What Are The Long-term Effects Of Living In A Technological

World? Are These Mostly Negative Or Positive?

What are the long term effects of living in the technology world?
WHAT ARE THE LONG TERM EFFECTS OF LIVING IN THE TECHNOLOGY WORLD?
If you compare or differentiate the lifestyle of people in today’s time, you will see that it is more advanced and high tech
compared to previous years. People owe this to bright minds of those who keep on developing numerous advanced
equipment’s. Technology provides great changes to one’s life, making things more accessible and easier to handle. It is
really great to manage things with just one click of a finger, giving you a lot comfort and positive results as well.

Long Term Advantage Effects:-

· Living in technological worlds allows people to achieve great things in just a short period of time.

· Due to advance technology, communication was made easier.

· They are able to establish units which allow people to talk and see people living across the boundaries.

· This had given great opportunity not just to families and friends but also for businessman as well.

· A wide range of people can now access and see products and services even if it’s thousand miles away from their
location.

· For people with disabilities, technology had given them the chance to access things easily.

· For medical related advances, conducting and undergoing medical check-ups is very advance.

· Due to technology, people now are able to monitor their health without the need of going to their health care
provider.

· They develop things that will aid for easier illness identification and treatment.

Long Term Disadvantage Effects:-

· Due to the wrong use of advance technology, people are able to develop social isolation.

· This is being characterized by lack of communication or contact to people in a normal daily living like social
activities, friends and workplace.

· They are able to isolate themselves by means of spending greater time listening to iPods, spending time in front of
the computer and usage of mobile devices.

· According to research, people that suffer from social isolation are identified to live a shorter life.
· Technology is the one that created the perfect formula for depression due to human’s lack of contact, inactive
lifestyle and overeating.

· Poor sleeping habit is another disadvantage of technology.

Here are the advantages and disadvantages long term effects of living in the technology world.

Describe the role of media channels in shaping

the public opinion and transactions
Pdf check

Discussion Population Planning In Pakistan.

Merits And Demerits 20 Marks

Family planning in Pakistan

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
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"Tabber", a stone monument at PIMS, Islamabad. The two taller stones represent parenthood while the smaller one represents a
single child.
Even though there is considerable demand for family planning in Pakistan, the adoption of family planning has been hampered by
government neglect, lack of services and misconceptions. Demographics play a large role in Pakistan's development and security
since the recent change from military rule to civilian leadership.[1] Challenges to Pakistani's well-being, opportunities for education
and employment, and access to health care are escalated due to the country's continuously-growing population.[1] It was estimated
in 2005 that Pakistan's population totaled 151 million; a number which grows 1.9 percent annually, equaling a 2.9 million population
growth per year.[2] Though Pakistan's fertility rates still exceed those of neighboring South Asian countries with a total fertility rate
at 4.1 (3.3 children in urban settings and 4.5 children in rural areas) and contraception use is lower than 35 percent, approximately
one-fourth of Pakistani women wish to either delay the birth of their next child or end childbearing altogether.[1]

According to Dr. Ansar Ali Khan, an advisor of reproductive health to the United Nations Population Fund in Pakistan, "A
combination of factors like non-availability of services, baseless traditional beliefs and misconception play a big role."[2] In addition,
Ali Khan stated that "a fairly large number of the population believes the use of artificial contraceptives for family planning is against
nature and also against Islam."[2] Unlike family planning in Iran, a neighboring Islamic republic, Pakistan's family planning program
has been touted to have failed in recent years due to neglect and constant policy changes as a result of political upheaval.[a][5]
While 96 percent of married women were reported to know about at least one method of contraception, only half of them had ever
used it

Top 10 Facts about Overpopulation in Pakistan

The population is large, but the country is small: The population of Pakistan is the fifth highest in the world, but it only makes up
0.59 percent of the Earth’s surface. Compared to other countries with high populations, Pakistan takes up the smallest amount of
space. This means that Pakistan is dealing with more consequences than other highly-populated nations because of its lack of space.
The population may double in 30 years: The United Nations reported that Pakistan’s population will rise to 400 million by 2050,
doubling its current amount. Even now, overpopulation in Pakistan is a major issue, so the negative consequences of a large
population will significantly worsen with the anticipated population increase.
The birthrate and death rate are significantly different: The high birthrate and low death rate both contribute to Pakistan’s
overpopulation problem. At 27.7 births per 1,000 people, the birthrate in Pakistan is one of the highest in the world outside of
Africa. By comparison, Pakistan’s death rate is 7.228 per 1,000. This vast difference between the number of people being born and
those dying has led to a steadily increasing population.
There are more children than adults: As a result of the high birthrate, 60 percent of Pakistan’s population is still under the age of 30.
This has dangerous consequences because more resources are required to raise more children. With nearly 39 percent of families
living in poverty, it can be difficult to provide for so many children.
Education suffers when there are too many students: Education is an important step in reducing poverty. The Balochistan Education
Sector Plan was put in place by the Global Partnership for Education in 2013 to address the problem of the quality of education. The
group was able to focus on reducing dropouts by developing learning standards, making a new language policy that would facilitate
healthier learning and investing in teachers. The number of students enrolled in primary school increased by about 100,000 in one
year thanks to a combined effort in school reform.
Family planning is taboo: Pakistan’s national religion is Islam; therefore, some citizens believe that it is wrong to participate in family
planning strategies. Married women are expected to have as many children as possible during child-bearing age. As a result, 70
percent of them use no birth control method whatsoever. This is a contributing factor to the growing population in Pakistan. In
2012, Pakistan made a commitment to the Family Planning 2020 program to increase fertility management and education.
Pakistan takes in a high number of refugees: Pakistan’s Indian refugee population alone is around two million. This is among the
highest of all countries’ refugee populations. Even still, the prime minister of Pakistan, Imran Khan, supported granting citizenship to
at least 1.5 million Afghan and Bengali refugees despite the extreme costs.
Overpopulation can lead to food insecurity: Approximately 60 percent of Pakistanis already live with food insecurity. If the
population continues to increase, families will resort to using agricultural lands for settlement as the urban areas become more
crowded. This will decrease agricultural production, making resources even more scarce and expensive. As a result of existing food
insecurity, there is already an issue with malnutrition and stunting. In 2018, the World Food Program intervened in the cities Sindh,
Balochistan and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa in Pakistan to give out food from a specialized nutrition program targeting children and
pregnant women. This aided in the effort to prevent stunting in children under five years old. Overall, the population’s nutrition has
improved and is on track to meet goals of reducing stunting by 40 percent and wasting to less than 5 percent by 2025.
Overpopulation puts pressure on the water supply: Pakistan’s water supply is becoming scarce due to the increase in the population.
The supply should hold steady at 191 million acre-feet by 2025; however, the demand will increase to 274 million acre-feet. This
means that the people of Pakistan will be approximately 83 million-acre feet short of an important, life-giving resource. Pakistan’s
Karachi Water Partnership, a group of 200 activists, has reached out to thousands of children in 25 Pakistani schools to raise
awareness on saving water. The group was able to repair pipes and resolve hygiene issues in the schools within 15 months.
The government has not made a plan of action: Pakistan’s government has discussed the possibility of decreasing the population
growth rate from 2.1 percent as of 2018 to 1.5 percent by 2025, but no official plans have been established. The Supreme Court of
Pakistan even proposed a two-child limit on families, but the idea was met with strong opposition from the conservative Muslim
majority.

USA Withdrawal From Afghanistan Will Have

Security Implications For Pakistan With
Reference to Influx Of Refugees. Suggest
Suitable Measures To Be Taken By Pakistan
What’s new? The fast-paced withdrawal of foreign troops amid stalled peace talks and rising insurgent violence in
Afghanistan threatens to undermine Pakistan’s efforts to facilitate the Taliban’s return to Kabul through power-sharing
arrangements that have international backing.

Why does it matter? Should the Afghan peace process continue to sputter or altogether fail, Islamabad’s relations with
Kabul and Washington would sour. Further instability or Taliban gains in Afghanistan could embolden Pakistani militants
aligned with their Afghan counterparts, deepening insecurity in Pakistan, especially in its tribal areas along the Afghan
border.

What should be done? Islamabad should reach out to Kabul to reduce mistrust. Using the access and leverage provided
by the Taliban leadership’s sanctuaries on its territory, Pakistan should press the insurgents to reduce violence and
negotiate a compromise on power-sharing arrangements with other Afghan stakeholders.

I.
Overview
Pakistan’s stakes in a stable Afghanistan have never been higher as violence escalates in that country and the peace
process set in train in September 2020 remains largely deadlocked. An unravelling Afghanistan could embolden Pakistani
militant groups, particularly the Pakistani Taliban, and threaten yet another massive influx of Afghan refugees.
Islamabad has been trying to persuade its Afghan Taliban allies to opt for a peacefully negotiated political settlement. Its
failure in that endeavour would strain its ties with Washington and Kabul. With the clock ticking on the deadline for
pulling out U.S. and NATO troops from Afghanistan, Pakistan should redouble its efforts to convince the Taliban to scale
back both their attacks and their aspirations to reinstitute their version of Islamic governance – so that the peace
process may yet succeed.

Pakistan has supported the Afghan peace process, largely because its long-time Taliban ally can use the talks as a road to
power with international legitimacy and the attendant economic support. It saw an opportunity to push for its preferred
option – the Taliban’s inclusion in power-sharing arrangements – when the Trump administration began pursuing a
political settlement in Afghanistan as the U.S. prepared to withdraw troops from the country. Washington
acknowledged Islamabad’s role in facilitating the February 2020 U.S. agreement with the Taliban and the subsequent
peace talks, also known as the intra-Afghan negotiations.

But in January 2021, when President Joe Biden took over the U.S. administration, the talks were at an impasse. The
Taliban continued to rely on violence to strengthen their bargaining position; Kabul, too, appeared unwilling to make
substantive compromises. Biden’s decision, announced on 14 April 2021, to withdraw all U.S. troops by 11 September,
even absent a political settlement, has tightened timelines for getting a peace process moving before the conflict
intensifies, as appears likely, in the withdrawal’s wake. (At the time of publication, the withdrawal looks set to be
completed even earlier, by mid-July.)

Since intra-Afghan negotiations started in Doha, Qatar on 12 September 2020, Pakistan’s military leadership and Prime
Minister Imran Khan’s Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf government have repeatedly emphasised that only a political settlement
can end conflict in Afghanistan. Pledging support for an Afghan-led peace process, they have also repeatedly denied
backing any party to the conflict. Yet the presence of the Taliban’s top military and political leadership on Pakistani
territory gives Islamabad a direct role, and hence a big stake, in the intra-Afghan parley. The sanctuary Pakistan gives the
Taliban also reinforces mistrust of Pakistani intentions among Afghan governing and opposition circles.

As foreign soldiers leave, and the insurgents appear bent on using force to gain power and install an Islamic system of
government, Islamabad faces renewed pressure from Kabul and Washington to convince the Taliban at the very least to
reduce violence to ensure that negotiations continue. Pakistan’s clout with the insurgents has declined as they continue
to make military gains in Afghanistan. That influence has far from dissipated, however, since the Taliban shura
(leadership council) still operates out of Pakistani havens. Taliban commanders in Afghanistan may dispute but will still
follow that leadership’s instructions.

A failed peace process could spark all-out civil war in Afghanistan and a massive influx of refugees into Pakistani
territory.
It is in Pakistan’s interest to persuade, using pressure if need be, the Taliban shura to break the logjam in the peace talks
by reducing violence and moderating demands for Islamic, likely Sunni Deobandi, governance. Indefinitely stalled
negotiations would heighten tensions with Kabul and might harm Islamabad’s relations with Washington – a grave
concern for Pakistani military leaders. China, Pakistan’s closest foreign partner, also probably prefers that Islamabad
work to produce a more stable outcome than a Taliban victory followed by an attempt at monopolistic rule. A failed
peace process could spark all-out civil war in Afghanistan and a massive influx of refugees into Pakistani territory.
Violence in Afghanistan would also spill over into Pakistan, destabilising its conflict-prone western border as Taliban
gains empower the Afghan insurgents’ Pakistani Deobandi militant allies. In the worst-case scenario, a Taliban military
takeover in Kabul, Pakistan would face the dilemma of dealing with its ally heading a regime that would enjoy scant
outside backing and – crucially – very little financial aid.

Once foreign troops leave Afghanistan, Western patience with the country’s unending conflict, and its quarrelling
factions, is likely to fade. Time is of the essence if Pakistan is to achieve the objective of a political settlement that gives
its Taliban allies a road to legitimate power sharing and prevents the Afghan conflict from undermining security at home.

II.
Backdrop
A.
Pakistan’s Afghan Proxies
Pakistan’s intervention in Afghanistan and links with the Taliban predate the movement’s 1996 establishment of its
Islamic Emirate by several decades. Seeing itself as inheriting the British Indian empire’s western frontier, the so-called
Durand Line, in 1947, Pakistan perceived Afghanistan as falling within its sphere of influence. It retains this view, often
looking at Afghanistan as a “fifth province” that is dependent on a “benevolent big brother’s good-will”. Afghans have
historically bristled at these Pakistani attitudes. The Durand Line, moreover, cuts through areas that the Pashtuns
dominating successive Kabul governments have considered their homeland. Afghan leaders have long refused to
recognise the 2,430km line as the international border and staked claims to contiguous Pakistani Pashtun-majority
territories. The dispute has marred bilateral relations.

Since at least the 1970s, Pakistan has backed various Afghan Islamist factions as an antidote to Pashtun nationalism. To
gain vital U.S. support, Pakistan also provided safe haven and military support to various Afghan mujahideen factions
during the so-called anti-Soviet jihad. Many mujahideen leaders now hold prominent positions in Afghan ruling and
opposition circles. Though earlier Afghan leaders had sought to distance themselves from Pakistan’s rivalry with India,
opting for neutrality in the 1965 and 1971 Indo-Pakistani wars, the Soviet-backed communist government in Kabul drew
closer to New Delhi as Islamabad sponsored Afghan insurgents.

Following the 1989 Soviet withdrawal and the civil war that ensued, Pakistani intervention in Afghanistan continued,
including failed attempts at forging political settlements among warring mujahideen factions. Yet the pledges, such as
after the Soviet withdrawal, to help Afghans find a peaceful solution were mere rhetoric, with Pakistan choosing instead
to back handpicked Afghan proxies. Pakistan’s preferred Afghan partners first included Gulbuddin Hekmatyar’s
predominantly Pashtun Hizb-e Islami.

As Hekmatyar lost ground to Afghan opponents, including the Tajik-dominated Jamiat-e Islami, the Pakistan military
shifted its support to the largely Pashtun Taliban. Many present-day Taliban leaders and commanders were students
(talibs) in madrasas run by two factions of the Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam, a Pakistani Deobandi Pashtun political party, led by
Fazlur Rehman and Samiul Haq. Haq, who headed the Akora Khattak madrasa in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province’s
Nowshera district, had particularly close ties to Taliban founder Mullah Mohammad Omar. Pakistan’s Deobandi madrasa
networks were also a major source of Pakistani Pashtun recruits to the Taliban cause.

Pakistan was one of three countries to recognise the Taliban’s Islamic Emirate [and after 2001] provided shelter to ...
their top leaders.
Pakistan was one of three countries, the others being Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, to recognise the
Taliban’s Islamic Emirate, established after the movement captured Kabul in 1996. The Taliban’s rivals, the Northern
Alliance, dominated by Tajiks, Uzbeks and Hazaras, not surprisingly sought New Delhi’s backing. After the September
2001 terror attacks in the U.S., pressure from Washington prompted Pakistan’s military ruler President Pervez
Musharraf formally to sever ties with the Taliban. Yet, after the October 2001 U.S.-led invasion ousted the Taliban’s
regime, Pakistan provided shelter to their rahbari shura, the body composed of their top leaders and military
commanders. The Taliban’s command structures – political and military – were reconstituted out of these sanctuaries,
which allowed the insurgents to recruit, raise money and conduct attacks on U.S. and aligned forces as well as Western-
backed Afghan governments. Aided also by the predation of Kabul’s new rulers and abuses by foreign forces, the Taliban
gained support in the Pashtun-majority south and east.

B.
Bringing the Taliban in from the Cold
As the Taliban insurgency gained ground beginning around 2005, successive Afghan governments, namely Hamid
Karzai’s and Ashraf Ghani’s, attributed its military prowess to Pakistani havens and Islamabad’s active logistical and
material support. The Taliban’s resurgence also strained Pakistan’s relations with the U.S. In 2011, after an attack on the
U.S. embassy in Kabul, Admiral Michael Mullen, then chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, called the Taliban-aligned
Haqqani network “a veritable arm” of Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) – the Pakistan military’s premier intelligence
agency.

Well aware that any path for the Taliban’s return to power (in a manner that would not cast Pakistan as, once again,
protector of a pariah regime) would depend on international recognition, Pakistani policymakers now faced the
challenge of bringing the Taliban in from the cold. As early as the 2001 Bonn conference that drew up a roadmap for
post-invasion Afghanistan, Pakistan had asked for the Taliban’s inclusion in consultations on Afghanistan’s constitutional
and political restructuring. A former senior Pakistani diplomat said Pakistan had “pleaded with the U.S. to include the
Taliban in Bonn”. Pakistan’s consistent efforts to persuade the U.S. to bring the Taliban into the political mainstream
appeared to bear fruit a decade later, when the Obama administration signalled its intention to leave Afghanistan and
its openness to talking with the Taliban.
On 7 July 2015, Pakistan hosted the first direct formal contacts between the Taliban and Afghan government
representatives, including the deputy foreign minister, in Murree; U.S. and Chinese representatives were also present. A
second round, scheduled for 31 July, was aborted after the Afghan presidential palace disclosed that Taliban leader
Mullah Omar had died two years earlier, allegedly in a Pakistani hospital. Subsequent Pakistani efforts at a negotiated
settlement that would give the Taliban a pathway to power, including the Quadrilateral Dialogue (Pakistan, Afghanistan,
the U.S. and China), made little headway, largely because the insurgents refused to talk directly to the Afghan
government. That dialogue, moreover, came to a halt after the U.S. killed Taliban leader Mullah Akhtar Mohammed
Mansour in a drone strike as he re-entered Pakistan from Iran in May 2016.

Yet the restructuring of the Taliban shura following Mansour’s death, with successor Shaikh Haibatullah Akhunzada
appointing Sirajuddin Haqqani as one of his principal deputies, worked to Pakistan’s advantage. The Haqqanis,
particularly close to Pakistan, were now an integral part of the top Taliban leadership. Any attempt – by Kabul or
Washington – to seek dialogue with the Taliban would of necessity include the Haqqanis and hence reduce pressure on
Pakistan to cut its ties with the lethal insurgent faction. By 2021, Sirajuddin Haqqani’s younger brother, Anas, had
become a member of the Taliban negotiating team in Doha and was engaging with U.S. officials.

C.
Facilitating the Peace Process
The Trump administration’s decision to hold direct talks with the Taliban, as it prepared to end the U.S. war in
Afghanistan, presented Pakistan with new opportunities to push for the Taliban’s inclusion in governance and security
structures. In his 2017 South Asia policy address, President Donald Trump had criticised Pakistan for playing a double
game, benefiting from massive U.S. assistance and then, naming the Taliban, giving “safe havens to terrorist
organisations”. Yet Trump also implied that the U.S. might consider a political settlement of the Afghan conflict that
included “elements of the Taliban”. Once the Trump administration accepted the Taliban’s demand to deal directly with
them, bypassing the Afghan government, Pakistan was quick to respond positively to U.S. requests to facilitate the
nascent peace process.

A U.S. analyst commented that the Trump administration’s “new plan B”, a negotiated outcome of the Afghan war
through direct talks with the Taliban, was “always Pakistan’s Plan A”. Pakistan’s internal dynamics then, as now,
determined the direction of its Afghanistan policy.

A settlement would also end decades of war in Afghanistan and might help stabilise Pakistan’s conflict-prone western
borders.
Since taking power in a contested election in July 2018, and lacking a stable majority in parliament, Prime Minister Imran
Khan has largely ceded decision-making on security and foreign policy to the top brass. Earlier governments, such as
Nawaz Sharif’s (2013-2018), had attempted to ease tensions with Afghanistan though the high command still hedged its
bets, either actively or tacitly supporting the Afghan insurgency. Under Khan’s government, however, the military
leadership, a former senior army officer said, “is solely responsible for Afghan policy, and the foreign ministry is merely
tasked with implementation”. That said, the high command’s preferred option for Afghanistan is in complete alignment
with Khan’s. Both support a deal that would protect Pakistan’s interests in and influence over Afghanistan, including by
giving the Taliban a power-sharing role. A settlement would also end decades of war in Afghanistan and might help
stabilise Pakistan’s conflict-prone western borders. Facilitating the U.S.-led Afghan peace process would also help mend
relations with Washington.

The peace process soon bore out the predictions of how it would help Pakistan. In October 2018, during Zalmay
Khalilzad’s visit to Islamabad, a month after he was appointed U.S. special representative for Afghanistan reconciliation,
Pakistan released Mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar, a co-founder of the Taliban and formerly Mullah Omar’s deputy, who
had been detained in Karachi since 2010, when he had reportedly reached out to Hamid Karzai’s government without
Pakistan’s blessing. Baradar was allowed to join the Taliban’s political office in Doha. Baradar’s presence gave the
political office gravitas it had previously lacked because of his standing within the Taliban shura. Recognising the
Pakistan military leadership’s predominant policymaking role, the U.S. kept it in the loop as talks with the Taliban
progressed. Visits by top U.S. officials, including peace envoy Khalilzad and senior military officers, accompanied every
critical juncture. An opposition politician said: “The military leadership was under the impression that the U.S. was
subletting Afghanistan to them”.

Anxious to ensure that the talks succeeded, the military quickly intervened to remove hurdles, such as after President
Trump abruptly called off talks on 6 September 2019 on the eve of an expected deal. At a news briefing on 17 January,
concluding his visit to Washington, Foreign Minister Shah Mahmood Qureshi said he had told Secretary of State Mike
Pompeo: “We fulfilled our promise. The Taliban came to the table. Then you said the delegation should be authoritative
and powerful. We did that”.

Pakistan’s top military and political leaders welcomed the 29 February 2020 U.S.-Taliban peace deal, and committed, in
Prime Minister Khan’s words, Pakistan “to playing its role” in ensuring it “holds and succeeds”. Through the deal, the
Taliban had achieved a key goal: a firm date for the departure of foreign forces in return for pledges to end ties with
terrorist groups, including al-Qaeda, and to enter into negotiations over a political settlement to the conflict. For
Pakistan, the deal’s value lay in the prospect of a political settlement that would, by benefiting its Taliban ally, cement
Pakistan’s influence over Afghanistan. Pakistan’s facilitation was also expected to garner U.S. rewards.

Those hopes were dashed as the Doha talks, which began in September, made little progress, partly because of Kabul’s
fractured politics, but largely because the Ghani government and the Taliban shura were equally averse to making
concessions. It did not help that the talks commenced so close to the U.S. presidential election, adding uncertainty as to
whether Washington would stick with the February 2020 deal. With the insurgents also continuing to rely on force to
strengthen their bargaining hand, Pakistan’s already tense relationship with the Ghani government worsened further.
Hoping to salvage progress made, Pakistan has urged the Biden administration to build on the Doha peace process. That
process still exists, and U.S. and Pakistani efforts to energise it continue, but it faces new and serious challenges.

III.
Back to Square One?
The Biden administration’s policy has changed the rules of the Afghanistan game for Afghans and for the country’s
neighbours. On 14 April, President Biden announced an unconditional withdrawal of U.S. forces by 11 September, the
twentieth anniversary of the terror attacks that led to the U.S. military intervention in Afghanistan. The pullout of U.S.
and allied troops is well under way and likely to be completed during July, but the prospects of a negotiated peace
appear slim.

An earlier effort by U.S. envoy Zalmay Khalilzad to convince Ghani’s government and the Taliban to agree on a
transitional power-sharing government at a proposed April meeting in Turkey, alongside a UN-sponsored meeting of
major regional stakeholders, had proven a non-starter. Angered that the U.S. had reneged on the 1 May pullout date
and reluctant to be pressured openly, the Taliban refused to attend any conference on Afghanistan’s future “until all
foreign troops withdraw”.

Reacting to Biden’s withdrawal announcement, Pakistan’s foreign office emphasised that the troop withdrawal
“coincides with progress in the peace process”. Reportedly persuaded, or pressured, by Pakistan, the Taliban have since
agreed to rejoin the peace process, with talks once again resuming in Doha. The group’s leaders have not yet been
convinced, however, to disclose their political vision for Afghanistan, beyond vague generalities such as a demand for an
Islamic government. Until they begin to do so, a genuine negotiation cannot take place.
At the same time, the Taliban have also escalated military attacks countrywide, reportedly capturing district centres and
threatening provincial capitals, including those ringing Kabul. If the peace process fails to make headway, a new and
bloodier phase of Afghanistan’s civil war could ensue, with potential consequences for Pakistan’s security.

A.
The Costs of International Isolation
In Pakistani perceptions, a Taliban attempt to seize power would be an undesirable outcome. If the Taliban were to
forcibly oust the Afghan government, they would likely lose much of the international legitimacy they gained by
declaring their willingness to seek a political settlement of the conflict, all the more so if they crack down violently on
former enemies, shut down institutions in which foreign governments have invested heavily and roll back the gains that
women have made over the past twenty years. Even if the Taliban do not manage to overthrow the Afghan government,
the group’s military push undermines Pakistan’s hopes for the insurgents’ participation in internationally recognised and
backed power-sharing arrangements.

Islamabad’s role in facilitating U.S.-Taliban negotiations has also somewhat eased tensions with Washington. As the
troop drawdown continues, high-level U.S. contacts, primarily with Pakistan’s military leadership, have focused on the
country’s role in shoring up the Afghan peace process. Responding to questions at a Senate Foreign Relations
Committee hearing on 27 April, Khalilzad said Pakistan had been “supportive of our efforts to press the Taliban to
reduce violence, to enter into negotiations with the government of Afghanistan [and] to be an active participant in
peace negotiations”. He added, however, that “Pakistan has a special responsibility given its influence over the Taliban.
… We appreciate what Pakistan has done but we are not there yet”.

U.S. support, including resumed military assistance, a top priority for the Pakistani high command, will be contingent on
that facilitation. The peace process, however, will not survive if the Taliban does not reconsider its campaign to conquer
territory, even if it is just short of seizing power. If the Taliban keeps up its offensive, Pakistan will risk international
opprobrium should it continue to support the insurgents, including by providing safe haven to the Taliban shura.

Pakistan is also well aware that conflict-torn Afghanistan’s economic viability and reconstruction requires extensive
international financial support. In a proposed four-point plan on the way forward for the Afghan peace process, Foreign
Minister Qureshi, for instance, called on outside powers to “deepen and sustain economic engagement with Afghanistan
for its reconstruction and economic development”.

No amount of international assistance will help prevent economic meltdown if the country returns to all-out civil war.
The U.S. and other major donors have pledged to continue supporting the Afghan government financially. Yet no
amount of international assistance will help prevent economic meltdown if the country returns to all-out civil war, and
aid delivery will become increasingly difficult in that scenario as well. Even if the parties reach a peace settlement in
which the Taliban impose their version of ultra-orthodox Islam on governance, such support will be in doubt. In
November 2020, donors pledged $12 billion in civilian assistance for Afghanistan, but many countries conditioned the
funds on progress in the peace talks and respect for the rule of law, human rights and gender equality. The European
Union (EU) made the largest pledge at $1.4 billion but tied it to a peace settlement based on republican and democratic
principles. Should the Taliban opt for an all-out military takeover, the EU as well as individual Western countries would
shun the new regime and likely levy sanctions against it.

B.
Emboldening Homegrown Militants
If the Taliban increases its military footprint on the ground, its prowess may further embolden Pakistani militants. A
retired general said: “The space for the Taliban’s natural allies – Pashtun militants and Sunni sectarian outfits – is already
expanding in Afghanistan. Those risks would increase even further if Kabul were to fall to the Taliban”. A former senior
counter-terrorism official likewise warned: “Pakistani sectarian and other militants will be the ultimate beneficiaries of
Taliban state capture. Instead of being a strategic asset, the Taliban will become a strategic threat to Pakistan”.

Pakistan civilian and military leaders are particularly concerned about the Taliban’s apparent insistence on replacing the
post-Bonn republican order, including the 2004 constitution, with governance based on sharia informed by their
Deobandi ideology. They believe that the imposition in Afghanistan of Sunni Hanafi Islamic jurisprudence as state law,
including for the minority Afghan Shia population, could encourage Islamists to renew demands for similar laws at
home, fuelling sectarian tensions in a country that has the second largest Shia population in the world after Iran.
Sectarian Pakistani Sunnis could feel empowered by the Taliban’s return to power and might even seek the movement’s
backing, as they have in the past. According to some security sources, an expansion of Taliban control over Afghan
territory already benefits likeminded Pakistani groups. A former senior security official, for example, said: “The
imposition of the Taliban’s preferred version of Deobandi Islam in large parts of Afghanistan is boosting Pakistani
Deobandi militants”.

An escalation of Afghanistan’s civil war could also destabilise Pakistan’s tribal belt. Militants from the Tehreek-e-Taliban
Pakistan (Taliban Movement of Pakistan, or TTP), formed in 2007 from various militant factions with the goal of
overthrowing the Pakistani government, are already regrouping in border areas – the former Federally Administered
Tribal Areas (FATA) in the country’s north west and adjacent regions of Balochistan to the south. Militant attacks in the
tribal belt, including several launched from across the Afghan border, have killed scores of security personnel in 2021.

Since the Taliban’s ouster in 2001, some Pakistani Taliban have fought alongside and provided recruits to their Afghan
counterparts in the so-called jihad against Western forces and the Western-backed Afghan government. Pakistani
militants fleeing from Pakistani military operations in the tribal belt have long sheltered in Afghanistan and used havens
in remote border areas to conduct cross-border attacks. Pakistan has accused Afghan intelligence and India of backing
Pakistani militants, operating from bases in Afghanistan, to stage raids into Pakistan. Yet the Pakistani military is well
aware of the close ethnic and ideological linkages between the predominantly Pashtun Deobandi Pakistani Taliban and
their Afghan brethren. A security official said: “They are two faces of the same coin”.

Despite Pakistani demands, the Afghan Taliban have yet to deny Pakistani Taliban militants shelter or to dissuade their
fellow militants from using territory they control to attack Pakistani forces. A former senior Pakistani diplomat with close
links to several Pakistani, including military, governments, disclosed: “The Pakistan military has tried but has failed to
convince the Taliban leadership to distance itself from the Pakistani Taliban”. On the contrary, Pakistani Taliban splinter
groups, based mainly in Taliban-controlled territory, have rejoined the TTP, enhancing that group’s ability to attack
Pakistani forces. A Pakistani newspaper editorial that decried TTP “safe havens” in Afghanistan called on Islamabad to
“exercise its leverage with the Afghan Taliban and let them know that allowing the TTP or other anti-Pakistan groups to
use space under their control will not be tolerated”.

Separate from any agreement between the Taliban and their Afghan adversaries, Pakistan wants explicit assurances that
the insurgents will stop giving refuge to Pakistani Taliban militants on the territory they control. Notwithstanding the
support the Taliban receives from Pakistan, the movement’s track record suggests it will be reluctant to give up militants
that have often for years fought alongside Afghan Taliban forces and share its ideology. The Taliban’s continued
rejection of such demands and cross-border attacks by the Pakistani militants could strain relations between Pakistan’s
high command and its longstanding Afghan allies.

C.
Tensions with Kabul
The Afghan peace process had given Pakistan a chance to reset its troubled relations with Kabul. In the run-up to intra-
Afghan dialogue, and since it began, Pakistan’s top political and military leaders have regularly consulted the Ghani
government on the talks and other pressing issues, including how to ease border tensions. Yet the spike in insurgent
violence as foreign forces depart and the Taliban shura’s continued presence on Pakistani territory has reinforced
Kabul’s suspicions of Islamabad’s intentions.

In an interview with a German newsmagazine in May, President Ashraf Ghani accused Pakistan of providing the Taliban
with “organised logistical support”. As the U.S. leaves Afghanistan, Ghani said: “It now plays only a minor role. … It is first
and foremost a matter of getting Pakistan on board”. On 10 May, army chief Qamar Javed Bajwa and ISI chief Faiz
Hameed, meeting Ghani in Kabul, reiterated support for the peace process. According to Ghani, Bajwa “clearly assured
Afghanistan that the restoration of the Emirate or dictatorship by the Taliban is not in anybody’s interest in the region,
especially Pakistan”. Ghani and other anti-Taliban stakeholders will, however, judge Pakistan’s pledges by its
performance – in pressuring the insurgents to reduce violence and in bringing them back to the negotiating table.

[An Afghan politician warned Pakistan:] ‘If the military believes that putting up walls will keep refugees at bay, it should
understand that those walls will fall.’
Pakistan’s efforts to fence the contested border with Afghanistan could also affect bilateral relations. According to the
Pakistani military, the fence construction, which began in 2017, is aimed at preventing cross-border movement of
terrorists, as are the 843 planned frontier posts, which it insists are inside Pakistan’s territory. Yet Pakistani and Afghan
forces have clashed over contested posts in the former FATA and other Khyber Pakhtunkhwa regions adjacent to the
Afghan border.

Fencing the border has implications that go beyond state-to-state relations. Pakistan has long demanded that around
1.4 million registered Afghan refugees and close to another million Afghan citizens go back to their homeland, citing
their presence as both an economic burden and a security threat. Should Afghanistan enter into another, potentially
more lethal, phase of the war, hundreds of thousands of Afghans could again seek shelter in Pakistan. Should Pakistan
attempt to forcibly prevent such an influx, the human costs aside, it would anger anti-Taliban Afghan factions and
alienate Pashtuns living along the border. A senior Pashtun politician warned: “If the military believes that putting up
walls will keep refugees at bay, it should understand that those walls will fall”.

IV.
Pakistan and the Taliban: The Question of Influence
With the departure of all foreign forces fast approaching and no peace settlement in sight, Pakistan’s preferred options
remain unchanged. It does not support an outright military takeover by the Taliban. “This is our stance in principle”,
Pakistan’s foreign minister told parliament. Instead, it wants a negotiated settlement of the Afghan conflict that gives its
Taliban allies a share – possibly a major one – in governance and security structures, with international recognition and
support. Pakistan is aware that attempts at monopolistic rule by the Taliban would be contested by anti-Taliban forces
and would burden Islamabad with having to decide whether and how to support a regime with little international
backing or funding. Yet achieving its preferred outcomes will depend on Pakistan’s ability, and indeed intention, to
pressure or persuade the Taliban to talk instead of fight and to abandon maximalist positions in future negotiations.

Yet Pakistan retains influence with and leverage over the Taliban, which, if used wisely, could prevent the Afghan
conflict from escalating to the point of no return.
Weeks into the start of the 2020 peace talks, a former Pakistani ambassador to Kabul said: “Pakistan has to dissuade the
Taliban from refusing to compromise. We have to make them realise they can overplay the military hand”. The
prospects for talks leading to a political settlement have since declined as foreign troops depart and the Taliban seem to
gain confidence in their ability to defeat the Afghan security forces on the battlefield. Yet Pakistan retains influence with
and leverage over the Taliban, which, if used wisely, could prevent the Afghan conflict from escalating to the point of no
return. It is in Pakistan’s interest to do so.

Nor can Pakistan absolve itself of all responsibility for the Afghan conflict’s outcome, as it would like to do. As a study on
a future Afghan peace process noted:
Pakistan’s role in perpetuating the Afghan conflict by allowing the Taliban safe haven within its territory and Pakistan’s
perception of Afghanistan as within its legitimate sphere of influence means that its support for the resolution of the
conflict will be especially crucial.

Pakistan’s ties to the Taliban are certainly far closer, and hence its ability to influence the outfit greater, than any other
regional or extra-regional actor. Top Taliban negotiators have as frequently consulted Pakistani officials on the peace
talks as they have their Pakistan-based leadership. The Taliban shura’s continued presence gives Pakistani policymakers
unique opportunities of direct access to the leadership. They cannot dictate the shura’s decisions, but they can certainly
help shape them.

Pakistan’s leverage has likely declined, as the Taliban gain ground militarily, but it remains significant. A senior former
security official said: “Pakistan’s mentor relationship with the Taliban has weakened”. Still, Pakistani authorities,
particularly the military and its intelligence arm, retain considerable influence. An expert with extensive knowledge of
the relationship said Pakistan’s influence has changed, rather than diminished. For instance, Pakistan no longer provides
weapons directly to the Taliban but allows the movement to import the arms it purchases freely through Pakistani
territory. Emphasising that Taliban sanctuaries in particular remain a major bargaining chip for Pakistan in its dealings
with the Taliban, the expert said: “That clout can be used to shape Taliban behaviour”. The Taliban shura is unlikely to
relocate to Afghanistan in the foreseeable future. So long as this council needs Pakistani sanctuaries and support, a
former senior military officer said, Pakistan will “retain leverage over the Taliban”. He said: “We are giving the leadership
and their families security and safety”.

Pakistan’s relationship with the Taliban has certainly not been trouble-free. Taliban leaders who attempted to resist
Pakistani preferences in the past were imprisoned or disappeared. Baradar, for instance, was detained for several years
before his 2018 release. Two senior Taliban leaders, Mullah Ubaidullah Akhund, the former Taliban defence minister,
and Ustad Yasir reportedly died in Pakistani security agencies’ custody between 2010 and 2012. The current Taliban
leadership might chafe at perceived Pakistani intervention, but Pakistan has the capacity to use their sanctuaries on its
territory as leverage if it so chooses, including to pressure the Taliban to stop giving safe haven to their Pakistani militant
brethren. The military’s assessment of the costs and benefits – for internal security and the country’s international
standing – will shape Pakistan’s relations with the insurgent group.

V.
Rethinking Policy toward Afghanistan
Pakistan’s civil and military leaders have repeatedly stressed that they will support any political settlement that Afghan
stakeholders reach. Their denials of partisanship will, however, have little credence with the Taliban’s Afghan
adversaries. So long as the insurgent leadership is based in Pakistan, and at those leaders’ direction violence continues
to spike, Islamabad’s repeated pledges that it is trying to convince the Taliban to scale back attacks are unlikely to find
believers in Kabul or Washington.

If the peace talks continue to stall or even fail, and deadly conflict engulfs Pakistan’s neighbour, a former senior
diplomat warned, “Pakistan would be caught between a rock and a hard place. To be proactive would embroil it in
Afghanistan’s conflict. Yet it could not afford to sit on the sidelines as it faces growing instability on its western borders”.
Should the Taliban refuse to cease violence and also continue to maintain their close ties with al-Qaeda, Pakistan could
also face heightened U.S. pressure to end all support, including sanctuary, for the Taliban leadership.

There are growing concerns in Pakistani policymaking circles about the implications of Afghanistan’s worsening conflict
for Pakistan’s domestic security and for its relations with the U.S.
There are growing concerns in Pakistani policymaking circles about the implications of Afghanistan’s worsening conflict
for Pakistan’s domestic security and for its relations with the U.S. In early June, expressing concern about rising violence
in Afghanistan as foreign forces withdraw, Prime Minister Khan, warning that “the Taliban feel they have won the war”,
added: “We are trying our level best [to achieve] some sort of political settlement before the Americans leave”. The
same week, his national security adviser, cautioning that the “hasty” U.S. withdrawal “was not a good idea”, called on all
Afghan stakeholders “to work towards a political settlement”.

Such worries have yet to translate into a tangible policy shift toward either the Taliban leadership or Kabul. Yet, as a
former Pakistani ambassador noted, should Pakistan’s “declared policy” of seeking “a peaceful Afghanistan” and
supporting an “Afghan-led, Afghan-owned peace process” continue to collide “with its operational policy that has long
tolerated use of its space by the Taliban leadership”, Islamabad might have to reconsider. The ex-ambassador went on:
“Pakistan might think it would be a good policy to stay away from the Afghan conflict, but the Afghan conflict will not
stay away from Pakistan”.

A former foreign secretary has proposed a radically different course, essentially a decoupling:

For Pakistan, beset with its own problem of religious extremism and knowing that the world will seek a scapegoat for
Afghanistan’s civil war, the best course would be to ask the Taliban to leave Pakistan and conduct their negotiations with
other Afghan parties from their strongholds in Afghanistan. Meanwhile, Pakistan must complete the fencing of its
border with Afghanistan and insulate itself to the extent possible from Afghanistan even while keeping trade routes
open and providing whatever assistance it can to the peace process.

Pakistan is, however, unlikely to oust the Taliban shura. A retired senior army officer said: “The military will want to keep
its links and hence its influence with the Taliban intact”. An expert on the relationship concurred: “Pakistan wants to
keep the shura here. It can then, when it so chooses, exercise influence over Taliban decision-making”. Although such
influence has limits, Pakistan can, for example, impose restrictions on the movement of Taliban leaders within or outside
the country, cut off their communications with field commanders, and even detain leaders and their families, as it has
done in the past. Pakistan can also clamp down on the Taliban’s extensive business interests in the country, including in
Quetta, Peshawar and Karachi, close their bank accounts and take over their properties.

Pakistan’s policymakers should act now or else it might be too late. They should pressure the Taliban leadership to
reduce violence and work with other Afghan stakeholders in reaching a political settlement. As an early step, they
should push the Taliban to publish a detailed political vision subject to both scrutiny and the push-and-pull of
negotiations. In tandem, they should make an equally earnest effort to pressure and persuade the Afghan Taliban to
sever their ties with anti-Pakistan militants. Progress in the peace talks would also improve relations with Kabul, in turn
addressing another Pakistani concern, that about India’s role as a spoiler of Pakistan’s interests in Afghanistan. At the
same time, other governments in the region should also pressure the Taliban, for example through travel restrictions,
until they demonstrate willingness to participate meaningfully in the Doha peace process.

VI.
Conclusion
Up to now, Pakistan has managed to cajole the Taliban to occasionally join talks and to demonstrate interest in a peace
process without turning the screws on the leadership and risking a breach in the relationship. In light of the U.S. and
NATO withdrawal, the time may be fast approaching when push comes to shove and Pakistan no longer can balance
pursuing its preference for a negotiated settlement with its preference for a moderated approach to pressuring the
Taliban. Overcoming decades of suspicion and ill will in Kabul will also require Pakistan to stop treating Afghanistan as a
Pakistani protectorate and abandon “an approach that has for far too long focused on cultivating Afghan proxies”. If the
Afghan conflict continues, Pakistan, sitting right next door, stands to lose more than any country but Afghanistan itself.
https://www.crisisgroup.org/asia/south-asia/pakistan/b169-pakistan-shoring-afghanistans-peace-process
Describe The Effects Of Climate Change In
Pakistan And Suggest Immediate Measures To
Mitigate its Effects.
Dealing with climate change news can be exhausting, especially when each subsequent news story seems to
be worse than the last.

We may choose to block out the apocalyptic news but let’s not forget that scientists have given us a tight
deadline of around 11 years to quite literally save the planet, and ourselves.

Pakistan has been continuously ranked among the most affected countries by climate change. Our people in
different parts of the country are already getting adversely affected by climate impacts, which include flash
floods due to glacial melt, increased heatwaves, water scarcity, rising sea levels, food shortages and
displacement. The worst part is that these impacts are only going to get worse.

In such a scenario, we may want to help but may not know where to start. Here, I suggest some tips for the
government as well as for individuals, based on my travels across Pakistan in search of climate stories.

What the government should do

Undertake urgent reforestation and afforestation programmes on mountain slopes. Northern areas have
suffered severe deforestation due to a lack of access to electricity and natural gas. The Billion-tree Tsunami
campaign is a good start but needs to be scaled up in the long-term. The communities and the general public
also need to be engaged in mass plantation drives across the country.

Build dams in Thar to store rainwater. Let me also stress here how important local consultation is. During our
travels, we came across a dam in Nagarparkar being used as a cricket pitch because the government did not
consult people and disregarded their knowledge of where to best build it. Sometimes, the solution is as simple
as asking the people. They live there and have a pretty good idea of what solutions would work in their
context.

Devise and implement a waste management strategy for mountainous areas. Since mountain communities
have nowhere to dispose of their waste, they end up either throwing it in the rivers, burning the waste in open
air (which contributes to black carbon deposition on glaciers and accelerates their melting) or burying it
underground (which resurfaces in the event of a natural disaster and adds to existing risks). Proper waste
disposal systems and awareness (especially for tourists) can help mitigate greenhouse gas emissions, air
pollution and disaster risk.
Ban diesel vehicles in the mountains. An increasing number of tourists visiting the scenic mountains in the
north opt for using diesel (the most inefficient fuel) in their four-wheelers. The particulate matter emitted by
the incomplete burning of fuels at such high altitudes directly contributes to the rapid melting of glaciers,
thereby accelerating climate change and worsening the health of people.

Switch to renewable energy sources. We have massive potential for solar energy in Thar and hydropower in
the north which can provide clean, cost-effective and uninterrupted energy.

Acknowledge that Pakistan faces diverse climate challenges in different geographical and cultural contexts. For
example, the climate impacts in Chitral will be vastly different from the impacts faced by Sindh. Therefore,
there is a need to ideate solutions keeping in mind the context and diversity.

Deploy a proactive approach rather than a reactionary one. We usually react to a disaster once it has
happened, instead of preparing ourselves beforehand. The proactive approach of preparedness and
foresightedness will save much time, money and lives.

Make climate change a priority in the development and political agenda. Climate change will influence every
area of human and economic development and needs to be taken into account at every level.

These efforts are urgently required, but it is also important to recognise that the onus for change is not
completely on the government. We, as aware citizens, need to demand action on these issues and work
closely with governmental and non-governmental institutions to ensure that these measures get
implemented. It is time to shun passivity and take an active part in climate advocacy.

What can you do?

We, each in our own capacity and community, have the power to take climate action. Here are some starting
ideas:

Just talk about climate change. We don’t change what we never discuss. You can form local climate discussion
groups to start the conversation, reach out, help and support vulnerable people and take collective action.

We need activism, not pessimism. It takes courage to focus on a positive and action-oriented approach. Go
work for or volunteer with a local organisation working on climate change issues.

Please reconsider piling your plates with excess food the next time you’re at a wedding or party. Currently,
40% of the food in Pakistan goes to waste while 43% of our population is considered food insecure. What most
people don’t realise is that food waste is also a big contributor to climate change. Methane (a powerful
greenhouse gas) is emitted from rotting food in landfills. You can also help by donating excess food to a charity
or initiatives like the Robinhood Army and ‘Rizq that help redistribute it to the needy.

Reiterating a cliché here but it’s important: save energy. In a country like ours, where electricity supply is
intermittent and already a luxury, we must be extra mindful and turn off lights and appliances when not in
use. This can be as simple as unplugging your charger when your phone/laptop is fully charged. Plugged
devices still consume phantom power and add to your bill and the greenhouse gas emissions.
Write about and share your ideas and work. Every climate story (whether of suffering or success) matters. It
gives other people permission to share theirs.

The list of recommendations shared here is in no way complete; it only serves as a reminder that climate
action can be initiated at different scales. Taking action can also help with eco-anxiety (a new type of
psychological condition where you feel extremely worried about the worsening state of our planet and
climate).

Feeling anxious about the environmental crisis may not be a bad thing in small doses, if it motivates you to
avoid the catastrophic future. Remember that a series of small steps implemented by many leads to a large
impact and change. At this point, we need everyone doing their part to deal with a problem as complex and
imminent as climate change.
https://www.dawn.com/news/1511555

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