UNITED STATES

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

INTERIM STAFF REPORT: INVESTIGATING

THE STUNNING SECURITY FAILURES ON
JULY 13, 2024 IN BUTLER, PENNSYLVANIA

Prepared for

MEMBERS OF THE TASK FORCE

October 21, 2024
 TABLE OF CONTENTS

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY............................................................................................................. 4
OVERVIEW OF INVESTIGATION .............................................................................................. 6
TABLE OF PHASE ONE FINDINGS ............................................................................................ 7
OVERVIEW OF PHASE ONE FINDINGS ................................................................................. 10
Advance Planning Failures .................................................................................................... 10
Secure Perimeter Did Not Include the AGR Complex ......................................................... 11
Mismanaged Walkthrough .................................................................................................... 14
No Unified Briefing on July 13 ............................................................................................ 15
Lines of Sight Failures ............................................................................................................ 16
Local Tactical Team Positioning .......................................................................................... 16
Lines of Communication Failures ......................................................................................... 19
Separate Command Posts ...................................................................................................... 20
Connectivity, Capacity, and Interoperability Issues ............................................................. 23
Timeline of Crooks’ Movements............................................................................................ 25
Crooks Cases the Butler Farm Show .................................................................................... 25
Crooks Returns to the Property and Deploys a Drone .......................................................... 26
Law Enforcement Notices Crooks ........................................................................................ 26
Law Enforcement Photographs Crooks and Sees Rangefinder ............................................ 30
Secret Service, State, and Local Law Enforcement are Alerted ........................................... 34
Officers Respond to Search for Crooks ................................................................................ 38
Crooks Moves to AGR Roof................................................................................................. 39
Law Enforcement Sees Crooks is Armed ............................................................................. 42
Shots Fired ............................................................................................................................ 44
Local Officer Returns Fire and Secret Service Counter Sniper Neutralizes Crooks ............ 44
Ladder ................................................................................................................................... 46
Autopsy and Toxicology Findings ......................................................................................... 48

Page 2
NEXT STEPS................................................................................................................................ 51
APPENDIX I: SUMMARY OF RESOURCES ............................................................................ 52
State and Local Law Enforcement Entities .......................................................................... 52
Emergency Services Entities .................................................................................................. 53

Page 3
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
For the past two months, the Task Force on the Attempted Assassination of Donald
J. Trump (Task Force), led by Chairman Mike Kelly and Ranking Member Jason Crow,
has been investigating the stunning security failures that occurred at the Donald Trump
campaign rally on July 13, 2024, in Butler, Pennsylvania. The Task Force has obtained
information from an array of sources, including witnesses who testified at a Task Force
hearing on September 26, 2024; a series of briefings from the United States Secret Service
(USSS or Secret Service) and Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI); and 23 voluntary
transcribed witness interviews of state and local law enforcement officials. The Task Force
also obtained thousands of pages of documents in response to requests to federal, state, and
local agencies. Chairman Kelly also issued three subpoenas to obtain sensitive documents
from local agencies in Pennsylvania.

Although the findings in this report are preliminary, the information obtained during
the first phase of the Task Force’s investigation clearly shows a lack of planning and
coordination between the Secret Service and its law enforcement partners before the rally.
For instance, USSS did not give clear guidance to the relevant state and local agencies
about managing areas outside the secure event perimeter, and there was no joint meeting
on the day of the rally between USSS and all state and local law enforcement agencies
assisting USSS.

The information obtained by the Task Force also shows areas outside the secure
perimeter were recognized as security risks—specifically the adjacent American Glass
Research (AGR) property and building complex. Despite its proximity to a main road, clear
sight lines to the stage, and elevated position, the Secret Service placed the AGR complex
outside the secure perimeter for the event, meaning that the crowd that gathered there was
not screened by USSS or other law enforcement. The consequences of that decision were
compounded by the fact that state and local law enforcement posted near the complex did
not have complete visual coverage of the area. While there was a local sniper team inside
the AGR complex, they understood their assignment to be overwatch of the rally site—not
securing the AGR roof and property. Accordingly, the local sniper teams inside the AGR
complex had a narrow field of vision and were not positioned to monitor the areas where
the shooter, Thomas Matthew Crooks, was spotted on the afternoon of July 13.

Indeed, federal, state, and local law enforcement officers could have engaged
Thomas Matthew Crooks at several pivotal moments. Throughout the afternoon, as
Crooks’s behavior became increasingly suspicious, fragmented lines of communication
allowed Crooks to evade law enforcement and, eventually, climb on to the roof of the AGR

Page 4
complex and fire eight shots at the rally stage and crowd, killing a rally attendee and
injuring three others, including former President Trump. Crooks was neutralized by a
Secret Service counter sniper. A local law enforcement officer also returned fire at Crooks.
The autopsy shows Crooks died because of a single gunshot wound to the head.

Put simply, the evidence obtained by the Task Force to date shows the tragic and
shocking events of July 13 were preventable and should not have happened.

Page 5
OVERVIEW OF INVESTIGATION
On July 24, 2024, the U.S. House of Representatives passed House Resolution 1367
by a vote of 416-0. The resolution, introduced by Chairman Mike Kelly (R-PA), formally
established and empowered the Task Force with investigating the attempted assassination
of Donald J. Trump in Butler, Pennsylvania on July 13, 2024. The resolution required
House Committees to transfer relevant records to the Task Force within seven days, and
the Committees of jurisdiction that began investigations in the immediate aftermath of July
13 did so. The Task Force has since leveraged that information, and the investigative
authorities conferred by House Resolution 1367, to obtain evidence—on a voluntary basis
and in response to three subpoenas—from federal, state, and local agencies, including:

● Department of Homeland Security (DHS)

● U.S. Secret Service
● Department of Justice (DOJ)
● Federal Bureau of Investigation
● Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF)
● Pennsylvania State Police (PSP)
● Butler County Sheriff’s Office (Butler CSO)
● Butler Township Police Department (Butler Township)
● Butler County Department of Emergency Services (Butler EMS)
● Butler County Emergency Services Unit (Butler ESU)
● Butler County Office of the Coroner
● Beaver County Emergency Services Unit (Beaver ESU)
● Allegheny County Office of the Medical Examiner (ACOME)

On August 26, 2024, the Task Force conducted a site visit to Butler, Pennsylvania
and received a series of briefings from the relevant state and local agencies. The Task Force
subsequently conducted 23 transcribed interviews with witnesses from state and local
agencies, all of whom participated voluntarily.

In August and September, the Task Force received a series of classified and non-
classified briefings from senior Secret Service and FBI officials and obtained thousands of
pages of documents from those and other agencies.

On September 26, 2024, the Task Force held its first public hearing with witnesses
from state and local law enforcement agencies and medical examiners. The Task Force’s
work is ongoing, and all the findings presented in this report are preliminary.

Page 6
TABLE OF PHASE ONE FINDINGS
Finding 1
There was inadequate planning and coordination
before the rally on July 13, 2024.
There was no joint meeting between the Secret Service
(USSS), state police, and local law enforcement (LLE) on
the day of the rally. It remains unclear whether certain
assignments were communicated by the USSS to LLE
partners. USSS did not effectively verify responsibilities
were understood and being executed.
See, Advance Planning Failures, page 10

Finding 2
The AGR complex, and the surrounding area, were not
part of the secure perimeter.
Despite proximity to a main road, clear sight lines to the
stage, and its elevated overlook, the Secret Service placed
the AGR complex outside the secure perimeter for the
event, and the AGR complex was not otherwise secured.
See, Secure Perimeter Did Not Include the AGR Complex, page 11

Finding 3
Local sniper teams inside the AGR complex had a
narrow field of vision and were not positioned to
monitor the AGR property.
The sniper teams in the AGR complex understood their
assignment to be limited to overwatch of the rally site,
rather than securing the AGR buildings, AGR roof or the
areas around the AGR complex.
See, Local Tactical Team Positioning, page 16

Page 7
 Finding 4
There was no unified command post to facilitate
communications between the Secret Service and its state
and local partners.
There were two command posts on the day of the event.
Though the Secret Service command post could have
accommodated more people, key local law enforcement
partners were in a separate trailer in a separate part of the
vast Butler Farm Show property, and there was no
dedicated radio link between law enforcement in the two
posts.
See, Separate Command Posts, page 20

Finding 5
Critical pieces of information about Crooks and the
escalating threat situation at the AGR complex moved
slowly due to fragmented lines of communication and
unclear chains of command on July 13.
Moments before Crooks fired, a local law enforcement
officer radioed that Crooks was on the roof with a gun.
There is no evidence, to date, that this information reached
the former President’s detail, and he remained on stage.
See, Timeline of Crooks’ Movements, page 25

Finding 6
Testimony from local law enforcement indicates that
they fired a shot at Crooks prior to the USSS sniper
firing the kill shot. While the exact order of shots remains
unclear, testimony from local law enforcement states that
they took a shot in Crooks’ direction, which may have
caused Crooks to stop firing.
See, Local Officer Returns Fire and Secret Service Counter Sniper Neutralizes Crooks, page 44

Page 8
 Finding 7
Crooks did not use a ladder to access the AGR roof.
Crooks did purchase a ladder on July 13, but he
subsequently abandoned that ladder in a wooded area in
Bethel Park, Pennsylvania. The ladder viewed in the widely
circulated photographs of the AGR complex was placed by
local law enforcement to access the roof after the
assassination attempt.
See, Ladder, page 45

Finding 8
The autopsy report indicates a single bullet killed
Crooks. The report indicates a single entry wound on the
upper left lip and a corresponding exit wound in the rear
neck area. The wounds are consistent with a high velocity
bullet from a distant range. There is no evidence of an entry
wound from a second bullet.
See, Autopsy and Toxicology Findings, page 48

Page 9
OVERVIEW OF PHASE ONE FINDINGS
At a Task Force hearing on September 26, 2024, Chairman Mike Kelly stated: “In
the days leading up to the rally, it was not a single mistake that allowed Crooks to
outmaneuver one of our country’s most elite group of security professionals. There were
security failures on multiple fronts.”1 Ranking Member Jason Crow added: “It is clear that
the Secret Service failed on July 13.”2 He continued, stating: “The Secret Service must be
expected to accomplish its zero-fail protection mission without any errors.”3

The majority staff’s preliminary findings from the first phase of the Task Force’s
investigation are broadly related to failures in advance planning (see Advance Planning
Failures, page 10); decisions about mitigating dangerous lines of sight and positioning
snipers and counter-snipers (see Lines of Sight Failures, page 16); and communications
during the rally (see Lines of Communication Failures, page 19).

Advance Planning Failures

There was inadequate planning and coordination

before the rally on July 13, 2024.
There was no joint meeting between the Secret Service
(USSS), state police, and local law enforcement (LLE) on
the day of the rally. It remains unclear whether certain
assignments were communicated by the USSS to LLE
partners. USSS did not effectively verify responsibilities
were understood and being executed.

Over the course of twelve days—from July 2 through July 13—the Secret Service’s
planning and coordination for the campaign event in Butler appears to have been
inadequate. According to USSS Acting Director Rowe, “the Secret Service did not give
clear guidance or direction to our local law enforcement partners.”4 Documents and

1
The Ongoing Investigation of the Butler, Pennsylvania Security Failure: The Secret Service’s Reliance on State
and Local Law Enforcement: Hearing Before the H. Task Force on the Attempted Assassination of Donald J.
Trump, 118th Cong. (Sept. 26, 2024) (statement of Mike Kelly, Chairman, H. Task Force on the Attempted
Assassination of Donald J. Trump).
2
118th. Cong. (Sept. 26, 2024) (statement of Jason Crow, Ranking Member, Task Force on the Attempted
Assasination of Donald J. Trump).
3
Id.
4
Eileen Sullivan & Kate Kelly, Communication Failures Plagued Deadly Trump Rally, Secret Service Finds, N.Y.
TIMES (Oct. 9, 2024).

Page 10
testimony obtained by the Task Force show that scattered meetings, vague instructions,
and unclear chains of command caused confusion about the division of responsibilities—
especially for local and state officers.

On July 2, the former President’s USSS detail (DTD) notified the USSS Pittsburgh
field office of a potential campaign event on July 13.5 The USSS DTD confirmed the event
date on July 3 and the USSS assigned a Lead Advance Agent the same day. 6 The USSS
DTD confirmed the event location on July 4.7

Secure Perimeter Did Not Include the AGR Complex

The AGR complex, and the surrounding area, were not

part of the secure perimeter.
Despite proximity to a main road, clear sight lines to the
stage, and its elevated overlook, the Secret Service placed
the AGR complex outside the secure perimeter for the
event, and the AGR complex was not otherwise secured.

On July 8, USSS personnel, campaign staff, and Butler Farm Show staff walked the
Butler Farm Show grounds.8 Evidence obtained by the Task Force shows that during the
walkthrough, USSS personnel discussed with campaign staff how to implement line-of-
sight mitigation from the area where the stage would be constructed.9

Acting USSS Director Rowe testified to a joint Senate Committee hearing:

“Controlling high ground is something that’s a must for us whenever we go into a
location.”10 But the Secret Service designated the AGR complex, and the areas around the
AGR complex, outside of the secure perimeter, despite its proximity to a main road and
elevated positions from several areas on the property, including the rooftops. The USSS
failed to ensure the risks associated with the AGR property were addressed, both in terms
of lines of sight to the stage and as an attractive area for crowds to gather.

5
Production to Task Force, U.S. Secret Service, U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., Bates 001367 (2024) (on file with the
Task Force).
6
Id.
7
Id.
8
Id.
9
Production to Task Force, U.S. Secret Service, U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., Bates 000794 (2024) (on file with the
Task Force); Production to Task Force, U.S. Secret Service, U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., Bates 001367-001368
(2024) (on file with the Task Force).
10
Examination of the Security Failures Leading to the Assassination Attempt on Former President Trump: Joint
Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary and the S. Comm on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs,
118th Cong. (Jul. 30, 2024).

Page 11
 There is disagreement and confusion among the entities involved in planning for the
July 13 event as to who was responsible for ensuring the AGR complex was secure.
According to Pennsylvania State Police (PSP) Lieutenant John Herold, when the Secret
Service assigned posts during a walkthrough at the Butler Farm Show property on July 11,
the Secret Service did not request assets to be placed at the AGR complex, although PSP
had the resources to do so.11 The PSP understood from the Secret Service that the Butler
County Emergency Services Unit (Butler ESU) was responsible for the AGR complex. 12

According to the Secret Service, however, Lieutenant Herold advised the USSS on
July 9 that PSP had already spoken to the owner of the AGR property and “coordinated it
to be closed, locked, and posted.”13 The Task Force found that the AGR parking lot was in
fact closed to vehicle traffic, but a crowd gathered on the adjacent grassy area near the
chain link fence that marked the outer perimeter established by the Secret Service.
Onlookers in that area did not need to pass through the event’s magnetometers to see the
rally stage—despite being approximately 150 yards from where the former President was
speaking.

Drew Blasko, a patrolman with the Butler Township Police Department and an
assistant team leader with the Butler ESU sniper team, testified to the Task Force that he
shared his concerns about the AGR complex with the Secret Service on July 11. Patrolman
Blasko testified that he told the Secret Service his team did not have the manpower to post
officers around the AGR property, and that he asked the Secret Service for additional
officers to be posted there. According to Patrolman Blasko, the Secret Service said, “they
would take care of it.” In response to questions from Rep. Madeleine Dean during the Task
Force hearing on September 26, 2024, Patrolman Blasko testified:

REP. DEAN: Is it true that within minutes of joining the walk

through on the morning of the 11th, you shared
your concerns about AGR complex not being
secure? Again, here's the -- here's the rooftop
where Crooks was positioned and dies. And
shoots from and dies. You shared your concerns

11
John Herold, Penn. State Police Lieutenant, Recorded Administrative Interview Before Penn. State Police,
00:21:30 (Jul. 22, 2024) (on file with the Task Force).
12
Production to Task Force, PSP Response to Senate Committee on Homeland Sec. and Governmental Affairs –
Final 8.14.24, Penn. State Police, 37 (2024) (on file with the Task Force).
13
Production to Task Force, U.S. Secret Service, U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., Bates 000794-98 (2024) (on file
with the Task Force).

Page 12
 about the AGR complex with whom, and what
did you say?

BLASKO: I did share my concerns with the agents, from my

understanding, that were in charge of the site that
day. I explained to them that the snipers inside
that building were over watching the venue
itself, and that the whole area, specifically the
whole area leading up from the water tower, we
had no vantage point from. We could see part of
the building that was -- that Crooks was on, but
we had no access or line of sight, I should say, to
that area. And I asked the Secret Service
members that we do not have the additional
manpower to post anybody there. And I
requested additional people to be posted there so
there would be no access to those grounds.

REP. DEAN: And what response did you get?

BLASKO: That they would take care of it.

REP. DEAN: They would take care of it?

BLASKO: Yes.

REP. DEAN: And did you think that meant they would put it
within their secured perimeter?

BLASKO: Whether they put it within their secured

perimeter or they posted bodies, actual people
there, that was my expectation of what was going
to happen.14

14
The Ongoing Investigation of the Butler, Pennsylvania Security Failure: The Secret Service’s Reliance on State
and Local Law Enforcement: Hearing Before the H. Task Force on the Attempted Assassination of Donald J.
Trump, 118th Cong. (Sept. 26, 2024).

Page 13
Mismanaged Walkthrough

On July 11, at 1000, the USSS led a walkthrough with PSP and local EMS, fire, and
police at the Butler Farm Show.15 The walkthrough covered the rally stage and crowd area,
and the perimeter area along the fence that divides the Butler Farm Show property from
the AGR property. Witnesses who participated in the walkthrough told the Task Force it
was disorganized.16 Butler ESU Commander Ed Lenz testified to the Task Force that “there
was no structure to it. There was no, hey, let's all talk and figure out what we have to do.
It was really just a bunch of people sort of milling around the site” and “it did not seem
organized at all.”17

According to Acting Director Rowe, USSS personnel “assum[ed]” that local police
were going to adequately secure the AGR complex.18 Rowe stated, “there clearly was not
that follow up to make sure,” and any deficiencies “were never escalated up to the
supervisors to be able to resolve.”19

The evidence shows concerns about securing the AGR property were discussed
during the July 11 walkthrough, but those concerns were not meaningfully addressed.20 For
instance, Butler ESU Witness 4 testified to the Task Force that, during the walkthrough, a
Secret Service official “explained that there were to be uniformed officers in the area that
day [but] that didn't take place.”21 Butler Township Police Department (PD) Witness 1
similarly testified that the USSS did not provide any guidance as to whether or how to
secure the AGR property, even after Butler Township PD Witness 1 advised PSP that his
Department did not have enough manpower to station a car in the AGR parking lot during
the rally.22

15
Production to Task Force, U.S. Secret Service, U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., Bates 001368 (2024) (on file with
the Task Force).
16
Butler ESU Witness 1, Transcribed Interview Before the Task Force on the Attempted Assassination of Donald J.
Trump, 16-17 (Sept. 12, 2024) (on file with the Task Force); Edward Lenz, Butler ESU Commander, Transcribed
Interview Before the Task Force on the Attempted Assassination of Donald J. Trump, 33-34 (Sept. 12, 2024) (on file
with the Task Force).
17
Edward Lenz, Butler ESU Commander, Transcribed Interview Before the Task Force on the Attempted
Assassination of Donald J. Trump, 34 (Sept. 12, 2024) (on file with the Task Force).
18
Press Briefing, Ronald L. Rowe, Jr., Acting Dir., U.S. Secret Service, U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec. (Sept. 20,
2024).
19
Id.
20
See, e.g., Drew Blasko, Butler Township Police Dep’t Patrolman, Transcribed Interview Before the Task Force on
the Attempted Assassination of Donald J. Trump, 10 (Sept. 13, 2024) (on file with the Task Force).
21
Butler ESU Witness 4, Transcribed Interview Before the Task Force on the Attempted Assassination of Donald J.
Trump, 20 (Sept. 12, 2024) (on file with the Task Force).
22
Butler Township PD Witness 1, Transcribed Interview Before the Task Force on the Attempted Assassination of
Donald J. Trump, 27-28 (Sept. 6, 2024) (on file with the Task Force); John Herald, Penn. State Police Lieutenant,

Page 14
No Unified Briefing on July 13

On the morning of July 13—the day of the rally—Butler ESU led a briefing at
approximately 0915 with other tactical assets from across the region.23 Officers from the
Butler Township Police Department had a separate briefing at around 0930. 24 The Secret
Service did not participate in either briefing. Butler ESU Commander Lenz testified to the
Task Force: “When I arrived the day of the rally, I actually did not speak to anybody from
the Secret Service until I had to make a phone call to the Secret Service specific to a
possible threat that the 911 center received.”25

USSS held its own briefing at 1000 with USSS assets at the site. 26 USSS counter
snipers and LLE sniper assets spoke with each other following these briefings, but
witnesses testified to the Task Force that there was no broader briefing among USSS and
local or state partners, nor were they aware of an intent to hold such a briefing. In fact, a
PSP trooper who was assigned to the USSS Command Post for the rally was invited to the
1000 USSS briefing by one USSS agent, then subsequently asked to leave by another.27

The lack of a unified briefing on July 13 may have led to gaps in awareness among
state and local law enforcement partners as to who was stationed where, spheres of
responsibility, and expectations regarding communications during the day. For instance,
before the rally started, Butler County Sheriff’s Office (CSO) Witness 1 expressed concern
to Butler CSO Witness 3 about the fact that the AGR complex was outside the USSS secure
perimeter, with no law enforcement on or near the building, to which Butler CSO Witness
3 responded that “PSP has that covered.”28 Butler CSO Witness 1 was unaware that
personnel from the Butler and Beaver Emergency Services Units were inside an AGR

Recorded Administrative Interview Before Penn. State Police, 00:20:00 (Part 1), 00:12:27 (Part 2) (Jul. 22, 2024)
(on file with the Task Force).
23
Butler ESU Assist Request Timeline, Butler ESU, 3 (2024) (on file with the Task Force).; Edward Lenz, Butler
ESU Commander, Transcribed Interview Before the Task Force on the Attempted Assassination of Donald J.
Trump, 90-91 (Sept. 12, 2024) (on file with the Task Force).
24
Incident Report, Butler Township Polce Dep’t (2024) (on file with the Task Force); Butler Township PD Witness
1, Transcribed Interview Before the Task Force on the Attempted Assassination of Donald J. Trump, 23 (Sept. 6,
2024) (on file with the Task Force).
25
The Ongoing Investigation of the Butler, Pennsylvania Security Failure: The Secret Service’s Reliance on State
and Local Law Enforcement: Hearing Before the H. Task Force on the Attempted Assassination of Donald J.
Trump, 118th Cong. (Sept. 26, 2024).
26
BTPD 24-03435 Campaign Event, Butler Township Police Dep’t, 9 (2024) (on file with the Task Force);
Production to Task Force, U.S. Secret Service, U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., Bates 001369 (2024) (on file with the
Task Force).
27
PSP Witness 3, Recorded Administrative Interview Before Penn. State Police (Jul. 20, 2024) (on file with the
Task Force).
28
Butler CSO Witness 1, Transcribed Interview Before the Task Force on the Attempted Assassination of Donald J.
Trump, 19-21, 26, 65, 66 (Sept. 5, 2024) (on file with the Task Force).

Page 15
building— Butler CSO Witness 1 could not see them from an assigned post near the AGR
fence line.29

Lines of Sight Failures

The Task Force’s investigation found that Crooks had a clear line of sight to the
rally stage from his position on the AGR complex roof. At a Senate hearing on July 30,
2024, Acting Director Rowe stated that he visited the Butler Farm Show site and laid in
the same position as the shooter “to evaluate his line of sight.”30 He testified: “What I saw
made me ashamed. As a career law enforcement officer and a 25-year veteran with the
Secret Service, I cannot defend why that roof was not better secured.”31

Local Tactical Team Positioning

Local sniper teams inside the AGR complex had a

narrow field of vision and were not positioned to
monitor the AGR property.
The sniper teams in the AGR complex understood their
assignment to be limited to overwatch of the rally site,
rather than securing the AGR buildings, AGR roof or the
areas around the AGR complex.

Local law enforcement told the Task Force that the Secret Service did not give any
guidance to Butler ESU and Beaver ESU regarding the placement, role, and responsibilities
of their snipers on July 13, and that in the absence of any such guidance, they understood
their assignment to be overwatch of the rally venue.32 Edward Lenz, Commander for the
Butler ESU, testified to the Task Force that he was never asked to put a sniper team on top
of the roof of the AGR complex and that he never told USSS that he would. He testified to
the Task Force that his team “didn’t receive any direction from the Secret Service as far as

29
Butler CSO Witness 1, Transcribed Interview Before the Task Force on the Attempted Assassination of Donald J.
Trump, 19 (Sept. 5, 2024) (on file with the Task Force).
30
Examination of the Security Failures Leading to the Assassination Attempt on Former President Trump: Joint
Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary and the S. Comm on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs,
118th Cong. (Jul. 30, 2024) (testimony of Ronald L. Rowe, Jr., Acting Director, U.S. Secret Service, U.S. Dep’t of
Homeland Sec.).
31
Id.
32
Beaver ESU Witness 1, Transcribed Interview Before the Task Force on the Attempted Assassination of Donald J.
Trump, 15 (Sept. 11, 2024) (on file with the Task Force); Beaver ESU Witness 3, Transcribed Interview Before the
Task Force on the Attempted Assassination of Donald J. Trump, 15 (Sept. 11, 2024) (on file with the Task Force);
Butler ESU Witness 4, Transcribed Interview Before the Task Force on the Attempted Assassination of Donald J.
Trump, 20 (Sept. 12, 2024) (on file with the Task Force).

Page 16
how they wanted our sniper teams to deploy or what their actual mission would be. So, our
snipers, on our normal missions, they deploy more as marksman observers.”33

In response to questions by Rep. Mike Waltz, Commander Lenz testified that USSS
did not provide written guidance to the local sniper teams as to how to place their assets,
and former USSS Agent Patrick Sullivan stated that USSS should “absolutely” have
provided such guidance to their local law enforcement partners. They testified:

REP. WALTZ: And you never got any written guidance of how
many assets to put where?

LENZ: Correct. And -- and it was our decision to place

those snipers in that -- the second floor of that
AGR building. [Secret Service] were aware of
that -- certainly aware that they would be there,
but there was no feedback or guidance that they
-- they wanted them there or that they didn't want
them there, but really by not raising an
objection...

REP. WALTZ: Mr. Sullivan, should that guidance have been

provided, in your experience?

SULLIVAN: Absolutely. Absolutely, no question about it.34

Absent guidance to the contrary, and consistent with their typical role as “marksman
observers,” local ESU snipers positioned themselves inside the AGR complex, near
windows facing the Butler Farm Show property, to conduct overwatch of the rally stage
and crowd. The overwatch posture placed ESU personnel several feet back from the
windows, looking through scopes toward the rally stage and crowd—unable to easily see
the unsecured areas on the AGR property, including most of the rooftops of the AGR
complex and the areas directly below the windows.35

33
The Ongoing Investigation of the Butler, Pennsylvania Security Failure: The Secret Service’s Reliance on State
and Local Law Enforcement: Hearing Before the H. Task Force on the Attempted Assassination of Donald J.
Trump, 118th Cong. (Sept. 26, 2024) (Testimony of Edward Lenz, Butler ESU Commander).
34
The Ongoing Investigation of the Butler, Pennsylvania Security Failure: The Secret Service’s Reliance on State
and Local Law Enforcement: Hearing Before the H. Task Force on the Attempted Assassination of Donald J.
Trump, 118th Cong. (Sept. 26, 2024).
35
Butler ESU Witness 4, Transcribed Interview Before the Task Force on the Attempted Assassination of Donald J.
Trump, 20 (Sept. 12, 2024) (on file with the Task Force); Beaver ESU Witness 3, Transcribed Interview Before the
Task Force on the Attempted Assassination of Donald J. Trump, 15 (Sept. 11, 2024) (on file with the Task Force).

Page 17
 Image created by Beaver ESU36

The Butler ESU snipers offered other reasons for their placement in the AGR
complex, such as the fact that the building was outside the secure perimeter and thus
vulnerable to “360 degree exposure” to threats, and the extreme heat at the rally that day.37
The decision by Butler ESU leaders to position teams in the second story of the AGR
complex was also predicated in part on the expectation that the area around the AGR
complex would be covered by other law enforcement partners, mitigating the narrow field
of visibility from the sniper teams’ indoor position. Butler ESU Witness 1 testified to the

The extent to which Butler ESU or Beaver ESU personnel could have seen the roof if they had temporarily
positioned themselves against the windows in an effort to do so is unknown.
36
Production to Task Force, SKM_C250i24072423260, Beaver ESU, 1 (2024) (on file with the Task Force).
37
Butler ESU Witness 1, Transcribed Interview Before the Task Force on the Attempted Assassination of Donald J.
Trump, 45 (Sept. 12, 2024) (on file with the Task Force); Drew Blasko, Butler Township Police Dep’t Patrolman,
Transcribed Interview Before the Task Force on the Attempted Assassination of Donald J. Trump, 41 (Sept. 13,
2024) (on file with the Task Force).

Page 18
Task Force that he was not concerned that a threat could gain access to the roof because he
had “the understanding that […] it was covered and people would be around the building.38

Lines of Communication Failures

At the Task Force hearing on September 26, 2024, Ranking Member Jason Crow
stated: “The communication between the Secret Service and local and state partners was
disjointed and unclear.”39 The evidence shows that gaps in the lines of communication
between and among the agencies responsible for securing the rally were a major
contributing factor to the failures that allowed Crooks to fire eight shots from the roof of
an AGR complex.

Leading up to the rally, information about Crooks began circulating by radio and
text message between state and local law enforcement. Whether any of this information
reached the former President’s detail is unclear. Secret Service records show that
information about a suspicious person—Crooks—at the AGR property did not reach the
Secret Service command post until about 1751.40 By then, Crooks had been under scrutiny
by the Secret Service’s state and local partners for approximately 40 minutes.

38
Butler ESU Witness 1, Transcribed Interview Before the Task Force on the Attempted Assassination of Donald J.
Trump, 45 (Sept. 12, 2024) (on file with the Task Force); Drew Blasko, Butler Township Police Dep’t Patrolman,
Transcribed Interview Before the Task Force on the Attempted Assassination of Donald J. Trump, 41 (Sept. 13,
2024) (on file with the Task Force).
39
The Ongoing Investigation of the Butler, Pennsylvania Security Failure: The Secret Service’s Reliance on State
and Local Law Enforcement: Hearing Before the H. Task Force on the Attempted Assassination of Donald J.
Trump, 118th Cong. (Sept. 26, 2024).
40
Production to Task Force, U.S. Secret Service, U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., Bates 001370 (2024) (on file with
the Task Force).

Page 19
Separate Command Posts

There was no unified command post to facilitate

communications between the Secret Service and its state
and local partners.
There were two command posts on the day of the event.
Though the Secret Service command post could have
accommodated more people, key local law enforcement
partners were in a separate trailer in a separate part of the
vast Butler Farm Show property, and there was no
dedicated radio link between law enforcement in the two
posts.

On July 13, there were two command posts instead of one. The Secret Service
established a command post at the Butler Farm Show to function as a communications hub
during the rally. The only local government representative in the USSS command post was
from the Butler County Department of Emergency Services (Butler EMS)—that
representative, Butler EMS Witness 1, was focused on reports related to medical events
during the rally. Notably, local law enforcement was not represented in the Secret Service
command post. According to testimony from Butler ESU Commander Lenz, the lines of
communication for July 13 were not established in advance of the event.41

Meanwhile, representatives from local law enforcement partner agencies—

including those whose personnel first observed and engaged Crooks at the AGR property—
were in a separate trailer elsewhere on the property. There was no dedicated radio link
between law enforcement in the two posts, and cell connectivity issues further undermined
communication during the critical period when the threat posed by Crooks rapidly
escalated.

The USSS command post consisted of USSS personnel, one official from PSP, and
Butler EMS Witness 1. Butler Township PD Witness 1 testified that the Butler Police
Department was not invited to have a presence in the USSS command post.42

The local command post included local law enforcement entities (Butler ESU,
Butler Township, Butler County Sheriff, and Butler County EMS). The trailer was not

41
The Ongoing Investigation of the Butler, Pennsylvania Security Failure: The Secret Service’s Reliance on State
and Local Law Enforcement: Hearing Before the H. Task Force on the Attempted Assassination of Donald J.
Trump, 118th Cong. (Sept. 26, 2024).
42
Butler Township PD Witness 1, Transcribed Interview Before the Task Force on the Attempted Assassination of
Donald J. Trump, 16-17 (Sept. 6, 2024) (on file with the Task Force).

Page 20
well-suited to serve as a nexus for local communications due to high levels of background
noise and dividers that limited peer-to-peer communications.

During a transcribed interview, Butler CSO Witness 1 expressed concerns about the
communication set up on the July 13., Prior to the rally, Butler CSO Witness 1 told LLE
leadership: “We need to be able to talk to PSP. We need to be able to talk to Secret
Service.”43

Former USSS Agent Patrick Sullivan testified to the Task Force that it was “very
unusual” to have separate command posts during a visit. Sullivan stated:

Normally, there will be an overall command post for the entire

visit. Then each site will have what's called a security room,
where radio traffic pertinent to that individual site is controlled.
And the command post, the overall command post should be
the state, local police, Secret Service, and other federal partners

43
Butler CSO Witness 1, Transcribed Interview Before the Task Force on the Attempted Assassination of Donald J.
Trump, 80 (Sept. 5, 2024) (on file with the Task Force).

Page 21
 that may be assisting. So, this is very unusual that the way it
turned out here at this site.44

Butler ESU Commander Lenz testified to the Task Force that a unified command
post mitigates issues related to an influx of radio traffic. For the July 13 rally, as with
similar events, the federal, state and local teams used different radio channels. With a
unified command post, information shared on the respective channels flows into a
communications hub, where it can be relayed as appropriate. Lenz stated:

It's not feasible to have everybody communicate on the same

channel just because the amount of radio traffic. However, a
unified Command Post, as we're all taught in many different
FEMA classes, a unified Command Post solves that issue.45

Butler EMS Witness 1 was stationed in the USSS command post. Butler EMS
Witness 1 testified to the Task Force that he had not previously worked an assignment with
multiple command posts.46 According to Butler EMS Witness 1, whose duties that day
were not related to law enforcement, USSS requested only one representative from local
agencies in the USSS command post, and Butler EMS Witness 1 volunteered.47 Critically,
Butler EMS Witness 1 did not function as—and said that he did not understand himself to
be a liaison between—the USSS command post and the local command post. Butler EMS
Witness 1 testified that he did not hear local law enforcement communications regarding a
suspicious individual at any point during the July 13 event.48 According to Butler EMS
Witness 1, the command post had approximately thirty chairs, but only six people were at
fixed positions in the room that day.49

Butler County Sheriff’s Office (CSO) Witness 4 was stationed in the local command
post and assigned to monitor the Butler CSO channel on the radio. Butler CSO Witness 4
testified that he had never worked an assignment with multiple command posts before July

44
The Ongoing Investigation of the Butler, Pennsylvania Security Failure: The Secret Service’s Reliance on State
and Local Law Enforcement: Hearing Before the H. Task Force on the Attempted Assassination of Donald J.
Trump, 118th Cong. (Sept. 26, 2024).
45
The Ongoing Investigation of the Butler, Pennsylvania Security Failure: The Secret Service’s Reliance on State
and Local Law Enforcement: Hearing Before the H. Task Force on the Attempted Assassination of Donald J.
Trump, 118th Cong. (Sept. 26, 2024).
46
Butler EMS Witness 1, Transcribed Interview Before the Task Force on the Attempted Assassination of Donald J.
Trump, 91 (Sept. 5, 2024) (on file with the Task Force).
47
Id. at 18.
48
Id. at 71-72, 100.
49
Id. at 84.

Page 22
13.50 Butler CSO Witness 4 testified that he had trouble hearing anything besides his radio
channel because of the sound of the air conditioning in the trailer, and he stated that
physical dividers that separated him from others in the trailer interfered with his ability to
overhear voices and radio chatter.51 If he picked up information from the CSO channel that
needed to be shared with USSS, Butler CSO Witness 4 said that he would have had to
speak with the EMS representative in the local trailer who would relay it to Butler EMS
Witness 1 in the USSS command post, who could then relay the information to USSS.52

Connectivity, Capacity, and Interoperability Issues

In testimony to the Senate on July 30, 2024, Acting Director Rowe stated that a lack
of communications capacity and radio interoperability challenges allowed Crooks to evade
Secret Service detection. Acting Director Rowe stated that the Secret Service’s internal
review of the assassination attempt found an over-reliance on cell phones, instead of Secret
Service radio frequencies, to communicate vital information. Local law enforcement
officers, who searched for Crooks as his behavior on the AGR property became
increasingly suspicious before the rally, shared information “via mobile/cellular devices in
staggered or fragmented fashion” instead of through the Secret Service’s own network.
Rowe stated: “The failure of personnel to broadcast via radio the description of the
assailant, or vital information received from local law enforcement regarding a suspicious
individual on the roof of the AGR complex, to all federal personnel at the Butler site
inhibited the collective awareness of all Secret Service personnel.”53

The Task Force similarly found that the use of non-interoperable radios exacerbated
the absence of a unified command post that would have functioned as a central hub for all
radio communications. PSP, which served as a point of contact for several of the local
agencies that supported the Secret Service on July 13, used its own set of radio channels,
and there was no interoperability between the radios used by USSS, PSP, and the
supporting agencies such as Butler ESU, Beaver ESU, and Washington SWAT.54

50
Butler CSO Witness 4, Transcribed Interview Before the Task Force on the Attempted Assassination of Donald J.
Trump, 11 (Sept. 5, 2024) (on file with the Task Force).
51
Id. at 21-23.
52
Id. at 10-11, 24-25.
53
Press Briefing, Ronald L. Rowe, Jr., Acting Dir., U.S. Secret Service, U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec. (Sept. 20,
2024).
54
See, e.g., Edward Lenz, Butler ESU Commander, Transcribed Interview Before the Task Force on the Attempted
Assassination of Donald J. Trump, (Sept. 12, 2024) (on file with the Task Force); Beaver ESU Witness 3,
Transcribed Interview Before the Task Force on the Attempted Assassination of Donald J. Trump, 88 (Sept.11,
2024) (on file with the Task Force); John Herold, Penn. State Police Lieutenant, Recorded Administrative Interview
Before Penn. State Police (Jul. 22, 2024) (on file with Task Force).

Page 23
 Butler ESU officers attempted to address interoperability issues with Beaver ESU
and Washington SWAT by offering them Butler ESU radios. Beaver ESU and Washington
SWAT retrieved these radios.55 Further, representatives from local law enforcement
communicated in-person at the local command post.56

Butler ESU addressed interoperability with PSP by receiving a radio from PSP.
However, the PSP radio did not work well for reasons attributed to connectivity issues.57
Butler ESU Commander Lenz testified to the Task Force that “the radio reception for the
State Police system was very poor.”58

Butler ESU also attempted to address the lack of interoperability with USSS radios
by offering Butler ESU radios to Secret Service counter snipers. USSS counter snipers,
however, reportedly did not retrieve these radios. Lenz testified to the Task Force:

LENZ: So I had communicated with [USSS Agent 1].

He was going to stop and pick up a ESU radio
from our command post. And then also on the
day of the rally, when [USSS Agent 1] arrived,
he did a face-to-face meeting with our sniper
team leader, [Butler ESU Witness 6], and he
reminded him, hey, stop at the command trailer
and grab one of our radios.

TF STAFF: Okay.

LENZ: So I listed him as having a radio as I assumed he

was going to pick up a radio and be able to talk
to us.

TF STAFF: Did he ever pick up that radio?

LENZ: He did not.

55
See, e.g., Beaver ESU Witness 3, Transcribed Interview Before the Task Force on the Attempted Assassination of
Donald J. Trump (Sept. 11, 2024) (on file with the Task Force).
56
See, e.g., Butler CSO Witness 4, Transcribed Interview Before the Task Force on the Attempted Assassination of
Donald J. Trump (Sept. 5, 2024) (on file with the Task Force).
57
Edward Lenz, Butler ESU Commander, Transcribed Interview Before the Task Force on the Attempted
Assassination of Donald J. Trump, 133 (Sept. 12, 2024) (on file with the Task Force).
58
Id. Notably, there were several Secret Service agents paired with local and state law enforcement throughout the
rally which may have mitigated radio interoperability issues to some degree.

Page 24
Timeline of Crooks’ Movements

Critical pieces of information about Crooks and the

escalating threat situation at the AGR complex moved
slowly due to fragmented lines of communication and
unclear chains of command on July 13.
Moments before Crooks fired, a local law enforcement
officer radioed that Crooks was on the roof with a gun.
There is no evidence, to date, that this information reached
the former President’s detail, and he remained on stage.

The Task Force obtained information from the FBI and from witnesses affiliated
with state and local law enforcement agencies that details Crooks’ movements on July 13.
The evidence shows the various aforementioned issues—ineffective advance planning, a
poorly planned perimeter, and vulnerabilities related to lines of sight and lines of
communication—allowed Crooks to move around the AGR property for several hours
before climbing onto the roof and firing eight shots at the stage and crowd.

Crooks Cases the Butler Farm Show

On July 7, Crooks drove from his home in Bethel Park, Pennsylvania to the Butler
Farm Show grounds, and was there for about 20 minutes.59 FBI investigators later assessed
that Crooks was casing the area.

On July 13, according to a receipt found in Crooks’ pocket, he purchased a ladder

from Home Depot in Bethel Park at approximately 930. He then drove to the rally site and
arrived around 1000. He stayed about 70 minutes, then left the site. He drove back to Bethel
Park. According to the FBI, at approximately 1330, Crooks’ father gave him the firearm
that would later be used in the assassination attempt.60 The firearm was legally transferred
to Crooks by his father the year prior.61 Crooks told his father that he was going to a local

59
Briefing from Fed. Bureau of Investigation to Task Force Staff (Aug. 21, 2024) (notes on file with Task Force
Majority Staff).
60
Id.
61
Press Release, Investigative Updates on the Butler, Pennsylvania, Assassination Attempt, Fed. Bureau of
Investigation, U.S. Dep’t of Justice (Jul. 29, 2024).

Page 25
gun range, as he had done many times previously.62 Crooks then bought 50 rounds of
ammunition at Allegheny Arms & Gun Works at approximately 1354.63

Crooks Returns to the Property and Deploys a Drone

Crooks returned to Butler and arrived at the Butler Farm Show property at about
1545. At approximately 1550, Crooks flew a drone over the site for 11 minutes. 65 The
64

drone’s flight path would have positioned the drone’s cameras to show Crooks a view of
the stage and podium approximately 200 yards away. Members of local law enforcement
place Crooks in the vicinity of the AGR complex at or around 1626, but digital evidence
subsequently showed Crooks was in fact near the Farm Show air strip at that time, walking
past a row of vendors outside the secure perimeter approximately a half mile away from
the AGR property.66

Law Enforcement Notices Crooks

Three local law enforcement officers first noticed Crooks at approximately 1700.
These observations were made independently, and based upon each officer’s experience,
Crooks’s behavior and manner were suspicious. For instance, Butler ESU Witness 3, a
member of the Butler ESU Quick Response Force (QRF), saw Crooks in the 1630-1700
timeframe. Butler ESU Witness 3 was stationed inside the secure perimeter near the barns
behind the stage, but he was able to see Crooks as Butler ESU Witness 3 looked out toward
the AGR property. Butler ESU Witness 3 stated:

When I first observed him, he was seated on coincidentally the

concrete wall that he was photographed to be sitting on. He
came and went from that position multiple times. I - lack of a
better term is I identified this person as not paying attention to
the venue, not paying attention to anyone around him. He was
secluded off to himself where the crowds they were - anybody
else that was there was either trying to seek shade, they had

62
Press Release, Investigative Updates on the Butler, Pennsylvania, Assassination Attempt, Fed. Bureau of
Investigation, U.S. Dep’t of Justice (Jul. 29, 2024); Briefing from Fed. Bureau of Investigation to Task Force Staff
(Aug. 21, 2024) (notes on file with Task Force Majority Staff).
63
Briefing from Fed. Bureau of Investigation to Task Force Staff (Aug. 21, 2024) (notes on file with Task Force
Majority Staff).
64
Press Release, Investigative Updates on the Butler, Pennsylvania, Assassination Attempt, Fed. Bureau of
Investigation, U.S. Dep’t of Justice (Jul. 29, 2024).
65
FBI Update 8.23.24, Fed. Bureau of Investigation, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 23 (Aug. 28, 2024) (on file with the Task
Force).
66
Id.

Page 26
 maybe a lawn chair with them, they are dressed in a way that
would basically signify some form of participation in the rally.
A lot of them were up against the outer perimeter fence line.
And, again, one of these isolated individuals was drawn way
back to the corner of the AGR building, secluded, playing on
the phone.67

Butler ESU Witness 3 also observed Crooks looking at the sniper teams that were
positioned inside the AGR complex. Butler ESU Witness 3 testified:

I observed that [Crooks] was looking up at my sniper elements,

or what I believed he believed was our sniper elements,
because there was open windows -- well, as much as they could
open – and then, again, would kind of come and go. And it
really appeared to me that he had absolutely zero interest in
anything that was happening inside the fence.68

67
Butler ESU Witness 3, Transcribed Interview Before the Task Force on the Attempted Assassination of Donald J.
Trump, 86 (Sept. 13, 2024) (on file with the Task Force).
68
Id. at 87.

Page 27
 Image created by Beaver ESU69

Butler ESU Witness 4, a sniper from Butler ESU stationed inside the AGR complex,
similarly observed Crooks behaving suspiciously slightly prior to 1700. Butler ESU
Witness 4 testified to the Task Force:

What I observed Crooks doing was - to me he looked he stood

out. -He was walking around the grassy area between AGR
and the secondary fence line, kept looking up, looking at the
building. One point that is what raised my suspicion is he was
looking directly at the window I was positioned at.70 . . .
He, like I said, he looked up at the window I was positioned at
and kept looking at it. He walked directly towards the window
and underneath of it up against the building to the point where
I couldn't see him. That made me feel as though he was looking
or could -was potentially looking at the window to see if there

69
Production to Task Force, FPOTUS After Action, Beaver ESU, 8 (2024) (on file with the Task Force).
70
Butler ESU Witness 4, Transcribed Interview Before the Task Force on the Attempted Assassination of Donald J.
Trump, 31 (Sept. 12, 2024) (on file with the Task Force).

Page 28
 was somebody inside the building. And when he went up
against the building to where I couldn't look down on him, I
found that to be very suspicious.

Butler ESU Witness 4 testified that he then lost sight of Crooks, and approached Beaver
ESU Witness 3, a Beaver County Emergency Services Unit sniper also in the AGR
complex, to ask if he had seen someone matching that description. Butler ESU Witness 4
stated:

So what had happened was I had observed him. When he

disappeared along the lower edge of the building, I couldn't see
where he went any further. I walked over and spoke to [Beaver
ESU Witness 3], and I asked him if he had seen this individual.
And I described him with the long hair, gray T shirt, khaki
shorts. At that time [Beaver ESU Witness 3] had not observed
him.71

Finally, Beaver ESU Witness 3 stated that he first saw Crooks slightly after 1700. Beaver
ESU Witness 3 testified:

So I was kind of moving around the building a little bit on

binocular glass and doing the observation, and I had moved
from the room that I was in into the hallway and was standing
where [Beaver ESU Witness 1] was positioned prior [to his
departure from the site at 1619]. As I was just looking out at
the crowd, I noticed an individual that was walking pretty close
to the building, kind of looking up and down the building, and
just thought it was odd.72

Beaver ESU Witness 3 stated that he then lost sight of Crooks, but that Butler ESU Witness
4 saw him shortly thereafter and alerted Beaver ESU Witness 3. Beaver ESU Witness 3
confirmed with Butler ESU Witness 4 that they had seen the same individual by comparing
Crooks’s clothing and hair, and they both began to search for Crooks.

71
Id. at 34.
72
Beaver ESU Witness 3, Transcribed Interview Before the Task Force on the Attempted Assassination of Donald J.
Trump, 78 (Sept. 11, 2024) (on file with the Task Force).

Page 29
Law Enforcement Photographs Crooks and Sees Rangefinder

Soon thereafter, Beaver ESU Witness 3 saw Crooks again and took two photographs
of him. Beaver ESU Witness 3 (ESU 3, below) testified about the sequence of events:

ESU 3: And as I brought my binoculars down, I just

happened to look down and I was like, ‘There he
is.’ He was sitting directly below me.

TF STAFF: This is from the southwestern corner of that

second building?

ESU 3: Yes. And there is, like, a little wall that's about
two and a half, three feet high, and he was just
sitting on it. I'm like, ‘Well, there he is.’ So I
don't know why. Maybe the opportunity and
because he was so close. I'm like, I got my
phone. I just pulled out the picture. The first one
is the one of his back. That was the first picture
that I took. And then the second picture is the
one -- because I took the first one. I'm like,
‘Come on, man. Turn your head. Turn your
head.’ And then, finally, he turned, and then I
took that second one, which was the side view.73

Similarly, Butler ESU Witness 4 testified that Beaver ESU Witness 3 showed him the
photographs of Crooks, and Butler ESU Witness 4 identified him as the person he had seen
looking at the building. Butler ESU Witness 4 stated:

A short time [after Butler ESU Witness 4 first saw Crooks]

[Beaver ESU Witness 3] tells me that he does see the individual
I described. So I walk back over to [Beaver ESU Witness 3],
and at that point [Beaver ESU Witness 3] had showed me – he
had taken two photographs of Crooks. I identified him as that
was the individual I was describing earlier. At that time he was
sitting on the concrete wall at the southwestern edge of the
AGR complex that we were in scrolling through his phone.74

73
Beaver ESU Witness 3, Transcribed Interview Before the Task Force on the Attempted Assassination of Donald J.
Trump, 81 (Sept. 11, 2024) (on file with the Task Force).
74
Butler ESU Witness 4, Transcribed Interview Before the Task Force on the Attempted Assassination of Donald J.
Trump, 34 (Sept. 12, 2024) (on file with the Task Force).

Page 30
Butler ESU Witness 4 returned to his post, and at approximately 1710, Beaver ESU
Witness 3 yelled, “[Butler ESU Witness 4], he's out here again. He has a rangefinder.”75
Butler ESU Witness 4 stated that he encouraged Beaver ESU Witness 3 to notify local
law enforcement leadership, but it is not clear that either did so, although Butler ESU
Witness 4 did send a series of text messages to Butler ESU Witness 3 at 1715 that
included a description of Crooks. The final message stated: “He has a range finder.” 76
Butler ESU Witness 3 stated that he did not see those text messages until approximately
1740.77

Beaver ESU Witness 3 testified that he used his binoculars to observe Crooks and saw
him use a rangefinder. He stated:

I noticed he was on a cellphone, and I was sitting there with

binoculars. So I zoom in on his cellphone, and I could tell that
he's looking at news feeds. Which particular ones, I don't
know, but he he's scrolling through news feeds on his phone.
So then he takes his phone and he puts it in his pocket, and he
pulls out -- it's a rangefinder, but he pulls out a rangefinder and

75
Id. at 36. In his interview with the Task Force, Beaver ESU Witness 3 seemed to recall first seeing the rangefinder
several minutes later, perhaps after 5:30, but contemporaneous messages in possession of the Task Force that are
described in this report indicate that the rangefinder was known to Butler ESU Witness 4 no later than 5:15 PM,
suggesting that Beaver ESU Witness 3 had likely informed Butler ESU Witness 4 of the rangefinder by that time.
76
Id. at 61; Text messages received by Butler ESU Witness 4, sent by Beaver ESU Witness 3, on July 13 at 1715
(on file with the Task Force).
77
Butler ESU Witness 3, Transcribed Interview Before the Task Force on the Attempted Assassination of Donald J.
Trump, 84-85 (Sept. 13, 2024) (on file with the Task Force).

Page 31
 he starts looking. At first, I'm like -- I'm looking -- I'm like, is
this a rangefinder, or is that binoculars? So I grabbed my
binoculars and I zoomed in again, and I noticed -- I'm like that's
a rangefinder. So, you know, when I noticed him looking
through this rangefinder he was looking towards the stage and
kind of just in different areas, general areas, looking out but in
the direction of the stage. I was like, yeah, this is not right.78

Beaver ESU Witness 3 subsequently went to look for Crooks, moving around the AGR
second floor. Beaver ESU Witness 3 observed a bicycle and a backpack that seemed
suspicious, although the FBI subsequently confirmed those items did not belong to
Crooks.79 Beaver ESU Witness 3 stated that he photographed the bicycle and backpack at
approximately 1725. He testified:

So I went over there and was still looking around for this
individual, and I had noticed over across the property there was
a bike sitting there with a backpack and it was underneath the
tree. And just from moving around earlier in the day, I didn't
remember seeing that. So after seeing him and then after seeing
that, it was like, eh. I thought it was kind of strange, so I took
a picture of. 80

78
Beaver ESU Witness 3, Transcribed Interview Before the Task Force on the Attempted Assassination of Donald J.
Trump, 108 (Sept. 11, 2024) (on file with the Task Force).
79
Press Release, Investigative Updates on the Butler, Pennsylvania, Assassination Attempt, Fed. Bureau of
Investigation, U.S. Dep’t of Justice (Jul. 19, 2024).
80
Beaver ESU Witness 3, Transcribed Interview Before the Task Force on the Attempted Assassination of Donald J.
Trump, 101 (Sept.11, 2024) (on file with the Task Force).

Page 32
 During this period, Butler ESU Witness 3 had been conducting surveillance outside
the AGR complex with binoculars. Butler ESU Witness 3 observed Crooks moving in and
out of sight near the edges of the AGR complex. Butler ESU Witness 3 (ESU 3, below)
testified to the Task Force:

TF STAFF: Now, you said you occasionally lose sight of

him, he looked like he was going around the
building and then he would come back. At some
point you -- you did see the text messages with
the photos that were sent by [Butler ESU
Witness 4]; right?

ESU 3: Yeah. Prior to that, I received three text messages

from [Butler ESU Witness 4] inside the building,
and because he's -- we had a kind of a text back
and forth where he was kind of observing that I
was watching that area—

TF STAFF: Right.

ESU 3: -- with a set of binoculars –

TF STAFF: Right.

ESU 3: -- so these text messages returned and pretty

much were saying, ‘Are you watching this guy

Page 33
 up against our building? Long hair, gray T-shirt,
white shorts. He has a rangefinder.’

TF STAFF: Right.

ESU 3: So, obviously, as soon as I seen that series of

messages, I presume or know exactly who he is
referring to.81

Butler ESU Witness 4 testified that he continued to search for Crooks from 1715 to
approximately 1740. At approximately 1739, Butler ESU Witness 4 received a call from
Butler ESU Witness 3 in response to the text messages from Butler ESU Witness 4.82
Following this call, Butler ESU Witness 4 and Beaver ESU Witness 3 decided to report
their observations of Crooks to law enforcement leadership.

Secret Service, State, and Local Law Enforcement are Alerted

At 1738, Beaver ESU Witness 3 sent a text message along with the photographs of
Crooks to a group of local snipers. The message stated: “Kid learning [sic] around building
we are in. AGR I believe it is. I did see him with a rangefinder looking towards stage. FYI.
If you wanna notify SS snipers to look out. I lost sight of him. Also a bike with a backpack
sitting next to it in rear of building that was not seen earlier.” Beaver ESU Witness 3
testified that he meant to type “lurking” instead of “learning.”83

81
Butler ESU Witness 3, Transcribed Interview Before the Task Force on the Attempted Assassination of Donald J.
Trump, 93 (Sept. 13, 2024) (on file with the Task Force).
82
Phone screen capture from Butler ESU Witness 4, showing calls from Butler ESU Witness 3 on July 13 (on file
with the Task Force).
83
Beaver ESU Witness 3, Transcribed Interview Before the Task Force on the Attempted Assassination of Donald
J. Trump, 110 (Sept. 11, 2024) (on file with the Task Force).

Page 34
 Over the course of approximately 13 minutes, from 1738 to 1751, a series of calls
and messages about Crooks’s description and movements reached the Secret Service.

At 1738, Patrolman Blasko received the text message from Beaver ESU Witness 3
with the photos of Crooks. Patrolman Blasko subsequently shared information about the
suspicious individual with the Secret Service Agent stationed at his post.

At 1742, Butler ESU Witness 6 phoned a description of Crooks to Butler ESU

Commander Lenz in the local command post. Butler ESU Witness 6 gave Crooks’s
description, described his use of a rangefinder, and advised he was located near AGR at
that time.84 At 1744, Commander Lenz called PSP Witness 3, who was in the USSS
Command Post, to relay this information.85 PSP Witness 3 stated that he verbally
84
H. Comm. Overview Presentation, Butler ESU, 12 (2024) (on file with the Task Force).
85
PSP Witness 3, Recorded Administrative Interview Before Penn. State Police, 00:10:52 (Jul. 20, 2024) (on file
with the Task Force); H. Comm. Overview Presentation, Butler ESU, 13 (2024) (on file with the Task Force).

Page 35
communicated this information to USSS agents in the USSS Command Post while still on
the phone with Lenz.86 Lenz also stated that he heard
PSP Witness 3 immediately relay this information to others in the USSS Command Post
during their phone call.87

At 1745, Butler ESU Witness 6 raised his profile to the attention of the Secret
Service counter snipers via a text message to a USSS Counter Sniper Team Leader, USSS
Agent 1.88

At 1745, Commander Lenz stated on the OPS-4 radio channel—used by the ESU
sniper teams—that “PSP and Sheriffs should be en route,”89 although the extent to which
officers from those entities deployed at that time is unclear. At 1747, he received the
photographs of Crooks and forwarded them to PSP Witness 3; due to issues with cell
service, they did not immediately go through.90 PSP Witness 3 eventually received the
photographs of Crooks, and forwarded them at 1751 to a USSS Agent in the USSS
Command Post.91

Butler Township Police Department personnel may not have been present in the
local command post at that time, which may have impacted their awareness of this
information.92 There is also currently no evidence to suggest this information was relayed
to the USSS DTD agents near the stage, or to the USSS Agents in charge of rally security.
At the Task Force hearing, former USSS Agent Patrick Sullivan testified that:

What should have happened, in my opinion, is when the

suspicious person was identified, the detail leader and the shift
agent should have been told there's an issue we're working, a
suspicious person. And then at that point, it was probably --
probably would be inappropriate to remove the President from
the stage. But the detail leader should know there's an issue. I
may have to react quicker. So, at a minimum, when there's a

86
Id.
87
House Committee Overview Presentation, Butler ESU, 13 (2024) (on file with the Task Force).
88
Butler ESU Witness 6, Transcribed Interview Before the Task Force on the Attempted Assassination of Donald J.
Trump, 79 (Sept. 12, 2024) (on file with the Task Force); Production to Task Force, U.S. Secret Service, U.S. Dep’t
of Homeland Sec., Bates 001370 (2024) (on file with the Task Force).
89
Presidential Rally Radio Timeline 7-13-2024, Butler ESU, Sheet 2, Row 227 (2024) (on file with the Task Force).
90
H. Comm. Overview Presentation, Butler ESU, 13 (2024) (on file with the Task Force).
91
Production to Task Force, U.S. Secret Service, U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., Bates 001920-001921 (2024) (on
file with the Task Force).
92
Incident #24-03435, Incident Report, Butler Township Police Dep’t (2024) (on file with the Task Force).

Page 36
 suspicious person, the detail leader and the shift agent should
be told there's an issue.93

Shortly after the photos of Crooks circulated on the text message chain, Beaver ESU
Witness 3 observed Crooks again, but there did not appear to be any law enforcement
personnel searching for Crooks in or around the AGR complex. Beaver ESU Witness 3
saw Crooks had returned to the picnic table with a backpack near him on the ground.
Crooks soon “took off running.” Beaver ESU Witness 3 “yell[ed] across the second floor
to [Butler ESU Witness 4] that now Crooks is at a picnic table with a backpack.”94 Beaver
ESU Witness 3 (ESU 3, below) testified to the Task Force:

TF STAFF: So now we're at 6:00. You reported this in. At

this point have you seen any kind of law
enforcement on foot outside the building looking
for this guy?

ESU 3: No.

TF STAFF: When do you first see people start looking for

this guy?

ESU 3: So at about 6:06, 6:07-ish, as I was moving

around the building that I was in, I seen Crooks.
...

***

ESU 3: And when I looked out, I noticed that Crooks was

standing out beside that picnic table and there
was a backpack sitting on the ground.

TF STAFF: Okay?

ESU 3: When I looked, I seen him. He grabbed that

backpack, and then he took off running.95

93
The Ongoing Investigation of the Butler, Pennsylvania Security Failure: The Secret Service’s Reliance on State
and Local Law Enforcement: Hearing Before the H. Task Force on the Attempted Assassination of Donald J.
Trump, 118th Cong. (Sept. 26, 2024).
94
Beaver ESU Witness 3, Transcribed Interview Before the Task Force on the Attempted Assassination of Donald J.
Trump, 40 (Sept. 12, 2024) (on file with the Task Force).
95
Id. at 124.

Page 37
 ***
TF STAFF: So you saw him at the picnic table, and you saw
him run with the backpack?

ESU 3: Yes.

TF STAFF: But then when he turned the corner, you couldn’t

see him any longer?

ESU 3: Yeah. Once he went in between the buildings, I

could not see him anymore. And at that point I
had then radioed to communication command. I
said, Hey, suspect spotted rear of building.
Grabbed the backpack and ran in between the
buildings.96

Officers Respond to Search for Crooks

Butler Township Police Department (PD) personnel in the vicinity of the AGR
complex responded to calls over the radio that described the escalating situation related to
Crooks’ behavior and movements. Butler Township PD Witness 2 testified to the Task
Force that several officers in the area left their posts to look for Crooks. He stated:

At that point there was another radio transmission. They were

looking for him at the AGR building. [Butler Township PD]
departed. He was in a patrol unit, in a patrol vehicle. He left
and drove towards the AGR building, which would have been
northwest of my location, and I started walking in the area
where I was posted. Then another radio transmission came that
they last seen him walking towards Sheetz by the AGR
building, which would have been towards where my location
was. So at that point I started -- between my intersection to
southwest, say, there's a tree line. So I started searching that
area.97

96
Id.
97
Butler Township PD Witness 2, Transcribed Interview Before the Task Force on the Attempted Assassination of
Donald J. Trump, 33 (Sept. 6, 2024) (on file with the Task Force).

Page 38
Crooks Moves to AGR Roof

Video obtained from a local business showed Crooks climbed to the roof via A/C
units on the backside of the building in the AGR complex at approximately 1805. 98 Video
from a local business, police dash cam footage, and police body camera footage show
Crooks’s movement across multiple AGR complex roofs between 1805 and 1808.99
Bystanders also saw Crooks pulling himself up to the roof and taking position. 100 Several
called the police, while others attempted to get the attention of police on the ground.

In response to reports over the radio of a suspicious person, Butler Township PD

Witness 2 left his post and approached the AGR complex. As he neared it, Butler Township
PD Witness 2 observed Crooks on the roof of the AGR complex from Butler Township PD
Witness 2’s position near the tree line, which was at least 100 yards from the buildings.
Upon seeing Crooks, Butler Township PD Witness 2 continued to move towards the AGR
complex, but he lost sight of Crooks. Butler Township PD Witness 2 testified to the Task
Force that he did not see any USSS personnel near the AGR complex at this point. Butler
Township PD Witness 2 radioed the information—that “someone’s on the roof”—to all
officers in the area. Butler Township PD Witness 2 (PD 2, below) testified to the Task
Force:

TF STAFF: Okay, sir. When you approached the AGR

building, did you see anyone on the roof?

PD 2: I did.

TF STAFF: [I]t is our understanding, [Butler Township PD

Witness 2], that at 6:08 p.m., you [. . .] radioed
that somebody was on the roof and that there was
someone on the roof with white shorts. Do you
recall making this transmission?

PD 2: I do, yes.

98
Remarks as prepared for delivery, FBI Pittsburgh Special Agent in Charge’s Remarks to Media on Updates to the
Butler, Pennsylvania, Assassination Attempt Investigation, Fed. Bureau of Investigation, U.S. Dep’t of Justice (Aug.
28, 2024).
99
Id.
100
See, e.g., Video: Shooter seen by some attendees at least one minute before Trump was shot, CNN,
https://edition.cnn.com/2024/07/15/us/video/shooter-seen-by-attendees-one-minute-before-trump-shot-digvid (last
visited Oct. 17, 2024).

Page 39
 TF STAFF: And where were you when you made this
transmission?

PD 2: I would have been in the power line, walking up

the tree line. A good hundred plus yards away
from the building.

TF STAFF: And did the person that you saw on the roof
match the description of the suspicious
individual that had been ID'd over the radio
moments prior?

PD 2: Yes.

TF STAFF: When you saw someone on the roof, sir, what did
you then do?

PD 2: I made a radio transmission that the male was on

the roof. Someone's on the roof.101

From his location in a patrol car in the AGR complex parking lot, Butler Township Police
Department (PD) Witness 4 heard the call from Butler Township PD Witness 2 over the
radio. Butler Township Police PD Witness 4 told the Task Force that he was posted on the
road near the AGR complex for traffic control. There was no traffic at his post, so Butler
Township Police PD Witness 4 departed the post to assist with locating the suspicious
individual when he heard about it over the radio. Butler Township Police PD Witness 4
arrived in his patrol car and parked at the water tower near the AGR complex, next to a
PSP officer.

Concurrently, at 1809, Commander Lenz called PSP Witness 3 in the USSS

Command Post to update him that a suspicious person was now on the roof of the AGR
complex.102

Butler Township Police PD Witness 4 was discussing the report of a suspicious male
with the PSP officer parked next to him when he spotted Crooks moving across the AGR
roofs. He testified to the Task Force that he saw a “male [who]appeared to have a gray shirt

101
Butler Township PD Witness 2, Transcribed Interview Before the Task Force on the Attempted Assassination of
Donald J. Trump, 33 (Sept. 6, 2024) (on file with the Task Force).
102
PSP Witness 3, Recorded Administrative Interview Before Penn. State Police, 00:26:40 (Jul. 20, 2024) (on file
with the Task Force); H. Comm. Overview Presentation, Butler ESU, 16 (2024) (on file with the Task Force). It
does not appear that any related communications were transmitted over the ESU radio channel, which would have
reached ESU personnel located inside the AGR complex.

Page 40
or a light shirt on running from the north end of the building to the south end of the building
towards the fence of the outer perimeter of the rally.” 103 Butler Township Police PD
Witness 4 did not see a weapon. He testified to the Task Force:

I’m watching this male go across the roof. At no point did I

see a firearm or see him armed, to be honest. I just thought
getting up there, I was going to run into a civilian that was
trying to get away. And at no point did anybody else there yell
out firearm or make it clear to me that, you know, he was armed
before getting up there.104

Butler Township Police PD Witness 4 lost sight of Crooks when a tree blocked his line of
sight to the roof. Butler Township Police PD Witness 4 testified to the Task Force:

So the trooper and I arrive at the southeast corner of the AGR

building. And as I was coming as I was approaching the AGR
building, I could still see the male running and there was, I
want to say, a tree or a bush, but it's a pretty large tree that
covers above the roof, and that's where I lost sight of him.105

Prior to Butler Township PD Witness 2’s transmission that Crooks was on the AGR roof,
Butler Township PD Witness 5 checked with Blasko in-person and learned about the
suspicious person.106 Butler Township PD Witness 5 was patrolling the area as part of his
regular duties—he was not specifically assigned to work the rally. Butler Township PD
Witness 5 then searched the water tower area and returned to Blasko.107 At the time, Blasko
was standing next to a USSS agent.108 Butler Township PD Witness 5 told the Task Force
that the USSS agent said, “if you find him, we’ll talk to him.” 109 Butler Township PD
Witness 5 proceeded to search around the AGR property, when he heard Butler Township
PD Witness 2’s transmission.110

103
Butler Township PD Witness 4, Transcribed Interview Before the Task Force on the Attempted Assassination of
Donald J. Trump, 16 (Sept. 6, 2024) (on file with the Task Force).
104
Id. at 23.
105
Id. at 17.
106
Butler Township PD Witness 5, Transcribed Interview Before the Task Force on the Attempted Assassination of
Donald J. Trump, 17 (Sept. 6, 2024) (on file with the Task Force).
107
Id. at 18-19.
108
Id. at 20.
109
Id.
110
Id. at 22.

Page 41
 Meanwhile, Butler Township Police PD Witness 4 had decided to pursue Crooks on
the AGR roof and exited his patrol car.111 As he moved towards the AGR complex, he
encountered Butler Township PD Witness 5, who helped raise Butler Township Police PD
Witness 4 onto the roof.112 Butler Township Police PD Witness 4 testified to the Task
Force:

From there, I was able to pull my hands to my chest. And as I

began to try to, how I describe it is, like, getting out of a pool
with your hands, like pushing up, my head is coming up, and
luckily for me, I'm looking left as that happens. And that is
when I first view Crooks on the rooftop.

I see Crooks facing downrange towards the stage, but his eyes
are back at me as I'm coming up. And I would say, like, his
facial expressions was surprised. His eyes were very big, like,
what are you doing up here?113

Law Enforcement Sees Crooks is Armed

Butler Township Police PD Witness 4 saw Crooks’s weapon for the first time when
Crooks turned and pointed the rifle at him. Butler Township Police PD Witness 4 testified
to the Task Force that he also saw that Crooks had a bookbag and extra magazines of
ammunition for a long gun. When Crooks turned to aim his rifle at Butler Township Police
PD Witness 4, Butler Township Police PD Witness 4 fell to the ground and immediately
radioed that the suspicious person on the roof was armed. Butler Township Police PD
Witness 4 stated:

And from there, he just slowly turned on his waist, like-- he

was proned out like this, and he kind of slowly turned around.
And as I came up, that's when he pointed his firearm in my
face. And at that time, I could see, you know, he had a bookbag
with him, I could see mags. I knew he had a long gun, like an
AR platform. And as I'm coming up and he's got the gun
pointed at me, I don't know if I reach for my gun, if I slip, but
all I know from that point is I'm looking at him, and all my
weight is on my, like, arms, my hands, and I don't have a grip.

111
Butler Township PD Witness 4, Transcribed Interview Before the Task Force on the Attempted Assassination of
Donald J. Trump, 17 (Sept. 6, 2024) (on file with the Task Force).
112
Id. at 17-18.
113
Id. at 18.

Page 42
 As you can tell by the video, it's just my fingertips. And I have
no support from the bottom from [Butler Township PD
Witness 5] anymore. The next thing I know is, I'm smack
against the ground and fall. Yeah. And from there, I just start
yelling out to the guys that are there, I yell on the radio right
away. I start saying, you know, South end, He's got a long gun,
Male on the roof. I just kept repeating, He's got a gun, He's got
a long gun. I'm telling the guys that are around, like, He's right
up there, guns up, eyes up, still screaming on the radio.114

Butler Township Police Department (PD) Witness 5 similarly testified to the Task
Force that Butler Township Police PD Witness 4 immediately began alerting that the
person on the roof of the AGR complex was armed with an assault rifle. Butler Township
PD Witness 5 stated: “I try to get him up to the roof. He's kind of on the side, however he
is up there. He comes back down screaming, “THERE'S AN AR! AN AR! A GUY WITH
AN AR!’”115

To date, the Task Force has not received any evidence to suggest that message
reached the former President’s USSS detail prior to shots fired. The fact that Crooks was
armed was reported out via the local patrol radio channel, OPS-3, which was heard by
Commander Lenz, who moved to deploy Butler ESU’s QRF at that time.116

Civilians on the AGR property were becoming increasingly aware of Crooks at this
point. Beaver ESU Witness 3 testified to the Task Force that he saw the crowd—which had
gathered to watch the rally—turn away from the stage and face the AGR complex, after
the former President had started his speech. Beaver ESU Witness 3 assumed the crowd had
turned to watch law enforcement engage Crooks on the roof.117

114
Id.
115
Butler Township PD Witness 5, Transcribed Interview Before the Task Force on the Attempted Assassination of
Donald J. Trump, 26 (Sept. 6, 2024) (on file with the Task Force).
116
Edward Lenz, Butler ESU Commander, Transcribed Interview Before the Task Force on the Attempted
Assassination of Donald J. Trump, 166, 182 (Sept. 12, 2024) (on file with the Task Force).
117
Beaver ESU Witness 3, Transcribed Interview Before the Task Force on the Attempted Assassination of Donald
J. Trump, 166, 182 (Sept.11, 2024) (on file with the Task Force).

Page 43
Shots Fired

At 1811, Crooks fired eight rounds before being fatally shot. The evidence shows
Crooks was on the roof for approximately six minutes prior to the shooting, between 1805
and 1811.

Image created by Beaver ESU 118

Local Officer Returns Fire and Secret Service Counter Sniper Neutralizes Crooks

Testimony from local law enforcement indicates that

they fired a shot at Crooks prior to the USSS sniper
firing the kill shot. While the exact order of shots remains
unclear, testimony from local law enforcement states that
they took a shot in Crooks’ direction, which may have
caused Crooks to stop firing.

Butler ESU Witness 5 testified to the Task Force that he was the first law
enforcement officer to return fire at Crooks. Butler ESU Witness 5 was posted on the Butler

118
Production to Task Force, FPOTUS After Action, Beaver ESU, 22 (2024) (on file with the Task Force).

Page 44
Farm Show property, in the vicinity of the stage.119 When he heard Crooks fire an initial
volley of three shots, Butler ESU Witness 5 located Crooks on the roof of the AGR
complex.120 He fired a single shot from a standing position at Crooks, who was in a prone
position on the roof.121 Butler ESU Witness 5 told the Task Force that he believes his shot
hit Crooks.122

The evidence shows Crooks was struck by a single bullet (see Autopsy and
Toxicology, page 48). On July 15, then-Secret Service Director Kimberly Cheatle
announced that a USSS “counter sniper team neutraliz[ed] the shooter”123 and there is no
evidence to date to the contrary.

Butler Township Police PD Witness 4—after falling from the roof—ran to retrieve
his rifle from his patrol car.124 Butler Township Police PD Witness 4 returned to the AGR
complex moments after Crooks was neutralized and made his way onto the roof.125 Footage
from Butler Township Police PD Witness 4’s bodycam shows he and a USSS agent
interacted briefly on the roof, where the USSS agent remarked that Secret Service counter
snipers fired the shot that killed Crooks.126

Butler Township Police PD Witness 4 then helped clear the AGR complex after
hearing reports of a second suspicious person inside the building.127 Butler Township
Police PD Witness 4 left for the hospital approximately 30 minutes after shots fired to
attend to his leg injury, which he suffered falling from the roof.128

119
Butler ESU Witness 5, Transcribed Interview Before the Task Force on the Attempted Assassination of Donald J.
Trump, 13 (Sept. 13, 2024) (on file with the Task Force).
120
Id. at 31.
121
Id. at 31-32.
122
Id. at 32.
123
Statement From U.S. Secret Service Director Kimberly Cheatle, U.S. Secret Service, U.S. Dep’t of Homeland
Sec. (Jul. 15, 2024).
124
Butler Township PD Witness 4, Transcribed Interview Before the Task Force on the Attempted Assassination of
Donald J. Trump, 19 (Sept. 6, 2024) (on file with the Task Force).
125
Id. at 20.
126
Id. at 22.
127
Id.
128
Id. at 46.

Page 45
Ladder

Crooks did not use a ladder to access the AGR roof.

Crooks did purchase a ladder on July 13, but he
subsequently abandoned that ladder in a wooded area in
Bethel Park, Pennsylvania. The ladder viewed in the widely
circulated photographs of the AGR complex was placed by
local law enforcement to access the roof after the
assassination attempt.

Based on reports that Crooks had purchased a ladder, and photos that circulated after
the shooting that showed a ladder against the AGR complex, a narrative emerged that
Crooks used a ladder to climb onto the roof of the AGR complex. While Crooks did
purchase a five-foot ladder at approximately 930 the morning of July 13, he abandoned
that ladder in a wooded area adjacent to the parking lot of a permanently closed business
in Bethel Park, approximately 50 miles away from the site of the rally.129

Example of published image 130

The ladder viewed in widely circulated photographs was placed by local law
enforcement personnel to access the roof and respond to the scene after shots were fired.131

129
PSP Response to Comm. on Homeland Sec., Penn. State Police, 1 (2024) (on file with the Task Force); Press
Release, Investigative Updates on the Butler, Pennsylvania, Assassination Attempt, Fed. Bureau of Investigation,
U.S. Dep’t of Justice (Jul. 29, 2024).
130
Laura Collins, Chilling images of how close shooter got to Trump - and what was hidden by the bushes, DAILY
MAIL (Jul. 15, 2024).
131
PSP Response to Comm. on Homeland Sec., Penn. State Police, 1 (2024) (on file with the Task Force).

Page 46
 Evidence gathered by the FBI shows Crooks reached the roof by climbing air
conditioning units on the side of the AGR complex.132 Security footage from a local
business shows Crooks climbing the air conditioning units.133

FBI Butler Investigation Evidence134

132
Press Release, Butler Investigation Evidence Photos, Fed. Bureau of Investigation, U.S. Dep’t of Justice (Aug.
28, 2024).
133
Ryan Nobles & Ken Dilanian, Trump shooter believed to have used air-conditioning unit to get on roof, NBC
NEWS (Aug. 27, 2024).
134
Press Release, Butler Investigation Evidence Photos, Fed. Bureau of Investigation, U.S. Dep’t of Justice (Aug.
28, 2024).

Page 47
Autopsy and Toxicology Findings

The autopsy report indicates a single bullet killed

Crooks. The report indicates a single entry wound on the
upper left lip and a corresponding exit wound in the rear
neck area. The wounds are consistent with a high velocity
bullet from a distant range. There is no evidence of an entry
wound from a second bullet.

After rendering the scene safe, the FBI contacted the Butler County Coroner’s
Office, and the coroner subsequently removed the body from the scene and conducted a
death investigation.135

The Butler County Coroner’s Office then deferred to the Allegheny County Office
of the Medical Examiner to conduct the autopsy due to Allegheny County’s more advanced
facility and capabilities.136 Once Allegheny County completed the autopsy, the Butler
County Coroner's Office consulted with the FBI, asking if there were any additional
necessary investigative steps with respect to the body.137 The autopsy was observed by FBI
and PSP personnel.138

Once the autopsy was completed, the Butler County Coroner’s office consulted with
the FBI to determine if there were any additional evidentiary needs with respect to the
body. The FBI determined there were not, and the FBI and PSP concurred with the Butler
County Coroner’s Office decision to release the remains to the subject’s family.139

The Allegheny County Medical Examiner’s Office subsequently prepared autopsy

and toxicology reports.140 The Task Force obtained the reports, which show Crooks was
pronounced deceased at 1825 on July 13, 2024, as a result of a single gunshot wound to

135
FBI Update 8.28.24, Fed. Bureau of Investigation, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 2 (Aug. 28, 2024) (on file with the Task
Force).
136
Id.
137
Id.
138
Autopsy Report, Allegheny Co. Office of the Medical Examiner, 3 (Aug. 5, 2024) (on file with the Task Force);
FBI Update 8.28.24, Fed. Bureau of Investigation, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 3 (Aug. 28, 2024) (on file with the Task
Force).
139
FBI Update 8.28.24, Fed. Bureau of Investigation, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 3 (Aug. 28, 2024) (on file with the Task
Force).
140
Autopsy Report, Allegheny Co. Office of the Medical Examiner (Aug. 5, 2024) (on file with the Task Force);
Toxicology Report, Forensic Laboratory Division, Allegheny Co. Office of the Medical Examiner (Jul. 22, 2024)
(on file with the Task Force).

Page 48
the head.141 The toxicology report revealed negative results for alcohol and drugs of
abuse.142 The bloodwork was positive for antimony, selenium, and lead.143 The Allegheny
County Chief Medical Examiner who performed the autopsy stated that the presence of
lead could possibly be a result of the time Crooks spent at the firing range.144

The reports further describe a single entry wound on the upper left lip and a
corresponding exit wound in the right lateral neck.145 The bullet track is reported as a
downward, backward, and rightward direction.146 The report also describes re-entry and re-
exit wounds from fragments at the upper right back attributable to the same bullet. 147 The
wounds are consistent with a high velocity bullet from a distant range.148 A small copper-
colored metal bullet jacket fragment was recovered from the upper right back during the
autopsy.149 The FBI has possession of the fragment.150 The autopsy found no evidence of
an entry wound from a second bullet.151

The FBI released the crime scene at the Butler Farm Show grounds, and the AGR
complex, to the property owners on a rolling basis, after collecting any items of evidentiary
value.152 The FBI’s process for releasing the AGR complex included cleaning the
biological material from the AGR roof. The FBI completed the final release of the scene
on July 20—seven days after the attack.

141
FBI Update 8.28.24, Fed. Bureau of Investigation, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 2 (Aug. 28, 2024) (on file with the Task
Force); Autopsy Report, Allegheny Co. Office of the Medical Examiner, 2 (Aug. 5, 2024) (on file with the Task
Force); Crooks Investigator Narrative, Allegheny Co. Office of the Medical Examiner, 2 (Jul. 16, 2024) (on file with
the Task Force).
142
Autopsy Report, Allegheny Co. Office of the Medical Examiner, 1 (Aug. 5, 2024) (on file with the Task Force);
Toxicology Report, Forensic Laboratory Division, Allegheny Co. Office of the Medical Examiner, 1 (Jul. 22, 2024)
(on file with the Task Force).
143
Toxicology Report, Forensic Laboratory Division, Allegheny Co. Office of the Medical Examiner, 1 (Jul. 22,
2024) (on file with the Task Force).
144
Briefing from Allegheny Co. Office of the Medical Examiner to Task Force Staff (Sept. 20, 2024) (notes on file
with Task Force Majority Staff).
145
Autopsy Report, Allegheny Co. Office of the Medical Examiner, 1 (Aug. 5, 2024) (on file with the Task Force).
146
Id.
147
Id.
148
Id.
149
Id.
150
Evidence Transfer Receipt, Allegheny Co. Office of the Medical Examiner (Jul. 14, 2024) (on file with the Task
Force).
151
The Ongoing Investigation of the Butler, Pennsylvania Security Failure: The Secret Service’s Reliance on State
and Local Law Enforcement: Hearing Before the H. Task Force on the Attempted Assassination of Donald J.
Trump, 118th Cong. (Sept. 26, 2024) (testimony of Allegheny Co. Chief Medical Examiner).
152
FBI Update 8.28.24, Fed. Bureau of Investigation, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 2 (Aug. 28, 2024) (on file with the Task
Force).

Page 49
 At a press conference, Kevin P. Rojek, Special Agent in Charge of the FBI
Pittsburgh Field Office stated: “The FBI Laboratory Division successfully test fired”
Crooks’ rifle, “concluding it was—and remains—fully operational” and “also positively
matched all eight shell casings located on the roof with the subject’s rifle.”153

Rojek further stated: “The autopsy report indicated the subject was pronounced
deceased at 6:25 p.m. on July 13, 2024, as a result of a single gunshot wound to the
head.”154 Rojek added: “All reviewable evidence collected from the AGR roof and from
the subject’s body are consistent with the round fired by the Secret Service sniper.” 155

In response to a question, Rojek stated, “Regarding the round fired by the local
officer, we have no forensic evidence indicating that that round either struck our subject or
the subject's rifle.”156

153
FBI Pittsburgh Special Agent in Charge’s Remarks to Media on Updates to the Butler, Pennsylvania,
Assassination Attempt Investigation, Fed. Bureau of Investigation, U.S. Dep’t of Justice (Aug. 28, 2024).
154
Id.
155
Id.
156
Remarks to Media on the Butler, Pennsylvania, Assassination Attempt, Fed. Bureau of Investigation, U.S. Dep’t
of Justice (Aug. 28, 2024).

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NEXT STEPS
The Task Force will continue to rigorously investigate the July 13 assassination
attempt in the coming months. The Task Force is in the process of conducting more than
20 transcribed interviews of federal officials and others who may have knowledge relevant
to the events of July 13. The Task Force remains committed to uncovering the planning
and security failures that led to the events of July 13, of which there appear to be many,
and to examining potential legislative solutions to ensure the USSS is equipped to fulfill
their “zero fail” mission.

In addition, the Task Force received expanded jurisdiction through House

Resolution 1470 to investigate the attempted assassination of former President Trump on
September 15, 2024, at the Trump International Golf Course in West Palm Beach, Florida.
In furtherance of this investigation, the Task Force sent letters to the ATF, USSS, and FBI
requesting documents, information, and interviews of relevant federal officials. This work
will provide additional context and information on the impediments the USSS faces in
safeguarding their protectees in this heightened threat environment and will inform the
Task Force’s overall conclusions.

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APPENDIX I: SUMMARY OF RESOURCES
State and Local Law Enforcement Entities

The entities listed below were present on the day of the rally. While all entities are distinct
and ultimately supported the U.S. Secret Service, certain entities were designated as leads for that
day. Each state or local law enforcement entity was primarily responsible for supporting either
security or logistics. Security entailed either tactical or patrol support. Logistics entailed either
motorcade escort or traffic support. Several officers with Butler Township, though detailed to
traffic, proactively assisted with patrol to help find Thomas Matthew Crooks when he was still a
suspicious person at large. All counts are based on productions submitted to the Task Force. The
exact count fluctuated throughout the day due to arrival and departure of those detailed for only
part of the event or those responding to Butler Farm Show in the aftermath of the shooting.

Lead: Butler Emergency Service Unit – Security (Tactical)

Support: Beaver Emergency Services Unit

Support: Washington Regional SWAT

✓ 44 individuals detailed between the three entities combined

Lead: Pennsylvania State Police – Security (Patrol) and Logistics (Motorcade Escort)

✓ 32 individuals detailed

Support: Butler County Sheriff’s Office – Security (Patrol) Only

✓ 8 individuals detailed

Support: Butler Township Police Department – Logistics (Traffic)

✓ 9 individuals detailed

✓ 1 individual fulfilling his full-time assignment to patrol his sector, which happened to
include the rally that day

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Emergency Services Entities

Separate from state or local law enforcement, multiple entities collaborated to provide rapid
medical response, primarily heat-related, at the rally. The exact number of personnel detailed to
the rally is unknown but has been estimated to be about a dozen individuals, including emergency
medical services providers, a Certified Registered Nurse Practitioner, and a registered nurse. The
list of emergency services entities involved on July 13 includes but is not limited to the following:

✓ Butler County Emergency Services

✓ Butler Memorial Hospital

✓ Connoquenessing Valley Regional Emergency Management Agency

✓ Connoquenessing Volunteer Fire Company

✓ Prospect Borough Franklin Township Volunteer Fire Department

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