100, 124 and Buddhists, 93-94
of Viet Minh, 50-51 and Camp Eagle, 142-147
and Catholics, 94
Fall, Bernard, 49, 63n. cells of, 108
‘*Fall of the Capital,’ 18 on civil servants, 162
Families control by, 131n.
budgets of, 21 and control zone, 182-183
cases of, 64-69 and coup against Diem, 96
and cells, 207 desertions from, 114n.
financial help within, 23 and economic development,
and guerrillas, 72 155-156
in research, XVil founded, 79
and Viet Minh recruitment, 32 heroes of, 102-103
Farmers’ Committee, 45 in Huong Thuy, (table) 123
First Infantry Division, 128, 167- intelligence efforts of, 173-174
170, 178, 183-184, 194, 203n. leaders die, 120
Fishing, 4 and Marines, 119-122
 Index | 227

in 1973-1974, 183, 188 elections of, 77, 126, 131, 156—

operations reduced, 145-147 158, 161, 165-166n., 193
organizations of, 92, 107-108 and.H.E.S., 193
and people in, 103-105 Information Service of, 158-159
and political development, 158, military influence over, 184-185
162 morale problems of, 182
proselyting of, 80, 98-105, 146— police force of, 171-173
147 , and political development, 150,
recruitment for, 116 156-162
and religion, 93-94 Popular Forces of, 179n.
and ridicule, rumors, 92-93 provincial forces of, 167-169
strategy of, 95 security forces of, 167-177
and Struggle Movements, 125— (See also Advisors; Diem Gov-
126 ernment; Economic develop-
support for, 91-92, 98, 111-113, ment; Elections; Military ac-
143, 191-193 tivities; Thieu, Nguyen Van)
taxes for, 91-92, 104, 176, 188, Graves, 6-7, 12n., 133-134
192 Guerrillas (see Guerrilla warfare)
upgrades forces, 121-122 Guerrilla warfare
uprising call of, 198 abductions, 93, 188, 193, 204n.
and Vietnamization, 176-179 ambushes, 58-60, 89, 121
and village, 105-107 assassinations, 124, 131n., 195-
(See also Guerrilla warfare; Mili- 196
tary activities; Proselyting; attacks, 122-123, 143-145, 182-
Provisional Revolutionary 183, 188
Government; Tet Offensive) begins, 82
Fugas, 138 and Camp Eagle, 144-145
clothing for, 82-83
Garbage-pickers, 137 and Combined Action Platoon,
General Uprising, 104, 110, 113n., 119, 123-124
127-128, 198 eating utensils for, 83
Geneva Agreement, 70, 78, 87 and enemies, 52, 90, 124
Gia Le, 16-17 and height requirements, 51-52
Gia Le 5, 133-134 in Huong Thuy, 60-61, 83, 86,
Gia Long, 11, 15n. 115, 121-122, (table) 123, (ta-
Giap, Vo Nguyen, 47n., 71, 204n. ble) 144, 183, 194, 199
Gourou, Pierre, 21, 31n. and 1967 incidents, (table) 123
Government and 1968 incidents, (table) 144
and advisors, 162-163, 182 in 1968-1972, 144-145
apparatus disappears, 199, 201 in 1973-1974, 183, 188
Army units of, 167-170, 178 in 1975, 193-196, 198-199
Civil Reserve Rear Force of, origin of, 51
179n. people assist, 116-117
control estimated, 131n. and proselyting, 104
and economic development, punji sticks for, 89-90, 122, 128,
150-155 208
228 / Village at War

Guerrilla warfare (continued) refugees enter, 193-195

recruitment for, 116 refugees from, 196-198, 200,
sniping for, 52-53, 89, 121-122, 205n.
128, 131n., 144, 183 Hung, 89
and Tet Offensive, 126-129 Hung family, 111
training for, 51-52 Hunger, 18, 21, 42
tunnels for, 91, 122, 140-141, 184 Huong, Vu, 14n.
upgrading for, 121-122 Huong Thuy .
in Viet Minh period, 51-55, 58-61 advisors in, 162-163
and Vietnamization, 176-179 Agricultural Bank of, 185
weaknesses of, 120 guerrilla activity in, 60-61, 83,
weapons for, 82-83, 95n. 86,7 1155. 121=122< (table) 1237
and women, S51, 58, 120-121, (table) 144, 183, 194, 199
131n., 195 H.E.S. scores for, 203n.
Guns (see Weapons) land redistribution in, 209
location of, |
H.E.S., 143-144, 193, 203n. Newsletter, 158-159
Hai Van Pass, 197-198 police of, 179n.
Ham Nghi, 17-18 population of, 13n.
Hamlets, xvii, 9, (map) 10
Hammer, Ellen, 11, 15n., 19, 31n. I.C.P. (see Indochinese Communist
Han, Vo Luan, 13n. Party)
Hawail, University of, 12n. I-Re rice; 151, 165n:
Head tax, 19 Indochinese Communist Party
Helicopters, 117-118, 134, 139 cell of, 27-29, 31n., 33
Henry, Yves, 47n. and five men, 28-29, 31n.
Hickey, Gerald, 15n., 131n. influence of, 62
Highway One, names for, 1 literature of, 28
Hitler, 187 members of, 28
Ho Chi Minh, 43, 62, 70-71, 102- in Thua Thien/Hue, 28-29
103, 146-147, 188-189, 208 and Viet Minh, 33, 62
Ho Chi Minh Offensive, 193-201, Indochinese Democratic Front, 28
207 Information Service, 158-159, 209
Hoa Da Tay, 60-61 Informers, 88, 124-125, 173-174
Hoa My, 55 Intelligence networks
Hoi chanh, \14n. and Civic Action, 142
Homes, 1, 7 of Diem Government, 87-88
Hong Kong, 211 of Front, 173-174
Hope, Bob, 135 of Government, 87-89, 124-125,
Hue 142, 184
advisors in, 162-163 of Viet Minh, 34, 60
art of, 14n. Inter-family chiefs, 156-158
beauties of, 6 Irrigation, 4, 22, 153-154
French attack, 17
map of, xix Japan
people of, 6 aims in Vietnam of, 35
poems about, 6 and French, 35
 Index | 229

in 1944-1945, 42 Laos, 210

and post-war period, 44, 48 Le Doig
Johnson, Lyndon B., 115 Leaders
Joint Development Group, 13n. attitudes of, 185-187, 189
Jones, Robert III, 13n., 149n., 163, death of, 120
203n.—204n. defined, 26-27, 185-187, 189
examples of, 71
Kahin, George McT. and John W. and five men, 25-28
Lewis, 79, 81n. names for, 92
Kalb, Bernard and Marvin Kalb, of 1964-1967, 107
201n. of 1968-1972, 145-147
Kelling, Roger, 204n., 211n. of 1973-1974, 188
Khai Dinh, 164 and people, 187, 189
Khe, Kieu, 14n. and Te, 56-58, 70-71, 79
Khiem, Thai Van, 13n.-14n. and three young men, 33-34
Kuomintang, 48 of Viet Minh, 33-34, 40, 78
view of, 78
(See also Leadership)
Labbe, Jean-Claude, 194, 205n. Leadership, 26-27, 186-189
Labor Party, 101 Leaflets, 159, 176-178, 195, 198-
Laborers, corvée, 12 199
Lamb, Alastair, 11, 15n. Lewy, Guenter, 179n.
Land Liberation Army, 82
in Central Vietnam, 47n. Literacy classes
communal, 3, 20, 31n., 35-36, 45, of post-war regime, 209
Gl, 75, 209 of Viet Minh, 46
and Diem years, 74-75 Long, Ngo Vinh, 11, 15n., 18-19,
distribution of, 31n., 209 30n.—31n., 46n.—47n.
Front policy on, 109 Looting, 84-85, 89, 175, 177, 179n.,
manipulation of, 24, 30 194, 197, 207
of name groupings, 14n., 31n.
in 1940s, 37 McAlister, John, 47n.
ownership of, 20-21, 36, 209 McTaggart, Arthur, 21 In.
pressure to sell, 20 ‘‘Mad minutes,’ 138
redistribution of, 209 Malaysia, 211
rent increases for, 36 Mandarinate, 9, 17-19, 26, 187
Landholders, large Maps
attack upon, 100 of Hue area, xix
and Binh land, 66 of village, 2, 10
Front warnings to, 90 Marine Corps
holdings of, 37 advisor quoted, 150
manipulation by, 37 arrival in province, 97, 115
as supporters of French, 37-38 and Civic Action, 140
and tenants, 20 and Combined Action Platoon,
wealth of, 37 118-120, 123-124, 130n., 167
(See also Land) and Front, 119-122
Landlords (see Landholders, large) helicopters of, 117-118
230 / Village at War

Marine Corps (continued) morale problems, 182

operations of, 115, 117-120 Nevada Eagle operation, 140,
reactions to, 130n. (table) 141, 145
Markets, 4, 12, 15n. in 1973-1974, 183-185
Martin, Earl, 21 1n. in 1975, 193-201, 207
Mau, 20 of North Vietnam Army, 97, 126,
Medicine, 18 149n., 177-178, 182-183, 193-
Meetings 201, 207-208
formal, 41 of People’s Self-defense Force,
of Front, 106-107, 120 170-171, 184, 191, 203n.
informal, 42, 108-109 of Popular Forces, 167-169,
of Information Service, 158-159 179n., 184
of new regime, 200-201 of provincial forces, 169-170,
of People’s Self-defense Force, 179n., 184
159-160 of Regional Forces, 167-169, 184
of Viet Minh, 41-42, 44-45, 50 sniping, 121-122, 128, 131n., 144,
Message-relay system, 12 183
Methodology, research, xili-xvi Tet Offensive, 126-129
Military activities of Third Division, 168, 178
ambushes, 58-60, 89, 121, 137- tunnels, 91, 122, 140-141, 184
138 of Viet Minh, 51-55, 58-61
assassinations, 124, 131, 195-196 Vietnamization, 174-179, 180n.
casualties, 180n. (See also Camp Eagle)
Civic Action, 140, 142 Military Management Committee,
of Civil Reserve Rear Force, 207
179n. Militia, 86
of Combined Action Platoon, Mines, 95n.
118-120 Minh, 24, 28-29, 79
of Diem forces, 83-86 Minh, Sergeant, 88-89
and draft, 167-169, 183, 190-191, Minh Mang, 164
204n., 211 Ministry of Colonies, 18
of First Infantry Division, 128, Mo Tau, 190
167-170, 178, 183-184, 194, Money, 13n.-14n.
203n. Moneylenders, 21, 38, 46, 66
of France, 48-49, 53-55 Morale problems, 182
guerrilla attacks, 122-123, 143- Morrison, Norman, 103
145, 182-183, 188 Mung, Nguyen Van, 14n.-15n.
(See also Guerrilla warfare) My Thuy, xi
of helicopters, 117-118, 134, 139 My Thuy Phuong
in Huong Thuy, 60-61, 83, 86, area of, |
115, 121-122, (table) 123, (ta- as atypical village, xiv
ble) 144, 183, 194, 199 color of, 3
‘‘Mad minutes,’ 138 homes of, |
of Marine Corps, 115, 117-120, location of, 1
123-124, 130n., 167 maps of, 2, 10
of militia, 86 name of, xiii
 Index / 231

population of, 1, 13n. Patrols, 174-175, 184

settlement of, 9 Patron-client ties
soil types of, 13n. changes in, 22, 33, 74
topography of, 13n. examples of, 21-22
Pentagon Papers, 81n., 97, 113n.
Name groupings People’s Anti-Corruption Move-
land of, 14n., 31n. ment, 190
shrines of, 7 ‘ Péople's Army. 51,55, 60) 70
National Liberation Front (see People’s Committee, 43
Front) People’s Congress, 208-209
Nationalism, 50 People’s Revolutionary Commit-
Nationalist Party, 44 tee, 13245-2007,
Nevada Eagle operation, 140, (ta- People’s Revolutionary Party, 79,
ble) 141, 145 O27 1015, 108) 120; 1425183
New economic zones, 210 People’s Self-defense Force, 159-
Newspapers, 28, 41, 208-209 160, 170-171, 184, 191, 203n.
Nghi, 24, 39-40 People’s Village Assembly, 44-46
Ngu Binh, 6 Perfume River, 6, 17, 49
Nixon, Richard M., 174, 187 Perimeter, 53, 137-138, 183-184
Noncooperation, 50-51, 105, 146, Personalist Labor Party, 76-77
170 Phoenix program, 172-173
North Vietnam (see Vietnam, Phu Bai, 115, 136, 183
North) Phu Thu, 115, 194
Notables, 9, 11 Phuoc, 87-88
Phuong, Tran, 31n.
Oberdorfer, Don, 132n. Phuong Hoang, 172-173
Occupational profile, 4-6 Pike, Douglas, 47n., 63n., 70, 81n.,
Officers 95n., 108, 113n.-114n., 130n.,
corruption by, 168 U3277l49ne 2 ons
desertion of, 197 Police
of Diem period, 86-89 assassination of, 195-196
and reeducation, 208 colonial, 24, 26, 37, 41, 50-S1
and Vietnamization, 175 under Diem, 75, 85-86
Operation Nevada Eagle, 140, (ta- functions of, 171-173
ble) 141, 145 guerrillas pose as, 121
of Huong Thuy, 179n.
Pagoda in 1940s, 36-37
description of, 8 in 1973-1974, 184
groups of, 23 operations of, 171-172
Thien Mu, 6 and taxes, 37, 75
(See also An Quang Buddhists) Political development
Paris, Camille, 16-17 aims of, 150
Paris agreement, 181-182, 188, Front response to, 158, 162
191-192 programs detailed, 156-162
Partition, national, 70, 87, 181 (See also Elections)
Party cell (see Cells) Popkin, Samuel, 31n.
232 | Village at War

Popular Forces, 167-169, 179n., Punji sticks, 89-91, 122, 128, 208
184 Purges, 62
Population
age of, | Radio broadcasts, 80-81n., 127,
growth of, 23 146-147, 178, 192, 197-198,
Size(Ot, A, 1Sriz 210
Porter, Gareth, 132n., 201In. Rainfall, 3, 13n.
Prison, 265 172=173 Rape, 49, 139
Procolonial group Reeducation, 208
cooperative ties within, 39 Refugees, 177, 193-200, 205n., 207,
cultural ties within, 39-40 2M
(See also Council; Landholders, Regional Forces, 167-169, 184
large; Tradesmen) Religion
Proselyting and ancestor veneration, 8
by Front and animism, 8
messages, 98-105 (See also An Quang Buddhists;
in 1968-1972, 146-147 Catholics)
on Paris agreement, 188 Rents
on people, 103-105 cause dissatisfaction, 57
on Struggle Movements, 125 increases in, 20
during Tet attacks, 127 lowered, 45, 61
on United States, 97-98 Republic of Vietnam (see Diem
on Vietnamization, 176-177 Government; Government)
by Government Republican Youth, 77-78
through Information Service, Research
158-159 methodology in, xili-xvi
by militia members, 159-160 values in, XVi-XVii
in schools, 160 Resistance (see Viet Minh)
by post-war regime, 207-209 Resistance Committee, 48
by Viet Minh, 41-43, 50, 61- Revolution
62 messages on, 98-99
Prostitutes, 135, 148n., 169 (See also Front; Guerrilla war-
Protectorate, 17 fare; Provisional Revolution-
Provincial forces, 167-169, 179n., ary Government: Viet Minh;
184 Vietnam, North)
Provincial Reconnaissance Unit Rice production
(Pea e173 for Central Vietnam, 210
Provisional Revolutionary Gov- cycle of, 3
ernment in Huong Thuy, 13n.
currency of, 209 and I.R. rice, 151, 165n.
economic activity under, 209- in village, 13n.
210 Riceland
organizations of, 207-208, 210 area of, 3
proselyting by, 208-209 rental of, 22
and reeducation, 208 (See also Agricultural develop-
Pumps, 4, 153 ment; Rice production)
 Index | 238

Rose, Dale, 81n. Stireté, 36

Rumors, 51, 93 Szulc, Tad, 201n.

NGO, A, Sila, Taboulet, Georges, 30n.

Schools, 9, 12, 23, 39, 140-141, “Tale of Kieu,’ 190-191
150, 160-161, 199, 208-209 Tanville, George, 122
Self-criticism, 107 Task Force X-Ray, 115, 118, 122
Self-defense Force (see People’s Taxes
Self-defense Force) collection of, 35—37
Self-help groups and councilmen, 35
and Binh family, 65 for French, 19-20, 35-36, 46n.
discouraged, 54-55 for Front, 91-92, 104, 176, 188,
examples of, 22-23 192
Serong, F. P., 180n. and police, 37, 75
Service occupations, 5 traditional, 11
Shaplen, Robert, 113n., 131n. for Viet Minh, 59-60
Shrines, 7-8 Viet Minh reform of, 46
Snepp, Frank, 196, 204n. Tay Son Movement
Sniping, 52-53, 89, 121-122, 128: history of, 11
131n., 144, 183 legacy of, 12
Social change Te, 56-58, 70-71, 79
and Camp Eagle, 135-137 Tear gas, 138
under France, 19-23, 54-55 Tertrais, Hughes, 213n.
under Front, 105-107 Terzani, Tiziano, 206n., 213n.
and military operations, 54-SS, Tet Mau Than (see Tet Offensive)
135-137 Tet Offensive
and patron-client ties, 22, 33, attitudes after, 129
74 and Government collapse, 127-
under post-war regime, 209-211 128
and self-help groups, 54-55, 65 impact of, 127-129
under Viet Minh, 33, 45-46 preparations for, 126
Socialist Republic of Vietnam, reactions to, 128-129
210-211 Textbooks, 160, 208
Soil, 13n. Thai, Nguyen, 8In.
Son, Pham Van, 132n. Thai, Nguyen Van, 14n.-15n.
Songs, 298 Thanh Lam, 16-17
South Vietnam (see Diem Gov- Thanh Thai, 18
ernment; Front; Government; The 24)-285.33
Provisional Revolutionary Thien Mu Pagoda, 6
Government) Thieu, Nguyen Van, 157-158, 161,
Soviet Union, 210 164, 172, 184, 190, 192, 196-
Spragens, John, 202n. 198, 200
Strategic hamlets, 73 Third Division, 168, 178
‘Street Without Joy,” 1, 49 Third Force, 182
Struggle Movements, 73, 125-126, Thomazi, Auguste, 30n.
132A 172 Three young men, 33-34
234 / Village at War

Thua Phu Prison, 26 Union of Soviet Socialist Repub-

Thua Thien lics, 210
advisors of, 150, 162-163, 182 United States
combined with other provinces, advisors of, 150, 162-163, 182,
210 211n.
map of, xix aid to France, 48
offensive of 1975 in, 193-200 Consulate Representative of, 182
population of, 137. Cultural Center of, 125, 211n.
post-war government of, 207 Front messages on, 98, 177
province chief of, xvii, 205n. and Paris agreement, 181-182
Thua Thien 230 operation, 171-172 Provisional Revolutionary Gov-
Thuan An, 200 ernment messages on, 208
Thuy Phu, 194 and Vietnamization, 174-177
Thuy Phuong, xiii, 75 (See also Camp Eagle; Marine
Thuy Thanh, 194 Corps)
Tony, 136 Uy tin
Tractor, 152-153 of Buddhist leaders, 94
Tradesmen defined, 27
as class, 20 statement on, 189
and Commodity Import Pro- of three young men, 34
gram, 153-154
and council, 37-38 Values, XVi-XVil
price manipulation by, 38 Vegetable production, 4, 152
profile of, 5 Vennema, Alje, 132n.
Trams, 12 Vial, Paulin, 19
Treaster, Joseph, 179n. Vien, Nguyen Khac, 9, 15n.,
Tri family, 67-69, 112-113 30n.-31n., 47n., 63n., 81n.,
Troi, Nguyen Van, 102 132n., 149n.. 180n.
Truoi Bridge, 199 Viet Cong (see Front; Guerrilla
Truong, 24, 28-30, 79 warfare; Provisional Rev-
Truong Chinh, 47n. olutionary Government)
Trung sisters, 9 Viet Minh
Thi, BS appeals of, 41, 43
Tu, Lieutenant, 89 direct attack of, 51-55, 58-61
Tu Duc, 14n. emergence of, 32-34
Tung, Thanh, 14n. enemies of, 50-51
Tunnels, 91, 122, 140-141, 184 and families, 32
flag of, 43
Uncommitted guerrillas of, 51-55, 58-61
in 1964-1967, 109-111 and Indochinese Communist
in 1968-1972, 143 PAarty.35, 62
pressure on, 91, 93 intelligence nets of, 34, 60
and research, xvi-xVil leaders of, 33-34, 40, 78
and Tet Offensive, 129 meetings of, 41-42, 44-45, 50
and Third Force, 182 messages of, 50, 62
and World War II period, 40 newspapers of, 41
 ~ Index | 285

noncooperation movement of, Vietnamization

50-51 and casualties, 180n.
and post-war period, 61-62 and Front, 176-179
proclaims independence, 43 illustrated, 174-177
proselyting of, 41-43, 50, 61-62 lessons of, 175-176
purges within, 62 Village chief
reaches for support, 34 assassinated, 124, 131n.
reaction to, 42-43 removed, 163
retreat of, 48 Selection of, 35
and rumors, 51 Village office, 161-162, 184
and social changes, 33, 45—46 Village Self-Development Program
strategy of, 49-50 budget of, 165n.
support for, 33-34, 40, 43 described, 154-155
targets of, 50-51 Front reaction to, 155
taxes for, 59-60 Vinh, Nguyen Van, 31n., 47n.
training of, 55 Vinh Loc, 194, 199
and World War II period, 40—43
Vietnam Water buffalo, 4, 18, 37-38, 58, 117,
Democratic Republic of (see 134, 155-156, 210
Vietnam, North) Watergate, 192
names for, 14n. Weapons
People’s Army of, 51, 55, 60, 70 black market in, 182
Provisional Revolutionary Gov- delivered by U.S., 182
ernment of, 207-210 of deserter, 103
Republic of (see Diem Govern- of French forces, 16, 53
ment; Government) of guerrillas, 82-83, 89-91, 95n.,
Socialist Republic of, 210-211 122, 128, 208
(See also Vietnamization) mines, 95n.
Vietnam, North of People’s Self-defense Force,
Army of 170-171, 184, 203n.
in Easter Offensive, 177-178 punji sticks, 89-91, 122, 128, 208
morale of, 149n. wooden, 82, 95n.
in 1973-1974, 182-183 Women
in 1975, 193-201, 207-208 in associations, 208
soldiers of, 208 of Gia Le, 160
in South, 97 in guerrilla force, 51, 58, 120-
and Tet attacks, 126 L, UBhges MOS)
and offensive of 1975, 193-201, in labor force, 168
207 tasks of, 3
training in, 70-72 Wood-gathering, 5, 65, 68, 190
view of, 186 Woodside, Alexander, 114n.
Vietnam, South (see Diem Gov-
‘ernment; Front; Provisional Youth
Revolutionary Government) groups for, 77-78, 208, 210
Vietnam People’s Army, 51, 55, 60, in Viet Minh, 46
70 (See also Children)
 About the book ~
_ VILLAGE AT WAR is a history of asmall Vietnamese village during the three
decades of the recent Indochina conflict. The story here is a compelling
One, perhaps all the more so because it is told from the perspective of the
participants, and often in their own words. Here are the voices of s
ters from both sides as well as the words and feelings of those who s
only to survive amidst the trauma, confusion, and cruelty of civil wa
is the story of a small village in a faraway country as related
villagers themselves to the young American who came to live among
in 1974 and stayed almost until the final collapse of the Saigon regi
the following year. .
As Eugene J. McCarthy's somber foreword suggests, this is a po
historical document which would be valuable if its only contributio
to acquaint us with a small village about which we would otherwi
ignorant VILLAGE AT WAR does more than this. however. It s
perhaps first and foremost. to remind us that for each and every p
misunderstanding there is an all too real and human price to be paid:
more, it tells us something about ourselves. the rich and powerful outs!
whose weapons. technology, and even willingness to expend our own lives
proved ee {0 save a government but more than ample to destroy a»
way of life :

Abou! the author

JAMES WALKER TRULLINGER JR was associated with the USAID in
Vietnam between 1968 and 1972 As a refugee officer, he helped establish
the Shoeshine Boys Foundation, a well-known social welfare project
Created to help Vietnam's most pathetic war victims, its homeless shoe-
shine boys. After enrolling as adoctoral candidate in political science at the
East-West Center in Honolulu, Hawaii, Trullinger returned to Vietnam in’
1974 to conduct the research which resulted in VILLAGEAT WAR. Since
receiving his doctorate from the University of Hawaii, Trullinger has served
aS _a Mayoral campaign consultant in New York City and, from 1977 to
1979, as Director of the Pear! S. Buck Foundation in Seoul, Korea. He is
_ presently living and working in New York, where he is establishing an art
gallery and import business |

rN ~

Cover Design: Dan Serrano 0-582-28181-4