Title

People vs Navarro

Case Decision Date

Defendants in U.S. v. Navarro are convicted for violating the Election Law by
falsely claiming property ownership, but the court rules in their favor, stating
that the assessed value of real estate is the determining factor for property
quali!cation of voters.

19 Phil. 134

[ G.R. No. 6160. March 21, 1911 ]

THE UNITED; STATES, PLAINTIFF AND APPELLEE, VS. DANIEL NAVARRO ET AL.,
DEFENDANTS AND APPELLANTS.

DECISION

CARSON, J.:

The appellants in this case were convicted in the court below of a violation of section 30 of
the Election Law (Act No. 1582), and each of them was sentenced to pay a !ne of P200 and
costs, to be extinguished at the rate of one day's imprisonment for each P2 of !ne and costs
remaining unpaid.

The evidence of record satisfactorily establishes that each of the appellants made oath,
before an election o"cer in the municipality of Piddig, in proceedings had in connection
with the general election held on the 2d day of November, 1909, that he owned real property
to the value of P500. The evidence further discloses that at the time none of these
appellants, except Daniel Navarro and Genaro Calixtro, owned property of the assessed
value of P500. Upon this evidence we think the court below properly convicted all of the
appellants except Daniel Navarro and Genaro Calixtro, but each of these defendants having
proven that he owned, at the time when he made oath to the value of his property, real estate
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 of the assessed value of more than P500, the judgment of conviction as to them should be
reversed.

It will be seen that the proof upon which the judgment of conviction rests is limited to
evidence touching the assessed value of the property owned by the person making oath that
he is a quali!ed voter. It has been suggested that, under the statute, the true test of the
quali!cation of a voter is the actual or market value of the real property owned by him and
not the assessed value thereof, so that proof that one is not the owner of real property of the
assessed value of P500 is not proof that he is lacking this quali!cation of a voter, in the
absence of further proof that he is not the owner of unassessed real property of the value of
P500, or that the assessed property owned by him is not of the actual or market value of
P500 whatever may be the amount for which it is assessed.
.
But while the statute does not in express terms declare that it is the ownership of property
of the assessed value of P500 which determines this quali!cation of a voter, nevertheless,
that such was the intention of the legislator becomes clear from an examination of the
immediate context of the provision of the statute de!ning the "property quali!cations" of
voters, and of the statute as a whole, keeping in mind the purpose and object sought to be
attained by the provisions of the statute generally, and particularly of those provisions
de!ning quali!cations and disquali!cations of voters and providing machinery whereby
persons entitled to vote may be secured in the exercise of that right, while any unlawful
attempt to vote is severely penalized.

In the !rst place this quali!cation is made immediately alternative to the quali!cation based
upon an annual payment of a !xed amount of the established taxes, both quali!cations
falling under a single head. This striking juxtaposition under one head or class of these
separate and distinct kinds of quali!cations at once suggests that in the mind of the
legislator there was some intimate relation which justi!ed their being thus bound together,
as it were, under one head. The liability for the payment of a substantial amount of "the
established taxes" at once sug- gests itself as the relation which must have been in the mind
of the legislator, and since taxes are collected upon "real property" in accordance with its
assessed Value, we think we are justi!ed in concluding that it was the intention of the
legislator to limit the grant of the voting franchise based upon ownership of real property to
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 owners of real property to the assessed value of P500.

Our conclusion that this is the true meaning to be given the language of this section of the
statute is reinforced by the fact that another section of the statute provides that "any person"
is disquali!ed from voting "who is delinquent in the payment of public taxes assessed since
August thirteenth, eighteen hundred and ninety-eight," this being the only disqualifying
provision based on the nonpayment of taxes. It is quite clear that this provision was directed
to the case of delinquency in the payment of land taxes as well as all other taxes, and it
would indeed be an anomaly if the failure to pay assessed land taxes would disqualify one
person, as a voter, while the possession of nonassessed real estate, whatever its value, could
be held as the sole and su"cient ground upon which another person may qualify as a voter.

Finally, the most super!cial examination of the statute as a whole discloses that many of its
most important provisions looking to the due administration of the law as a whole - that is to
say, as an election law - and especially those provisions intended to secure the purity of the
ballot box, would be in large measure defeated, if not rendered wholly abortive by any other
construction of the language of the provision under consideration than that which we give
it. We con!dently assert that, if a successful challenge of the right to vote, asserted by one
basing his claim on his alleged ownership of property of the value of P500, could only be
successfully maintained by proof that the real or market value of the land owned by him is
less than P500, then the task assigned by the law to the electoral boards, the registration
boards, the judges of elections, and other elective o"cers, as well as to the courts of the
Islands, could never be e"ciently and intelligently performed so as to secure practical
results within the limited time necessarily allowed to them for the.performance of their
respective duties in connection with elections, in the event of any general or even
considerable attack on the^purity of the ballot box by persons setting up an illegal claim of a
right to vote based on this property quali!cation. While on the other hand, such a
construction placed on the language of the statute, would place, for practical purposes,
almost arbitrary power in the hands of dishonest registration boards to harass honest voters
seeking registration based on their property quali!cation, and to deny their right of registry
on the pretense that the proof o#ered of the existence of such quali!cation is not
satisfactory.
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 When the language of a particular section of a statute admits of more than one construction,
that construction should be adopted which tends to give e#ect to the manifest purposes and
objects sought to be attained by the enactment of the statute as a whole; and a construction
should be rejected which would defeat or strongly tend to defeat the intention of the
Legislature as expressed in other sections of the same statute. Applying this rule in
construing the provision of the Election Law under consideration, we have no doubt that it
is the ownership of real property to the assessed value of F500, whatever may be the real or
market value thereof, which constitutes the quali!cation of voters prescribed in subsection
(b) section 13 of the Election Law.

The judgment of the court below, convicting and sentencing the appellants in this case, is
a"rmed as to all and each of them, except Daniel Navarro and Genaro Calixtro, with a
proportionate share of the costs of this instance against the appellants as to whom the
judgment is a"rmed, the provision for the extinguishment of the penalty and costs being
modi!ed, however, so as to exclude therefrom the amount of the costs and so as to !x the
rate of extinguishment at one day's imprisonment for each P2.50 of the !ne imposed.

The judgment convicting and sentencing Daniel Navarro and Genaro Calixtro is reversed
and those appellants are acquitted of the o#ense with which they are charged, with the costs
of both instances de o!cio as to them.

Arellano, C, J., Moreland and Trent, JJ., concur.