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Transmission
System Phase
Backup Protection
Technical Reference Document

June 2024
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RELIABILITY | RESILIENCE | SECURITY

NERC | Report Title | Report Date

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19 Table of Contents
20 Preface ........................................................................................................................................................................... iv
21 Statement of Purpose ..................................................................................................................................................... v
22 Chapter 1: Introduction and Need to Discuss Backup Protection .................................................................................. 1
23 Chapter 2: Background on NERC SPCWG Activities Related to Backup Protection ........................................................ 2
24 Chapter 3: Terminology Used in This Document ............................................................................................................ 3
25 Chapter 4: Advantages and Disadvantages of Local and Remote Backup Protection .................................................... 5
26 Advantages of Local Backup Protection Systems ........................................................................................................ 5
27 Disadvantage of Local Backup Protection Systems ..................................................................................................... 5
28 Advantages of Remote Backup Protection Systems .................................................................................................... 5
29 Disadvantages of Remote Backup Protection Systems ............................................................................................... 5
30 Chapter 5: System Performance Requirements ............................................................................................................. 7
31 Function of Local Backup ............................................................................................................................................. 7
32 Function of Remote Backup: ....................................................................................................................................... 7
33 Chapter 6: Post-2003 Events Involving Backup Protection ............................................................................................. 9
34 2008 Florida Event ....................................................................................................................................................... 9
35 Description of the 2008 Florida Event...................................................................................................................... 9
36 Backup Protection and the Florida Event: ............................................................................................................... 9
37 2004 West Wing Substation Event .............................................................................................................................. 9
38 Description of the 2004 West Wing Substation Event: ........................................................................................... 9
39 Backup Protection and the West Wing Event: ......................................................................................................... 9
40 2007 Broad River Event ............................................................................................................................................... 9
41 Description of the 2007 Broad River Event:............................................................................................................. 9
42 Backup Protection and the Broad River Event:...................................................................................................... 10
43 2006 Upper New York State Event ............................................................................................................................ 10
44 Description of the 2006 Upper New York State Event: ......................................................................................... 10
45 Backup Protection and the Upper New York State Event: .................................................................................... 10
46 Chapter 7: Examples ..................................................................................................................................................... 11
47 Remote Backup Protection on Transmission Lines .................................................................................................... 11
48 Example 1............................................................................................................................................................... 11
49 Example 1A ............................................................................................................................................................ 12
50 Example 2............................................................................................................................................................... 13
51 Example 3............................................................................................................................................................... 14
52 Backup Protection on Autotransformers .................................................................................................................. 16

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 Table of Contents

53 Relay Settings Based on a Simple System .............................................................................................................. 18

54 Example 4: Phase Time Overcurrent Relay Setting................................................................................................ 18
55 Example 5: Torque Controlled Phase Time Overcurrent Settings ......................................................................... 19
56 Example 6: Phase Distance and Instantaneous Phase Overcurrent with Fixed Timers Settings ........................... 20
57 Table 7.2: Simple System Setting and Time to Trip Summary ............................................................................... 22
58 More Complex Systems ............................................................................................................................................. 22
59 Chapter 8: Conclusions.................................................................................................................................................. 24
60 Chapter 9: Recommendation ........................................................................................................................................ 25
61 Appendix A: Contributors.............................................................................................................................................. 26
62 Revision History............................................................................................................................................................. 28
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66 Preface
67
68 Electricity is a key component of the fabric of modern society and the Electric Reliability Organization (ERO) Enterprise
69 serves to strengthen that fabric. The vision for the ERO Enterprise, which is comprised of NERC and the six Regional
70 Entities, is a highly reliable, resilient, and secure North American bulk power system (BPS). Our mission is to assure
71 the effective and efficient reduction of risks to the reliability and security of the grid.
72
73 Reliability | Resilience | Security
74 Because nearly 400 million citizens in North America are counting on us
75
76 The North American BPS is made up of six Regional Entities as shown on the map and in the corresponding table
77 below. The multicolored area denotes overlap as some load-serving entities participate in one Regional Entity while
78 associated Transmission Owners/Operators participate in another.

79
80
MRO Midwest Reliability Organization
NPCC Northeast Power Coordinating Council
RF ReliabilityFirst
SERC SERC Reliability Corporation
Texas RE Texas Reliability Entity
WECC WECC
81

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 82 Statement of Purpose
83
84 The NERC Reliability and Security Technical Committee (RSTC), through its subcommittees and working groups,
85 develops and triennially reviews reliability guidelines in accordance with the procedures set forth in the RSTC Charter.
86 Reliability guidelines include the collective experience, expertise, and judgment of the industry on matters that
87 impact BPS operations, planning, and security. Reliability guidelines provide key practices, guidance, and information
88 on specific issues critical to promote and maintain a highly reliable and secure BPS.
89
90 Each entity registered in the NERC compliance registry is responsible and accountable for maintaining reliability and
91 compliance with applicable mandatory Reliability Standards. Reliability guidelines are not binding norms or
92 parameters nor are they Reliability Standards; however, NERC encourages entities to review, validate, adjust, and/or
93 develop a program with the practices set forth in this guideline. Entities should review this guideline in detail and in
94 conjunction with evaluations of their internal processes and procedures; these reviews could highlight that
95 appropriate changes are needed, and these changes should be done with consideration of system design,
96 configuration, and business practices.
97
98 This document was originally approved by the NERC Planning Committee in June 2011. This document was originally
99 published as a Reliability Guideline. It has been reclassified as a technical reference document and placed into the
100 current NERC report format as it still contains useful information.
101
102

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103 Chapter 1: Introduction and Need to Discuss Backup Protection
104
105 Backup protection can, and in many cases does, play a significant role in providing adequate system performance or
106 aiding in containing the spread of disturbances due to faults accompanied by Protection System failures or failures of
107 circuit breakers to interrupt current. However, NERC protection standards affect and may limit the use of backup
108 protection to ensure that backup protection does not play a role in increasing the extent of outages during system
109 disturbances. A number of significant system disturbance reports since the 2003 Northeast Blackout have
110 recommended evaluating specific applications of adding backup and/or redundant protection to enhance system
111 performance or contain the extent of a disturbance. The most significant of these is the Florida Reliability
112 Coordinating Council (FRCC) report from the February 26, 2008 system disturbance titled “FRCC System Disturbance
113 and Underfrequency Load Shedding Event Report February 26th, 2008 at 1:09 pm”. This report states that “NERC
114 should assign the System Protection and Control Task Force to produce a technical paper describing the issue and
115 application of backup protection for autotransformers”. As a result, the NERC Planning Committee (PC) has assigned
116 the NERC System Protection and Control Subcommittee (SPCS) the task of developing a document on backup
117 protection applications.
118
119 The goal of this reliability guideline1 is to discuss the pros, cons, and limitations of backup protection, and include
120 recommendations, where deemed appropriate, for a balanced approach to the use of backup relaying as a means to
121 ensure adequate system performance and/or to provide a system safety net to limit the spread of a system
122 disturbance for events that exceed design criteria, such as those involving multiple protection system or equipment
123 failures. The document provides a discussion of fundamental concepts related to phase backup protection for the
124 most common equipment on the power system: transmission lines and autotransformers. The document is not
125 intended to provide a comprehensive discussion of all methods used for providing backup protection.
126
127
128

1Reliability Guidelines are documents that suggest approaches or behavior in a given technical area for the purpose of improving reliability.
Reliability guidelines are not standards, binding norms, or mandatory requirements. Reliability guidelines may be adopted by a responsible
entity in accordance with its own facts and circumstances.

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129 Chapter 2: Background on NERC SPCWG Activities Related to
130 Backup Protection
131
132 The use of backup protection and the implications of its use on the power system is a subject that has been discussed
133 many times by the NERC SPCS since its formation as a NERC Task Force2 after the 2003 Northeast Blackout.
134 Overreaching or backup phase distance relays providing primary and/or backup functions played a role in the
135 cascading portion of the 2003 Northeast Blackout and have played similar roles in other previous and subsequent
136 blackouts.
137
138 The SPCS has done much work with respect to backup protection or issues that affect the use of backup protection.
139 One of the first SPCTF reports was on the “Rationale for the Use of Local and Remote (Zone 3) Protective Relaying
140 Backup Systems.”3 This paper discussed the pros and cons of the use of Zone 3 type backup protection in a general
141 sense. The Protection System Reliability Standard developed as a result of the 2003 Northeast Blackout, PRC-023-1
142 “Transmission Relay Loadability,” codified requirements for loadability of phase responsive transmission relays which
143 in some cases significantly limited the ability of some relays to provide backup protection. This led to other SPCTF
144 papers illustrating ways to use legacy and modern protective relays to increase relay loadability while meeting
145 protection requirements.
146
147 The SPCTF reference paper “Protection System Reliability”4 was created to accompany the Standard Authorization
148 Request (SAR) for a new standard to set the acceptable level of redundancy required in Protection System designs to
149 meet system performance requirements. A new standard is currently being considered under a SAR submitted by the
150 SPCS. The Protection System Reliability paper discusses the potential use of local and remote backup Protection
151 Systems to provide redundancy, but purposely does not go into detail regarding all the complexities involved in the
152 use of remote backup protection.
153
154 The “Power Plant and Transmission System Protection Coordination”5 Technical Reference Document describes a
155 number of backup protection elements that may be applied on generators and how to ensure adequate coordination
156 and loadability of these elements. These SPCS efforts, other SPCS efforts, and experiences from other events since
157 the 2003 Northeast Blackout point to a need to address the technical details behind the pros and cons of applying
158 backup protection in greater detail in this technical paper.
159
160
161

2 The System Protection and Control Task Force (SPCTF), formed in 2004, was the predecessor to the System Protection and Control
Subcommittee (SPCS). Since then, the SPCS was recategorized as a working group and renamed the SPCWG
3 Rationale for the Use of Local and Remote (Zone 3) Protective Relaying Backup Systems – A Report on the Implications and Uses of Zone 3

Relays, February 2, 2005.

4 Protection System Reliability – Redundancy of Protection System Elements, December 4, 2008.
5 Power Plant and Transmission System Protection Coordination – Revision 1, July 30, 2010.

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162 Chapter 3: Terminology Used in This Document
163
164 Redundancy
165 In the context of this paper, redundancy is the existence of separate Protection System components, as discussed in
166 the NERC SPCS Technical Reference Document “Protection System Reliability,” installed specifically for the purpose
167 of meeting the NERC system performance requirements during a single Protection System failure.
168
169 It is not the goal of this paper to specify detailed methods to design redundancy into a Protection System. Other
170 papers, including the NERC document cited above and the IEEE Power System Relaying Committee (PSRC) Working
171 Group I19 document “Redundancy Considerations for Protective Relay Systems,”6 provide detailed discussion of
172 methods to design redundancy into a Protection System.
173
174 Backup Protection
175 In the context of this paper, backup protection consists of any Protection System elements that clear a fault when
176 the fault is accompanied by a failure of a Protection System component or a failure of a breaker to interrupt current.
177 Backup protection may operate because it is intentionally set to meet specific performance requirements, or it may
178 operate for conditions when multiple contingencies have occurred that bring the event into the backup zone of
179 protection. Backup protection may be provided locally, remotely, or both locally and remotely.
180
181 Local Backup
182 The local backup method provides backup protection by adding redundant Protection Systems locally at a substation
183 such that any Protection System component failure is backed up by another device at the substation. For local backup
184 to provide redundancy, the local backup Protection System must sense every fault and consist of separate Protection
185 System components, as discussed in the NERC SPCS Technical Reference Document “Protection System Reliability.”
186 To back up the failure of a circuit breaker to interrupt current, breaker failure circuitry is commonly used to initiate a
187 trip signal to all circuit breakers that are adjacent to the failed breaker. On some bus arrangements, this may require
188 transfer tripping to one or more remote stations.
189
190 Remote Backup
191 The remote backup method provides backup by using the Protection Systems at a remote substation to initiate
192 clearing of faults on equipment terminated at the local substation. Figure 3.1 depicts use of the terms “local” and
193 “remote” in the context of this discussion.
194

195
196 Figure 3.1: Definition of Local and Remote Backup as Applied to Transmission Lines

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 Chapter 3: Terminology Used in This Document

197 Remote backup may be used to provide protection for single or multiple Protection System failures or failures of
198 circuit breakers to interrupt current at the local substation. When remote backup is used to provide backup
199 protection for a single Protection System failure or a failure of a circuit breaker to interrupt current, the relays at the
200 remote station are set sensitive enough that they can detect all faults that should be cleared from the adjacent (local)
201 substation for which backup protection is being provided. Remote backup may provide an additional benefit of
202 protecting for multiple Protection System failures, but the relays at the remote station may not be set sensitive
203 enough that they can detect all faults that should be cleared from the local substation.
204
205 When remote backup can be set to meet system performance requirements it can provide complete Protection
206 System redundancy since it shares no common components with the local relay system. The remote backup
207 protection is intentionally set with time delay to allow the local relaying enough time to isolate the faulted Elements
208 from the power system prior to the remote terminals operating. The remote backup protection covers the failure of
209 a Protection System and/or the failure of a circuit breaker to interrupt current.
210
211

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212 Chapter 4: Advantages and Disadvantages of Local and Remote
213 Backup Protection
214
215 Advantages of Local Backup Protection Systems
216
217 System disruption - For the failure of the local Protection System or the circuit breaker, local backup protection
218 usually isolates a smaller portion of the transmission grid as compared to remote backup protection.
219
220 Relay loadability – Local backup protection generally has no effect on relay loadability because it is set similarly to
221 the primary system. Local backup does not require as sensitive a setting as remote backup and therefore is less
222 susceptible to loadability concerns.
223
224 Tripping on Stable System Swings – Local backup protection is less susceptible to operation for stable power swings
225 for the same reasons it is less susceptible to loadability concerns.
226
227 Speed of operation – Generally, local backup Protection Systems can be set to operate more quickly than remote
228 backup Protection Systems.
229
230 Disadvantage of Local Backup Protection Systems
231
232 Multiple Local Protection System Failures – Providing redundant Protection Systems does not eliminate the
233 possibility of all common mode failures. A well designed fully redundant local Protection System can fall short when
234 multiple local Protection System failures occur.
235
236 Advantages of Remote Backup Protection Systems
237
238 Common Mode Failures – Use of remote backup systems, because of their physical separation, minimizes the
239 probability of delayed clearing or failure to clear a fault due to a common mode failure.
240
241 Multiple Protection System Failures – Remote backup can, in some cases, provide a safety net to limit the extent of
242 an outage due to multiple local Protection System failures. This is especially significant for low-probability scenarios
243 that exceed design criteria.
244
245 Reduced Reliance on Telecommunication – Remote backup protection generally does not rely on telecommunication
246 between substations.
247
248 Disadvantages of Remote Backup Protection Systems
249
250 Slow Clearing – Remote backup generally requires longer fault clearing times than local backup to allow the local
251 Protection System to operate first.
252
253 Wider-Area Outage for Single Failures – For a single Protection System failure, remote backup generally requires
254 that additional Elements be removed from the power system to clear the fault versus local backup. Depending on the
255 scenario, this can have the added impact of de-energizing the local substation and interrupting all tapped load on the
256 lines that are connected to the substation where the relay or breaker fails to operate.
257
258 Relay loadability – The desired setting of remote backup is more likely to conflict with the relay loadability
259 requirements than local backup.

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 Chapter 4: Advantages and Disadvantages of Local and Remote Backup Protection

260
261 Tripping on Stable System Swings – Remote backup is more susceptible to tripping during stable system swings
262 because this application typically requires relay settings with longer reach or greater sensitivity than local backup.
263
264 Difficult to Detect Remote Faults – It is more difficult and more complicated to set remote backup protection to
265 detect all faults in the protected zone for all possible system configurations prior to a fault.
266
267 Difficult to Study – It is generally more difficult to study power system and Protection System performance for a
268 remote backup actuation. This is because more power system Elements may trip. Tripping may be sequential and
269 reclosing may occur at different locations at different times. For example, tapped loads may be automatically
270 reconfigured and prolonged voltage dips that may occur due to the slow clearing may cause tripping due to control
271 system actuations at generating plants or loads. It is very difficult to predict the behavior of all control schemes that
272 may be affected by such a voltage dip, thus it is very difficult to exactly predict the outcome of a remote backup
273 clearing scenario.
274
275

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276 Chapter 5: System Performance Requirements
277
278 The Bulk Electric System must meet the performance requirements specified in the Transmission Planning (TPL)
279 standards when a single Protection System failure or a failure of a circuit breaker to interrupt current occurs. When
280 a single Protection System failure or failure of a circuit breaker to interrupt current prevents meeting the system
281 performance requirements specified in the TPL standards, either the Protection System or the power system design
282 must be modified.
283
284 When time delayed clearing of faults is sufficient to meet reliability performance requirements, owners have the
285 option to deploy either two local systems or one local system and a remote backup system to meet reliability levels.
286 In either case, the Protection Systems must operate and clear faults within the required clearance time to satisfy the
287 system performance requirements in the TPL standards.
288
289 Backup protection may also function as a safety net to provide protection for some conditions that are beyond the
290 system performance requirements specified in the TPL standards. When used as a safety net, backup protection may
291 be designed to protect against a specific multiple Protection System failure or failures of circuit breakers to interrupt
292 current. Backup protection may also be designed to limit the extent of disturbances due to unanticipated multiple
293 Protection System failures or failures of circuit breakers to interrupt current. When backup is applied as a safety net
294 it must meet the requirements of current NERC standards related to relay loadability, Protection System
295 coordination, and system performance requirements during a single Protection System failure or failure of a circuit
296 breaker to interrupt current. Future standards related to Protection System performance during stable system swings
297 may also affect the use of backup protection and provide further guidance on assessing relay response during stable
298 swings. When remote backup is applied as a safety net it may be appropriate to place a greater emphasis on security
299 over dependability.
300
301 Function of Local Backup
302 The main function of local backup is to address a single local Protection System failure or failure of a circuit breaker
303 to interrupt current. The redundancy provided by local backup inherently addresses single Protection System failures
304 while minimizing the impact to the system. Local backup may address some failures of multiple Protection Systems,
305 but generally will not address these failures to the extent of a remote backup scheme.
306
307 Breaker failure is a form of local backup that must be studied per NERC Planning Standards. The effects of a breaker
308 failure operation must be studied to determine that system performance requirements are met. It is common
309 throughout the industry to apply local breaker failure protection for transmission level circuit breakers.
310
311 Function of Remote Backup:
312 Remote backup can play a role in addressing single or multiple Protection System failures or failures of circuit breakers
313 to interrupt current.
314
315 For addressing a single Protection System failure or failure of a circuit breaker to interrupt current, local backup is
316 generally preferred to remote backup for many of the reasons stated above. However, certain configurations lend
317 themselves to the use of remote backup while minimizing the disadvantages of using remote backup. Examples are
318 discussed later in this document.
319
320 Multiple Protection System failures may not be anticipated or studied. The degree to which protection designs can
321 detect faults under the condition of multiple Protection System failures varies based on a company’s design practices,
322 system topology, and a number of other factors.
323

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324 Remote backup protection can provide a safety net minimizing the impact of unanticipated conditions caused by
325 multiple Protection System failures to a greater degree than that afforded by local backup protection only.
326
327 Multiple failures due to more common combinations of single Protection System failures and/or failures of circuit
328 breakers to interrupt current occurred in a number of the examples of post-2003 events discussed below.
329

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330 Chapter 6: Post-2003 Events Involving Backup Protection
331
332 2008 Florida Event
333 Description of the 2008 Florida Event
334 On February 26, 2008, a system disturbance occurred within the FRCC Region that was initiated by delayed clearing
335 of a three-phase fault on a 138 kV switch at a substation in Miami, Florida. According to the report “FRCC System
336 Disturbance and Underfrequency Load Shedding Event Report February 26th, 2008 at 1:09 pm” it resulted in the loss
337 of 22 transmission lines, approximately 4300 MW of generation and approximately 3650 MW of customer load. The
338 local primary protection and local backup breaker failure protection associated with a 138 kV switch had been
339 manually disabled during troubleshooting. The fault had to be isolated by remote clearing because the local relay
340 protection had been manually disabled.
341
342 Backup Protection and the Florida Event:
343 The report states “The 230 kV/138 kV autotransformers at Flagami do not utilize phase overcurrent or impedance
344 backup protection. Although there are no current industry requirements for this type of protection, the
345 autotransformers offer a position to install additional local relaying that could be used to isolate the 230 kV system
346 from faults on the 138 kV system.” Furthermore the investigation recommends “NERC should assign the System
347 Protection and Control Task Force to produce a technical paper describing the issue and application of backup
348 protection of autotransformers.” The lack of autotransformer backup protection that contributed to this event was
349 addressed by the installation of new protection equipment after this event.
350
351 2004 West Wing Substation Event
352 Description of the 2004 West Wing Substation Event:
353 Another significant event where fault clearing times and the extent of outages could have been improved by the use
354 of local backup or planned remote backup protection was the West Wing event on June 14th, 2004. In this event, a
355 230 kV line faulted to ground. The relay system for the faulted 230 kV line was designed with a single auxiliary tripping
356 relay. This relay was used for tripping of the 230 kV line breakers and breaker failure initiation. The single auxiliary
357 relay failed. Remote backup clearing with clearing times of 20 to 40 seconds was required to clear the fault. The
358 remote clearing required in this case resulted in the loss of ten 500 kV lines, six 230 kV lines, and over 4500 MW of
359 generation (including three nuclear units) per the initial WECC communication on the event. A couple of weeks after
360 the event, several of the single-phase 500/230 kV autotransformers involved in the event failed catastrophically.
361
362 Backup Protection and the West Wing Event:
363 The first recommendation from the Arizona Public Service (APS) report “June 14, 2004 230 kV Fault Event and
364 Restoration” was to add backup protection to the 500/230 kV autotransformers involved in the event. The report
365 states that had backup protection been installed on the 500/230 kV autotransformers that the fault would have been
366 cleared significantly faster and damage would have been prevented, and this remote backup “would have prevented
367 the disturbance from being cleared within the 500 kV system”.
368
369 Additionally, if the local protection scheme at West Wing included fully redundant systems with redundant auxiliary
370 tripping relays, this event could have been mitigated.
371
372 Both the lack of remote backup protection and the lack of redundant local protection that contributed to this event
373 were addressed by the installation of new protection equipment after this event.
374
375 2007 Broad River Event
376 Description of the 2007 Broad River Event:
377 Another event where remote backup protection played a key role was the August 25, 2007 Broad River Energy Center
378 Event. In this event, a 230 kV generator step-up transformer bushing failed and faulted to ground. The relay system

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 Chapter 6: Post-2003 Events Involving Backup Protection

379 for the faulted 230 kV transformer was designed with a single auxiliary tripping relay. The single auxiliary relay failed.
380 Remote backup protection cleared the fault in about 0.5 seconds. The remote clearing in this case resulted in the loss
381 of four 230 kV transmission lines and three Broad River Energy Center Units. In addition one 230 kV transmission line
382 tripped due to a failed relay, two generating units tripped due to incorrectly coordinated backup protection settings,
383 and two generating units tripped due to low station auxiliary bus voltage during the fault.
384
385 Backup Protection and the Broad River Event:
386 Recommendations from the NERC investigation report for this event included installing redundant relaying for the
387 generator step-up transformer that sustained the fault. This recommendation has been implemented.
388
389 The overall effects of this event to the power system were minor compared to the Florida or West Wing events.
390 However, this event does illustrate that when remote backup is applied to meet system performance requirements
391 during single Protection System failures, the highest degree of coordination of Protection Systems and knowledge of
392 system reactions to sustained low transmission level voltage is needed.
393
394 2006 Upper New York State Event
395 Description of the 2006 Upper New York State Event:
396 The last event is a near miss event that occurred in New York State on March, 29, 2006 in the switchyard for a hydro
397 plant. In this event, a ground fault occurred on the 13.8 kV side of a 115/13.8/13.8 kV transformer due to raccoon
398 contact. The fault quickly evolved into a 3-phase to ground fault on the 115 kV side of the transformer. One of the
399 115 kV circuit breakers required to clear the 13.8 kV and 115 kV faults failed. Breaker failure was initiated to clear the
400 fault via the surrounding circuit breakers; however one of these breakers failed to clear for about 5 seconds resulting
401 in a double breaker failure for 5 seconds. During this time, all 14 in-service hydro units at the connected plant tripped
402 on backup phase distance relays. The switchyard at this location also included a number of 230/115 kV
403 autotransformers and 230 kV lines. The 230/115 kV autotransformer relay schemes in this area were not designed
404 with phase backup protection that could detect this 115 kV fault. The delayed clearing in this event resulted in the
405 loss of the 14 units at the hydro plant, numerous smaller hydro-generating facilities throughout northern New York,
406 and one unit in Ontario, totaling 1200 MW, as well as various equipment in the connected switchyard.
407
408 Backup Protection and the Upper New York State Event:
409 Recommendations from the New York Power Authority (NYPA) investigation report for this event included
410 considering whether to apply overcurrent backup protection on autotransformers. A decision whether to add backup
411 overcurrent protection has not been made at this time.
412
413 The overall effects of this event to the power system were minor compared to the Florida or West Wing events.
414 However, this event is a good illustration of the type of unanticipated failure event where remote backup protection
415 can provide a safety net that may limit the extent of an outage.

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416 Chapter 7: Examples
417
418 The following sections provide a number of examples of backup protection applied to transmission lines and
419 transformers. It is important to note that these examples were selected to illustrate concepts discussed in the paper
420 and are not intended to be prescriptive or to suggest a preferred method of transformer protection, nor are they
421 inclusive of all possible methods for providing backup protection. The protection system design (e.g., CT and PT
422 primary connections) and settings derived in these examples are only for illustrative purposes.
423
424 Remote Backup Protection on Transmission Lines
425 Protection Systems applied to transmission lines commonly include elements which provide remote backup
426 protection. The most common type of remote backup protection for phase faults on transmission lines is phase
427 distance relaying with fixed time delay. The most common methods to provide remote backup for ground faults are
428 by using ground distance relays with fixed time delay, ground time overcurrent relays with inverse time-current
429 curves, or a combination of both. Phase faults generally affect the system to a higher degree than ground faults and
430 phase relays are more susceptible to tripping than ground relays for severe system conditions.
431
432 The following series of examples focus on phase faults and illustrate some of the complexities of using remote backup
433 protection as outlined above. Examples 1, 2, and 3 illustrate the complexity of applying remote backup protection to
434 meet NERC system performance requirements during a single Protection System failure. In these examples the line
435 terminals do not have local backup protection. Figure 7.1 is used to illustrate application of remote backup protection
436 for breaker failure protection. In this example the line terminals have local backup protection.
437
438 Example 1

439
440 Figure 7.1: Simple Three-Station, Two-Line System Used in Example 1
441
442 The simple system of two lines in Figure 7.1 shows the configuration under consideration in this example. In this case,
443 the backup zone at the Station A line terminal can be set to cover phase and ground faults on the transmission line
444 between Stations B and C and provide remote backup for any single transmission line Protection System related
445 component failure. For this configuration, source impedances behind Stations A and C are not important.
446
447 For this example, using a 25% margin, the backup relay reach at Station A necessary to detect all faults on line L2 is
448 Zbu = 1.25 (L1 + L2) = 25 Ω
449
450 Complexities
451 If a time delay of 0.7 to 1.0 seconds is assumed, remote backup clearing would be slower than a local breaker failure
452 scheme with transfer trip from Station B to Station A. A transient stability simulation may be necessary to verify that
453 this clearing time results in a system response that meets performance requirements. In many cases similar to this
454 example the remote backup can be set within the loadability requirements of PRC-023, will not reach through the
455 distribution transformers, and will provide adequate backup protection for Protection System failures at Station B.

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 Chapter 7: Examples

456 The simple system of three lines in Figure 7.2 shows the configuration under consideration in this example.
457
458 Example 1A

459
460 Figure 7.2: Simple Four-Station, Three-Line System Used in Example 1A
461
462 In this case, all of the line terminals have local backup protection for line faults as defined in section 3. Thus, a backup
463 zone at the Station A line terminal may be designed to provide protection to address a couple of different situations:
464 1. The breaker failure protection scheme for the breakers at Station B is designed with local breaker failure but
465 without breaker failure transfer trip communications capability from Station B to Station A. Due to the lack
466 of transfer trip communications, the backup zone at Station A is designed to provide backup protection for
467 faults on lines BC or BD with a breaker failure at Station B. Because the Station B breakers have local breaker
468 failure protection, the Station A relay can be set to cover phase and ground faults on the transmission line
469 between Stations B and C or B and D without considering apparent impedance (i.e., the local breaker failure
470 operation at station B will open the other two breakers and remove the infeed). The owner of this scheme
471 has decided to use backup instead of installing a transfer trip channel. This backup setting will also provide
472 some protection for multiple Protection System failures of line BC or BD relaying. For this configuration and
473 application, source impedances behind Stations A, C and D are not important.
474 2. The breaker failure protection scheme for the breakers at Station B is designed with local breaker failure and
475 breaker failure transfer trip communications capability from Station B to Station A. The backup zone at
476 Station A is designed to provide backup protection for faults on lines BC or BD with a breaker failure and a
477 loss of transfer trip communications at Station B. Similar to the first situation, because the Station B breakers
478 have local breaker failure protection, the Station A relay can be set to cover phase and ground faults on the
479 transmission line between Stations B and C or B and D without considering apparent impedance for this
480 application. This application protects for a situation that is beyond a single Protection System failure or failure
481 of a circuit breaker to interrupt current and is thus not required to meet system performance requirements.
482 The owner of this scheme has decided to apply backup as a safety net and may have decided to apply this

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 Chapter 7: Examples

483 type of backup based on past experiences or events. This backup setting will also provide some protection
484 for multiple Protection System failures of line BC or BD relaying. For this configuration and application, source
485 impedances behind Stations A, C and D are not important.
486
487 For this example, using a 25% margin, the backup relay reach at Station A necessary to detect all faults on line L3 is
488 Zbu = 1.25 (L1 + L3) = 37.5 Ω.
489
490 Complexities
491 If a time delay of 0.7 to 1.0 seconds is assumed, remote backup clearing would be slower than a local breaker failure
492 scheme with transfer trip from Station B to Station A. When the system is designed without transfer trip capability, a
493 transient stability simulation may be necessary to verify that this clearing time results in a system response that meets
494 performance requirements. In many cases similar to this example the remote backup can be set within the loadability
495 requirements of PRC-023, will not reach through the distribution transformers, and will provide adequate backup
496 protection for breaker failures at Station B and some line Protection System failures at Station B. Figure 7.3 illustrates
497 the increased backup protection reach in this example compared to Example 1.
498
499 Example 2

500
501 Figure 7.3: Four-Station, Three-Line System Used in Example 2
502
503 Example 2 is complicated compared to Example 1A by the presence of a longer line between Stations B and D and
504 the distribution transformers at bus B. For this configuration, source impedances behind Stations A and C are assumed
505 to be equal. The source impedance behind Station D is not important in this simple system. In this case, a fault on L3
506 near Station D would be difficult to detect from Station A without overreaching for faults beyond Station C or seeing
507 through the distribution transformers.
508
509 The apparent impedance seen by the relay at Station A is: Zbu = Va/Iab = ((Iab x L1) + (Ibd x L3))/Iab = L1 + (Ibd/Iab) x L3
510 Given the symmetry of the example system, Iab = Icb, and thus Ibd = 2Iab
511
512 For this example, using a 25% margin, the backup relay reach at Station A necessary to detect all faults on line L3 is
513 Zbu = 1.25 (L1 + 2L3) = 112.5 Ω.
514

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515 If the source impedance of System A could be higher for certain system conditions, the setting would need to be
516 increased accordingly.
517
518 Complexities
519 In this case, such a large setting at Station A may detect distribution level faults at Station B. A time delay of 0.7 to
520 1.0 seconds would be required to coordinate with remote relaying at Stations B and C given that the Station A backup
521 zone will likely detect all faults on L2 and may look far past Station C, especially when L3 is out of service. The longer
522 time to clear may also cause power quality issues for the loads at Stations A, B, or C that in the worst case may result
523 in local loss of load. In many cases similar to this example it may not be possible to set the remote backup within the
524 loadability requirements of PRC-023 without the use of some form of load encroachment. The larger setting might
525 also be more susceptible to tripping on stable system swings. A transient stability simulation may be necessary to
526 verify that this clearing time results in a system response that meets performance requirements. Figure 7.4 illustrates
527 the increased backup protection reach in this example compared to Examples 1 and 1A.
528
529 Example 3

530
531 Figure 7.4: Four-Station, Three-Line System Used in Example 3
532
533 Example 3 is further complicated compared to Example 2 by the presence of a generator at Station B. For this
534 configuration, source impedances behind Stations A and C are assumed to be equal at 20 Ω with a reasonable system
535 contingency source outage behind Station A. The impedance of the generator at Station B (including the generator
536 step-up transformer) is assumed to be equal to 40 Ω. The source impedance behind Station D is not important for
537 this example and can be ignored. In this case, a fault on L3 near Station D would be more difficult to cover.
538
539 The apparent impedance seen by the relay at Station A must be calculated:
540
541 For the given fault, System A + L1 is in parallel with System C + L2, and the combination of these two systems is in
542 parallel with Generator B, with all three systems in series with L3,
543
544 Or
545

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 Chapter 7: Examples

546 The equivalent impedance of these systems is 30 Ω is in parallel with 30 Ω, in parallel with 40 Ω, + 40 Ω = 50.9 Ω
547
548 For fault near Station D on a 138 kV system, the total fault contribution from System A, System C, and Generator B is
549 1571 A.
550
551 The fault current contribution at Station A is 571 A and the line-to-ground voltage is 68.550 kV.
552
553 The apparent impedance at Station A for the L1 line relay is ~120 Ω
554
555 For this example, using a 25 percent margin, the backup relay reach at Station A necessary to detect all faults on line
556 L3 is Zbu = 1.25 (120) = 150 Ω
557 Additionally, the voltage on the Station B 138 kV bus is ~ 0.82 per unit.
558
559 Complexities
560 In this case, such a large setting at Station A may detect distribution level faults at Station B. A time delay of 0.7 to
561 1.0 seconds may be required to coordinate with remote relaying at Stations B and C given that the Station A backup
562 zone will likely detect all faults on L2 and may look far past Station C, especially when L3 is out of service and/or
563 Generator B is out of service. Thus, remote backup clearing would be much slower than local backup clearing. The
564 longer time to clear may cause power quality issues for the loads at Stations A, B, or C that in the worst case may
565 result in local loss of load. The longer time to clear and resulting lower voltage dip at the Station B bus may also cause
566 an issue for the auxiliary equipment at Generating Station A that could result in a loss of generation. In many cases
567 similar to this example it may not be possible to set the remote backup within the loadability requirements of PRC-
568 023 without the use of some form of load encroachment. The larger setting might also be more susceptible to tripping
569 on stable system swings. A transient stability simulation may be necessary to verify that this clearing time results in
570 a system response that meets performance requirements.
571
572 In general, a system such as shown in Figure 7.4 requires much greater care and study to ensure adequate system
573 performance prior to implementation than a system that uses local backup to cover for faults on L3. Additionally,
574 much greater care is required as the system changes over time to ensure that the remote backup system for Example
575 3 still provides adequate fault coverage while meeting system performance requirements. Figure 7.5 illustrates the
576 increased backup protection reach in this example compared to Examples 1, 1A, and 2. It must be noted that the line
577 lengths in the various examples were purposely picked to illustrate the effects that apparent impedance can have on
578 remote backup settings. The extent to which relay reach must be increased for actual configurations may be more or
579 less than shown in these examples.
580

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581
582 Figure 7.5: Comparison of Backup Protection System Reach for Examples 1, 1A, 2, and 3
583
584 Backup Protection on Autotransformers
585 Applying phase backup protection on autotransformers is not as common as applying remote backup on transmission
586 line terminals. Backup protection on transformers can be applied as backup for faults on both the high side and low
587 side voltage levels and is commonly applied to protect transformers for uncleared faults.
588
589 The system events involving multiple voltage levels described in Section 6 were all related to faults on equipment on
590 lower voltage systems (115 kV or 230 kV). These events support the general observation that the level of redundancy
591 of protection on higher voltage level circuits is usually greater than that on the lower voltage circuits connected to
592 autotransformers. Some lower voltage lines may not have local redundancy at all and the use of backup protection
593 on the transformers may provide additional protection for uncleared faults.
594
595 Autotransformer backup may be designed to clear faults due to single relay failures or as a safety net. Figure 7.6
596 provides examples of the safety net protection coverage that may be achieved for two possible system
597 configurations. In the second configuration, the reach of the backup protection will be reduced by roughly one-half
598 versus the first configuration due solely to the paralleled equivalent contributions of the two transformers. When
599 autotransformer backup protection is counted on to clear faults due to single relay failures, it is subject to meeting
600 system performance requirements and subject to many of the same limitations as remote backup on transmission
601 lines. When lower voltage systems are fully redundant, autotransformer backup can provide a safety net to limit

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 Chapter 7: Examples

602 damage to the low voltage system and isolate the low voltage system from the high voltage system for slow clearing
603 faults due to multiple Protection System failures or failures of circuit breakers to interrupt current.
604

605
606 Figure 7.6: Safety Net Backup Protection Reach
607
608 Since the cited system events involving multiple voltage levels were related to faults on the lower voltage systems,
609 the discussion on autotransformer backup will focus on backup applied to detect faults on the low voltage side of the
610 autotransformer. The discussion will also be geared toward phase faults since phase faults generally negatively affect
611 the system to a higher degree than ground faults and most transformer Protection Systems include ground backup
612 protection. Additional reasons to focus on phase faults are that slow clearing ground faults can migrate into phase
613 faults, and phase relays are more susceptible to tripping due to loadability issues than ground relays for severe system
614 loading conditions.
615
616 Various methods may be utilized to protect and clear an autotransformer for phase faults external to an
617 autotransformer. Three common types of phase backup protection for autotransformers to be discussed in this paper
618 with examples are: phase time overcurrent relays; phase time overcurrent relays torque controlled by phase distance
619 relays and phase instantaneous relays; and phase distance and phase instantaneous relays with fixed time delays. A
620 fourth type of backup that can be applied on a transformer low side to provide backup protection for low side bus or
621 close-in fault protection failure that has little complexity is a limited reach distance function. This application does
622 not have relay loadability issues that may be associated with other methods. Additional discussion on transformer
623 backup protection is provided in the IEEE Guide for Protective Relay Applications to Power Transformers (IEEE
624 C37.91).
625
626 A very inverse time overcurrent curve will be used in the examples in this paper. Other types of curves have different
627 advantages and disadvantages which are outside the scope of this paper and require similar considerations.
628
629 Example Autotransformer Data:
630 • 345(wye)/34(delta)/138(wye) kV with no delta connected load
631 • 300 MVA maximum nameplate for the 345/138 winding
632 • 1250 A nameplate at 138 kV and 500 A nameplate at 345 kV
633 • Maximum 138 kV 3-phase fault = 20,000 A (ZTR ~ 4 Ω @ 138 kV)
634 • This transformer has been determined to be critical by the Planning Coordinator and
635 • is thus subject to PRC-023 limitations
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 Chapter 7: Examples

636
637 Relay Settings Based on a Simple System
638 A phase protective relay could be applied on either the high or the low side of the autotransformer. For the examples
639 that follow, the current elements of all the phase protective relays are connected to current transformers on the high
640 side of the transformer such as in Figure 7.7. Thus, these relays also may provide backup protection for faults on the
641 transformer high side and tertiary windings. In many cases, 3-phase potential devices are only available on the low
642 side of the transformer so the phase distance relays are applied on the 138 kV side of the transformer. This also
643 allows for a better reach of the phase distance relay into the 138 kV system as this connection does not result in the
644 Protection System detecting the voltage drop through the transformer for 138 kV faults.
645
646 A desirable goal is to create a generic method for setting the phase protection relays that provides adequate backup
647 protection, coordinates with other system relays, provides adequate overload protection for uncleared through-
648 faults, will not trip on transformer inrush, and meets the loadability limitations of PRC-023-1. It may not be possible
649 to meet all of these goals for all configurations of some systems. Two examples (a simple system and a more complex
650 system) illustrate some of these limitations.
651

652
653 Figure 7.7: Simple System One-Line Used in Transformer Protection Example
654
655 Example 4: Phase Time Overcurrent Relay Setting
656 In this example PRC-023 limitations for phase responsive transformer relays will dictate the minimum pickup setting
657 of the relay. These limitations are:

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658 • 150% of the applicable maximum transformer nameplate rating (expressed in amperes), including the forced
659 cooling ratings corresponding to all installed supplemental cooling equipment.
660 • 115% of the highest operator established emergency transformer rating.
661
662 Assuming there are no operator established emergency transformer ratings for this transformer, the minimum pickup
663 for this relay is limited to 150% of 300 MVA. On the 345 kV side this translates to ~ 750 A. Adding a minimum of
664 additional margin and creating a setting that could likely be used for electromechanical relays with limited tap
665 selections, the minimum pickup will be set to 800 A (about 2000 A at 138 kV).
666
667 To coordinate with local 138 kV breaker failure for close-in faults (typical 10 cycle breaker failure relay time is
668 assumed), the minimum time to trip must be at least 0.4 second. This tripping speed also ensures that this relay trips
669 faster than remote backup protection on the high voltage system (1 second is assumed) that may also detect low
670 voltage system faults (especially close-in low voltage system faults). Thus, a time lever of 3 is chosen. Using the very
671 inverse curve, the time for the relay to initiate a trip will then be about 0.4 second for a 20,000 A 138 kV fault, 0.77
672 second for a 10,000 A 138 kV fault and 1.74 seconds for a 6,000 A 138 kV fault. Coordination must be verified between
673 these fault clearing times and the 138 kV line L1 protection (see Figure 7.2.2). The clearing times in this example were
674 selected because they will coordinate with typical transmission line protection settings, will be secure during
675 transformer inrush conditions, and are faster than required to coordinate with the transformer through-fault damage
676 curve shown in IEEE Standard C37.91- 2000.
677
678 Example 5: Torque Controlled Phase Time Overcurrent Settings
679 For the relay in Figure 7.8, a mho phase distance element and a phase instantaneous overcurrent element both
680 torque control a phase time overcurrent. The phase time overcurrent element will not pickup and start timing until
681 the mho phase distance element or the phase instantaneous overcurrent element picks up first. This allows a more
682 sensitive phase time overcurrent setting than a pure phase time overcurrent relay since the phase time overcurrent
683 relay is not subject to the loadability limitation. The phase instantaneous element is needed in addition to the phase
684 distance element to cover for 138 kV bus faults and other close-in faults where the phase distance element may lose
685 memory voltage and drop out prior to fault clearing given that the phase distance element is connected to the 138
686 kV potential device.
687

688
689 Figure 7.8: Logic Diagram for Application of Phase Time Overcurrent Elements Torque
690 Controlled by Phase Distance and Instantaneous Phase Overcurrent Elements
691
692 Phase Distance Element Setting
693 Assuming there are no operator established emergency transformer ratings for this transformer, the same PRC-023
694 limitation (150% of maximum nameplate rating) will limit the reach of the phase distance relay. Using the NERC
695 criteria and assuming the relay uses a mho characteristic,
696 Max Allowable Setting = Zrelay@30 = (0.85*Vrelay)/(1.732*INameplate*1.5)

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697 where Vrelay = phase-to-phase line voltage at the relay location

698 and INameplate = 1250 A
699
700 To make the loadability of this setting equivalent to the time overcurrent for comparison purposes, we will use 800
701 A at 345 kV (2000 A at 138 kV) instead of INameplate*1.5 (750 A at 345k V or 1875 A at 138 kV) to determine the
702 loadability limitation. This limits Zrelay@30 to about 34 Ω at 138 kV. Since this relay is subject to PRC-023, this relay will
703 be set with a 90 degree torque angle to maximize loadability. Thus Zrelay@90 is set to 68 Ω (Zrelay@90 = Zrelay@30/cos (90-
704 30)). A typical 138 kV line impedance angle is 75 degrees. The reach at the 75 degree line angle is 68*cos(15) = 66 Ω.
705
706 Phase Instantaneous Overcurrent Element Setting
707 If high side potentials are available and used for the phase distance element, this element may not be required. The
708 use of high side potentials to feed a distance relay does, however, limit the reach of the relay into the lower voltage
709 system. The examples in this document are based on use of low side potential devices, so this element is included
710 in this example as a method for assuring reliable operation for close-in low side faults when the phase distance relays
711 do not have sufficient memory polarization for the duration of a zero voltage fault.
712
713 The instantaneous phase element setting is required for close-in three-phase faults where the phase distance relay
714 may not operate because of very low voltage. Thus, sensitivity is not a great concern. Set this element to 225% of
715 transformer nameplate to provide ample margin above emergency loading or roughly 1200 A at 345 kV (3000 A at
716 138 kV).
717
718 Phase Time Overcurrent Setting:
719 The phase time overcurrent minimum pickup is not subject to loadability limitations because the phase distance and
720 instantaneous phase overcurrent relays that provides the torque control meets the loadability requirement;
721 however, it may be desirable to provide additional security. For this example, the relay is set at 500 A at 345 kV
722 (corresponding to the transformer nameplate rating) as a balance between security and sensitivity.
723
724 To coordinate with local 138 kV breaker failure for close-in faults, the minimum time to trip must be at least 0.4
725 second. This tripping speed also ensures that this relay trips faster than remote backup protection on the high voltage
726 system (1 second is assumed) that may also detect low voltage system faults (especially close-in low voltage system
727 faults). Thus, a time lever of 3.5 is chosen. Using the very inverse curve, the time to trip for selected 138 kV faults will
728 then be about 0.39 second for a 20,000 A fault, 0.55 second for a 10,000 A fault, and 0.96 second for a 6,000 A fault.
729 Coordination must be verified between these fault clearing times and the 138 kV line L1 protection (see Figure 7.2.2).
730 The clearing times in this example were selected because they will coordinate with typical transmission line
731 protection settings, will be secure during transformer inrush conditions, and are faster than required to coordinate
732 with the transformer through-fault damage curve shown in IEEE Standard C37.91-2000.
733
734 Example 6: Phase Distance and Instantaneous Phase Overcurrent with Fixed Timers Settings
735 For the relay in Figure 7.9, a mho phase distance element tripping through a fixed timer is used. When the potential
736 is provided from the low side of the transformer, the phase distance element is supplemented by an instantaneous
737 phase overcurrent relay that also trips through the fixed timer.
738

739
740 Figure 7.9: Logic Diagram for Application of Phase Distance and Instantaneous Phase
741 Overcurrent Elemets with Fixed Timers

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 Chapter 7: Examples

742
743 Phase Distance Element Setting
744 Assuming there are no operator established emergency transformer ratings for this transformer, the same PRC-023
745 limitation (150% of maximum nameplate rating) will limit the reach of the phase distance relay. Using the NERC
746 criteria and assuming the relay uses a mho characteristic,
747 Max Allowable Setting = Zrelay@30 = (0.85*Vrelay)/(1.732*INameplate*1.5)
748 where Vrelay = Phase-to-phase line voltage at the relay location
749 and INameplate = 1250 A
750
751 To make the loadability of this setting equivalent to the unsupervised phase time overcurrent for comparison
752 purposes, we will use 2000 A instead of INameplate*1.5 (1875 A) to determine the loadability limitation. This limits
753 Zrelay@30 to about 34 Ω. This relay will be set with a 90 degree torque angle to maximize reach while meeting the
754 loadability limitation. Thus Zrelay@90 is set to 68 Ω (Zrelay@90 = Zrelay@30/cos (90-30)). A typical 138 kV line impedance angle
755 is 75 degrees. This reach at the 75 degree line angle is 68*cos(15) = 66 Ω.
756
757 Instantaneous Phase Overcurrent Element Setting
758 If high side potentials are available, this element may not be required. The use of high side potentials to supply a
759 distance relay does, however, limit the reach of the relay into the lower voltage system. The examples in this
760 document are based on use of low side potential devices, so this element is included in this example.
761
762 The instantaneous phase element setting is required only for close-in three-phase faults where the phase distance
763 relay may not operate because of very low voltage. Since for this example the main concern is with using this element
764 to protect for close-in 138 kV faults (approximately 8000 A at 345 kV for a 138 kV bus fault) and the distance element
765 will provide sensitivity for more remote faults sensitivity for this element is not a great concern. Set this element to
766 800 percent of transformer nameplate to provide security for transformer inrush or roughly 4000 A at 345 kV (10,000
767 A at 138 kV).
768
769 Fixed Timer Settings
770 Ideally, this timer is set slower than the longest 138 kV line backup protection time and faster than any 345 kV line
771 backup protection that reaches into the 138 kV system.
772
773 In practice, 345 kV relaying may not be able to detect 138 kV faults under normal conditions. If so, the timer should
774 be set slightly higher than the longest 138 kV line backup protection time. Assuming a maximum 138 kV line backup
775 time of 1.0 second, this relay may be set at 1.2 seconds.
776
777 If 345 kV relays are able to detect 138 kV faults under normal conditions, coordination with 345 backup protection
778 may not be possible. In this case, the Transmission Owner must choose a specific time based on careful consideration
779 of the consequences of the possible tripping sequence that might occur when a 138 kV fault is cleared in backup time
780 or re-coordinate as necessary. Examples of this are shown in Table 7.1 and Table 7.2.
781
Table 7.1: Simple System Setting and Reach Summary
3-phase fault Reach into
345 kV Side Setting 138 kV Side Setting
simple 138 kV system
Phase Time Overcurrent Only 800 2000 36 Ω
Torque Controlled Phase Time
500 1250 60 Ω
Overcurrent
Distance Element NA 66 Ω @ 75 degrees 66 Ω

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 Chapter 7: Examples

782 Assumptions:
783 • 345 kV system is an infinite source
784 • 300 MVA transformer is 4 Ω at 138 kV
785 • Overcurrent Relay Setting = 80000/(4 + Reach in ohms)
786
Table 7.2: Simple System Setting and Time to Trip Summary
20,000 A 138kV Fault 10,000 A 138kV Fault 6,000 A 138kV Fault
Phase Time Overcurrent Only 0.4 seconds 0.77 seconds 1.74 seconds
Torque Controlled Phase Time
0.39 seconds 0.55 seconds 0.96 seconds
Overcurrent
Distance Element with Fixed Timer 1.2 seconds 1.2 seconds 1.2 seconds
787
788 More Complex Systems
789 Most systems are not as simple as a single autotransformer feeding a single transmission line. Substations can have
790 numerous transmission lines, multiple transformers in parallel, additional components such as shunt devices, and
791 networked or looped lines. As the substation and its connected transmission system become more complex, so too
792 does the application of backup protection.
793
794 A more complex system is shown in Figure 7.10 consisting of two autotransformers operating in parallel each feeding
795 its own bus. In this example the connected 138 kV transmission lines are networked with significant fault current
796 sources. This substation has two autotransformers operating in parallel feeding four transmission lines. In this
797 configuration, the reach of the backup protection will be reduced by roughly one-half versus the simple system
798 example due solely to the paralleled equivalent contributions of the two 300 MVA transformers. If any of the
799 connected lines are short and provide additional fault current source contributions, the reach will be less than one-
800 half of the reach calculated for the simple system. This reach limitation must be factored into system performance
801 analyses when the Protection System design relies on autotransformer backup to clear faults for single Protection
802 System failures. Figure 7.10 illustrates the impact on backup protection reach when multiple transformers are in
803 parallel. In some cases it may be difficult, if not impossible, to achieve coordinated backup protection for more than
804 close-in faults. In these cases the Transmission Owner may need to carefully consider the consequences of possible
805 tripping sequences or re- coordinate where possible.
806

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 Chapter 7: Examples

807
808 Figure 7.10: More Complex System One-Line Used in Transformer Protection Example
809
810 Another problem for autotransformer backup in more complex systems is the inability of the local backup Protection
811 Systems on the two transformers to provide selectivity based on the location of faults. The Protection Systems on
812 both transformers may react similarly and operate simultaneously for faults because they will have similar or identical
813 relay settings. In some cases it may be worthwhile considering backup protection that will split the bus to limit the
814 number of system Elements interrupted, although for some bus configurations this may be impractical or add an
815 undesired level of Protection System complexity. The relay practitioner will need to consider the application of
816 backup Protection Systems applied on these complex systems and incorporate the appropriate degree of
817 dependability and security to protect the assets and prevent degradation of reliability.

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818 Chapter 8: Conclusions
819
820 Transmission system events have shown that backup protection can play a significant role in preventing or mitigating
821 the effects of Protection System or equipment failures.
822
823 Local backup inherently addresses single Protection System failures or failures of a circuit breaker to interrupt current
824 while meeting NERC performance requirements and generally reduces the number of Elements that must be
825 removed from the power system to clear the fault. Local backup may address some failures of multiple Protection
826 Systems, but generally will not address these failures to the extent of a remote backup scheme. Remote backup may
827 also adequately perform this function and can also act as a safety net to reduce the extent of a power system
828 disturbance during multiple Protection System failures or failures of circuit breakers to interrupt current. Application
829 of remote backup protection, however, may be limited by the need to meet the requirements of NERC Reliability
830 Standards designed to assure adequate power system response during single failures or severe system events.
831
832 The design of the power system and the local protection design practices dictate whether local or remote backup
833 protection can be securely and dependably applied to meet NERC standards for power system and Protection System
834 performance requirements. Careful examination of the overall interaction of Protection Systems may provide insight
835 as to where additional local or remote backup can be applied to help mitigate the spread of an outage.

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836 Chapter 9: Recommendation
837
838 Large autotransformers are major capital investments and play a large role in the reliability and flexibility of the Bulk
839 Electric System. Lead times for obtaining replacements are typically a minimum of six to twelve months; therefore,
840 failures of these transformers can result in prolonged reduction in Bulk Electric System reliability and flexibility.
841 Because of this, it is recommended that back up Protection Systems be applied to these assets to reduce the
842 likelihood of damage due to prolonged through-fault currents caused by the failure of local or remote Protection
843 Systems to clear the fault.

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844 Appendix A: Contributors
845
Jonathan Sykes Charles W. Rogers
Chairman Transmission Dependent Utility Principal
Manager of System Protection Pacific Gas and Electric Engineer
Company Consumers Energy Co.
William J. Miller Joe T. Uchiyama
Vice-Chairman U.S. Federal
Principal Engineer Senior Electrical Engineer
Exelon Corporation U.S. Bureau of Reclamation
John Mulhausen Joshua L. Wooten
RE – FRCC U.S. Federal
Manager, Design and Standards Florida Power & Light Manager of System Protection and Analysis Tennessee
Co. Valley Authority
Richard Quest Daniel McNeely
RE – MRO U.S. Federal – Alternate
Engineer Engineer - System Protection and Analysis Tennessee
Xcel Energy, Inc. Valley Authority
Daniel Jesberg
Philip J. Tatro
RE – MRO – Alternate
NERC Staff Coordinator
Engineer
Senior Performance and Analysis Engineer NERC
Midwest Reliability Organization
Robert W. Cummings
Jeff Iler
NERC Staff
RE – RFC
Director of System Analysis and Reliability Initiatives
Senior Engineer American Electric Power
NERC
Philip B. Winston Jonathan D. Gardell
RE – SERC Subject Matter Expert – NERC Consultant Associate
Chief Engineer, Protection and Control Southern Consultant – Quanta Technology President – Gardell
Company Power Consulting, Inc.
Lynn Schroeder
Jim Ingleson
RE – SPP
Subject Matter Expert
Manager – Substation Protection and Control Westar
RLC Engineering
Energy
Samuel Francis Eric A Udren
RE – TRE Subject Matter Expert
System Protection Specialist Oncor Electric Delivery Executive Advisor Quanta Technology
Baj Agrawal Tom Wiedman
RE – WECC Subject Matter Expert – NERC Consultant
Principal Engineer President
Arizona Public Service Company Wiedman Power System Consulting, Ltd.
Miroslav Kostic Murty Yalla
Canada Provincial Subject Matter Expert
P&C Planning Manager, Transmission Hydro One President
Networks, Inc. Beckwith Electric Company Inc.
Sungsoo Kim W. O. (Bill) Kennedy
Canada Provincial Subject Matter Expert
Section Manager – Protections and Technical Principal
Compliance Ontario Power Generation Inc. Kennedy & Associates Inc.

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 Appendix A : Contributors

Michael J. McDonald Forrest Brock

Investor-Owned Utility Observer
Principal Engineer, System Protection Ameren Services Transmission Compliance Specialist Western Farmers
Company Electric Coop.
Mark Fidrych James Roberts
Observer Correspondent
Manager of Performance Reviews and Metrics North Transmission Planning
American Transmission Forum Tennessee Valley Authority
Joe Spencer
Mahmood Safi
Observer
Correspondent
Manager of Planning and Engineering SERC Reliability
Omaha Public Power District
Corporation
David Angell
Saurabh Sauksena
Correspondent
Correspondent
T&D Planning Engineering Leader Idaho Power
National Grid
Company
Dean Sikes
Hasnain Ashrafi
Correspondent
Correspondent
Manager, Transmission Protection, Apparatus, and
Engineer
Metering
Sargent & Lundy
Cleco Power, LLC
Deven Bhan Evan T. Sage
Correspondent Correspondent
Electrical Engineer Consulting Engineer
Western Area Power Administration Potomac Electric Power Company
Larry Brusseau Bob Stuart
Correspondent Correspondent
Standards Manager Senior Director – Transmission BrightSource Energy,
Midwest Reliability Organization Inc.
Dac-Phuoc Bui
Guy Zito
Correspondent
Correspondent
Engineer, System Protection Hydro-Québec
Assistant Vice President of Standards NPCC
TransÉnergie
John L. Ciufo Fred Ipock
Correspondent Correspondent
Principal Senior Engineer - Substations & Protection City Utilities
Ciufo and Cooperberg Consulting Ltd. of Springfield, Missouri
Sara Filling
Lorissa Jones
Correspondent
Correspondent
Director, System Protection & Automation Baltimore
Bonneville Power Administration
Gas & Electric Company
Mark Lauby
Jeanne Harshbarger
Correspondent
Correspondent
Director, Reliability Assessment and Performance
System Protection Engineer Puget Sound Energy, Inc.
Analysis NERC
Lynn Oelker
Correspondent
EON-US
846

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847 Revision History
848
Revision History
Version Comments Approval Date
V1.0 Original Approved document June 2011
V1.1 SPCWG review and minor revision of approved document Pending
849
850

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