SUMMER 2021 - Volume 68, Number 2

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.....Shape the Future

know the past
 Summer 2021 - Volume 68, Number 2
WWW.AFHISTORY.ORG

.....Shape the Future

know the past

Features Fly High, Fly Low: SAC Photographic Reconnaissance in Southeast Asia
William Cahill 7
Gene Deatrick: An Appreciation
Jonna Doolittle Hoppes 27
The SA-2 and U-2: Secrets Revealed
John A. Schell 33
Mexicans in World War II: America’s Ally of the Air
Cynthia Buchanan 43
Book Reviews Balloons and Airships: A Tale of Lighter than Air Aviation
By Anthony Burton Review by Joseph Romito 48
Beaufighters:Over Sea, Sand and Steaming Jungles
By Jack Colman & Richard Colman Review by Gary Connor 448
Showdown in Western Sahara Volume 2: Air Warfare over the Last African Colony, 1975-1991
By Tom Cooper, Albert Grandolini, & Adrien Fontanellaz Review by George W. Runkle 49
Ho Chi Minh Trail 1964-73: Steel Tiger, Barrel Roll, and the Secret Wars in Vietnam and Laos
By Peter E. Davies Review by Joseph D. Yount 50
French Bombers of WWII
By José Fernandez and Patrick Laureau Review by Joseph Romito 4550
Arado Ar 234 Bomber and Reconnaissance Units
By Robert Forsythe and Nick Beale Review by Gary Connor 51
Luftwaffe Aces in the Battle of Britain
By Chris Goss Review by Edward M. Young 52
War in the Far East: Japan Runs Wild 1942-1943
By Peter Harmsen Review by Edward M. Young 52
V2: A Novel of World War II
By Robert Harris Review by Robert Huddleston 53
Oswald Boelcke: Germany’s First Fighter Ace and Father of Air Combat
By R. G. Head . Review by Gary Connor 53
Robert A. Lovett and the Development of American Air Power
By David M. Jordan Review by Steven D. Ellis 54
Through Adversity: Britain and the Commonwealth’s War in the Air 1939-1945: Volume 1
By Ben Kite Review by Edward M. Young 55
Memoirs of a Stuka Pilot
By Helmut Mahlke Review by Joseph Romito 55
US Air Cavalry Trooper versus North Vietnamese Soldier Vietnam 1965-1968
By Chris McNab Review by John Cirafici 56
Inferno: The True Story of a B–17 Gunner’s Heroism and the Bloodiest Military Campaign...
By Joe Pappalardo Review by Steven Agoratus 57
Operation Colossus: The First British Airborne Raid of World War II
By Lawrence Patterson Review by Steven D. Ellis 57
Airpower Over Gallipoli
By Sterling Michael Pavelec Review by Jayson A. Altieri 58
The Battle for Heraklion. Crete 1941: The Battle Revealed Through Allied and Axis Accounts
By Yannis Prekatsounakis Review by Steven D. Ellis 59
The Yugoslav Air Force in the Battle for Slovenia, Croatia, and Bosnia and Herzegovina, 1991-92, Vol. 1
By Aleksandar Radi Review by John Cirafici 59
Spying from the Sky: At the Controls of U.S. Cold War Aerial Intelligence
By Robert L. Richardson Review by Joseph Romito 60
World War II Gunships: YB–40 Flying Fortress and XB–41 Liberator Bomber Escorts
By William Wolf Review by Scott A. Willey 61
Departments President’s Message 3
Upcoming Events 62
New History Mystery 64

COVER: The U–2R (front cover), introduced in 1967, was significantly larger than the original U–2. Its
wingspan was 103 feet rather than 80 feet. The new aircraft took advantage of a more powerful engine.
 The Air Force Historical Foundation

The Journal of the

Air Force Historical Foundation
Summer 2021 Volume 68 Number 2

Editor
Richard I. Wolf

Editor Emeritus
Jacob Neufeld

Air Force Historical Foundation Book Review Editor

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First Vice Chairman Lt Col Raymond Fredette, USAF (Ret.) duced for Spring, Summer, Fall, and Winter by
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2 AIR POWER History / SUMMER 2021

 From the President
Dear Foundation Members and Friends,

From June 2017 to June 2021, I have been honored to serve as

President of the AFHF. I am grateful to my many predecessors for their
stewardship of the Foundation, especially Maj Gen Dale Meyerrose
who led us successfully to fiscal sustainability and created the major
award programs that now highlight AFHF each year. Even more, I
am immensely indebted to the many Board members and our staff who
contributed wisely and well to the Foundation over the last four years;
their dedication brought us through the pandemic intact and poised
us for new vibrancy, even as the Department of the Air Force prepares
to celebrate its 75th Anniversary.
As we pause to look back to the Foundation’s beginnings in 1953,
we can take pride in an Air Force Historical Foundation created and
led by the towering figures of American combat aviation and the
United States Air Force. Over the years, AFHF has done truly unique and valuable work in docu-
menting and analyzing Air Force history. The Foundation and those who write military history have
told the stories of people, air and space systems, technologies, bases, missions, valor, and innovation.
They have recorded how Airmen assured the preservation of America’s freedom and prosperity
through the Cold War and since its end, in peacetime and combat, everywhere on the globe and in
orbit above it. Throughout its almost sixty-eight years of operation, the Foundation has highlighted
successes and failures while recognizing the unfailing dedication and quality of Airmen and civilians
who have generated America’s air and space power. As historians, members, and supporters of the
Foundation you have been essential to that unique and valuable work.
As we approach the 75th Anniversary year of 2022, AFHF will contribute in several tangible
ways. It’s likely our Fall awards will be held in-person, for what should be a memorable and enjoyable
event! We are resuming book-publishing efforts as well, with one book fully committed to coincide
with the USAF’s 75th anniversary in 2022. Entitled “75 Great Airmen,” it is meant to be an inspi-
rational work that tells the stories of men and women who made a difference over the decades since
1947.
Looking to the future, the U.S. Air Force and the U.S. Space Force now share a Military Depart-
ment, a powerfully innovative technological heritage, and an exacting and truly global responsibility.
The initial and ongoing partnership between these two Services should be a source of great pride
for our nation, Air Force, and Foundation. The challenges our nation faces are ever more complex
and historians face an even more daunting task in documenting, analyzing, and sharing insights,
based on fact, that can inform and inspire action. This will be the hallmark of the coming era, as
American society’s attention is pulled in innumerable directions and the discipline of history—and
military history in particular—is less present in secondary and university education and more politi-
cized in broader society. Assuring national security is growing more difficult in every respect—de-
manding more capable and more interconnected people, technologies, organizations, laws,
relationships. Making it comprehensible and accessible to people who should read it will be a chal-
lenge that today and tomorrow’s historians must take on. And while today’s serving Airmen and
Guardians are admirable, indispensable professionals, their love of history can’t be assumed—it
must be cultivated, and the Foundation will need to evolve how it reaches them and what it offers
to succeed in that vital pursuit.
AIR POWER History / SUMMER 2021 3
 I have great confidence that the Board whose election is just now concluding will be superbly led
and energetic as it seeks to expand our resources, ambition and electronic presence; sustain impec-
cable documentation of American military power; and enhance AFHF’s impact on all we reach. Be-
yond the Board, our Foundation depends greatly on the vitality and contributions of its
membership—what you think, give, and do matters greatly!
As I conclude seven years on your Board and four as President and Chairman, I thank you for
your faithful support now and in the years to come. It has been a privilege to serve.

With Best Regards,

Christopher D. Miller,
Lieutenant General, USAF (Ret)
President and Chairman of the Board

From the Editor

Our first article is by long-time contributor William Cahill, who writes about the devel-
opment of the peacetime reconnaissance capability of Strategic Air Command.
Our second article is from Jonna Doolittle Hoppes, a Foundation Board member and
granddaughter of Gen. Jimmy Doolittle, who writes an appreciation of Gene Deatrick, Air
Force officer and possessor of a most notable career. He recently passed away, and his de-
parture prompted an examination of the events of his life and career.
Our third article is by John A. Schell who updates the scholarship surrounding the 1960
shootdown of a U–2 over the Soviet Union, which resulted in the public trial of its pilot Fran-
cis Gary Powers and upended U.S.-Soviet relations. There is a great deal of clarification of
the fuzzy sequence of events.
The final article in this issue is by a first-time contributor,Cynthia Buchanan, who writes
about the Mexican contribution to the air combat of World War II. It’s an oft-neglected area,
so take advantage of the opportunity to read about it. Don’t skip over it to get to the reviews
of which there are 21 this time..
The President’s Message begins on page 3. Don’t miss Upcoming Events on page 62, al-
though I fear you must take all dates in that section as still uncertain at this point. If you
see something scheduled, be sure to check with the organization sponsoring the event to en-
sure it will take place. It’s still a most uncertain world. And the closing story is this issue’s
Mystery. Enjoy!

Air Power History and the Air Force Historical Foundation disclaim responsibility
for statements, either of fact or of opinion, made by contributors. The submission of
an article, book review, or other communication with the intention that it be pub-
lished in this journal shall be construed as prima facie evidence that the contributor
willingly transfers the copyright to Air Power History and the Air Force Historical
Foundation, which will, however, freely grant authors the right to reprint their own
works, if published in the authors’ own works.

4 AIR POWER History / SUMMER 2021

AIR POWER History / SUMMER 2021 5
6 AIR POWER History / SUMMER 2021
Fly High, Fly Low:
SAC Photographic
Reconnaissance in
Southeast Asia

William Cahill

T
U–2C, likely in the U.S., depicting the new SAC black velvet
paint scheme, circa 1965-66. (Photo courtesy of Chris Pocock.)

he Second World War provided ample opportunity for America’s airmen to validate their theories from the Air
Corps Tactical School at Maxwell Field. One point made clear in retrospectives on the European and Pacific strate-
gic bombing campaigns was the necessity of strong strategic reconnaissance forces to find targets for the bombing
force and measure the success of the ongoing bombing campaign. Strategic Air Command (SAC) validated this concept
in the Korean conflict, with SAC reconnaissance assets ranging across the theater to not only find targets, but to also as-
sess the intentions of Chinese Communist forces across the border (see the author’s “The Korean War and the Maturation
of SAC Reconnaissance,” in Fall 2012 Air Power History for more details on SAC’s role in this conflict). Under the guidance
of General Curtis LeMay, SAC became singular in focus: the organization existed to accomplish the SAC Emergency War
Order (EWO), its planned execution of this future air war. Within this framework, SAC viewed its reconnaissance mission
in two phases: pre-hostilities and wartime.1
Pre-hostility, reconnaissance forces were to “establish, determine, and confirm the potential enemy’s order of battle”
to assist in the constant updating of the EWO. Once ordered to war, reconnaissance forces would confirm enemy defenses
and, if need be, confirm target locations for bomber missions as well as conduct post-strike reconnaissance for follow on
bomber attacks. These missions were centrally controlled in the United States by SAC, with an added layer of control in
Washington during peacetime. In 1964 the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) established a Joint Reconnaissance Center (JRC)
which served the purpose of providing a single focal point for sensitive peacetime reconnaissance. Through the JRC, the
JCS would direct reconnaissance operations during periods of tension prior to open hostilities. SAC’s Strategic Recon-
naissance Center (SRC) acted as a clearing house and coordination center for SAC, directing and controlling SAC’s re-
connaissance fleet to collect intelligence data essential for SAC’s EWP. Within SAC, organization for reconnaissance
followed command lines, e.g., the commanders of the Second, Fifteenth and Sixteenth Air Forces, and Third Air Division.
Subordinate to them were the forward area (OL) commanders who were designated to command the reconnaissance
forces overseas.2
While there was a significant amount of pre-hostility signals intelligence that could be accomplished by flying an air-
craft off the coast of a hostile nation, there was little for photographic reconnaissance to do to prepare for war (see the au-
thor’s “Strategic Air Command SIGINT Support to the Vietnam War,” in Winter 2019 Air Power History for more details
on SAC’s SIGINT mission in Southeast Asia). Save a few excursions such as Project HOMERUN overflights of the Soviet
Union in 1956 SAC’s photographic reconnaissance assets had little to do operationally after the conclusion of the Korean
conflict. That would be altered as tensions heated up in Southeast Asia.

AIR POWER History / SUMMER 2021 7

US National Interests – 1960

After the neutralist Laotian Government collapsed in

December 1960, a new Laotian Government asked the
United Nations for aid against an invasion from the Dem-
ocratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV – North Vietnam) or
Communist China. Alarmed over the possible introduction
of foreign troops, President Eisenhower requested more in-
telligence on the matter. To meet the President’s needs, the
Special Group directed the Central Intelligence Agency
(CIA) to deploy U–2 aircraft.3 The Special Group, a sub-
committee of the National Security Council, was responsi-
ble for coordinating government covert operations such as
the CIA’s U–2 reconnaissance aircraft, a program which
gave the US Government low visibility collection opera-
tions with a minimal footprint. The joint US Air Force
Lockheed U–2A Serial Number 56-6951 of the 4028th Strategic Recon-
(USAF)/CIA U–2 reconnaissance project was known as naissance Squadron taxiing at Bien Hoa Air Base, RVN in early 1965.
IDEALIST and had been flying operational missions since RVN AF Douglas A–1H Skyraiders and USAF Martin B–57B Canberras
1956. In the Far East, joint CIA-Republic of Chinese (ROC) are in the background. U–2D 56-6951 crashed on October 19, 1966 on
Air Force U–2 missions were executed under Project the runway at Davis Monthan AFB, Arizona, during a practice approach
and landing. The pilot survived without injury.
TACKLE and had already flown missions over Communist
China.4 In January 1961, under Operation POLECAT, the revealed additional activity in south China. Based on this
CIA flew seven missions over Southeast Asia (SEA) from intelligence, the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) re-
Naval Air Station Cubi Point in the Philippines. Operation quested additional missions over both areas to further in-
EBONY in August 1961 was a similar activity with one vestigate what was occurring. The CIA continued to fly
mission over the DRV. In addition to conducting photo- missions until May 1963 when operations were paused due
graphic reconnaissance, the aircraft flew with the System to weather.
VI Electronic Intelligence (ELINT) sensor and were able The weather in SEA had a large influence on high al-
to map Chinese and probable DRV radar sites.5 titude flight operations. A contemporary study revealed
The need for intelligence slowly grew, and in October January through May having an average of six “good” (less
1961 four RF-101C photographic reconnaissance aircraft than 25% cloud coverage) days per month for high altitude
from the 15th Tactical Reconnaissance Squadron arrived reconnaissance. This dropped down to one to two through
at Tan Son Nhut Air Base to conduct operations over the the summer monsoon months of June, July and August be-
Republic of Vietnam (RVN – South Vietnam) and Laos.6 In fore recovering in September.10 Monthly CIA U–2 missions
February 1962 the CIA commenced regular flights in SEA over DRV resumed from Takhli in October 1963 but shifted
using the Project TACKLE U–2s operating from T’ao-yuan back to Taiwan after November, which continued to sup-
Air Base, Taiwan.7 In March 1962 TACKLE operations port sorties over DRV and Laos until Takhli operations re-
were expanded to cover Commander in Chief, Pacific sumed the following March. On January 23, 1964, the
(CINCPAC)-requested targets in south China and the DRV Special Group authorized collection over RVN to support
necessary to understand China’s intentions in SEA.8 These the strategic hamlet program. Requirements for photo-
additional missions were flown from Takhli Royal Thai Air graphic reconnaissance in SEA, though, continued to build.
Force Base (RTAFB), Thailand, a location previously used Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV) and De-
by the CIA for missions against the Chinese-Indian border partment of Defense (DoD) put forth the need for daily cov-
and Tibet.9 The first sortie was flown on December 27, 1962 erage of infiltration routes through Laos and Cambodia as
and imagery from this mission revealed “significant new well as additional coverage of RVN. In a Special Group
military activities” in the DRV while a sortie from Taiwan meeting on February 24 to discuss these new require-
ments, DCI McCone called it illusory to believe daily im-
agery coverage “would result in consistent comprehensive
William Cahill is a retired Air Force intelligence offi-
coverage of Viet Cong infiltration and build up.”
cer who contracts for DoD in the Washington D.C.
McCone’s comments notwithstanding, the Special
area. An Intelligence Weapons Officer with squadron
Group recommended SAC deploy three U–2 aircraft to
and wing-level experience, he has also served on the
Saigon and the CIA increase the tempo of its U–2 opera-
Air Staff and in an inter-agency capacity outside of
tions in order to fulfill the MACV and DoD requirements.
DoD. Mr. Cahill is a graduate of San Jose State Uni-
The National Reconnaissance Office, responsible for coor-
versity and has MS degrees from Embry Riddle Aero-
dinating CIA and DoD reconnaissance activities, recom-
nautical University and the National Defense
mended that SAC U–2s cover RVN, Laos, and the DRV up
Intelligence College. Mr. Cahill has been published in
to 30 miles from the Chinese border while CIA TACKLE
Air Power History, FlyPast, the USAF Weapons Re-
U–2 missions flown by ROC pilots would be responsible for
view and C4ISR Journal.
south China and the DRV south of the Chinese border. The

8 AIR POWER History / SUMMER 2021

 gic reconnaissance missions in an environment similar to
what was envisioned during times of war.13 In late 1963
and early 1964 SAC would fly a few peripheral ELINT mis-
sions against the USSR but the U–2 fleet was still under-
utilized from a strategic reconnaissance perspective. That
would soon change.14
In February 7, 1964 CINCPAC Admiral Harry D. Felt
requested the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) provide U–2s to
aid in supporting Op Plan 34A, the DoD covert action cam-
paign against the DRV. Deputy Secretary of Defense Cyrus
Vance ordered SAC to dispatch three U–2 aircraft and
seven pilots to the Philippines, ostensibly for one flight to
cover two targets. On February 11, 1964 SAC deployed
three U–2E aircraft from the 4080th SW to Clark Air Base
(AB), Philippines. The aircraft arrived at Clark, designated
Operating Location 15 (OL-15), the following day but ap-
parently the deployment was not well coordinated in Wash-
ington as neither the appropriate channels in State
Department nor the Special Group were aware of the ac-
tion. Within 24 hours of arrival the first LUCKY DRAGON
sortie was launched on February 13. Two other missions
were flown, on the 15th and 16th, though of these three
only one produced usable imagery due to clouds in the tar-
get area. On February 19th OL-15 was directed to deploy
all its assets to OL-14, Andersen AB, Guam, while things
Imagery from a Ryan 147S/AQM-34L operational mission flown over the were sorted out in Washington. On March 5, 1964, the air-
DRV on October 6, 1968. The Model 147S took horizon to horizon im- craft finally arrived at their designated home, Bien Hoa
agery, which is a strip at lower right; the main photo is an enlargement AB, RVN and set up OL-20. The next day the wing flew its
of the top third of the image strip depicting a DRV AAA site disguised to first sortie, with two sorties per day being flown for the re-
look like an SA-2 site mainder of the month.15
Special Group reviewed the proposal and concurred with Intelligence requirements increased as the US was
the deployment of SAC U–2s, but limited their operations drawn inexorably into the conflict in SEA with the opera-
to RVN.11 On March 17, 1964 the Special Group trans- tions tempo starting to strain the IDEALIST/TACKLE
ferred responsibility for the target list in the DRV and Laos program. The loss of a U–2 on a training mission off Taiwan
from the Committee on Overhead Reconnaissance brought the Agency inventory down to six aircraft; with
(COMOR), which coordinated CORONA satellite and CIA new requirements on the books to surveil French nuclear
U–2 collection, to the Commander of MACV.12 The nature tests and monitor the Chinese-Indian border, something
of the war as well as the CIA’s role was rapidly changing; had to give. The CIA needed relief from what was turning
in a little over a year the CIA had gone from strategic mon- into a tactical DoD requirement and worked with the NRO
itoring to tactical support. to develop a solution. At a meeting of the Special Group on
April 23, 1964 the Acting DCI, Lt Gen Marshall Carter,
SAC Enters the Fight proposed transferring all tasking that contributed to the
tactical mission – all of RVN, Laos, the DRV up to the Chi-
SAC activated the 4080th Strategic Wing (SW) on May nese border, and 30 miles deep into Cambodia – to SAC U–
1, 1956 to operate the Martin RB-57D high altitude recon- 2s. The Special Group unanimously approved, keeping the
naissance aircraft flown by the 4025th Strategic Recon- 30 mile limit into Cambodia but allowing SAC to fly an un-
naissance Squadron (SRS). The 4028th SRS stood up to limited number of flights as locally required.16
operate the U–2A the same year, though the first aircraft SAC quickly settled into a routine with missions flown
did not arrive until June 1957. The SAC U–2s would spend from OL-20 under the authority of SAC Operations Order
the next few years flying high altitude air sampling mis- (OPORD) 60-66-07 to “conduct photo reconnaissance of
sions around the globe to monitor Soviet nuclear tests, re- military objectives in Southeast Asia as specified by JCS,
taining their photo reconnaissance capability for wartime COMUSMACV and Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) val-
employment. The CIA had been monitoring the Soviet idated requirements.”17 Between May 18 and June 14 sev-
arms buildup in Cuba with its own U–2s since October enteen LUCKY DRAGON U–2 flights were flown to
1960, but as things started to heat up in the Caribbean in include missions over the DRV. The targets for the U–2
October 1962 the USAF and Secretary of Defense McNa- were largely selected by MACV and CINCPAC for tactical
mara successfully lobbied to transfer the mission to SAC intelligence, including airfields, military installations, and
and the 4028th SRS. SAC U–2s came to the forefront dur- lines of communication. COMOR maintained the target
ing this operation and proved their ability to fly true strate- list, forwarding to SAC through DIA for collection. The U–

AIR POWER History / SUMMER 2021 9

 SA-2’s Fan Song target tracking radar and was mounted
in two wing pods, opening up the sensor “Q-Bay” aft of the
cockpit for cameras. The QRC-192 used an above-fuselage
‘ram’s horns’ antenna configuration and provided a direc-
tion finding capability which could help plot out SA-2 loca-
tions—a vast improvement over the simple omni-
directional capability of Systems IV and IV-A. The system
had been trialed off Cuba in August 1963 but was still
being tinkered with when it deployed to SEA in September
1965.22 Technicians worked to refine the QRC-192, but
until then OL-20 would have to make do with the existing
SIGINT sensors as well as System XII, which fielded in
mid-1965 and also covered the frequency range of the Fan
Song.23
While the CIA maintained its on again, off again mis-
sions over southern China from Taiwan, SAC continued to
Ryan Model 147SDL being carried on the wing of a DC–130 in flight as expand its effort over the war zone.24 By January 1965 the
viewed from the cockpit of the DC–130. A U–2R flies in formation off the SAC U–2s were up to 25 missions per month to cover re-
port wing of the DC–130 to show the reconnaissance airframes associ- quirements in Laos, Cambodia, RVN and the DRV.25 The
ated with the 100th SRW. Circa 1972-74 next month, CINCPAC requested that TROJAN HORSE
2 flights were not just for intelligence purposes – the John- missions be used to follow the progress of the deployment
son Administration considered the twenty missions per of SA-2 SAMs to the DRV.26 February also witnessed CIA
month “messaging on intent” to the DRV.18 TACKLE missions return to operations, likely after a
The facilities at Bien Hoa AB were far from optimum, month-long stand-down following the loss of a TACKLE
with overcrowded buildings, limited ramp space, and a aircraft over Inner Mongolia. Missions were flown over the
local threat literally right outside the perimeter fence. As northern part of the DRV and southern China, often toting
OL-20 adjusted into a routine, SAC reduced the assigned SIGINT payloads and servicing targets such as airfields,
U–2 aircraft from three to two as the tasking settled into military installations, and industrial complexes.27
an average of one sortie per day when the weather allowed In March 1965, the tensions ratcheted up once again
it. The U–2 sorties averaged about five hours, with weather with the initiation of Operation ROLLING THUNDER on
causing 86 stand down days in the first year of flight oper- March 2. ROLLING THUNDER was the Johnson Admin-
ations. In October 1964 SAC directed its U–2s to be painted istration’s plan to apply selective pressure against Hanoi
from the initial grey and aluminum paint schemes to a to compel it to end aggression in the RVN. ROLLING
black velvet scheme, mirroring the aircraft flown by the THUNDER brought a sustained bombing campaign to
CIA. In mid-December 1964, the SEA mission program SEA—a campaign in need of targets, intelligence on
name transitioned from LUCKY DRAGON to TROJAN threats, and bomb damage assessment (BDA) of strikes.
HORSE, with the OL-20 U–2 missions retaining this name During the first six months of 1965 SAC launched 135 sor-
for the next three years.19 ties from OL-20. The DRV reacted to ROLLING THUN-
The 4028th SRS deployed with two Type B cameras as DER by bringing into operation an integrated air defense
well as one A-2 mapping camera, the A-2 seeing use on ini- system of MiG fighters and SA-2 SAMs controlled by their
tial missions over RVN to create a mosaic in support of mil- air arm, the Vietnam People’s Air Force (VPAF). With the
itary requirements. For operations up north, the Type B discovery of the SA-2 in the area of Hanoi and Haiphong
was the primary sensor and was the same sensor used on on the April 5 TROJAN HORSE mission, U–2 flights were
CIA overflight missions.20 That same month, SAC deployed restricted to routes outside a 30 NM circle around known
the Strategic Air Relocatable Photographic Facility SAM sites.28 Soon the “Oscar Sierra” unit, a display for the
(SARPF) to Ton Son Nhut AB to support U–2 and Ryan pilot to indicate an SA-2 being launched already in CIA U–
Model 147 operations in RVN and replace the initial photo 2s, was installed in SAC U–2s along with the System 13
processing capabilities brought from Clark AB in April SA-2 jammer.29 There was a constant battle within SAC
1964.21 Though deployed for their photographic capability, over what electronic countermeasures systems to field to
all U–2 sorties flew with Systems I and III signals intelli- OL-20 and what to reserve for EWO use only. A similar
gence (SIGINT) payloads for collecting against DRV radar fight had occurred 15 years prior in the skies over Korea
and communications. Tapes from these payloads were with B–29 defensive measures. At times it was better to
downloaded and flown to Offutt Air Force Base (AFB), NE just avoid the threat; as the SAM threat increased, the
for processing by the 544th Aerospace Reconnaissance 4028th SRS started to fly SIGINT missions over the Gulf
Technical Wing. Initially, the SIGINT capability of the SAC of Tonkin, some with F–4 escort due to air threat.30
U–2s was marginal at best. Soon SAC fielded Systems IV The time was coming to a close for CIA U–2 operations
and IV-A, but with the emergence of the SA-2 Surface to in SEA. On December 30, 1965, the Secretary of Defense
Air Missile (SAM) additional capability was required. The ordered a stand down of all U–2 flights over South China
QRC-192 worked with Systems IV and IV-A to target the to eliminate possible conflicts with efforts to enter peace

10 AIR POWER History / SUMMER 2021

 bishment and follow on missions. The first BLUE
SPRINGS mission was flown on August 20, 1964. After a
few missions, the detachment rotated to OL-20/Bien Hoa
AB for eight days to fly missions over the DRV with drone
recovery at Da Nang AB, RVN. The 4080th SW Task Force
supporting BLUE SPRINGS returned to OL-20 for good
on October 8, 1964, launching its first mission three days
later.33
By January 1965, the Ryan 147B drones were sched-
uled for eight missions against China and the DRV. For the
first six months of 1965, SAC launched 22 missions of
which 14 were recovered and 12 were considered effec-
tive.34 OL-20 had one DC–130 and up to 11 Ryan 147s in
August 1965, averaging five to ten BLUE SPRINGS Ryan
147 missions per month. On July 1, 1965, the 4025th RS
A dark painted Ryan Model 147J mounted on the wing of a DC–130 at was formed to provide structure to the detachment and op-
Bien Hoa AB, RVN, April 1966, the same month the Model 147J model, a erate the DC–130A and Ryan 147 aircraft.35
147G model optimized for low altitude work, started operations in SEA. Though deployed for photographic reconnaissance, the
Between April 1966 and November 1967 the Model 147J flew 94 sorties Ryan 147s entered into the SIGINT business in a rather
with a 65 percent recovery rate. dramatic way. Project LONG ARM surfaced as a concept
negotiations with the DRV. In early January two CIA U– to fly an expendable Ryan 147 drone within lethal range
2s at Edwards AFB were transferred to SAC for use in of a hostile SA-2 SAM site and, perhaps, even be “killed”
SEA.31 Shortly thereafter the CIA detachment at Takhli by a SAM. The drone would relay ELINT received by its
closed up shop and redeployed back to the US. Though a sensors to specially-configured RB–47Hs flying nearby but
few more TACKLE missions would be flown in mid-1966, outside of the lethal range of the SAMs. Ryan developed
the south China mission had largely transferred to a dif- two Model 147D drones for the purpose, taking a standard
ferent asset – SAC unmanned reconnaissance drones. photographic reconnaissance Model 147C drone and equip-
ping it with radar receivers. The Ryan 147Ds and the two
Drones to the Front modified RB–47H aircraft were ready to go for an opera-
tion over Cuba in December 1962, but the action never ma-
In February 1962, the BIG SAFARI program office, a terialized and the two drones were put in storage.36 In
USAF organization specializing in the rapid acquisition of October 1963, the operation was back on and Headquarters
systems derived from existing aircraft, awarded its first USAF directed SAC to prepare a concept of operations and
contract to Ryan to modify their BQM–34 target drone into an initial statement of requirements. SAC complied, ac-
the Model 147 FIREFLY Special Purpose Aircraft. When quiring three Model 147E drones—essentially an updated
the program name FIREFLY was compromised it was Model 147D—and bringing its modified RB–47Hs back
changed to LIGHTNING BUG. As the program matured, into the proper configuration as well as training personnel.
the 4080th SW was identified as the unit to operate the The project again waxed hot and cold until early 1965
photographic reconnaissance drones and in March 1963 when SAC started test flights. After three months of test
Headquarters SAC directed the wing to send personnel on flights in Arizona, California and Florida the system was
temporary duty (TDY) to Holloman AFB, NM to train on working reliably enough for overseas deployment.37
Ryan 147 drones and GC–130 (soon named DC–130) The JCS directed Project LEFT HOOK as a combined
launch aircraft. Airmen also received maintenance training CINCSAC, CINCPAC, and National Security Agency oper-
with Ryan as well as the sub-contractors who built avionics ation that would have the older Ryan 147D drones locate
and payloads for the drones. In March 1964, the wing de- SA-2 sites for follow-on attack by fighter aircraft. The Ryan
ployed one DC–130 and three Ryan drones to Eglin AFB, 147s were packed and shipped to the Pacific and the LONG
FL for two months to continue training.32 ARM RB–47Hs deployed for flight operations from OL-7
On the heels of the August 4, 1964 Tonkin Gulf inci- in the Philippines. The Ryan 147D drones were launched
dent the JRC directed the SRC to deploy personnel, Ryan by 4080th SW DC–130s out of Bien Hoa—the first on Au-
147B drones, two DC–130s, and ten Ryan technical repre- gust 20, 1965, the second on August 31. Both drones were
sentatives to OL-8 at Kadena AB, Okinawa, Japan under knocked down by ground fire with little to show for their
control of SAC OPORD 63-65, HIGH BAR, which covered effort. With both drones expended, the project was termi-
worldwide drone operations. SAC FRAGO 63-65B, BLUE nated, and operations rolled into Project UNITED EF-
SPRINGS, was a JCS-directed project to accomplish aerial FORT using the Model 147E drones. The first operational
photography in SEA. The 4080th SW Task Force charged mission took place on October 16, 1965 but the North Viet-
with drone operations would launch the drones from DC– namese failed to engage the drone and it was recovered.
130s over the South China Sea for missions against south- The second and third UNITED EFFORT missions, flown
east China with drone recovery in Taiwan. The drones on October 20 and November 5, were deemed a partial suc-
would then be ferried by DC–130 back to OL-8 for refur- cess. Though both drones were lost, they did capture some

AIR POWER History / SUMMER 2021 11

SIGINT data but not the critical fuzing signal. Operations
were temporarily halted while the sole remaining Ryan
147E was returned to the US for rework. It was not until
February 13, 1966, on the fourth mission, that the signal
was successfully captured, the Ryan 147E relaying critical
signals before it was destroyed. With no more Model 147E
drones and the signals captured the LONG ARM RB–47s
deployed back to Forbes AFB.38
An unknown number of Model 147G drones were mod-
ified as a follow-on to the Model 147E. On September 27,
1966 one LONG ARM RB–47H arrived at OL-7 and flew
five OLD BAR missions between October 5 and November
10 along with a flight to Bien Hoa AB to do telemetry
checks with the Model 147G; one operational 147G mission
was flown in this time period. At least one additional drone
ELINT flight was planned against a Chinese SA-2 site at
Canton on January 12, 1967 but after failing checkout on
Ryan AQM-34L "TOM CAT" mounted on the wing of a DC–130 at U-Tapao
the DC–130 was never flown. The LONG ARM RB–47H RTAFB, Thailand, in 1972. This drone had the record for largest number
deployed back to the US, returning on June 20, 1967 to OL- of completed sorties (68) and finally was lost on sortie 69, September
7 after a telemetry check at Davis Monthan AFB with the 25, 1974. Standing beside the AQM–34 is one of her Launch Control Offi-
4080th SW. This last LONG ARM RB–47H TDY lasted less cers, Major John Dale
than two months and it is unknow if any additional 147G
SIGINT missions were flown during this time period.39 drone would deploy a parachute at medium altitude, usu-
ELINT birds notwithstanding, the Ryan 147B contin- ally around 15,000 feet, and as it was floating down it
ued to be the standard drone in use for most of 1965. The would be snagged by a helicopter in a method similar to
imagery provided by the Model 147Bs was not the best, but that used to recover CORONA film capsules. The mid-air
the sheer volume made up for this shortfall. The National retrieval system (MARS) encountered a difficult gestation
Photographic Interpretation Center (NPIC) in Washington period and would not become operational until early
compared early mission imagery to “poor quality U–2 im- 1966.44 On April 3, 1966 the first CH-3C MARS helicopters
agery.” Film was originally processed by SAC’s Third Air arrived in Vietnam and by mid-June work began on a hel-
Division at Anderson AFB, Guam and shipped to NPIC for iport at Da Nang AB for Det 10, 4025th RS, the helicopter
exploitation but transitioned to the SARPF at Ton Son detachment associated with SEA drone operations.45
Nhut AB in September 1965.40 In late October 1965 the In early 1966 ten standard BQM-34A target drones
first four Model 147G drones joined the effort, an improve- were modified as Model 147N decoys and were launched
ment on the B model with better sensors, range and alti- to accompany both G and J model drones to lure away
tude. The Model 147G flew its first operational mission on VPAF MiGs which had started to engage the Ryan drones.
October 31, 1965 with a further 12 launches completed be- A follow on order of an additional ten N models was made
fore the end of the year. Once the Ryan 147G had proven in August 1966. The N models started to have an adequate
to be operationally acceptable the Model 147B was retired, survival rate and would return to crash into their pre-pro-
the initial model racking up 78 sorties with a 61% recovery grammed ditch point as they were not built for recovery.
rate. During 1965 Ryan 147s accounted for 33 of the 63 SA- The full potential of the Model N was realized with the ac-
2 sites discovered in the DRV.41 quisition of the Model NX, a decoy fitted with a recovery
Southeast Asia’s monsoon season dictated an opera- parachute and a cheap, low resolution camera for “bonus”
tional need for a low altitude drone to fly under the intelligence collection.46 Another improvement fielded at
weather. Three early test Model 147C drones were modi- this time was the Microwave Command Guidance System
fied for low altitude work and deployed in September 1965 (MCGS), a line of site link from the drone to the DC–130
with the first flight on October 1; all three launches re- that allowed the Launch Control Officer to maneuver the
sulted in crashes. The Model 147J model, a G model opti- drone back onto course to take into account inertial navi-
mized for low altitude work, started operations in April gation system drift. The MCGS would later be used to ma-
1966.42 Low level drones would normally operate around neuver the drone when there were indications that VPAF
1500 ft above ground level, making them vulnerable to MiGs were airborne and stalking the vehicle for a kill.47
anti-aircraft artillery (AAA) but hard for SA-2s to hit. The On June 25, 1966, the 4080th SW and subordinate
high level drones such as the 147B and 147G operated at units underwent a name change, the wing becoming the
63,000-69,000 ft, above AAA but vulnerable to the SA-2.43 100th SRW and the 4025th RS the 350th SRS.48 As the air
In the original Ryan 147 design, the drone deployed a war expanded in Southeast Asia, the need for intelligence
parachute at the end of its mission to land near a desig- went up. The growing surface to air threat from the SA-2
nated recovery area. This often damaged the airframe and pushed more and more of the photographic reconnaissance
reduced operational life and availability. In late 1964 a pro- burden over the DRV onto the 350th SRS. Missions over
gram to develop a mid-air retrieval system where the southern China continued, with eight G model high alti-

12 AIR POWER History / SUMMER 2021

 wards AFB—while an additional two aircraft were with
Lockheed undergoing repair. SAC was little better off, only
boasting eight operational aircraft on its books. On August
1, 1966, the DCI and the Secretary of Defense placed a joint
order with Lockheed for eight new U–2s. The new-built air-
craft, christened the U–2R, was a revised design with ex-
panded fuselage and wing to accommodate the additional
equipment added to the original aircraft over their opera-
tional life. Before delivery, the order was increased by four,
with the first of the new twelve aircraft flying on August
28, 1967. Included with the new airframe were thirteen
Type H cameras, their development bugs finally ironed
out.53 But the U–2R was still in the future, and the hard
pressed Agency and SAC pilots continued to deliver intel-
U–2E Serial Number 56-6707 at Bien Hoa AB, RVN shortly after deploy-
ment from Davis Monthan AFB, AZ in February 1964. The aircraft is ligence with their increasingly antiquated early model U–
shown in the original SAC light gray scheme before being painted black 2 aircraft.
velvet. This aircraft was converted to a U–2F and later modified for the To help prolong the life of its original U–2s, SAC
ALSS program and survives on display at Laughlin AFB, TX. (Photo started to upgrade its U–2A to U–2C configuration in Oc-
courtesy of Chris Pocock.)
tober 1965, cycling airframes back to California for rework.
tude drones being launched in the second half of 1966.49 The SAC U–2C standard was similar to the CIA’s aircraft
The mission tempo continued to increase in 1967, with with the J-75 engine replacing the J-57 and providing 23%
more missions flown that year than the previous two and more thrust, fed through enlarged intakes. The aircraft
a half years. The majority of the missions were flown by also had increased fuel capacity, better sensor accommoda-
the low altitude J model. Between April 1966 and Novem- tion, and an upgraded SIGINT system. The first U–2C ar-
ber 1967 the Model 147J flew 94 sorties with a 65% recov- rived at Bien Hoa in April 1966, OL-20 making do with two
ery rate. The H model, a replacement for the G featuring a loaned CIA U–2G aircraft in the interim.54 Even the up-
redesigned modular payload nose and jamming equipment graded U–2C, though, was beginning to show its age. Not
targeting the SA-2, flew its first operational mission on only was it vulnerable to SAMs, enemy fighter aircraft
March 17, 1967 while the last G mission was on September were starting to threaten missions over the DRV. On Feb-
1, 1967. High altitude G and H missions were often accom- ruary 6, 1966, a VPAF MiG-21 attempted to intercept a
panied by the NX series decoys to complicate VPAF target- TROJAN HORSE mission. To confront this new threat,
ing of both SA-2s and MiGs.50 The mission name changed fighter escort was sometimes provided for the U–2 mis-
from BLUE SPRINGS to BUMBLE BUG on August 1, sions, to include protection from Chinese fighters crossing
1967, but the tasking remained the same. Flights contin- the border. The SAM threat continued to evolve, with a U–
ued to be scheduled to cover most of the DRV and the 2 pilot noting two Fan Song radars tracking him on Janu-
southern China, with three of the five H model missions ary 29, 1967 followed by an attempted MiG-21 intercept.55
over China in the first half of 1967 being lost.51 But the mission went on.
The planned replacement for the low altitude Model On June 25, 1966 the 4028th SRS became the 349th
147J, the Model 147S, was encountering delays in produc- SRS and on October 8, 1966 a U–2 was lost returning from
tion and development and it was feared the 350th SRS an operational mission after it departed from controlled
would run out of J models before the S model was fielded. flight.56 The target set remained unchanged, though with
Interim low altitude versions of the Model N, the NP and the proliferation of SA-2s throughout the DRV more and
NQ, were produced to cover the gap. The night reconnais- more airspace was ceded to the enemy and had to be cov-
sance Model 147NRE was also deployed at this time, ered by Ryan 147 operations. Still, OL-20 maintained its
mounting cameras that were synchronized with a flashing same footprint of three pilots and two aircraft and flew 92
light source on the underside of the drone. The NRE was missions in the first six months of 1967. Sorties over the
used to track PAVN night movements, with the first oper- Gulf of Tonkin continued, including five flown between
ational mission taking place on May 25, 1967. The Model April and July 1967 to try out a new camera.57
147S finally fielded in 1968 and went through many vari- Up to this point in the conflict, the intelligence com-
ants, including an SRE night low altitude version.52 munity had been serving two masters. While SAC recon-
naissance was meeting MACV’s needs for the operational
U–2 flights continue fight by tracking weapons within the DRV and personnel
and supply movements from the DRV south to RVN, policy
A decade of operational use had taken a toll on the CIA makers in Washington were concerned about the strategic
U–2 fleet. Attrition of two to five aircraft per year had eaten implications of the war for the region. With the Korean po-
away at the inventory, and the loss of four aircraft in the lice action still in the back of their minds, CIA analysts
first half of 1966 was being felt by the operational detach- were looking for signs that pointed to a shift in the nature
ments. By the summer of 1966, the Agency was down to six of the conflict—the introduction of ‘game changing’
flyable U–2s—two deployed to Taiwan and four at Ed- weapons systems such as surface to surface ‘offensive’ mis-

AIR POWER History / SUMMER 2021 13

 ile’ aircraft that had no markings other than a tail
number.63
Three aircraft were ferried non-stop across the Pacific
and the CIA detachment was in place on May 26, flying the
first operational mission five days later. Many of the A–12
missions were flown against DRV SAM sites and chased
the alleged DRV surface to surface missiles that kept
Washington analysts awake at night.64 Though the BLACK
SHIELD missions provided tremendous assistance in cov-
ering these target sets as well as lines of communication
between the DRV and China, policy restrictions kept them
from flying into China.65 The A–12 operated with impunity
over DRV SA-2 sites due not only to its high altitude and
speed but also a robust electronic countermeasures system
carried aboard the aircraft.66
U–2R fitted with SENIOR SPEAR SIGINT payload at U-Tapao RTAFB, Even before the shootdown of Frank Powers over the
Thailand in April 1975. SENIOR SPEAR did not arrive in Thailand until Soviet Union in May 1960 the CIA knew the U–2 was liv-
late 1974 and would have seen service for the last missions flown over ing on borrowed time. Even with ECM similar to that car-
Laos and the Gulf of Tonkin before the fall of RVN. (Photo courtesy of ried by the A–12, the lower performance margin did not
Chris Pocock.)
guarantee survivability. The loss of five TACKLE jets be-
siles or new air defense, ground, and naval systems. This tween 1962 and 1968 only highlighted the obvious. The Di-
activity required “nearly daily readable photographic cov- rector of Program B at the NRO noted in a letter to the
erage” of rail yards and ports.58 Washington also requested Director, NRO, in 1965 that the U–2 had a “useful life” lim-
monitoring of southern China and lines of communication ited by the introduction of “unfavorable defensive environ-
for indications of the introduction of Chinese forces into the ments.”67 Still, the IDEALIST program soldiered on in the
fight—a hint that the war was widening.59 These strategic Far East. Missions continued to be flown against China,
intelligence requirements kept the CIA in the fight and re- with a mission that covered the border with the DRV being
quired the introduction of a radical, new collection platform flown on July 20, 1967 for good measure. In all, though,
—the Lockheed A–12. only six operational missions were flown by Agency U–2Cs
between July 1 and September 8, 1967. The loss of a Tai-
OXCART to the Rescue wanese-piloted TACKLE mission on September 8, 1967
caused a stand-down of the TACKLE program. The arrival
The Lockheed A–12 OXCART was conceived as a fol- of OXCART came just in time - the entire U–2 program
low-on to the U–2 to enable operation within a more capa- was grounded between November 6 and 18, 1967 after
ble and threatening air defense environment. When the SAC discovered cracks in the wing of one of its OL-20 U–
decision was made to proceed with the OXCART in 1959, 2s causing all SAC and CIA U–2s to have ultra-sonic in-
it followed a joint CIA-USAF development program similar spections.68
to that of the U–2. The CIA awarded a development con- The SAC U–2s were flying at a higher operational
tract to Lockheed Aircraft Corporation in January 1960 tempo than their Agency brethren as DoD still found utility
with the first test flight occurring in April 1962, with the in its high altitude platform. 100th SRW U–2s were flying
USAF SR–71 variant first flying in December 1964. The on average 2-3 missions per week in 1967, with planning
A–12 was flown by a single pilot and was designed for for these sorties starting with target requirements being
peacetime overflights compared to the two-man SR–71 forwarded to Headquarters SAC at Offutt AFB. Planners
which had a wartime mission. With one less crewman and would plot the targets and build flight paths called Route
associated life support equipment and ejection seat, the A– Packages to cover the photographic reconnaissance targets.
12 was lighter and subsequently could fly higher and faster SAC would then transmit a tasking message to OL-20 cit-
than her USAF partner.60 ing the specific route (i.e. T914, T909 Mod 3, etc.) to be flown
The OXCART reached IOC on December 1, 1965.61 on a specific day. In 1967, the majority of the routes and
Studies undertaken in early 1966 proved that the OX- missions were not in the DRV but covered communist in-
CART was the only platform able to meet urgent require- filtration routes in Cambodia and Laos. Routes within the
ments as well as operate with relative immunity to DRV continued to keep a 30 mile bubble around known SA-
communist air defenses. Though deployment of the OX- 2 sites, the location of which was derived from SAC SIGINT
CART to SEA had been considered since March 1966, con- assets in theater such as the RB–47H and RC–135C/D, re-
cerns about how China would interpret the introduction of placed by the RC–135M in November 1967. Weather im-
such an advanced platform kept it in the US for over a pacted missions, forcing cancellation or recall of missions
year.62 Finally, on May 16, 1967 the OXCART was directed and causing SAC to direct 86 stand-down days from July 1,
to deploy to Kadena AB under the name BLACK SHIELD. 1966 – July 1, 1967. VPAF continued to attempt intercepts
Civilian A–12 pilots would fly missions approved, planned with MiG-21s and engagements with SA-2s, resulting in a
and directed by Headquarters CIA in Washington in ‘ster- SAC OPORD dated July 1, 1967 that directed U–2 pilots to

14 AIR POWER History / SUMMER 2021

 covert overflight capability, especially in light of the dwin-
dling utility of the IDEALIST U–2 program, elements
within the CIA had fought a rear-guard action to keep their
program alive but to no avail. Based on a study completed
by the Bureau of Budget, DoD and CIA, on December 19,
1966 President Johnson made the decision to phase out the
OXCART program by December 1967.73 The introduction
of the SR–71 was a slow process as two major deficiencies
were found with the program – the lack of a defensive ECM
capability and sensor performance.74 As a result, two three
month extensions were made in order to allow time for the
modifications to be made to the SR–71 – the first on Octo-
ber 23, 1967 and the second on December 29, 1967. The A–
12 continued to fly missions, but it was only a matter of
time before a different black bird arrived on Okinawa.
U–2R Serial Number 68-10340 taxiing out for a mission from Bien Hoa
AB, RVN in 1969. (Photo courtesy of Chris Pocock.) 1968 – A Year of Change

abort a mission if an attack was attempted or the aircraft The Tet Offensive was launched on January 30, 1968
fired upon.69 As SA-2s started to proliferate outside of the by the Viet Cong and PAVN against RVN and US forces
Hanoi-Haiphong corridor, this OPORD became more and throughout much of the RVN. Though it had little direct
more relevant. In response to PAVN artillery attacks impact on the SAC forces and their tasking, its impact was
against US Marine Corps bases at Con Thien and Gio Linh felt in Washington. On February 1, 1968, the 303 Commit-
in northern RVN near the DMZ, in September and October tee (the new name for the Special Group after 1964) de-
1967 ARC LIGHT B–52 missions were tasked to attack cided to suspend a group of overflight approvals for the
known and suspected communist artillery locations. A U– month of February and called for ‘mission by mission ap-
2 supporting this mission on October 29 had to abort when proval’ until tensions were lower. CIA U–2s in Taiwan flew
three SA-2s were fired at one of the B–52s.70 Instances such an overflight of southern China along the DRV border on
as this were starting to impact the operational tasking of March 16, the first overflight of China since a TACKLE
the TROJAN HORSE mission, changed to GIANT mission had been shot down the previous September. The
DRAGON on July 1, 1967. Another impact was the strain CIA detachment in Thailand re-appeared and flew two
that the SAC U–2 fleet was feeling. missions over Cambodia on March 27 and April 3, the first
Maintenance of the OL-20 deployment was putting missions flown from Thailand since early 1966. This one
stress on the 100th SRW. With 25% of the 349th SRS air- time push for one to two missions over Cambodia was the
craft inventory deployed overseas, there was little room left result of a request that went to the White House from the
for training and aircraft scheduled maintenance. A train- NRO two weeks prior. These turned out to be the last con-
ing accident on June 1, 1967 dropped the squadron inven- tribution of CIA U–2s to the conflict in SEA. The State De-
tory to seven U–2 aircraft and further pressure was coming partment opposed any further overflights, citing the risk
from the pilot pool. The 3-4 pilots on 60 day TDYs to OL- of increasing Chinese air defense effectiveness.75 The risk
20 represented 20% of the U–2 qualified pilots within SAC, of losing an aircraft over China drove the intelligence com-
eliciting assistance from Offutt AFB when the 349th SRS munity to make do with satellite reconnaissance and the
dipped to 17 combat ready crews.71 Relief came in the form 7-12 foot resolution imagery the CORONA KH-4 system
of reduced tasking as the A–12 took up more missions over was providing at the time.76
the DRV. The three pilots and two U–2Cs still assigned to OL-
With the A–12 now shouldering the load in the Far 20 continued to fly through 1968, marking the 1,000th SEA
East, requirements for the supersonic platform started to mission for SAC on June 15. The tempo was much reduced,
subtlety change. In late November 1967 Washington re- with many missions canceled in the second quarter by SAC
duced their strategic target deck and placed greater em- – April and May seeing only 7 of 17 scheduled sorties flown
phasis on supporting ROLLING THUNDER with over the two month period.77 Reflecting the unwritten re-
surveillance of SA-2 sites and other targets under the DRV ality that most of the DRV was too high of a threat for the
SAM umbrella. The A–12 was slowly shifting away from U–2, SAC restricted operations of the airframe to south of
the surface to surface missile and Chinese intervention the 20° North Parallel in April 1968. In July 1969, the long
strategic target set into more of an operational role sup- in the tooth U–2C aircraft started to be replaced by the
porting DoD air strikes.72 With this change in tasking, it new-built U–2R airframes and soon the 349th SRS started
was only a matter of time before the SR–71 would replace to fly a mission that would be all consuming by the end of
the A–12. In September 1967, the Executive Committee the conflict – SIGINT collection flights over the Gulf of
(ExCom) of the National Security Council had already re- Tonkin.78
quested the National Reconnaissance Office provide a com- Ryan 147 operations in 1968 started out with no change
parison between the two platforms. Ever protective of their from the previous year, targets running the gamut from air-

AIR POWER History / SUMMER 2021 15

fields to infrastructure. Overflights of southern China were
suspended starting on March 27, 1968 and did not resume
until the following year.79 With the cessation of bombing
north of the 19° North on March 31, 1968, the Ryan 147s
suddenly became the sole focus of VPAF air defenses. The
low-level Model 147S drone flight plans were altered to re-
duce altitude down to 500 feet, normally flown at a speed of
500 knots, to increase survivability. The halt of ROLLING
THUNDER and the bombing of the DRV on November 2,
1968 appeared to have little impact as Ryan 147 operations
continued at a pace of about one per day. What was new was
a different SAC partner over the DRV – the SR–71A.
The USAF worked to resolve the remaining issues
with the SR–71A and was ready for deployment in March
1968, with the last CIA BLACK SHIELD mission over the
DRV being flown on March 8, 1968. The next day the first U–2R fitted with SENIOR BOOK SIGINT payload as seen in the UK, circa
of three SAC SR–71A aircraft arrived at OL-8, Kadena AB, late 1970s. The SENIOR BOOK payload used the Melpar HARC II sensor
with the last aircraft in place by March 13 to support the controlled by a ground station at Nakhon Phanom Royal Thai Air Force
first mission on March 21, 1968. During its operational Base to provide COMINT collection over Laos and the Gulf of Tonkin.
(Photo courtesy of Chris Pocock.)
time at Kadena, the A–12 flew 26 missions in support of
the war in SEA. The last operational mission for the OX- numbers remained in popular use. Also beginning in 1969,
CART was against North Korea, flown May 5, 1968; in late the JCS directed SAC to conduct 25 drone sorties per
June, the remaining deployed aircraft were ferried back to month over SEA while maintaining an ability to surge to
Palmdale and mothballed.80 45-50 sorties per month when directed. Though these un-
The SR–71A flew with a variety of photographic recon- derlying requirements would remain unchanged through
naissance payloads to include the high resolution Technical mid-1972, drone reconnaissance activity peaked in 1969 as
Objective Camera (TEOC), the Terrain Objective Camera SAC worked to fulfill all the collection requirements being
(TROC), and the Operational Objective Camera (OOC). tasked north of the 20° North Parallel. 437 BUMPY AC-
These sensors were mounted in the chine bays of the air- TION drone missions, the program name since December
craft while the High Resolution Radar (HRR) was nose- 1968, were flown that year on missions requiring high res-
mounted. 81 The SR–71 was also fitted with SIGINT olution photography or when targets scheduled for the SR–
sensors and flew its first SIGINT mission on May 11, 1968. 71 were under heavy cloud cover. The majority, 392, were
Tasking for the Blackbird centered on the high threat area flown by Model 147SC/AQM-34L low-level birds. Model
targets in Hanoi and Haiphong and it was only a matter 147H/AQM-34N high altitude missions continued into
of time before the DRV SAM operators took a shot. On July 1969, with the new high altitude Model 147T/AQM-34P
26, 1968 the first of many failed SA-2 engagements was model fielding that year as well. Though the high altitude
tried against the SR–71.82 The three original SR–71s were drones were usually at risk for intercept from MiG-21s and
replaced in September 1968 and sent to Plant 42 at Palm- SA-2s, even the low altitude missions had risk beyond just
dale, CA for depot work, with a similar rotation taking AAA. On February 4, 1969 imagery from a drone near
place in spring 1969.83 Haiphong revealed two MiG-21 fighter aircraft attempting
When the November 1, 1968 bombing halt over the to down the AQM-34 with AA-2 Atoll IR guided missiles.
DRV took effect, tactical aerial reconnaissance was re- The drone led a charmed existence and survived at least
stricted to operating south of the 19° North Parallel, leav- three missile shots and emerged unscathed.86 When possi-
ing coverage of the critical Hanoi-Haiphong region as well ble, RC–135M or other COMINT platforms would relay
as the rail lines to China to the SR–71, Ryan 147 and CO- MiG intercept activity to the DC–130, allowing the Launch
RONA.84 A review of collection four months into the bomb- Control Officer to use the MCGS datalink to ‘maneuver’
ing halt revealed that while coverage south of the 19° the AQM-34 to throw off the aim of the MiG pilot.
North Parallel was adequate, photo reconnaissance north Though the AQM-34 had been re-approved to fly over
of the line was not satisfying JCS requirements mainly due China on March 22, 1969, various reasons ranging from
to weather. While low level Ryan 147 drone flights provided the North Koreans shooting down a US Navy EC-121 to
high quality imagery, the narrow swath of the flight path President Nixon’s trip to the region kept flights in
limited collection.85 It would take some tweaking of flight abeyance. After discussions in the 303 Committee, Presi-
routing and increasing the capability of the drones to dent Nixon acted on the recommendation of National Se-
slowly close the gap. curity Advisor Henry Kissinger and approved Ryan drone
flights no deeper than 200 miles into China for the tactical
Drones intelligence required by DoD against Chinese installations
in the DRV, Laos and Burma border regions. Even with a
In 1969, the U.S. Air Force redesignated the Ryan 147 State Department non-concur, high altitude AQM-34N/P
vehicle as AQM-34, although the manufacturer-assigned overflight of south China resumed in October 1969 with

16 AIR POWER History / SUMMER 2021

the first mission flying on the 17th followed up by three
more before the end of the month.87 Although one U–2 mis-
sion could collect the same amount of imagery as four
AQM-34s sorties, the political reality dictated manned mis-
sions were not going to happen even though the threat en-
vironment in the area was conducive to U–2 operations.88
Four additional drone overflights of southern China were
tasked in November 1969.89
The continuation of the bombing halt and the sporadic
peace talks in Paris gave Washington time to tinker with
the rules governing operations in the combat zone. In No-
vember 1969, the JCS defined broad restrictions for recon-
naissance activities in SEA. High and low altitude drone
photographic reconnaissance as well as SR–71 photo-
graphic reconnaissance and ELINT operations were au-
Four 4028 SRS personnel posing at Bien Hoa AB, RVN, circa 1965.
thorized over all of Southeast Asia, though when operating Shown are pilots Bob Spencer, Pat Halloran, Don McClain and navigator
over Laos, the SR–71 had a 10 NM buffer with the Chinese Ray Pierson. (Photo courtesy of Pat Halloran.)
border. U–2 imagery operations were permitted in all areas
of Southeast Asia except the DRV.90 That same month, the areas with the DRV was captured by SR–71 overflights of
JCS also directed that high altitude AQM-34 missions be this nation. U–2s also imaged Laos and parts of RVN to
reduced to 1-2 sorties per month in order to retain enough satisfy national and CINCPAC requirements, with the ma-
high altitude drones in case new air defenses precluded jority of the missions over Laos to monitor PAVN troop
SR–71 use. Though recovery rate was steadily climbing, movements and road construction. Occasionally, the U–2
there were also concerns about the navigation capabilities would fly a stand-off mission in the Gulf of Tonkin to image
of the drones. In 1970, the AQM-34L low altitude drones littoral DRV with the Itek Iris II camera, a long range pho-
hit only 38% of tasked targets, this improving only slightly tographic sensor delivered in 1969.95 Though not near the
to 40% the following year. The usable swath of imagery was threat level of the DRV, even Laos and Cambodia were
only 1-3 miles wide, so minor deviations as well as exces- starting to become too contested for the U–2. Sometime in
sive banking in turns could cause a target to be outside the the 1969-1970 timeframe, the threat from VPAF MiGs in
imagery. Attempts to update the update the AQM-34’s po- Cambodia and Laos dictated an escort of USAF fighters
sition via the MCGS produced mixed results.91 for U–2s and DC–130s flying in this airspace. During this
On July 4, 1970 OL-20 closed down, with 349th and same time period, reduced tasking enabled SAC to drop
350th SRS operations moving to U-Tapao RTAFB, Thai- the number of deployed U–2R airframes at OL-RU to one.96
land, designated OL-RU. Since the drones were still recov- With more survivable photographic reconnaissance
ered over the Gulf of Tonkin, the CH-3 recovery helicopters platforms available in the form of the SR–71 (or expend-
remained at Da Nang AB. The drones continued to concen- able in the form of the AQM-34) the U–2 was made avail-
trate on low altitude day missions, but during the winter able for other missions. A December 1970 review of
of 1970-71 the remaining AQM-34N and some new AQM- airborne COMINT operations by DIA considered collection
34P high altitude drones flew a few missions. Sortie rate against DRV from the Tonkin Gulf to be critical.97 On May
in 1971 was about 20 missions per month, the majority 13, 1971 the Deputy Secretary of Defense approved SEN-
being low altitude AQM-34L drones that flew 277 missions IOR BOOK, the U–2 SIGINT operation in Southeast Asia,
in 1971.92 With the loss of two of the three AQM-34N mis- for collection of COMINT in the Gulf of Tonkin. Test flights
sions flown in July 1971, SAC stopped high altitude pho- began on August 17, 1971, with signals collected from the
tographic reconnaissance drone flights as the SR–71 orbiting U–2R using the Melpar HARC II sensor relayed
assumed responsibility for all high altitude missions over via a Sperry multi-channel datalink to a ground station at
the DRV.93 Nakhon Phanom RTAFB, Thailand. USAF Security Serv-
ice linguists translated the collection real-time and could
The Dragon Continues to Prowl relay resulting intelligence via SAC KC-135 Luzon Radio
Relay aircraft to USAF fighters in the region.98 After ten
In July 1969, the SAC U–2 missions in SEA changed test flights, operational missions began on October 1, 1971.
designations once again with the GIANT DRAGON pro- Each mission lasted about ten hours, providing eight hours
gram transitioning to GIANT NAIL. U–2 missions contin- of orbit time over the Gulf of Tonkin in Track Z-108. With
ued over Laos and Cambodia, reinforced by a July 1970 an anticipated requirement of daily SENIOR BOOK mis-
DIA request for high resolution imagery coverage of east- sions, SAC deployed two additional U–2Rs to OL-RU in
ern Cambodia that was likely looking for the return of com- September, raising the number of U–2s in Thailand to
munist forces after the US-ARVN offensive in the area three. Unfortunately, late 1960s telecommunication tech-
conducted earlier that year.94 Most of the Cambodia task- nology was not 100% reliable and many SENIOR BOOK
ing was accomplished by a single U–2R flying GIANT missions were deemed unsuccessful due to poor communi-
NAIL missions, though some bonus imagery of border cations links. Sperry worked to upgrade the datalink re-

AIR POWER History / SUMMER 2021 17

 as tensions grew and the US prepared for a five day bomb-
ing campaign starting on December 26. The higher tempo
continued into the new year, with the AQM-34s concentrat-
ing on Hanoi and Haiphong. While some drones were
launched from northern Laos, the majority were launched
from the Gulf of Tonkin.103 Increased threat levels necessi-
tated escort for DC–130s flying further north than the 18°
30’ North Parallel over the Gulf of Tonkin.104 The threat
over Cambodia and Laos, on the other hand, was down-
graded and the order for fighter escort for the DC–130s
over these nations was rescinded in January 1972.105
Drone activity during this time was restricted to the
low altitude AQM-34L. In response to the DRV ‘Easter Of-
fensive’ invasion of RVN on March 30, 1972, President
Nixon authorized the bombing of the DRV up to the 18°
North Parallel. On April 8, the JCS extended the line up to
19° North. As the bombing campaign increased, so did the
A U–2F refueling as seen from the refueling boom operator's position.
The U–2F was a refuellable U–2C while the U–2E aircraft that deployed in tasking for SAC reconnaissance assets. SR–71s and low al-
1964 was a U–2A aircraft modified for inflight refueling. (Photo courtesy titude AQM-34L missions were tasked to provide BDA
of Chris Pocock.) against key logistics sites struck by SAC B–52s between
April 9 and 23. The U–2 Iris II Optical Bar Camera (OBC)
sulting in increased performance by 1972.99 On April 11, was modified to fit in the SR–71 and a single prototype de-
1972 SENIOR BOOK became OLYMPIC TORCH but the ployed to Kadena AB in April was used to support these
mission remained the same. operations. The OBC provided stereo coverage with supe-
rior resolution to the existing OOC sensor and better cov-
Blackbird Reigns over the DRV erage than the TEOC but, being mounted in the nose bay,
displaced the HRR. Also joining the Kadena team in April
With increased threats to both high altitude drones was an SR–71 Mobile Processing Center (MPC) to expedite
and U–2s from VPAF MiG-21s and SA-2s, the SR–71 be- processing and reporting of imagery. Prior to the arrival of
came the only survivable high altitude imagery platform the MPC, the 548th Reconnaissance Technical Group at
in SEA. In spring 1970 OL-8 increased to four SR–71A Hickam AFB, HI processed all SR–71 imagery.106
with the base averaging two flights per week, the majority Bombing operations expanded on May 9 with Opera-
of which was over the DRV. On October 30, 1970 OL-8 at tion LINEBACKER, a systematic interdiction campaign
Kadena AB was re-designated OLRK, changing again to that went further north into the DRV. The drones and SR–
OLKA on October 26, 1971, but operations continued un- 71s were tasked with pre- and post-strike photography to
abated. By 1971 aircraft rotation had slowed to every support these efforts as well as the Operation POCKET
twelve months vice the prior requirement of every six MONEY mining of Haiphong harbor that had started the
months. The detachment started to suffer some aircraft previous day. Increased photographic reconnaissance re-
losses, but not due to enemy fire; on May 10, 1970, an air- quirements, including daily coverage of POCKET MONEY
craft crashed in Thailand due to loss of control while a sec- facilities, drove the Kadena Blackbirds to 30 missions in
ond SR–71 was lost while landing in high cross winds on May, more than double the 14 flown in April. In addition,
July 20, 1972. 100 AQM-34s were tasked to cover DRV activity in the RVN’s
By 1971 most GIANT SCALE missions were flown overrun Quang Tri province. Drone sortie rate for the first
with the High Resolution Radar (HRR) synthetic aperture half of 1972 averaged 37 missions per month, all executed
radar photographic payload mounted in the nose of the air- with the existing two CH-3s, though a third DC–130 was
craft, enabling all-weather photographic reconnaissance deployed to U-Tapao in February 1972. The SR–71s deliv-
operations through cloud cover but at a much decreased ered 28 sorties in June, continuing to image DRV logistics
resolution. SR–71s also carried the Electromagnetic Re- efforts.107
connaissance (EMR) ELINT payload, with thirteen ELINT Accompanying SAC’s reconnaissance missions were
missions flown in FY72. 101 The FY73 budget reduced the drones of another flavor - Tactical Air Command (TAC)
SR–71 budget by 20% which resulted in 100th SRW au- Model 147NC/AQM-34H drones originally built to lay chaff
thorized aircraft dropping from 12 to 9 on July 1, 1972 with screens but modified to dispense propaganda leaflets.
a plan to reduce to 6 by January 1973.102 Cuts such as this These TAC drones, assigned to the 355th Tactical Fighter
would have had a dramatic impact on the number of de- Wing, were launched by 350th SRS DC–130s and flew 28
ployable airframes, but DRV actions saw otherwise. night low altitude leaflet sorties between July and October
31, 1972. 108 SAC also flew their own modified drones dur-
The Easter Offensive ing this time. On June 8, 1972, Headquarters USAF di-
rected SAC to configure three of its five remaining Model
In late December 1971, the drone sortie rate doubled 147H/AQM-34N high altitude drones stored at Davis-Mon-

18 AIR POWER History / SUMMER 2021

The Lockheed SR–71A offered a good platform but its sensors initially limited its utility. Even after receiving better optical cameras, it was essentially
limited to cloud-free days as its all weather radar imagery payload had poor resolution. This SR–71 is depicted post-war, possibly at RAF Mildenhall, UK.

than AFB into SIGINT vehicles optimized against SA-2 trated on monitoring DRV repair and rebuilding efforts
beacon downlink signals similar to the earlier Model 147E post-LINEBACKER as part of Operation POST WATCH.
UNITED EFFORT mission. The three modified drones, The SR–71 was the primary platform to collect on the 176
nicknamed COMPASS COOKIE, were designed, flight high priority POST WATCH targets, with target revisit
tested, and deployed to U-Tapao RTAFB by August 24, rate varying from near daily to once per week depending
1972. Four missions were flown between September 9 and on the category.111
September 29, with the AQM-34 sending its SIGINT back
to the DC–130. The program was a success with the drones Linebacker II
capturing the required signal at a cost of one of the modi-
fied AQM-34N vehicles. 109 With peace talks in Paris not appearing to be making
As peace negotiations continued to grind on in Paris, any headway, the Nixon administration decided to resume
intelligence analysts in Washington knew that once a bombing in an effort to stimulate conversation. On Decem-
treaty was signed they required timely photographic re- ber 15, in anticipation of the attacks, the JCS directed SAC
connaissance collection against DRV targets to confirm the to photograph 32 targets in the DRV with SR–71 and
actions and intentions of Hanoi. CORONA imagery, infre- AQM-34 missions. Two days later, on December 17, the
quent and delayed in exploitation, was not considered ideal JCS directed SAC to initiate a maximum, sustained recon-
for this type of work so some form of aerial collection was naissance effort against the DRV with these same assets.
needed. When the bombing halt over DRV took effect on On December 18 President Nixon ordered bombing north
October 23, 1972, tactical aerial reconnaissance was re- of the 20° North Parallel to resume.112
stricted to operating south of the 20° North Parallel, leav- SR–71s were tasked to provide daily coverage of tar-
ing coverage of the critical Hanoi-Haiphong region as well gets in the DRV beginning on December 19, using either
as the rail lines to China to the SR–71 and AQM-34, simi- conventional or HRR photographic reconnaissance sensors.
lar to the condition that occurred after the 1968 bombing AQM-34s were tasked with multiple missions per day
halt.110 against highly defended areas such as Hanoi and
On November 1, 1972 100th SRW OL-RU was redes- Haiphong. US Navy BLUE TREE tactical reconnaissance
ignated 99th SRS. On that same date, the Ryan 147 drone assets would be used to supplement as needed, as the tar-
recovery operation and its CH-3s moved from Da Nang AB get list expanded from the original 32 to 139 by the end of
to Nakhon Phanom RTAFB, Thailand, designated OL-NB. the bombing campaign. With the re-opening of the bombing
The CH-3 movement started on September 29 and was of the DRV, SAC’s Fifteenth Air Force notified the 100th
completed on November 24. The standup of the 99th SRS SRW to prepare to augment U–2 and AQM-34 operations.
was part of a plan to field the Advanced Location Strike The first step of this witnessed two additional U–2 pilots
System (ALSS), a program that required three U–2C air- arriving at U-Tapao RTAFB on December 23 to augment
craft to be airborne at the same time to rapidly geolocate the five pilots deployed with the 99th SRS. After Christ-
signals of interest. However the ALSS, which would have mas, an additional U–2R and pilot were deployed to South-
brought six modified U–2C aircraft to Thailand in January east Asia along with a third DC–130 and associated crew
1973, was not fielded. Surveillance of POCKET MONEY as well as additional maintenance personnel. These aug-
targets between November 19 and December 1, 1972 was mentation forces would remain in place until the end of
done exclusively by AQM-34s as the Blackbirds concen- January 1973. Supporting imagery distribution was

AIR POWER History / SUMMER 2021 19

CIA U–2C on a test flight over the western US. Article 682 remained a Lockheed A–12 article 928 in testing at Groom Lake, Nevada. When de-
CIA asset until transfer to NASA in 1971 and is representative of the ployed, the A–12 only was marked with its tail number. (Photo courtesy
Agency U-2s deployed for Far East operations. (Photo courtesy of the of the Nevada Aerospace Hall of Fame via TD Barnes.)
Nevada Aerospace Hall of Fame via TD Barnes.)
which were flown the third week of December.117 One chal-
GIANT CIRCLE, the movement of SR–71 intelligence lenge to the AQM-34 arose mid-way through the bombing
products from Kadena AB to Saigon as well as Washington. campaign. On December 21, one of the OL-NB-based CH-
Four KC-135As were eventually committed to this effort 3Es became unserviceable and was out for the duration of
that delivered processed imagery to decision makers the bombing campaign, the drone operations relying upon
within 24 hours of sortie completion.113 a single CH-3E and two crews.118
Unfortunately, weather bedeviled SR–71 reconnais- The 99th SRS started surging with two OLYMPIC
sance operations during LINEBACKER II. Though the TORCH U–2R missions per day on December 18, one fly-
north-east monsoon season is generally drier, it can bring ing 0800-1600 local time (0100-0900Z) over the Gulf of
heavy rains in the early months – which was the case in Tonkin and the second timed to be over the Gulf during the
1972. Low cloud ceilings resulted in the SR–71 using the B–52 attacks, usually 1900-0500 (1200-2200Z). The U–2
HRR payload on all but two days – the missions flown on was tasked primarily for COMINT collection supporting
December 21 and 27. The mission scheduled to fly the day the LINEBACKER strikes and the SRC coordinated com-
after Christmas was also weather delayed for 24 hours. The plementary missions with the RC–135M. SIGINT analysts
HRR was used primarily against ports and waterways, tar- discovered that VPAF tracking of their own MiGs was
get types optimized for radar imagery. Though radar im- being done on communication links that only the U–2 pay-
agery could, under certain conditions, be used against load was capable of intercepting. Most of the RC–135 mis-
targets such as bridges and airfields, overall it had limited sions were flown on track F710 in the Gulf of Tonkin from
utility in performing bomb damage assessment against fa- 1300-0100Z, with a second sortie flown approximately
cilities. SR–71s were also tasked with SIGINT collection, every third day from 2200-1000Z in the F711 track south
flying a night mission on December 28 and a day mission of the DMZ. As the campaign started to gain steam, on De-
on December 29 looking for updated ELINT associated cember 20th CINCPAC requested the SRC change the
with VPAF SAM operations.114 OLYMPIC TORCH station time to 1650-0900Z, but SAC
The low cloud ceilings that caused challenges for SR– did not alter operations. The U–2R maintained its tempo
71 operations brought AQM-34L operations to the fore. throughout the bombing campaign, though only one mis-
Most of the photographic reconnaissance support to LINE- sion was flown on Christmas during the bombing pause.
BACKER II operations was delivered by AQM-34 missions. U–2Rs ended up flying 39 OLYMPIC TORCH missions in
Forty two Ryan drone missions were launched during the December 1972.119
eleven day bombing operation, with four lost. 34 of the 38 LINEBACKER II continued until 2359Z on December
recovered drones delivered valuable imagery, covering 36% 29. Though offensive action north of the 20° North Parallel
of the 944 targets they were tasked to cover and bonus col- was halted at this time, SR–71 and AQM-34 reconnais-
lection on another 366 targets.115 On average, four low level sance missions continued unabated. Talks in Paris re-
BUFFALO HUNTER missions were flown daily to support sumed on January 8 and concluded with the signing of the
BDA.116 A mini-surge on December 15-16 saw four missions Paris Peace Accords on January 27, 1973, ending US in-
per day, with operations scaling back to two on December volvement in the wars in Southeast Asia. While the talks
17th and 18th before resuming four per day. December were ongoing, SAC reconnaissance tempo was nearly equal
27th and 28th were also reduced sortie rates of only three to that of December, with 62 AQM-34 sorties logged in Jan-
missions. During December 1972 seventy five AQM-34L uary, most north of the 20° North Parallel, with the last
missions were flown, 2/3 supporting BDA efforts for Line- sortie occurring on January 27.
backer II. Between December 20, 1972 and January 19, According to the treaty signed in Paris, the United
1973 one hundred AQM-34 missions were flown, 27 of States would stop “all military activities against the terri-

20 AIR POWER History / SUMMER 2021

A–12 imagery depicting Gia Lam airport, Hanoi, DRV, 19 July 1967. The
A–12 provided national decision makers and theater commanders with a
responsive reconnaissance asset for high threat areas over the DRV, The Lockheed SR–71A replaced the A–12 in overflight of high threat
proving out technology and flight operations for the follow-on SR–71A. DRV targets. The speed and operating altitude of the SR–71 enabled it to
(Photo courtesy of the Nevada Aerospace Hall of Fame via TD Barnes.) operate with impunity at high altitude over the DRV, complementing the
under the weather low altitude AQM–34 to support air strikes in 1972.
tory of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam by ground, air
and naval forces, wherever they may be based.”120 In addi- age 25 missions per month through the end of 1974 and
tion, the United States would “respect the independence, was relied upon heavily by the DIA and Pacific Command
sovereignty, unity and the territorial integrity of Vietnam.” to understand communist activities and intentions in
The challenge existed on how to monitor DRV compliance RVN.123 With the fall of RVN in 1975, there was little left
with the peace accords while complying with the accords to do, but SAC reconnaissance had one last mission to per-
themselves. The Nixon Administration resolved this thorny form. In support of the action to recover the SS Mayaguez
issue by tasking the CIA with flying airborne reconnais- in May 1975, U–2s from U-Tapao RTAFB acted as commu-
sance against DRV target sets from international waters nications relay between engaged forces and headquarters
12 miles off the coast. Though it was near death, the IDE- elements in Thailand. With this last gasp, the conflict in
ALIST Program was still capable of responding in the time Southeast Asia was over and the SAC operating location
of need. The Agency dispatched several pilots to Taiwan in Thailand was finally shuttered in April 1976.124
and the first SCOPE SHIELD mission flew on March 30, Like the Korean conflict two decades prior, the Viet-
1973. Weather contributed to a marginal collect, though a nam conflict helped solidify the role of reconnaissance in
second mission flown the next day provided better results. the eyes of SAC. Though SAC flew operational reconnais-
The monsoon season halted all flight activity until July 21, sance missions every day during the Cold War in the form
1973, when the first of two missions approved May 7 was of SIGINT missions off the coast of the various adversarial
flown. Issues with the Type H camera lowered the image states, the Vietnam experience was different. SAC had to
quality, but it was still usable. Even before the first SCOPE use photographic reconnaissance assets to locate targets
SHIELD mission was flown, DCI Schlesinger had re- and perform battle damage assessment – two wartime
quested for up to five SR–71 missions to be flown to gather functions it was not able to accomplish during peacetime.
critical intelligence and demonstrate US resolve until the Headquarters SAC also had to integrate SIGINT with im-
final American POWs were returned. Two SR–71 over- agery to produce updated orders of battle and plan mis-
flights of the DRV were flown, one on April 19 with the pro- sions around these threats. This construct – built with the
totype CAPRE imaging radar and the second on April 24 global thermonuclear war in mind where deconfliction
with conventional cameras, to ensure the DRV was com- could only be accomplished with a single integrated plan -
plying with the terms of the Paris accords. The last SCOPE worked in a lower operations tempo such as ROLLING
SHIELD mission was flown on January 6, 1974.121 Joining THUNDER or ARC LIGHT but not for a high intensity
the Agency U–2s over the Gulf of Tonkin were 99th SRS bombing campaign such as LINEBACKER II. Centralized
U–2Rs, initially flying daily OLYMPIC TORCH COMINT planning of missions started to unravel during LINE-
missions to monitor DRV adherence to the peace accords. BACKER II as witnessed by mounting B–52 losses and
An orbit was also established over Laos for similar pur- would give SAC and an entire generation of planners grist
poses, providing different look angles and access into the to mill over the two decades leading up to Operation
DRV. Moving into 1974, SAC continued to fly reconnais- DESERT STORM. Reconnaissance assets, though, worked
sance in the region, with AQM-34, U–2 and SR–71 aircraft as advertised. Flawed centralized planning aside, in LINE-
relatively active over RVN, Laos and Cambodia. The SR– BACKER II all the operational components of SAC worked
71 even did at least one overflight of the DRV on March as advertised - SAC SIGINT located threats, SAC photo-
28, 1974.122 graphic reconnaissance located targets, and SAC bombers
The BUFFALO HUNTER program continued to aver- destroyed targets. In some ways, SAC did get it right. ■

AIR POWER History / SUMMER 2021 21

 NOTES

1. Strategic Air Command. History of Strategic Air Command, Vietnam and Environs (26 February 64). CIA-
1 July 1954 – 30 June 1956, Volume 1. N.d., “Medium Reconnais- RDP89B00980R000600070023-7; Central Intelligence Agency.
sance Force” section page numbers redacted. Air Force Historical Memorandum for the Record. 9 March 1964. Subject: Points of
Research Agency, K416.01 V.1, 1 Jul 54 – 30 Jun 56, Maxwell Issue re NRO. CIA-RDP85B00803R000100050046-9. All CIA
AFB, AL.; Headquarters USAF. Message to Commander ATRC. FOIA Reading Room,
Nov 4, 1954. No subject. AFOOP OPS-6-8 Reconnaissance Folder, 12. CAS Division, Central Intelligence Agency. Memorandum for
Box 72, Entry 345 (1954) – Air Force – Operations; Operations Assistant Director, Current Intelligence. 18 March 1964. Subject:
subject numeric files, 1954, RG 341, NA. Preliminary Evaluation of Missions S014A, Flown 11 March
2. Headquarters Strategic Air Command. Reconnaissance: His- 1964; Mission S024A, Flown 12 March 1964; and Mission S034A,
tory of SAC, Jan-Jun 1965; Historical Study No. 100A. 15 April Flown 14 March 1964. CIA FOIA Reading Room, CIA-
1966, pp. 5-6. FOIA to ACC/HO by Robert Hopkins; Historical RDP66B00664R000400110003-2; Deputy for Field Activities, Of-
Study No. 99A. 8 October 1965, p.1. FOIA to ACC/HO by Robert fice of Special Activities, Central Intelligence Agency.
Hopkins. Memorandum for Chief, IDEALIST Division, OSA. 26 March
3. Pedlow, Gregory and Welzenbach, Donald. “The CIA and the 1964. Subject: Requirements in Southeast Asia. CIA FOIA Read-
U-2 Program, 1954-1974, “ p. 221. Center for the Study of Intelli- ing Room, CIA-RDP33-02415A000100390090-8.
gence, Central Intelligence Agency, 1998. Redacted copy, available Possess digital copy – CIA-RDP33-02415A000100390090-8
at CIA FOIA Reading Room; Chairman, Committee on Overhead 13. Chris Pocock, Dragon Lady: The History of the U-2 Spyplane,
Reconnaissance. Memorandum for Col James E. Mahon, Joint (Shrewsbury: Airlife Publishing, 1989), pp. 59-89.
Chiefs of Staff. X November 1960. Subject: Photographic Coverage 14. Chris Pocock, 50 Years of the U-2: The Complete Illustrated
of Laos-North Vietnam. CIA FOIA Reading Room, CIA- History of the ‘Dragon Lady,’ (Atglen, Schiffer Publishing, 2005),
RDP79B01709A002300010007-0. p. 195.
4. Deputy Director for Plans, Central Intelligence Agency. 15. 4080th Strategic Wing. Monthly History, February 1964. N.d.
Memorandum for All Members U.S. Government IDEALIST Air Force Historical Research Agency, K-WG-4080-HI, IRIS
Community. 4 January 1961. Subject: Redesignation of CIA Proj- 460463, Maxwell AFB, AL; 4080th Strategic Wing. Monthly His-
ect Involving Utilization of U-2 Aircraft for Reconnaissance Pur- tory, March 1964. N.d. Air Force Historical Research Agency, K-
poses as Project IDEALIST. CIA FOIA Reading Room, WG-4080-HI, IRIS 460464, Maxwell AFB, AL; Deputy Director,
CIA-RDP33-02415A000300190048-5. Central Intelligence Agency. Memorandum for the Director. 13
5. Pedlow, Gregory and Welzenbach, pp. 221-222; Office of Sci- February 1964. Subject: SAC U-2 Operations Over North Viet-
entific Intelligence, CIA. ELINT Report of Mission 3025. 27 nam from the Philippines. CIA FOIA Reading Room, CIA-
March 1961. CIA FOIA Reading Room; Chairman, Committee on RDP80B01676R001400010003-5; Air Command and Staff
Overhead Reconnaissance. Memorandum for Deputy Director College. Air University Designated Study #7 – Volume III, Recon-
(Plans). 31 August 1961. Subject: Requirements for Photo Recon- naissance. 15 June 1968. Air Force Historical Research Agency,
naissance in Southeast Asia. CIA FOIA Reading Room, CIA- K239.0321-7 V.3 C.1, IRIS 1103688, Maxwell AFB, AL.
RDP79B01709A001700020047-2. 16. Deputy Assistant Director (Special Activities), Central Intel-
6. Robert Futrell, The United States Air Force in Southeast ligence Agency. Memorandum for Acting Director of Central In-
Asia: The Advisory Years to 1965, (Washington: US Government telligence. 21 April 1964. Subject: Proposal for Transfer of
Printing Office, 1981), 75. Responsibility for Tactical U-2 Reconnaissance in Southeast Asia.
7. Pedlow, Gregory and Welzenbach, p. 224-26 CIA FOIA Reading Room, CIA-RDP33-02415A000100390053-9;
8. Pedlow, Gregory and Welzenbach, p. 224-26; Committee on Acting Director, Central Intelligence Agency. Memorandum for
Overhead Reconnaissance. Memorandum COMOR-D-2/8. 27 Record. 25 April 1964. Subject: Special Group Meeting on 23 April
March 1962. Subject: Highest Priority National and Military Ob- and Other Matters. CIA FOIA Reading Room, CIA-
jectives in South and Central China and Hainan Island. CIA RDP80B01676R001400040059-1; Office of Special Activities, Cen-
FOIA Reading Room, CIA-RDP92B01090R002600100014-4. tral Intelligence Agency. Memorandum for Executive Officer,
9. Pedlow, Gregory and Welzenbach, p. 230-31 Deputy Director for Science and Technology. 27 May 1965. No
10. Deputy Director for Science and Technology, Central Intelli- subject. CIA FOIA Reading Room, CIA-
gence Agency. Memorandum for Director of Central Intelligence. RDP75B00285R000200010021-6; Director of Central Intelli-
11 April 1966. Subject: Effects of Weather on Photographic Re- gence. Memorandum [blank]. 2 April 1964. Subject: Ideas for
connaissance over North Vietnam. CIA FOIA Reading Room, Discussions on NRO Problems for the Baker Panel and Clifford
CIA-RDP68B00724R000100050012-3. Board. CIA FOIA Reading Room, CIA-
11. Central Intelligence Agency. Memorandum for Assistant Di- RDP80R01580R002004130034-7.
rector, Current Intelligence. 6 January 1964. Subject: Preliminary 17. 4080th Strategic Wing. History, October-November-Decem-
Evaluation of Photo Recon Missions 6070, 29 December and 6071, ber 1965. N.d. Air Force Historical Research Agency, K-WG-4080-
30 December. CIA-RDP69B00404R000300140030-5; Director, Na- HI, IRIS 460471, Maxwell AFB, AL.
tional Reconnaissance Office. Memorandum for The Special 18. National Security Council? Illustrative Military Moves De-
Group. 5 February 1964. Subject: U-2 Reconnaissance of South signed to Demonstrate the U.S. Intention to Prevent Further
Vietnam. CIA-RDP67B00558 R000100060049-1; Peter Jessup, Communist Advances in Laos and South Vietnam. N.d. (assessed
Central Intelligence Agency officer assigned to White House. June 1964). Vietnam/Southeast Asia Collection, Box 4, National
Memorandum for Record. 24 February 1964. Subject: Minutes of Security Archive; Chairman, Committee on Overhead Reconnais-
the Special Meeting of the Special Group, 24 February 1964. CIA- sance. Memorandum for Committee on Overhead Reconnais-
RDP67B00558R000100060044-6; Deputy Assistant Director sance. 17 June 1964. Subject: Status of Overhead Photographic
(Special Activities), Central Intelligence Agency. Memorandum Reconnaissance. CIA FOIA Reading Room, CIA-
for Director of Central Intelligence. 26 February 1964. Subject: RDP79B01709A002600010006-8.
Comments on DNRO Proposal for U-2 Operations over South 19. NIPE, Deputy Director of Central Intelligence. Memoran-

22 AIR POWER History / SUMMER 2021

dum for Record. 3 April 1964. Subject: DCI Appearance before the Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs,
President’s Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board on the National Deputy Secretary of State for Political Affairs, Deputy Secretary
Reconnaissance Organization. CIA FOIA Reading Room, CIA- of Defense, Director of Central Intelligence. 28 December 1964.
RDP80R01580R002004130011-2; 4080th Strategic Wing. Quar- Subject: Forecast of NRO Air and Satellite Activities for January
terly History, October-December 1964. N.d. Air Force Historical 1965. CIA FOIA Reading Room, CIA-
Research Agency, K-WG-4080-HI, IRIS 460465, Maxwell AFB, RDP80R01580R002004180003-6; Assistant for Photographic
AL.; Jay Miller, AeroGraph 3: Lockheed U-2 (Austin: Aerofax, In- Analysis, National Photographic Interpretation Center. Memo-
corporated, 1983), 42. randum for DDI/CIA. 30 September 1964. Subject: Data on BLUE
20. Headquarters Strategic Air Command. Reconnaissance: His- SPRING Photography. CIA FOIA Reading Room, CIA-
tory of SAC, Jan-Jun 1965; Historical Study No. 100A. 15 April RDP78B05708A000500050006-8; Headquarters Strategic Air
1966. FOIA to ACC/HO by Robert Hopkins. Command. Reconnaissance: History of SAC, Jan-Jun 1965; His-
21. Bennett, George. A Study of the Use of the RB-57 and U-2 torical Study No. 100A. 15 April 1966. FOIA to ACC/HO by Robert
Aircraft in Southeast Asia, 1967-1967. Air University, 1968, 29- Hopkins; William Wagner, “Lightning Bugs and Other Reconnais-
34. Call # K239.042-3566. Air Force Historical Research Agency, sance Drones” (Fallbrook: Aero Publishers, 1982), pp. 53-55
Maxwell AFB, AL; Air Command and Staff College. Air Univer- 35. 4080th Strategic Wing. History, July-August-September
sity Designated Study #7 – Volume III, Reconnaissance. 15 June 1965. N.d. Air Force Historical Research Agency, K-WG-4080-HI,
1968. Air Force Historical Research Agency, K239.0321-7 V.3 C.1, IRIS 460470, Maxwell AFB, AL.
IRIS 1103688, Maxwell AFB, AL; 9th Strategic Reconnaissance 36. William Wagner. Lightning Bugs and other Reconnaissance
Wing. Miscellaneous Corona Harvest Inputs for Strategic Recon- Drones (Fallbrook: Aero Publishers, Inc, 1982), p. 46; Headquar-
naissance in SEA Report. 14 March 1969. Air Force Historical Re- ters Strategic Air Command. Reconnaissance: History of SAC,
search Agency, K-WG-9-SU, IRIS 447839, Maxwell AFB, AL. Jan-Jun 1965; Historical Study No. 100A. 15 April 1966, p. 31.
22. 9th Strategic Reconnaissance Wing. Miscellaneous Corona FOIA to ACC/HO by Robert Hopkins.
Harvest Inputs for Strategic Reconnaissance in SEA Report. 14 37. Headquarters Strategic Air Command. Reconnaissance: His-
March 1969. Air Force Historical Research Agency, K-WG-9-SU, tory of SAC, Jan-Jun 1965; Historical Study No. 99A. 8 October
IRIS 447839, Maxwell AFB, AL; Headquarters Strategic Air Com- 1965, pp. 29-35. FOIA to ACC/HO by Robert Hopkins; 55th
mand. Reconnaissance: History of SAC, Jan-Jun 1965; Historical Strategic Reconnaissance Wing. Quarterly History, January-
Study No. 100A. 15 April 1966. FOIA to ACC/HO by Robert Hop- March 1965, Vol I. N.d. Air Force Historical Research Agency, IRIS
kins; Pocock, 50 Years, p. 195. 451073, Maxwell AFB, AL.); 55th Strategic Reconnaissance Wing.
23. Headquarters Strategic Air Command. Reconnaissance: His- Quarterly History, April-June 1965, Vol I. N.d. Air Force Historical
tory of SAC, Jan-Jun 1965; Historical Study No. 100A. 15 April Research Agency, IRIS 451076, Maxwell AFB, AL.; William Wag-
1966. FOIA to ACC/HO by Robert Hopkins. ner. Lightning Bugs and other Reconnaissance Drones (Fallbrook:
24. Pedlow, Gregory and Welzenbach, p. 230-34, Directorate of Aero Publishers, Inc, 1982), p. 48
Science and Technology, Central Intelligence Agency. Preliminary 38. 55th Strategic Reconnaissance Wing. Quarterly History,
Report, U-2 Reconnaissance Mission C224C flown 31 October July-September 1965, Vol I. N.d, pp. 15-16. Air Force Historical
1964. 9 November 1964. CIA FOIA Reading Room, CIA- Research Agency, IRIS 451078, Maxwell AFB, AL.; 55th Strategic
RDP66B00664R000700070038-5. Reconnaissance Wing. Quarterly History, October-December
25. Director, National Reconnaissance Office. Memorandum for 1965. N.d. Air Force Historical Research Agency, IRIS 451080,
Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, Maxwell AFB, AL; 55th Strategic Reconnaissance Wing. Quar-
Deputy Secretary of State for Political Affairs, Deputy Secretary terly History, April – June 1966. N.d. Air Force Historical Re-
of Defense, Director of Central Intelligence. 28 December 1964. search Agency, IRIS 451082, Maxwell AFB, AL.; Col Marvin
Subject: Forecast of NRO Air and Satellite Activities for January Morss. AFHRA Interview about RC-135M operations in Vietnam,
1965. CIA FOIA Reading Room, CIA- 1966-1967. 1 November 1968. Air Force Historical Research
RDP80R01580R002004180003-6. Agency, K239.0512-393 Reel 1, IRIS 904393, Maxwell AFB, AL.;
26. Bennett, 38. Office of Special Activities, CIA. Memorandum for Record. Sub-
27. Directorate of Science and Technology, Central Intelligence ject: LONG ARM Drone Modifications. 19 August 1965. CIA FOIA
Agency. Preliminary Report, U-2 Reconnaissance Missions Reading Room; Alfred Price, The History of US Electronic War-
C465C, C475C and C485C flown 25 and 26 August and 5 Sep- fare, Volume III (Washington: Association of Old Crows, 2000), 57-
tember 1965. N.d. CIA FOIA Reading Room, CIA- 59; Headquarters Strategic Air Command. Reconnaissance:
RDP89B00709R000100230012-0. History of SAC, Jan-Jun 1965; Historical Study No. 100A. 15 April
28. Headquarters Strategic Air Command. Reconnaissance: His- 1966, pp. 31-32. FOIA to ACC/HO by Robert Hopkins.
tory of SAC, Jan-Jun 1965; Historical Study No. 100A. 15 April 39. 55th Strategic Reconnaissance Wing. Quarterly History, Oc-
1966. FOIA to ACC/HO by Robert Hopkins. tober-December 1966, Volume 2. N.d. Air Force Historical Re-
29. Headquarters Strategic Air Command. Reconnaissance: His- search Agency, IRIS 451085, Maxwell AFB, AL.; 55th Strategic
tory of SAC, Jan-Jun 1965; Historical Study No. 100A. 15 April Reconnaissance Wing. Quarterly History, April – June 1967, Vol-
1966. FOIA to ACC/HO by Robert Hopkins. ume 2, Appendix I. N.d. Air Force Historical Research Agency,
30. Pocock, Dragon Lady, 89; Pocock, 50 Years, p. 196 IRIS 1106980, Maxwell AFB, AL.; Headquarters Strategic Air
31. Director of Reconnaissance, Central Intelligence Agency. Command. Reconnaissance: History of SAC, Jan-Jun 1967. Sep-
Memorandum for the Director of Central Intelligence. 20 January tember 1968. FOIA to HQ USAF by Chris Pocock; Pocock, 50
1966. Subject: Briefing of PFIAB in Progress in the National Re- Years, p. 231
connaissance Program. CIA FOIA Reading Room, CIA- 40. Assistant for Photographic Analysis, National Photographic
RDP72R00410R000200010007-9. Interpretation Center. Memorandum for DDI/CIA. 30 September
32. 4080th Strategic Wing. Monthly Histories, April 1963 and 1964. Subject: Data on BLUE SPRING Photography. CIA FOIA
March 1964. N.d. Air Force Historical Research Agency, K-WG- Reading Room, CIA-RDP78B05708A000500050006-8.
4080-HI, IRIS 460454, 460464, Maxwell AFB, AL.; Bill Grimes, 41. Headquarters Strategic Air Command. Reconnaissance: His-
The History of BIG SAFARI (Bloomington: Archway Publishing, tory of SAC, Jan-Jun 1965; Historical Study No. 100A. 15 April
2014), pp. 231-233 1966. FOIA to ACC/HO by Robert Hopkins.
33. 4080th Strategic Wing. Quarterly History, October-December 42. Headquarters Strategic Air Command. Reconnaissance: His-
1964. N.d. Air Force Historical Research Agency, K-WG-4080-HI, tory of SAC, Jan-Jun 1965; Historical Study No. 100A. 15 April
IRIS 460465, Maxwell AFB, AL. 1966. FOIA to ACC/HO by Robert Hopkins.
34. Director, National Reconnaissance Office. Memorandum for 43. Director, Central Intelligence Agency. Memorandum for The

AIR POWER History / SUMMER 2021 23

Deputy Secretary of Defense, Special Assistant to the President RDP72R00410R000200010007-9.
(Mr. Rostow), The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political 62. Executive Secretary, United States Intelligence Board. Mem-
Affairs. 15 May 1967. Subject: OXCART Reconnaissance of North orandum for the United States Intelligence Board. 10 March
Vietnam. CIA FOIA Reading Room, DOC_0001471747. 1966. Subject: Requirement for [redacted] Photographic Coverage
44. Headquarters Strategic Air Command. Reconnaissance: His- of South China and North Vietnam. CIA-
tory of SAC, Jan-Jun 1965; Historical Study No. 100A. 15 April RDP79B01709A002300020006-0; Executive Secretary, United
1966. FOIA to ACC/HO by Robert Hopkins. States Intelligence Board. Memorandum for the United States
45. 350th Strategic Reconnaissance Squadron. History, 1 April Intelligence Board. Redacted date, estimated 16 March 1966.
1966 – 30 June 1966. N.d. Air Force Historical Research Agency, Subject: Requirement for the Employment of the OXCART over
K-SQ-350-HI, IRIS 1107011, Maxwell AFB, AL. South China and North Vietnam. CIA-RDP79B017
46. William Wagner, “Light Bugs and other Reconnaissance 09A002300020009-7; Executive Secretary, United States Intelli-
Drones” (Fallbrook: Aero Publishers, 1982), p. 110 gence Board. Memorandum for the United States Intelligence
47. Elder, Paul. Project CHECO Report: Buffalo Hunter - 1970- Board. 17 March 1966. Subject: Requirement for High Photo-
1972. Pacific Air Forces. 24 July 1973. IRIS 517466. Air Force His- graphic Coverage of South China and North Vietnam. CIA-
torical Research Agency, Maxwell AFB, AL RDP79B01709A002300020011-4; Executive Secretary, United
48. 350th Strategic Reconnaissance Squadron. History, 1 April States Intelligence Board. Memorandum for Holders of USIB-D-
1966 – 30 June 1966. N.d. Air Force Historical Research Agency, 41.14/288. 22 March 1966. Subject: Requirement for High Reso-
K-SQ-350-HI, IRIS 1107011, Maxwell AFB, AL. lution Photographic Coverage of South China and North
49. 350th Strategic Reconnaissance Squadron. History, 1 April Vietnam. CIA-RDP79B01709A00 2300020012-3; Director of Cen-
1966 – 30 June 1966. N.d. Air Force Historical Research Agency, tral Intelligence. Memorandum for the President. 29 April 1966.
K-SQ-350-HI, IRIS 1107011, Maxwell AFB, AL.; Headquarters Subject: OXCART Deployment Proposal. CIA-
Strategic Air Command. Reconnaissance: History of SAC, Jan- RDP79B01709A001900060036-8; Director of Central Intelli-
Jun 1967. September 1968. FOIA to HQ USAF by Chris Pocock. gence. Memorandum for the 303 Committee. 15 June 1966.
50. Wagner, p. 118 Subject: OXCART Deployment. CIA-
51. Headquarters Strategic Air Command. Reconnaissance: His- RDP77B00403R000100010002-4; all CIA FOIA Reading Room.
tory of SAC, Jan-Jun 1967. September 1968. FOIA to HQ USAF 63. Office of Special Activities, Central Intelligence Agency. Cable
by Chris Pocock traffic. 24 January 1968. CIA FOIA Reading Room, CIA-
52. Wagner, pp. 121-22. RDP69B00041R001600030023-4; Office of Special Activities, Cen-
53. Pedlow, Gregory and Welzenbach, 251-53; National Recon- tral Intelligence Agency. OXCART Information. 13 March 1968.
naissance Office (?). Memorandum for the NRP Executive Com- CIA FOIA Reading Room, CIA-RDP33-02415A000800340015-9.
mittee. 15 July 1966. Subject: U-2 Program. CIA FOIA Reading 64. Director of Special Activities, Central Intelligence Agency.
Room, CIA-RDP89B00980R000600040008-7. Memorandum for Director, CIA Reconnaissance Programs. 20 Oc-
54. Headquarters Strategic Air Command. Reconnaissance: His- tober 1967. Subject: Program Progress Report. CIA FOIA Reading
tory of SAC, Jan-Jun 1965; Historical Study No. 100A. 15 April Room, CIA-RDP33-02415A000800250016-8; Director, Central In-
1966. FOIA to ACC/HO by Robert Hopkins; Pocock, 50 Years, p. telligence Agency. Memorandum for The Deputy Secretary of De-
231 fense, Special Assistant to the President (Mr. Rostow), The
55. Bennett, George. A Study of the Use of the RB-57 and U-2 Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs. 15 May
Aircraft in Southeast Asia, 1967-1967. Air University, 1968, pp. 1967. Subject: OXCART Reconnaissance of North Vietnam. CIA
39-40. Call # K239.042-3566. Air Force Historical Research FOIA Reading Room, DOC_0001471747; Deputy Director, Cen-
Agency, Maxwell AFB, AL tral Intelligence Agency. Memorandum for Director, Central In-
56. Bennett, George. A Study of the Use of the RB-57 and U-2 telligence. 6 July 1967. Subject: Dissemination of Information
Aircraft in Southeast Asia, 1967-1967. Air University, 1968, p. 29. derived from BLACK SHIELD. CIA FOIA Reading Room, CIA-
Call # K239.042-3566. Air Force Historical Research Agency, RDP79B01709A001900060024-1.
Maxwell AFB, AL. 65. Committee on Overhead Reconnaissance. Memorandum for
57. 100th Strategic Reconnaissance Wing. April-June 1967. N.d. the United States Intelligence Board. 20 September 1967. Sub-
Air Force Historical Research Agency, K-WG-100-HI, IRIS ject: Review of Far East Requirements for Photographic Cover-
453863, Maxwell AFB, AL.; Headquarters Strategic Air Com- age. CIA FOIA Reading Room,
mand. Reconnaissance: History of SAC, Jan-Jun 1967. September CIA-RDP79B01709A001800010005-8.
1968. FOIA to HQ USAF by Chris Pocock 66. Director of Scientific Intelligence, Central Intelligence
58. Executive Secretary, Committee for Imagery Requirements Agency. Memorandum for Director of Special, Directorate of Sci-
and Exploitation (COMIREX). Memorandum for Committee for ence and Technology. 4 October 1965. Subject: Implications of
Imagery Requirements and Exploitation. 13 November 1967. SAM Site Mobility for IDEALIST and OXCART Programs. CIA
Subject: Requirements for Photographic Reconnaissance of the FOIA Reading Room, CIA-RDP75B00285R000200070001-2.
Far East – [redacted]. CIA FOIA Reading Room, CIA- 67. Director Program B, Central Intelligence Agency. Memoran-
RDP79B01709A003600010011-1. dum for Director, National Reconnaissance Office. 3 February
59. Central Intelligence Agency. Memorandum. 2 April 1971. 1965. Subject: IDEALIST Program Summary. CIA FOIA Reading
Subject: Photoreconnaissance of Cambodia. CIA FOIA Reading Room, CIA-RDP75B00285R000200010057-7.
Room, CIA-RDP79B01709A001700060003-6. 68. Pedlow, Gregory and Welzenbach, p. 242; Headquarters
60. Directorate of Science and Technology (?), Central Intelli- Strategic Air Command. Reconnaissance: History of SAC, Jul-Dec
gence Agency. Point paper. 13 May 1965. Subject: A Summary of 1967. September 1968. FOIA to HQ USAF by Chris Pocock
the National Reconnaissance Problem. CIA FOIA Reading Room, 69. Col George Nakis. AFHRA Interview about U-2 operations
CIA-RDP71B00508R000100160002-8; Director of Special Activi- in Vietnam, 1967. 6 February 1969. Air Force Historical Research
ties, Central Intelligence Agency. Memorandum for 303 Commit- Agency, K239.0512-094, IRIS 903876, Maxwell AFB, AL.; Ben-
tee. 18 March 1969. Subject: OXCART and SR-71 Mach 3 nett, George. A Study of the Use of the RB-57 and U-2 Aircraft in
Reconnaissance Aircraft. CIA FOIA Reading Room, CIA- Southeast Asia, 1967-1967. Air University, 1968. Call # K239.042-
RDP68B00724R000100160043-7. 3566. Air Force Historical Research Agency, Maxwell AFB, AL.
61. Director of Reconnaissance, Central Intelligence Agency. 70. Headquarters Strategic Air Command. Reconnaissance: His-
Memorandum for the Director of Central Intelligence. 20 January tory of SAC, Jul-Dec 1967. September 1968. FOIA to HQ USAF
1966. Subject: Briefing of PFIAB in Progress in the National Re- by Chris Pocock.
connaissance Program. CIA FOIA Reading Room, CIA- 71. 100th Strategic Reconnaissance Wing. April-June 1967. N.d.

24 AIR POWER History / SUMMER 2021

Air Force Historical Research Agency, K-WG-100-HI, IRIS 82. Paul Crickmore, Lockheed SR-71: The Secret Missions Ex-
453863, Maxwell AFB, AL. posed (Botley: Osprey Publishing, 1993), 122-129.
72. Committee for Imagery Requirements and Exploitation 83. Crickmore, 133.
(COMIREX). Memorandum for Record. 5 December 1967. Sub- 84. History Division, Headquarters Strategic Air Command.
ject: Requirements for Photographic Reconnaissance of North History of SAC Reconnaissance Operations, FY 73. Historical
Vietnam. CIA FOIA Reading Room, CIA- Study No. 127. 15 November 1974. FOIA to ACC/HO by Robert
RDP79B01709A001900060013-3. Hopkins
73. Director, National Reconnaissance Office. Memorandum for 85. Executive Secretary, Committee for Imagery Requirements
Mr. Nitze, Mr. Helms, Dr. Hornig. 23 September 1967. Subject: and Exploitation (COMIREX). COMIREX-M-66. 20 March 1969.
SR-71/A-12 Comparison. CIA FOIA Reading Room, CIA- Subject: Requirements for Photographic Reconnaissance of the
RDP79B01709A001900060021-4, CIA-RDP74B00283R00010- Far East – [redacted]. CIA FOIA Reading Room, CIA-
0090012-2-1; Central Intelligence Agency, unknown element. RDP79B01709A000800030006-6.
Memorandum for the Deputy Director for Science and Technol- 86. National Photographic Interpretation Center. Attachment to
ogy. 15 November 1967. Subject: EXCOM Issues. CIA FOIA Read- M-5844. MiG Reaction to U.S. Drone Aircraft Haiphong Area,
ing Room, CIA-RDP74B00283R000100090007-8; Deputy Director North Vietnam. 18 February 1969. CIA FOIA Reading Room,
of Special Activities, Central Intelligence Agency. Memorandum CIA-RDP85T00339R000100140002-8.
for Deputy Director for Science and Technology. 17 April 1968. 87. Chairman, Committee for Imagery Requirements and Ex-
Subject: Comments Pertaining to the D/NRO Paper Concerning ploitation (COMIREX). Memorandum for Committee for Imagery
OXCART Phase-out or Retention. CIA FOIA Reading Room, CIA- Requirements and Exploitation. 18 November 1969. Subject:
RDP71B00529R000200010037-2. Monthly Report on Overhead Imagery Reconnaissance. CIA
74. Chairman, Committee on Overhead Reconnaissance. Mem- FOIA Reading Room, CIA-RDP79B01709A003500040001-0;
orandum for the United States Intelligence Deputy Director for Frank Chapin, National Security Council Staff, White House.
Science and Technology, Central Intelligence Agency. Memoran- Memorandum for John Mitchell, David Packard, U. Alexis John-
dum for Director of Central Intelligence. 19 December 1967. Sub- son, Richard Helms. 25 September 1969. Subject: Air Reconnais-
ject: OXCART/SR-71 Information for EXCOM Meeting. CIA sance of South China. CIA FOIA Reading Room,
FOIA Reading Room, CIA-RDP74B00283R000100090003-2. CIA-RDP75B00159R000200070017-5.
75. Pedlow, Gregory and Welzenbach, p. 243; Director, National 88. Imagery Collection Requirements Subcommittee of Commit-
Reconnaissance Office. Memorandum for Special Assistant to the tee for Imagery Requirements and Exploitation (COMIREX).
President (Mr. Rostow), Deputy Secretary of Defense, Under Sec- Minutes of Meeting IRCS-M-34, 26 November 1969. N.d. CIA
retary of State for Political Affairs, Director of Central Intelli- FOIA Reading Room, CIA-RDP79B01709A002800080024-9; Im-
gence. 13 March 1968. Subject: U-2 Reconnaissance of Cambodia. agery Collection Requirements Subcommittee of Committee for
CIA FOIA Reading Room, CIA-RDP79B01709A001700030026-4; Imagery Requirements and Exploitation (COMIREX). Minutes
Director of Special Activities, Central Intelligence Agency. Mem- of Meeting, 21 May 1969. CIA FOIA Reading Room, CIA-
orandum for Director, CIA Reconnaissance Programs. 16 April RDP79B01709A002800080015-9; Imagery Collection Require-
1968. Subject: Program Progress Report. CIA FOIA Reading ments Subcommittee of Committee for Imagery Requirements
Room, CIA-RDP33-02415A000800250006-9; Deputy for Opera- and Exploitation (COMIREX). Minutes of Meeting, 7 October
tions, Office of Special Activities, Central Intelligence Agency. 1969. CIA FOIA Reading Room, CIA-
Memorandum for Record. 4 April 1968. Subject: North Vietnam RDP79B01709A002800080019-5.
Operational Restraints. CIA FOIA Reading Room, CIA- 89. Assistant Deputy Director for Intelligence, Central Intelli-
RDP71B00297R000300200002-6. gence Agency. Memorandum for Director of Central Intelligence.
76. Committee on Overhead Reconnaissance. Memorandum for 24 October 1969. Subject: JRC Reconnaissance Schedule for No-
the United States Intelligence Board. 17 October 1968. Subject: vember 1969. CIA FOIA Reading Room, CIA-
Overhead Imagery Reconnaissance of North Vietnam During a RDP75B00159R000200180030-8.
Truce. CIA FOIA Reading Room, CIA- 90. History Division, Headquarters Strategic Air Command.
RDP79B01709A002300040008-6. History of SAC Reconnaissance Operations, FY 72; Historical
77. 100th Strategic Reconnaissance Wing. April-June 1968. N.d. Study No. 125, Vol I, Narrative. 18 April 1974. FOIA to ACC/HO
Air Force Historical Research Agency, K-WG-100-HI, IRIS by Robert Hopkins.
453867, Maxwell AFB, AL. 91. Elder, Paul. Project CHECO Report: Buffalo Hunter - 1970-
78. Pocock, Dragon Lady, pp. 115-16; Pocock, 50 Years, p. 255; 1972. Pacific Air Forces. 24 July 1973. IRIS 517466. Air Force His-
Headquarters Strategic Air Command. Reconnaissance: History torical Research Agency, Maxwell AFB, AL.
of SAC, Jan 1968 – Jun 1971. Unknown Date. FOIA to HQ USAF 92. Wagner, pp. 193-197; History Division, Headquarters Strate-
by Chris Pocock. gic Air Command. History of SAC Reconnaissance Operations,
79. Henry A. Kissinger. Memorandum for The President. 9 Oc- FY 72; Historical Study No. 125, Vol I, Narrative. 18 April 1974.
tober 1969. Subject: Air Reconnaissance of South China. CIA FOIA to ACC/HO by Robert Hopkins.
FOIA Reading Room, CIA-RDP74J00828R000100200028-9. 93. History Division, Headquarters Strategic Air Command.
80. Office of Special Activities, Central Intelligence Agency. OX- History of SAC Reconnaissance Operations, FY 72; Historical
CART Information. 13 March 1968. CIA FOIA Reading Room, Study No. 125, Vol I, Narrative. 18 April 1974. FOIA to ACC/HO
CIA-RDP33-02415A000800340015-9; Director of Central Intelli- by Robert Hopkins.
gence. Memorandum for The President’s Foreign Intelligence Ad- 94. Executive Secretary, Committee for Imagery Requirements
visory Board. 19 February 1968. Subject: Central Intelligence and Exploitation (COMIREX). Meeting Minutes for COMIREX-
Agency Operation of the OXCART. CIA FOIA Reading Room, M-103. 30 July 1970. CIA FOIA Reading Room, CIA-
CIA-RDP75B00159R000100070014-9; Director of Special Activi- RDP79B01709A000900060004-4.
ties, Central Intelligence Agency. Memorandum for Director, CIA 95. History Division, Headquarters Strategic Air Command.
Reconnaissance Programs. 16 April 1968. Subject: Program History of SAC Reconnaissance Operations, FY 72; Historical
Progress Report. CIA FOIA Reading Room, CIA-RDP33- Study No. 125, Vol I, Narrative. 18 April 1974. FOIA to ACC/HO
02415A000800250006-9. by Robert Hopkins.
81. History Division, Headquarters Strategic Air Command. 96. History Division, Headquarters Strategic Air Command.
History of SAC Reconnaissance Operations, FY 72; Historical History of SAC Reconnaissance Operations, FY 72; Historical
Study No. 125, Vol I, Narrative. 18 April 1974. FOIA to ACC/HO Study No. 125, Vol I, Narrative. 18 April 1974. FOIA to ACC/HO
by Robert Hopkins. by Robert Hopkins.

AIR POWER History / SUMMER 2021 25

97. Acting Director, Central Intelligence Agency. Memorandum Headquarters Strategic Air Command. History of SAC Recon-
for the Honorable David Packard, Deputy Secretary of Defense. naissance Operations, FY 73. Historical Study No. 127. 15 No-
21 December 1970. No subject. CIA FOIA Reading Room, CIA- vember 1974. FOIA to ACC/HO by Robert Hopkins
RDP80R01720R001300030019-1. 112. History Division, Headquarters Strategic Air Command.
98. History Division, Headquarters Strategic Air Command. History of SAC Reconnaissance Operations, FY 73. Historical
History of SAC Reconnaissance Operations, FY 72; Historical Study No. 127. 15 November 1974. FOIA to ACC/HO by Robert
Study No. 125, Vol I, Narrative. 18 April 1974. FOIA to ACC/HO Hopkins
by Robert Hopkins; Pocock, 50 Years, p. 264 113. History Division, Headquarters Strategic Air Command.
99. Hanyok, Robert. Spartans in Darkness: American SIGINT History of SAC Reconnaissance Operations, FY 73. Historical
and the Indochina War, 1945-1975 (National Security Agency, Study No. 127. 15 November 1974. FOIA to ACC/HO by Robert
2002), p. 277. Declassified/redacted version downloaded from NSA Hopkins
FOIA webpage; Chris Pocock, 50 Years, p. 164. 114. History Division, Headquarters Strategic Air Command.
100. History Division, Headquarters Strategic Air Command. History of SAC Reconnaissance Operations, FY 73. Historical
History of SAC Reconnaissance Operations, FY 72; Historical Study No. 127. 15 November 1974. FOIA to ACC/HO by Robert
Study No. 125, Vol I, Narrative. 18 April 1974. FOIA to ACC/HO Hopkins
by Robert Hopkins; Crickmore, 120-141 115. History Division, Headquarters Strategic Air Command.
101. History Division, Headquarters Strategic Air Command. History of SAC Reconnaissance Operations, FY 73. Historical
History of SAC Reconnaissance Operations, FY 72; Historical Study No. 127. 15 November 1974. FOIA to ACC/HO by Robert
Study No. 125, Vol I, Narrative. 18 April 1974. FOIA to ACC/HO Hopkins
by Robert Hopkins. 116. Strategic Air Command. Project CORONA HARVEST V, 1
102. History Division, Headquarters Strategic Air Command. July 1972 – 15 August 1973. Volume I, Appendix A, LINE-
History of SAC Reconnaissance Operations, FY 73. Historical BACKER II – SAC Operations. Call # K416.041-13. Air Force His-
Study No. 127. 15 November 1974. FOIA to ACC/HO by Robert torical Research Agency, Maxwell AFB, AL.
Hopkins 117. Wagner, pp. 198-199.
103. History Division, Headquarters Strategic Air Command. 118. Elder, Paul. Project CHECO Report: Buffalo Hunter - 1970-
History of SAC Reconnaissance Operations, FY 72; Historical 1972. Pacific Air Forces. 24 July 1973. IRIS 517466. Air Force His-
Study No. 125, Vol I, Narrative. 18 April 1974. FOIA to ACC/HO torical Research Agency, Maxwell AFB, AL.; History Division,
by Robert Hopkins. Headquarters Strategic Air Command. History of SAC Recon-
104. Elder, Paul. Project CHECO Report: Buffalo Hunter - 1970- naissance Operations, FY 73. Historical Study No. 127. 15 No-
1972. Pacific Air Forces. 24 July 1973. IRIS 517466. Air Force His- vember 1974. FOIA to ACC/HO by Robert Hopkins
torical Research Agency, Maxwell AFB, AL. 119. History Division, Headquarters Strategic Air Command.
105. History Division, Headquarters Strategic Air Command. History of SAC Reconnaissance Operations, FY 73. Historical
History of SAC Reconnaissance Operations, FY 72; Historical Study No. 127. 15 November 1974. FOIA to ACC/HO by Robert
Study No. 125, Vol I, Narrative. 18 April 1974. FOIA to ACC/HO Hopkins; Strategic Air Command. Project CORONA HARVEST
by Robert Hopkins. V, 1 July 1972 – 15 August 1973. Volume I, Appendix A, LINE-
106. History Division, Headquarters Strategic Air Command. BACKER II – SAC Operations. Call # K416.041-13, IRIS
History of SAC Reconnaissance Operations, FY 72; Historical 1103578. Air Force Historical Research Agency, Maxwell AFB, AL;
Study No. 125, Vol I, Narrative. 18 April 1974. FOIA to ACC/HO Hanyok, p. 272.
by Robert Hopkins. 120. Agreement on Ending the War and Restoring Peace in Viet-
107. Wagner, pp. 193-197; History Division, Headquarters nam (Paris, 27 January 1973); hosted on CVCE.eu by l’Université
Strategic Air Command. History of SAC Reconnaissance Opera- du Luxembourg. Accessed 23 May 2018. Available at:
tions, FY 72; Historical Study No. 125, Vol I, Narrative. 18 April https://www.cvce.eu/content/publication/2001/10/12/656ccc0d-
1974. FOIA to ACC/HO by Robert Hopkins. 31ef-42a6-a3e9-ce5ee7d4fc80/publishable_en.pdf
108. Elder, Paul. Project CHECO Report: Buffalo Hunter - 1970- 121. Pedlow, Gregory and Welzenbach, p. 247; Executive Secre-
1972. Pacific Air Forces. 24 July 1973. IRIS 517466. Air Force His- tary, the 40 Committee. Memorandum for Mr. William Clements,
torical Research Agency, Maxwell AFB, AL.; History Division, Department of Defense, Mr. William Porter, Department of State,
Headquarters Strategic Air Command. History of SAC Recon- and Admiral Thomas Moorer, Joint Chiefs of Staff. 19 March
naissance Operations, FY 73. Historical Study No. 127. 15 No- 1973. Subject: Request for Authorization to Fly SR-71 Photo-
vember 1974. FOIA to ACC/HO by Robert Hopkins graphic Reconnaissance Missions over North Vietnam. CIA FOIA
109. Wagner, pp. 198-199; History Division, Headquarters Reading Room, CIA-RDP80R01720R001300010023-8, CIA-
Strategic Air Command. History of SAC Reconnaissance Opera- RDP80R01720R000800050020-3.
tions, FY 73. Historical Study No. 127. 15 November 1974. FOIA 122. Executive Secretary, Committee for Imagery Requirements
to ACC/HO by Robert Hopkins and Exploitation (COMIREX). Meeting Minutes for COMIREX-
110. Deputy Director for Intelligence. Memorandum for the Di- M-203. 18 April 1974. CIA FOIA Reading Room, CIA-
rector. 27 October 1972. Subject: Reconnaissance of North Viet- RDP79B01709A001300020001-5; Pocock, 50 Years, p. 266
nam. CIA FOIA Reading Room, 123. National Intelligence Officer for South Asia, Southeast Asia,
CIA-RDP80R01720R000700110008-1; Special Assistant for Viet- and Africa, Office of the Director of Central Intelligence. Memo-
namese Affairs. Memorandum for Record. 31 October 1972. Sub- randum for the Director. 13 November 1974. Subject: Comments
ject: Reconnaissance over North Vietnam. CIA FOIA Reading on the Intelligence Loss Which Would Result from Returning
Room, CIA-RDP80R01720R000400090040-1. BUFFALO HUNTER Drone Photoreconnaissance Assets from
111. Elder, Paul. Project CHECO Report: Buffalo Hunter - 1970- Southeast Asia to CONUS. CIA FOIA Reading Room, CIA-
1972. Pacific Air Forces. 24 July 1973. IRIS 517466. Air Force His- RDP80B01495R001300070007-7.
torical Research Agency, Maxwell AFB, AL.; History Division, 124. Pocock, Dragon Lady, p. 116.

26 AIR POWER History / SUMMER 2021

Gene Deatrick: An Appreciation

Jonna Doolittle Hoppes

Gene Deatrick stands in front of a
PBY in Adak, Alaska.

I
t has been said that there are old pilots and there are bold pilots, but no old bold pilots. The truth is there are a few
and, on Fridays around noon in a small private dining room at the Army Navy Country Club in Arlington, Virginia, a
group of these legendary pilots gather to discuss the good old days, current events and the future. Over the years that
luncheon included Buz Carpenter, David North, Frank Gallo, Nordy Norwood, Jenna Dolan, Whitey Feightner, Dick Hal-
lion, Scotty Crossfield, Heather Penney, John Alison, and many others whose love of flying pushed them to great heights
– both literally and figuratively. For years, at the head this table, sat a pilot who was a walking encyclopedia of Air Force
history. His was first-hand knowledge. Colonel Eugene “Gene” Peyton Deatrick, Jr. was a great facilitator, a guy who gen-
uinely liked people. He’d sit there chin up, eyes focused middle distance, pipe in hand, and preside over what was frequently
an intense discussion. And sometimes, when things got particularly passionate, Gene, with a mischievous twinkle in his
eye, would inject some levity, and simply crack everybody up.
Born in 1924, he lived through the Great Depression but never focused on life’s negatives. The only child of two uni-
versity professors, he spent most of his childhood in Morgantown, West Virginia and Washington, D.C. Gene assumed he
would follow in his parents’ footsteps. But that changed as World War II began to unfold in Europe. His mother asked if
he’d ever considered attending the United States Military Academy. Gene admitted his only association with West Point
was that they played Navy every year and beat them. He received an appointment from Senator Jennings Randolph.
“I never knew one man could be so mean to another as they were up there. I’d come from a very friendly family.” Gene
quipped in a West Point oral history. “‘Shoulders back! Head up! Shut up!’ It was quite a change. The only thing I re-
member thinking is, if Patton and Bradley can do it, so can I.”
Gene hated to admit that he wasn’t a kid who built model airplanes and dreamed about flying. No, what made him
want to fly was an exercise during his plebe year. Company C-1 was on maneuvers up in Watertown. They were on a long
march when a T–6 simulated a strafing run that drove them all into the wet weeds. As Gene looked up he saw the pilot
wave and thought, “If I ever go to war, that’s the way I want to go.” When offered the opportunity for flight training he
took it.
Gene became an unofficial member of General Jimmy Doolittle’s family in 1944. Christmas leave wasn’t long enough
for him to take the train to West Virginia so he joined his classmate, John Doolittle, for the holiday. Mrs. Doolittle had a
small apartment on Connecticut Avenue in Washington, D.C. It was crowded that weekend since Jim, Jr., his wife and
son, were visiting. At bedtime that first night, Mrs. Doolittle told Gene, “You’re sleeping on the kitchen floor, and if you
want breakfast, please get up, we eat at eight o’clock. If you don’t, why, we’ll just step over you.”

AIR POWER History / SUMMER 2021 27

 His years at West Point were memorable and were cap-
tured in the 1946 Howitzer

The comedy began when this West Virginian strolled

through the sallyport one July morning. Because Dea was
a hive, he had no trouble from the Academic Department;
but his troubles with the femmes brought many a laugh to
C Co. The Air Corps gained Dea’s attention early in cadet
life, and his one ambition was to become a “hot pilot.” Ex-
emplary of his ability, Dea chose a branch in which he is
certain to go high.

A member of the last West Point class to take flight train-

ing, Gene received his wings on June 1, 1946, from General
Carl Spaatz.
The former Air Force Historian, Dr. Richard P. Hallion
stated in a recent interview:

Gene graduated at an interesting time. Not only were the

services transforming and he was seeing that air power was
gaining status as a separate military force but also we were
seeing tremendous changes in technology. We were going
from the era of propeller driven airplanes to the era of jets.
We were going from the era of subsonic flight to transonic
and supersonic flight. The shape of the aircraft was trans-
forming dramatically going from airplanes with broad
high-aspect-ratio wingspans and fuselages that were rela-
tively short to wings growing much smaller, lower aspect
ratio, and the fuselage is growing much longer – there’s a
whole series of problems – handling problems, flight dy-
Gene Deatrick (front) and Bryce Moore at Adak, Alaska.
namics, issues like that. And then in the external world, we
have the beginnings of what we will see emerge as the com- problems we have with so called “Third World” – two major
puter revolution. We also have a complete transformation blocks of power are grappling to really secure – if you will –
in weaponry where we go from conventional high explosives global dominance over the other and the Third World as
to atomic weaponry, then within ten years to thermonuclear well. And that’s the environment that shapes largely what
weaponry. On top of that we have a very unstable global cri- Gene ends up doing as a professional military aviator and
sis emerging, the Cold War. We had defeated three great test pilot. It’s interesting that if you take a look at him – he
powers that were causing problems for the rest of the world plays into issues and circumstances and situations that in-
– Nazi Germany, Fascist Italy, militarist Japan – but now fluence that war – that cold war, occasionally hot, as he wit-
all of a sudden we’re confronting new adversaries – one dat- nessed in Vietnam – all the way to the point where he retires
ing to 1917 (the Soviet Union) but then after 1949 Commu- from the military.
nist China and then, from the late 1950’s onwards, all the
As Dr. Hallion noted, these challenges are the back-
drop to Gene’s Air Force career. Gene liked to say that Air
Ms. Doolittle Hoppes is the author of two published
Force assignments were like haircuts, you get a few bad
books. Calculated Risk: The Extraordinary Life of
ones but for the most part, they’re pretty good. One of those
Jimmy Doolittle is a memoir of her famous grandfa-
“good haircuts” was in Alaska where Gene learned to fly in
ther, aviator Jimmy Doolittle and his equally extraor-
adverse weather conditions. After transitioning into multi-
dinary wife, Joe. Her second book, Just Doing My Job
engine aircraft in Enid, Oklahoma and a short stint at
is a collection of biographical stories from World War
MacDill Air Force Base, Gene volunteered for the 10th Air
II. Her third book, The Wrong Stuff, General William
Rescue Squadron in the Aleutians under the command of
Lyon’s autobiography, is due to be released in the near
Colonel Bernt Balchen, the famed Norwegian explorer and
future. Her next project, Athena’s Voice, is a collection
first airman to fly over both of the Earth’s poles.
of stories of American women who have served in com-
Balchen wanted a PBY Catalina for rescue missions in
bat, many currently serving in our military. Her arti-
the Bering Sea so he contacted his Navy friends and se-
cles have appeared in a number of magazines. She is
cured a wonderful little machine that was very hard flown.
a board member for the Air Force Historical Founda-
Gene, who had “shot over 100 takeoffs and landings in a
tion, and a current advisor to the Flying Tiger Histor-
light airplane up in Anchorage” grants that he was a little
ical Foundation.
overconfident when he tried his first heavy takeoff. He re-

28 AIR POWER History / SUMMER 2021

called his experience in an oral history for the Society of
Experimental Test Pilots (SETP). “I never realized a take-
off in choppy water in a PBY yields full-stall takeoff …
every wave you hit you lose another knot. Pretty soon it
will break and just as we did the right wing went down,
caught a wingtip. We turned around and pulled the power
off, and I heard, ‘glug, glug, glug.’ It split the hull and it
sank….I should have done more practice.” With a shake
of his head he continued, “That’s my claim to fame. I’m
probably the only Air Force pilot that’s ever sunk a PBY!”
Gene had a second accident that week. Returning from
Shemya in wet conditions, he heard a Gooney Bird land
and thought, “Hell, if he can get in, I can.” He set the B–17
right on the end of the runway, a beautiful landing, but he
went down the runway with a 5-knot tailwind in the rain
and off the end into a ditch. Scotty Crossfield liked to in-
troduce Gene as the most efficient Air Force pilot he’d ever
met, claiming that Gene did it to save the Air Force a whole
lot of money by having only one Accident Board.
Flying in the Aleutians was quite an experience. Their
rescues ranged across the entire northern tier of North
America and the techniques they developed are the ac-
knowledged standard used today in cold weather search
Gene Deatrick and Pancho Barnes.
and rescue operations. As one can imagine, the conditions
were often treacherous. Gene remembered a safety meet- was like asking Noah if he knew where the ark was.
ing where Balchen told them, “I know that I’ve asked you An assignment to Bomber Flight Test Division at
to fly in weather that no one should be flying in, but with Wright Patterson Air Force Base, Ohio, followed test pilot
an emergency we try to go. I do expect losses…But I would school. Between 1954 and 1956, Gene participated in the
appreciate, if you crack up an airplane, when writing the testing of nuclear and thermonuclear weapons. The first
accident report, please say something other than, ‘that’s all tests in Arizona using a B–29, focused on the effect drop-
there is for this son-of-a-bitch.’” ping nuclear weapons had on pilots. Subsequent testing,
Air Force regulations stated that if a pilot had three a series of high yield test detonations conducted at the Pa-
major accidents within five years, they were required to cific Proving Grounds, included Operation Castle and Op-
meet with a Flying Evaluation Board at Warner Robins. eration Redwing by Joint Task Force 7 at Bikini Atoll and
Gene had three. After meeting with the board and reestab- Eniwetok Atoll. Gene flew co-pilot with Jim Bauer in both
lishing currency, he was called into the Commander’s office operations. The tests focused on load survey studying ther-
for a ‘father-and-son’ chat. As they walked out the General mal and overpressure effects of an atomic blast on aircraft
put his arm around Gene and said, “Deatrick, don’t ever in flight. He remembered the tests in an oral history for
forget. Unless you crack up an airplane now and then, no the SETP. “There are things that happen when you explode
one will ever know who you are.” the bomb: heat, pressure, and radiation. Radiation isn’t too
Gene’s next assignment was Bombing Engineering bad because you can get away from it. It’s the heat and
Test Pilot for the 3759th Electronics Test Squadron where, pressure wave. So they would try to position us from the
as the nucleus of the Air Armament Center, they focused bomb site somewhere in the various attitudes…so that
on the development of new radar bombing equipment. we’d only get probably about eighty percent of the load. The
His most memorable event from that assignment was problem was, no one could estimate what the hell the yield
when he picked up General Copeland’s son from Virginia of the bomb was going to be. One of the first hydrogen tests,
Military Institute. Apparently the kid bailed out when the they were looking at eight megatons and it went fifteen.”
right engine caught on fire. Gene, focused on controlling On that particular flight, when the bomb went twice
the plane, didn’t realize he was missing until they landed. as high as expected, the question was, “What the hell do
Luckily the General was in the right seat. we do now?” They had to land light because of the short
In 1951, he was offered a slot in the first class of the runway at Eniwetok, so they usually flew around for about
Experimental Test Pilot School at Edwards AFB. Just prior an hour at low level to burn off fuel. But they weren’t sure
to departing for his new assignment, he visited General what an explosion at fifteen megatons had on the airplane.
and Mrs. Doolittle in New York. He told them he was head- If the flaps were unusable, they’d go off the end of the run-
ing to the school and Doolittle suggested he look up an old way. If the flaps went down partway and stuck, they would-
friend. Gene arrived at Edwards late Friday afternoon and n’t be able to reach Guam or anywhere for that matter. So
headed to the Officers Club that evening. He asked his the decision was made to leave the flaps up and fly to
commander, Colonel Boyd, if he knew Doolittle’s friend, Hawaii where the length of the runway at Hickam could
someone named Pancho Barnes. Gene later stated that it accommodate a no-flap landing.

AIR POWER History / SUMMER 2021 29

 Gene noted in the SETP interview another matter of
concern. You couldn’t get alcohol on Eniwetok, so the crew
members would pick it up when they visited other bases
and store it in the back of the plane. “Fortunately the guys
at Hickam were more enamored by the airplane than
searching it. They never found all the whiskey we had on-
board.”
In August of 1955, Gene was “signed off” in the Boeing
B–52B, the first B model, by Colonel Guy Townsend. It was
extensively instrumented to measure thermal blast and
gust effects of a nuclear explosion. Pilot Charles G. “Andy”
Anderson and Deatrick participated in eight “shots” in this
aircraft including Cherokee, the first airdrop of a three-
stage thermonuclear design. Over the course of his assign-
ment to the Bomber Flight Test Division, Gene
participated in thirty-eight nuclear tests but Cherokee
stood out in his mind. “I’ll never forget that. Fortunately,
the position was such that we were just going away on the
peripheral of the bomb blast. They brought in an airplane
Express-20 A-1 Skyraider Class.
out from Albuquerque. I don’t know much about the bomb
system but he was doing a run going from visual to radar. Tactical Air Command (TAC), and if Estes gets you into F–
Somehow it got screwed up, and he ended up with a 100 – 100s, I can assure you that you’ll probably spend your
150 knot tailwind. I’ll never forget, the countdown started, whole tour in Saigon behind a desk. My advice is you vol-
‘60 seconds, 50 seconds, 40 seconds’, and then the navigator unteer for the A–1, which no respectable fighter pilot would
yells, ‘Get the hell out of here!’ It went off early. Fortunately be caught in, but if you can get through a year successfully
we were going away so we were well positioned, but, boy, with that, you can get into TAC and do what you want.”
I’ll tell you, the bump when it comes, you know it! God help That’s what he did. After relocating his family to Los
us if we ever use them.” Angeles, he called a friend at Douglas Aircraft. “Can you
Gene viewed one of the drops on Bikini from Eniwetok. get me a dash-one on an A–1 so I know what the devil I’m
In the SETP interview, he noted, “When the shot comes and going to be flying?” His friend did better than that. He flew
the wind blasts, it’s terrific. You could feel the surge of wind Gene up to Naval Air Station Lemoore. The first thing
when it passes down there. I’ve long had a philosophy, if Gene noticed was that the A–1 had the R-3350 engine, the
we get into a war and they shoot a thousand our way and same engine they had on the B–29, which had an unfortu-
we shoot fifteen hundred their way, what everyone should nate tendency to catch on fire. His first thought was, “My
do is go out and watch it because it will be the most exhil- God, I’ve volunteered for the wrong airplane!” The Navy
arating sight you’ve ever seen. And then pray to God that captain that took him around gave Gene some advice,
you die three minutes later.” “Colonel, I want to tell you something. This is a 6G airplane
When Gene returned he wanted to get on the B–58 with a 40G cockpit. Don’t ever leave it.” Gene flew 402 com-
program but was told, “You’ve been here long enough. bat missions, never lost an engine and never bailed out.
You’re going to have to find a new job.” That new job was General Michael Dugan remembered when Gene
as executive officer to General Howell Estes, Jr. According showed up at Hurlburt Field to train in the A–1. “All the
to Gene, Estes didn’t really want an aide. He wanted some- people there had combat experience in T–28s or A–1s and
one who could fly with him, thus making Gene the highest here was this older lieutenant colonel who came from Mil-
paid copilot in the Air Force. Gene was fond of saying that itary Airlift Command, I mean, he wasn’t a fighter pilot
“the only reason [Estes] didn’t fire me was he liked my wife like we were… he’d wear his wheel cap on the flight line
and knew she’d starve to death if he did, and so I stayed and set it on the other seat… so there was a little snicker-
on. It was an interesting job.” ing about that… It turns out that nobody looked up his
When asked why he volunteered for Vietnam in 1965, background…It didn’t take very long to figure out that this
Gene replied, “I was a graduate from West Point and the guy hasn’t been where I’ve been but he knows a lot about
purpose of it is to fight for your country. I spent five years where I’ve been and he knows where he’s going.”
being an executive officer to a four star general who was The same thing was true when Gene assumed com-
commander of Military Transport at the time. I decided if mand of the 1st Air Commando Squadron located at
I was ever going to fulfill my pledge to be a warrior, I had Pleiku, Republic of Vietnam (RVN) in March 1966. Accord-
to volunteer to go to Vietnam before it ended and that’s ing to General Dugan, who served under Gene in Vietnam,
what I did.” “The fighter pilots he commanded learned that he was a
Initially Gene wanted to fly F–100s and asked General substantial aviator and grew himself into a fighter pilot as
Estes to help him get into them. But a chance meeting with a senior officer. Not many people make that transition.” In
General Pete Everest, an old test pilot at Edwards and a discussing Gene’s leadership skills, Dugan went on to say,
good friend, resulted in some advice. “You’ve never been in “A–1s had a terrific loss rate…the second highest loss rate

30 AIR POWER History / SUMMER 2021

 can see the ground directly below him only when he banks
ninety degrees, and only for a few seconds. There was a
bend in the river and when Gene made that ninety degree
bank to the left, he saw a fisherman standing on a rock in
the water waving what looked like a white net. Gene con-
tinued on for about ten minutes but something just didn’t
settle right. Natives don’t wave to fully loaded airplanes.
This was enemy territory with no friendlies. There wasn’t
a village in sight. It just seemed strange. He circled back
over the river. The fisherman continued to wave.

Gene circled a third time and asked Andy if he could see

anything.
“It looks like he’s trying to write SOS.”
They pulled off to the side and Gene called Airborne Com-
mand’s C–121 controller in the area and asked if any-
one had been shot down.
Negative.

Picking up somebody in enemy territory could be risky.

The fisherman might be an enemy combatant calling for a
rescue and, when pulled into the helicopter, set off an ex-
plosion and take them down. But the nagging voice that
Gene Deatrick (center) with Simpson (left) and Eleazar Parmly.
something was off kept at him. After a lengthy conversa-
tion that went all the way to Saigon they secured two Jolly
in terms of pilots in Vietnam. We did quite well when Gene Green Giants.
was in charge.” Two of his squadron mates escorted the helicopters in
The squadron’s primary mission was close air support from the coast and Gene took the lead helicopter to the site.
and the A–1 was good plane for the job. You could fly at It couldn’t get down very low because of the mountains.
1500 feet, stay for three or four hours, and do a lot of very Gene held his breath when they dropped the penetrator
good close air support. This was before the surface-to-air cable and pulled Dieter into the plane. He only released it
missile came along. That changed a lot when you had when the helicopter pulled away and didn’t blow up. “I was
shoulder-fired missiles coming at you. scared to death,” he remembered, “that he’d get up there
Gene’s most memorable flight took place in July 1966 and blow himself up.”
when he spotted Navy pilot Dieter Dengler. On February Dieter and the six other prisoners escaped in pairs. He
1, 1966, Lieutenant Junior Grade Dieter Dengler launched and Duane Martin, an Air Force helicopter pilot out of Mil-
from the USS Ranger. Visibility was poor and luck was not itary Airlift Command, made their way through the jungle
with him when he rolled his Skyraider in on the target. Hit together, barefoot. Unfortunately they ran into a couple of
by antiaircraft fire he went down in Laos. He was captured tribesmen and one of them decapitated Duane. Dieter fled
two days later and survived five months of torture before back into the jungle and wandered around for another
escaping on June 29, 1966. His son, Rolf Dengler, recalls week before ending up on that rock. He later told Gene that
Gene telling the story of his father’s rescue, “Pipe in hand, he was trying to write SOS and just couldn’t remember
eyes aiming up left towards the sky as if being back in his how to make an S.
aircraft, Gene would begin...” People frequently congratulated Gene for finding Di-
“It was a once in a lifetime coincidence. We were as- eter but that’s not how he remembered the rescue. “I didn’t
signed that morning to take off at about eight o’clock.” find him, God did. The fact that both airplanes had prob-
The day’s mission was scrubbed twice because of me- lems that morning on takeoff, the fact that we were in a
chanical difficulties with the planes. Determined to get in free fire zone, just the fact that on the river we went the
at least one mission that day, Gene and his wingman, Andy, right way and I could see him….otherwise I would have
took off after lunch with full loads of napalm. The target just flown over and never knew he was there.”
area in northern Laos was a free fire zone, meaning any- That wasn’t the only time Gene conducted a rescue
thing that looked like the enemy could be bombed. The mission while stationed in Vietnam. Task Force Prong,
mountains, tops shrouded in fog, peaked at about 1500 feet commanded by Eleazar Parmly, was ambushed by the
with maybe 500 – 1000 foot visibility beneath the ceiling. North Vietnamese Army (NVA) Sixth Battalion forces in
Andy flew high to maintain contact with Danang. Gene the Plei Trap Valley near the Cambodian border on No-
went down on the deck. vember 10, 1966. With the battle turning against him,
The landscape was dense jungle with a river running Parmly radioed Captain Partridge, a Forward Air Con-
down from the mountains. Because the wings of the A–1 troller working in the area. Gene related the conversation
are set into the fuselage right under the canopy, the pilot in an oral history.

AIR POWER History / SUMMER 2021 31

“Do you know Colonel Eugene Deatrick, CO of the 1st Air there. They were loaded... I wasn’t thinking. I shouldn’t
Commando Squadron at Pleiku?” have done it. We saved a couple of good airplanes.”
“Sure do.” Toward the end of his tour in Vietnam, Gene went
“Tell him his classmate is in deep shit down here.” down to Bangkok and met with General Ferguson, Com-
“So they called me and I got a pair of us airborne and we mander of Air Force Systems Command. At dinner that
did some close air support and got Lee home.” night General Ferguson offered Gene his dream job. “How
would you like to be Commandant of the Test Pilot School?”
As Commander of the 1st Air Commando Squadron, “When I got my ears wrung out and my head back on top,
Gene worked closely with the ground forces. He strength- why, I said, ‘I’d love it!’”
ened the bonds between the pilots and the people on the When asked about his biggest disappointment in the
ground in a number of ways. He made arrangements with field of flight test, Gene said, “Having to leave it.” He went
the general on the ground to fly their pilots in the empty on to say that commanding the Test Pilots School was one
right seat of the A–1, reinforcing the feeling that the Air of the two highlights of his career, the other was command-
Force had a good picture of the camps. He also sent his pi- ing the 1st Air Commando Squadron in Vietnam.
lots into their camps so that the Air Force would under- After Test Pilot School, Gene attended the National
stand what was going on when the troops were under War College and went on to the staff of the Joint Chiefs of
attack - the perimeter, the firing, and everything - and if Staff. His last assignment was Director of Test, Air Force
they were to escape, how they would go. “Each camp had Systems Command, Andrews Air Force Base, Maryland.
one of my pilots go through it, which brought us closer to- He retired in 1974.
gether. They were Special Forces camps. It helped us pro- Gene flew more than 50 different types of aircraft and
vide close air support for them.” accumulated more than 12,000 hours of flying. He was
Gene had a couple of close calls during his deployment awarded the Legion of Merit with one oak leaf cluster, the
to Vietnam. One he related to Dana Kilanowski in his Distinguished Flying Cross with one oak leaf cluster, the
SETP oral history. “I was getting ready for a two week R&R Bronze Star with Valor and one oak leaf cluster, and the
in Hawaii with my wife. We went on a bombing mission on Air Medal with twenty-two oak leaf clusters.
a bridge, dropped the bombs, and climbed up to 5,000 feet. When asked about his least favorite airplane, Gene
I’m flying along and I smelled smoke. A couple of red lights replied, “There wasn’t any least. I enjoyed every moment
came on. I opened the window a little bit and, from under in every one of them. Perhaps the biggest thrill was finally
the right seat, a sheet of flame came up and went out the checking out in the B–47. I always said the two most excit-
window. I closed the window. The fire had burned through ing flights were when I took off. Being essentially a bomber
my controls to the aileron. I was having a hell of a time. I pilot, when I was forced to check out in the P–51, I never
was going down and wondered, ‘should I bail out or stay felt so much power in my life, so I had an enjoyable time
with the plane?’ Then I remembered something Bob flying that for a while. And when I had the school, I checked
Hoover said, ‘If you’re faced with a forced landing, fly the out in the F–104, and my first flight in that, I was going
thing as far into the crash as possible.’ So I kept going… through 5,000 feet, my brain was still back on the runway.
Fortunately, my wingman realized I was in trouble so he Those were two of the most memorable takeoffs that I can
guided me over to a marine base where I bellied in. I called ever remember. But I enjoyed every one.”
my wife and explained that I wouldn’t be meeting her in Those who knew Gene were struck by his humanity.
Hawaii. I just couldn’t go and have a good time and then Kathy La Sauce, the first female C–141 aircraft com-
come back to all that bullshit.” mander stated, “He was ahead of his time. He understood
There was another time Gene was almost shot down. the importance of letting women serve… He took me under
He ended up bellying in at Pleiku. As he climbed out of the his wing.” General Fogleman talked about Gene’s kindness
cockpit, an intelligence officer ran out to the flight line, “I toward a number of retired officers including General
won the bet!” “What bet?” “I bet you’d climb out of the cock- Eaker, “Gene, without ever making a big deal about it…al-
pit with your pipe in your mouth.” most became an aide [to Eaker] in retirement.” After he
In typical Gene fashion, when Dana asked him about passed, Gene continued to look after his widow, Ruth.
receiving the Distinguished Flying Cross, the Air Medal There are hundreds of stories of his thoughtfulness.
and the Bronze Star for Valor, he answered, “Oh, a couple Perhaps, in closing, General Fogleman’s words say it
of little missions, someone put me in.” all, “Gene Deatrick led an exemplary life in terms of the
They weren’t just “little missions.” For example, Gene kinds of contributions he made to our Air Force both as an
received the Bronze Star with the V for Valor when the active duty officer, a warrior, and also in retirement in the
base at Pleiku was mortared one night. The attack only way he represented the Force. The National Aviation Club,
lasted about ten or fifteen minutes but as Gene recalled it, Quiet Birdmen, and every organization he touched, his
“They just walked mortars right down from one end of the participation always made it better and he did it in the
base down past our containment. I went out and moved humblest of ways. As a result he’s got a tremendous num-
some airplanes while they were on fire, got them out of ber of now aging folks who so greatly respected him.” ■

32 AIR POWER History / SUMMER 2021

 The SA–2 and U–2:
Secrets Revealed

John A. Schell

C
Francis Gary Powers (right), downed U–2 pilot on trial in
Moscow.

old War overflight of the USSR provided critical intelligence updates of Russian long-range bombers, nuclear
warhead production, ICBMs, and nuclear submarines. Collection of IMINT, ELINT, COMINT, and TELINT from
airborne overflight provided intelligence data for U.S. nuclear weapons planning and targeting. Equally important,
it was a basis for National Intelligence Estimates (NIE) and justification of congressional funding for more U.S. nuclear
weapons, intercontinental bombers, land and submarine-based ICBMs.
In the early Cold War period, only airplanes were used for overflight and peripheral flight. These included RB–17,
RB–29, RB–36, RB–45, RF–86F, P2V, RB–47, RB–50, RB–57, RB–69, RF–100, and the U–2. There were hundreds of mis-
sions. Many peripheral flights were intercepted, forced down or shot down with lives lost.1 By the mid-fifties, Soviet air
defense forces had improved, necessitating much higher altitude for overflight. The RB–57D was the first to establish a
“somewhat safe” altitude (65,000 ft) through modifications. The U–2 was the first airplane specifically designed to fly
higher than interceptors. The initial U–2s could reach a maximum altitude of 72,000 ft.
Wishing to avoid further provocation from overflight, President Eisenhower proposed “Open Skies” at the Geneva
Conference in July 1955 to Premier Khrushchev. It would give the USSR access to U.S. air bases and U.S. overflight in
return for the same within the USSR. Almost immediately Khrushchev rejected Open Skies.2 U–2 flight test and pilot
training were already underway. With the U–2, overflight could continue from a “safe” altitude. But there was disagree-
ment within intelligence circles. Some thought it only a matter of time until the U–2 would be shot down by a surface to
air missile. President Eisenhower was reluctant to approve overflights, believing they could poison mutual relations and
possibly lead to hostilities.

Author’s Note: My research began as a collaboration with U–2 historian Chris Pocock to construct a new map of the
May 1st, 1960, U–2 shoot-down, as it truly occurred. That map with a discussion is posted by Chris on this link.
https://dragonladyhistory.com/2020/05/01/u-2-mayday-shootdown-gary-powers/
This article provides new information on the shoot-down which has never been published in the English language.
First-hand accounts of the Russian participants and records of SA-2 operation were classified and immediately hidden
in Russian Military Archives. Translations from the Archives were used in preparation of this paper and secrets are
now revealed, some sixty years later. Although the full story may never be complete, hopefully what follows will fill some
important gaps. To provide context, I will begin by describing the U–2 and its sensors, the early U–2 overflights, and the
SA-2 and its operation.

AIR POWER History / SUMMER 2021 33

 U–2 Configured for CIA with NACA markings. (NASA)

mi area at nadir. The collection coverage was 36 miles wide,

18 miles to either side.
Each film canister contained 1,800 feet of 9-inch-
wide film, sufficient for recording a contiguous strip of
imagery 2,856-mile-long. Typically, the cameras would
be turned on/off over the target areas during the mis-
A-2 camera configuration. (CIA photo.)
sion. The recorded image film was air transported to the
U.S. for processing and analysis by the CIA after each
Initial U–2 Configuration mission.
The U–2s carried an ELINT receiver which made mag-
All USSR overflights were conducted by the CIA. The netic tape recordings of radar signals. A COMINT receiver
rationale was a “CIA spy plane” would be less hostile to the made recordings of voice and low frequency radar. ELINT
USSR than a USAF military overflight. The cover story and COMINT recordings were analyzed after each flight.
was that NACA (National Advisory Committee for Aero- There were no U–2 defensive countermeasures for SAM
nautics which later became NASA) was conducting high radar systems or for SAM threat warning to the pilot.3
altitude weather research. A drift sight was used to observe the terrain for navi-
For the early overflights, a Hycon Model 731 (A-2 cam- gation, observe the cloud cover, and align the cameras. It
era) was installed in the Q-bay. It was a three-lens config- could be pointed up for day and night celestial navigation.
uration providing overlapped stereo pair images on 9x18 Thru the drift site, the pilot could sometimes see intercep-
inch frames of film. The cameras pointed straight down tors coming up from below.
and +/- 37 degrees left and right. Each f8 lens had a 24-
inch focal length resulting in 4-ft spatial resolution, looking Verifying the “Bomber Gap”
straight down (nadir) at 70,000 ft altitude. The field of
views were overlapped, providing stereo coverage in a 5x10 Starting with the May Day parade in 1955, the Soviets
began showing their new, jet-powered long-range M-4
“Bison” bombers at parades and air shows. The same
John Schell graduated with a BSEE and MSEE in April bombers encircled and flew repeatedly past spectators, giv-
1970 from Penn State University and a reserve commis- ing the false appearance that there were up to 30 opera-
sion in the USAF. Entering active duty at Wright-Patter- tional Bisons. At the same time, they were developing a
son AFB, he worked as a radar research engineer at the new, turbo-prop long-range bomber, the Tu-95 Bear.
Air Force Avionics Lab (now Sensors Directorate). There U.S. journals, magazines and newspapers carried arti-
he became project engineer on the spotlight mode syn- cles speculating on a Russian lead in long range nuclear
thetic aperture radar. That radar was the world’s first capable bombers. The U.S. Congress demanded concrete in-
high resolution (SAR) imaging system with controlled formation about a presumed “Bomber Gap” of the Bison
errors and consistent image quality. Subsequently, in relative to B–52s. SAC generally supported the notion of a
1976, he was assigned to the SR–71/U–2 Project Office Bomber Gap which might result in additional funding for
at WPAFB. There he led the development of ASARS-1 B–52 production. Although the CIA was much more con-
and ASARS-2 radar prototypes for the SR–71 and U– servative on the number, President Eisenhower approved
2R, also serving briefly as the Chief Avionics Engineer, initial CIA U–2 overflights to collect imagery.
responsible for all SR–71 and U–2 mission systems. After The first overflight of the USSR occurred on July 4,
separating from the Air Force in 1980, he supported 1956. Mission A-2013 was piloted by Hervey Stockman.
ASARS testing and fielding, development of several Primary targets were the suspected long-range Bison air-
image exploitation systems, and development of the RQ- fields around Minsk and Leningrad.
4 Global Hawk. Retiring from industry in 2016, he lives The second overflight was the very next day. Mission
in Dayton, Ohio and serves as a volunteer at the Na- A-2014 was flown by pilot Carmine Vito. He flew directly
tional Museum of the USAF. His passion is the Cold War over Moscow and became the only U.S. pilot to overfly the
era, about which he has made multiple presentations Soviet capital city. As Vito’s U–2 left Wiesbaden AB, it was
and written papers on the U–2 and SR–71. immediately detected by long range early warning radars

34 AIR POWER History / SUMMER 2021

U–2 Image of Baranovichi (Belarus) Airfield. (U.S. National Archives via Lin Xu.)

inside East Germany. In his cockpit view sight, Carmine image of the Red Square and Kremlin. This is the only
could see some of the MiG–17 and MiG–19 interceptors image of Moscow from a U–2 overflight.
coming up well below. As he approached Moscow, the early As a result of both missions, the White House denied
warning radar near Smolensk detected his inbound U–2. emergency USAF requests for more B–52 funding. By the
Carmine flew over the Fili Bison airframe plant in south- end of 1956, with additional U–2 evidence, the CIA con-
west Moscow, and over Red Square. CIA analysts claimed cluded that there was no “bomber gap”. 4 The U.S. eventually
that this one flight provided as much intelligence as was built over 750 B–52s and the Russians built about 90 Bisons.
typically gained over a whole year.
Although the Air Force claimed that the Soviets had U.S. National
over 100 new M-4 Bison, the U–2 imagery proved this Archives via LIn Xu.
wrong. Not a single Bison or Bear was found at any of the
nine long range bomber airfields imaged on the first two
overflights. And there was no indication of significant pro-
duction at the Bison plant. As seen above, Baranovichi Air-
field had numerous interceptors and medium range
Badgers, but no Bisons or Bears.
Mission A-2014 was planned to overfly Moscow at 0808
in the morning. The clock was recorded during flight onto
the image film. It shows the U–2 was on schedule. As it
flew directly over Moscow, a break in the clouds allowed an U–2 image of Moscow. (U.S. National Archives via Lin Xu.)

AIR POWER History / SUMMER 2021 35

SA-2 missile and launcher in the Urals. (VPK News. Ru [with permission.])

Although Vito’s U–2 overflew the USSR for over four MiG–19 which had altitude limits of 55,000 and 60,700 ft.
hours and was detected shortly after leaving Wiesbaden, respectively. Neither of them could reach the U–2 cruise
it was not shot down. altitude of 65,000 – 70,000 ft. The pilot might see the in-
SA–1 Berkut surface to air missile sites encircled terceptors coming up from below in his drift-sight, but they
Moscow, yet the U–2 was not attacked. There was massive were not a threat unless a mechanical problem had forced
confusion within the Troops of the Soviet Air Defense the U–2 to fly lower.
(PVO). The missiles were not on their launch pads - they Initially, the SA–2 Guideline missiles had max alti-
were in storage when the U–2 flew over! Something better tudes of 72,000 – 88,5000 ft and were fully capable of hit-
was needed. And the Soviets were already working on it, ting the much slower moving U–2. And the U–2 pilot had
the SA–2 Guideline Surface to Air Missile (SAM) System. no electronic warning. If he did see a missile coming up
in the drift sight, the pilot could make a hard turn to
A SAM Designed to Reach U–2 Altitudes avoid being hit. (The U–2 had a shorter turn radius than
the missile.)
The SA–2 Guideline began operation in January 1958. The question became, could Soviet radars detect and
It was deployed to protect large cities, defense plants, and continuously track a U–2? CIA analysts confirmed from
critical military sites. SAM defense was part of Soviet Air the ELINT tapes that U–2s were surely being detected, but
Defense (PVO), which also included air interceptor aircraft. they were unsure of the continuous tracking by SA-2 radar
Primary interceptors at the time were the MiG–17 and required for a kill.

36 AIR POWER History / SUMMER 2021

 Spoon Rest Radar (P-12 Yenisei). (Wikimedia Commons.)

determined when a missile could be launched. Once

Fan Song Radar (RSN-75). (SIMHQ [public forum])
launched, the missile was tracked and guided by the small
Detecting a U–2 parabolic antenna. It is important to note that although
tracking and guidance could be performed manually, auto-
Detection was the easy part. Initial low frequency early matic tracking and guidance were normally used.
warning (EW) radars such as the Knife Rest and Token
had about 150-mile range. By 1959, improved EW radars Launching and Arming a Missile
(Tall King and Bar Lock) provided 250-mile detection
range and could determine elevation, range and bearing of Up to three missiles could be launched five seconds
an incoming U–2. This was electronically reported to PVO apart. A launch command was given by the battery com-
District HQ which could scramble interceptors and alert mander and executed by the launch officer. After the first
the appropriate SAM Battalions and their missile batter- stage solid fuel rocket separated (four seconds), the second
ies. stage liquid fueled rocket ignited. A beacon near the tail
transmitted a signal to Fan Song. By comparing the missile
Tracking a U–2 x-y-z location to the U–2 x-y-z location, the computer de-
termined the intercept point and generated command
Tracking was complex both in terms of the radar op- guidance corrections needed for intercept. Command guid-
erations, launch operations and procedures. Once the ap- ance was uplinked to the missile.
proaching U–2 information was received, incoming target Once the missile was within lethal distance of the air-
acquisition was made by radar. All battalions had a Spoon craft, an arming command was given by the battery com-
Rest (P-12 Yenisei) radar for acquisition. Its antenna ro- mander and executed by the launch officer. The arming
tated 360 degrees and measured U–2 range, elevation, and signal was sent by uplink thru the guidance antenna. Once
bearing out to about 125 miles. The P-12 had an IFF inter- armed, a radio beacon in the missile determined proximity
rogation function to separate friend from foe. to the U–2 for warhead detonation. If intercept did not
Rapid acquisition was important for timely tracking occur, the missile self-destructed about a minute after
initiation by the Fan Song (RSN-75). Hand off was verbal launch. If not armed, the missile fell inertly to earth.
(by radio) and electronic (to a remoted display inside the
RSN-75 operator van). The RSN-75 radar was slewed to Verifying the “Missile Gap”
the bearing and elevation angle of the incoming U–2 to ini-
tiate track. Operation proficiency was essential to success- Shortly after the USSR launched Sputnik (using the
ful SA–2 launch. One RSN-75 was at each battery, capable rocket that later became its first ICBM), the SA–2 Guide-
of simultaneously tracking one target and three missiles. line became operational. Although the U–2 provided high
A salvo of three missiles was used to increase the proba- value imagery, not available through other means, Presi-
bility of kill to about 90 percent. dent Eisenhower was increasingly worried that further
It had a folded lens scanner design. The scanners each overflight would poison upcoming arms talks. He withdrew
had a rotating feed horn at their ends which caused the overflight authorization in March 1958. By then, 19 USSR
beams to move left-right (azimuth) and up-down (eleva- overflights had been flown by the U–2.
tion). The U–2 was tracked in x-y-z coordinates (range, az- Just as the Soviets had previously goaded the West
imuth, and elevation) without physically moving the into believing they had a long- range nuclear bomber ad-
antenna. It could establish a U–2 track at about 60 mile vantage, they now began a propaganda campaign to assert
(100km) range. Tracking data was fed to a computer which an ICBM nuclear missile lead. The CIA had observed in-

AIR POWER History / SUMMER 2021 37

Timeline leading to May 1, 1960. (J. A. Schell)

creased construction of ICBM facilities from imagery al- frames to allow stereo viewing and height extraction. With
ready collected. In February 1959, the Soviets falsely an- improved f10, three-inch aperture lens design, the 36-inch
nounced operational readiness of their R-7A ICBM missile. focal length camera had a nadir resolution of 2.5 feet from
Premier Khrushchev added to the hype with public an- 70,000 ft altitude. It recorded onto two overlapping 9 x 18
nouncements such as “we’re making missiles like inch frames fed by two film contra-winding film magazines.
sausages” and “we can now wipe our enemies off the face If the inner three lens positions were used, a ground swath
of the earth”. Once again, the U.S. press and Congress de- of 25 miles resulted. If all seven lens positions were used
manded more information on a presumed “missile gap”. In (mode 1), a panoramic ground swath of 650 miles (horizon
December 1959, the U.S. SECDEF estimated a future (5 to horizon) resulted. The extra wide coverage was used for
year) Soviet 500 ICBM advantage which could wipe out analyst orientation to the main collection areas near nadir.
SAC and all major U.S. cities. The CIA, with more informa- The B–Camera had 3,600 mi of contiguous coverage, 25 mi
tion at hand, was not so sure the USSR had a ready capa- wide, with full film load.
bility. ELINT and TELINT was being collected by ground Overflights lasted four to nine hours, sometimes di-
sites in Turkey, and peripheral flights by RB–47 and U–2 rectly over a SA–2 battery. Yet the U–2 was never fired
during Soviet ICBM range tests. The intercepts revealed upon. After the April 9th mission, a high-level Soviet in-
that the Soviets significantly lagged U.S. ICBM launch pro- vestigation revealed insufficient training on SA–2 radars
cedures and operational readiness – but that information and a serious lack of operations protocols. The SA–2 had
was highly classified at the time and was not releasable. been fielded for a year in the overflight areas and yet the
Under pressure, President Eisenhower reluctantly ap- PVO was unable to effectively operate it. The investigation
proved resumption of additional, limited overflights. Four also identified multiple missile maintenance issues and
U–2 more missions were flown between July 9, 1959 and missile shortages. 5
April 9,1960. Targets included the ICBM test range at Tyu- Khrushchev was outraged. Many PVO officers were rep-
ratam, the SA–2 training site at Saryshagan, the nuclear rimanded and demoted. Khrushchev personally blamed Air
weapon test site at Semipalatinsk, and rail lines which Marshall Biryuzov for not anticipating the routes and con-
transported the ICBMs. centrating his forces. The entire Air Defense chain of com-
From 1957, the U–2s were equipped with the new mand was now highly tense, and they began to anticipate
HYCON HR-73B. The panoramic B–Camera had seven possible future U–2 routes. This was the backdrop for the
“stop and shoot” positions of a single lens with overlapped next overflight – that of Francis Gary Powers on May 1, 1960.

38 AIR POWER History / SUMMER 2021

Grand Slam route. (C. Gibson and R. Hopkins, Spyflights and Overflights, Vol. 1, with permission of Crecy Publishing.)

Operation Grand Slam proached Sverdlovsk from the south. As it approached, the
Soviet Minister of Defense repeatedly called PVO Air Mar-
Operation Grand Slam was the twenty-fourth and shall Sergey Biryuzov, requesting U–2 status. Before he left
final U–2 overflight. It originated from Peshawar, Pakistan for the May Day Parade, Premier Khrushchev also called
and was to be flown no later than May 1. Originally Biryuzov. “It’s a scandal”, Khrushchev said, “the country
planned for late April, there were multiple delays due to gave all the necessary resources to the Troops of the Air De-
weather enroute and NATO exercises in Norway, the land- fense, yet you can’t destroy a subsonic plane!”6 Around
ing area. The Grand Slam route was 3,800 miles of which Sverdlovsk, six SA–2 missile battalions were awaiting the
2,900 miles was within the USSR. Estimated flying time U–2. They had been activated a few hours earlier that morn-
was 9 hours, 55 minutes. ing. And they were equipped with the latest Guideline, a
Francis G. Powers, with an ID as “USAF Air Weather Desna 13D missile which had a max altitude 27 km (88,500
Service GS-12, Francis G. Palmer”, was selected to fly the ft), a max range of 34km (21 mi) and a kill zone radius of
mission. The U–2 selected was Article 360 (SN 56-6693). 32km (20 mi). 7
In his book Operation Overflight, Powers stated Article
360 was referred to as the “dog” for the many problems it The May 1 Shoot-Down – As It Actually Occurred 8
had. Reportedly, a common problem was inability to con-
sistently feed all wing tank fuel to the engine. (As it As the U–2 entered the Sverdlovsk region, it ap-
turned out, the autopilot failed four hours into the mis- proached the 5th Battalion from the south, but there was
sion, but Powers decided to continue under manual con- a delay in launch. The U–2 failed to respond to the Spoon
trol.) Article 360 was equipped with two slipper pods on Rest IFF as it should have. As the U–2 entered the kill
its wings, each carrying 100 gal of reserve fuel. And it had zone, Brigade HQ gave the order to open fire. But there
the more powerful J75-P-13 engine which supplied 17,300 was a contradiction between Spoon Rest’s moving target
lbs. of thrust. It could climb to 75,000 ft. Grand Slam indicator and coordinates provided from Brigade HQ. This
cruise was at 70,500 ft. delayed the decision to fire. As the U–2 began to depart,
Targets included the ICBM test range at Tyuratam, a the conflict was resolved and a command to launch two
plutonium processing facility at Chelyabinsk, ICBM facto- missiles was given by Commander Lt Col Novikov. Now
ries near Sverdlovsk, the now operational ICBM site at there was another delay. The Launch Officer had forgotten
Plesetsk, and nuclear submarines at Murmansk. to move the missile launch controls from “test” to “operate”.
Soviet EW radar (likely the Tall King and Bar Lock) de- A single missile was finally launched at 0846 AM just as
tected the U–2 when it was still over Afghanistan. They were Powers made a left turn to line up the U–2 on next leg to-
not present on the last (April 9) overflight. All Soviet com- ward southwest Sverdlovsk. He was now at the edge of the
mercial and general aviation were grounded as the U–2 ap- kill zone. The second missile never launched.

AIR POWER History / SUMMER 2021 39

 The missile and U–2 were automatically radar
tracked. When it was within range, the missile was armed.
It exploded and fragments hit the U–2 from behind. It is
believed that the U–2 engine protected missile shrapnel
from hitting Powers. This strike, which brought down the
U–2, occurred at 0847 AM, about 25 miles south of
Sverdlovsk and at the edge of the kill zone (19 miles) for
the 5th Battalion.
After the strike, Powers was able to level the wings,
but unable to control pitch. The nose just kept going up.
That was because the tail section had separated, and the
U–2 went into an inverted spin. Powers eventually pushed
his way out, leaving a spinning U–2, tail section, and mis-
sile fragments moving toward another missile battery at
Kosulino. The 2ndBattalion at Kosulino was able to launch
a missile at 0852 AM. There was a launch delay until the
Fan Song could establish track on a now much lower U–2.
Gary Powers at his trial. (CIA via C. Pocock.)
Launch occurred when the inbound U–2 was about ten
miles away. After launch, automated radar tracking was reports from the field, he needed something coherent to re-
engaged, although the warhead was never reported armed. port to Khrushchev. They came up with a story and Biryu-
This, the second missile strike, hit the U–2 at about 0853 zov hurried to the May Day parade.
AM. The airplane broke into several sections which fell Whispering into Khrushchev’s ear, he said, “Two missiles
near Kosulino. The 2nd Battalion was never able to launch were launched against two close targets that had merged as
a second missile. one blip on the radar display. After the airplanes separated,
About 19 miles to the north of Kosulino, the 1st Bat- one missile struck the U–2 and the other missile stuck a
talion, at the direction of its Brigade HQ, fired three mis- MiG–19 which had given chase.” 9 From the missile launch
siles at 0855 AM. But the U–2 was out of range, and all fell cards, we know this is not even close to the actual chain of
to earth unexploded. Although the HQ for the air intercep- events that morning. And Biryuzov knew it too.
tor forces and four of the SAM Battalions shared the same On May 2nd and before the official investigation, the
building at Koltsovo airfield, the staff did not coordinate Soviet press informed the Russian citizens and global com-
with each other. Even worse, there was competition for the munity that a foreign spy plane had been shot down near
kill. The air interceptor commander, Gen Savitsky, disbe- Sverdlovsk by Air Defence units led by Maj M.R. Voronov
lieved the initial SAM report. He sent a Su–9 airborne from and Capt N.I. Sheludko.10 Soviet TV interviews followed.
Koltsovo with orders to search for and “ram the U–2”. The Voronov, Sheludko, and members of the 57th Brigade re-
Su-9 was unarmed, but it could climb to altitude. When it ceived many awards. (Air Marshall Biryuzov was later pro-
returned unsuccessful, he hurriedly ordered two MiG–19s moted to Chief of General Staff.)
aloft at 0843 AM. In their hurry to leave, it is believed the During interrogation and trial, Gary Powers disclosed
MiGs forgot to reset their IFF transponders from April to the route, the mission, the explosion from behind with tail
May separation, the inverted spin, his escape, and capture.
About 24 miles to the west of Kosulino, the 4th Battal- Yet it was 5th Battalion of the 37th Brigade com-
ion eventually detected one of the MiG’s on its Spoon Rest manded by Lt Col Novikov that really shot down the U–2.
within their zone. They did not receive a proper IFF re- Even without the second strike, the U–2 was down. But
sponse and believed it to be the U–2 at a lower altitude. they received absolutely no recognition. Today, all accounts
They were given permission to fire from their HQ at of the shoot-down discuss only missiles fired from the 2nd
Koltsovo. Three missiles were launched at 0922 AM. One Battalion commanded by Maj Voronov.
of them made an intercept, bringing down the MiG–19 and Although the investigation report went to the Minis-
killing Soviet 2ndLt Sergei Safronov at 0923 AM. This was ter of Defense, neither he nor Premier Khrushchev were
over 30 minutes after the U–2 was first hit. provided a complete or accurate account. The debriefing
Gary Powers was captured, sent to trial, imprisoned, notes, the missile launch cards, and all records pertaining
and eventually traded for a Soviet spy. Lt Safronov was to the shoot-down were immediately classified and sent
posthumously awarded the order of the Red Banner. Eight to the Ministry of Defense archive at Podolsk. Missile
missiles from four SA–2 battalions had been fired in less crews were told by a Colonel conducting the investigation;
than one hour. One U–2 and one MiG–19 had been de- “It’s easy to be wise after an event, you should never dis-
stroyed. cuss this (your involvement) with others.” For over fifty
years, they held their silence, although most knew the of-
Secrets Were Hidden ficial report did not hold water. In February 2012, after
years of research in the archives, Col (Ret) Boris
Air Marshall Sergey Biryuzov met with his General Samoylov published a series of unclassified articles dis-
Staff at Air Defense HQ in Moscow. With only fragmented cussing the investigation, the surveillance/firing cards,

40 AIR POWER History / SUMMER 2021

 Investigation Report: “The 5th battalion carried out
the first launch, but the U–2 was out of range.”
This ignores the fact that the U–2 was in range, as es-
tablished by reconstruction of Maj Powers account of where
and when the U–2 was hit. After the shoot-down, SA–2
rules of engagement were modified to allow SA-2 missile
launch at departing targets.
Investigation Report: “The U–2 was hit from the
rear by missiles from 2nd and 1st Battalions”.
This obviously is tailored to fit the narrative told to
Khrushchev at the Parade. We know (from Gary Powers
recollection in his book) that he was hit from behind about
25-30 miles south of Sverdlovosk. At that location, the mis-
sile could only have come from the 5th Battalion. The sec-
ond missile to strike the U–2 was fired by Voronov of the
2nd Battalion. It is believed that after the second strike the
U–2 broke into pieces which fell around Kosulino and were
recovered. And the U–2 never entered the kill zone of the
1st Battalion whose missiles fell undetonated.
Investigation Report: “The U–2 turned 180 degrees
as it approached the 2nd Battalion. Passive radar
jamming from the U–2 was observed on displays”.
Again, tailored to a narrative. The U–2 did not turn
180 degrees. Powers had already pushed his way out, and
the U–2 was in an inverted spin as it entered the kill zone
of the 2nd. If it had not been struck and pushed toward
Air Marshall Sergey S. Biryuzov. (Mil.ru)
Kosulino, the U–2 would have never entered the 2nd Bat-
and personnel interviews. (Samoylov was a trained radar talion zone.
engineer and was the deputy commander of the 5th Bat- The U–2 had no passive or active jammer for the SA–
talion under Novikov. 2 radar. Their Fan Song was detecting the disintegrating
It is obvious to me that the records were immediately U–2 and fragments of the first missile, which they attrib-
classified and buried to protect the Air Defense Forces and uted to chaff. They had never been trained on a target at
their Commander from further criticism. Especially so, in high altitude and were unfamiliar with what their display
view of the recriminations after the April 9, SA–2 failures. should look like after warhead detonation.
Official reports which cast further doubt on their capability Investigation Report: “The 4th battalion was given
would assuredly lead to further reprimands and demotions. the job of finishing off the U–2. A MiG–19 was mis-
There was a severe shortage of trained personnel, a taken for the U–2 and was shot-down”.
shortage of missiles, and a lack of cooperation between the This is misleading and covers up a lack of PVO staff
fighter interceptor troops led by Gen Savitsky and the sur- coordination. The U–2 was on the ground when the MiG
face to air missile troops led by Gen Kuleshov. The lack of was shot down. If the Commanders coordinated , the two
cooperation went all the way down the chain of command.11 MiGs would have been returned to base after the first mis-
sile hit the U–2.
Secrets Revealed – The Investigation Report And if they had set the proper IFF, a missile would not
have been launched. The Spoon Rest IFF interrogator at
The following information was recovered from the clas- 4th battalion had tested good earlier that morning, so it
sified archive by Col (Ret) Boris Samoylov. The extracts are should have operated properly.
from the official investigation report from Commander Air
Defense Forces Marshall S.S. Biryuzov to Minister of de- Secrets Revealed – SA–2 Operations and Mainte-
fense Marshall R. Ya. Malinovskiy. nance
Investigators interviewed all battalions in the
Sverdlovsk region. The 5th Battalion was able to provide The Archives documented several missile crew train-
detailed descriptions of their engagement but they were ing proficiency errors. SA–2 operation was complex and
disbelieved. The SA–2 had never engaged a target that was highly technical. Most crews had only partial training.
departing. The rules of engagement only dealt with ap- Only one crew, the 5th, had trained on a target at U–2 al-
proaching targets. In addition, the investigators tried to titude.
persuade members of the 5th battalion that the U–2 The rules of engagement (ROE) were incomplete and
turned 180 degrees after their missile was fired, thereby were not formally documented. This, almost a year after
avoiding a strike. But their radar cards documented oth- the SA–2 became operational in the Sverdlovsk area. And
erwise. missiles were in short supply.

AIR POWER History / SUMMER 2021 41

 There had been an extensive radar calibration at the offer was “Father feared that the West might be tempted
5th Battalion on April 30. Their Spoon Rest acquisition to launch (a first) nuclear strike if it learned how weak its
radar should be working properly. The incoming U–2 was opponent really was.”
being forwarded from a radar at Brigade HQ over a land We know from overflight that the Bisons deployed to
line. This had a small time delay. The delay was likely the air bases in limited numbers, and factory production did
cause of the discrepency in hand-off of U–2 coordinates not appear to be high. We know from RB–47 ELINT and
from Brigade to the 5th Battalion’s Spoon Rest. While we actual telemetry from ICBM testing that the Soviets were
are uncertain how this was resolved, we do know it delayed far behind in their refinement of launch and control proce-
the launch decision by several minutes. Much further delay dures for ICBMS. We learned from U–2 imagery the actual
would have resulted in the U–2 escaping shoot-down.12 status of ICBM site construction and operation.
Launch of the first missile was additionally delayed by Some 60 years later, the full account of May 1, 1960 is
the launch officer at the 5th leaving the firing switches set still unfolding. There are many discrepancies in reporting,
to “test” rather than “operate”. An electronic test is per- some by “fog of war” and some on purpose. I hope that “The
formed at start-up and the switch should have been SA–2 and U–2, Secrets Revealed” provides both a perspec-
changed to “operate” at the conclusion of the test. tive and further clarity on what truly occurred on that fate-
It is unknown why the 5th could not launch a second ful day, May 1, 1960.
missile - except to say it was reported as a "technical fail-
ure". This would indicate an electrical or mechanical mal- Postscript
function and a possible maintenance problem.
It is worrisome that there were several instances of On October 27, 1962 Maj Rudolf Anderson was shot
crews not being able to understand what the Fan Song down by an SA–2 after imaging Soviet MRBM sites in
radar display was showing and quickly taking appropriate Cuba.
action. They attributed fragments from the detonated mis- Within the next few years, the Soviets mastered oper-
sile and U–2 debris as "passive jamming". ation and maintenance of the SA–2 system. Thousands of
Two of the six SAM sites surrounding Sverdlovsk were PVO troops accompanied the SA–2 introduction into North
inactive with radar maintenance problems that should have Vietnam in 1965. Initially they performed all operation and
been found and fixed the night before. The sites were acti- maintenance, and eventually they trained the North Viet-
vated only two hours before the U–2 arrived that morning. namese. Our Wild Weasels became a critical resource to off-
set the significant SA–2 threat to U.S. air operations over
Summary North Vietnam.
The SA–2 was the most widely deployed SAM system
Khrushchev’s boasts were propaganda to project Soviet of all time. It is now retired from all locations.
strengths in areas of weakness. He was in fact fearful that The U–2 has continued to operate and improve its
the U.S. would discover how far the Soviets were behind. reconnaissance capability for both strategic and tactical
According to his son Sergei, Khrushchev had brought needs. Today it employs worldwide real time transfer
home an Open Skies brochure that President Eisenhower and processing of data. Only the B–52 has a longer op-
gave to him at the 1955 Geneva Conference. It had high erational lifetime in the USAF. Without question, the U–
resolution aerial photos which impressed the Premier with 2 is the most prolific U.S. reconnaissance airplane of all
their detail. The reason he denied Eisenhower’s Open Skies time. . ■

NOTES

Acknowledgements 4. Ibid.
5. Ret Col Alexander Orlov, “The U–2 Program: A Russian Of-
I want to thank Chris Pocock, the world’s foremost U–2 historian ficer Remembers” CIA/CSI Public Symposium, Sep. 17, 1998.
and author, for generously supplying source materials and his 6. Pocock, 50 Years of the U–2.
time to thoroughly review this work. I could not have completed 7. Steven J. Zaloga, Red SAM: The SA-2 Guideline Anti-Aircraft
the research or this paper without his expert help. Missile” Osprey Publishing, 2007. The maximum Desna 13D mis-
I also want to thank Lin Xu, a Cold War historian, for con- sile range is exact, the kill radius is a calculation.
tributing U–2 camera information and imagery that he gathered 8. Launch times are from the missile launch cards recorded by
from the U.S. National Archives. Lin’s help has greatly improved each missile battalion, stored in the Ministry of Defense Archive
this paper. at Podolsk, as reported by Col (Ret) Boris Samoylov
9. Sergei Khrushchev, “The Day We Shot Down the U–2” Amer-
1. Robert S. Hopkins, Spyflights and Overflights, Vol. 1, 1945- ican Heritage Magazine, Vol 51, Issue 5, September 2000. (Sergei
1960, Appendix 1, Hikoki Publications, 2016. had left Russia and became a U.S. citizen)
2. Gregory W. Pedlow & Donald E. Weizenbach, “The U–2 and 10. Boris Samoylov (Col Ret) “The Secret of the May Day Shoot-
Oxcart Programs, Chapter 3, p 96, The Central Intelligence down 1960”, Translation from VPK (Military Industrial Courier)
Agency History Staff, 1992. News, Feb 2012
3. Chris Pocock, 50 Years of the U–2, The Complete Illustrated 11. Pocock, 50 Years of the U–2.
History of the Dragon Lady, Appendix B, Schiffler Publishing Ltd, 12. Report — Commander of 4th Air Defense Division report to
2005. Marshall Biryuzov, May 5, 1960 as referenced by Samoylov.

42 AIR POWER History / SUMMER 2021

Mexicans in World War II:
America’s Ally of the Air

SS Potrero del Llano was an oil tanker built in 1912. She sur-
vived service in the First World War, only to be torpedoed
Cynthia Buchanan

I
and sunk by a German U-boat during the Second World
War while sailing under the Mexican flag off the coast
of Florida. Her sinking contributed to Mexico's decision to
enter the war on the side of the Allies.

n the face of Germany’s casus belli in 1942, when Nazi submarines sank Mexico’s oil tankers and killed her merchant
sailors in the Atlantic, Mexico declared war on the Axis Powers. The Mexico-United States Defense Commission
marked a monumental alliance under the aegis of Franklin D. Roosevelt and president Manuel Ávila-Camacho.
Never before in Mexico’s history had this republic ever fought on foreign soil. In 1944, her government sent the Mexican
Expeditionary Air Force to the United States to train under the U.S. Army Air Corps.
The legendary Escuadrón 201 de Pelea, known as “Aguilas Aztecas,” consisted of 300 volunteer airmen, thirty-six of
them pilots, and all marched across the international bridge at Laredo, Texas, bound for San Antonio (“Alamo City”) to
enlist at Randolph Army Air Field. On the Texas-Mexico border and Gulf Coast they piloted P–47 Republic Thunderbolt
fighter-bomber aircraft, the famous “Jug” that would serve them in 1945 combat, as part of the USAAF 58th F.G. in the
Pacific, under the command of Gen. Douglas MacArthur. Based on Luzon, 201st Mexican Squadron flew long-distance
fighter sweeps plus a mission to support a battle ship bound for Okinawa, in the event of kamikaze attacks.
After the atomic bomb was dropped on Japan in August, the “Aztec Eagles” remained in the Philippines to mop up
Japanese’ intense resistance in the mountains. In October the unit sailed for California to board their “victory train” heading
through a Southwest that once belonged to Mexico and were wildly cheered by crowds at whistle stops in Arizona, New
Mexico, and Texas, pausing in Del Rio, San Antonio and Laredo before crossing the Rio Grande to travel on to Mexico City.
The national November 20 holiday commemorating the Revolution was held two days early to celebrate historic Mex-
ican Expeditionary Air Force, whose leaders Gen. MacArthur recommended for U.S. medals. Escuadrón 201 put its country
on the map as an international presence, defending Mexico’s honor with valor, announced President Manuel Ávila-Ca-
macho, decorating them at a heroes’ parade.

Dedicated to the Memory of Dr. Bruce Ashcroft (1951-2007)

US Navy & Naval Reserve (Ret.)
Staff Historian AETC Training Command Randolph AFB • San Antonio

AIR POWER History / SUMMER 2021 43

 in 1919, flew a biwing DeHavilland 4B, patrolling the bor-
der against incursions by Pancho Villa and his Golden Cav-
alry. At Del Rio on a dare Doolittle flew under the high
bridge that spanned the yawning canyon of the Pecos
River.
In World War II, as retaliation for Pearl Harbor, five
months later he led a swarm of B–25 medium bombers off
the Pacific aircraft carrier USS Hornet. “Doolittle’s
Raiders” undertook the first strike against Japan on April
1942, boldly bombing Tokyo and the main islands of this
ancient Nippon. Doolittle was awarded the Medal of Honor.
Thirty three days after Doolittle’s bombardment of Im-
perial Japan it happened that German U-boats torpedoed
and sank two Mexican oil tankers in the Battle of the At-
lantic. On May 22 when Mexico declared war on Germany
and its Axis henchmen, Mexico’s role as an Allied Power
kicked in monumentally.
In the meantime, Jimmy Doolittle as a lieutenant gen-
eral in the Mediterranean Theater of Operations was gear-
ing up with the Western Allies for the Anglo-American
invasion of Nazi-occupied North Africa. History-cracking
desert war meant Rommel’s Afrika Korps with Tiger tanks
on the ground and Goering’s Luftwaffe in the skies.
After Allied victories of 1942 and 1943, the sub-Saha-
President Franklin D. Roosevelt and President Manuel Avila-Camacho at
a state dinner in Mexico in 1943. ran climes were dotted with camp tents and barbed wire
enclosing German prisoners by the thousands. Round
The Good Neighbor Policy about lay obliterated tanks of the SS Panzer Korps and
blackened hulls of Messerschmitt bombers and fighter air-
The “Good Neighbor Policy” for U.S. ties with Latin craft. It was then Doolittle, as commander of North African
America was in place long before World War II. This cross- Strategic Air Forces, hosted Col. Antonio Cárdenas Ro-
border urgency, among other stimuli, dated back to Ger- driguez, chief of the Mexican Air Force on his good will tour,
many’s sub rosa role in the Mexican Revolution overlapping a reflection of Mexico-U.S. Defense Commission.
the years of the Great War 1914-1918 and not to exclude A military pilot educated at Escuela Militar de
German spies, U.S. intrigue and Krupp arms for the Revo- Aeronáutica and Colegio Militar de México, Cárdenas was
lution shipped to Mexico through the Texas border region. no stranger to deserts. Born in the rugged, revolutionist
During the epochal violence in Mexico, along the Texas state of Coahuila bordering Texas, he was deployed at con-
frontier daredevil U.S. government pilot Jimmy Doolittle flicts in the Sonoran Desert neighboring Arizona once. That
combustive engagement was the least of his experiences in
the xeriscapes of the Mexican wilderness. His formal duties
Cynthia Buchanan holds an M.A. in Creative Writing
in Mexico City, Distrito Federal, led to Cárdenas meeting
from the University of the Americas in Mexico and was
Doolittle during the pilot’s diplomatic venues in Latin
awarded a Fulbright grant in Creative Writing in
America when the Great Powers keened to the drums of
Spain. She has published in The New York Times,
war. Apparently, Col. Cárdenas was among officials to greet
The Washington Post and Newsweek, among others.
Medal of Honor winner Jimmy Doolittle. History’s man,
Her first novel Maiden, taught as an American classic
who taught Japan a mindless air raid by its Imperial Navy
at Harvard, NYU and UCLA, was optioned for film by
at Pearl stirred up the “sleeping dragon” of the American
Lily Tomlin. In 2021, Buchanan has finished two
war machine, indeed.
darkly comic novels. The Scarlet Spaniard is about
When Mexico entered the war as a belligerent in 1942,
Spain’s Civil War and anti-Fascist guerrillas. Cowgirl
the Mexico-U.S. Defense Commission was already in place
Polygamy as satire is set in the Spanish Southwest.
as hemispheric protection. The U.S. State and War Depart-
“Mexicans in World War II,” the result of Buchanan’s
ments lost no time in arranging Col. Cárdenas’ trip across
interviews with Squadron 201 veterans, is from her
the Atlantic to liaise with war zone leaders in 1943. He flew
book project Aztec Eagles of World War II: Mexico’s
to Britain, then with a handful of officials toured the
Heroes, America’s Brothers. Taught as micro-history
Mediterranean in his role of observer and commander of
at the Naval Academy by Capt. Chris Hemler, USMC,
the Mexican Expeditionary Air Force while in the U.S. se-
the curricula is also under consideration at the U.S.
lect MEAF pilots were flying new war planes supplied by
Air Force Academy. Links for educators are at
President Roosevelt’s ongoing mobilization and urgent pro-
www.bit.ly/fictionforce and https://www.gofundme.
grams.
com/hispanic-heritage-graphic-novel-for-education.
In the Philippines in 1945 as Escuadrón 201 entered

44 AIR POWER History / SUMMER 2021

 force to the U.S. as martial compadrazgo. His proposal was
still being negotiated by diplomats of both countries well
into 1943.
Col. Antonio Cárdenas Rodríguez, commander of the
Mexican Air Force and the new and untested Escuadrón
Aéreo de Pelea 201, was a year away from deployment in
the South Pacific. In spring 1943 he was still touring that
Mediterranean Theater of War, welcomed at the Supreme
Headquarters of Allied Expeditionary Forces and hosted
by 5th Army officers. Having met Gen. F.W. Clark as well
as Col. Elliott Roosevelt of the USAAF, the Mexican officer
visited North African bases to observe Anglo-American
troops, gaining a grasp of Allied Armies at Casa Blanca, Al-
giers, and Tunis. His Saharan junket provided Cárdenas a
view of Bizerte prison camps, 800 German POWs behind
barbed wire..
All said, his most exhilarating education under the
Western Allies was the mentorship of none other than
SHAEF’s Gen. James Doolittle. It was the stuff of war-
fighting daydreams for military pilot Cárdenas when
Doolittle, commanding general of the Fifteenth Air Force
in the Mediterranean, embedded his Mexican guest in the
97th Heavy Bomber Group out of French North Africa. B–
17 Flying Fortresses protected by P–38 fighters were
Col. Antonio Cárdenas Rodriguez, chief of the Mexican Air Force.
preparing to demolish the Luftwaffe’s air base at Castel-
combat under the momentous command of Douglas vetrano, Sicily, for one. Doolittle arranged for Cárdenas to
MacArthur they knew that during his titanic career the attend briefings and finally, to “collaborate in bombing mis-
General had “been to” Mexico. Considered himself a friend sions over the enemy front,” for an entire month, as Cár-
of the Mexican Republic. In South Pacific offensives “Aztec denas effused in his 1949 memoir Mis Dos Misiones.
Eagles” saw undeniably how he coordinated the Army Air Doolittle’s coaching and solicitation empowered the Mexi-
Forces with the sea-dominant campaigns of the U.S. Navy’s can aviator to achieve “my goal of learning about modern
Adm. Chester Nimitz. air war.”
Japanese for generations settled in Mexico as did Ger- Upon Col. Cárdenas’s return from Mediterranean bat-
mans in the pre-Revolution empire and during the Great tle sites, he received a glowing testimonial typed on letter-
War were a geflecht of espionage and intrigue, Germany head of the Strategic Air Force of Northeast Africa and
shipping arms to Mexican revolutionaries. By the 1930s signed by Doolittle to memorialize Cárdenas’ trip to the
Hitlerian propaganda and Axis foment added a nightmar- combat zone plus his role in four bombing missions against
ish ambiance to daily life in Mexico and it was feared targets in Italy, flying with 97th Heavy Bomber Group. It
Japan would invade at Mexico’s vulnerable Pacific coast in was a pleasure “to have you with us...so you could have the
World War II. opportunity of going on bombing missions and participat-
On the Atlantic in 1940 an antiquated bomber of the ing in our operations” that proved “an advantage for us and
Mexican Air Force on anti-submarine patrol near Tampico we’ll always be at your service and the nation you repre-
spotted a U-boat. The pilot released his modest payload but sent.” The letter was dated May 22, 1943, one year to the
missed the invader altogether. In 1942 and 1943, when U- day after Germany’s “unspeakable aggression against
boats in the Battle of the Atlantic sank Mexico’s govern- Mexico” which provoked its declaration of war against a
ment-owned oil tankers leaving Tampico in the Gulf of tripartite Axis of Germany, Italy and Japan.
Mexico, the tonnage was headed to the U.S. Whether the Thirteen months afterwards Doolittle led the Eighth
Allies and Hitler-ravaged Britain needed crude oil or fuel Air Force in the Allied invasion of Normandy on June 6,
oil for war production, petroleum-rich, tungsten-rich Mex- 1944, while Antonio Cárdenas was in Mexico and in the
ico was crucial to President Roosevelt’s focus on the Repub- U.S. training the MEAF’s 300 volunteers. Five weeks later
lic of Mexico. By 1943, Germany’s submarine fleet had they crossed the international frontier at Nuevo Laredo,
torpedoed eight Mexican oil takers, sending sailors and a destination “Alamo City” San Antonio, Texas. At Randolph
captain to their deaths in the Atlantic. It was during the Field—“The West Point of the Air”—the Mexicans were
“Operation Drumbeat” U-boat offensive that the United processed per ground crew assignments to support 36 pi-
States almost lost the war—“our darkest hour”—while the lots. Some of the “Aztec Eagles” visited the Alamo, and
exuberant Kriegsmarine called this death circus on the preumably took in cinema at gilt-pillared Aztec Theater,
high seas “The Happy Time.” (“Die glückliche Zeit.) After perhaps John Wayne in “The Fighting Seabees.” After their
U-boats sank Mexican ships in the Atlantic, president Randolph Field programming the Mexicans were dis-
Manuel Ávila-Camacho in 1942, offered to send a military persed throughout the U.S. to train and to “stand ready to

AIR POWER History / SUMMER 2021 45

shoulder your share of the burden of combat” against the
brutal empire of Japan. “Do not underestimate this enemy.”
The Air War in the Pacific was in the hands of Gen.
George C. Kenney when the Mexican Expeditionary Air
Force fought as part of USAAF. As mentioned, many of the
201st Squadron pilots were polished aviators, some having
trained in the U.S. in the Navy and Army Air Corps. As col-
laborating brass Lt. Col. Arthur Kellond assigned the Mex-
ican unit to the 5th Fighter Command in the Philippines
on the island of Luzon 4,500 miles west of Hawaii. Clark
Air Field had been bombed by Japan on December 8, “the
other Pearl Harbor,” considered worse than the enemy raid
at Honolulu since Clark Field’s B–17’s and P–40 fighters
were wiped out on the ground as U.S. forward defense in
the Pacific.
During 1945 and this ongoing Battle of Luzon the 58th
Fighter Group was led by air ace Major Ed Roddy of Cleve-
land, Ohio. The squadron base lay a distance from Clark
Field, outside the village of Porac, where pilots used air
strips built by the former occupying Japanese. Col. Antonio
Cárdenas, however, was officed at Clark Field for his mul-
tiple decisive meetings with his corresponding American
officers. He would eventually come to see dual command
was not without its conflicts up against USAAF brass.
The “Aztec Eagles”’ day-to-day operations were super-
vised by a brilliant aviator named Radames Gaxiola An-
drade, who also led some flight formations in the 201st. A
veteran of the European war, in the invasion of Normandy
he co-piloted a twin-engine heavy bomber in the cockpit
Javier Martínez Valle.
beside an American flier. Born on Mexico’s Pacific coast
at Mazatlán, Sinaloa, Gaxiola was fluent in English from phosis “took place within an international environment
his youth, educated in American schools. His leadership preparing for large scale war.”
skills and advanced pilot training in Texas at San Anto- Scholar María Emilia Paz examined the gradual or-
nio’s Randolph Field, coupled with his fluency in English ganic change in Mexico’s army “in accordance with the ne-
made Gaxiola the quintessential combat pilot to repre- cessities of modern warfare.” Mexico had to protect itself
sent Mexico and invade Nazi-occupied Europe on D-Day in a spirit of democracy, nourishing alliances with the U.S.
1944. and buttressed by President Roosevelt, who sent select air-
It was in Mexico at Escuela Militar de Aviación that craft to Mexico, planes for anti-submarine patrol and oth-
his aeronautical exceptionalism had led to his being taken erwise boosted Mexico’s archaic air force.
up as assistant to Gen. Gustavo Salinas, chief of the fledg- That the American Chief of State had a burning heart
ling Mexican Air Force. A pioneer aviator during the Mex- for Mexico and the “Good Neighbor Policy” to guard the
ican Revolution, he had fought under charismatic Pancho hemisphere against German, Japanese and Italian infil-
Villa. In fact, many fathers of “Aztec Eagles” were once rev- tration, espionage and sabotage was not lost on the U.S.
olutionist soldiers under Villa or division generals else- Army Air Forces or the world of diplomats.
where. In July 1944, after Fuerza Aerea Expedicionaria Mex-
Mexico’s Minister of Defense during World War II was icana boarded their troop train in the capitol and crowds
Gen. Lázaro Cárdenas del Rio (no relation to Col. Cárde- wept and sang “Las Golondrinas” and “Adios a Un Sol-
nas). Thirty years earlier a leader in the Constitutionalist dado,” thirty-six hours later they reached Rio Bravo del
Army during the Mexican Revolution he was a figure of Norte on July 24. Marching across the bridge at Nuevo
heroic dimensions. Elected president of Mexico in 1934 and Laredo, the FAEM was received mid-bridge by American
serving until 1940, he nationalized petroleum, expropri- dignitaries in a ceremony that can only be called historical.
ated foreign oil companies and created government oil com- The “Aztec Eagles” thereupon paraded robustly down
pany PEMEX. Laredo’s main street flanked by binational crowds cheering
Lázaro Cárdenas’ sweeping reforms are cited by Latin these exquisite moments in time.
American historian Frederiche Schuler in describing the One of the caveats to join Mexican Squadron 201—
modernization of the Mexican military under President whether pilot, mechanic, armorer, radio operator, artillery-
Cárdenas. By the 1930s, “the Mexican armed forces, as an man, cook or in any role without which a combat squadron
institution, was in need of a new permanent mission as could not be operational—that airman had to speak Eng-
part of the postrevolutionary state” and such a metamor- lish. How fluently was never established.

46 AIR POWER History / SUMMER 2021

 While training in Texas the “Aztec Eagles” learned to
identify enemy ships marked with the “Rising Sun” of
Japan, red disk on white background. Or on Mitsubishi
bombers or Zero fighters in the sky or parked on an air
strip. Japan’s sacred red disk Allied fliers called “the meat-
ball” was ripe for gunnery on the Texas coast, where “Ris-
ing Sun” targets mounted on a wharf-track awaited
Mexican flyboys attacking Japan in low-altitude exercises.
They dropped bombs at designated ranges—an eight-mile
strip along the Rio Grande and off the coast at Matagorda
Island.
Pilots and ground crew trusting the P–47 knew this
warplane was the workhorse of the Air Corps on European
fronts as in the Pacific. One can but imagine late night bull
sessions about the tough P–47 beloved by battle-hardened
aviators while others claimed “The Jug” was impossible for
dive-bombing, even suicidal.
Certain of the pilotos aviadores before the Mexican
Reynaldo Perez-Gallardo of Squadron 201 on the wing of his P-47D squadron was formed received dive-bombing training at
Thunderbolt in the Pacific. Mexican Expeditionary Air Force was a unit U.S. military bases such as the Coast Guard Air Station at
of the US Army Air Corps 58th Fighter Group in 1945.
St. Petersburg, Florida.
At the 201’s headquarters in Greenville, Texas, at Ma- During a 2004 interview in Texas, Col. Carlos Gar-
jors Field they trained under American officers planning duño-Nuñez told me he learned to dive-bomb in San Diego,
the graduation ceremony in early 1945, and presentation California. Then during combat in the Philippines, when
of Mexico’s battle flag. Those U.S. commanders and certain he put his P–47 into a dive, he swooped so low he was 500
instructors were fluent in Spanish. A number of the “Aztec feet above the water. “I had to pulllllllll up on the stick
Eagles” were bilingual since childhood, educated in the U.S. like....thiiiissss!” into his lap, lest he plunge into the Pacific
and such was the case with Javier Martínez Valle. Ocean as was the fate of young Fausto Vega Santander. His
As a boy he had migrated with his family to Houston. P–47 stalled at high speed during dive bombing practice
His military career began in Mexico in 1936 when he joined off coastal Luzon and crashed in the sea, exploding. Noth-
a regimiento aéreo. At Heróico Colegio Militar he then be- ing was found of the valiant “eaglet” but that life jacket and
came a cavalry cadet and later served as flight instructor at the oil slick.
Escuela Militar de Aeronáutica. Soon the Mexican Air Force Escuadrón 201 flew 59 tactical support combat mis-
sent Teniente Piloto Aviador Martínez to train at the U.S. sions from June 4 to August 9, 1945, remaining in the Pa-
naval air base in Corpus Christi, Texas. Returning to Mexico cific war zone for ten weeks after the first atomic bomb was
he taught flying again at the Military Aviation School. dropped on Hiroshima August 6 and the second one three
In March 1945, at Brownsville Army Air Field on the days later on Nagasaki.
Texas Gulf Coast when he crashed during aerial gunnery By war’s end the “Aztec Eagles” had flown 96 sorties.
practice, Martínez had just scored hits on a target towed After the surrender of Japan, the 58th Fighter Group and
by a B–26 before his P–47 collided with the cable, plunged 201st Mexican Squadron were still flying cover for Ameri-
into the marsh at South Padre Island and exploded. He can and Filipino ground troops mopping up pockets of
was the unit’s second fatality. The first occurred three fierce enemy resistance in northern Luzon.
months earlier elsewhere in Texas; Cristoforo Salido Gri- Sixty thousand starving Japanese soldiers battled to
jalva crashed on a runway during training, possibly hav- the end, hidden by rain forest canopy or holed up in jungle
ing misunderstood the tower’s radio instructions in mountain redoubts riddled with tunnels. When a Mexican
English. pilot swooped into a canyon, enemy artillery firing from the
Shaken by the fiery death of talented comrade Javier mouth of a cave left flak damage on the tough hide of “The
Martínez at South Padre Island, the “Aztec Eagles” forged Jug.”’
ahead, rehearsing air-to-air combat and were soon de- The surrender of Japan on September 2, 1945, was for-
ployed in the Philippines to support Gen MacArthur’s “is- malized in a ceremony aboard the 450,000 ton battleship
land hopping” campaign to defeat the Japanese. The USS Missouri in Tokyo Bay, MacArthur officiating while
Mexican squadron’s missions included flying cover for the dazed representatives of “Sun God” Emperor Hirohito
American and Filipino ground forces, bombing and strafing signed the staggering instruments of surrender, “the un-
railways, bridges and ammunition factories of the Japan- thinkable.” After the Japanese dignitaries, there came the
ese occupiers. signings by Gen. MacArthur, Adm. Nimitz and Gen.
The 201st fighter sweeps to South China Sea and For- Jonathan Wainright emaciated from three years of starva-
mosa (Taiwan) meant flying long-distances challenging tion and brutal torture in POW prisons. Among Allied com-
fuel supply despite extra tanks in the new P–47D Thun- manders to witness Japan’s historic surrender was Col.
derbolts with a bubble canopy. Cárdenas of the Mexican Expeditionary Air Force. ■

AIR POWER History / SUMMER 2021 47

 Book Reviews
Balloons and Airships: A Tale of Lighter than Air plane three days earlier. But Amundsen’s bigger objective
Aviation. By Anthony Burton. Philadelphia: Pen and was to traverse the Arctic Ocean and land in Alaska, a feat
Sword Transport, 2019. Photographs. Illustration. Bibliog- the team accomplished several days later. Nobile, frus-
raphy. Index. Pp. 208. $25.38. ISBN: 978-1-52671-949-2 trated that he had to share the glory of the polar flight with
others, returned to Italy. A flight in his new airship Italia
Anthony Burton is an author and broadcaster who spe- ended in disaster when the ship crashed, killing half of the
cializes in the history of transportation and technology. His crew.
objective is to provide an all-encompassing history of lighter- Burton achieved his objective of telling most, if not all,
than-air (LTA) flying from the 1780s to the present day. of the story of LTA aviation. Nevertheless, the book has
Burton begins with the familiar story of the Mont- several shortcomings. First, British use of commas and
golfier brothers and their flights in 1783 leading to the first other punctation sometimes makes it difficult for a reader
untethered, manned flight that was witnessed by thou- of American English to follow the sentences. In addition,
sands of enthusiastic spectators. Burton is inconsistent in his spelling of place names and
Ballooning remained a pastime for the entertainment names of individuals. This might seem trivial, but it’s an
of the public, with limited practical application. To become unacceptable error when committed by a professional
useful, balloons would have to overcome an essential chal- writer and editors.
lenge, that of control. Balloons flew wherever the wind took Second, and more importantly, the book has notable
them. Aeronauts could dictate whether their craft would omissions. Burton pays surprisingly little attention to con-
climb or descend, but directional control required control troversial aspects of the events he describes, and this de-
surfaces (elevators, rudders) and power sources that would tracts from a full understanding of the events. He barely
enable balloonists to navigate a desired course through mentions the loss of the USS Macon in 1935, doesn’t tell
prevailing winds. us that Byrd’s claim to have flown over the North Pole was
In the latter half of the 19th century, practical use was disputed at the time and has since been largely discredited,
made of balloons in military operations. In the Civil War, and devotes only a few words to describing the extreme
the Union Army employed Thaddeus Lowe’s balloon corps hostility between Nobile and his detractors in the Italian
for artillery spotting and reconnaissance. Several years government. One has to wonder why he makes no mention
later, during the Franco-Prussian War, besieged forces in of the use of airships by Goodyear, whose advertising
Paris used balloons to transport mail and messages to their blimps have been one of the most visible presences in the
provisional government in Tours. world of LTA aviation for decades.
The first successful steerable balloon or dirigible came Those interested in the history of balloons and airships
in August 1884 when two French army officers designed would be better served by looking at two older works, The
and built a balloon with a propeller powered by an electric Aeronauts and The Giant Airships, volumes in the Time-
engine. For the first time, a balloon could land at a place of Life Epic of Flight series.
the pilot’s choosing. It could handle only light winds but
was an important advancement. Lt. Col. Joseph Romito, USA (Ret), Docent, National Air
The most important breakthrough came from a Ger- and Space Museum
man, Ferdinand Graf von Zeppelin, whose research pro-
gram addressed all aspects of ballooning technology. In ◆◆◆◆◆◆
1909, after several successful designs for the army, Zeppelin
formed the world’s first commercial airline. By the start of Beaufighters: Over Sea, Sand and Steaming Jungles.
World War I, the airline had flown over 100,000 miles and By Jack Colman and Richard Colman. Stroud UK: Fonthill
carried 10,000 passengers. During the war, the Zeppelins’ Media Ltd., 2020. Photographs. Appendices. Pp. 320.
most important role was that of reconnaissance aircraft. $40.00. ISBN: 978-1-78155-746-4
In the 1920s, the Zeppelin company established trans-
Atlantic passenger service and expanded its commercial This is the second of a two-volume set of the personal
program into an ambitious round-the-world flight in Au- memoirs of Jack Colman, an RAF pilot during World War
gust 1929, on which the Graf Zeppelin airship carried pas- II. Volume I recounts his flight training (he was qualified
sengers in luxury, traversing the globe in 21 days. The as both pilot and navigator) and early operational career
Zeppelin era came to a tragic end when the Hindenburg flying Liberators for Ferry Command and Coastal Com-
crashed and burned at Lakehurst NJ. mand. Volume II picks up with his assignments to Bristol
Airships played a major role in attempts to fly over the Beaufighter units and his operational career through the
North Pole. Norway’s Roald Amundsen partnered with end of the war.
Italy’s Umberto Nobile to fly Nobile’s Norge airship over Jack Colman was an extremely gifted writer. His prose
the Pole. They did so on May 12, 1926, but were seemingly is smooth and unhurried. When describing postings in
beaten by USN Commander Richard Byrd and pilot Floyd Southwest Asia, he included a lot of local words and
Bennett, who claimed to have flown over the Pole in an air- phrases but explained them and used them conversation-

48 AIR POWER History / SUMMER 2021

ally. His son, Richard, edited both volumes but makes clear ◆◆◆◆◆◆
these books are his father’s work.
The Bristol Beaufighter was a twin-engine, light
bomber/attack aircraft used against land and sea targets. Showdown in Western Sahara Volume 2: Air Warfare
The platform was also modified to carry torpedoes, result- over the Last African Colony, 1975-1991. By Tom
ing in the “Torbeau.” The closest American platform was Cooper, Albert Grandolini, and Adrien Fontanellaz. Haver-
the Douglas A–20, while the closest Luftwaffe plane was town PA: Casemate, 2020. Maps. Tables. Photographs. Il-
the Henschel Hs 129. The twin-engine configuration of this lustrations. Notes. Glossary. Bibliography. Pp. viii, 80.
class of aircraft permitted payloads and weapons configu- $29.95 paperback. ISBN: 978-1-91-286629-8
rations much greater than those carried by single-engine
attack aircraft. Beaufighter makes clear that Colman and This book is well-researched, intricately sourced, has
the Beaufighter were a perfect fit. over 120 photos, and has a wealth of information about a
Writing in the first person, Colman brings the reader topic rarely explored in the English language. However, it
into the cockpit. He talks about the locations of controls needs a more accurate title. Since the air campaign in
and instruments and seamlessly describes visual cues from Western Sahara was focused on close air support, resupply
the cockpit when attacking land and maritime targets. On of ground troops, and suppression of battlefield short-range
one mission, two of his four 20mm cannons exploded and air defenses, it is impossible to write this story without a
blew the bottom off his airplane; the reader can feel the ex- lengthy and detailed description of ground operations. A
plosions, hear the noise, and feel the air streaming into the third of the illustrations and photographs are of ground op-
cockpit. erations. A more fitting title would read “Warfare in” vice
Much of Beaufighters describes Colman’s service in “Air Warfare over,” or something along those lines.
Southwest Asia. For the uninitiated, Britain’s war effort in The authors do an excellent job describing a compli-
this theater is usually described as the “Forgotten War.” cated strategic situation where insurgents either battled
Fought largely with colonial troops and second- or third-tier forces of, or received support from, five nations from 1975
equipment, the British Fourteenth Army and its supporting until the 1991 ceasefire. Some nations came into the fight
elements were charged with stopping the Japanese advance later, while others changed sides as other national priori-
through Burma and into India. The chapter describing Col- ties took shape. The book breaks all of this down, describ-
man ferrying a Beaufighter to Burma demonstrates the ing the complicated conflict in a chronological manner, and
vastness of this theater. It took him over a month to deliver highlighting key actions to give the reader a taste of the
his one Beaufighter from the UK to Burma. fight. Additionally, the sheer volume of photographs (espe-
As the war in the European Theater drew to a close, cially of ground actions) gives the reader the feel of wit-
newer equipment began to make its way into the theater, nessing the conflict first-hand.
and Colman was expected to trade in his beloved Beau- I especially liked the placement of the glossary in the
fighter for a deHavilland Mosquito. He didn’t like it one bit. front of the text. Because there were so many end notes, it
Considering the reputation of the “Mossie,” this came as a was convenient to be able to quickly refer to the front of
surprise. Colman’s criticisms are numerous (metal con- the book to find an acronym meaning, while simply flipping
struction vs. wood, control wheel vs. stick, radial engine vs. to the back to find a source.
inline, and so on). His most significant operational criticism Unfortunately, the book is in dire need of a good copy
was that the Beaufighter’s Hercules radial engines were editor, additional maps, and a general overhaul of its chapter
relatively quiet, and the pilots could sneak up on targets. structure. It is impossible to understand the context without
On the other hand, the Mossie’s Merlins were so noisy that reading the introduction, even though the first chapter in-
potential targets could hear them coming in time to take cludes a bit of detail about the geo-political situation in the
cover. Western Sahara. Additionally, although Morocco receives a
The last quarter of the book talks about Colman’s time full chapter devoted to its military organization, none of the
in India following his operational tour. While not always other players does—this complicates understanding of the
aviation related, many of his observations are insightful. relative strength of each side, and goes a long way in the
For example, he compares the English class social system book’s failure to explain how the insurgents traveled unde-
to the much-criticized Indian caste system. He talks openly tected (but in mechanized columns) several hundred miles
about the discrimination shown to British personnel who from a non-adjacent African country (Mali) to conduct
married foreign nationals. strikes in the Western Sahara. Finally, the limited number
I unequivocally endorse this book to the armchair avi- of chapters (six) meant that (with the exception of the chap-
ation/military historian. I’m going to go back and read vol- ter specifically devoted to the Moroccan military) the chap-
ume I. ters lacked common narratives internally. They tended to
run together to make the book feel like a combat chronol-
Gary Connor, docent, Smithsonian National Air and Space ogy—even though the chapters themselves are not neces-
Museum’s Udvar Hazy Center sarily presented in chronological order.

AIR POWER History / SUMMER 2021 49

 While the book has eight maps, most are in the second General Giap was the DRV’s architect for successful
half of the book and are of the same area and scale. There infiltration of men and material. Under constant threat of
are no maps that show areas in greater detail, or even a air attack and enduring heavy losses, thousands of North
macro-map that shows how insurgents received logistics Vietnamese troops and civilians devised ingenious means
support from Libya and Mali, despite the shifting stance to survive attacks. They traveled in trucks or by foot, day
of Algeria. There are also factual errors. In the section de- or night, sometimes pushing bicycles laden with ammuni-
scribing the key Battle of Amgala, the authors state the tion and rice. Resourceful engineers and construction crews
battle occurred in January 1977, although the accompany- frustrated US efforts. The trail was an intricate maze of
ing map and text clearly specify the battle occurred in Jan- roads, foot and bicycle paths, and truck parks. Supply
uary 1976. Because most readers will probably have little bunkers, storage areas, barracks, hospitals, and command-
previous knowledge or understanding of the conflict, such and-control facilities were concealed from aerial observa-
a serious error in dates makes one wonder if this is a one- tion by an intricate system of natural and man-made
time typo or if there are similar errors throughout the text. camouflage. The DRV responded to aerial threats through
Overall, the book provides a good holistic look at the sit- increased use of heavy concentrations of AAA. By 1968, it
uation in the Western Sahara, designed for either the casual was mainly 37mm and 57mm radar-controlled weapons.
observer or as an introductory text to a future specialist. In 1969, 85mm and 100mm guns appeared. Eventually,
over 1500 guns defended the system. In 1972, the Soviets
Capt. George W Runkle IV, USA, III Corps Command His- made more SA-2s and SA-7s available to the DRV. Their
torian use made the trail even more deadly.
Davies shows US and South Vietnamese interdiction
◆◆◆◆◆◆ efforts were impacted by weather from mid-May to mid-
September. Since the road network was generally dirt,
Ho Chi Minh Trail 1964-73: Steel Tiger, Barrel Roll, most military efforts the trail supported were conducted
and the Secret Air Wars in Vietnam and Laos. By during the dry season. Eventually, the bulk of the trail was
Peter E. Davies. Oxford UK: Bloomsbury Publishing, 2020. either asphalted or hard packed, thus allowing large quan-
Maps. Photographs. Notes. Tables. Sources. Glossary. tities of supplies to be moved even during the rainy season.
Index. Pp. 96. $24.00. ISBN: 978-1472842534 Due to the increased effectiveness of US interdiction ef-
forts, DVR transportation units usually took to the roads
The Trails War was a series of campaigns (the so-called only at dusk, with traffic peaking in the early morning
“secret war”) to cut the Ho Chi Minh Trail, the supply hours. Just as US aircraft came on station, traffic would
routes Communist forces depended on in Laos, Cambodia, subside until just before dawn, when fixed-wing gunships
and South Vietnam. This short book contains a chronology, and night bombers returned to their bases.
discussion of both sides’ capabilities, US objectives, and a As more territory within South Vietnam came under
short analysis on why the US failed to close the trail. Communist control, the DRV could extend the trail into
On December 14, 1964, Operation Barrel Roll—the US that country. American fighting methods proved counter-
air war in northern Laos—began. On April 3, 1965, Oper- productive. US firepower was so destructive that it killed
ation Steel Tiger began as a covert aerial interdiction to thousands of the civilians it was meant to “save.” Never-
impede the flow of men and materiel from the Democratic theless, the campaign had a profound effect on the course
Republic of Vietnam (DRV) via the trail. Therefore, Amer- of the war.
ica was really fighting in four separate theaters: “in-coun- This book is well written and an easy read. It provides
try” South Vietnam, an air war over North Vietnam, a points to ponder when it comes to the application of air-
campaign against the Ho Chi Minh Trail, and supporting power within the greater context of international diplo-
allies in a civil war in Laos. matic, informational, military, and economic efforts.
Davies notes that the US held air superiority. Their ar-
senal eventually included propeller aircraft (T–28, C–47) Joseph D. Yount, USAF (Ret) and NASM Docent
and jets (F–105, F–4, F–8), helicopters (CH–3, HH–53),
gunships (AC–47, -119, and -130), and unique “one-of-a- ◆◆◆◆◆◆
kinds” (EC–121R, QU–22B). Their bombs and rockets im-
proved over time, especially with the arrival of laser-guided French Bombers of WWII. By José Fernandez and
weapons. Tactics changed as needs arose or technology per- Patrick Laureau. Havertown PA: Casemate Publishers,
mitted. Discussed are both slow and fast forward air con- 2019. Tables. Diagrams. Illustrations. Photographs. Pp.
trol aircraft and an electronic fence to find and destroy 288. $62.00. ISBN: 978-83-63678-59-3
infiltrators. However, terrain, vegetation (triple canopy jun-
gle), weather (monsoons), a slash-and-burn agriculture While the French Air Force (or le armée de l’Air) didn’t
(smoke and haze), and political considerations limited, and play much of a role in World War II, it did have dozens of
sometimes prevented, successful interdictions. types of bomber and attack aircraft in its inventory in the

50 AIR POWER History / SUMMER 2021

period leading up to and during the war. Little has been The book is well-researched and exceptionally well
written about these. The authors’ goal is to document the written. If the subject of French World War II bombers in-
French bomber fleet in a single-volume, English-language terests you, this would be a great addition to your library.
reference work. They approached the task with what The authors clearly achieved their objective of giving us a
amounts to a three-part narrative: French bomber design single-volume reference source for an aspect of World War
and manufacture in the interwar period, the military op- II aviation that usually receives scant attention.
erations that led to France’s surrender, and an encyclopedic
look at each French bomber type. Lt. Col. Joseph Romito, USA (Ret), docent, National Air and
With its success in World War I and its abundance of Space Museum
raw materials, French aviation in the 1920s and 1930s had
great potential, but the potential was never realized. In the ◆◆◆◆◆◆
years immediately following World War I the French mili-
tary did not develop a clear operational concept for the Air Arado Ar 234 Bomber and Reconnaissance Units. By
Force. Air units were seen as subordinate to the Army. And Robert Forsythe and Nick Beale. Oxford UK: Osprey Pub-
the Army, believing the Maginot Line provided adequate lishing, 2020. Photographs. Illustrations. Pp. 96. $24.00
protection against a possible German invasion, placed softcover. ISBN: 978-147284439-2
more emphasis on defense rather than offense. This defen-
sive mindset did not offer opportunities for effective em- Any reader familiar with the Osprey Combat Aircraft
ployment of air power, particularly a bomber force. French series, knows exactly what kind of book Arado Ar 234
bomber designs did not move far beyond the capabilities Bomber and Reconnaissance Units will be before they open
that had existed during World War I, and not a single truly the cover. They will find a clearly written narrative on the
noteworthy airplane design entered service in the 1920s. subject matter. Research and citations will be brief but ad-
By the time Germany fired the first shots of World War II equate. Photographs will illustrate salient concepts. And
in 1939, many French bombers were obsolete, and even there will be illustrations—lots of illustrations.
their best bombers were either past their prime or were The first quarter of this book serves as an introduction
flown in insufficient quantities to constitute a robust force. to the Ar 234 itself. Often overlooked in favor of the Me 262
Recognizing their shortfall, French authorities turned to Schwalbe, the Blitz was a significant step forward in
the US, placing orders for hundreds of Douglas DB–7s (US medium bomber and reconnaissance capability. The num-
A-20 Havoc) and Martin 167s (RAF Maryland). ber of similar platforms that emerged in the world’s air
For those unfamiliar with the first 9-10 months of the forces in the late 1940s (e.g., English Electric Canberra,
war in Europe, the authors provide a useful recap of the Ilyushin Il–28 Beagle, North American B–45 Tornado) pays
period from August 1939 to June 1940. Hostilities began homage to the technology and design significance of the Ar
with Germany’s invasion of Poland, which prompted 234. The book goes into some detail on the teething prob-
Britain and France to declare war on Germany. Then fol- lems of the Blitz. Especially interesting is the discussion of
lowed the so-called “Phony War,” which saw little ground bombsights and experiments designed to determine if the
action but nonetheless included bombing and reconnais- optimum weapon delivery profile was level or glide bomb-
sance missions by French units. Major combat operations ing. Disappointingly, there is not a parallel discussion of
resumed in April/May 1940 with Germany’s invasions of reconnaissance systems.
Denmark and Norway, followed by attacks on the Low The remainder of the book addresses the brief opera-
Countries (Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxembourg) and tional career of the Blitz. Fortunately, it draws heavily on
then France. France surrendered on June 22, essentially the memoirs of Erich Sommers as published in his highly
bringing an end to the existence of the French Air Force. recommended autobiography Luftwaffe Eagle. Sommers
Some air units were integrated into the Royal Air Force had the space to tell a more complete story, whereas
and the Soviet forces to fight on the Allies’ side, while units Forsyth and Beale offer a brisk narrative, compressing an
under control of the Germans were redesignated the 18-month operational career into a few pages. When the
Armistice Air Force. authors take the time to tell a more complete story, as they
The rest of the book is devoted to a detailed discussion do with the Remagen Bridge campaign, they show them-
of each aircraft. Covering 32 types designed and built by selves to be competent storytellers.
15 French companies and three American firms, the au- My greatest complaint about the book is the presenta-
thors categorize these aircraft as old-generation bombers, tion of the written text. As with many Osprey books the
modern bombers, attack aircraft, imported types, trainers, text is presented on the outer two-thirds of the page with
and prototypes under test when the war began. Each air- the inner third reserved as “white space.” This means there
craft gets a thorough discussion of its design, development, is sufficient room to either use a larger, more readable font
production, and operational employment; and the narra- or keep the smaller font and expand the material pre-
tive is supplemented by numerous photos and excellent sented. In this book, the publisher gives you the worst of
full-color illustrations. both options.

AIR POWER History / SUMMER 2021 51

 Arado Ar 234 Bomber and Reconnaissance Units is an of Britain, making their first victory claims in the early-
adequate introduction to a unique and transitional air- July skirmishes and their final claims at the end of Octo-
craft. But the book’s real value is as a starting point for fur- ber. This was true for the Luftwaffe’s top scorers during the
ther research and reading. Battle: Adolf Galland, Werner Mölders, Helmut Wick, and
Walter Oesau, all of whom averaged around 100 days be-
Gary Connor, docent, Smithsonian National Air and Space tween their first and last claims. Most of the RAF’s leading
Museum’s Udvar Hazy Center fighter pilots averaged around 50 days on operations. Also
noticeable are the losses in this group of Luftwaffe pilots.
◆◆◆◆◆◆ During the Battle, 46 out of the 204 pilots claiming five or
more victories by the end of the Battle had been killed or
Luftwaffe Aces in the Battle of Britain. By Chris Goss. made prisoners of war. A further 91 pilots were killed in
South Yorkshire, England. Air World Books, 2020.Tables. the years following the Battle. By the end of the war, nearly
Photographs. Bibliography. Pp. 286. $42.95. ISBN:978-1- half were dead.
52675-421-9. This book will be of most interest to those with a par-
ticular fascination with the Battle of Britain or the careers
Chris Goss, a former RAF Wing Commander, has writ- of Luftwaffe aces. The general reader may get more out of
ten extensively on the Luftwaffe in World War II, with Goss’ other books on the Luftwaffe in the Battle of Britain.
more than forty books to his credit. His latest effort builds
on several of his earlier books on Luftwaffe fighter pilots Edward M. Young, PhD, volunteer, Museum of Flight, Seat-
in the Battle of Britain. Luftwaffe Aces in the Battle of tle WA
Britain is a compendium of pilots who claimed five or more
victories in the period between the start of the war in Eu- ◆◆◆◆◆◆
rope on September 1, 1939, and the end of the Battle of
Britain on October 31, 1940. All pilots listed claimed at War in the Far East: Japan Runs Wild 1942-1943. By
least one, if not all, of their victories during the Battle. Peter Harmsen. Oxford: Casemate Publishers, 2020. Maps.
Not surprisingly, the book concentrates on the Luft- Photographs. Notes. Bibliography. Index. Pp. v, 210. $34.95.
waffe jagdgeschwaders (equivalent to a USAAF group) fly- ISBN: 978-1-61200-625-3
ing the single-seat Messerschmitt Bf 109 and their pilots.
The introduction gives tables of statistics that cover oper- In this book, Peter Harmsen takes the reader on a
ations during the Battle: the number of aces by whirlwind tour of the main battles and campaigns that
jagdgeschwader, total victory claims by jagdgeschwader, took place during 1942-1943 following Japan’s initiation of
the top twenty highest-claiming pilots, and a list of aces by war against America, Britain, and the Netherlands. This
jagdgeschwader. There is a similar statistical section for is the second volume in a planned trilogy of books on the
the smaller number of zerstörergeschwader (heavy/de- aptly named War in the Far East. Harmsen brings to this
stroyer fighter group) that flew the Messerschmitt Bf 110 work twenty years of experience as a journalist in East
in the Battle, though Goss notes that the records for these Asia and a fluency in Mandarin. He has previously written
units are less accurate and complete than the records for two well-received books on the Sino-Japanese War, Shang-
the single-engine fighter units. hai 1937: Stalingrad on the Yangtze and Nanjing: Battle
The bulk of the book consists of short biographies of for a Doomed City. The first volume in his planned trilogy,
the 204 Bf 109 pilots claiming five or more victories up to Storm Clouds Over the Pacific 1931-1941, covers the ori-
October 31, 1940. The biography includes pre-war service gins of the Sino-Japanese conflict that led, ultimately, to
in the Luftwaffe, victory claims achieved prior to the Battle, Japan’s decision to go to war with America and the colonial
claims during the Battle, and the pilot’s service after the powers in Southeast Asia, and ends with the Japanese at-
Battle of Britain. A table listing the pilot’s claims during tack on Pearl Harbor.
the Battle gives the date of the claim, the aircraft claimed, This second volume begins with the sinkings of the
the time, and the approximate location, if known. In some Prince of Wales and Repulse on December 10, 1941, and
cases, Goss has been able to link claims and losses with then describes Japan’s rapid advance through the Philip-
corresponding pilots in the Royal Air Force. Some of the bi- pines, Malaya and Singapore, the Dutch East Indies, and
ographies include excerpts from RAF combat reports and Burma—a brilliantly conceived campaign that shocked,
memories of Luftwaffe pilots. The biographies often include overwhelmed, and humiliated the Allied armies who
a photograph of the pilot, sometimes from the Battle of vainly, and with great sacrifice, tried to stop Japan’s ad-
Britain period and sometimes alongside an aircraft the vance. He proceeds month by month through the rest of
pilot flew during the Battle. 1942, covering most of the major naval battles and the be-
A point that comes out from reading these biographies ginnings of the Allied offensive in the Southwest Pacific
is that many of the Luftwaffe pilots, unlike their RAF coun- with the landing on Guadalcanal. During 1943 the Allies
terparts, flew in combat for the entire period of the Battle began to turn the tide against the Japanese. The battles

52 AIR POWER History / SUMMER 2021

for New Guinea and the Solomon Islands brought Japan- eteers” achieved successful launches, Hitler directed it be
ese expansion to a halt, and the invasion of Tarawa began placed in production. He perhaps fantasized that indefen-
the American campaign across the central Pacific. Mean- sible attacks on England would induce the British to with-
while, the bulk of the Japanese army remained committed draw from the conflict, thus allowing Germany to shift its
in China, to the great benefit of the Allies fighting in the military force to defeat the Soviet Union. But Britain,
Pacific. under Winston Churchill, stood firm. The source for the
Narrative descriptions from many participants, from Harris’ description of the V2 ballistic rocket was Michael
different nations and of different ranks, reflect the shock Neufeld’s The Rocket and the Reich: Peenmunde and the
of the early defeats by a badly underestimated enemy, the Coming of the Ballistic Missile Era. His portrayal is so ac-
misery of fighting in the jungle, and the lessons gained curate that I would have described V2 as a “nonfiction
through painful experience. Harmsen provides brief sum- novel.”
maries of both Allied and Japanese strategies. The story is set in November 1944 when V2 rockets
This book is a concise introduction to the first two rained down on London. It involves two imaginary charac-
years of the war against Japan. In covering two years of ters whose lives intertwine: On the defensive side of the
intensive fighting in only 164 pages, the book can be little German rocket bombing is Kay Cotan-Walsh, an English
else. It is well-written, and the narrative is fast-paced. It officer in the Women’s Auxiliary Air Force. Lt. Cotan-Walsh
would be a good starting place for someone who is unfa- is determined to play an active role in the conflict. On the
miliar with the subject, but for the knowledgeable reader offensive side is Dr. Rudi Graf, a rocket engineer and long-
it adds little to what has previously been written, as Harm- time associate of Dr. Wernher von Braun. Graf is possibly
sen relies almost exclusively on secondary sources. The based upon a young Luftwaffe officer posted to the rocket
benefit of the book is his argument, expressed in the tril- program. In his memoir, The Peenemunde Wind Tunnels (a
ogy’s title, that the war against Japan was much wider source Harris used), Peter P. Wegener reveals that he wit-
than the Western-centric focus on the battles of the Pacific nessed the horrible treatment of slaves in the underground
and in Burma and involved many more participants than rocket factory. This induced him not to join Von Braun.
are commonly acknowledged. He links events in China to Harris notes that apart from such well-known histor-
the war in the Pacific and places China within the larger ical figures as Wernher von Braun and SS General Hans
context of Allied strategy against Japan. Curiously, he does Kammler, his cast of characters and their particular ad-
not mention the furious debate within American military ventures are all purely imaginary. While Von Braun is well-
and political circles between those favoring Stilwell and a known, General Kammler is not. Trained as an architect,
ground campaign in China and Chennault’s argument for he is known to have designed and supervised the construc-
an exclusively air offensive as the best means of supporting tion of both Auschwitz in Poland and the underground
China. Perhaps this will appear in the third volume. rocket production factory at Nordhausen, Germany. He is,
An extensive bibliography serves as a guide to further without doubt, the personification of the devil, something
reading. readers will draw from the novel.
Harris is a talented writer and has orchestrated an es-
Edward M. Young, PhD, volunteer, Museum of Flight, Seat- pecially interesting and suspenseful storyline that not only
tle creates realistic and sympathetic characters, but also in-
forms the reader of the historic introduction of ballistic
◆◆◆◆◆◆ missiles to modern warfare. But, as he notes, it was a costly
military asset that contributed nothing to Nazi Germany’s
V2: A Novel of World War II. by Robert Harris. New military prowess.
York: Random House, 2020. Pp. 364. $28.95 paperback.
ISBN: 978-0-525-65671-5 Robert Huddleston, author and combat veteran of World
War II, Chapel Hill NC
The unconditional surrender of all German forces in
early May 1945 triggered a mad dash by the Allies to ex- ◆◆◆◆◆◆
ploit the defeated enemy’s jet aircraft and ballistic missiles.
While some thought ballistic missiles could be used in the Oswald Boelcke: Germany’s First Fighter Ace and
continuing conflict against the Japanese, they actually had Father of Air Combat. By Brigadier General R.G. Head.
no effect on World War II. However, they were considered London: Grub Street. 2019 (paperback reprint of hardback
the weapon of the future and were, thus, coveted by the US, published in 2016). Photographs. Notes. Bibliography. Pp.
Soviet Union, Great Britain, and France. 240. $24.95 paperback. ISBN: 978-191162142-3.
In Harris’ latest novel, the V2 ballistic missile is the
lead player. The missile had a range of 225 miles, but an The original hardcover issue of Head’s biography of the
advanced model on the drawing boards was supposed to be great German World War I ace was very well received and
able to reach the continental US. After the German “rock- earned numerous accolades. The substance of the book has

AIR POWER History / SUMMER 2021 53

not changed, so there is no reason to reduce the praise he & Co., 2019. Photographs. Notes. Index. Bibliography. Pp
earned. ix, 258. $39.95 paperback. ISBN: 978-1-4766-7549-7
Essentially, it is equal parts biography and history.
Head takes the time to put Boelke’s life into context. He The author, a successful attorney, is best known for his
uses meticulous research to justify the praise he heaps on baseball histories, particularly those concerning the A’s or
Boelcke, explaining why the facts are significant both in Athletics, whether in Philadelphia, Kansas City, or Oak-
and of themselves, but also in the context of the aerial cam- land. He has also authored biographies on 19th century
paigns of the Great War. American military officers and the 1944 United States
Much of Boelke’s success as an aviator stemmed from presidential campaign. In this effort, he tackles the story
him being in the right place at the right time and having of one of the more remarkable personalities of the 20th cen-
access to the right technology. It is difficult for the aviation tury. While the title emphasizes Lovett’s contribution to the
historian of today to grasp just how fast aviation technol- success of the strategic bombing campaign in World War
ogy was advancing at that time. In the 21st century, it is II, that period of his life as Assistant Secretary of War for
not uncommon for a new aircraft design using cutting-edge Air (1940-1945) makes up less than a third of the text.
technology to take a decade to go from a design to a fielded As an undergraduate attending Yale University in
weapon system. During the Great War, designers were ex- 1916, Lovett learned to fly as part of the Yale unit, a group
pected to make the same generational leap every 60-90 of students who financed their own flight training with en-
days. Emerging technologies could provide the user with couragement from the U.S. Navy. Lovett would become
aerial supremacy and inflict horrible casualties on the op- Naval Aviator 66 and serve in World War I. Hungry for ac-
position. tion, he flew as a gunner on British Handley Page bombers
Boelcke was able to ride the wave of technological ad- attacking German submarine bases in Belgium. Historians
vantage twice—once with the Fokker Eindecker and, later, have suggested that this experience influenced Lovett’s
with the Albatross D.I/II. He was also fortunate to be in a views on strategic bombing by striking the enemy’s infra-
non-operational assignment during periods of Allied dom- structure, a theory he would zealously pursue in World War
inance. To his credit, he used his down time to develop the II.
Dicta Boelcke, codifying the elements of aerial tactics Having earned a law degree after the war, he joined
needed to survive and thrive in aerial combat. the Wall Street investment firm of Brown Brothers Harri-
When Boelcke was given command of Jasta 2 (Fighter man, becoming a partner in 1925. He also became a direc-
Squadron 2), he used his Dicta as the core of a training pro- tor of the Union Pacific Railroad in 1926; and, once again,
gram for all assigned pilots. Newly assigned personnel his insight into surface transportation might have influ-
might spend months learning their profession. This enced his thoughts on strategic bombing.
sharply contrasts with the British model which frequently As the civilian manager of the Army Air Forces, he
threw new pilots into combat with 10 hours flight training faced many challenges. First and foremost was boosting
and no training in tactics or doctrine. In fact, the British production, something for which he was ideally suited,
did not seem to have any tactics or doctrine other than given his business background and military experience. He
Trenchard’s insistence on offensive action—even when he emphasized quality over quantity and successfully pro-
did not have the personnel or equipment to conduct them moted the four-engine bomber—the Boeing B–17, Consol-
without suffering horrific losses. This insistence on disci- idated B–24, and Boeing B–29—to take the war to the
pline and structure was probably Boelke’s greatest contri- enemy’s heartland.
bution to aerial combat. It is the reason he is still studied After the war, Lovett took a brief break before return-
today. ing to the Truman administration as the Assistant Secre-
Without question, Head’s book deserves the praise it tary of State under George Marshall. Because of Marshall’s
receives. My only criticism is of the book itself. Images are travel commitments and health issues, Lovett effectively
frequently 1 inch x 1 inch—so small as to be unviewable. managed the department much of the time. Perhaps his
But that is a small criticism of a very worthwhile read. Re- greatest accomplishment was implementing the Marshall
cently, a new book was released titled, Roland Garros, the Plan, the U.S.-funded effort to revitalize the shattered post-
First Fighter Pilot. It will be interesting to see if its author war economies of Western Europe.
builds as strong a case for Garros as Head did for Boelcke. Lovett briefly left government service, but Truman
came calling, convincing him to become Secretary of De-
Gary Connor, docent, Smithsonian National Air and Space fense, a post he held through much of the Korean War. In
Museum’s Udvar Hazy Center the years that followed, he resumed his business activities
with the railroad and bank, but he also maintained his ties
◆◆◆◆◆◆ with Washington. He became a confidant of Presidents
Dwight Eisenhower and John Kennedy. Perhaps his great
Robert A. Lovett and the Development of American contribution during this period was serving on a committee
Air Power. By David M. Jordan. Jefferson NC: McFarland that was highly critical of the Central Intelligence Agency’s

54 AIR POWER History / SUMMER 2021

ability to mount successful covert operations. and tactics, particularly the limitations of bombers at the
This work examines in sufficient detail the career of start of the war and the RAF’s failure in the interwar pe-
one of the most influential American statesmen of the riod to maintain an effective maritime anti-submarine ca-
World War II and early Cold War years. However, readers pacity and to provide support for the FAA. The loss of air
familiar with the behind-the-scenes development of the superiority to the Japanese shows the danger of underes-
Army Air Forces in World War II likely will be disap- timating one’s enemy.
pointed. James Fanton’s dissertation Robert A. Lovett: The Through Adversity is not a strictly chronological ac-
War Years, 1939-1945 does an equally, if not superior, job count, though it does follow the sequence of air operations
concerning Lovett’s World War II years. following the start of the war and includes descriptions of
several notable air actions. Kite does provide a good
Steven D. Ellis, Lt Col, USAFR (Ret), docent, Museum of overview of the different applications of air power. His book
Flight, Seattle WA is particularly good at taking appropriate selections from
the extensive list of memoirs cited in his bibliography to il-
◆◆◆◆◆◆ lustrate and support his observations on operations and
tactics. His descriptions are often cast in the words of those
Through Adversity: Britain and the Common- who flew on the various missions. He made good use of
wealth’s War in the Air 1939-1945: Volume 1. By Ben often unexploited oral-history interviews from the Imperial
Kite. Warwick UK: Helion, 2019. Maps. Photographs. Fig- War Museum and the Australian War Memorial. What
ures. Annexes. Notes. Bibliography. Index. Pp. v, 492. comes across are key themes Kite identified as leading to
$44.17. ISBN: 978-1-912866-23-6 successful application of air power: innovation, flexibility,
cooperation, leadership, courage, and determination.
Ben Kite’s first book, Stout Hearts: The British and However, there are a surprising number of minor er-
Canadians in Normandy 1944, was an excellent study of rors which might have been avoided with more careful fact
the British and Canadian armies in the Normandy cam- checking: B–17s and B–24s did not fly missions over Eu-
paign. As an experienced British Army combat officer, his rope between 32,000’ and 38,000’; German night fighters
intention was to document how an Army actually conducts were not armed with 40mm cannon; and the F4U Corsair
operations. He examined the infantry, artillery, armor, en- had six, not four, wing guns. Despite these, the book is in-
gineers, intelligence, and other branches to understand formative and valuable to the study of British air power in
how they fought, and to convey the experiences of soldiers World War II. The second volume, Undaunted, will cover
during the campaign. air transport, photographic reconnaissance, air intelli-
Through Adversity is the first of two volumes covering gence, and close air support.
British and Commonwealth air forces during World War
II. His goals with these two volumes are three-fold: 1) de- Edward M. Young, PhD, volunteer, Museum of Flight, Seat-
scribe the main themes or elements in the British and tle WA
Commonwealth air war; 2) explain, in detail, tactical and
operational techniques employed; and 3) use memoires and ◆◆◆◆◆◆
oral history interviews to show what it was like to go
against German fighters, fly a bombing mission over Ger- Memoirs of a Stuka Pilot. By Helmut Mahlke (trans-
many, patrol the seas searching for submarines, or fly off a lated by John Weal). London: Frontline Books, 2019. Illus-
pitching carrier deck to patrol a convoy. trations. Photographs. Appendices. Pp. xiv, 306. $18.00.
Part I covers the expansion of the RAF during the ISBN: 978-1-52676-078-4
1930s and how the RAF conducted flight training. The re-
maining three parts cover air superiority (II), the bomber Helmut Mahlke commanded a Stuka dive bomber
offensive (III), and the maritime air war (IV). Each includes group for much of World War II, leading his unit in combat
details and observations on strategy, evolution of tactics, in Poland, France, Dunkirk, the ramp-up to the planned
operations, and aircraft. In the section on air superiority, invasion of England, Malta, North Africa, Crete, and the
Kite covers successes (the Battle of Britain, night fighter Russian front.
defense over Britain, and the defense of Malta) and failures Mahlke had several objectives in writing this book: 1)
(loss of air superiority to the Japanese over Malaya, Sin- tell the story of one Stuka group during wartime; 2) use his
gapore, and Burma). The bomber offensive is organized experiences to bring about a deeper understanding of the
around the conduct of a bomber mission over Germany, past while recording human values such as compassion,
from preparation to return. The final section on the mar- courage, and selflessness that deserve to be preserved; and
itime air war covers Coastal Command’s war against the 3) hope his memories would help answer questions from
U-Boats, anti-shipping missions, and operations of Fleet post-war generations who would want to understand how
Air Arm (FAA) aircraft carriers. Throughout, Kite is frank German citizens in the 1930s-1940s could have allowed
about the challenges faced in developing suitable aircraft Adolf Hitler to do what he did.

AIR POWER History / SUMMER 2021 55

 It is the third objective that generates my only criti- US Air Cavalry Trooper versus North Vietnamese
cism of the book. As a group commander, Mahlke was fo- Soldier Vietnam 1965-1968. By Chris McNab. Oxford
cused on the day-to-day challenges of the war: training and UK: Osprey Publishing, 2020. Index. Photographs. Illus-
leading his subordinates, planning for and carrying out re- trations. Maps. Pp. 80. $22.00. ISBN 978-1-4728-4175-9
peated redeployments as his unit moved from theater to
theater, and maintaining his combat proficiency. At their In early 1965 while at Fort Benning, Georgia, I wit-
level, soldiers and airmen fought for each other and fought nessed an incredible sight. Actually, I heard it first, and it
to accomplish their assigned missions. They probably gave sounded as if I were inside a beehive. Suddenly, an armada
relatively little thought to the rhetoric expressed by their of helicopters with Mohawk reconnaissance aircraft lead-
national leaders. Mahlke’s third objective could not be ing the way and Caribou transports to either side emerged
achieved by simply documenting his wartime experiences. low over the trees. I had no idea that what I was seeing
That issue aside, this is an excellent memoir that de- was the future of combat operations—the employment of
serves the highest possible marks. It paints a vivid picture airmobile forces on the battlefield. The 11th Air Assault Di-
of air combat in flying the airplane that played a critical role vision (Test) was completing its final phase and, within
n Germany’s early blitzkrieg operations. It is exceptionally months, would be redesignated as the 1st Cavalry Division
well written, thanks to both the author and his translator. and sent to combat in Vietnam. Airmobile warfare, leads
In most translated works, occasional words and phrases suf- directly to this monograph’s subject: the air cavalry trooper
fer in translation; but there is none of that in Mahlke’s story. versus the soldiers of the People’s Army of Vietnam
The entire narrative is captured in clear, American English. (PAVN).
Mahlke enlisted for naval pilot training in 1931, ex- McNab is quick to focus on the key components of suc-
pecting to serve as a dive bomber pilot on an aircraft car- cess by the respective opponents. The Air Cavalry was a
rier that was under construction. The carrier was never true product of combined arms warfare, employing vertical
completed, so his unit was unexpectedly transferred to the envelopment on the battlefield while supported with in-
newly formed Luftwaffe in 1935. Initially he flew the credible firepower. The PAVN had the impressive ability to
Heinkel He 50, an airplane designed primarily for the quickly adapt their tactics to diminish the air cavalry’s ad-
Japanese Navy and not well suited to the dive bombing vantages and to inflict maximum casualties on assaulting
mission. The group took a huge step forward when it con- troopers before withdrawing.
verted to the Junkers Ju 87B Stuka in September-October The cavalry utilized technologies to enhance success
1939. Its first operational mission came in May 1940, a on the battlefield. The latest advances in radio communi-
blitzkrieg operation against French forces, in which cations permitted rapid responses to a fluid situation on
Mahlke’s men flew as many as four missions in a single the ground, and scout helicopters allowed for eyes-on-the-
day against tank formations, troop concentrations, bridges, battlefield command and control. Helicopters could rapidly
and roads—anything that would disrupt the flow of enemy insert forces and shift them as the battlefield evolved.
communications, supplies, and troop movements. Although the 1st Cavalry led the way with new tactics,
Mahlke’s group flew almost without a break through- mobility, and technology, it still had to fight conventionally
out the war, only occasionally standing down for brief pe- once on the ground. While it inflicted significant casual-
riods to rest crews and refurbish aircraft. His descriptions ties—especially because of the firepower at its command—
of the unit’s frequent redeployments give the reader a good it, too, suffered large losses. One should read Hal Moore’s
appreciation of the pace of combat operations and of the firsthand account of the Ia Drang battle, We Were Soldiers
importance of the Stuka in supporting ground units. Once and Young, and the 2020 book, Death in the High-
On the Russian front, Mahlke twice had to make lands: The Siege of Special Forces Camp Plei Me, to grasp
forced landings because his airplane sustained significant the ferocity of the fighting. By the time the division was
damage. His accounts of how he survived in enemy terri- withdrawn, it had suffered more casualties than any other
tory and returned to friendly forces are particularly inter- US division in the conflict.
esting. He was the first surviving member of his group to To illustrate the respective tactics of the 1st Cavalry
receive the Knight’s Cross. After recovering from severe and the PAVN, McNab draws on the engagements fought
burns and other injuries, he spent the remainder of the war in 1966-1967, in particular (particularly Operations Crazy
in ground assignments, most of them on the Russian front. Horse and Masher) and the battles of Tam Quan and the
He remained on active duty after the war, eventually re- Vinh Thanh Valley. He mentions the PAVN’s uncompli-
tiring as a Generalleutnant (equivalent to a two-star gen- cated method to neutralize airpower and artillery. Their
eral). He died in 1998 at the age of 85. soldiers were to quickly close with US troops and “hold the
enemy’s belt.” In other words, get inside the safe zone for
Lt. Col. Joseph Romito, USA (Ret), docent, National Air and American forces where artillery and airstrikes were
Space Museum equally dangerous for both sides. If they did not, then the
PAVN’s units would by mauled with significant losses.
◆◆◆◆◆◆ This is a first-rate monograph, with one exception.

56 AIR POWER History / SUMMER 2021

McNab failed to acknowledge Air Force members who were training courses and, in April 1943, was shipped to Eng-
organic to the 1st Cavalry Division (indeed all Army com- land as a replacement gunner.
bat divisions and independently operating battalions)—the This book argues that despite his intractability, Smith
Forward Air Controllers (FAC) and Tactical Air Control was intelligent, articulate, rational, adaptable, and re-
Party. There was a special bond that allowed unit FACs to silient. These traits may have paved the way for the un-
work closely with Army leadership, have hands-on knowl- usually complete record of his life that has survived the
edge of operational planning and execution, and be familiar decades.
with the troops in the field. Otherwise, this monograph Smith had little patience with the unwritten, but time-
brings much to the table: It is flush with excellent illustra- honored, expectation of reticence on the part of those who
tions and photographs that greatly enhance the narrative have received the nation’s highest military honor. He took
and is supported by highly usable maps with descriptive advantage of his status to obtain privileges, passes, and
keys. It is a valuable reference tool. other luxuries before official patience wore thin. Back
home, the War Department put Smith on a cross-country
John Cirafici, Milford DE morale tour. Here he was in his element with the cheering
crowds, introductions by local dignitaries, street-spanning
◆◆◆◆◆◆ banners, handshaking, and motorcades. After the war, he
regularly made speeches, signed autographs, and posed for
Inferno: The True Story of a B–17 Gunner’s Heroism photos. He sold autographed, poster-sized cards detailing
and the Bloodiest Military Campaign in Aviation his MOH mission; freely discussed his combat experiences;
History. By Joe Pappalardo. New York: St. Martin’s Press, and saved every laudatory article, photo, and program. Ad-
2020. Photographs. Index. Pp. 343. $28.99. ISBN 978-1- vantageously, people in whom Smith confided later pro-
250-26423-7 vided many revealing interviews to researchers; and his
extensive documentation collection was a bonanza of re-
All too often, stories of Medal of Honor (MOH) recipi- search material.
ents are confined to brief narratives of the action that Intended for the casual reader, the book is lively and
earned them the honor. In this well-researched biography, engaging. It establishes a context for Smith’s brave action
Joe Pappalardo, former associate editor of Air and Space with a summary of the desperate, deadly air war over Eu-
Smithsonian, addresses the distinctive qualities of the rope in 1943.
Eighth Air Force’s Maynard H. Smith—a man with a trou- Most of the photos appear here for the first time. There
bled reputation. On May 1, 1943, he was the ball turret is no bibliography, but sources appear in the informative
gunner on a 306th BG B–17 heading for the submarine footnotes. Readers may want to compare Smith’s story with
pens at St. Nazaire. After bombing, Smith’s group tragi- those of fellow MOH recipients John C. Morgan (Simmons,
cally turned too soon for England and flew directly over 2018) and Red Erwin (Erwin and Doyle, 2020), both of whom
well-defended Brest, France. Heavy and accurate flak and saved their planes and crews in dire combat situations. Pos-
fighters badly damaged Smith’s plane. Emerging from his sessed of different backgrounds and values than Smith, the
turret, Smith found fires blazing, wounded crew, and reader will find vivid contrasts to him in both men.
enemy aircraft queuing up. He calmly and methodically As a study of the elusive quality called courage, this
fought the fires; tended to the wounded; and, when enemy book is a convincing study of a complex individual who
fighters came too close, responded with the B–17’s .50-cal. lived his long and eventful life largely—and arguably suc-
waist guns. cessfully—on his own terms. It is highly recommended
Smith’s actions in saving his plane merited the MOH. reading.
It is likely a review would eventually have picked it up.
However, in mid-1943, Eight Air Force was waging a battle Steven Agoratus, Hamilton NJ
of public opinion. There was a search for heroes. The 306th
BG gave the story of Smith’s fateful flight to reporters. ◆◆◆◆◆◆
Soon it spread across the country, and officialdom deter-
mined he deserved the MOH. Secretary of War Stimson Operation Colossus: The First British Airborne Raid
presented it on July 16, 1943. Finding Smith’s repeated in- of World War II. By Lawrence Patterson. Barnsley UK:
fractions of military discipline irresistible, the press Greenhill, 2020. Maps. Photographs. Notes. Appendix.
dwelled on them. Thus began the legend of habitual repro- Glossary. Bibliography. Index. Pp xx, 236. $32.95. ISBN:
bate that dogged Smith throughout his life. 978-178438-378-7
Pappalardo found that the true story is more complex.
Smith was rebellious from childhood. By 1942, with a con- Lawrence Patterson is best known for documenting
siderable trail of debts, legal infractions, and wrecked au- Germany’s World War II submarine operations through
tomobiles in his wake, a judge gave him a choice of jail or more than a dozen books. Here, he ventures into an en-
the military. Smith chose the military. He excelled in his tirely different aspect of military history: the beginning of

AIR POWER History / SUMMER 2021 57

Britain’s airborne forces. The Soviet Union is generally con- ◆◆◆◆◆◆
sidered to be the first nation to seriously pursue the devel-
opment of parachuting infantry onto the battlefield. The
Germans demonstrated the value of airborne units during Airpower Over Gallipoli, 1915-1916. By Sterling
their invasion of Belgium and the Netherlands in May Michael Pavelec. Annapolis MD: Naval Institute Press,
1940. The actions inspired British Prime Minister Winston 2020. Maps. Photographs. Notes. Bibliography. Index. Pp.
Churchill to demand his army train 5,000 paratroopers. 205. $40.00. ISBN 978-1-6125-1023-1
Patterson details the selection of the training cadre A widely published author and professor at the Air
and the initial soldiers (all volunteers) who formed the first Command and Staff College, Pavelec tackles one of the
operational unit—designated as X Troop—for the mission most ignored topics of the First World War—Allied and
described in this book. Those responsible for creating the Central airpower operations outside of the more well-
airborne force recruited civilian parachutists as instruc- known Western Front. Outside T. E. Lawrence’s Seven Pil-
tors, some of whom had performed for Britain’s traveling lars of Wisdom and a few movies such as Lawrence of
aerial shows in the late 1920s and 1930s. By late 1940, Arabia (German two-seater bombers) and Shout at the
British commanders had selected a target. About three Devil (Portuguese pusher observation aircraft), airpower
dozen paratroopers would be dropped into southern Italy in Africa and the Middle East is rarely discussed by histo-
with the goal of destroying what was believed to be a crit- rians or in popular culture. This book focuses on the men
ical aqueduct. and aircraft that operated in the skies of the Dardanelles
The Royal Air Force reluctantly provided a few Arm- Strait and Gallipoli Peninsula during one of the most con-
strong Whitworth Whitley Mk II bombers for training and troversial British-French land-sea operations of the First
the actual operation. With the arrival of the first of nearly World War. During the campaign, three Allied (two British
2,000 Douglas Dakota (C–47) transports more than two and one French) seaplane tenders and three land-based
years distant, these were the most suitable aircraft avail- squadrons (two British and one French) flew and fought
able. Technicians removed the ventral turret, thus provid- against two combined German-Ottoman squadrons and
ing a hole in the bottom of the fuselage through which the the extreme weather in the crossroads between Europe
troops could exit the aircraft. and the Orient.
As typically happened in World War II airborne oper- In March 1915, Allied forces launched an ill-fated com-
ations, troops and equipment seldom landed where they bined naval campaign on Turkish forces in the Dardanelles
were intended. So it was on the dark night of this February Strait in northwestern Turkey. The goal was to take control
1941 operation. Despite some difficulties, enough of the of the strategically vital strait separating the country. The
troops with limited explosives secured the target area and failure of the campaign at the Dardanelles, along with the
damaged the aqueduct. land campaign later that year in Gallipoli, resulted in
The extraction plan proved to be very unrealistic. All heavy casualties and a serious blow to the reputations of
concerned were captured by the Italians. One, an Italian Allied leaders, including First Sea Lord and future Prime
internee from a British detention camp who agreed to par- Minister Winston Churchill. The withdrawal of the Allies
ticipate, was executed. All British personnel either escaped solidified the reputation of German General Carl Liman
to Switzerland or were later liberated from German prison von Sanders, militia attaché to the Ottoman Government
camps. and actual commander of the Turkish forces in the Dard-
While the attack had almost no impact on the Italian anelles. Finally, the defeat of the Allies helped the political
infrastructure, the British learned some of the shortcom- aspirations of Turkish General Mustafa Kemal Ataturk,
ings of dropping troops and equipment. The next mission— who would go on to become of the “Father of the Turks” in
a successful effort to obtain a portion of a German radar post-war Turkey.
site in coastal France in 1941—definitely benefited from The nine-month aerial contest did not determine the
the previous experience. outcome of the Dardanelles campaign; it did demonstrate
Aside from the references to the use of Whitleys as that airpower was expeditionary; flexible; and, with the
transports and the value of aerial photography, or the lack right mix of personalities, able to operate jointly. Airpower
thereof, aviation enthusiasts will find little of interest. On Over Gallipoli provides both a chronology of the build-up
the other hand, this story will remind readers of the con- of Allied forces (including aircraft) and the German-Ot-
sequences of inadequate mission planning and command- toman counter moves. Next the book follows several early
and-control shortcomings. Furthermore, detailed accounts and influential airpower leaders from Britain, France, and
of the British paratroopers’ actions after the attack on the Germany who saw the long-term value of aviation technol-
aqueduct should fascinate those seriously interested in ogy, even if the equipment itself did not live up to promises.
survival, evasion, resistance, and escape (SERE). Finally, the book highlights the joint air, land, sea, and
coalition tactical operational nature of the entire cam-
Steven D. Ellis, Lt Col, USAFR (Ret), docent, Museum of paign, addressing both the advantages and challenges of
Flight, Seattle WA such operations that are still relevant today.

58 AIR POWER History / SUMMER 2021

 Airpower Over Gallipoli, 1915-1916 is both well writ- city. In this account, most of the small-unit firefights are
ten and cited, using a variety of resources from across the described in detail. In many instances, the gravesites of
British Commonwealth, France, Germany, and (when many German paratroopers are documented.
available) Turkey to take an objective assessment of air op- With a couple of exceptions, the impact of the Luftwaffe
erations during the campaign. What is lacking from an oth- and absence of the Royal Air Force are seldom mentioned.
erwise insightful book are proper maps showing the Of course, the venerable Junkers Ju 52 transports provided
locations of both the combatants’ airfields and squadrons the Germans with the initial airlift on May 20 and with
and the general location of the seaplane tenders in the Dar- later reinforcements. In an attempt to force a surrender
danelles Strait. Airpower Over Gallipoli adds to the list of after direct assaults had failed, the Luftwaffe threatened
scholarly work on a subject fading with the passing of time. to destroy the city. The defenders refused. On May 23, the
It also provides future historians with a foundation on how Luftwaffe followed through, inflicting enormous damage
to assess the public perceptions of controversial military but causing relatively few casualties. Citizens and soldiers
operations and the employment of a new technology; a les- alike found sufficient shelter in the centuries-old city walls.
son that could very well apply to future assessments of the Despite the pounding, the defenders resisted effec-
long wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. tively over the next few days. Eventually, however, the Ger-
mans linked up their forces south of the city. This action
Col Jayson A. Altieri, USA (Ret), former Army aviator and isolated the defenders from reinforcements and supplies.
paratrooper; Asst Professor, Air War College, Maxwell AFB During the early morning hours of May 29, Royal Navy de-
AL. stroyers evacuated Commonwealth troops from the small
harbor. Later that day the Greek forces surrendered.
◆◆◆◆◆◆ Readers interested in small-unit combat will find this
book highly satisfying. It has all the necessary elements—
The Battle for Heraklion. Crete 1941: The Battle Re- detailed personal accounts from those involved, very good
vealed Through Allied and Axis Accounts. By Yannis maps, and an excellent combination of “then-and-now” pho-
Prekatsounakis. Warwick UK: Helion & Company, 2020. tographs. Anyone interested in the Crete campaign and a
Photographs. Maps. Notes. Bibliography. Index. Pp. xii, 294. devotee of battlefield visits will find this work to be an in-
$39.95 paperback. ISBN: 978-913336-01-1. dispensable guide.

In his first published work, the author, a retired Greek Steven D. Ellis, Lt Col, USAFR (Ret), docent, Museum of
naval officer and native of Heraklion, chronicles the 10-day Flight, Seattle WA
battle for his hometown fought in May 1941. From the be-
ginning, it is readily apparent that he has spent much of ◆◆◆◆◆◆
his lifetime researching the battle. Unlike the typical Ger-
man and British Commonwealth accounts of the fighting, The Yugoslav Air Force in the battles for Slovenia,
he includes the perspective of the native Greeks attempt- Croatia, and Bosnia and Herzegovina, 1991-1992,
ing to defend their homeland from the Nazi invaders. Volume 1. By Aleksandar Radi . Warwick UK: Helion &
Military historians typically remember the Crete cam- Company, 2020. Notes. Maps. Tables. Photographs. Pp. 88.
paign for two reasons: first, the Commonwealth’s inability $29.95. ISBN: 978-1-912866-35-9
to repel the invaders despite superior numbers; and sec-
ond, the extraordinarily high losses absorbed by the Ger- Helion is highly regarded for the scholarship of its au-
man paratroopers. After achieving considerable success thors and their subject knowledge. They often have extensive
through bold airborne assaults in the spring of 1940, the firsthand experience with their topics and are often native
losses Germany’s elite troops suffered on Crete led Adolf speakers of the subject country’s language. This is true with
Hitler to forbid their use in similar operations for the re- Aleksandar Radi , a former affiliate of the Yugoslav military,
mainder of the war. They did fight as infantry, however, who is well acquainted with the events, personalities, lay of
particularly on the Western Front in 1944. the land, equipment of the Yugoslav Air Force, and how the
Drawing on letters, diaries, and interviews, the author weaponry and aircraft were tactically employed.
traces the story from pre-assault preparations on Greece Radi immediately impresses a reader with his de-
proper to the final outcome—surrender of the city after tailed knowledge of the Yugoslav military (JNA) and espe-
withdrawal of most Commonwealth forces. The Germans cially the Air Force. His level of familiarity with the subject
made the capture of the city on Crete’s north-central coast- and personal contact with actual participants during the
line a top priority. On its outskirts was one of the island’s crises discussed in this monograph provide details other-
most capable airfields—a necessary asset for planned re- wise difficult to access. Equally formidable is his thorough
inforcements. grasp of the political situation that precipitated a brutal
The stubborn Commonwealth and Greek defenders struggle between several of the seceding constituent re-
turned back repeated assaults to the east and west of the publics of federated Yugoslavia.

AIR POWER History / SUMMER 2021 59

 Radi takes the reader step-by-step on parallel tracks at age 100), but the primary focus is his years in aerial re-
leading to Yugoslavia’s internal war. One track follows the connaissance.
changing nature of the JNA’s war plans taking it from its Born into a sharecropper family in Tennessee, he dis-
traditional role in resisting a conventional invasion to a covered his love of flying in the Civilian Pilot Training Pro-
new direction—engaging former members of Yugoslavia in gram. In September 1941, Gregory joined the Army Air
warfare. Radi argues that the JNA was ill prepared for a Corps Cadet Program in order to assure himself of the
conflict within Yugoslavia, because the focus had been on greatest opportunities to fly during the upcoming war.
defeating an invading force—NATO or the Warsaw Pact— Gregory’s first operational assignment was in the P-38
and not an internal war between the federated state’s var- fighter, in which his squadron supported the Allied inva-
ious republics. The other track follows Yugoslavia’s political sion of North Africa and the invasion of Sicily. Gregory
evolution from a communist state to the re-emergence of completed 50 bomber-escort and ground-attack missions.
nationalism embraced by the various ethnic groups. This He returned to the States in late 1943 as both an instructor
led to secession. and ferry pilot.
Radi parallels his account of the disintegration of Yu- Gregory left active duty in 1947 and joined the Re-
goslavia with the evolving role of the Yugoslav Air Force serves. After being mobilized for Korea, he decided to re-
during the crises as the tactics and use of force changed sume his active-duty career. He served in a B–47 squadron
from non-violent intimidation to all-out combat. This in- briefly before being asked to participate in Project Black
credibly detailed account of the conflict, however, seems to Knight, the Air Force’s high-altitude surveillance program.
represent the Yugoslav military as ambivalent about con- Black Knight was a recognition that the U.S. intelligence
ducting combat operations within Yugoslavia. One must community had not been effective in the years following
keep in mind that the JNA was allied with Serb paramili- World War II, having foreseen neither the Berlin Blockade
tary groups responsible for horrific atrocities visited on the in 1948 nor the USSR’s first nuclear detonation in 1949.
Croats and later on the Muslim Bosnians. The JNA’s hands The U.S. needed better intelligence on Soviet capabilities
were not clean in any of this; they shared culpability for and intentions. The only way to gather the essential infor-
the wanton destruction. mation was by conducting high-altitude overflights of the
I was a witness to that destruction in Croatia, Dalma- Soviet Union and other areas.
tia, and Bosnia Herzegovina. Having been there in Bosnia Gregory’s first reconnaissance airplane was the RB–
and Croatia during the actual conflict in 1993, preparing 57D Canberra. The airplane was later upgraded to the RB–
for what would have been the Vance-Owen Peace Plan, I 57D-2, with enhanced cameras and electronic collection
can attest to the accuracy of Radi ’s accounts. devices. With a cruising altitude of 70,000 feet, it could
While reading this monograph, one should keep in avoid being shot down by Soviet missiles and fighters. In
mind that the 1991-92 fighting discussed in here (the first the mid- to late-1950s, Gregory led deployments to Japan,
volume covering the conflicts) eventually led to direct US Alaska, and the UK. It was during this time that his work
involvement with imposition of a no-fly zone in 1993, became highly classified, and he was not permitted to tell
airstrikes in Bosnia in 1995, and deployment of ground his family what he was doing, where he was going, or when
forces there under NATO direction. Later, in response to he would return.
genocide in Kosovo, the US entered direct combat with Ser- In 1960, Gregory was brought into the U–2 program as
bia in 1999. commander of a detachment at the Edwards AFB. He was
I am impressed with the author’s knowledge and play- to develop and maintain an operational U–2 capability while
by-play description of the crises, and recommend this supporting developmental and testing activities. Deploy-
monograph as an important primer to understanding the ments included basing U–2s in the Philippines to surveil
events taking place as Yugoslavia fell apart. Vietnam and Laos and then to Texas for overflights of Cuba
as part of the run-up to the Bay of Pigs invasion in 1961. He
John Cirafici, Milford DE spent two-thirds of his time away from home and family.
In August 1962, his detachment discovered Soviet sur-
◆◆◆◆◆◆ face-to-air missiles in Cuba, leading to the Cuban Missile
Crisis in October. U–2s continued to conduct Cuban over-
Spying from the Sky: At the Controls of U.S. Cold flights until the final flights in November confirmed that
War Aerial Intelligence. By Robert L. Richardson. Soviet weapons and personnel had been removed from the
Philadelphia: Casemate Publishers, 2020. Illustrations. Ta- island. This was the high point of his career in aerial re-
bles. Photographs. Notes. Appendices. Index. Pp. x, 301. connaissance.
$34.95. ISBN: 978-1-61200-836-3 He continued working on challenging U–2 develop-
mental projects, and left flying to serve on the Air Staff in
Air Force Colonel William Gregory played an impor- the Pentagon. He retired from the Air Force in 1975, took
tant role in some key events of the Cold War. This book cov- a job with the state government in Austin TX, and then re-
ers his life from 1920 to the current day (still going strong tired for good in 1992.

60 AIR POWER History / SUMMER 2021

 The book also looks at U.S. surveillance programs that Twenty-two YB–40 service test models were ordered
didn’t directly involve Gregory. These informative, well- starting in early 1943. A highly experienced B–17 pilot, Lt
written excursions address an overall view of strategic re- Col Paul Tibbets, Jr. (later to command the 509th Compos-
connaissance in the decade or so immediately following ite Group), was selected to lead the evaluation team. With
World War II, the need for and development of the A-12/SR- recommended changes, twelve of these aircraft were sent
71, and development of the Corona photo reconnaissance to the 92nd Bomb Group at RAF Alconbury in the UK.
satellite. These sections add to the book’s value as a primer During a two-month operational period, 59 YP-40s were
on aerial reconnaissance. dispatched (48 were credited) on 14 different missions, usu-
The book contains a few factual errors that are in- ally in the most vulnerable positions in the formation. All
significant and have no impact on the story. Richardson told, they were credited with five fighters shot down and
has produced a well-researched, well-written book that two probables, while losing one of the YB–40s. These air-
achieves his objective of introducing us to Colonel William craft had slower times to climb and had troubles keeping
Gregory and helping us understand his role in preserving up with the regular bombers, especially after they had
the peace during the Cold War. dropped their bomb loads. With the incoming P-38, P-47,
and P-51 fighters, the bomber escort program was can-
Lt. Col. Joseph Romito, USA (Ret), docent, National Air and celled before the end of the year.
Space Museum Meanwhile, one B–24 had been similarly configured as
the XB–41. Its flight test revealed many problems, and it
◆◆◆◆◆◆ was not pursued. Also, one YB–29 was built as an escorter.
It featured 18 .50-cal guns and one 30mm and four 20mm
World War II US Gunships: YB–40 Flying Fortress cannons! It, too, was dropped from further consideration.
and XB–41 Liberator Bomber Escorts. By William The only meaningful change that came out of the pro-
Wolf. Oxford UK: Osprey, 2020. Tables. Diagrams. Illustra- gram was inclusion of nose turrets in late B–17F aircraft
tions. Photographs. Bibliography. Index. Pp. 80. $22.00 pa- and all of the B–17Gs built. The B–24 ended up with a dif-
perback. ISBN: 978-1-4728-9 ferent turret in its nose. This afforded much greater frontal
defense for the majority of America’s heavy bombers.
In this book, Dr. Wolf has put together, for the first This is an interesting story, well told, of one attempt to
time, the saga of one of the odder concepts pursued during protect the bombers. Profusely illustrated and loaded with
the Second World War—the heavy bomber escort aircraft. photographs, this is the sourcebook for an interesting proj-
I’ve known about the YB–40 and XB–41 since I was a kid, ect that didn’t work anywhere close to the hopes of those
but retired dentist and World War II historian Wolf has fi- who pushed it.
nally provided readers with the complete story, thanks to
his usual superb research work. Col. Scott A. Willey, USAF (Ret), Book Review Editor, and
The USAAF had been watching the war in Europe. Docent, NASM’s Udvar-Hazy Center
Germany and the UK were proving that the widely be-
lieved doctrine of “the bomber will always get through” was
not entirely true. Even before America’s entry into the war, ◆◆◆◆◆◆
Army leaders were concerned that their primary heavy
bomber, the B–17 Flying Fortress, might not live up to its
name. It was probably going to be especially vulnerable
from frontal attacks. With no long-range fighters available
to any of the combatants, other means of additional defense
were needed. By September 1941, the Army had issued
specifications for what a bomber converted to a bomber es-
cort should look like.
When the US entered the war, development of the con-
PROSPECTIVE REVIEWERS
cept moved into high gear. The first project was the XB–
40, a B–17F modified with a two-gun chin turret, another Anyone who believes he or she is qualified to substan-
two-gun turret on top, twin vs. single guns at the waist po- tively assess one of the new books listed above is invited
sitions, and the bomb bay converted to be a magazine for to apply for a gratis copy of the book. The prospective re-
extra .50-cal ammunition. All told, the aircraft carried viewer should contact:
Col. Scott A. Willey, USAF (Ret.)
nearly 14,000 rounds of ammo and had over a ton of addi-
46994 Eaker St
tional armor for the crew and vital aircraft systems. Un- Potomac Falls VA 20165
fortunately, this made it about two tons heavier than a Tel. (703) 620-4139
standard B–17. The airplane first flew on 10 November e-mail: [email protected]
1942.

AIR POWER History / SUMMER 2021 61

 Compiled by
George W. Cully
In light of the coronavirus pandemic,
events listed here may not happen on
the dates listed here, or at all. Be sure
to check the schedules listed on the
individual organization’s web sites
for the latest information.

July 7-10, 2021 Colorado. For registration and other October 5-6, 2021
The International Womens Pilot details, see the Foundation’s website at The Aviation Engine Historical
Association, better known as The https://www.spacesymposium.org/. Society will conduct its annual gathering
Ninety-Nines, will hold their annual at the Hilton Doubletree Hotel in
meeting on board the SS Queen Mary September 9-11, 2021 Dearborn, Michigan. Expected site visits
moored in the harbor of Long Beach, The National WWII Museum will host include the Henry Ford Museum,
California. For registration, see their web- “Memory Wars: World War II at 75,” an Greenfield Village, Automotive Hall of
site at https://travelplannerstexas.swoo- international conference to address the Fame and the Yankee Air Museum. For
go.com/99s2021/333555. shifting landscapes of popular memories of further information as it becomes avail-
this world-altering conflict. The gathering able, see the Society’s website at
July 13-15, 2021 will be held at the new Higgins Hotel & http://www.enginehistory.org/.
The American Astronautical Society Conference Center in New Orleans,
will present its annual John Glenn Louisiana. For more information, see the October 11-13, 2021
Memorial Symposium in an on-line for- Museum’s website at Home | The The Association of the United States
mat. For details, see the Society’s website National WWII Museum | New Orleans Army will present its Annual Meeting
at John Glenn Memorial Symposium | (nationalww2museum.org). and Exhibition at the Walter E.
American Astronautical Society. Washington Convention Center in
September 9-11, 2021 Washington, D.C. For registration and
July 25-31, 2021 The Tailhook Association will hold its other details, visit the Association’s web-
The International Committee for the annual symposium at the Nugget Resort site at Home (ausa.org).
History of Technology will hold its 26th in Reno, Nevada. This year’s presentation
annual meeting in virtual form. This will focus on NAVAIR’s role in the Air War October 11-13, 2021
year’s theme is “Giants and Dwarves in over Vietnam. For details, see the The American Astronautical Society
Science, Technology and Medicine.” For Association’s website at http://www.tail- will present its annual Wernher von
registration and more information, see the hook.net. Braun Memorial Symposium in
Committee’s website at ICHST 2021. Huntsville, Alabama. For additional
September 18-21, 2021 details as they become available, see the
August 2-6, 2021 The Air Force Association will host its Society’s website at Wernher von Braun
The American Institute of annual convention at the Gaylord Memorial Symposium | American
Aeronautics and Astronatics will host Convention Center in National Harbor, Astronautical Society.
its annual Aviation Forum in virtual form. Maryland. This will be immediately fol-
For more information, see the Institute’s lowed by the Association’s annual Air, October 13-17, 2021
website at Virtual Event FAQs | AIAA. Space & Cyber Conference at the same The Oral History Association will hold
site. For more details as they become avail- its annual meeting in virtual form. See
August 16-19, 2021 able, see the Association’s website at the Association’s website at Oral History
The Association of Unmanned Vehicle https://www.afa.org/events. Association for scheduling information as
Systems International will present it becomes available.
Xponential 2021, its premier annual sym- October 5-6, 2021
posium and convention at the Georgia The Aviation Engine Historical October 21-24, 2021
World Congress Center in Atlanta, Society will conduct its annual gathering The Institute for Korean Uniication
Georgia. For registration and other infor- at the Hilton Doubletree Hotel in (IKU), Pusan National University is host-
mation, see the Association’s website at Dearborn, Michigan. Expected site visits ing an international conference on the
AUVSI XPONENTIAL 2021: FAQs. include the Henry Ford Museum, United Nations and Korean War (1950-
Greenfield Village, Automotive Hall of 1953): Politics, War and Peace. https://iku.
August 19-22, 2021 Fame and the Yankee Air Museum. For pusan.ac.kr/iku/54496/subview.do.
The American Fighter Aces further information as it becomes avail-
Association will hold its 2021 Reunion able, see the Society’s website at
at the DFW Airport Marriott South Hotel http://www.enginehistory.org/.
in Dallas, Texas. For registration and Readers are invited to submit listings of
upcoming events Please include the name of
other details, see the Association’s website October 22-25, 2021 the organization, title of the event, dates
at AFAA21 2021 Hotel Info (militaryre- The Society of Experimental Test Pilots and location of where it will be held, as well
unionplanners.com). will hold its 65th Annual Symposium and as contact information. Send listings to:
Banquet at Disney’s Grand Californian Hotel George W. Cully
August 23-26, 2021 and Spa in Anaheim, California. For registra- 3300 Evergreen Hill
The Space Foundation will host its 36th tion and a schedule of events, see the Society’s Montgomery, AL 36106
annual Space Symposium at the website at The Society of Experimental Test (334) 277-2165
Broadmoor Hotel in Colorado Springs, Pilots (setp.org). E-mail: [email protected]

62 AIR POWER History / SUMMER 2021

 History Mystery Answer

During a span of less than two months, Second

Lieutenant Frank Luke shot down 4 airplanes and 14 bal-
loons. Because of his 14 balloons kills, Frank Luke became
known as the “Arizona Balloon Buster.” Thirteen of his
kills came during just one week in September. What
makes this feat even more impressive is that he did not fly
for two of the days that week. Assigned to the 27th Aero To learn more about:
Squadron, 1st Pursuit Group, 2Lt Luke flew a French built Frank Luke: https://www.afhistoryandmuseums.af.mil/
SPAD XIII. The 2th Aero Squadron had orders to attack About-Us/Fact-Sheets/Article/994275/2nd-lt-frank-luke-jr/
balloons, and that Frank Luke certainly did. Frank Luke h t t p s : / / w w w. a f h i s t o r y. a f . m i l / F A Q s / F a c t -
preferred to fly alone, which led fellow pilots to think of Sheets/Article/639654/luke-2nd-lt-frank-luke-jr/
him as fearless as well as “Wild and Reckless.” On Frank Lukes’ Congressional Medal of Honor
September 29th, 1918 Frank Luke took off at sunset for Citation: https://www.cmohs.org/recipients/frank-luke-jr
what would become his last sortie. During his final sortie SPAD XIII: https://www.nationalmuseum.af.mil/Visit/
he shot down three balloons before being engaged and Museum-Exhibits/Fact-Sheets/Display/Article/197399/
chased by the eight German aircraft protecting the bal- spad-xiii-c1/
loons. Luke was wounded and forced to land. Hailing from The Army Air Services during World War I:
Phoenix Arizona, in 1949, Luke Air Force was named in his https://media.defense.gov/2010/Oct/13/2001329758/-1/-
honor. Frank Luke was only 21 years old. His remains are 1/0/AFD-101013-007.pdf
buried in the American Meuse-Argonne Cemetery in
Romagne, France.

AIR POWER History / SUMMER 2021 63

 New History Mystery by Dan Simonsen

This issue’s quiz:

This Medal of Honor winner hailed from the state of
Arizona. Among pilots who only served with the American
Expeditionary Force, his tally of air-to-air victories is only
second to that of Eddie Rickenbacker. He enlisted in 1917
into the Army Signal Corps and earned his wings in 1918.
He was assigned to the 27th Aero Squadron [Today the
27th Fighter Squadron flies the F-22A Raptor]. His air-to-
air victories are a combination of balloons and aircraft.
After being killed in action, he was awarded the Congres-
sional Medal of Honor. An Air Force Base is named in his
honor. Name this American World War I Ace. What was his
Nickname? How many victories did he have? As a side
note, the image of the notebook is of his notebook that is
currently stored at the National Museum of the Air Force.

64 AIR POWER History / SUMMER 2021

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