Cognition & Emotion

ISSN: 0269-9931 (Print) 1464-0600 (Online) Journal homepage: www.tandfonline.com/journals/pcem20

What Are Emotions, Really?

James R. Averill

To cite this article: James R. Averill (1998) What Are Emotions, Really?, Cognition & Emotion,
12:6, 849-855, DOI: 10.1080/026999398379466
To link to this article: https://doi.org/10.1080/026999398379466

Published online: 31 Aug 2010.

Submit your article to this journal

Article views: 830

View related articles

Citing articles: 1 View citing articles

Full Terms & Conditions of access and use can be found at

https://www.tandfonline.com/action/journalInformation?journalCode=pcem20
 CO G N IT IO N AN D EMO TION, 1998, 12 (6), 849± 855

W hat Are Emotions, Really?

A review of Parkinson, B. (1995). Ideas and realities of emotion.
London: Routledge. ISBN 0± 415± 02859± 0 $19.95 (pbk)

James R. Averill
University of M assachusetts, Amherst, USA

The title of Parkinson’s book, Ideas an d realities of em otion, accurately

re¯ ects the problem set by the au thor. Everyday language is replete with
ideas ab out em otions. Som e of these ideas presum ably re¯ ect an indepen-
dently existing reality whereas others are highly fanciful. We like to think
that our scienti® c ideas ab out em otions are of the form er (realistic) type.
But are they? W hat are the realities of emotion, anyway? And wh at is the
relation between our ideas of em otion and the realities of em otion?
A nswers to these questions, Parkinson rightfully notes, are complicated
by the fact that our ideas about em otions can help construct their ow n
reality. Fo r exam ple, what I do and feel when an gry depends in part on
what I conceive anger to be. But not all ideas are equally in¯ uential in this
respect. N o one has ever literally turned green with envy, and whatever
m akes the world go ’round, it is not love. Still, even some of our most
fanciful ideas canÐ like strongly held superstitionsÐ in¯ uence the way we
perceive an d respond to events. In the realm of emotion, it is not easy to
distinguish myth from reality.
Parkinson divides his book into two parts. In Part I, he critically reviews
theory and research that focus on em otions as individual phenom ena; in
particular, he challenges the widely held notion that em otions are inner, private
events. In addition to a general overview (Chapter 1), separate chapters are
devoted to appraisal (Chapter 2), action tendencies (Chapter 3), physiological
arousal (Chapter 4), and expressive behaviour (Chapter 5). These features are
then integrated into a ``four-factor theory’’ of emotion (Chapter 6).
In Part II, Parkinson places em otions in broad er social contexts. Em o-
tional reality, he argues, is fundam entally interpersonal in nature (C hapter

Requests for reprints should be sent to Professo r James R. Averill, Department of Psychol-
ogy, Tobin H all, University of M assachu setts at Amherst, Box 37710, Am herst , MA 010 03±
77 10, USA .

q 1998 Psychology Press Ltd

850 AVERILL

7). This leads to an exam ination of the role of em otion in institutional life,
with an em phasis on the workplace (Chapter 8). W ith the interpersonal
nature of em otion thus explicated, Parkinson refocuses on the issue of how
emotional representations (ideas) ® t w ith the rest of em otional reality
(C hapter 9). Finally, he explores the implications for both theory and
research of treating the em otions as dyn am ic interpersonal episodes rather
than as momentary personal reactions (C hapter 10 ).
Em otion theorists have often been likened to the six blind m en of
Indostan, each of whom felt part of an elephant an d m istook that part
for the wh ole. Parkinson is no blind m an Ð he exam ines emotions from a
variety of perspectives, both philosophical and empirical, and his an alysis
is revealing. Parkinson acknowledges that his book is ``a partisan one’’ .
Increasingly, however, I believe that disagreem ents am ong theorists are
becom ing less partisan and more a matter of em phasis than of substance.
Be that as it may, wh at does the em otional elephan t look like, according to
Parkinson? The following propositions (each accompanied by a represen-
tative quotation from Parkinson’s book) trace its outline:

1. E motions do not constitute a uni® ed category but, rather, a ``fuzzy

set’’ with indistinct boundaries; hence, no set of propositions (including
those wh ich follow ) applies equally to all emotions.

There m ay not be a single type of emotion episode with a common deep

structure, but rather a range of real-life real-time phenom ena, which share
only family resemblances with each other. (p. 165)

2. E motions are multicom ponential, with no one com ponent or type of

response being a necessary or suf® cient condition for the whole.

From the present perspective, emotion can be seen as a syndrome of partly

integrated and partly independent components. Different components may
have different roles and priorities at different stages in the real-time devel-
opment of the syndrome. (p. 163)

3. E motions are a form of communication; their prim ary function is to

inform others (and sometimes ourselves) that a change in the situation is
necessary.

All that emotion is, in many circumstances, is a particular form of com-

munication . . . the true nature of emotion is in m any cases a form of
communication. (p. 170)

4. E motions are constructed ``on-line’’ as an episode progresses; they do

not exist preform ed (e.g. as cognitive schem as or neurological circuits), just
waiting to be activated by som e stim ulating event.
 WHAT ARE EMOTIONS REALLY? 851
In my view, the performance of getting emotional is often shaped dynamically
by the unfolding structure of the interpersonal situation rather than run off in
accordance with a prespeci® ed internal script. (p. 225)

5. Em otions are interpersonal, not private (intrapsychic) events.

Instead of looking inside the psyche for emotional processes, it seems worth
attempting to construct at least a preliminary account solely by reference to
what is going on in the public social world, and what we understand about
this world as competent users of conversational tactics. (p. 289)

6. Em otions are ineluctably infused with the beliefs, values, an d norm s

of society.

[C]ulture is everywhere yet typically outside or beyond focal awareness: we

are caught inside but scarcely aware of the fact, much as ® sh are said to be
insensitive to the concept of water . . . Thus, we become tem pted to mistake
the culturally manufactured for the biologically natural. (p. 222)

In this brief review, I will focus prim arily on those aspects of Parkinson’s
analysis that center around the conception of em otion as a form of
communication.

EMOTION AS COMMUNICATION
Every good thesis deserves an anti-thesis. The antithesis of ``em otion-as-
communication’’ is ``em otion-as-expression’’ . A ccording to the latter, em o-
tional behaviour is the outward m an ifestation of some inner stateÐ the
emotion proper. O ne problem with this particular antithesis is that no one
holds it, at least not in pure form . Ekman is often cited as a proponent, but
he, too, claim s that emotions are a mean s of com munication, a view which
he attributes even to D arwin (e.g. Ekm an , 1997 ). If emotion-as-expression
theorists also m aintain that emotions are (at least in part) a form of
communication, with what can we contrast Parkinson’s em otion-as-com -
munication point of view ? An answer must be found within the dom ain of
communication itself.
B ees comm unicate by dan ce the location of ¯ owers; birds com municate
by song a readiness to m ate; and dogs com municate by bared teeth an
aggressive intent. H um ans can com municate in sim ilar way s, for exam ple,
by bodily movem ents, tone of voice, an d facial expression. But humans can
also com municate by langu age. Is emotional comm unication more like that
of infrahum an anim als or is it m ore like hum an language? H ere, a clear
divergence of opinion em erges. Em otion-as-expression theorists, when they
speak of com munication, typically have the an im al model in m ind. By
contrast, when Parkinson speaks of em otions as com munications, he has
852 AVERILL

som ething closer to hum an langu age in m ind. For example, he states that
his general view with respect to nonverbal behaviour ``is analogous to
Vygotsky’s (1986, p. 118) about verbal expression of thoughts’’ . Parkinson
then qutoes Vygotsky to the effect that ``Experience teaches us that thought
does not express itself in words, but rather realises itself in them ’’ . A nalo-
go usly, em otions are not sim ply expressed, but are realised in both verbal
an d nonverbal ways.
How, then, do we account for the fact that em otions are often experi-
enced in the privacy of our ow n m inds, only to be expressed, if at all, in
disguised or truncated form ? Here, too, the analogy with langu age is
informative. O n any given day, we talk to ourseves more than we talk to
other people, an d m any of the things we say to ourselves we would never
say in public. H owever, before we can talk to ourselves, we must learn to
talk to others; private discourse is derivative of, and ultim ately dependent
on, public discourse. A nd so it is with the em otions, according to Parkin-
son. Exp eriencing an em otion in the privacy of our own m inds is a lean ed
skill, like talking or reading to oneself.
Another an alogy between emotion an d language is that an em otional
episode develops over tim e, as does a conversation. M oreover, what is said
or done during an em otional episode varies as a function of the intended
m essage, the au dience, an d the setting. T his theme, to wh ich Parkinson
returns repeatedly throughout the book, has important im plications for
research. Am ong other things, any investigation that neglects the target or
intended au dience of the emotion is necessarily partial an d potentially
m isleading.
W hen we look closely at the development of an emotional episode over
tim e, another im plication for research emerges. The analysis of em otional
episodes presents a form idable task. Parkinson cites Birdwhistle’s (1970 )
claim that it takes one hour to analyse fully one second of interactive
behaviour between two infants, an d Peery’s (1978) assertion that the true
nature of m any emotional episodes is only evident after a by frame-by-
fram e an alysis of a videotape. Few investigators have the tim e, energy, or
patience for such efforts. But perhaps the task m ay not be as form idable as
these exam ples suggest. W hat is needed is not so much an ``affective
m icroscope’’ (Peery’s term ) focused on m odes of expression, but an ``affec-
tive rhetoric’’ of the type exempli® ed by Aristotle (1941). (Im agine what
wo uld happen if, when an alysing a speech it wa s though t necessary to
scrutinise, second by second, every change in intonation, every phonem e,
every choice of word. D epartments of Com munication and Rhetoric would
soon be devoid of students an d faculty.)
In any case, rather than automatic and highly sterotyped behaviour,
emotional responses during an episode are ¯ exible and often creative.
W hat remains consistent, if anything, is the message, not the m edium .
 WHAT ARE EMOTIONS REALLY? 853
Once again, the an alogy with language helps clarify the issue. The sam e
m essage can be conveyed in very different wo rds, som etim es with triteness
and banality, but som etim es w ith grace and style. And so it is with the
emotions.
O f course, the analogy between emotions and language is just thatÐ an
analogy. A nd like any analogy, this one has its lim itations. The real ques-
tion is not, In wh at ways are em otions like language? but, rather, In what
ways are emotions and langu age interrelated? Too often, Parkinson notes,
psychologists have taken the prim ary function of emotional language to be
descriptive. D escription, however, is only one, and seldom the most impor-
tant function of em otional language. M ore com m only, what a person says
when em otional is a m an ifestation of the em otion itself, not a comm entary
on it.
E motional language m ay be used to cajole, praise, blam e, cast asper-
sions, excuse, seek help, and so forth. In such instances, it is no more
m eaningful to ask, Is the assertion true? than it is to ask of a cry of pain,
Is it true? The sincerity of an avowal, Parkinson observes, is not the sam e as
the accuracy of a report. This does not mean that langu age is simply
another form of em otional expression. T he words we use to express our
emotions also em body our ideas about emotions. Thus, language has a
special power to construct and reconstruct an emotional episode as it
unfolds.
If it is granted that em otions are a form of com munication, what do they
communicate? That depends, of course, on the em otion: Anger conveys a
different m essage than does love or sadness. B ut in general, em otions
convey appraisals; that is, they indicate how a situation is being evalu-
atedÐ and what m ight be done ab out it, if anything. Even m ore generally,
Parkinson argues that em otions are a way of asserting one’s identity or
position within a relationship. ``T hus, it seem s that emotion does not
sim ply re¯ ect an evaluation of the situation but the com municative pur-
poses of an interpersonally de® ned position in a dialogue’’ (p. 276).
T he shift of emphasis from appraisal to the act of com municating m ight
at ® rst seem m inor, but it has important theoretical consequences. A mong
other things, the need to com municate, not cognitive appraisals, is now
seen as central to the cau sation of em otion. To illustrate, love com muni-
cates the desire for a certain kind of relationship; the appraised desirab ility
(idealisation) of the loved one is a m an ifestation, not a cause of the love. To
take an other exam ple, an ger com municates blam e and a desire for retribu-
tion. O f course, an an gry outburst will be m ore effective in achieving
compliance if the blam e is justi® ed (or at least if the an gry person is
convinced that it is justi® edÐ an d can convince the target), but such
justi® cation is not as necessary to the anger as is the need to com municate.
854 AVERILL

This raises the question: W hat differentiates em otional from nonem o-

tional com munications? The traditional answer to this question, Parkinson
notes, is that something is added to everyd ay experience to give it an
emotional quale or feeling tone. That extra something m ight be feedback
from physiological arousal or facial expression, or it m ight be centrally
m ediated affect signals. Parkinson does not deny the potential contribution
of such mechan isms to the experience of em otion, but he disputes the
theoretical im portance traditionally afforded them . A com m on feature of
all such suggestions, he argues, is that they m ake em otions highly personal
or private affairsÐ a position which he rejects. Em otions are, rather, m odes
of interpersonal communication with rules of their own.
Parkinson does not attempt to specify what the rules of various em otions
m ight be. A lm ost the opposite: ``emotion occurs in those places and at
those tim es where the local or general m oral or rational order break s down
or sim ply loses relevance an d events becom e unaccountable in terms of
what is taken for gran ted’’ (p. 292). That m ay be true as far as it goes. No
social order can be relevant to all contingencies: W hen a situation calls for
action but inform ation is incomplete or dem ands competing, em otions
m ay provide transitional m odes of coping (Oatley, 1992). A s transitional
roles, the em otions them selves (at least those standardised emotions that
are recognized in ordinary langu age as anger, love, fear, grief, etc.) can best
be viewed as part of the m oral or rational order, not simply as signs of its
breakdown, as the earlier quotation might imply.

FINAL OBSERVATIONS
Parkinson considers his thesis to be ``a relatively radical one’’ , and in many
respects it is. D rawing on conversational and dram aturgical metaphors, he
wishes to change the way we think an d talk ab out emotions. It is a tribute
to Parkinson that by the end of the book his way of talking seem s m ore
reasonable than radical. I have tried to convey som e of that reasonableness,
but as with any good book, the bread th an d depth of Parkinson’s an alysis
de® es brief summ ary.
Parkinson provides a wide ranging and judicious review of the psycho-
logical literature on emotion. I found his an alyses of appraisal, expressive
behaviour, and emotional representations (ideas) particularly insightful. It
should be noted, however, that Parkinson does not try to cover all aspects
of em otion. H e intentionally omits any detailed discussion of biological
factors, on the one hand, an d of cultural in¯ uences, on the other, although
he clearly recognises the im portance of both. Returning to the m etaphor
used in the introduction to this review, Parkinson is not concerned with the
origins of the emotional elephantÐ its biological or social evolutionÐ but
with its appearance in interpersonal relationships.
 WHAT ARE EMOTIONS REALLY? 855
N or is Parkinson concerned with the inner wo rkings of the elephant,
whether physiological or cognitive. Indeed, he anticipates that a major
criticism will be his neglect of cogn itive processes. In defence of this
om ission, he notes that current m odels of inform ation processing are not
well suited to the im provisational an d interpersonal nature of emotional
episodes. W hether one agrees with that assertion or not, Parkinson is
content to leave it to others to explore the internal m echan ism s that help
m ediate emotion. Som e division of labour is necessary.
E ven with the earlier cited om issions, Parkinson’s analysis is wide-ran-
ging an d com plex. The exposition is well organised, however, with frequent
preview s and summ aries. H ence, his arguments are seldom dif® cult to
follow. Ideas and realities of emotion wo uld make an excellent textbook
for a course on the social psychology of emotion. But it is much m ore than
a textbook. Even the m ost knowledgeable researcher will be inform ed an d
challenged by what Parkinson has to say.

M anuscrip t received 31 M arch 1998

REFERENCES
Aristot le (1941). Rhetoric . In R. M cKeon (E d.), The basic works of Aristotle. New York:
Rando m House.
Birdwhist le, R.L. (1970). Kinesics and context. Phildelphia, PA: Univers ity of Pennsyl vania
Press.
Ekman , P. (1997). Should we call it expressi on or com municat ion? Innovation: European
Journal of Social Sciences, 10, 333± 344.
Oatley, K. (1992). Best laid schemes: The psychology of emotion. Cam bridge, UK : Cam bridg e
University Press.
Peery, J.C. (1978). M agni® cation of affect usin g fram e-by-fram e ® lm analysis. Environmental
Psychology and Nonverbal Behavior, 3, 58± 61.
Vygotsky, L.S. (1986). Thought and language. Cambridge, M A: M IT Press.