European Parliament

2019-2024

Plenary sitting

A9-0041/2024

19.2.2024

REPORT
on a European Parliament recommendation to the Council, the Commission
and the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union
for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy on the situation in Syria
(2023/2052(INI))

Committee on Foreign Affairs

Rapporteur: Nathalie Loiseau

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 PR_INI_RecommCFSP

CONTENTS

Page

DRAFT EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT RECOMMENDATION...............................................3

EXPLANATORY STATEMENT ............................................................................................13

ANNEX: ENTITIES OR PERSONS FROM WHOM THE RAPPORTEUR HAS RECEIVED

INPUT.......................................................................................................................................14

INFORMATION ON ADOPTION IN COMMITTEE RESPONSIBLE.................................15

FINAL VOTE BY ROLL CALL IN COMMITTEE RESPONSIBLE ....................................16

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DRAFT EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT RECOMMENDATION

to the Council, the Commission and the Vice-President of the Commission / High
Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy on the situation in
Syria
(2023/2052(INI))

The European Parliament,

– having regard to the accession of Syria as a Member State to the Organisation for the
Prohibition of Chemical Weapons on 14 October 2013,

– having regard to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production,

Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on their Destruction ratified by Syria on
14 December 2013,

– having regard to UN Security Council Resolution 2170 as adopted on 15 August 2014

and Resolution 2254 as adopted on 18 December 2015,

– having regard to UN Security Council Resolutions 2533 as adopted on 11 July 2020 and
2504 as adopted on 10 January 2020, both concerning the border crossings of Bab al-
Salam and Bab al-Hawa and the provision of humanitarian aid,

– having regard to UN Security Council Resolution 2664 as adopted on 9 December 2022,

– having regard to UN Security Council Resolution 2672 as adopted on 9 January 2023,

– having regard to UN General Assembly Resolution 77/301 of 29 June 2023, establishing

an Independent Institution on Missing Persons in the Syrian Arab Republic,

– having regard to the report of the UN Independent International Commission of Inquiry

on the Syrian Arab Republic of 21 January 2021 to the 46th regular session of the Human
Rights Council,

– having regard to the report of the UN Independent International Commission of Inquiry

on the Syrian Arab Republic of 14 August 2023 to the 54th regular session of the Human
Rights Council,

– having regard to the order of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) of

16 November 2023 on the request for the indication of provisional measures for the
application of the Convention against Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment (Canada and the Netherlands v. Syrian Arab Republic),

– having regard to the order of the Paris Judicial Court (TJP) of 14 November 2023 issuing
an international arrest warrant against Syrian President Bashar Al-Assad, Maher Al-
Assad, Ghassan Abbas and Bassam Al-Hassan,

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 – having regard to European Council Decision 2023/1035 of 25 May 20231, which extends
the EU sanctions until 1 June 2024,

– having regard to Rule 118 of its Rules of Procedure,

– having regard to the report of the Committee on Foreign Affairs (A9-0041/2024),

A. whereas the Geneva and Astana processes have failed to bring an end to the conflict and
establish an inclusive transitional governing body, given the continued refusal of the
Syrian regime to seriously negotiate a credible political solution with the opposition;
whereas the Syrian regime has used selective engagement in international talks as a
delaying tactic to nullify the results of international talks, thereby prolonging the
suffering of the Syrian people;

B. whereas since 2011 half a million Syrians have died and 14 million have been forcibly
displaced owing to violent attacks by armed and terrorist groups, but mainly as a result of
the fierce repression and demographic engineering by the Syrian regime, with the help of
its allies, of its own people; whereas this repression has included the repeated use of
chemical weapons, cluster munitions, incendiary bombs, barrel bombs, missiles and
conventional aerial bombardments on civilians; whereas thousands of civilians have been
killed as a result of hundreds of chemical attacks carried out by the Syrian regime,
including the sarin attack in East Ghouta in August 2013; whereas at least 150 000
Syrians are missing in the regime’s mass arbitrary detention system, of whom no fewer
than 112 713 have been forcibly disappeared, with frequent deaths in custody and
extrajudicial executions; whereas families have still not been informed of the fate of their
loved ones; whereas this is currently the largest displacement crisis in the world; whereas
the crisis has left some 15.3 million people in Syria in need of humanitarian aid and
protection; whereas an estimated 8.8 million people were further affected by the
earthquakes in February 2023, exacerbating the pre-existing humanitarian challenges in
Syria and its neighbouring countries; whereas, according to UN reports, 90 % of the
Syrian population lives in poverty and lacks basic goods; whereas the ICJ’s order
directed Syria to take all measures within its power to prevent acts of torture and other
abuses, after having considered various reports by the UN Independent International
Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic, which concluded that there were
‘reasonable grounds to believe that the [Syrian] Government continued to commit acts of
torture and ill treatment’; whereas Syria is ranked 175 out of 180 on the Reporters
Without Borders press freedom index; whereas at least 300 professional and non-
professional journalists have been killed since 2011; whereas despite the Syrian regime’s
brutal repression of its people, Syrians continue to organise peaceful anti-government
protests, notably those in the Druze-majority Syrian governorate of Souweïda that started
in August 2023 and attracted thousands of protesters, particularly women, from across the
province over several weeks; whereas the demonstrations have been calling for political,
civil and human rights for all Syrians;

C. whereas authoritarian foreign actors, including Russia and Iran and their proxies – the
Wagner militia and the Lebanese Hezbollah –, Iraqi militias and Afghan mercenaries, as
well as local Syrian proxies, have played a destructive role in the country since 2011;

1 Council Decision (CFSP) 2023/1035 of 25 May 2023 amending Decision 2013/255/CFSP concerning
restrictive measures in view of the situation in Syria, OJ L 139, 26.5.2023, p. 49.

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 whereas Syria serves as a testing ground for Russia, in which to practice and demonstrate
its military capabilities, tactics, logistical reach as well as its capacity for foreign military
intervention to save a beleaguered allied regime; whereas the Syrian regime does not
control the whole of the national territory and can remain in power only with brutality
and the support of these foreign actors; whereas both Russia and Iran remain major
suppliers of military equipment to the regime;

D. whereas several investigations and prosecutions of serious crimes committed in Syria are
under way based on the principle of universal jurisdiction, giving some hope in the
struggle for justice and accountability for acts of torture, crimes against humanity or war
crimes in Syria; whereas France has issued an international arrest warrant for Syrian
dictator Bashar Al-Assad, his brother Maher Al-Assad, who is the de facto chief of a
Syrian elite military unit, and two armed forces generals accused of complicity in crimes
against humanity in relation to attacks with chemical weapons in 2013; whereas to
prevent possible sanctions and military intervention, Russia and China have vetoed
resolutions on Syria sponsored by Western and Arab countries at the UN Security
Council, thereby shielding the Syrian regime from accountability for its war crimes;

E. whereas the regime in Syria has supported Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and recognised
the occupied Luhansk and Donetsk region in eastern Ukraine; whereas Russia claims that
it has sent over 63 000 Russian personnel since 2015, including special forces, military
advisers, air force personnel and private military contractors such as the Wagner Group,
to support and protect the Assad regime from collapse; whereas Russia has consistently
committed war crimes in Syria, including the bombing of medical facilities and civilian
areas and the use of indiscriminate weapons; whereas Russia’s military footprint in the
country consists of two main bases: the Hmeimim Air Base and a naval base in Tartus,
and more than 100 smaller military sites across the country; whereas Russia is the largest
supplier of weapons to the Assad regime amounting to billions of Euro in sales;

F. whereas Hezbollah has attempted to receive Iranian weapons through Syrian territory;
whereas Israel has carried out repeated air strikes to prevent such arms transfers,
including on Damascus and Aleppo airports in October 2023 in the aftermath of the
7 October terrorist attacks against Israeli civilians by Hamas; whereas the Israel-Hamas
conflict, triggered by the terrorist attacks carried out by Hamas against Israel on
7 October 2023, caused a renewed cycle of violence in the region; whereas Syria must
abstain from any military involvement in the war in the Gaza Strip; whereas the alleged
Israeli strikes in Aleppo and Damascus have led to a temporary halt of the UN´s
Humanitarian Air Service; whereas, since Hamas’s brutal attack against Israel on
7 October 2023, Iran-backed militias in Syria have stepped up the firing of drones and
rockets at Israel and US and international forces in north-eastern Syria; whereas Syrian
airports have been used by Iran to transport weapons from Iran and Iraq to Syria and
Hezbollah in Lebanon, as well as to help Iran to supply weapons to Hamas; whereas the
regime has murdered thousands of Syrian Palestinians and refugees;

G. whereas Türkiye, which occupies territories in northern Syria, regularly engages in large-
scale military operations on Syrian territory both directly and through proxies,
particularly targeting Kurdish-held areas; whereas the unilateral Turkish military
interventions in north-east Syria constitute a violation of international law; whereas, in
October 2023, the Turkish Parliament voted to extend the mandate that allows for

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 military operations in Syria for another two years; whereas Türkiye should end its illegal
occupation of northern Syria and withdraw its military and paramilitary proxy forces;

H. whereas The Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) committed gross, systematic abuses of
human rights and violations of international law, including crimes against humanity and
genocide, in the territories temporarily under its control prior to the intervention by the
international coalition; whereas in 2014 the formation of a broad international coalition to
defeat ISIS was set up, consisting of 86 coalition members, who committed themselves to
the goals of providing military support to partners, impeding the flow of foreign fighters,
stopping financing and funding of ISIS, addressing humanitarian crises in the region and
exposing the true nature of jihadist movements;

I. whereas the assets of 289 individuals and 70 entities directly involved in the repression of
the Syrian people are subject to EU sanctions; whereas as a result of Russia’s continued
obstruction in the UN Security Council, only one crossing point is ensured for the
delivery of international humanitarian aid between Türkiye and the areas not controlled
by the regime in Syria; whereas since 2014 the Bab-al Hawa crossing has been used for
deliveries of cross-border relief from Türkiye to Syria with the authorisation of the UN
Security Council; whereas Russia has frequently obstructed the renewal of this
authorisation in the UN Security Council and ultimately vetoed the authorisation for the
aid corridor in July 2023, for which reason Bab-al Hawa remained closed; whereas in
September 2023, as a result of negotiations between UN agencies, the Syrian regime, and
Hay’et Tahrir al-Sham, the dominant armed group in Idlib, aid deliveries through Bab al-
Hawa resumed and the aid corridors Bab al-Salam and Al-Rai border crossings, that the
Syrian regime agreed to open following the devastating earthquake in February 2023,
were extended for another three months; whereas the conditions under which the Syrian
regime and Hay’et Tahrir al-Sham authorised the UN to resume aid deliveries through the
three border crossings are unknown; whereas renowned international humanitarian law
experts question whether cross-border UN aid requires UN Security Council
authorisation;

J. whereas several countries in the region have started to normalise their relations with the
Syrian regime, which has led to Syria’s reintegration into the Arab League as decided by
the League’s foreign ministers on 7 May 2023, in Cairo, despite Syria’s record of serious
international crimes and without any indication that its abusive practices have ceased;
whereas the working groups of the Arab League have been suspended since September
2023 due to the fact the Syrian regime did not respect its commitments, including to limit
drug trafficking, facilitate the safe return of refugees, release political prisoners and allow
humanitarian aid to all areas; whereas meetings between the Arab League and
representatives of the Syrian regime have been suspended in the meantime; whereas no
action has been undertaken since the adoption of Parliament’s resolution of
11 March 2021 on the Syrian conflict – 10 years after the uprising2 to ensure that war
criminal suspects cannot be given asylum in an EU Member State, especially when other
EU Member States have already rejected their asylum claim;

K. whereas the EU and its Member States have been the largest donors to the people affected
by the conflict since 2011, contributing EUR 30 billion; whereas the European aid

2 OJ C 474, 24.11.2021, p. 130.

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 pledged at the Brussels Conference in June 2023 amounts to EUR 3.8 billion out of a
total of EUR 5.6 billion; whereas the EU and the Member States provided emergency
assistance during the earthquake in Syria, and on 23 February 2023 the EU decided on a
temporary exemption from sanctions on humanitarian grounds to facilitate the delivery of
aid to the victims; whereas the UN warns that 90 % of the Syrian population is living
below the poverty line, with many Syrians now eking out an existence in conditions that
are even worse than those that existed during the years of conflict; whereas the World
Food Programme estimates that 12.4 million Syrians are suffering from food insecurity,
representing nearly 60 % of the population; whereas the responsibility for the current dire
situation lies mainly with the Assad regime;

L. whereas the regime is not sufficiently addressing the basic needs of the Syrian people, the
country’s economic situation is extremely precarious and Syria has turned into a narco-
state, further destabilising the region; whereas humanitarian advocates and practitioners
continue to raise concerns about the security and protection of returnees and displaced
people in the light of the conditions in many areas of the country and, raise questions
about the Syrian Regime’s approach to political reconciliation; whereas this hinders
Syria’s social and economic progress, as well as blocking its way out of the crisis;

M. whereas according to a report by the European Monitoring Centre for Drugs and Drug
Addiction (EMCDDA) and the German Federal Criminal Police Office (BKA) from
September 2023, Europe is a key trans-shipment point for Captagon (fenethylline)
arriving from the Middle East, mainly Syria and Lebanon, and bound for the Arabian
Peninsula; whereas countries in the region have banned the import of fruit and vegetables
from Lebanon in an effort to crack down on Captagon drug smuggling; whereas Europe
has become both a destination but also a popular transit hub for Captagon, and according
to the European Monitoring Centre for Drugs and Drug Addiction over a million tablets
and almost two thousand kilograms of Captagon have been seized in Europe since 2018;
whereas in April 2023, the EU sanctioned 25 individuals and eight entities in Syria for
their involvement in the trafficking of narcotics;

N. whereas the Syrian regime’s destruction and neglect of water sources and the healthcare
system led to the outbreak of a country-wide cholera epidemic in August 2022 which is
still ongoing; whereas public education is under pressure in Syria and in the countries
hosting Syrian refugees, with around half of Syria’s school-aged population (nearly 2.4
million pupils) not receiving any form of education, resulting in many children suffering
from the psycho-social impacts of prolonged conflict and displacement; whereas
according to UNESCO only around half of young people aged 15-24 in Syria meet the
minimum expected competency levels in literacy, numeracy and life skills;

O. whereas according to the UN Refugee Agency (UNHCR), most Syrian refugees would
like to return to Syria but have legitimate security concerns; whereas this means that for
the current situation resettlement and complementary pathways remain the most viable
durable solution for Syrian refugees; whereas the UN Independent International
Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic, in its most recent report dated
September 2023, found that insecurity remained rife far beyond the frontlines, rendering
the safe return of Syrian refugees implausible and further concluded that it had
documented specific cases where Syrian refugees returning from neighbouring countries
were ill-treated by Syrian security forces;

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 1. Recommends, with regard to their policies vis-à-vis Syria, that the Council, Commission
and the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for
Foreign Affairs and Security Policy:

Political process

(a) reaffirm the EU’s strong support for Syria’s continued democratic aspirations,
despite the regime’s total repression since the peaceful protests in 2011, which has
been bolstered by decisive military and financial assistance from Iran and Russia to
enable Assad and his cronies to retain power; denounce the regime’s granting of
contracts that allow Russia and Iran to access the country’s resources at the expense
of the Syrian people;

(b) stress the regime’s personal responsibility, without downplaying the role played by
ISIS and other armed and terrorist groups, for the death of half a million civilians, the
destruction of the country, the displacement of the majority of the population, the
torture and forced disappearance of no fewer than 112 713 people3 at the hands of the
mass arbitrary detention system, the use of chemical weapons against civilians and
the systematic crushing of any democratic and peaceful opposition;

(c) oppose any normalisation of relations with the Assad regime unless there are
profound and verifiable developments in the implementation of UN Security Council
Resolution 2254 (2015), including the release of political prisoners, informing the
families of the victims about the fate of missing persons and victims of enforced
disappearance, and the cessation of any attacks on or obstacles to humanitarian aid;
call on EU Member States to refrain from measures weakening or undermining the
common EU position on Syria; stress that despite the sovereign decision of some
Arab states to readmit Syria to the Arab League, the Syrian regime has not given any
indication that it wants to combat drug trafficking, a problem originating in Syria but
which affects the whole region; condemn the stranglehold of the Assad family and its
allies, including Hezbollah, on the market for the drug Captagon, which is estimated
to be worth USD 57 billion; note that the brother of Bashar Al-Assad, Maher Al-
Assad, commands the army unit responsible for facilitating the drug’s production;
support an EU coordinated security response to prevent the EU being used as a trans-
shipment zone for Captagon produced in Syria and Lebanon;

(d) stress that the repression, negligence and corruption on the part of the regime are
responsible for the dire economic situation; recall that EU sanctions are only
targeting individuals and entities involved in the repression; address the issue of
financial over-compliance that can prevent aid groups from transferring funds into
the country and to run programmes or pay local staff and suppliers, even when the
transactions are to support activities exempt from sanctions; underline, however, that
EU restrictive measures need to remain targeted, continue to ensure exemptions for
humanitarian aid, and prioritise deliveries of aid at the local level;

(e) swiftly grant robust, extensive and clear exemptions to trusted international
humanitarian organisations; harmonise as far as possible the interpretation by

3Syrian Network for Human Rights, 12th Annual Report on Enforced Disappearance in Syria on the
International Day of the Disappeared: Enforced Disappearance is an Ongoing Crime in Syria, 30 August 2023.

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 Member States of the Regulation on restrictive measures in view of the situation in
Syria and apply UN Security Council Resolution 2664 (2022) on humanitarian aid to
it;

(f) salute the courage of the demonstrators in the towns of Souweïda and Deraa who
have once again been rising up peacefully against the Assad regime since August
2023; consult with and provide long-term, flexible and core support to the Syrian
civil society networks in Europe and in Syria that share democratic values and strive
to protect human rights defenders and activists in the region; strongly condemn all
forms of religious discrimination and insist on respect by all for the rights of ethnic
and religious groups and minorities in Syria, including Christians, Druze, Kurds,
Alawites and all other minorities; strongly condemn antisemitic propaganda and the
denial of the right of Israel to exist, a key feature of Bashar Al-Assad’s family’s
overall messaging; make sure that education and educational materials are in line
with these principles; call for anyone who has been displaced, to continue to live in
or return to their historical and traditional homelands in dignity, equality and safety,
and to be able to freely practise their religion and beliefs without being subjected to
any kind of coercion, violence or discrimination; support interreligious dialogue;

Security

(g) deplore the continued presence on Syrian territory of hundreds of Iranian, Turkish
and Russian bases and Iranian and Russian militias; express concern about the
economic exploitation of the country by predatory foreign powers; condemn the
attacks by Turkish forces and their occupation of Syrian territories in the north as
well as the renewed brutal military campaign by the Syrian government and Russia
in north-western Syria, including on civilian targets; express their deep concern
about the persistence of radical Islamist opposition in Idlib province; support the
continuation of the international coalition against ISIS, which remains active in Syria
despite significant defeats; call for a determined international effort to continue its
fight against ISIS in Syria until its complete elimination; recall that Turkish
unilateral military actions constitute a grave violation of international law and have
undermined the stability and security of the region as a whole; dismantle the jihadist
networks campaigning in Syria and Iraq and track and prosecute their members, who
commanded over five thousand foreign fighters who they had radicalised, recruited
and brought from Europe; continue to support the Global Coalition To Defeat ISIS in
terms of political, financial, operational and logistical means;

(h) stress the role of the Syrian Democratic Forces in the fight against ISIS in north-east
Syria;

(i) urge Member States to continue repatriating their nationals from the Al-Hol and Roj
jihadist prison camps and to try them, in fair trials, for any crimes they have
committed; express serious concern about the deteriorating humanitarian, sanitary
and security situation in the camps in north-east Syria, especially the Al-Hol and Roj
camps, which continue to be breeding grounds for radicalisation; call on the Member
States to repatriate all European children, offering them adequate support and
reintegration; call on the Member States to promote in all bilateral relations and
international bodies the repatriation of all children of nationals of third countries, in

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 full respect of international law;

(j) step up efforts to counter Russian and Iranian disinformation about Syria, including
disinformation in Arabic; take the necessary steps to ensure that online platforms
substantially increase their fight against disinformation in the region, in particular
through the recruitment of Arabic-speakers to moderate online content;

(k) condemn the launch of rockets by Syrian forces from Syrian territory towards Israel
and the Israeli-occupied Golan heights, and the sending of an unarmed drone to the
north of Israel; condemn the repeated attempts by Hezbollah to receive Iranian
weapons through Syrian territory; condemn the Assad regime’s permissive attitude
towards Al-Qaeda and other terrorist groups, especially with regard to facilitation
efforts in the Iraq conflict, as it has fed the growth of Al-Qaeda, ISIS, and affiliated
terrorist networks inside Syria;

(l) underline that Israel has occupied a part of the Syrian territory in the Golan Heights
since 1967 and that the Israeli military continues to launch air strikes and other forms
of attacks on Syrian territory;

(m) ensure that Syria-related EU resolutions, reports and decisions are translated into
Arabic;

Fight against impunity

(n) stress that the fight against impunity in Syria is a prerequisite for any future
resolution of the ongoing crisis, as well as a moral and political imperative for
Europe and the international community; welcome the judicial progress made by the
Franco-German Joint Investigation Team regarding the 11 000 bodies of torture
victims identified in the César report, the suspension of Syria from the International
Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons; welcome the issuance of
international arrest warrants against Bashar Al-Assad, his brother Maher Al-Assad
and two generals, by French courts in November 2023, for crimes against humanity
in relation to attacks with chemical weapons against civilians; welcome the ICJ order
directing Syria to take all measures within its power to prevent acts of torture and
other abuses after the Netherlands and Canada filed a case regarding Syria’s
violation of the international Convention against Torture; welcome also the progress
made in Germany, France and Sweden in bringing Syrian criminals to justice, such
as through the criminal trials in Koblenz and Frankfurt; encourage all EU Member
States to implement universal jurisdiction, where applicable to the respective
constitutional order; support attempts to bring the leadership of the Syrian regime to
justice; call for the pooling of expertise and interpreters among the judicial and
police authorities, and for a public prosecutor for crimes against humanity to be
appointed in each Member State; call on EU Member States to establish specialised
war crime units within law enforcement and prosecution services, in those cases
where they do not already exist, and ensure they are adequately resourced; encourage
the Member States to pay particular attention to, and prevent, the activities of Syrian
intelligence services and their influence on the Syrian diaspora, including the
protection of witnesses; call for European scholarships to be specifically allocated to
Syrians seeking legal training in the fight against impunity;

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 (o) urge that information be exchanged automatically between all Member States on war
criminals whose asylum applications are rejected under Article 1(F) of the
Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees; call on Member States to establish a
European fund for victims of serious violations of international law in Syria,
including victims of torture, by identifying existing funds linked to violations of
international law in Syria within their jurisdictions, such as monetary judgements,
sanctions, fines and penalties, forfeiture orders, funds frozen as they are linked to
property unlawfully acquired by the Syrian regime, and other revenue; call to
develop a legal framework allowing the transfer of such funds to the families of the
victims, including victims of torture; recall that such funds must be carefully
designed in full cooperation with the families of the victims; recognise the ongoing
threat of illicit trafficking in looted art and cultural goods from Syria by both the
Assad regime and ISIS; urge the EU’s action plan against trafficking in cultural
goods to be strengthened along with third country cooperation to ensure that cultural
goods are protected, removed from the black market, and are repatriated to the
countries of origin when conditions permit; welcome the adoption of the UN General
Assembly resolution of 29 June 2023 establishing an Institution for Missing Persons
in Syria, and the continued funding of the International, Independent and Impartial
Mechanism to support investigations into the most serious crimes committed in Syria
since 2011; urge the EU and its Member States to expand the list of those subject to
targeted sanctions under the EU Global Human Rights Sanctions Regime (the so-
called EU Magnitsky Act), including the Syrian and Russian civilian and military
commanders who may have command responsibility for or have been credibly
implicated in war crimes, crimes against humanity and other serious violations
committed in north-west Syria;

Humanitarian aid and refugees

(p) urge the international community, at the 2024 Brussels Conference, to urgently
increase its humanitarian assistance to the 15.3 million Syrians who depend on it on a
daily basis; insist on access to clean water, including drinking water, sanitary water
and water for agricultural purposes, formal education, also for girls and women,
energy supply, affordable motor fuels, education and long-term budget support
tailored to women’s needs; focus on directing humanitarian aid especially towards
clean water, affordable energy, heating, healthcare and health products; call on the
Commission and the Member States to step up efforts to support the work of local
civil society and refugee-led organisations; stress the importance for aid agencies of
reinforcing accountability to the beneficiaries of assistance and act on their feedback
and needs, in line with the principle of ‘accountability to affected populations’; point
out that the EU is the biggest contributor in this regard; welcome the continued
efforts of Lebanon, Jordan, Türkiye and Iraq to host six million refugees while facing
difficult economic conditions; remind these countries of their obligation to adhere to
international law in this regard; reiterate the need to guarantee the status of refugees,
notably in the main host countries of Türkiye, Lebanon, Jordan, and Iraq, and to
refrain from any discrimination towards minorities; recognise the huge cultural
heritage of Syria as a major part of the world’s cultural heritage and as a source of
solutions to some of the country’s problems; recognise Aramaic as an endangered
minority language, since it is only spoken by about 100 000 people in Syria, while in
Europe this number is as high as 500 000 people;

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 (q) strongly condemn Russia’s countless vetoes against delivering aid to the people in
the north of Syria, specifically its veto on the renewal of United Nations Security
Council Resolution 2672 (2023), thereby not allowing an extension of humanitarian
access through Bab al-Hawa; denounce once again Russia’s attempts to tarnish the
image of the ‘White Helmets’ (Syrian civil defence); stress that the White Helmets
play a significant role in the rescue of Syrian civilians; commend the work of
journalists, bloggers and individuals as well as organisations, such as the White
Helmets, who, despite the brutality of the regime, continue to carry out their work in
the country, informing the international community, supporting victims on the
ground and maintaining their focus on the future of the country; note the
government’s decision to grant further access to UN humanitarian agencies and
partners through the Bab al-Hawa corridor until 13 January 2024, and Bab al-Salam
and al-Rai until 13 February 2024; remind all parties responsible of the absolute need
to keep these accesses open; urge the Commission and the Member States to, in
parallel with robust diplomatic action at the level of the UN Security Council, obtain
the continued operation of the border crossings of Bab al-Hawa, Bab al-Salaam and
al-Rai, for at least 12 months; explore the possibility of also channelling resources
through the recently established ‘Aid Fund for Northern Syria’; condemn the
systematic attempts by the Syrian regime to divert international humanitarian aid and
transfer it to militias, and the regime’s manipulation of exchange rates in order to
appropriate the majority of the aid destined for the territories under its control;

(r) recall that Syria cannot be regarded, in whole or in part, as a safe country for the
return of Syrian nationals living as refugees and asylum seekers in Europe and
around the world, people who have fled the crimes of the regime and risk torture and
enforced disappearance if they return to Syria; reiterate to host countries, such as
Türkiye, Lebanon, Jordan, Iraq and Egypt, that Syria is not a safe country, neither in
whole nor in part, and that Syrian nationals can therefore not return safely; stress that
each and every return must be voluntary and be under dignified conditions; stress
that some Syrians have fled terror organisations operating in Syria such as ISIS;
stress that there are areas in Syria where violent jihadist groups and militias are still
active; highlight the impact of the Syrian conflict on the 438 000 Palestinian refugees
estimated to be in the country and who depend primarily on the UN Relief and
Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA) for their basic
needs; express concern regarding the Agency’s financial situation and call for
Palestinian refugees to be better included in the EU’s humanitarian plans in Syria;

° °

2. Instructs its President to forward this recommendation to the Council, the Commission,
the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign
Affairs and Security Policy, and to have it translated and published in Arabic.

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 EXPLANATORY STATEMENT

As all eyes are once again turned towards the Middle East, Syria remains the land of a
forgotten conflict in the area, despite half a million deaths and millions of refugees. Assad’s
bloody dictatorship survives only through Russia and Iran’s support, and serves as a pawn in
the latter's strategy of regional destabilisation. Terrorist cells are still active. There cannot be
peace without justice, a return of refugees without a political settlement and a normalisation
of EU relations with Damascus without significant changes.

Three years after Parliament adopted a resolution on the 10th anniversary of the violently
repressed Syrian uprising and subsequent ongoing conflict, the situation in the country has,
unfortunately, stagnated, if not worsened. Bashar Al-Assad's Syria is ravaged by arms and
drug trafficking, with his brother commanding the army unit responsible for facilitating
Captagon's production. Al-Assad's regime is personally responsible for the death of half a
million civilians, the destruction of the country, the displacement of the majority of the
population and the torture and forced disappearance of more than 100 000 people. It has also
grown dependent on military and financial assistance from Iran and Russia, which it has
allowed to profit from exploiting the country's natural resources, at the expense of the Syrian
people. ISIS and other armed and terrorist groups remain a serious threat.

The Committee on Foreign Affairs opposes any normalisation of relations with the Assad
regime if it does not properly implement the UN Security Council Resolution 2254 (2015),
including by releasing political prisoners, informing the families of the victims about the fate
of the missing persons and victims of enforced disappearance, and stopping all attacks and
obstacles to humanitarian aid. The report stresses that the fight against impunity in Syria is a
prerequisite to any future resolution of the ongoing crisis, as well as a moral and political
imperative for Europe and the international community. The EU and its Member States must
continue to support attempts to bring the leadership of the Syrian regime to justice. The
international community must also urgently increase its humanitarian assistance to the 15.3
million Syrians who depend on it on a daily basis.

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 ANNEX: ENTITIES OR PERSONS
FROM WHOM THE RAPPORTEUR HAS RECEIVED INPUT

Pursuant to Article 8 of Annex I to the Rules of Procedure, the rapporteur declares that she
has received input from the following entities or persons in the preparation of the report, until
the adoption thereof in committee:

Entity and/or person

PAX
11.11.11
Women Support Unit
Midad organisation
Euro-Syrian Democratic Forum
Brigitte Curmi, Ambassadrice de France pour la Syrie
Hélène Le Gal, Service européen pour l’action extérieure
Michel Duclos, Special Advisor and Resident Senior Fellow, Geopolitics and Diplomacy at Institut
Montaigne
Kristina Kausch, Deputy Managing Director & Senior Fellow, GMF
Firas Kontar, French-Syrian human rights activist, political scientist and jurist
Manon-Nour Tannous, Doctor in International Relations, lecturer at the University of Reims
Champagne Ardenne

The list above is drawn up under the exclusive responsibility of the rapporteur.

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 INFORMATION ON ADOPTION IN COMMITTEE RESPONSIBLE

Date adopted 13.2.2024

Result of final vote +: 45

–: 5
0: 5

Members present for the final vote Alviina Alametsä, Alexander Alexandrov Yordanov, François Alfonsi,
Maria Arena, Petras Auštrevičius, Traian Băsescu, Krzysztof Brejza,
Fabio Massimo Castaldo, Włodzimierz Cimoszewicz, Michael Gahler,
Kinga Gál, Giorgos Georgiou, Sunčana Glavak, Bernard Guetta, Sandra
Kalniete, Dietmar Köster, Andrius Kubilius, Ilhan Kyuchyuk, David
Lega, Miriam Lexmann, Nathalie Loiseau, Leopoldo López Gil,
Antonio López-Istúriz White, Jaak Madison, Thierry Mariani, Pedro
Marques, David McAllister, Vangelis Meimarakis, Sven Mikser,
Francisco José Millán Mon, Alessandra Moretti, Javier Nart, Gheorghe-
Vlad Nistor, Demetris Papadakis, Kostas Papadakis, Tonino Picula,
Thijs Reuten, Nacho Sánchez Amor, Mounir Satouri, Andreas Schieder,
Jordi Solé, Dominik Tarczyński, Hermann Tertsch, Dragoş Tudorache,
Viola von Cramon-Taubadel, Thomas Waitz, Charlie Weimers, Isabel
Wiseler-Lima, Bernhard Zimniok, Željana Zovko
Substitutes present for the final vote Christophe Grudler, Andrzej Halicki, Georgios Kyrtsos, Katrin
Langensiepen, Christian Sagartz, Mick Wallace

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 FINAL VOTE BY ROLL CALL IN COMMITTEE RESPONSIBLE

46 +
PPE Alexander Alexandrov Yordanov, Traian Băsescu, Krzysztof Brejza, Michael Gahler, Sunčana Glavak,
Andrzej Halicki, Sandra Kalniete, Andrius Kubilius, David Lega, Miriam Lexmann, Leopoldo López Gil,
Antonio López-Istúriz White, David McAllister, Vangelis Meimarakis, Francisco José Millán Mon,
Gheorghe-Vlad Nistor, Christian Sagartz, Isabel Wiseler-Lima, Željana Zovko

Renew Petras Auštrevičius, Fabio Massimo Castaldo, Christophe Grudler, Bernard Guetta, Georgios Kyrtsos, Ilhan
Kyuchyuk, Nathalie Loiseau, Javier Nart, Dragoş Tudorache

S&D Maria Arena, Włodzimierz Cimoszewicz, Dietmar Köster, Pedro Marques, Sven Mikser, Alessandra Moretti,
Demetris Papadakis, Tonino Picula, Thijs Reuten, Nacho Sánchez Amor, Andreas Schieder

Verts/ALE Alviina Alametsä, François Alfonsi, Katrin Langensiepen, Mounir Satouri, Jordi Solé, Viola von Cramon-
Taubadel, Thomas Waitz

5 -
ID Thierry Mariani, Bernhard Zimniok

NI Kostas Papadakis

The Left Giorgos Georgiou, Mick Wallace

5 0
ECR Dominik Tarczyński, Hermann Tertsch, Charlie Weimers

ID Jaak Madison

NI Kinga Gál

Key to symbols:
+ : in favour
- : against
0 : abstention

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