Table of Contents

(1) Dhulabhai v State of Madhya Pradesh, AIR 1969 SC 78...........................................2

(2) Rajasthan SRTC v Mohar Singh, AIR 2008 SC 2553...................................................4
(3) The Premier Automobiles Ltd. Vs. Kamlekar Shantaram Wadke of Bombay and
Ors. : AIR 1975 SC 2238......................................................................................................5
(4) Most. Rev. P.M.A. Metropolitan and Ors. vs. Moran Mar Marthoma and Ors.
(20.06.1995 - SC) : AIR 1995 SC 2001..................................................................................6
 (1)
Dhulabhai v State of Madhya Pradesh, AIR 1969 SC 78
The Supreme Court has laid down In regard to the jurisdiction of special tribunals and the
exclusion of civil court jurisdiction.
a) Where the statute gives a finality to the orders of the special tribunals the Civil
Court's jurisdiction must be held to be excluded if there is adequate remedy to do
what the Civil Courts would normally do in a suit. Such provision, however, does not
exclude those cases where the provisions of the particular Act have not been
complied with or the statutory tribunal has not acted in conformity with the
fundamental principles of judicial procedure.

b) Where there is an express bar of the jurisdiction of the court, an examination of the
scheme of the particular Act to find the adequacy or the sufficiency of the remedies
provided may be relevant but is not decisive to sustain the jurisdiction of the civil
court.

c) Where there is no express exclusion the examination of the remedies and the
scheme of the particular Act to find out the intendment becomes necessary and the
result of the inquiry may be decisive. In the latter case it is necessary to see if the
statute creates a special right or a liability and provides for the determination of the
right or liability and further lays down that all questions about the said right and
liability shall be determined by the tribunals so constituted, and whether remedies
normally associated with actions in Civil Courts are prescribed by the said statue or
not.

d) Challenge to the provisions of the particular Act as ultra vires cannot be brought
before Tribunals constituted under that Act. Even the High Court cannot go into that
question on a revision or reference from the decision of the Tribunals.

e) When a provision is already declared unconstitutional or the constitutionality of any

provision is to be challenged, a suit is open. A writ of certiorari may include a
direction for refund if the claim is clearly within the time prescribed by the Limitation
Act but it is not a compulsory remedy to replace a suit.

f) Where the particular Act contains no machinery for refund of tax collected in excess
of constitutional limits or illegally collected a suit lies.

g) Questions of the correctness of the assessment apart from its constitutionality are
for the decision of the authorities and a civil suit does not lie if the orders of the
authorities are declared to be final or there is an express prohibition in the particular
Act. In either case the scheme of the particular Act must be examined because it is a
relevant enquiry.

h) An exclusion of the jurisdiction of the Civil Court is not readily to be inferred unless
the conditions above set down apply.
Facts:
The appellants are dealers in tobacco and have their places of business at Ujjain. They
purchase and sell tobacco used for eating, smoking and for preparing bidis. They get their
tobacco locally or import it from extra-state places. The former Madhya Bharat State
enacted in 1950 the Madhya Bharat Sales Tax Act (Act 30 of 1950) which came into force on
May 1, 1950. Under s. 3 of the Act every dealer whose business in the previous year in
respect of sales or supplies of goods exceeded in the case of an importer and manufacturer
Rs. 5,000 and in other cases Rs. 12,000 had to pay tax in respect of sales or supplies of goods
effected in Madhya Bharat from 1st May 1950. Under s. 5, the tax was a single point tax and
it was provided that the Government might by a notification specify the point of the sales at
which the tax was payable. The section also fixed the minimum and maximum rates of tax
leaving it to Government to notify the actual rate.

Government, in pursuance of this power, issued a number of notifications on April 30, 1950,
May 22, 1950, October 24, 1953 and January 21, 1954. All these notifications imposed tax at
different rates on tobacco above described on the importer, that is to say at the point of
import. The tax was not levied on sale or purchase of tobacco of similar kind in Madhya
Bharat. The tax was collected by the authorities in varying amounts from the appellants for
different quarters. We are not concerned with the amounts. The appellants served notices
under s. 80 of the Code of Civil Procedure and filed the present suits for refund of the tax on
the ground that it was illegally collected from them being against the constitutional
prohibition in Art. 301 and not saved under Art. 304(a) of the Constitution.

The State of Madhya Pradesh was formed on November 1, 1955. In Bhailal v. M.P.
MANU/MP/0157/1959 : 1960 M.P.L.J. 601 the High Court of Madhya Pradesh declared the
notifications to be offensive to Art. 301 of the Constitution on the ground that it was illegal
to levy a tax on the importer when a equal tax was not levied on similar goods produced in
the State. The decision was later confirmed on this point in State of M. P. v. Bhailal Bhai
MANU/SC/0029/1964 : [1964]6SCR261 . The appellants did not take recourse to the
provisions of Art. 226 of the Constitution but filed their suits on December 21, 1957.

The suits were opposed by the State on the main ground that such a suit was barred by the
provisions of s. 17 of the Act which provides :

“Bar to certain proceedings. - Save as is provided in s. 13, no

assessment made and no order passed under this Act or the rules made
thereunder by the assessing authority, appellate authority or the
Commissioner shall be called in question in any Court, and save as is provided
in sections 11 and 12 no appeal or application for revision shall lie against
any such assessment or order."
 (2)
Rajasthan SRTC v Mohar Singh, AIR 2008 SC 2553
Ratio Decidendi:
In the event, it is found that the action on the part of a State is violative of the Constitutional
Provisions or the mandatory requirements of a statute or statutory rules, the Civil Court
would have the jurisdiction to direct reinstatement with full back wages

If a right is claimed under the Industrial Disputes Act or the sister laws, the jurisdiction of the
Civil Court would be barred, but if no such right is claimed, civil court will have jurisdiction

Facts:
First appellant (Corporation) is a statutory corporation constituted and incorporated under
the Road Corporation Act, 1951. Respondent herein was a driver of a bus employed by the
Corporation.

On the charges of alleged commission of misconduct on the part of the respondent, a

disciplinary proceeding was initiated against him on or about 6.11.1982. The Enquiry Officer
found him guilty of the said charges. By reason of an order dated 31.5.1985, the disciplinary
authority, upon considering the report of enquiry officer inflicted the punishment of
dismissal from services on him with immediate effect. It was furthermore directed that he
shall not be entitled to further wages save and except what has already been paid to him by
way of subsistence allowance.

An appeal preferred by him was dismissed by the Appellate Authority by an order dated
16.6.1987.

Respondent filed a civil suit in the Court Additional Munsif, Jaipur which was marked as Civil
Suit No. 632/88 (290/86). In his written statement, the appellant, inter alia, contended that
the Civil Court had no jurisdiction to entertain the suit.

Held:

The decisions referred to hereinbefore clearly brings about a distinction which
cannot be lost sight of. If a right is claimed under the Industrial Disputes Act or the
sister laws, the jurisdiction of the Civil Court would be barred, but if no such right is
claimed, civil court will have jurisdiction.


Appellant is a 'State' within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution of India. It is
created under a statute. As a State, it is bound to comply with the requirements of
Article 14 of the Constitution of India as also other provisions of Part III of the
Constitution. It is also bound to comply with the mandatory provisions of the statute
or the regulations framed by it.
 
It is also bound to follow the principles of natural justice. In the event, it is found that
the action on the part of a State is violative of the Constitutional Provisions or the
mandatory requirements of a statute or statutory rules, the Civil Court would have
the jurisdiction to direct reinstatement with full back wages.

(3)
The Premier Automobiles Ltd. Vs. Kamlekar Shantaram Wadke
of Bombay and Ors. : AIR 1975 SC 2238
The principles applicable to the jurisdiction of the Civil Court in relation to an industrial
dispute may be stated thus:

a) If the dispute is not an industrial dispute, nor does it relate to enforcement of any
other right under the Act and the remedy lies only in the civil Court.

b) If the dispute is an industrial dispute arising out of a right or liability under the
general or common law and not under the Act, the jurisdiction of the civil Court is
alternative leaving it to the election of the suitor concerned to choose his remedy for
the relief which is competent to be granted in a particular remedy.

c) If the industrial dispute relates to the enforcement of a right or an obligation created

under the Act, then the only remedy available to the suitor is to get an adjudication
under the Act.

d) If the right which is sought to be enforced is a right created under the Act such as
Chapter VA then the remedy for its enforcement is either Section 33C or the raising
of an industrial dispute, as the case may be.

(4)
Most. Rev. P.M.A. Metropolitan and Ors. vs. Moran Mar
Marthoma and Ors. (20.06.1995 - SC) : AIR 1995 SC 2001
One of the basic principles of law is that every right has a remedy. Ubi jus ibi remedied is the
well known maxim. Every civil suit is cognisable unless it is barred, 'there is an inherent right
in every person to bring a suit of a civil nature and unless the suit is barred by statute one
may, at one's peril, bring a suit of one's choice. It is no answer to a suit, howsoever frivolous
the claim, that the law confers no such right to sue' Smt. Ganga Bai v. Vijay Kumar and Ors.
MANU/SC/0020/1974 . The expansive nature of the Section is demonstrated by use of
phraseology both positive and negative. The earlier part opens the door widely and latter
debars entry to only those which are expressly or impliedly barred. The two explanations,
one existing from inception and latter added I 1976 bring out clearly the legislative intention
of extending operation of the Section to such religious matters where right to property or
office is involved irrespective of whether any fees is attached to the office or not. The
language used is simple but explicit and clear. It is structured on the basic principle of a
civilised jurisprudence that absence of machinery for enforcement of right renders it
nugatory. The heading which is normally key to the Section brings out unequivocally that all
civil suits are cognizable unless barred. What is meant by it is explained further by widening
the ambit of the Section by use of the word 'shall' and the expression, all suits of a civil
nature' unless 'expressly or impliedly barred'.

Each word and expression casts an obligation on the court to exercise jurisdiction for
enforcement of right. The word 'shall' makes it mandatory. No court can refuse to entertain
a suit if it is of description mentioned in the Section . That is amplified by use of expression,
'all suits of civil nature'. The word 'civil' according to dictionary means, 'relating to the citizen
as an individual; civil rights'. In Black's Legal Dictionary it is defined as, 'relating to provide
rights and remedies sought by civil actions as contrasted with criminal proceedings'. In law it
is understood as an antonym of criminal. Historically the two broad classifications were civil
and criminal. Revenue, tax and company etc. were added to it later. But they top pertain to
the larger family of 'civil'. There is thus no doubt about the width of the word 'civil'. Its width
has been stretched further by using the word 'nature along with it. That is even those suits
are cognisable which are not only civil but are even of civil nature. In Article 133 of the
Constitution an appeal lies to this Court against any judgment, decree or order in a 'civil
proceeding'. This expression came up for construction in S.A.L. Narayan Row and Anr. Etc.
Etc. v. Ishwarlal Bhagwandas and Anr. Etc. Etc. MANU/SC/0160/1965 : [1965]57ITR149(SC) .
The Constitution Bench held 'a proceedings for relief against infringement of civil right of a
person is a civil proceedings'. In Arbind Kumar Singh v. Nand Kishore Prasad and Anr.
MANU/SC/0129/1968 , it was held 'to extend to all proceedings which directly affect civil
rights'. The dictionary meaning of the word 'proceedings' Is 'the institution of a legal action,
'any step taken in a legal action.' In Black's Law Dictionary it is explained as, 'In a general
sense, the form and manner of conducting juridical business before a court or judicial officer.
Regular and orderly progress in form of law, including all possible steps in an action from its
commencement to the execution of judgment. Term also refers to administrative
proceedings before agencies, tribunals, bureaus, or the like'. The word 'nature' has been
defined as, 'the fundamental qualities of a person or thing; identity or essential character;
sort; kind; character'. It is thus wider in content. The word 'civil nature' is wider than the
word 'civil proceeding'. The Section would, therefore, be available in every case where the
dispute has the characteristic of affecting one's rights which are not only civil but of civil
nature.

Are religious rights, for instance right to worship in a religious place, entry in a temple,
administration of religious shrines for instance a temple, mosque or a church are rights of
civil nature? is the suit filed by the respondent bad as the declaration, injunction and
prohibition sought are in respect of matters which are not civil in nature? The answer is
given by Explanation I. The Civil Procedure Code was enacted during British period. The
legislature enacting the law was aware that there were no ecclesiastical courts either in
ancient or Medieval India as in England. 'The term "ecclesiastical law" may be used both in a
general and in a technical sense. In its general sense it means the law relating to any matter
concerning the Church of England administered and enforced in any court; in its technical
sense it means the law administered by ecclesiastical courts and persons' [Halsbury's Laws
of England Vol. 14 para 137]. The ecclesiastical law of England is as much the law of the land
as any other part of the law' [Halsbury's Laws of England Vol. 14 para 139]. There was no
such law in our country. The ecclesiastical courts are peculiar to England. The Parliament was
aware of it. That is why it added Explanation I to Section 9 of the Civil Procedure Code. It
obviates any ambiguity by making it clear that where even right to an office is contested
then it would be a suit of a civil nature even though that right may entirely depend on the
decision of a question as to religious rites or ceremonies. Explanation II widens it further to
even those offices to which no fees are attached. Therefore, it was visualised from the
inception that a suit in which the right to property or religious office was involved it would
be a suit of civil nature. Reason for this is both historical and legal. In England ecclesiastical
law was accepted as a part of the common law binding on all. But, 'the introduction of
English Law into a colony does not carry with it English ecclesiastical law'. (Halsbury Laws of
England Vol. 14 para 315). In ancient or medieval India the courts were established by King
which heard all disputes. No religious institution was so strong and powerful as church in
England. The Indian outlook was always secular. Therefore, no parallel can be drawn
between the administration of the churches by ecclesiastical courts in England. Religion in
India has always been ritualistic. The Muslim rulers were by and large tolerant and
understanding. They made India their home. They invaded, ruled and became Indian. But
Britishers made it a colony. However they did not interfere with religion. Disputes pertaining
to religious office including performance of rituals were always decided by the courts
established by law.