FOUNTAINHEAD OF JIHAD

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 VAHID BROWN
DON RASSLER

Fountainhead of Jihad
The Haqqani Nexus, 1973–2012

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Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Brown, Vahid.
Fountainhead of jihad : the Haqqani nexus, 1973/2012/Vahid Brown, Don Rassler.
p.â•…cm.
Includes bibliographical references and index.
ISBN 978-0-199-32798-0 (alk. paper)
1. Haqqani (Organization)╇ 2. Jihad.╇ 3. Terrorism—Religious aspects—Islam.
4. Terrorists—Pakistan—History.╇ I. Rassler, Don.╇ II. Title.
HV6433.P182H373 2012
363.325095491—dc23
2012039143

135798642

Printed in India
on Acid-Free Paper
 CONTENTS

Authors’ Acknowledgements vii

List of Illustrations ix

Introduction 1

PART I

ESTABLISHMENT AND HISTORICAL EVOLUTION

OF THE HAQQANI NEXUS

1.╇Situating the Haqqanis: Origins, Political Culture,

Regional Contexts 21
2.╇Birth of the Nexus: the Haqqani Network, Foreign
Fighters, and the Origins of al-Qa’ida 59
3.╇The Fountainhead: The Haqqani Network, The Taliban,
and the Rise of Global Jihad 83

PART II

CONTINUITY, VALUE, CHANGE, AND THE

HAQQANI NEXUS POST-2001

4.╇Local: Pakistani Taliban Factions and Other Local

Insurgent Units 129
5.╇Regional: The Pakistani State and its Inter-Services
Intelligence Directorate 151
6.╇Global: al-Qa’ida and Other Global Jihadist Groups 183

v
 CONT E NT S

7.╇Entanglements and Management of the Haqqanis’

Nexus Position 219
Conclusion 235

Notes 245
Bibliography 295
Index 307

vi
 AUTHORS’ ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

This book would not have been possible without the assistance pro-
vided by many people over several years, and in the course of writ-
ing it we have incurred a number of debts.
â•… First, we owe a special thanks to Thomas Hegghammer.
â•… Our partner Ahmed was responsible for all Pashto and Urdu
translations found within the text and without his talent and assis-
tance this book would have lacked important nuance and the pres-
entation of these primary sources. It is our hope that he will build
upon this work in his future endeavors and give voice to additional
Pashto and Urdu materials and the contributions of Afghans to
other facets of history.
â•… A similar thank you needs to be extended to the staff at the
Afghanistan Center at Kabul University and to Atifa Rawan at the
University of Arizona for facilitating access to some of the primary
sources we used. The National Endowment for Humanities should
also be commended for their wisdom in supporting efforts to pre-
serve these and other rare documents found within Afghanistan.
â•… This book was much improved by the helpful feedback and criti-
cism that we received from the four anonymous reviewers of our
manuscript. We also appreciate the comments and suggestions
provided by Thomas Hegghammer, Thomas Ruttig, Nelly Lahoud,
Gretchen Peters, and Robert Nickelsberg, who all reviewed an ear-
lier version of our work.
â•… Jere Van Dyk, Pir Zubayr Shah, Anand Gopal, Morten Skoldager,
and others who cannot be named provided critical insights and
firsthand perspectives on a range of topics.

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 AUT H OR S ’ AC K NOW L E D GEMEN TS

â•… Our gratitude also goes to the Combating Terrorism Center at

West Point for supporting our initial research into the Haqqani net-
work and for publishing an earlier report of our work.
â•… For his excellent work on our graphics and maps we are thankful
for the skill of Rami Moghadam.
â•… Rassler appreciated the support provided by a number of men-
tors, friends, and colleagues, especially Liam Collins, Rob Greenway,
David Asher, Mike Pease, Christopher O’Leary and Jenna Watson
for their efforts to facilitate opportunities and help him make a
broader impact. He is also extremely grateful for the leadership and
support provided by Mike Meese, Cindy Jebb, John Abizaid, Vinnie
Viola, and Bill Ostlund, and for the assistance provided by his Har-
mony comrades. The friendship and advice of Assaf Moghadam
and Alex Gallo, have been equally as valuable. His biggest thank
you, however, goes to G and his family, as without them and their
sacrifices and patience none of this would have been possible.
â•… Brown would like to extend his gratitude to Kevin Bell, David
Bikman, Will McCants, and Brian Fishman for all the helpful con-
versations and editorial insights. Thanks to Cyrus Schayegh and
Şükrü Hanioğlu for their comments on early versions of two of the
chapters. To all the friends and family in Portland, Tacoma, and
Princeton: this wouldn’t have been possible without your support.
â•… Finally, we would like to thank Michael Dwyer and the rest of the
team at Hurst for supporting this project.

Vahid Brown Don Rassler

Princeton, NJ New York, NY

viii
 LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS

(after Introduction)
Fig. 1: Haqqani fighter using an anti-aircraft gun during the anti-
Soviet jihad period.
Fig. 2: Entrance to the Zhawara base.
Fig. 3: Abdullah Azzam.
Fig. 4: Jalaluddin Haqqani recovering from injuries sustained dur-
ing a Soviet and Afghan assault on his Zhawara base in
1987.
Fig. 5: Nusrat al-Jihad cover with Jalaluddin Haqqani and Zia
ul-Haq.
Fig. 6: Jalaluddin Haqqani and Sami ul-Haq in a General Gather-
ing of the Jamiat-e-Ulama-e-Islam in Lahore, Pakistan,
April 1991.
Fig. 7: Jalaluddin Haqqani with Gulf Sheikhs.
Fig. 8: The Manba’ ‘Ulum madrassa, in North Waziristan, Pakistan
circa 1989.
Fig. 9: Jalaluddin Haqqani (back seated row, third from
right), Ahmed Shah Massoud (to his right), Abdul Haq (in
white with Afghan pakool) and leaders at the National
Commanders Shura, May 1990.
Fig. 10: Ibrahim Haqqani after the capture of Khost garrison in
1991.
Fig. 11: Uighur fighters cleaning guns in Khost, 1990.
Fig. 12: Ibrahim Haqqani being interviewed by Rahimullah Yusuf�zai
and Lyse Doucet after the capture of Khost in 1991.

ix
 LI S T OF I L L US T R AT I O N S

Fig. 13: Burhanuddin Rabbani with Jalaluddin Haqqani in the

weapons room at the Zhawara base.
Fig. 14: Poster of Osama bin Laden captured at the Zhawara base
after the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan in October 2001.
Fig. 15: Screen grab from a Haqqani network video of President
Barack Obama giving the commencement address at the
U.S. Military Academy at West Point, 22 May 2010.
Fig. 16: Screen grab of the emir of the Pakistani Taliban, Hakim�ullah
Mehsud, sitting with Jordanian suicide bomber, Humam
Khalil Abu-Mulal al-Balawi (Abu Dujanah al-Khorasani)
before his attack against Forward Operating Base Chapman
in December 2009.

x
Map 1

Map 2
Map 3

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 INTRODUCTION

As we prepared this book for press it seemed that the Haqqani net-
work scarcely needed any introduction. The network began consist-
ently making international headlines with a July 2008 suicide attack
on the Indian Embassy in Kabul, followed by a years-long cam-
paign of high-profile attacks in the Afghan capital that shows no
signs of abating. On 13 September 2011 the Haqqanis staged the
longest and most audacious attack in the capital since the beginning
of the war, raining a twenty-hour barrage of rockets and gunfire
from the unfinished upper floors of a high-rise building upon the
embassies of Kabul’s diplomatic neighborhood.1 At the end of the
following week, the outgoing chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
Admiral Mike Mullen set off a storm of international controversy
by declaring in US Senate testimony that the Haqqani network acts
as “a veritable arm” of the ISI, Pakistan’s powerful intelligence
agency.2 These comments and the ensuing media frenzy made pub-
lic what many policy insiders had long known: that the Haqqani
network is one of the most powerful forces in the Afghan insur-
gency, and among the most important points of conflict in the trou-
bled relationship between the United States and Pakistan.
â•… Yet if barely a week goes by these days without the Haqqani net-
work making the front page, when we began our research over
three years ago it was still an obscure group to most people, includ-
ing many involved in regional policy. The Haqqani network was
not even known as such in the West until 2006. The appellation first
appears in a diplomatic cable sent to Washington on 18 January of

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 F OUNT AI NH E AD OF JIHAD

that year from Richard Norland, then chief of mission at the US

Embassy in Kabul. Discussing a recent series of bomb attacks in the
city of Khost, the cable notes that “Khost Governor [Merajuddin]
Pathan is convinced that the bombings were the work of the
Haqqani Network, operating out of Miram Shah in Pakistan’s North
Waziristan.”3 Only one other 2006 usage of the term appears in the
diplomatic cable traffic leaked by the WikiLeaks organization, a
2€July 2006 cable in which, again, the term is used in a passage sum-
marizing statements made by an Afghan official.4 Beginning in
2007, however, the phrase is used with increasing frequency in
cable traffic, reflecting its entry by that time into wider usage in the
Western press, following its appearance in Senate testimony deliv-
ered by Rear Admiral Robert Moeller in March 2006.5
â•… A sense of how the Haqqanis were understood in these early
references to the newfound “network” is perhaps best summarized
by Admiral Moeller’s testimony:
The Haqqani Tribal Network, which has ties to the Taliban, operates pri-
marily in eastern Afghanistan and the FATA region of Pakistan. Haqqani
goals are limited primarily to obtaining autonomy in eastern Afghanistan
and the FATA region. Although the most tactically proficient of the enemy
we face in Afghanistan, they present a limited strategic threat.6

â•… This has been the standard view of the Haqqani network ever
since, and it is generally accurate as far as it goes. But we felt from
our previous research on the history of al-Qa’ida and regional con-
flict that there was a larger story being missed here, a larger signifi-
cance to the organization not reflected in the assessment of the
Haqqani network by those that first named it so in 2006, nor in the
secondary or historiographic literature. So we assembled and stud-
ied a unique archive consisting of thousands of pages of Haqqani-
relevant primary sources that others before us had not. What we
found, ultimately, is the Fountainhead of Jihad.
â•… The title of our book was the name of a series of magazines pub-
lished by the Haqqanis in the 1980s and 1990s, as well as a media
“studio” that has been producing and distributing Haqqani propa-
ganda videos in more recent years. It is, in other words, the
Haqqanis’ brand. This is not a metaphor, as the Haqqani network
quite literally had something to sell, and the nature of their product

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 I NT R OD UC T I ON

is directly advertised in the brand itself. Since the late 1970s the
Haqqani network has provided a variety of state sponsors, private
donors, and entrepreneur revolutionaries with a particularly valu-
able resource in the global economy of conflict: a platform for the
delivery of violence. The Haqqanis’ provision of this service has
reaped for them a great deal of wealth and local power, and has
given them a hitherto unrecognized influence in violent conflicts far
beyond the border hinterlands where they reside. This book,
through the lens of the primary sources, explores the Haqqani net-
work’s rise to this position of power in the conflict economy.
Understanding that rise requires an unpacking of the three key
terms used in our title, which also serve as the central themes of the
chapters that follow: fountainhead, jihad, and nexus.

Fountainhead
The Haqqani network magazines and video production studio are
called, in Arabic, Manba’ al-Jihad. A manba’ is a wellspring, platform,
or source, a site from which something originates or flows forth. But
what did it mean for the Haqqanis to offer a platform of jihad,
which we will gloss for now simply as violence, in a series of maga-
zines that provided bank account routing numbers for potential
customers right on the covers? What kind of production site were
they advertising, and how did they come to be in a position to put
it on the market in the first place?
â•… One very simple way in which this Haqqani network value
proposition has been understood is in terms of safe haven. Indeed,
in recent years the Haqqanis have used their influence in North
Waziristan to provide shelter to a disparate group of international
malcontents all seeking to deliver violence against various states.
Uighurs opposing China’s rule of its Muslim-majority northwest;
Uzbeks at war with the government of Uzbekistan; Pakistanis at
war with India, Pakistan, and in some cases both; and the polyglot
group of al-Qa’ida supporters fighting to undermine an American-
dominated international system—all have taken refuge with the
Haqqanis on Pakistan’s highland frontier. But understanding the
Haqqanis’ offer of a fountainhead of violence in these terms alone

3
 F OUNT AI NH E AD OF JIHAD

ignores the much broader support the Haqqani network provided

to these groups for many years prior to 9/11. More importantly, it
obscures the relationship between the Haqqanis’ capacity to pro-
vide such support to these relatively marginal groups on the one
hand, and the Haqqani network’s earlier dealings with much larger
and wealthier clients on the other. It was the latter—and in particu-
lar Pakistan and the United States—that enabled the Haqqanis to
establish the fountainhead, to consolidate their territorial domi-
nance, and to become primary producers of violence in their own
right in the decades-long Afghan conflict. Direct American support
for the Haqqani network ended in the early 1990s; the Pakistani
state relationship continues to this day.
â•… The Haqqani network’s area of operation, the place of the foun-
tainhead, straddles the Durand Line, which is more of a geopolitical
fault line than an international border dividing Afghanistan from
Pakistan. The Haqqani network’s early members all hailed from
southeastern Afghanistan and studied in the late 1960s at the
Haqqaniyya seminary in northwestern Pakistan. Rooted in both
countries, the Haqqanis proved particularly well suited to facilitat-
ing a conflict between the two states, one centering initially on the
ultimate status of the Pashtun homelands bisected by the Durand
Line. For reasons explored in greater depth in Chapter 1, the
Haqqanis sided with Pakistan in this dispute, and because of this
alliance their area of operation in Afghanistan developed into the
single richest pipeline for war materiel servicing the anti-Soviet
conflict during the 1980s.
â•… Pakistan’s military support for the Haqqanis began in the 1970s
when Pakistan looked to Afghan Islamists opposed to a Moscow-
leaning Afghan government to serve as its agents in a tit-for-tat
Pak-Afghan proxy war. Pakistan’s most famous Afghan partners in
this conflict were urban Islamist elites who had fled Kabul for the
Pakistani border city of Peshawar. Most of these men had no roots
in the highland tribal areas on the Afghan side of the Durand Line,
nor any infrastructure there with which to mobilize resources for a
sustained campaign of anti-regime violence. The Haqqani network
did. More importantly, the southeastern region where the Haqqanis
originated and where they began their 1970s jihad against the

4
 I NT R OD UC T I ON

Afghan government was singularly blessed in terms of strategic

space. Mountainous and peopled by tribes who had long main-
tained a significant degree of autonomy from the state center, the
region known as Loya Paktia was easily defended—especially as
the heights overlooking the areas along the border lie on the Pakis�
tani side. It was also relatively close to Kabul and even closer to
Jalalabad, and so could pose a real threat to two cities that were
strategically vital to the regime, including the capital. Long-stand-
ing ties of tribal solidarity and cooperation in shared struggles
against state intervention meant that the Haqqanis and their Afghan
tribal allies would have no trouble finding refuge and support from
just over the border, and from the mid-1970s the Haqqanis were
based just as much in Pakistan’s North Waziristan Tribal Agency as
they were in the Afghan southeast.
â•… After the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan in 1979, the Haqqanis’
advantageous strategic location and well-developed capacity for
mobilizing the tribes for war made them among the most favored
recipients of the massive amounts of military and financial aid that
the United States, Saudi Arabia, and several other states poured into
Pakistan to counter the Soviet advance. With money from the CIA
and Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence Directorate (ISI), and using
Saudi contractors, a sprawling base and supply depot was built at
Zhawara in the province of Khost and put under the Haqqanis’ com-
mand. Flying in the face of guerrilla warfare doctrine, the Pakistani
military decided that this base would be a fortified fixed position
and principal node for distributing war materiel to the Afghan
resistance from within the country. When attacked by Soviet and
Afghan forces, the ISI and Pakistani army twice deployed forces to
defend the base, the only instances of this kind of direct cross-border
incursion by Pakistan in the entire conflict.
â•… With control of this strategic asset, the Haqqanis’ position was
further consolidated throughout the 1980s by hundreds of millions
of dollars worth of military aid provided directly by the ISI and
CIA. According to the CIA official in charge of the provision of
American assistance to the Afghan mujahidin, 60,000 tons of mate-
riel were shipped across the border from Pakistan every year.7 The
ISI official responsible for the distribution of this massive resource

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 F OUNT AI NH E AD OF JIHAD

supply to the various resistance parties has written that 20 percent

of these supplies were routed directly to the Haqqanis at Zhawara.8
This would mean that, by their own estimates, the ISI and CIA sup-
plied the Haqqanis with at least 12,000 tons of war materiel every
year during the 1980s conflict with the Soviet Union in Afghanistan.
The Haqqani network thus served as a fountainhead of violence
without parallel during that conflict.
â•… From Zhawara the Haqqanis supplied resistance groups through-
out the south and east of Afghanistan, and in that sense alone it is
clear that the Haqqanis were more than local actors, concerned only
with regional autonomy. Moreover, their very local autonomy was
predicated upon the unrivalled access to resources afforded them
by their ISI and CIA relationships. But from the mid-1980s the
Haqqanis’ fountainhead began to service conflicts much further
afield as well. Pakistan’s military dictator Zia ul-Haq is reported to
have said in 1980 that “the biggest share of the international arms
and American financial assistance” would be given to “whoever
trains our boys from Kashmir.”9 The areas surrounding the
Â�HaqqaÂ�nis’ Zhawara base became the central facility for this training
initiative in Afghanistan, and the Haqqani network continued to
host and support these camps, with direct ISI involvement, until
September 2001. And it was not just holy warriors bound for
Â�Kashmir who benefited from the Haqqanis’ Zhawara training com-
plex. Al-Qa’ida established its first major camps in the Zhawara
Valley, and it was from these camps that it declared war on the
United States in the late 1990s. The Uighurs, Uzbeks, and other
Asian and Arab militant groups that shelter today with the Haqqani
network in North Waziristan also trained in the Zhawara camps. As
these groups continue to wage their various revolutionary struggles
from the Haqqani network’s strongholds on the Pakistani frontier,
the Haqqanis remain to this day intertwined in cycles of violence
that extend throughout the world.

Jihad
The Haqqani network’s clients, be they states or anti-state revolu-
tionaries, have not sought the Haqqanis’ services for the delivery of

6
 I NT R OD UC T I ON

violence in some abstract sense. The Haqqanis’ brand indicates a

fountainhead of “jihad,” of violence specifically sanctioned by
Islam. The way this term is understood and deployed by so-called
jihadi groups taking recourse to political violence is of relatively
recent origins however, and was the product of a profound trans-
formation in the theory and practice of jihad wrought during the
last quarter of the twentieth century. The Haqqanis played a key
role in this transformation, though this fact has not previously been
recognized.
â•… The term jihad, which literally means struggle, has been
employed for multiple purposes during the past century. From the
political activism of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt to the inter-
national missionary work of the Tablighi Jama’at, the appropriation
of this term by different actors in the contemporary world has not
always referred to organized violence. Even in the case of the latter
there are many variations and ambiguities, from irredentist libera-
tion struggles to revolutionary political violence against repressive
regimes. There is no question, however, that the concept of jihad as
a category of action around which large numbers of people mobi-
lized for collective struggle underwent a profound transformation
in the context of the Afghan–Soviet war of the 1980s. One critical
site of that transformation was the Haqqanis’ fountainhead of jihad.
â•… In the sense used by al-Qa’ida, jihad has come to mean universal,
privatized, volunteer militarism in asymmetrical conflict with a
globally distributed enemy. This phenomenon—also known as
global jihadism—arose in large part due to the initiative of two
famous Arab supporters of the anti-Soviet mujahidin: ‘Abdullah
‘Azzam and Osama bin Laden. ‘Azzam has long been credited with
issuing the foundational Islamic legal decisions declaring the
Afghan jihad a universally and individually binding duty borne by
all Muslims worldwide. As documented in Chapter 2, however,
Jalaluddin Haqqani preceded ‘Azzam in this innovation by several
years, and was the first Afghan Islamist known to have actively
recruited Arab foreign fighters into his ranks. The Haqqanis also
figured prominently in the propaganda through which ‘Azzam first
popularized this notion of global jihadism throughout the Arab
world. As for Bin Laden, his most important contribution to global

7
 F OUNT AI NH E AD OF JIHAD

jihadism was in establishing al-Qa’ida, the earliest form of which

was a training camp that, as one early eyewitness put it, was
“advertised as forming the nucleus of an Islamic army capable of
fighting jihad anywhere in the world.”10 That camp was established
just north of the Zhawara base, using construction equipment from
that base, and employing Arab trainers that had fought for years
alongside the Haqqanis in the southeast. The founder of al-Qa’ida,
its first two military leaders, and the man credited with crafting its
anti-American strategy, all began their careers in jihad as volunteer
fighters at Haqqani network fronts. Al-Qa’ida and the Haqqani
network, in other words, evolved together, and they have remained
intertwined throughout their history. They remain so to this day.
â•… Al-Qa’ida’s particular brand of sacralized global violence was not
the only form of militant Islamism to emerge from the Haqqani
network’s fountainhead of jihad. Veterans of Haqqani battlefields
and alumni of the Zhawara camps figure prominently in a bewil-
dering variety of contemporary jihadisms. From North Africa to the
North Caucasus, the Persian Gulf to the Philippines, a truly global
coterie of militant groups has been actively supported by the
Haqqani network through training, fundraising, and propaganda
services. Though the Haqqanis established this network of relation-
ships during the 1980s and 1990s, they did not cease with the
American invasion of Afghanistan in 2001. As discussed through-
out Part II of this book, the Haqqanis continue to provide valuable
services to a diverse group of regional and transnational militants
from their haven in North Waziristan.

Nexus
In light of the fact that North Waziristan falls nominally under the
sovereignty of a “frontline partner” in the US-led global war on
non-state terrorism, one naturally wonders how the Haqqani net-
work is able to maintain these connections to transnational jihad-
ism. A similar question could be raised about the Haqqanis’ support
for jihadi groups in the 1990s. As discussed in Chapter 3, the Taliban
regime was under intense international pressure to crack down on
non-Afghan militants operating from within their borders, and the

8
 I NT R OD UC T I ON

Taliban leadership took a number of measures in the last years of

their rule to do just that. The Haqqani network, however, remained
effectively outside Taliban control, and Taliban restrictions on al-
Qa’ida and other jihadis were easily circumvented in Haqqani-
controlled Khost. Why was this so? How, in other words, was the
Haqqani network able to maintain their autonomy from state
�control and keep the fountainhead of jihad in business during all
these years?
â•… The answer lies in a complicated set of relations to local, regional,
and global allies, clients and resource providers, whose various
interests and goals have often been in direct contradiction with each
other. The Haqqani network has survived for nearly forty years in
an extremely volatile region of the world, and it has done so pri-
marily through a careful balancing act that has kept it at the center
of a nexus of violence. The dynamics of this nexus are explored at
length in Part II, but its contours can be grasped by briefly consider-
ing the Haqqanis’ triangle of relations with the Pakistani Taliban,
the Pakistani military, and al-Qa’ida.
â•… Respectively representing the local, regional, and global dimen-
sions of the Haqqani nexus, these are not three groups that one
would expect to find sharing a single partner. Al-Qa’ida and large
segments of the Pakistani Taliban—in particular the Tehrik-e
Â�Taliban Pakistan (TTP)—are at war with the Pakistani state, and
despite their differences, Pakistan does aid the United States in the
latter’s drone war on al-Qa’ida and the TTP. Yet all three of these
groups rely on the Haqqanis as a platform for the delivery of vio-
lence that serves their various interests, and in ways that mutually
reinforce the Haqqani network’s position of power in North
Waziristan and Loya Paktia.
â•… All three of these groups rely on the Haqqanis for the latter’s
unparalleled capacity to deliver anti-regime and anti-Coalition vio-
lence in Afghanistan—a capacity that, again, is itself built partly on
the Haqqanis’ relations with these groups. Pakistan is determined
to limit the influence of its archrival India in Afghanistan, and the
Haqqanis have proven willing to direct their violence toward this
end. The 2008 Indian Embassy bombing in Kabul is perhaps the
most notable example. The Afghan government’s defense ministry,

9
 F OUNT AI NH E AD OF JIHAD

moreover, is led largely by former leaders of the pre-2001 Northern

Alliance, an anti-Taliban coalition that was supported by India.
Pakistan continues to view these men as pro-India and thus hostile
to Pakistan’s interests. All of the Haqqani network’s anti-regime
violence is therefore viewed by the Pakistani military establishment
as weakening India’s position in Afghanistan. No other segment of
the Afghan insurgency can offer the Pakistani military the same
level of capability in delivering destabilizing violence to the Afghan
capital. So long as Pakistan’s army remains committed to unilater-
ally shaping the post-American future of Afghanistan in its per-
ceived interests, the Haqqani network will continue to be a valuable
asset of the military.
â•… In addition to the provision of safe havens, al-Qa’ida relies on the
Haqqanis to provide access to a symbolically important front
against the “Zionist-Crusader” occupiers of Afghanistan. For years
al-Qa’ida has been sending its fighters with Haqqani commanders
carrying out attacks in the southeast, though the most important
weapon al-Qa’ida has brought to these fights is a video camera.
Dozens of videos have been produced in this way, allowing al-
Qa’ida to capitalize on this Haqqani-assisted access in the form of
recruitment and fundraising productions. Al-Qa’ida’s media efforts
attract further resources for violence in North Waziristan, though
how much this directly benefits the Haqqani network is not entirely
clear. The Uighur Turkestan Islamic Party and the Uzbek-domi-
nated Islamic Jihad Union have adopted the same symbiotic prac-
tices, repackaging their Haqqani-facilitated involvement in the fight
in the southeast as resource-generating propaganda videos.
â•… Since 2007 the various Pakistani Taliban militias have directed
much of their violence against Islamabad, though initially the rai-
son d’être of these groups was supporting the Afghan fight against
foreign invaders. The Mehsud tribes that dominate the TTP today
do not occupy territory contiguous with Afghanistan, and they rely
on the Haqqanis to facilitate access to the Afghan battlefields and
provide in-country military leadership for their fighters. The TTP
has a material interest at stake here: if they cannot send men to the
fight, they cannot raise men or money for the fight. In this sense
their business model relies heavily on the Haqqani network’s foun-
tainhead services.

10
 I NT R OD UC T I ON

â•… All three of these groups also rely on the Haqqanis for the latter’s
diplomatic “good offices.” The Pakistani state has repeatedly turned
to the Haqqanis to negotiate on its behalf with the TTP and other
Pakistani militants based in the tribal areas, negotiations that have
resulted in a number of infamous peace accords that have effec-
tively ceded sovereignty in parts of the tribal areas to the Haqqanis
and their allies and have included in some cases the release of TTP
leaders from Pakistani prisons. According to one source, Iran even
turned to the Haqqani network when one of its diplomats was kid-
napped in Peshawar, and the Haqqanis allegedly secured the
release of the hostage in return for the release of a number of prom-
inent al-Qa’ida members from Iranian custody.11 The Haqqanis
were recently called upon to assist in settling a long-running sectar-
ian war between Sunni and Shi’i tribes in Kurram Agency. Its abil-
ity to intervene effectively in these instances and to help regulate
levels of intra-Pakistani violence underscores the ways in which the
Haqqani network’s status as a proxy of the Pakistani state is not
limited to the latter’s interests in Afghanistan.
â•… For its part, the Haqqani network derives clear benefits from this
triangle of relations. Its value as a “strategic asset” to Pakistan has
proven so great that the latter has not taken any significant meas-
ures to restrict the Haqqani network’s activities or curtail its power,
despite unrelenting pressure from the United States to do so. There
seems little doubt that the Pakistani military establishment is the
Haqqanis’ most valuable partner, for without the effective impunity
afforded them by the state they would be unable to provide services
to or derive benefit from their local and transnational militant allies.
The Haqqanis’ relationship with the Pakistani Taliban provides
them with tens of thousands of reserve foot soldiers. The Pakistani
Taliban’s reliance on the Haqqani network for access to Afghanistan
gives the Haqqanis a certain degree of influence over the TTP’s
direction of violence, a card that considerably strengthens their
hand with the Pakistani state. Al-Qa’ida continues to provide the
Haqqanis with a global media platform and a highly visible profile
within its constituency of potential donors and supporters. More
tangibly, the Haqqani network has made extremely lethal use of
al-Qa’ida’s innovative tactics and technologies of violence, intro-

11
 F OUNT AI NH E AD OF JIHAD

ducing suicide attacks into Afghanistan and reportedly importing

IED technologies developed by al-Qa’ida in Iraq.12

Unresolved Tensions
Despite the various ways in which the Haqqanis clearly benefit
from their alliance with al-Qa’ida, a good argument could be made
that the relationship is actually more of a liability than an asset for
the Haqqani network. From the cruise missile strikes on its camps
in 1998 to the current wave of drone attacks on its stronghold in
North Waziristan, the Haqqani network’s ties to al-Qa’ida have
made it the target of a United States willing to go to extraordinary
lengths in its war on global jihadism’s vanguard. The al-Qa’ida
alliance would also seem to complicate the Haqqani network’s rela-
tionship with the Pakistani military. For it is one thing for Pakistan
to be seen as hedging its bets toward an uncertain future in post-
American Afghanistan, and quite another for Pakistan to be per-
ceived as facilitating, even indirectly, al-Qa’ida’s war on the United
States. For an organization that has proven itself in so many other
respects an extremely pragmatic actor, why do the Haqqanis remain
so invested in al-Qa’ida’s quixotic global jihad?
â•… This question points to certain unresolved tensions that have
emerged in the four-decades long career of the Haqqani network,
not least being its ideological definition. No other organization or
group has had as long, as close, and as enduring a relationship with
al-Qa’ida as the Haqqani network. This relationship has always
entailed significant risks and has complicated the Haqqani net-
work’s relations with much more powerful partners, including the
Taliban and the Pakistani military. One is tempted therefore to put
this down to ideological extremism and to read the Haqqani net-
work as committed on principle to al-Qa’ida’s jihadi project. The
evidence for this, however, is ambiguous. As discussed in Part I, the
Haqqanis did anticipate al-Qa’ida’s anti-American turn in their own
publications in the early 1990s, but this hardly set them apart from
other Afghan mujahidin groups or indeed from the main currents
of Islamism worldwide, which were largely united in condemning
the American military involvement in the first Gulf War. The

12
 I NT R OD UC T I ON

Haqqanis also proved adept at talking out of both sides of their

mouths in these publications, sometimes making mutually contra-
dictory statements in different magazines to suit the perceived
preferences of those magazines’ different audiences. Public rhetoric
aside, what did set the Haqqani network apart was that its ideologi-
cal pronouncements were being backed by significant investment
in and support for al-Qa’ida’s training camp infrastructure in Loya
Paktia throughout the 1990s. In that sense the Haqqani network was
decisively less moderate than the Taliban, as it was not simply ideo-
logically sympathetic to al-Qa’ida’s cause but was actively helping
the group to operationalize its vision.
â•… However, the picture of the Haqqani network’s ideological com-
mitments that emerges from its publications is markedly different
from that of so-called Salafi jihadism, bearing a much greater
resemblance to mainstream Pakistani Deobandi Islamism. These
publications bear little if any trace of the Salafism of many of al-
Qa’ida’s leaders, do not cite the standard traditional authorities or
proof-texts of Salafi jihadism, and show no signs of the hyper-
monotheistic rigidity associated with Salafi or Wahhabi move-
ments. As noted in Chapter 3, the Haqqanis took exception to the
Taliban’s repressive interpretations of Islamic orthodoxy and did
not allow certain Taliban restrictions on women and popular cus-
toms to be applied in Khost. Unlike their “fundamentalist” counter-
parts in the anti-Soviet war, the Haqqanis did not subscribe to the
tenets or adopt the organizational models of revolutionary Islam-
ism; they never sought to seize state power for themselves, did not
employ hierarchical cadre structures, and there is no evidence that
they ever expressed the least displeasure with popular forms of
Islamic ritual practice. On the contrary, Saudi trainees headed for
the Haqqani camps at Khost were warned to bite their tongues at
the “heresies” that they would there see on display.13 In their atti-
tudes toward Islam and tribal political culture, the Haqqanis appear
in most respects as conservatives, not radicals.
â•… Again, this is a tension that the Haqqani network—or at least our
study of its history—has been unable to resolve completely. Many
writers have argued that Sirajuddin Haqqani, the current military
leader of the network, seems to have presided over a shift toward

13
 F OUNT AI NH E AD OF JIHAD

a more radical ideological position than that held by his father

�Jalaluddin. But a further tension remains, one whose resolution
only the future can determine. Throughout its history the Haqqani
network has literally and figuratively straddled the Pak-Afghan
border, always with one foot in two nations. Yet its relations with
the Pakistani state, while long-standing, have had their ups and
downs. The ISI’s single-minded favoritism for Gulbuddin Hekmatyar
during the post-Soviet Afghan civil war was not lost on the
Haqqani network, which largely charted its own course during
those years and made common cause with many Afghan mujahidin
leaders that the ISI considered bitter enemies. The Haqqanis first
took up arms in defense of highland Pashtun autonomy in Afghan-
istan’s southeast, and their acceptance of Pakistan’s military assis-
tance has been predicated from the beginning on furthering that
aim. Pakistan’s interests in Afghanistan are not limited to Loya
Paktia, however, and it remains to be seen to what extent the
Haqqani network will continue to hitch its fate to the Pakistani
military’s perilous regional strategies.

A Note on Sources
This study of the Haqqani network is the first of its kind in that it is
based almost entirely on primary documentary sources. We con-
ducted the first known review of near-complete sets of three maga-
zines produced by the Haqqani network from 1989 to 1993, in all
comprising well over 1000 pages: Manba’ al-Jihad (one version in
Pashto and another in Arabic) and Nusrat al-Jihad (“Support for
Jihad,” in Urdu). We were able to obtain and study a number of
book-length publications by the Haqqanis dating to this period,
books which have likewise been hitherto unknown to scholarship,
as well as a series of digital videos produced by the group since
2001. We also make extensive use of materials stored in the US
Defense Department’s “Harmony” database, including a review of
several thousand pages of letters written to and from Haqqani com-
manders during the 1980s and 1990s. While this latter material is
extremely rich and illuminating, readers should be aware of the
limitations that surround the use of these documents. Items in the
Harmony database were collected on the battlefield in an ad hoc

14
 I NT R OD UC T I ON

manner. There is no way to know how representative the docu-

ments captured by US forces are of a potentially much larger body
of texts produced by the Haqqani network, al-Qa’ida, or other
groups active in Afghanistan.
â•… Our study is also informed by a review of over two dozen vol-
umes of memoirs and first-person narratives, as well as hundreds
of pages of private correspondence, by Arab supporters of the
Haqqani network, al-Qa’ida members, and other members of the
Afghan Arab community (non-Afghan Muslim volunteers who
travelled to Pakistan and Afghanistan to aid the Afghan mujahi-
din). As with the Haqqani network publications, many of these
texts have never been studied before, and the material made avail-
able here for the first time sheds much new light on the history of
the Afghan Arabs, al-Qa’ida, and the origins of global jihadism.
â•… We also conducted interviews with a number of historians, jour-
nalists, and policy practitioners who have either personally encoun-
tered or have had firsthand knowledge of the Haqqani network at
specific points in its history. In addition to those that asked not to
be named here, we benefited from communicating with Anand
Gopal, Antonio Giustozzi, Bob Nickelsberg, Thomas Ruttig, Pir
Zubayr Shah, and Jere Van Dyk.
â•… As for secondary sources and materials in Western languages, we
made every effort to be comprehensive, including in our research
all references to the Haqqanis in the English-language press, in the
foreign press translated by the Foreign Broadcast Information Ser-
vice (FBIS), in the documents released by WikiLeaks, and in the
considerable body of secondary literature on Afghanistan and
�Pakistan. Whenever possible, however, our emphasis in this book
is placed squarely on the primary sources, and we have not
attempted to provide an analytical survey of the secondary litera-
ture here. Particularly valuable secondary sources are cited in the
text and listed in the bibliography.

Caveats
In giving primacy to what the Haqqanis and their various allies
have written about themselves, we are in a certain sense privileging

15
 F OUNT AI NH E AD OF JIHAD

their version of events. Many of our sources were originally

intended as propaganda, presenting the Haqqani network in a par-
ticular light in order to attract support. This book does not simply
mediate the Haqqanis’ self-representation, however. As already
noted, our archive consists just as much of private, internal com-
munication as it does of texts meant for public consumption. More-
over, we have sought to contextualize the sources within the
broader history of regional conflict and to corroborate statements
by, wherever possible, presenting multiple sources on specific
points of fact. In some instances, however, we have had to rely on
single sources, sources whose version of events may be challenged
or contradicted by the emergence of further evidence. We decided
to include such details to provide a baseline primary source history
of events about which many questions still remain.
â•… It also bears pointing out what Fountainhead of Jihad isn’t. We do
not attempt to provide here a comprehensive history of the Haqqani
network. As its subtitle indicates, our book is as much concerned
with the larger context of the development of transnational Islamist
militancy (the nexus) as it is with the Haqqanis themselves. In being
the first monograph centered on the Haqqani network we of course
hope to have gone some way to filling this significant gap in the
literature, though much remains to be done. However valuable our
primary sources are for understanding the history of the Haqqanis
and their relationships, studies based on fieldwork—such as those
of Thomas Ruttig—or interviews with the principal actors—such as
the work of Anand Gopal—are still indispensable. We hope our
book will have supplemented, but certainly not replaced, the work
of such scholars.
â•… Finally, the authors decided at the beginning of our research that
we would leave the policy debates surrounding the Haqqani net-
work aside and instead focus on the available primary sources.
Our sole aim has been to advance public knowledge and under-
standing of one of the most complicated set of actors in a long-
running and ongoing conflict, and not to advocate for or against
any particular policy option by any particular state involved in this
conflict. To the extent that our findings bear upon the Haqqani
network’s potential futures as we near the 2014 drawdown of US

16
 I NT R OD UC T I ON

and NATO forces in Afghan�istan, such questions are addressed in

the Conclusion.

Layout of the Book

At every stage of the research, this project has been a shared and
collaborative process, though we have divided the writing neatly
down the middle. Part I, including this Introduction, was written
by Vahid Brown. Part II, including the Conclusion, was written by
Don Rassler. We have arrived at our interpretations and conclu-
sions in conversation with one another, though the respective
authors are solely responsible for whatever is written in their seg-
ments of the text.
â•… Part I is primarily historical, providing a narrative of the origins
of the Haqqani network and of the course of its development up to
11 September 2001. Chapter 1 seeks to situate the Haqqani network’s
origins within their regional, cultural, and political contexts. Part of
what has made the Haqqanis distinctive in Afghanistan’s recent
violent history is their relationship to highland Pashtun tribal poli-
tics, a relationship that has left an indelible imprint on the forms of
Islamism and popular mobilization they have deployed. This chap-
ter explores this relationship and identifies the Haqqanis’ place in
Pak-Afghan interstate conflict, a position that first attracted the
resources enabling them to establish the fountainhead of their future
jihadi enterprises. Chapter 2 centers on the Afghan–Soviet war and
the Haqqani network’s pivotal role in facilitating the militant evolu-
tion of the Afghan Arab movement, a process that included the birth
of al-Qa’ida as among its most fateful consequences. Chapter 3
charts the course of the Haqqani network’s further development in
the aftermath of the Soviet withdrawal, including its relations with
the Taliban movement and the expansion of its support for a wide
variety of transnational jihadi organizations.
â•… Though partially offset with a wealth of audiovisual materials,
documentary sources for the period covered in Part II are relatively
few. The second part of the book therefore shifts from the primarily
historiographic register of the first half to a more analytic effort to
explore and explain the organizational dynamics of the Haqqani

17
 F OUNT AI NH E AD OF JIHAD

network and its various relations. Beginning with a separate intro-

duction, Part II explores these relationships during the post-2001
period through the lens of the group’s value proposition to its local,
regional, and global partners. The first three chapters of Part II are
organized around this framework, with Chapter 4 providing an
assessment of the local Afghan and Pakistani components of the
Haqqani network and how and in which functional areas the
Haqqanis’ operations are integrated with and provide value to its
local partners (i.e., various factions of the Pakistani Taliban). Chap-
ter 5 broadens this view to a regional aperture and explores the
dynamics of the Haqqani network’s relationship with the Pakistani
state and its military and intelligence agencies. Chapter 6 docu-
ments the nature of the Haqqani network’s ties with al-Qa’ida and
other global jihadist actors, such as the Islamic Jihad Union, across
functional and operational realms since 9/11. Chapter 7 provides
an overview of how the Haqqani network has been able to manage
and maintain its nexus position over time, and an assessment of the
entanglements and organizational tension associated with the
group’s nexus position. The text concludes with an overview of our
major findings and what they potentially tell us about the future of
US–Pakistan ties, the Haqqani network, and al-Qa’ida.

18
Fig. 1: Haqqani fighter using an anti-aircraft gun during the anti-Soviet
jihad period (Source: Manba al-Jihad).

Fig. 2: Entrance to the Zhawara base (Source: Manba al-Jihad).

 Fig. 3: Abdullah Azzam (Source: Manba al-Jihad).

Fig. 4: Jalaluddin Haqqani recovering from injuries sustained during a

Soviet and Afghan assault on his Zhawara base in 1987 (Source: Manba
al-Jihad).
Fig. 5: Nusrat al-Jihad cover with Jalaluddin Haqqani and Zia ul-Haq
(Source: Nusrat al-Jihad).

Fig. 6: Jalaluddin Haqqani and Sami ul-Haq in a General Gathering of the

Jamiat-e-Ulama-e-Islam in Lahore, Pakistan, April 1991 (Source: Manba al-
Jihad).

Fig. 7: Jalaluddin Haqqani with Gulf Sheikhs (Source: Manba al-Jihad).

Fig. 8: The Manba’ ‘Ulum madrassa, in North Waziristan, Pakistan circa

1989 (Source: Manba al-Jihad).
Fig. 9: Jalaluddin Haqqani (back seated row, third from right), Ahmed
Shah Massoud (to his right), Abdul Haq (in white with Afghan pakool)
and leaders at the National Commanders Shura, May 1990 (Source: Manba
al-Jihad).

Fig. 10: Ibrahim Haqqani after the capture of Khost garrison in 1991
(Source: Robert Nickelsberg).

Fig. 11: Uighur fighters cleaning guns in Khost, 1990 (Source: Robert Nick-
elsberg).

Fig. 12: Ibrahim Haqqani being interviewed by Rahimullah Yusuf�zai and

Lyse Doucet after the capture of Khost in 1991 (Source: Robert Nickelsberg).
Fig. 13: Burhanuddin Rabbani with Jalaluddin Haqqani in the weapons
room at the Zhawara base (Source: Manba al-Jihad).

Fig. 14: Poster of Osama bin Laden captured at the Zhawara base after the
U.S. invasion of Afghanistan in October 2001 (Source: Getty Images).

Fig. 15: Screen grab from a Haqqani network video of President Barack
Obama giving the commencement address at the U.S. Military Academy at
West Point, 22 May 2010 (Source: Manba al-Jihad video).

Fig. 16: Screen grab of the emir of the Pakistani Taliban, Hakimullah
Mehsud, sitting with Jordanian suicide bomber, Humam Khalil Abu-Mulal
al-Balawi (Abu Dujanah al-Khorasani) before his attack against Forward
Operating Base Chapman in December 2009 (Source: Manba al-Jihad video).
 PART I

ESTABLISHMENT AND HISTORICAL

EVOLUTION OF THE HAQQANI NEXUS
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 1

SITUATING THE HAQQANIS

ORIGINS, POLITICAL CULTURE, REGIONAL CONTEXTS

The Haqqani network has been an enduring feature of the violent

political landscape of Afghanistan and Pakistan for the past four
decades, a period that has not been kind to either country. Seem-
ingly endless coups and foreign military interventions; regimes that
have oscillated between authoritarianism and ineptitude; unprec-
edented levels of displaced civilians, suicide terrorism, and heroin
production; devastating ecological disasters; and pervasive social
and economic instability have bedeviled the region during these
turbulent years. Afghanistan, the last battleground of the Cold War
and the first of the global War on Terror, has not known peace since
the Soviet invasion of 1979. Pakistan, which entered this period
with the loss of half its territory in Bangladesh’s war of independ-
ence, has been locked in a nuclear stalemate with India punctuated
by varying levels of cross-border war-by-proxy, and is currently
fighting Baluch and Pashtun insurgencies all along its western fron-
tier. Against this background of unrelenting chaos, how has the
Haqqani network managed not only to survive but to maintain the
sanctuary for the jihadi groups whose global campaigns of violence
have done so much to define the course of the still young twenty-
first century?

21
 F OUNT AI NH E AD OF JIHAD

â•… There is no single, simple answer to this question. Rather, the

factors that explain the rise and remarkable longevity of the
Haqqani network are as complex and messy as the history of the
region itself. This chapter seeks to locate the Haqqani network in
the first decade of its existence within the cultural, political, and
physical geography of the area from which it emerged. The particu-
lar history and characteristics of this region—eastern Afghanistan
and the mountainous tribal areas of Pakistan’s western frontier—
have not only shaped the Haqqanis’ evolution and strategic behav-
ior over time; they have also provided the Haqqanis with assets
critical to their success in eking out an enduring position of power
and far-reaching influence over four decades of regional conflict
and globalized political violence.

The Highland Pashtun “Shatter Zone”

The Haqqanis’ primary areas of operation since the early 1970s have
been the southeastern Afghan provinces of Khost, Paktia, and
Â�Paktika—known collectively as Loya Paktia or “greater Paktia”—
and North Waziristan, one of the seven Tribal Agencies that make
up Pakistan’s Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA). This
area lies at the southern end of the highland Pashtun region, which
stretches from Paktika, Afghanistan, and South Waziristan, Pakistan,
in the south, to Kunar, Afghanistan, and Bajaur, Pakistan, in the
north. This mountainous and agriculturally unproductive region
straddles the Durand Line, the (disputed) international boundary
between Afghanistan and Pakistan, and is home to the Karlanri
Pashtun confederacy, a group of tribes that share, in addition to a
single quasi-legendary ancestor, a distinct political culture that is
very different from the lowland Pashtuns of the two countries.1
â•… The Pashtuns themselves mark this distinction in terms of the
binary pair nang (honor-bound) and qalang (rent-paying), as in the
Pashtun proverb “taxes ate the valleys, honor ate the hills.”2
Anthropologist David Edwards succinctly summarizes this binary
in the following terms:
Nang Pakhtuns generally inhabit the mountainous fringe of the Pakhtun
universe where the land is poor and life is harsh; nang societies are acepha-

22
 S I T UAT I NG T H E H AQQAN IS

lous and segmentary in structure, and codes of conduct are bound by tra-
ditional codes of honor. Qalang Pakhtuns, on the other hand, are
hierarchical; they inhabit tracts of fertile land that produce large marketa-
ble surpluses; their patterns of social interaction are asymmetrical and
structured less by Pakhtunwali (the Pakhtun code of honor) than by the
economics of patron–client relations.3

Given the poor agricultural resources and fiercely defended inde-

pendence of the nang highland tribes, it is not altogether surprising
that neither Afghanistan nor Pakistan—nor, indeed, any of a long
list of invading empires that ruled the wider region in centuries
past—has ever been successful in completely integrating the high-
land Pashtun region into their respective polities. Instead, Afghan�
istan and Pakistan (and the British Raj before 1947) traditionally
adopted what Thomas Barfield has called a “Swiss cheese model”
of governance, whereby “regimes expected their writs to run com-
pletely only in the most populated and economically prosperous
parts of the country. The people in the poorer high mountains …
were left to fend for themselves as long as they did not challenge
state authority. If they did, the state resorted to a range of weapons
well short of direct rule to get them to cease.”4 Though thus mar-
ginal to the central political cultures of the two states, the Pashtun
highlands were also the source of “most acts of antistate violence
over the preceding hundred years or so,” to such an extent that “the
Pakhtuns of the frontier were the kingmakers and breakers”5 within
Afghanistan and were similarly troublesome to British rule in the
late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries—to say nothing of
Islamabad since 2007.
â•… A consistent feature of these highland Pashtun mobilizations of
violence against the two political centers on their flanks that has
particular bearing for our understanding of the Haqqani network is
that they were largely led and organized under the auspices of
clerical rather than tribal leadership. Indeed, the general political
significance of clerical authority in the Pashtun highlands has
existed in marked contrast to the role of mullahs in the political
economies of lowland Pashtuns, where their status is often defined
as marginal.6 It is because of this perceived marginality that the rise
of the Taliban in southern Afghanistan in the mid-1990s appeared

23
 F OUNT AI NH E AD OF JIHAD

as a revolutionary and unprecedented assertion of religious author-

ity over Afghanistan’s political destiny.7 However valid this insight
may be with regard to the Taliban, which arose among lowland
Pashtuns of the Kandahar region, the history of the Haqqani net-
work’s clerically based leadership is to a much greater extent in
continuity with the last century and a half of highland Pashtun
political history.8
â•… While that history cannot be traced in full here, some of its fea-
tures bear mentioning as they shed direct light on the form of
organization taken by the Haqqanis and their various regional allies
over the past forty years.9 Although there are numerous individual
antecedents earlier in the nineteenth century, the existence of a
broad-based “clerical network” throughout the highland Pashtun
zone that mobilized both resistance to Kabul and a series of upris-
ings against the British in India dates to the charismatic Sufi leader
Mullah Najmuddin (d. 1903), known as the Hadda Mullah, and his
network of disciples throughout the frontier.10 As the Haqqanis
would do decades later, this network established centers of religious
education that doubled as spaces for the articulation and deploy-
ment of a political discourse that went beyond those of individual
clans. This helped lay the groundwork for collective state-evasive
action that the atomized and acephalous form of nang Pashtun
political culture could not of itself sustain. Again, to quote Edwards:
Hadda Sahib was connected to an extensive network of support and iden-
tification through the tariqat [Sufi organization] system, which provided
him with an organizational structure that was unique in the area. As we
have seen, tribes represent the dominant form of social organization in the
region and one that has a particular resiliency in the face of state encroach-
ment, but tribes also tend to be insular in orientation and provide neither
the idioms of relationship that would allow for more far-reaching alliances
nor the resources to support a widespread and sustained mobilization of
manpower.11

â•… The generation of leaders of this network following in the wake

of the Hadda Mullah’s death—centered in particular on one Haji
Sahib Turangzai—became increasingly influenced by the teachings
of the revivalist and anti-colonial Deobandi school of South Asian
Sunni Islam, whose influence was rapidly spreading throughout the

24
 S I T UAT I NG T H E H AQQAN IS

region during this same period.12 Thus the network of charismatic

Sufi preachers (pirs) and their disciples (murids) that spearheaded
collective political action among the frontier Pashtuns in the late
nineteenth century gave way during the twentieth century to a net-
work of Deobandi madrassa-based clerics (mawlanas, ‘ulama) and
their students (talibs) who carried on in the same political tradition.
These networks created supratribal solidarities among their mem-
bers and new institutions for political mobilization: the Deobandi
madrassa networks. The latter, in turn, afforded the clerical leaders
a base of manpower capable of sustaining talib militias, periodically
fielded by these clerical leaders to either resist the encroachment of
state power or to enforce social–moral control, which “accorded
mullas a military power that they could use in pursuit of personal
or ideological objectives, becoming a coercive influence within the
tribal set-up.”13
â•… The highland Pashtun region throughout this period bears many
of the hallmarks of what James C. Scott has recently termed “shatter
zones” or “regions of refuge.”14 Geographically and ecologically
remote spaces on the margins of empires and states—most typically
mountainous regions—shatter zones have throughout human his-
tory been magnets for diverse human groups seeking refuge from
the predations and disadvantages of emerging state-forms, such as
taxation, forced conscription, corvée labor, warfare, monocrop-
induced famines, and epidemics. In their social, political, and eco-
nomic life-ways, shatter zone populations have developed patterns
of organization that appear, in Scott’s analysis, “designed to thwart
state appropriation.”15 As opposed to the intensive agriculture of
lowland state space, highland shatter zones have tended toward
nomadic pastoralism, swiddening, mixed cropping, and forest col-
lecting. In terms of social and political organization, the inhabitants
of regions of refuge formed “escape social structures … designed to
aid dispersal and autonomy and to ward off political subordina-
tion.”16 The central feature of such social structures is their radical
egalitarianism, the absence of clear or durable hierarchies. All of
this has been characteristic of the highland Pashtuns and is pre-
cisely what distinguishes them from their lowland cousins, divid-
ing the nang from the qalang.

25
 F OUNT AI NH E AD OF JIHAD

â•… Significantly, Scott’s analyses found that when the fissiparous

peoples of shatter zones needed to mobilize in collective defense of
their hard-won autonomy from the violent encroachments of
states, it has been religion that most commonly “provide[d] the
social cohesion necessary for collective action.”17 Scott’s primary
example is drawn from a predominantly Buddhist context—the
upland massif of Southeast Asia—and his numerous cross-cultural
examples demonstrate that there is nothing unique to Islam per se
in the mobilizations of this particular type of collective violence.18
Indeed, a noteworthy comparison to a Western European highland
tribal context was made by Howard Hensman, an eyewitness to
the second Anglo-Afghan War in 1879: “The fiery cross, which was
sped from end to end of the Scottish Highlands, in the old days,
when the call to the arms was made, was no more powerful than is
the Koran now carried from village to village by the moolah of
Afghanistan.”19
â•… A defining feature of shatter zones in Scott’s model is a high
degree of ethnic and linguistic variation. He identifies “relative
geographical inaccessibility and … enormous diversity of tongues
and cultures” as the two “diagnostic characteristics of shatter
zones.”20 In this connection, the Pashtun highlands, in that they
appear to share a common Pashto culture and language, do not fit
Scott’s ideal type, as he himself points out.21 The Muslim-majority
region that best fits Scott’s model is the North Caucasus, one of the
most ethno-linguistically diverse and geographically inaccessible
regions on the planet, where in the nineteenth and early twentieth
centuries Sufi organizations provided the glue binding the veritable
Babel of North Caucasus groups in resisting attempts at state
encapsulation by tsarist and communist Russia.22 Yet Scott’s exclu-
sion of the Pashtun highlands on grounds of cultural unity is, on
closer inspection, perhaps somewhat misplaced.
â•… As noted above, the tribes that predominate in much of the Pash-
tun highlands form part of the Karlanri confederacy, one of the four
maximal descent groups through which all of the Pashtun tribes
trace their lineage and claim, ultimately, to be interrelated. The
three other supertribal Pashtun confederacies—the Durrani (also
known as Abdali), the Ghilzai, and the Ghurghusht—all trace their

26
 S I T UAT I NG T H E H AQQAN IS

descent to one of the three sons of Qais, an Arab contemporary of

the Prophet Muhammad and the putative ancestor of all of the
Pashtuns (except the Karlanri; see below). The genealogies of these
tribes and confederacies, however, are hugely diverse and incon-
sistent, and in the case of the Karlanri the apical ancestor is some-
times considered an adopted son of Qais, and in other cases a son
of that adopted son. As Thomas Barfield notes, there is no historical
documentation of the Pashtuns as a single distinct group going
back further than 1500 CE, and there is evidence in the genealogical
texts that call into question the notion of their always having con-
stituted a single group. To quote him at some length:
[S]triking anomalies in the basic genealogies themselves hint at a more
complex origin. In a society where all descent is patrilineal, only the senior
line (Abdali in the west and Yusefzai in the east)23 and the Ghurghusht
claim an unbroken patrilineal descent from the founder. By contrast, the
Ghilzai genealogies trace their line to a Pashtun ancestress who married a
Ghorid prince after having a child with him out of wedlock (the founding
male ancestor of the Ghilzais). The Karlanri tribes, which constitute the
most important groups in today’s NWFP,24 have no genealogical link at all
(male or female) to the sons of Qais, the Pashtun’s apical ancestor. They are
the descendents of an adopted child of uncertain origins raised by Pash-
tuns. … The Ghilzais appear to have intermarried and absorbed different
groups, particularly the Turks, who passed through eastern Afghanistan.
The bulk of the Karlanri, by contrast, appear to be the indigenous inhabit-
ants of the mountains of the NWFP who mixed little with outsiders, but
who became Pashtuns (or more precisely Pakhtuns) by adopting their lan-
guage and culture.25

â•…The various highland groups that trace their lineages in such a

way as to be designated as Karlanri are each quite distinct from one
another—they have distinctive “tribal” regalia and clothing, lin-
guistic variation, territorial settlements, and even religious prac-
tices.26 To cite one recent example, a May 2009 diplomatic cable
from the US Embassy in Kabul leaked by the WikiLeaks organiza-
tion describes a meeting that month between Afghan officials and
Zadran tribespeople in the Gayan district of Paktika, which borders
North Waziristan in the Pakistani tribal areas and lies within the
Haqqani network’s area of operation.27 The cable describes appeals
to the Zadrans by Paktika Governor Katawazay to resolve an ongo-

27
 F OUNT AI NH E AD OF JIHAD

ing dispute with the Waziri tribe, a minority population in Gayan

district and, like the Zadran, part of the Karlanri confederacy.28 In
response, “the Zadran elders energetically denied that the Waziris
belong to Gayan district, saying they belong to neighboring Bermel
district, where nearly all Paktika’s Waziris reside. They insisted that
the Waziris differ fundamentally from the Zadran in language, cus-
tom, and culture and cannot be trusted because they are more
Â�Pakistani than Afghan.”
â•… Issues of highland Pashtun cultural unity aside, the shatter zone
status of the Haqqani network’s area of control since the late 1970s
is, in light of their multiethnic jihadi guests, much less ambiguous.
As detailed in the following two chapters, “Haqqani country” has
become a true region of refuge for an astonishing variety of poly-
glot revolutionaries and Islamist militants, hailing from nearly
every region of the world. From Algeria to Indonesia, California to
Germany, would-be holy warriors from around the globe have
sought and continue to seek an anti-state base of operations in the
state-evading safe haven maintained by the Haqqani network
throughout these decades. As these diverse refuge seekers have
used the Haqqanis’ non-state space as both a hideout and a plat-
form from which to attack the states that hunt them, this region has
truly become a shatter zone—and one that shatters back.

Jalaluddin Haqqani—His Life in Regional Context

Jalaluddin Haqqani, the founder and leader of the Haqqani net-
work, was born in 1939 in the tiny village of Karezgay in the Wazi
Zadran district of Paktia Province.29 This area now falls within the
unofficial Paktian district of Gerda Serai, as yet unrecognized by the
Afghan government and notorious to US and coalition forces in the
current conflict as a Haqqani network stronghold.30 As a teenager
Jalaluddin moved with his family to a larger village in the same
district, and locals in the area now identify Sultankhel as the
“hometown” of the Haqqani family.31 Jalaluddin and his family
belong to the Sultankhel clan of the Zadran tribe.32 His father,
Khwaja Muhammad Khan, was a relatively wealthy landowner
with trading interests in both Afghanistan and Pakistan, prosperous

28
 S I T UAT I NG T H E H AQQAN IS

enough to send his sons in later years to Pakistan for advanced

religious education.33 Jalaluddin was the first of at least four sons
born to Khwaja Muhammad Khan, and his three younger broth-
ers—Muhammad Isma’il (d. 1990), Ibrahim, and Khalil—all went
on to play leading roles in the family’s jihadi enterprises, as did
Jalaluddin’s brother-in-law Ghazi Khan.34
â•… In the years surrounding Jalaluddin’s birth the southern end of
the Pashtun highland region continued to be the center of numer-
ous uprisings and violent resistance movements against both the
Afghan state and British colonial India, with the Zadran and their
Karlanri cousins often playing a leading role. During the latter half
of the 1920s the Afghan king, Amanullah, hoping to modernize his
country along the lines of Turkey’s Atatürk, pursued a widely
unpopular reformist agenda that in the end proved his undoing.
Amanullah’s decrees attempting to end the practice of purdah—the
veiling and seclusion of women—and instituting coeducational
schools were met with fierce resistance by Afghanistan’s conserva-
tive religious leaders. He also departed from long-standing policies
by which Afghanistan’s leaders had sought to contract the nominal
loyalty of the southeastern highland tribes, reducing allowances to
the tribes and extending penal codes and conscription rules to a
frontier that had long been accustomed to exemptions from such
intrusions of the state. For nine months in 1924 and 1925 the Zadran
and Mangal rose up in a rebellion against these policies, led by a
Kharoti cleric known as Mullah-i Lang (“the Lame Mullah”).35
â•… Though the Khost Rebellion, as this uprising came to be known,
was eventually put down through a mixture of negotiations and
military assaults, the eastern tribes’ resentment of Amanullah did
not cease. After the latter’s return from a European tour in 1928, the
Zadran joined the Shinwari, Jaji, and Khugiani tribes in an open
revolt against the king that swept the east, forcing Amanullah to
flee Kabul and opening the way for the brief takeover of Afghan�
istan by its first Tajik ruler, the ill-fated and illiterate Bacha Saqqao
(Habibullah Kalakani).36 Seen as an outsider usurping the time-
honored Pashtun right of rule, he proved no more popular to the
eastern tribes than did his predecessor. The Hazrat of Shor Bazaar,
a member of the Mujaddidi family, then the most powerful reli-

29
 F OUNT AI NH E AD OF JIHAD

gious family in Afghanistan and later the leaders of one of the main
anti-Soviet mujahidin parties, led the highland Pashtuns in an
assault on Kabul that put a violent end to the nine-month reign of
Bacha Saqqao. Pashtun rule was reinstated in the person of King
Nadir Shah (r. 1929–33), who promptly reestablished strict rules of
purdah and rewarded the eastern highlanders who had brought him
to power by reinstating their traditional exemptions from taxation
and army conscription.37 Memory of these events has retained its
power years later in the southeast. In 1995 the Taliban prevailed
upon the Haqqanis, to whom they had likewise granted regional
autonomy in exchange for support, to send some of their men to aid
the Taliban’s offensive against Tajik-led opponents in the north.
Jalaluddin gathered a force of some 2000 fighters, “raised and dis-
patched to Kabul with suitable exhortations over the patriotic role
of the border tribes in ousting Tajik usurpers [Bacha Saqqao] from
the capital in 1929.”38
â•… The brief reign of Nadir Shah was a period of relative peace in
Afghanistan’s highland southeast, though there was a short-lived
Zadran uprising against him during the twilight of his reign in
1933.39 His successor to the throne, Zahir Shah, also saw a period of
respite throughout most of the 1930s and 1940s from highland
Pashtun insurgency.40 On the other side of the Durand Line, how-
ever, North Waziristan emerged in this period as the center of an
anti-British jihad that engulfed the frontier and was sustained virtu-
ally without interruption from 1930 until the British quit the sub-
continent in 1947.
â•… Sparked when police fired upon a peaceful demonstration in
Peshawar in early 1930, the wave of anti-British mobilization by the
frontier Pashtuns during that year was the largest since the Anglo-
Afghan war of 1919.41 The movement was organized by activists
from the Jamiat Ulema-e-Sarhad (JUS), the frontier branch of the
Jamiat Ulema-e-Hind, the Deobandi political organization of Indian
Muslims that worked, often alongside Gandhi’s Congress party, for
Indian independence from British colonial rule. The JUS was a fore-
runner of the Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam (JUI), the Deobandi Islamist
party in Pakistan with which the Haqqani network has long been—
and remains—closely associated. The uprisings were led by clerics

30
 S I T UAT I NG T H E H AQQAN IS

from the aforementioned Hadda Mullah network, including Haji

Turangzai in the northern tribal areas and the famous Faqir of Iqi
(Mirza ‘Ali Khan) in North Waziristan. The Waziristan forces were
strengthened by thousands of well-armed and battle-seasoned
Waziri tribesmen returning from the successful campaign to oust
Bacha Saqqao from Kabul, a battle to which many of the highland
Pashtuns from east of the Durand Line had rallied. The Faqir of Ipi,
a member of the Uthmanzai Wazir tribe, continued to lead anti-
British insurgencies from North Waziristan until Partition in 1947.42
His direct descendent, Gul Bahadur, currently leads the North
Waziristan Taliban and is a close ally of the Haqqani network.43
â•… The world into which Jalaluddin Haqqani was born was thus a
maelstrom of similar types of borderland violence that he would
find himself at the center of later in adulthood. Armed defense of
highland Pashtun territorial independence; violent resistance to
state meddling with tribal or Islamic customs; and large-scale mobi-
lizations against foreign invasion—these are not new to the high-
land frontier, but rather have periodically characterized its history
since long before Haqqani’s birth. Haqqani, his siblings, and fellow
Paktians have long been familiar with these modes of political life
among the highland Pashtuns, a familiarity that would stand them
in good stead as emerging resistance leaders in the turbulent years
after the Soviet invasion.

After Partition: Pashtunistan, Marxism, and the first Daoud Regime

In one sense the emergence of the Haqqani network is a tragic leg-
acy of the partition of India. The Haqqani network was not one of
“midnight’s children” in the literal sense—a full quarter century
separates that bloody summer of 1947 from Jalaluddin Haqqani’s
first declaration of jihad in the summer of 1973. But the events and
personalities that led Haqqani to make that fateful declaration are
bound up with Partition, and in particular with the adversarial rela-
tionship between Afghanistan and newly born Pakistan that it set
in motion.
â•… Kashmir was not the only territorial dispute left over from the
division of the subcontinent into the two states of India and West

31
 F OUNT AI NH E AD OF JIHAD

and East Pakistan (now Bangladesh), nor has the Kashmir dispute
been the only central determinant of Pakistan’s often bloody rela-
tions with its neighbors. Even before the partition was finalized,
Afghanistan began lobbying aggressively for the annulment of the
Durand Line, which it viewed as an illegal boundary imposed by
Britain in 1893 by force. Afghanistan appealed to the British Parlia-
ment in early June 1947 for the inclusion of two additional options
to the upcoming plebiscite in the Northwest Frontier: union with
Afghanistan and the formation of an independent Pashtun nation,
or “Pashtunistan.” Parliament rebuffed the request and the plebi-
scite went ahead, limiting the Pashtuns of the frontier to the choice
of joining Pakistan or India.44 The highland Pashtuns of the tribal
areas, of course, were not allowed to vote in the plebiscite, living as
they did beyond the administrative zone of British India proper in
a semi-autonomous legal limbo that Britain had established at the
turn of the century and which was largely carried over by the newly
emergent Pakistan.45 Not surprisingly, the NWFP plebiscite over-
whelmingly favored union with Pakistan.
â•… These events immediately soured relations between Afghanistan
and its new neighbor and shaped the two nations’ policies toward
one another for decades. Afghanistan voted against Pakistan’s entry
into the United Nations, and conflict on the “Pashtunistan ques-
tion” led to frequent cessations of diplomatic and economic rela-
tions between the two states.46 Afghanistan vigorously supported
Pakistani Pashtun movements for Pashtunistan independence, led
in the NWFP and the tribal areas by both Pashtun nationalists and
traditional tribal religious leaders. The former were initially repre-
sented by the Khudai Khidmatgar (“Servants of God,” also known
as the Red Shirts), led by the nonviolent Gandhian activist Abdul
Ghaffar Khan, while the latter found a leader in North Waziristan’s
Faqir of Ipi, whose “Free Pashtunistan” movement battled the
�Pakistani state well into the 1950s. Pakistan viewed these move-
ments as threats to its territorial sovereignty and sought to counter-
act Kabul-supported ethno-nationalism with appeals to Islamic
solidarity, the only ideological glue holding the multiethnic
Â�Pakistani state together. Pakistan’s “Islam over tribe” approach
became a pillar of its policies on the frontier and has characterized

32
 S I T UAT I NG T H E H AQQAN IS

its deep involvement in Afghanistan’s conflicts over the last thirty

years, including its support for the Haqqani network.
â•… Pakistan’s first opportunity to manipulate these alternative soli-
darities emerged immediately after Partition. The NWFP was not
immune to the intercommunal violence that erupted over the mas-
sive population transfers attending the hasty division of the sub-
continent into Muslim and Hindu homelands, and a wave of
anti-Sikh and anti-Hindu mob violence swept the Pashtun frontier
in September of 1947. In the following month Pakistan capitalized
on these impassioned sentiments by mobilizing highland Pashtuns
from the tribal areas for an incursion into Kashmir, the first of many
attempts by Pakistan to wrest Kashmir from India via irregular
Muslim militias.47 In the 1980s and 1990s, Pakistan would turn to
the Haqqani network to train such militias for the Kashmir jihad
(see below, Chapter 2). While no doubt motivated by its conviction
that Kashmir rightfully belonged with Pakistan, Arnold Fletcher
notes that, in part, the October 1947 operation “was intended at
once to arouse Moslem enthusiasm, block Pushtoon separatism,
bring discredit to the Khudai Khidmatgaran, and hinder action by
Afghanistan.”48 The Afghan government sought to prevent high-
land tribesmen from joining the Kashmir incursion, and an Afghan
clerical group issued a fatwa (Islamic legal decision) declaring that
the war in Kashmir was not a true jihad.49 Afghanistan also step�
ped€up its efforts over the following years on behalf of Pakistani
Pashtun independence.
â•… The most aggressive Afghan champion of Pashtunistan was King
Zahir Shah’s cousin Muhammad Daoud Khan, the target of the
Haqqanis’ first jihad in 1973. Defense minister under Zahir Shah’s
first prime minister, and prime minister himself from 1953 to 1963,
Daoud’s open support for the irredentist claims of the Pashtuns east
of the Durand Line made him the nemesis of a series of Pakistani
leaders. At the same time, his fostering of increasingly close ties
with Moscow and his revival of the Amanullah-era reforms won
him many enemies within Afghanistan’s conservative clerical estab-
lishment and among the highland Pashtuns. The specter of creeping
communist influence began to haunt Daoud’s relations with the
frontier tribes on both sides of the Durand Line, eventually tipping

33
 F OUNT AI NH E AD OF JIHAD

the balance in favor of Pakistan in the Pak-Afghan contest between

Islamocentrism and ethnocentrism for control of the borderlands.50
The communist stain on Daoud’s pro-Pashtunistan stance became
indelible in 1955. The Pakistani government abolished the provin-
cial status of the NWFP as part of the “One Unit” scheme, which in
1955 amalgamated West Pakistan’s provinces into one in order to
redress power-sharing imbalances between East and West Pakistan.
Daoud openly denounced this move as a direct attack on Pashtun
independence, and in April protestors in Kabul nearly destroyed
the Pakistani Embassy, hoisting the Pashtunistan flag over the
badly damaged building. In response, Pakistan closed all diplo-
matic offices in Afghanistan and suspended transit trade, isolating
its landlocked neighbor. At the end of the year, Soviet leader Nikita
Khrushchev arrived in Kabul bearing a generous assistance pack-
age, including substantial military aid, and directly entered the fray
by demanding “an impartial plebiscite in the Pashtun areas of
Â�Pakistan.”51 The United States had by this time made Pakistan a
central pillar of its Soviet containment strategy in the region and
had lavished it with generous military aid packages, and the United
States backed Pakistan in the Pashtunistan squabble. Washington
viewed Afghan aggression against Pakistan as more likely than an
outright Soviet takeover of Afghanistan, and it refused several
requests from Daoud for military aid.52 Afghanistan had no choice
but to tilt ever closer into the Soviet sphere of influence.
â•… The Soviet relationship only added fuel to the fires of highland
Pashtun resistance to Daoud’s reform efforts. In 1959 Daoud
brought the Afghan state into a direct conflict with the tribes of
Paktia in a series of events that were both reminiscent of the rebel-
lions of the 1920s and a sign of things to come. Since 1957 Daoud
had sought to force a departure from the Afghan practice of purdah,
staging high-profile appearances of unveiled female members of his
family and issuing a series of decrees affecting gender restrictions
that raised the ire of many of the traditional clerics. At the same
time he rescinded the exemptions granted by former rulers to the
frontier tribes, and embarked on an ambitious public works project
to run roads through Loya Paktia. In September 1959 the Afghan
army was sent into Paktia to put an end to a violent dispute over

34
 S I T UAT I NG T H E H AQQAN IS

timber rights between the Zadran and Mangal tribes, a military

intervention that proved to be the last straw, inciting an anti-gov-
ernment uprising in the southeast. There had already been riots in
Kandahar earlier in the year over Daoud’s anti-purdah measures,
but the Paktian revolt proved both more complex and more conse-
quential. Tribesmen fleeing across the Durand Line received sup-
port from Pakistan, where the conflict was cast in the national press
in such a way as to highlight the triple grievances of Daoud’s
affront to Islam, communist influence, and infringement upon high-
land Pashtun autonomy. In one press release the following state-
ments were attributed to a Mangal khan speaking in Peshawar:
The exodus of about 4,000 Mangals from their homeland, in whose libera-
tion from the Bacha Saqqao rule they had played a prominent part, is a
matter which deserves serious consideration by all those who believe in
fundamental human rights. My countrymen in Afghanistan as well as
our€co-religionists in Pakistan probably know that the late king, King
�Mohammad Nadir Shah, had through a royal proclamation granted us
certain concessions, which the present regime in Kabul has decided to
withdraw for no fault of ours. The crux of the matter is that the Afghan
Government has taken strong exception to our objection of the growing
Russian influence in Afghanistan which has brought the country into the
iron grip of communists, who are preaching their atheistic creed under one
garb or another. As true Muslims, we cannot silently watch the spread of
communist ideology in the land.53

â•… The final sentiment expressed in this statement was coming to be

shared by a growing segment of Kabul’s ruling elite. In the summer
of 1960 Daoud sent Afghan troops across the Durand Line to sup-
port the khan of Bajaur in a local dispute. Once again all diplomatic
relations between Afghanistan and Pakistan were suspended and
the border was closed to transit trade, interrupting the limited
development aid that the United States had begun to provide in an
effort to balance Soviet influence in the country.54 The blockade
remained in place into the early 1960s, making Afghanistan almost
totally dependent on Soviet trade and economic assistance. Daoud’s
mania for Pashtunistan had by 1963 brought Afghanistan to the
brink of ruin, a fact not lost on King Zahir Shah and other members
of the royal household. Taking the reins of government for the first

35
 F OUNT AI NH E AD OF JIHAD

time since ascending the throne in 1933, Zahir Shah accepted

Daoud’s “resignation” from the position of prime minister and
reversed the course of Afghan policy, patching up relations with
Pakistan, strengthening ties to the United States, and embarking on
an unprecedented period of political liberalization that was to last
until his own removal from power in a bloodless coup staged by
Daoud in 1973.

The Constitutional Period (1963–73): Urban and Highland Islamic

Organization
Zahir Shah’s efforts to create a more open political atmosphere in
Afghanistan did not resolve the underlying tensions roiling Afghan
society, which now found opportunity for open expression. The
king commissioned a new and more liberal constitution in 1964 and
introduced unprecedented freedoms of press and political organi-
zation. Legislation that would legalize the formation of political
parties was passed by both houses of parliament in 1968. Though
the king ultimately declined to sign the bill into law, Afghanistan
in this period saw an explosion of informal political parties, often
forming around the sudden profusion of journals and magazines
representing every shade of the political spectrum. On the left, the
Marxist–Leninist People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA)
emerged in 1965, organized into the two factions of Parcham (“Ban-
ner”) and Khalq (“Masses”), named after two communist maga-
zines. On the Islamic right, a group of professors from the Faculty
of Shari’a at Kabul University inspired a network of student activ-
ists that formed the Jawanan-i-Musulman (“Muslim Youth”) in
1969.55 As in much of the rest of the world in the turbulent 1960s,
the primary ideological—and increasingly physical—battleground
of radical politics in Afghanistan was the urban campuses of uni-
versities and technical colleges. All of these developments were
concentrated in Kabul and their protagonists were literate, highly
politicized, and hailed predominantly from the middle and upper
classes of Afghan society. In contrast, an alternative form of organ-
ized Islamic opposition to the state emerged during the same period
in the Pashtun highlands. Economically depressed and having the

36
 S I T UAT I NG T H E H AQQAN IS

lowest literacy rates in the entire region, the border tribes’ mobiliza-
tions against Zahir Shah’s reforms had less to do with the radical
milieu of private presses and campus activism than with the age-
old struggle for regional autonomy. It is to the latter context that the
ideological and organizational origins of the Haqqani network can
be traced.
â•… The Kabul Islamist scene coalesced around the leadership of Pro-
fessor Ghulam Muhammad Niazi, who became dean of the Shari’a
Faculty at Kabul University after completing advanced studies in
1957 at al-Azhar in Cairo, the most prestigious center of Sunni
learning in the world.56 Kabul’s university-centered Islamist move-
ment was ideologically rooted in the radical wing of the Egyptian
Muslim Brotherhood, as exemplified by the writings of Sayyid
Qutb, whose works the Kabul Islamists translated and studied, and
in the writings of Abu’l-‘Ala Maududi, the ideological architect of
Pakistan’s Jamaat-i Islami (JI).57 Their confrontational campus activ-
ism was in direct response to the growth of radical Marxist and
Maoist groups at the university, and they even studied Marxist
texts in order to develop counterpropaganda. This often-violent
“conversation” with Marxist organizers left an indelible imprint on
the Kabul Islamist circle—whose leading members included the
future leaders of the so-called “fundamentalist” mujahidin parties:
Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, ‘Abd al-Rabb Rasul Sayyaf, Burhanuddin
Rabbani, and Ahmad Shah Massoud—and led them in modernist
ideological and organizational directions that were ultimately very
similar to those of their leftist opponents.58
â•… By 1970 the Kabul Islamists had developed close organizational
ties to their nearest ideological cousins in Pakistan, the JI.59 Founded
in 1941 by Maududi—himself a major influence on Sayyid Qutb—
the JI had a great deal in common with the Kabul Islamists and their
1980s-era mujahidin parties.60 Both were largely urban and modern
university-based in the origins of their leaders and cadres; both
were organizationally centralized and highly bureaucratic; and
both were revolutionary in that they sought the eventual seizure of
state power in order to usher in “a new sociopolitical order based
on varying interpretations of Islamic tenets.”61 Again reflecting their
common “enemy in the mirror,” both the Kabul Islamists and the JI

37
 F OUNT AI NH E AD OF JIHAD

adopted Leninist-style cadre structures, cultivating a vanguard of

Islamist elites that would, in theory, capture the state at the propi-
tious revolutionary moment.62 The étatism of the Kabul Islamists
was signaled from the very beginning, declaring in a shabnama
(“night letter”) shortly after the formation of the PDPA in 1965 that
they would launch a jihad to establish an Islamic state in Afghani-
stan.63 When the Kabul Islamists finally formed a party in 1972, they
further underlined their closeness to Pakistan’s JI by naming the
party Jamiat-i Islami Afghanistan (JIA).64
â•… Jalaluddin Haqqani also began his Islamic activism in a campus
environment during these years, but one far removed both in space
and political temper from that of Kabul University. Beginning in
1964 Jalaluddin embarked on a program of advanced religious
studies at the Dar al-‘Ulum Haqqaniyya madrassa in the NWFP,
Pakistan, graduating in 1970 with the equivalent of a doctoral
degree and qualified to be addressed as a mawlawi.65 This Deobandi
seminary was the birthplace of a distinctively Pashtun Islamism,
embodied in an alumni social network of religious and political
elites that has had tremendous political success and far-reaching
social influence in both Afghanistan and Pakistan. It was also the
birthplace of the Haqqani network, and the institution from which
the Haqqanis take their name.66
â•… The Dar al-‘Ulum Haqqaniyya was established in 1947 in the vil-
lage of Akora Khattak, 30 miles southeast of Peshawar, by Abdul
Haq Akorwi, a graduate of the Dar al-‘Ulum Deoband in northern
India, from which the Deobandi movement originated in the late
nineteenth century.67 The site of the Dar al-‘Ulum Haqqaniyya
school is significant, as it was in the same location in 1826 that the
famous nineteenth-century anti-colonial activist-cum-mujahid
Sayyid Ahmad Shahid won the first major battle of his jihad against
the British-backed Sikhs of the frontier.68 The school has always
been closely affiliated with the Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam (JUI), one of
the two large Pakistani Sunni Islamist political parties—the other
being the JI. The current leaders of the two main factions of the
JUI—Mawlana Fazl ur Rahman (head of JUI-F) and Mawlana Sami-
ul Haq (head of JUI-S), both members of Pakistan’s National
Assembly—are graduates of Haqqaniyya. Mawlana Sami-ul Haq,

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 S I T UAT I NG T H E H AQQAN IS

the son of Abdul Haq Akorwi, has been the chancellor of the mad-
rassa for many years. By the 1960s the Dar al-‘Ulum Haqqaniyya
had become the “main institution for the production of graduates
of the Deobandis” in Pakistan, and between 1966 and 1985 roughly
a third of all Deobandi clerics in Pakistan graduated from Haqqani-
yya.69 It is thus not surprising that so many of the most prominent
figures in Pakistan’s Deobandi political party, the JUI, are Haqqani-
yya graduates. Most of these graduates hailed from the highland
Pashtun regions of Pakistan and Afghanistan, with the largest num-
ber of students originating from North Waziristan and Bannu, and
the second largest group coming from eastern Afghanistan—espe-
cially Paktia.70 A number of Jalaluddin’s fellow classmates at
Haqqaniyya from greater Paktia would go on to join him in anti-
government uprisings in Afghanistan in the 1970s and serve as
Haqqani network field commanders during the 1980s, including
Mawlawi Nizamuddin Haqqani, Fathullah Haqqani, Hanif Shah,
and Mawlawi ‘Aziz Khan.71
â•… Despite the ideological and social distance separating the Kabul
Islamist scene from the more traditional Pak-Afghan activist current
centered at Haqqaniyya, the two groups did have some overlap
during the late 1960s. Two older Haqqaniyya alumni in particular
bridged the two movements: Yunis Khalis and Muhammad Nabi
Muhammadi. Khalis (d. 2006), a Khugiani Pashtun from Nangarhar
Province in eastern Afghanistan, was one of the few traditional
Afghan ‘ulama who supported the Islamist student movement at
Kabul University in the 1960s.72 He helped to introduce the thought
of Sayyid Qutb in Afghanistan, publishing a Dari translation of one
of the latter’s early works in 1960.73 Khalis was also a frequent con-
tributor to one of the earliest Islamist newspapers of the liberal
period, Gahez (“Dawn”), established in 1968 by Minhajuddin
Gahez.74 Khalis was just as alarmed as the Kabul Islamists by the
growing Marxist influence in Afghanistan but he did not share their
statist revolutionary ideals. In one of his Gahez articles he warned
that the “acquisition of [state] power by capital or by the sword is
forbidden in Islam.”75 In an interview with David Edwards in 1984,
Khalis stated that the “Muslim Youth wanted to do demonstrations
and talk about the government, but we wanted to work deeply and

39
 F OUNT AI NH E AD OF JIHAD

bring about a theological revolution. … The Muslim Youth would

make up slogans just like the communists.”76
â•… Similar ideals motivated the Haqqaniyya graduate Nabi Muham-
madi, who emerged in the 1960s as one of the leading clerical anti-
communist activists in Afghanistan. Elected to parliament in 1965
from Logar Province, where he taught at a large madrassa,
Muhammadi became nationally famous for his role in a parliamen-
tary debate on Marxism that was broadcast over national radio. To
the assertions of the leftist parliamentarian Babrak Karmal, the
future communist president of Afghanistan, that there was no con-
tradiction between religion and Marxism, Muhammadi countered
with “detailed passages from Marx, Engels, Lenin and Stalin to
demonstrate the opposition of Marxist ideologies to religious
belief.”77 He toured the country with other ‘ulama preaching
against the menace of communism, and organized a protest dem-
onstration in 1972 in Kabul composed of clerics and madrassa
students opposing the activities of communist groups.78 Like
Â�Khalis, Muhammadi’s anti-communist activism was waged in
defense of Afghanistan’s traditional religious culture, and not in
pursuit of a revolutionary étatist agenda.
â•… During the anti-Soviet years, Yunis Khalis and Muhammad Nabi
Muhammadi would establish, respectively, the two traditional
highland Pashtun mujahidin parties: Hizb-i Islami-Khalis (HIK)
and Harakat-i Inqilab-i Islami (hereinafter “Harakat”). These two
party leaders and their senior battlefield commanders—foremost of
them being Jalaluddin Haqqani, who was affiliated during the war
with Khalis’ HIK—formed, along with the Pakistani Pashtun Islam-
ist politicians of the JUI, what could be called the “Haqqaniyya
network,” an intertwined group of Haqqaniyya graduates who
deployed distinctive practices of Islamist mobilization in the high-
land tribal regions of Afghanistan and Pakistan during the 1970s
and 1980s and from which some of the Taliban leadership emerged
in the 1990s. The ideological tensions between the Haqqaniyya-
educated leaders and the Kabul Islamists may have been relatively
muted during the late 1960s and early 1970s, but they would
emerge as major fault lines splitting the mujahidin parties during
the anti-Soviet conflict and in the subsequent civil war.79

40
 S I T UAT I NG T H E H AQQAN IS

â•… In contrast to what is often termed the fundamentalism of the

Kabul Islamists and their JI allies, the “Haqqaniyya network” of
highland Pashtun Afghan mujahidin and Pakistani clerical politi-
cians could better be described as traditionalist, in the sense that
their political activities were “defined in terms of the defense of
traditional Islamic culture” against strong central states, colonial or
imperial powers, or Marxist reforms.80 This is not to say that the
JUI and the Haqqanis did not wish to see some form of Islamic
government in Islamabad and Kabul: they did and still do, but they
have remained committed to decentralized, grassroots, and pre-
dominantly rural forms of mobilization that emphasize continuity
with tribal political culture and (highland) Pashtun regional auton-
omy.81 In contrast to the fundamentally anti-leftist orientation of
the �Pak-Afghan urban Islamists, the JUI has often made common
cause with the political left in Pakistan, seeing the socialist pop-
ulism of the PPP as “basically in resonance with the populism and
anti-imperialism of the pre-Partition Jamiat Ulema movements.”82
From these two distinct traditions of Islamism emerged two
regional blocs of Islamist mobilization, with the JI aligned with the
mujahidin parties of the Kabuli Islamists, headquartered during
the anti-Soviet war at Peshawar, and the JUI aligned with the
Haqqanis and the two Haqqaniyya network mujahidin parties of
HIK and Harakat.83
â•… These two strands of Pak-Afghan Sunni Islamism—the revolu-
tionary and the traditionalist, or put differently, the urban statist
and the highland state-evading—developed along separate but
interrelated trajectories over the course of the ensuing four decades
of regional conflict. Over time the two regional blocs forged their
own alliances with different segments of the Pakistani state and
international aid donors; with various Pakistani sectarian and
Kashmir-focused militant groups; and eventually with a variety of
transnational jihadi organizations. Across these developments, the
unique regional and sociopolitical location of the Haqqanis would
give them an ever more valuable advantage, an advantage they
were able to capitalize on by making the territory which they
�controlled the center at which all of these lines of development
converged.

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 F OUNT AI NH E AD OF JIHAD

The Islamist Blocs in Anti-Daoud Resistance

In 1970, after completing his studies at Dar al-‘Ulum Haqqaniyya,
Jalaluddin Haqqani campaigned in northwestern Pakistan for
�Mawlawi Abdul Haq, founder of the Haqqaniyya madrassa, in the
latter’s (successful) bid for a seat in Pakistan’s National Assembly
as a JUI candidate in the general elections that year.84 Jalaluddin
spent the following year teaching at the Haqqaniyya madrassa,
made the pilgrimage to Mecca, and then decided to return to
Afghanistan and establish a madrassa of his own—the Rahimiyya
madrassa in the town of Nika in Paktika Province.85 He gives the
following account of this period himself in an interview published
by one of the Haqqani network’s magazines in 1990:
I had planned to stay in the Haqqaniyya madrassa for at least four or five
years, until a strong, organized and informed group could be formed from
among the Afghan taliban (students) there, whom I could then take into
Afghanistan. But due to persistent emphasis by certain friends, I went to
Afghanistan instead and began teaching there. There [in Nika, Paktika], I
laid the foundation of a large madrassa and began cementing my contacts
with the ‘ulama. We began our campaign of inviting people to our Islamic
movement, and commenced our “cold” struggle against the communists.86

â•…Jalaluddin might have gone on to a successful and nonviolent

career in Pak-Afghan Islamist politics were it not for the eruption
of a fresh round of profound turmoil on both sides of the Durand
Line in 1973, throwing him together with the Kabul Islamists in a
guerrilla campaign of anti-communist resistance in Afghanistan
that would dominate his life through the 1980s. These events also
drew the Pakistani state more directly into the conflict in Afghan�
istan and marked the beginning of the long and still ongoing ties
between the Haqqanis and the Pakistani military establishment.
â•… After the catastrophic 1971 war in East Pakistan that ended with
the creation of Bangladesh and, among other losses, the holding of
90,000 of (West) Pakistan’s troops as prisoners of war in India,
Zulfikar Ali Bhutto became president and chief martial law admin-
istrator and oversaw the reorganization of a much-reduced �Pakistan
into its current four provincial governments. The earlier general
elections handed Bhutto’s PPP party significant majorities in Sindh

42
 S I T UAT I NG T H E H AQQAN IS

and Punjab, but a coalition of the National Awami Party (NAP) and
JUI parties in the NWFP and Baluchistan won enough seats from
their respective provinces to form the provincial governments
there. Despite a great deal of bad blood between them, in March of
1972 Bhutto’s government signed tripartite agreements with the
NAP–JUI coalitions in these two provinces that recognized their
provincial rule of the Northwest Frontier and Baluchistan. The JUI’s
Mufti Mahmood headed the NWFP government, while the Baluch
nationalist Sardar Ataullah Mengal was elected chief minister of
Baluchistan by its provincial assembly. This rule of Pakistan’s fron-
tier provinces by an ethno-nationalist coalition, however, did not
last a year. Bhutto’s government grew increasingly alarmed at the
assertive calls for autonomy by the Baluchistan provincial govern-
ment. It was also under pressure from the shah of Iran to curtail a
rising Baluch nationalism that threatened to spill over into Iranian
Baluchistan. In February of 1973 Bhutto dismissed the Baluchistan
provincial government, followed immediately by the resignation-
in-protest of the NAP–JUI coalition government in the NWFP.
Across the border, after ten years in the political wilderness, former
Prime Minister Daoud returned to power in Kabul in July in a pal-
ace coup, ousting Zahir Shah and returning immediately to his
prior agitation on behalf of “Pashtunistan.” On the day of the coup
itself, Daoud issued a radio broadcast announcing that relations
with Pakistan would be predicated upon a “peaceful and honorable
solution to this problem [Pashtunistan] in accordance with the
hopes and aspirations of the Pashtun and Baluch people and their
leaders.”87 Leaders of the NAP from Baluchistan and the NWFP fled
to Kabul where they received support from Daoud’s government in
leading nationalist resistance to the Bhutto regime along the Paki-
stani frontier. Bhutto sent the army into Baluchistan and launched
a war against the Baluch uprising that would last until his ouster
from power in 1977.
â•… In the aftermath of the 1973 developments, Daoud and Bhutto
initiated covert campaigns of symmetrical cross-border support for
destabilizing insurgencies against one another’s regimes. Daoud’s
government provided ammunition and arms to Baluch and Pashtun
nationalists that Pakistan regarded as “secessionist forces.”88

43
 F OUNT AI NH E AD OF JIHAD

Bhutto, meanwhile, tasked then-Brigadier Naseerullah Babar,

inspector general of Pakistan’s Frontier Corps, with arming and
training Afghan Islamists in their anti-Daoud efforts. Among the
thousands of recipients of the Pakistani training, provided at camps
established throughout the tribal areas, were prominent members
of the Kabul Islamist circles including Hekmatyar, Massoud, and
Rabbani, who had fled crackdowns on Islamist activism in Kabul by
Daoud upon his return to power. The ISI drew up a list of 1,331
Afghan resistance activists who were to receive monthly payments
through the Frontier Corps, while guerrilla warfare training was
provided to “at least 5,000 Islamists” in 1973 and 1974.89 The
�American diplomat Peter Tomsen was told by Pakistani officials of
ISI payments delivered to Hekmatyar while the latter was still in
Kabul, and after the Kabulis fled to Peshawar Hekmatyar was
selected by the ISI and Babar as their liaison to the group.90
â•… Babar, who would go on to serve as a primary link between the
ISI and the Taliban as Benazir Bhutto’s interior minister during the
mid-1990s, claimed that American aid was also directed to the
Afghan anti-Daoud activists at this time. He told the New York
Times in 1989 that when the Kabul Islamists fled to Pakistan, “We
took them under our cover because we knew that some day there
would be trouble in Afghanistan. We wanted to build up a leader-
ship to influence events.” He is then reported to have said that “the
United States had also been financing such potential leaders since
1973 and had taken Mr. Hekmatyar ‘under its umbrella’ months
before the Soviet invasion.”91 Though this claim is not to my knowl-
edge corroborated by other sources, neither is it entirely implausi-
ble. In March 1973 the Nixon administration relaxed restrictions on
military aid to Pakistan, releasing $24 million worth of military
equipment to Bhutto’s government. In September President Nixon
received Prime Minister Bhutto on a state visit at the White House,
announcing on that occasion that “the independence and integrity
of Pakistan is a cornerstone of American foreign policy.”92 Given
that one of the most active threats to Pakistan’s integrity in 1973—
as the Pakistani government saw it—was Daoud’s support for the
Baluch insurgency, and that Pakistan’s policy in response was to
aid the Afghan Islamist resistance, Babar’s claim of American

44
 S I T UAT I NG T H E H AQQAN IS

involvement in the latter effort would concord with Nixon’s state-

ment about America’s policy priorities. Jalaluddin Haqqani and his
Haqqaniyya allies became direct beneficiaries of the Pakistani sup-
port initiative by the end of 1973. Babar’s claim, then, raises the
possibility that the Haqqanis benefited from US government aid
much earlier than has previously been thought, and in the earliest
phase of their militant activities.
â•… According to Haqqani sources, Jalaluddin and his nascent net-
work of anti-communist ‘ulama began their war on the Daoud
regime several months before the establishment of the Pakistani
training initiative. In 1989 the Pashto-language Haqqani magazine
Manba’ al-Jihad (“Fountainhead of Jihad”) published a historical
account of the Haqqanis’ jihadi beginnings that dates their first calls
for jihad to July 1973, immediately after Daoud’s coup. The account
was written by Mawlawi Aziz Khan, who fought in some of the
earliest battles in the 1970s, spent the first half of the 1980s living in
the Gulf to mobilize support for the Haqqani network’s anti-Soviet
struggle, and went on to become the first dean of the Haqqanis’
Manba’ al-‘Ulum madrassa on the outskirts of Miranshah, North
Waziristan. After recounting the history of Islamist groups in
Afghanistan and their efforts to counter communist influence in the
country, Aziz Khan writes:
As soon as Daoud declared the establishment of the Republic through the
national radio [on 17 July 1973], Mawlawi Sahib Jalaluddin Haqqani
declared jihad in the village of Nika, Zadran, and raised the flag of jihad
there.93 He announced the commencement of jihad by loudspeakers
throughout the region, and some ‘ulama and taliban [madrassa students]
joined him. But the government interfered and prevented the spread of this
movement by appealing to the tribes, who in turn did not let Haqqani
Sahib continue his jihad. Having no choice, Haqqani Sahib began a secret
jihad. At that time, I joined him. It was night when I left my village, Gomal,
and went to Zadran to meet with Haqqani Sahib.94 There I was introduced
to him and Mawlawi Ahmad Gul, who was later killed. They told me
all€about their preparations. They also informed me that another group
of€‘ulama and youth, led by Hekmatyar Sahib, was forming, which
also€wanted to work toward the establishment of a true Islamic state in
Afghanistan. Haqqani Sahib then instructed me, Mawlawi Ahmad Gul,
Mawlawi Fathullah and Mawlawi Sher Muhammad, under the leadership

45
 F OUNT AI NH E AD OF JIHAD

of �Mutiullah Khan,95 to go to Peshawar to meet with Hekmatyar Sahib.

After we met with Hekmatyar in Peshawar, he instructed Mutiullah Khan
to take the group back to Afghanistan to start jihad against the regime and
its communist backers in Urgun.96 We also met with Qazi Muhammad
Amin Waqad97 to start making the preliminary preparations for the jihad.98

â•… Aziz Khan’s claim that Jalaluddin called for jihad in 1973 is
repeated in numerous other articles in the Haqqani magazines,
though no details are provided about any specific actions taken
against the regime beyond issuing calls for popular uprisings. Aziz
Khan’s account also does not specify how long Jalaluddin and his
comrades engaged in “secret jihad” in greater Paktia, though his and
other accounts do establish that the Haqqani resistance established
links with the Kabul Islamists in Peshawar at some point between
1973 and 1975, at which time Jalaluddin Haqqani shifted his base of
operations to North Waziristan. During this period the Kabul Islam-
ists and the highland Pashtun cleric activists forged closer ties with
each other, received training and support from �Pakistan via the
Frontier Corps, and argued over strategy. Hekmatyar, representing
the radical youth wing of the movement, wanted to embark imme-
diately with widespread armed struggle, but Burhanuddin Rabbani,
a professor at Kabul University, did not think that the Afghan
resistance-in-exile had sufficient resources or local support to �sustain
a violent campaign.
â•… It is well known that in the summer of 1975 the assembled
Afghan Islamists in Peshawar launched a series of uprisings against
the Daoud regime throughout Afghanistan, though no previous
account has ever noted the involvement of the Haqqanis in these
largely failed efforts.99 The decision to launch the revolts, which
were meant to coincide with an ill-planned coup to be carried out
by sympathizers within the military in Kabul, was taken by
Â�Hekmatyar—with Pakistani support—while Rabbani was visiting
Saudi Arabia. In the account quoted above, Aziz Khan ends by
describing how the party of Haqqani activists sent by Jalaluddin to
liaise with Hekmatyar’s group in Peshawar was sent back by
Â�Hekmatyar to Paktika to “start jihad … in Urgun.” Another Pashto
article in Manba’ al-Jihad describes the resultant efforts in Urgun and
dates them to the late summer of 1975. It would thus appear that

46
 S I T UAT I NG T H E H AQQAN IS

this Haqqani uprising in Paktika was clearly meant to coincide with

the other uprisings called for by Hekmatyar and that it was planned
in concert with the Kabul Islamists and Frontier Corps officers in
Peshawar.
â•… As the Urgun uprising is the first battle by the Haqqani network
for which we have details, and as it claims to draw upon Jalaluddin
Haqqani’s personal diary, I quote from the article at some length:
It was a night in August 1975. The local communists who had infiltrated
the local government organizations in Urgun District were continually
bothering people, particularly the religious scholars, by beating them and
jailing them for no reason. Eventually, the local people became very upset
with the situation and decided to do something about it. The people got the
backing of the ‘ulama and found weapons. One day, when the Urgun Dis-
trict Chief and his friends were supervising a project, the mujahidin
attacked them. They were a group of twenty-five fighters, led by Mawlawi
Jalaluddin Haqqani. The battle continued for a few hours. The District
Chief was wounded, but he fled and lived. The District Police Commander
and nine of his men were killed.
Soon the news spread in the area. The government began searching for
those who had perpetrated this attack. The first person was Haqqani,
whose house was surrounded by government troops. The government
warned that the local people must surrender Mawlawi Haqqani alive to the
government. … Let’s hear the story from Mawlawi Jalaluddin Haqqani
himself:
“When government forces surrounded my house, some of the elders
wanted to give me up to the enemy. But Haji Amanullah and some other
elders decided against it. Haji Amanullah told me: ‘We will all fight with
you. Even if they kill my brothers and destroy my house, I will not let
them take you alive.’ I decided that I would not surrender myself, and we
all decided to fight the government … There were a few problems, though.
First, some elders were opposed to our plan; and second, we did not have
enough ammunition … The elders asked the government forces to let the
women and children get out of the house, and then I would speak with
them and would go with them … The forces allowed the women and chil-
dren to leave and, taking advantage of this, I took the Qur’an in one
hand€and the gun in the other, and fled the house, reciting a verse from
the€Qur’an.”
Some of Mawalwi Haqqani’s madrassa pupils had set an ambush in Ziruk
so that if Haqqani was taken by the government they could ambush the

47
 F OUNT AI NH E AD OF JIHAD

forces and set him free.100 But when they received the news that Haqqani
had fled the house and gotten to the mountains safely, they, too, went to
the mountains and joined Haqqani. The total number of fighters was then
thirty men. Besides Mawlawi Haqqani, his younger brother, Haji Ibrahim,
who is now commander of the ‘Umar-e-Faruq Division, was also there.101
They spent a month and a half there. When their presence became known,
the government, with the assistance of people from Zadran and other dis-
tricts (those people were in appearance on the government’s side, but their
hearts were with the mujahidin) attacked the mujahidin many times, but
did not succeed in pushing the mujahidin out of the area. Finally, the gov-
ernment blocked all the roads leading to the area in an effort to flush the
mujahidin out.
The local people, who were with the mujahidin, consulted Mawlawi
Haqqani and reported to the government that the mujahidin had evacuated
the area and gone toward Katawaz.102 When the government forces left for
Katawaz, the mujahidin came out of their hideouts and went toward
�Pakistan. In this caravan, Mutiullah, whose real name was Gulbaz and had
taken part in multiple operations, and Mawlawi Mansoor, who had fled
from Zurmat, joined Mawlawi Haqqani.103 When these soldiers of God set
their journey off to Pakistan, the [Afghan] government arrested several of
Mawlawi Haqqani’s friends—Mawlawi Ahmad Gul, Sahib Qari Shah and
Mawlawi Mahmud—and put them in dark jail cells. But after spending
some time in jail, they were released. In consultation with Mawlawi
Haqqani, Mawlawi Aziz Khan and Mawlawi Ahmad Gul remained in the
area in order to keep the flames of jihad burning and to maintain the flow
of weapons and ideas into the area.104

â•… This early effort by the Haqqanis at inciting a popular struggle

against the government was a failure, ending with most of its lead-
ers either fleeing to Pakistan or in jail. A similar pattern marked the
efforts by Islamists elsewhere in the country that summer, though
many of the activists were not as lucky as Jalaluddin and his group.
The Muslim Youth networks in Kabul were decimated and many of
Afghanistan’s leading Islamists were executed. Hekmatyar’s pre-
cipitous action, combined with the fact that he had remained in
Peshawar during the uprisings, earned him a lasting reputation for
rash and autocratic leadership. Rabbani was furious and split with
Hekmatyar upon his return from Saudi Arabia. Jalaluddin Haqqani
and other highland Pashtun leaders joined the Kabul Islamist lead-
ers in Peshawar in late 1975 and an attempt was made to heal the

48
 S I T UAT I NG T H E H AQQAN IS

rift and overcome the centrifugal tendencies and ethnic divisions of

these often-divisive leaders. With Qazi Amin Waqad named its first
amir, the Hizb-i Islami Afghanistan party was formed in May of
1976, merging all of the factions of anti-Daoud Sunni Islamist activ-
ism into one organization. The executive committee of the new
party included, in addition to the aforementioned Kabuli leaders,
Jalaluddin Haqqani, Nasrullah Mansur, and Haji Din Muhammad,
another Haqqaniyya network cleric who would work closely with
Haqqani during the 1980s.105 Though the alliance ultimately failed,
this would not be the last time that Jalaluddin played a prominent
role in efforts at uniting the ranks of the fractious Kabuli elites, an
endeavor that would come to characterize his relationship to these
groups during and after the anti-Soviet war.
â•… After the short-lived 1975 Islamist revolts, Pakistan’s support for
the Afghan dissidents waned, and Hizb-i Islami lost any hope of
having the necessary resources or influence to inspire a broad-based
rebellion. Instead, the group focused on assassinations and political
violence in the capital and turned increasingly to the Arab world
for support (discussed further in Chapter 2). Qazi Amin and
�Hekmatyar both told David Edwards in interviews that the party
dispatched several hit squads to Kabul during these years, with
their only prominent success being the assassination of Parcham
ideologue Mir Akbar Khyber in 1978.106 Hekmatyar told Edwards
in 1983 that the killing “was the doing of Hizbi guerrillas.” As
Edwards notes, the murder was widely believed at the time to have
been Daoud’s doing. Yet in a profile of Jalaluddin Haqqani in the
English-language magazine Arabia, Haqqani sources claimed that
the killer was an early Haqqani network member. According to this
article, after the Muslim Youth leadership issued a call for jihad
against the regime and “initiated a national guerrilla campaign
against the ruling oppressors,” “Maulana Jalaluddin was an enthu-
siastic worker of the jihad movement and one of his men was
responsible for killing Mir Akbar.”107 The article further claims that
the unnamed assassin had earlier participated in a 1977 attempt by
Haqqani’s men to dig an underground tunnel to the Deh Mazang
prison in Kabul and free Islamist activists imprisoned there by
Daoud. The plot was discovered and all of the Islamist prisoners

49
 F OUNT AI NH E AD OF JIHAD

were later executed at Pul-e-Charkhi prison, a grisly event that has

been amply documented elsewhere.108
â•… As far as Pakistan was concerned, continued support to the
Afghan Islamists was now no longer necessary nor justified. Â�Bhutto’s
1975 gambit had paid off: the credible threat of a widespread
�Pakistan-supported Islamist insurgency in Afghanistan proved suf-
ficient to get Daoud to back down on “Pashtunistan” and cross-
border relations began to improve dramatically. Bhutto and Daoud
exchanged state visits in 1976 and Iran and the United States joined
in urging closer Pak-Afghan ties—and a lessening of Afghan–Soviet
ties. Daoud had already grown suspicious of Soviet involvement in
his administration and had begun a purge of PDPA members from
prominent government and military positions.109 During a visit to
Moscow in April 1977, Daoud alarmed his hosts with an angry dis-
play of defiant independence that may have sealed his own fate.
When pressed by General Secretary Brezhnev to curtail the number
of Western aid personnel in Afghanistan, Daoud retorted that the
USSR could “not dictate to us how to run our country and whom to
employ in Afghanistan” and then abruptly walked out of the meet-
ing.110 A year later Daoud was dead, killed in a coup by the PDPA
that brought Nur Muhammad Taraki to power as Afghanistan’s
first communist president.

Taraki, Zia, and the Mujahidin Parties

By the time of the coup against Daoud in April 1978, the united
Hizb-i Islami Afghanistan had fallen apart and the senior Kabuli
Islamist leaders had begun to establish their own parties.111 Hekmat-
yar led the Hizb-i Islami-Gulbuddin (HIG), the most ideologically
radical and organizationally centralized of all the parties, while
Rabbani went on to form the Jamiat-i Islami Afghanistan (JIA),
whose most capable commanders were Ahmad Shah Massoud in
the north and Isma’il Khan in Herat in western Afghanistan.
Though both were multiethnic in makeup, Pashtuns predominated
in HIG while JIA emerged as the premiere representative of the
Tajik resistance. Haqqani joined the Hizb-i Islami-Khalis (HIK) of
fellow Haqqaniyya alumnus Yunis Khalis, while Nasrullah Mansur

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 S I T UAT I NG T H E H AQQAN IS

joined the other Haqqaniyya party, Nabi Muhammadi’s Harakat.112

Sayyaf, imprisoned in Kabul during this period, was later released
and formed the Ittihad party in 1980. The different political cultures
of the Kabuli Islamists and the highland Pashtun clerical leaders not
surprisingly led to very different types of organization among these
various parties.
â•… In the years prior to the massive influx of foreign aid and the
manipulative patronage practices of the ISI and CIA, Haqqani and
the other Haqqaniyya network parties already enjoyed certain
advantages over the Kabuli-Peshawar parties in terms of organiza-
tional effectiveness and advantageous geographical position. As the
war against the communist regime in Kabul was staged from
�Pakistan, the first and most vital fronts, and the essential supply
lines to all areas of resistance in the country, were all located in the
highland Pashtun regions. The route through the southern end of
this region—Miranshah to Khost—was especially important, and
was the single most vital and abundant line of communication dur-
ing the whole of the conflict. On either side of the Durand Line, in
these areas the Haqqanis were respected locals, with deep familiar-
ity with and a strong attachment to the highland Pashtun traditions
of political mobilization.
â•… The Haqqani fronts were organized on tribal lines, distributing
power, local decision-making and rights to materiel between the
front commander and a tribal council, the latter composed of elders
selected by the tribes themselves.113 The Haqqani leaders were not
likely to forget the successes of the Daoud government in manipu-
lating tribal loyalties against their earliest efforts, and when Taraki
and later Babrak Karmal attempted to pursue similar strategies, the
Haqqanis prioritized good relations with the tribal councils and
vigorous counterpropaganda against Kabul’s outreach cam-
paigns.114 In January of 1980 Faiz Muhammad, a former interior
minister under Daoud, was appointed minister of frontier and tribal
affairs—the same position that Jalaluddin Haqqani would later
hold under the Taliban—and dispatched from Kabul to the Zadran
areas in the southeast in an effort to “win over rebel or neutral eth-
nic groups in eastern Afghanistan and to take advantage of rival-
ries.”115 In response the Haqqanis distributed a leaflet signed by

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 F OUNT AI NH E AD OF JIHAD

Jalaluddin Haqqani, “General Amir of the Paktia Jihadi Fronts,”

calling on the people to “reject the perfidy of the professional turn-
coat and spy, this Parchami traitor element, Faiz Muhammad. Dis-
card him and obliterate him.”116 In September of the same year, after
distributing $28,000 in cash to a meeting of Zadran elders in a vil-
lage near Khost, the minister was killed by locals.117 Even at this
early stage in the conflict, the Haqqanis were clearly able to mobi-
lize popular support against the regime in the face of determined
campaigns to undermine them.
â•… The Kabuli Islamist parties, on the other hand, were exiles rather
than locals on Pakistan’s highland frontier, and they had much less
success in establishing a predominant presence along the Pak-
Afghan border. Rabbani’s JIA had almost no presence in the
�Pashtun areas, and was strongest in the Tajik north and the Persian-
speaking west.118 Hekmatyar’s HIG, though present throughout the
Pashtun east, never established a predominant presence in any of
these areas and was subject to the logistical control of resources
given by the ISI to the Haqqanis in the southeast.119 The HIG also
remained inflexibly unaccommodating of Pashtun tribal practices,
and “insisted that all disputes and criminal proceedings be handled
according to Islamic law under the supervision of party leaders.”120
These strictures alienated the HIG from local people in the border
regions and created tensions with the Haqqaniyya parties of HIK
and Harakat. As Edwards notes, the HIG had a “long list of com-
plaints against Khales, Nabi, and other members of the ulema,
beginning with their condoning of popular religious practices that
had no basis in Islamic scripture.” Among the list of ritual practices
that Hekmatyar and his followers found objectionable was a custom
whereby “travelers embarking on a journey customarily passed
under a copy of the Qur’an to ensure their safe return.”121 The
American writer Jere Van Dyk, who visited the Haqqanis in Paktia
in 1981, witnessed Jalaluddin presiding over an instance of this very
practice with a group of fighters about to set off for an attack on an
Afghan army base:
The men gathered in a circle like players do around their coach before a
game. It was Azon, the call for jihad. Jaluladin [sic] prayed and each man
bowed, then raised his hands to the sky, palms upward, to receive the

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 S I T UAT I NG T H E H AQQAN IS

blessings of Allah. For a moment it was silent; then each man, single file,
passed underneath an unwound turban held by two men over the path. A
Koran lay wrapped in the cloth. They shouted, raised their rifles.122

â•…Participation in such popular religious practices by the leaders of

the Haqqani network not only set them apart ideologically from the
“fundamentalist” parties like HIG; they also granted their leader-
ship a popular legitimacy that the radical parties never managed
to€attain.
â•… Issues of popular legitimacy aside, HIG and the other Peshawar-
based Kabuli mujahidin parties received an unexpected boon
in€1977 when General Zia ul-Haq ousted—and then executed—Â�
Zulfikar Ali Bhutto in a coup, ending democratic rule in Pakistan
for the next decade and eventually restoring Pakistani aid to the
Afghan resistance. Zia had long been a supporter of the JI, and
while serving as army chief of staff under Bhutto he had proposed
making the writings of Abu’l-‘Ala Mawdudi, the founder of the JI,
part of the examinations for military promotion.123 When he came
to power Zia succeeded in co-opting the JI and bringing them into
his regime, favoring them as bolsterers of his claims to Islamic
legitimacy and as bulwarks against the Pakistani left. The JUI, on
the other hand, remained in opposition to Zia’s military dictator-
ship and joined the Movement for the Restoration of Democracy
(MRD), a coalition of political parties that included the leftist PPP.124
â•… With the hundreds of millions of dollars in military aid that
began pouring from the United States and other countries into
�Pakistan after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, Zia and the ISI,
Pakistan’s sprawling intelligence agency, had tremendous resources
at their disposal with which to manipulate the direction of the
Afghan insurgency. The welter of parties and resistance groups that
had sprung up in Peshawar were reduced to seven—all Sunni—and
only commanders fighting for one of these parties would receive
weapons or other forms of aid.125 Zia directed the ISI to prioritize
the JI-linked Afghan mujahidin parties, first and foremost Hekmat-
yar’s HIG, but also Sayyaf’s Ittihad party and, to a lesser extent,
Rabbani’s JIA as favored recipients of aid. This favoritism meant
that HIG was nearly always flush with resources and able to buy
access to more fronts than its unpopular organizational style may

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have otherwise allowed for. But the ISI also distributed aid on the
basis of battlefield effectiveness and rewarded parties for actions
taken—thus in reward for bringing down one Afghan or Soviet
plane with a Stinger missile, the ISI would supply the same front
with two more.126 Because of his unrivalled capacity as a guerrilla
leader in the all-important southeast, Jalaluddin Haqqani and his
fronts were thus not disadvantaged by Zia’s alliance with the
�JI-HIG, and he was instead given tremendous latitude and power
as the overall coordinator of logistical support in that region.127
â•… Despite their opposition to his regime and the presence of their JI
rivals in Zia’s cabinet, the JUI and their Afghan mujahidin partners
would benefit enormously from another aspect of Zia’s rule: the
Islamization campaign, and in particular the Zakat Ordinance. This
law, enacted under Zia in 1980, instituted a deduction at source
withdrawal on the first day of every Ramadan of 2.5 percent from
all savings accounts in Pakistan above a certain exemption limit, the
funds to be distributed to “the needy.”128 One of the primary benefi-
ciaries of this massive new source of state revenue were the mad-
rassas, as in providing room and board to indigent students they
were deemed legitimate agents of distribution of aid to the needy.
The JUI, already much more madrassa-based than the JI and operat-
ing before the Zakat Ordinance a much larger network of schools,
saw an immediate and rapid “mushroom-growth” in the construc-
tion of new schools, many of them on the highland frontier,
throughout the 1980s.129 As is now well known, this boom in the
jihad-era madrassa business, often catering to Afghan war refugees
along the border and operating with the express intent to prepare
and deploy young mujahidin to the theaters of conflict, wreaked
profound and still-unfolding havoc on the fabric of Pashtun society.
As Joshua White notes, the fallout of these developments in the
tribal areas included “the proliferation of small arms and the devel-
opment of the so-called ‘Kalashnikov culture;’ the entrenchment of
sectarian movements and their ideologies-of-difference; and, per-
haps most dangerously, the creation of a vast cadre of both ideo-
logical and opportunistic veteran jihadis beholden in only the most
tenuous fashion to the state system.”130 For the Haqqanis, however,
these were precisely the elements of the JUI madrassa boom that

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 S I T UAT I NG T H E H AQQAN IS

gave them a critical resource mobilization advantage that none of

the other Afghan parties could match.
â•… The Haqqanis were not simply beneficiaries of the growth in the
madrassa networks: they were also contributors. As already noted,
Jalaluddin Haqqani began the work of establishing his own seminar-
ies in eastern Afghanistan in the early 1970s, beginning with the
Rahimiyya madrassa in Nika, Paktika—the same village from which
he had issued his first call for jihad against Daoud in 1973. With the
influx of Zakat funds after 1980 his cross-border archipelago of reli-
gious schools grew to include no less than eighty madrassas.131 The
crown jewel was the Manba’ al-‘Ulum (“Fountainhead of Knowl-
edge”) in Danday Darpakhel, near Miranshah, North Waziristan, a
highly ornate building for which construction began in 1980. Its
Deobandi curriculum modeled after that of Dar al-‘Ulum HaqqaÂ�
niyya, Manba’ al-‘Ulum’s faculty consisted mainly of Haqqaniyya
graduates.132 As the Haqqani magazines later described it:
The location of the institute of Manba’ al-‘Ulum was chosen to be only a few
kilometers away from the borders of the province of Paktia, and overlooks
the gates of Khost where the battles have never ceased since the beginning
[of the jihad]. The location was chosen so that the students of the shari’a
sciences can be raised on the same soil where the battles are waged or at
least at a nearby location. It was necessary for the scholars who established
the institute to take into consideration the location because such a thing
definitely has an influence over the spirits as it could establish a living
bond between the students and the jihad. Often times the walls of the insti-
tute were shaken by the explosions in Khost.133

â•… Zia’s Zakat Ordinance thus helped the Haqqanis broaden their
social base as the most prominent religious leaders and providers
of religious education in their region, allowing them to build an
extensive local infrastructure for mobilization, recruitment, and
training. But Zia’s and the ISI’s manipulation of the ideological
direction of the resistance also strengthened the Haqqanis’ position
in local tribal politics, marginalizing one of the most powerful
Zadran families. In accordance with Kabul’s “Swiss cheese” approach
to governing the Pashtun highlands, the Afghan state had long
negotiated local allegiances on the frontier through the patronage
of prominent landowning families, and throughout the twentieth

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 F OUNT AI NH E AD OF JIHAD

century the most important such family among the Zadran tribes
was the Babrakzais. Babrak Khan, the eponymous patriarch of the
family, had served Abdur Rahman in the nineteenth century and
was killed in 1924 while aiding King Amanullah’s crackdown on
the Khost Rebellion.134 His grandson Muhammad Umar Babrak�zai,
a French-educated former Afghan Supreme Court justice and the
most prominent Babrakzai Zadran leader at the time of the Soviet
invasion, organized a Loya Jirga (“Supreme Council”) in Peshawar,
which led to the creation of the Islami Milli Inqilabi Jirga (“National
Islamic Revolutionary Council”) in early 1980.135 This jirga sought
to become an umbrella organization for all of the resistance groups
and it invited the Islamist leaders to join, but the latter refused,
calling the jirga an “enemy of the sacred Islamic revolution” on
account of its secular orientation.136 Zia’s government withheld any
support for the jirga and refused permission for it to convene an
assembly in Quetta, seeing the jirga as in direct conflict with the
government’s program of Islamization and a potential vehicle for
the reemergence of a Pashtun independence movement.137 The jirga
quickly faded into irrelevance, and the Haqqanis were thus rid of a
potential rival for control of the resistance among the Zadran
tribes.138

Conclusion
This chapter has sought to situate the origins and earliest activities
of the Haqqani network within several contexts, and with an eye
toward understanding its remarkable endurance in a place and time
characterized by constant change and violent upheaval. In terms of
its immediate local context, the Haqqani network emerged from
within a long-standing tradition of cleric-led highland Pashtun
resistance to state attacks on the political and cultural autonomy of
the tribes. Unlike the more radical Pashtun Islamists of the HIG
party, the Haqqanis utilized existing social structures and patterns
of mobilization that had been adapted by previous generations to
resist state appropriation. In building a network of activist seminar-
ies and harnessing religious authority to the cause of intertribal
defense against perceived threats to the social order, the Haqqanis

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 S I T UAT I NG T H E H AQQAN IS

followed in the footsteps of the Hadda Mullah and his early twen-
tieth-century disciples. This continuity with aspects of local political
culture helps to explain the measure of popular support that the
Haqqanis managed to win for their struggle. But it does not explain
the Haqqanis’ access to the resources needed to develop the infra-
structure that this support was predicated on in the first place. For
that we examined the Haqqanis in terms of broader contexts,
namely the rise of Islamism and Pak-Afghan interstate conflicts.
â•… The first generation of Haqqani network leaders was almost
entirely composed of seminary students who attended the Haqqa�
niyya madrassa during a decade in which radical Islamist political
movements were gaining a foothold in Kabul. The Haqqaniyya
students shared the anti-Marxist grievances of the Kabul Islamists
and had personal links to the latter movement through older
alumni like Yunis Khalis and Muhammad Nabi Muhammadi. Their
years at the madrassa also allowed the Haqqani leaders to forge ties
with a segment of Pakistan’s Islamist political establishment—the
JUI—which greatly broadened their access to resources, especially
after Zia’s Islamization campaign. These ideological links made the
Haqqanis enemies of the Afghan state, but they also made them
extremely useful to Pakistan. Feeling threatened by Kabul’s support
for irredentist Pashtun nationalism, a succession of governments in
Pakistan saw Afghan Islamists—especially Pashtun Islamists—as
an ideal counterweight, and poured ever-increasing amounts of
resources into supporting them. For ideological and political rea-
sons, Pakistan’s most favored representative of this Pashtun Islamist
antidote was Hekmetyar’s HIG, and this would remain the case
until the rise of the Taliban in 1994. But the Haqqanis were much
savvier than the HIG at tribal politics, which, combined with their
foothold in the strategically critical southeast, assured them a sig-
nificant share of the Pakistani largesse.
╅ Already by the late 1970s, then, the Haqqani network had amas�
sed many of the assets that would prove critical to their endurance
across the ensuing decades of conflict. Direct support from the
�Pakistani military establishment, a nationwide network of political
sympathizers in Pakistan’s JUI, safe haven in North Waziristan, and
deep roots in the social infrastructure of greater Paktia—the same

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elements that make the Haqqanis such formidable opponents of the

Western and Afghan armies today—were all well in place by 1979.
But the Haqqanis could not yet claim to represent the “fountainhead
of jihad” announced by their magazines of later years. In order to
achieve that distinction, the Afghan jihad—and the Haqqanis’ place
within it—would have to be significantly globalized, a process that
forms the central concern of the next two chapters.

58
 2

BIRTH OF THE NEXUS

THE HAQQANI NETWORK, FOREIGN FIGHTERS,

AND THE ORIGINS OF AL-QA’IDA

The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December of 1979 dramati-

cally altered the shape and scale of the Afghan resistance in ways
that the Kabuli exiles in Peshawar could not have imagined just a
year before. Afghanistan became the focal point for the final battle
of the global Cold War, and staggering quantities of resources
poured into Pakistan from all over the world to aid the mujahidin.
The United States, Saudi Arabia, China, and other partner states
contributed upwards of 12 billion dollars worth of direct aid to
Pakistan in the 1980s to support the insurgency, and according to
some estimates more small arms were shipped into Afghanistan
than to any other country in the world during that period.1 Accord-
ing to the CIA official in charge of the agency’s aid program, the
CIA alone was providing 60,000 tons of weapons and supplies to
mujahidin field commanders every year by the mid-1980s.2 In the
spring of 1978, however, none among the Afghan Islamist resist-
ance could have foreseen this turn of events, and the picture at that
time looked much more bleak. Despite the renewed interest in their
struggle shown by General Zia, Taraki’s communist coup in April
of 1978 found the Afghan Islamists resource-poor and disunited,

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 F OUNT AI NH E AD OF JIHAD

and it reignited the strategy debates that had divided the Islamist
leaders in 1975. Some wanted to return to Afghanistan and attempt
another broad uprising, while others, citing lack of weaponry and
cash, argued that appeals must first be made to the oil-wealthy
Arab states for aid.3
â•… The Haqqanis pursued both tracks simultaneously, but they also
introduced an innovation in their appeals to the Arab world that
would have fateful consequences in years to come. Unlike any of
the other parties, the Haqqanis made direct calls for foreign fighter
volunteers, and the Haqqanis would remain throughout the 1980s
the only group consistently willing to welcome large numbers of
non-Afghan volunteer fighters into their ranks. This innovation
transformed the nature of the jihad in Afghanistan, linking it to
broader struggles and giving birth in the following decade to what
would come to be known as global jihadism. It was in this context
and as a result of the Haqqanis’ strategic decision regarding foreign
fighters that Osama bin Laden and his supporters established the
al-Qa’ida organization in the last years of the 1980s. It was also in
this connection that the Pakistani military would turn to the
Haqqanis to train Kashmiri militants, establishing the Haqqanis as
a “strategic asset” in Pakistan’s policies of war-by-proxy.4 Histori-
ans have largely neglected the central role played by the Haqqanis
in these historic processes, and this chapter seeks to redress this by
introducing previously unstudied primary sources that firmly
establish the Haqqanis at the center of these world-changing events.

The Haqqani Network and the Rise of the Afghan Arabs

Though certainly the most famous, Osama bin Laden was by no
means the first or only “Afghan Arab” to have begun his military
engagement in the Afghan jihad with the Haqqanis.5 The first mov-
ers of direct battlefield participation on the part of Arab volunteers
were in fact recruited by the Haqqanis in the Gulf several months
before the Soviet invasion. Before 1986 the vast majority of the
Afghan Arabs were humanitarian aid workers providing services
out of offices set up in Peshawar by (mostly Saudi-supported)
Islamic non-governmental organizations.6 These early volunteers

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 B I R T H OF T H E NE XUS

hailed from Islamist activist networks with long-standing ideologi-

cal and personal links with the JI and the JI-associated Kabuli Islam-
ist parties. Bin Laden, for example, made his first visit to Pakistan
shortly after the Soviet invasion in order to meet with Mian
Muhammad Tufail, the second leader of the JI, to whom he pre-
sented money collected from members of his family for the cause of
the Afghan mujahidin.7 Early volunteers who came wishing to fight
alongside the Afghans had extremely few opportunities for doing
so, and those who succeeded before 1986 appear to have numbered
in the dozens at most.8 Of these, the largest number fought with the
Haqqanis, who were the first of the Afghan mujahidin to directly
appeal to the Arab world for volunteer fighters.
â•… Indeed, the Haqqani fronts were distinctive throughout the war
for their willingness to accept Afghan Arabs seeking battlefield
participation, and Haqqani-dominated Paktia was the single most
common destination for the Afghan Arabs who went beyond
�Peshawar. Yet most accounts of the origins of the Afghan Arab phe-
nomenon ignore Haqqani and emphasize the part played by the
Palestinian scholar-activist ‘Abdullah ‘Azzam and his Maktab al-
Khidamat (Afghan Services Bureau, hereinafter MAK), established
in Peshawar in 1984, in initiating the movement, and point to
�Hekmatyar and Sayyaf as the primary Afghan patrons of the for-
eign fighters.9 There is no question that ‘Azzam played a significant
role in mobilizing volunteers in the late 1980s and that some of
these men ended up fighting with Sayyaf or Hekmatyar. However,
Jalaluddin Haqqani’s mobilizations of Arab fighters preceded those
of ‘Azzam by five years. And while Sayyaf and Hekmatyar later
allowed Arabs onto their battlefields, it was the Haqqanis more
than any other Afghan mujahidin group who shaped the militant
evolution of the Afghan Arab phenomenon in the first place, trans-
forming muhajirun into mujahidun, emigrants into holy warriors.
â•… Much of ‘Azzam’s fame rests on what has long been regarded as
his revolutionary innovation in the doctrine of jihad, declaring in a
fatwa published in a booklet in 1984 that supporting the Afghan
jihad was an individual duty (fard ‘ayn) borne by all able-bodied
Muslims worldwide, and thus not contingent upon one’s parents’
or government’s permission to come and offer aid.10 Yet in a lengthy

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 F OUNT AI NH E AD OF JIHAD

interview with the Abu Dhabi-based newspaper al-Ittihad in the

summer of 1980, Jalaluddin Haqqani, introduced as a “member of
the supreme council of the Islamic Alliance for the Liberation of
Afghanistan and a top official in the alliance’s military commit-
tee,”11 declared:
Even though the revolutionary fighters are great in number, this does not
mean that the revolution should close its doors to those who wish to par-
ticipate in the jihad. Scores of volunteers from various parts of the world
are coming to us to join the ranks of the mujahidin. They are doing so of
their own volition. If the Islamic world truly wants to support and help us,
let it permit its men and young men to join our ranks. There is a tendency
in most of the Islamic countries which wish to help us to present aid and
food as a kind of jihad. Some even think that this is the best kind of jihad.
This, however, does not absolve the Muslim of the duty to offer himself for
the jihad.12

â•… This declaration was made years before ‘Abdullah ‘Azzam would
issue his “revolutionary” fatwa on the individually obligatory (fard
‘ayn) nature of supporting the Afghan jihad. Clearly Haqqani, and
not ‘Azzam, was the innovator in this regard, and it is even possible
that Jalaluddin’s views on this issue influenced those of ‘Azzam, as
the two were very close—‘Azzam wrote his own will and testament
in Haqqani’s home.13 In the same year in which ‘Azzam published
The Defense of Muslim Territories he also published another cele-
brated work—The Signs of the Merciful in the Jihad in Afghanistan—
portions of which were published in 1983 in the Muslim Brother�
hood magazine al-Mujtama. Based on accounts of divine miracles
experienced by the Afghan mujahidin, the book begins by introduc-
ing four men from whom ‘Azzam gathered the miracle accounts,
the first of which is Jalaluddin Haqqani. He writes of Haqqani with
lavish praise, introducing him with these words:
Who among us does not know the learned scholar Jalaluddin Haqqani,
unquestionably the most famous Afghan mujahid? Firm in faith, he has
lived inside the war since the first day, and to this day remains on the field
of battle. Ask any Afghan about him and they will not hesitate for a
moment to heap upon him all manner of praise and laudation.14

â•… While Haqqani’s 1980 appeal did not take the same technical
jurisprudential form as ‘Azzam’s 1984 fatwa, it was nevertheless

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 B I R T H OF T H E NE XUS

innovative in all of the ways claimed for ‘Azzam’s ruling.15 Haqqani

stated that it was the individual duty of Muslims living outside
Afghanistan to “offer themselves” to the jihad, a duty that could not
be absolved by providing other forms of aid. Haqqani further stated
that the “scores” of foreign fighters that had joined his ranks had
done so of their own volition—that is, by no one’s permission. The
notion of “universal private military participation” was thus advo-
cated by Haqqani several years before ‘Azzam, and, unlike ‘Azzam,
Haqqani had the means and the wherewithal to facilitate that par-
ticipation directly.16
â•… The 1980 interview was not the first time that Jalaluddin Haqqani
had appealed for support from the Arab world. He had already by
this time made numerous personal visits to Saudi Arabia, the UAE,
and Iran.17 More than a year before the Soviet invasion of Afghani-
stan Jalaluddin sent several of his followers to establish offices
throughout the Gulf to raise money and awareness of the threat
posed by Taraki’s communist coup in Kabul.18 In 1978, Mawlawi
Hanif Shah, a junior classmate of Jalaluddin’s at the Haqqaniyya
madrassa and an early supporter in the mid-1970s uprisings in
�Paktika, was sent for a two-year stint for this purpose in Saudi
Â�Arabia.19 Mawlawi ‘Aziz Khan, later the director of the Manba’ al-
‘Ulum madrassa in Miranshah, was also sent around this time
“along with a few other brothers … to the Gulf to promote the cause
of the Afghan jihad there. Spending five years in the Gulf, I had
many material and moral achievements for the jihad. Then other
brothers were appointed for that job.”20 That their efforts to procure
financial support were successful is indicated by the existence as
early as 1980 of an assistance program for Gulf-based donors to aid
the families of Afghans “martyred” on Haqqani fronts. A letter
from Fathullah Haqqani to other senior Haqqani commanders in
the summer of 1980 asks that the numbers of the family members of
martyrs be recorded, as “we must send those numbers to the
[United Arab] Emirates and other Arab countries so they can decide
what type of assistance they would give to the families.”21

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 F OUNT AI NH E AD OF JIHAD

The Recruitment of Abu’l-Walid and the First Afghan Arabs

These efforts also succeeded in recruiting the first of the Afghan
Arab war volunteers, a full five years before ‘Azzam established the
MAK and several months prior to the Soviet invasion. In the spring
of 1979, a group of Paktian ‘ulama was sent by the Haqqanis to tour
mosques in the Gulf in search of support. At a mosque in Abu
Dhabi, the Egyptian journalist Mustafa Hamid (better known by his
nom de guerre Abu’l-Walid al-Masri)22 encountered this delegation
and, after being shown photos from the war and letters in Arabic by
Jalaluddin seeking support, he and two Egyptian friends decided to
make their way to the Haqqani fronts.23 Travelling to Peshawar that
summer, they were escorted to Miranshah by Haji Din �Muhammad24
before joining up with Jalaluddin in Paktia in June.25 This was a
month before President Carter authorized a $500,000 covert aid
program to the mujahidin.26
â•… Abu’l-Walid al-Masri fought with the Haqqanis for the next
twelve years and began working closely with al-Qa’ida in the early
1990s, becoming the amir of al-Qa’ida’s al-Faruq training camp,
located at the Haqqani base at Zhawara.27 He was later credited by
al-Qa’ida’s senior leadership with having convinced Bin Laden in
the early 1990s to reorient the organization around a global con-
frontation with the imperial hegemony of the United States.28 This
“first mover” of Afghan Arab participation at the Haqqani fronts
would prove consequential for the Haqqanis in a number of ways,
not least of them in the media realm. Having already worked for
several years as a journalist for a magazine in the Gulf before com-
ing to Afghanistan, he soon got a job with the Abu Dhabi-based
al-Ittihad newspaper and was most likely responsible for arranging
the above-quoted 1980 interview with Jalaluddin. As noted by
‘Isam Diraz, another well-known Arab journalist who spent years
in Afghanistan chronicling the Arab involvement in the Afghan
jihad, there were no Arab or Muslim television reporters covering
the Afghan conflict up through the first half of the 1980s, nor did
any of the Arab newspapers maintain offices in the region—with
the exception of al-Ittihad, whose chief correspondent was Abu’l-
Walid, “one of the first Arab journalists to cover the Afghan cause
from the beginning.”29 Abu’l-Walid was thus instrumental in pre-

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senting the Haqqanis and their struggle before an international

Arabophone audience, a fact that no doubt played a role in the
primacy of the Haqqani fronts as the destination of choice for the
earliest of the Afghan Arab war volunteers. Abu’l-Walid later con-
tributed a number of articles to the Arabic-language version of the
Haqqani network’s monthly publication, Manba’ al-Jihad.30
â•… Prior to the 1984 establishment of the MAK in Peshawar, the
majority of the Arab war volunteers who came to Afghanistan
ended up like Abu’l-Walid, fighting for the Haqqanis in Loya
�Paktia, and all early visitors to the Haqqani fronts noted the pres-
ence of foreign fighters.31 The American writer Jere Van Dyk, for
instance, who was briefly hosted by Jalaluddin at a Haqqani base
camp in Shah-i Kot in 1981, encountered there a former major in the
Egyptian Army named “Rachid Rochman” (Rashid ‘Abd al-Rahman)
who had been working for Jalaluddin since the previous year.32
Another early arrival was ‘Abdullah ‘Abd al-Rahman, who arrived
at Peshawar in July of 1981, stayed at the single guesthouse oper-
ated by Sayyaf, and then “left from there with Shaykh Jalaluddin
Haqqani and Mawlawi Arsalan … The Arabs at that time were very
few, and some of the Syrian and Iraqi brothers went for jihad, par-
ticipating in the battles with Shaykh Jalaluddin.”33
â•… In late 1983 another Egyptian, ‘Abd al-Rahman al-Masri, came to
join the Haqqanis, bought a home in Miranshah, married an Afghan
refugee, and fought on the Haqqani fronts until his death at Khost in
1988.34 Soon after his arrival, ‘Abd al-Rahman al-Masri would make
a fateful introduction for another early Afghan Arab to the Haqqani
scene: Abu Hafs al-Masri (Muhammad Atif), who later became the
first lieutenant and then head of al-Qa’ida’s military committee. Abu
Hafs was in Peshawar at the time, and recalls that the condition
among the Arabs was extremely somber, as fighting had broken out
inside Afghanistan between forces loyal to Hekmatyar and Sayyaf,
respectively, resulting in the deaths of hundreds of Afghan mujahi-
din. At this time he encountered ‘Abd al-Rahman:
‘Abd al-Rahman had preceded me [in coming to the jihad] by some months,
and informed me about the fronts of Shaykh Jalaluddin Haqqani and his
treatment of the Arabs, which I discovered was truly different than the
treatment [in Peshawar]. Professor Sayyaf’s group made you feel like you

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were just a guest … so when I heard from ‘Abd al-Rahman about Shaykh
Jalaluddin and his relations with the Arabs, and the involvement of the€lat-
ter in training and operations, I said “God willing I will return with you.”35

â•… Abu Hafs accompanied ‘Abd al-Rahman down to Zhawara,

where he met Abu’l-Walid al-Masri, Abu ‘Ubayda al-‘Iraqi, and
Abu ‘Ubayda al-Banshiri (Ali Amin al-Rashidi)—the last-named
later becoming the first military leader of al-Qa’ida. Of the growing
group of Arabs working with the Haqqanis at this point, Abu Hafs
recalls that “we continued during the following years to work in a
variety of ways at the fronts of Shaykh Jalaluddin, far from the
vortex of Peshawar and the problems of the Arab presence there.”36
â•… Most accounts of the origins of the Afghan Arabs have neglected
these sources and instead refer to an oft-cited memoir of ‘Abdullah
Anas, an Algerian Afghan Arab who came to Peshawar at the end
of 1983. According to Anas, when he arrived at Peshawar with two
other Arab volunteers, he was told by Sayyaf that “up to now the
Afghan cause has had but twelve Arabs; with you three it comes to
fifteen.”37 Yet as Anas’ memoir makes clear, these “first” twelve
Arabs referred to by Sayyaf were simply the first group of Arabs
that were then attending the inaugural session at the recently
opened Camp Badr, a separate training area for Arabs that Sayyaf
had agreed to establish in early 1984 at his base in Pabbi, a suburb
of Peshawar. This number does not take into account the various
Syrians, Iraqis, and Egyptians whose presence at the Haqqani fronts
prior to the establishment of the Badr camp are attested by the pri-
mary sources cited above. Moreover, of the Badr trainees them-
selves, one source enumerates nine of the participants in February
of 1984 and notes that “they went on to participate in the first
operation at Khost after having trained for fifteen days at Badr.”38

The Zhawara Base: Resourcing the Jihad

Soon after Abu’l-Walid joined them and during the same period
as€the establishment of the Manba’ al-‘Ulum madrassa outside
Miranshah, the Haqqanis began to erect a network of training facili-
ties in Loya Paktia that would soon make the region the unrivalled
center for guerrilla training in all of Afghanistan, and the only

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region within the country where large numbers of non-Afghan

fighters could come for training. In July 1980 Jalaluddin Haqqani
dispatched two trainers to the front near Khost to set up a camp for
machine gun and mortar training.39 Much more ambitious projects,
however, soon became possible with the fast-growing resources
available from the international support for the jihad, and in 1981
the Haqqanis completed plans for a vast military base in the Zhawara
Valley, just 4 kilometers inside Khost from North Waziristan, which
was partially constructed by the following year but continually
expanded throughout the 1980s.40 According to the brigadier gen-
eral of the ISI responsible for directing the supply chain to the
mujahidin during the first half of the 1980s, “up to 60 percent of our
supplies” were routed through Khost and Paktia, a full third of this
directly through Haqqani’s headquarters and supply base at
�Zhawara.41 Much of the remaining materiel was distributed in
Peshawar to the leaders of the mujahidin parties, who had to main-
tain their own supply lines to fronts within Afghanistan where men
loyal to them were fighting. In contrast, Jalaluddin Haqqani had the
unusual position of being in overall tactical command of all the
fighting groups in his area of responsibility—sometimes defined as
“eastern Afghanistan,” sometimes more narrowly as greater Paktia—
regardless of their party affiliation, and of “coordinating logistical
support” to each of these groups.42
â•… The Zhawara base was the first major training center inside the
borders of Afghanistan, and it grew over the first half of the 1980s
to include a hospital, a hotel for visitors,43 a machine workshop, a
garage, a mosque, numerous caves for storing arms, and the Voice
of Afghanistan, the first Afghan mujahidin radio station, which from
1984 on issued three daily hour-and-a-half broadcasts in Pastho,
Dari, Uzbek, and Russian. As a headquarters of al-Qa’ida and other
foreign jihadi groups during the 1990s, the complex was further
expanded in the post-war period to include more than sixty above-
ground structures and an underground network of more than fifty
caves.44 The single most important transshipment point for war
materiel, the Zhawara base was the target of three major assaults by
Soviet and Afghan army forces between 1985 and 1987, the last of
which—Operation Magistral—was the single largest communist

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offensive of the entire war.45 Despite the scale of these assaults, the
ISI leadership had determined early on that should Zhawara or its
sister facility north of Jaji, Paktia, be attacked, “they would be
defended, we would not withdraw into Pakistan, but attempt to
hold our own and fight a conventional defensive battle. This was
against the normal principles of guerrilla war … [But] with up to 60
percent of our supplies passing through these two forward base
areas we just could not afford to lose them. They were essential
jump-off points for the entire campaign.”46 No other fixed position
in Afghanistan was defended by the Pakistani military in this way
during the entire war.
â•… According to a Defense Intelligence Agency assessment, the
Â�Zhawara base “was built by Pakistani contractors, funded by Paki-
stan’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) Directorate and protected
under the patronage of a local and influential Jadran tribal leader,
Jalaluddin Haqqani. However, the real host in that facility was the
Pakistani ISI.”47 While the ISI did coordinate the funding for the
Zhawara project, much of the money was contributed by Saudi
sources, and construction and mining equipment for blasting the
tunnels was imported by Osama bin Laden, who spent much of his
time in the latter half of the 1980s fortifying the Haqqanis’ infra-
structure at Zhawara and other sites in Paktia.48
â•… The Haqqanis’ strategically important position and growing
reputation for effectiveness also brought them to the attention of
American and Saudi officials in charge of coordinating the massive
aid effort from Pakistan. Jalaluddin deeply impressed Congressman
Charlie Wilson, an instrumental figure in the covert program of
US€support who once called Haqqani “goodness personified.”49
AccordÂ�ing to Steve Coll, Jalaluddin was “seen by CIA officers in
Islamabad and others as perhaps the most impressive Pashtun bat-
tlefield commander in the war.”50 These impressions translated into
direct financial and military support as well. At Pakistan’s insist-
ence, US and Saudi funding for the Afghan mujahidin was all to be
funneled through the ISI, not given directly to any mujahidin lead-
ers, but both the US and Saudi intelligence agencies made a small
number of exceptions during the war. Jalaluddin Haqqani was one
such exception, and in addition to the ISI-directed aid and extensive

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 B I R T H OF T H E NE XUS

private funding sources established in the Gulf, by the mid-1980s

he had secured a personal pipeline of Saudi aid through the Saudi
ambassador to Pakistan, Yousef Mottakbani, and had gained “uni-
lateral asset” status with the CIA, making frequent trips to Peshawar
where he regularly received “tens of thousands of dollars in cash
directly from CIA officers working undercover in Pakistan, without
the mediation of Pakistani intelligence.”51 This independent source
of money and materiel gave the Haqqanis a tremendous amount of
influence within Afghanistan’s mujahidin community and under-
pinned their capacity for assembling coalitions of commanders
from various parties.52 They were able to broker arms deals with
other field commanders independent of the ISI’s own metrics, and
their willingness to equip Arab volunteers was no doubt a factor in
their unique relationship with foreign fighters during the early
years of the conflict.53

At the Nexus of the Kashmiri Jihad

At around the same time as the graduating class of Arabs from
Sayyaf’s Camp Badr was making its way to the Haqqani fronts at
Khost, the Pakistani military leadership was looking to the Afghan
jihad as a preliminary staging ground for the furtherance of its
strategy of proxy war with India over control of Kashmir, another
development in which the Haqqanis would play a central role.
Early on in the war, Zia and the ISI had decided on a plan to
increase the pressure on India in Kashmir through the use of cross-
border attacks by Pakistani jihadi proxies, and Afghanistan pre-
sented the ideal place to establish training camps in pursuit of this
end. Such camps could easily be camouflaged as being in support
of the Afghan conflict, as could the diversion of some of the inter-
national military aid in funding and equipping the camps. The
obvious location for this enterprise was Zhawara, the most hard-
ened and well-resourced facility in all of Afghanistan and located
just 4 kilometers over the Pak-Afghan border.
â•… Given Zia’s above-noted alliance with the JI, Pakistan gave prior-
ity to the JI-associated Hizb ul-Mujahidin in the effort to prepare for
the Kashmiri mobilization.54 As already noted, the mujahidin party

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 F OUNT AI NH E AD OF JIHAD

closest to the JI was Hekmatyar’s HIG, and the latter maintained a

base protecting the southeastern approach to the Zhawara facility
known as Jihadwal.55 Here, beginning in 1985, a vast training com-
plex for Hizb ul-Mujahidin cadres known as Badr I and Badr II was
established, and over the next decade thousands of Hizb activ-
ists€were trained there, all at camps resourced by the Haqqanis’
�Zhawara facility.56
â•… Not to be outdone, the JUI also sought to position itself for the
coming conflict in Kashmir—which erupted almost immediately
upon the withdrawal of the Soviet Union from Afghanistan in
1989—and in the early 1980s several Kashmir-focused jihadi groups
arose out of the JUI madrassa networks. As with Hizb, these groups
established camps in and around Zhawara to train their cadres,
with the direct participation of the Haqqanis.
â•… In mid-May of 1989, Abu’l-Walid recorded a series of notes taken
during his travels through Khost with Jalaluddin Haqqani’s deputy
commander Nizamuddin Haqqani.57 Arriving at Bori, located just
northeast of the Zhawara base, they came upon a large group of
Pakistani mujahidin encamped there, from two different organiza-
tions: Harakat-ul Jihad al-Islami al-‘Alami (HuJI) and Harakat al-
Mujahidin (HuM).58 Abu’l-Walid was informed by his Haqqani
companion that the former group operated in Paktika under
�Nasrullah Mansur, the long-time comrade of Jalaluddin, while the
latter group operated in the areas directly under Haqqani’s con-
trol.59 According to Nizamuddin, both groups had become heavily
involved in the fighting in Loya Paktia beginning in 1984.60 Volun-
teer fighters from Bangladesh also established a camp at Zhawara,
and it was from this group that the Bengali branch of Harakut-ul
Jihad al-Islami (HuJI-B) was formed.61 The leader of the HuJI camp,
Fazlur Rahman Khalil, was later a signatory to Osama bin Laden’s
“World Front,” announced in 1997 at a press conference held at one
of the Zhawara camps.

The 1986 Zhawara Battle and the Birth of al-Qa’ida

By the middle of the 1980s the Haqqani fronts had already emerged
as the center of the growing nexus of the diverse strands of trans-

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national militancy then converging in Afghanistan. The makings of

what would become the global jihadi movement were all present:
robust resource mobilization networks spanning the globe, training
camps for foreign fighters of many nationalities, and open fronts for
the transformation of international muhajirin—emigrants, or in Abu
Hafs’ phrase, “guests”—into fighting mujahidin. Out of this mix the
self-proclaimed vanguard of that movement—al-Qa’ida—would be
born, and in a form that was and remains to this day inextricably
bound up with the Haqqani network.
â•… The catalyst for that birth was the Battle of Zhawara in the spring
of 1986, the first battle of the Afghan jihad in which significant
numbers of Afghan Arabs participated as a group.62 The Zhawara
battle and the much larger Operation Magistral the following year
were the last major offenses of a Soviet military then seeking to
craft an exit strategy from Afghanistan. Moscow had announced in
January 1986 that it would embark on a policy of “national recon-
ciliation,” and in February Mikhail Gorbachev gave his famous
speech to the Twenty-Seventh Party Congress calling the war in
Afghanistan a “bleeding wound.” The drawdown began with the
removal of six battalions that year, though the final Soviet with-
drawal would come three years later. The Afghan leader installed
at the end of 1986 to pursue the Soviet reconciliation policy, Presi-
dent Najibullah, appealed to the mujahidin leaders, including
�Jalaluddin Haqqani, to enter into negotiations with the regime.
Hoping to tip the military balance in favor of Kabul and give it a
stronger bargaining position down the road, the Soviets singled out
the strategically critical Haqqani positions in the southeast for a
series of massive assaults. The base was deemed a critical asset by
the ISI, which directly facilitated its defense. Twenty-five years
later, facing the same time horizon as the Soviet Union in 1986, the
United States in 2011 would pursue an almost identical Afghanistan
exit strategy of “fight, talk, build,” pushing for reconciliation while
at the same time focusing the endgame brunt of its military might
on the ISI-supported Haqqanis in the southeast.63
â•… The Battle of Zhawara began at the end of March 1986, as the
Afghan army, with Soviet aerial support, launched an attack on the
Haqqani base that would last more than a month. Jalaluddin Haqqani

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was in Miranshah when the siege began, but Nizamuddin Haqqani

spotted transport helicopters flying over the area and radioed in an
alert, which was also relayed to Peshawar.64 Logistical coordination
for defense of the base was overseen out of Miranshah by Brigadier
Mohammad Yousaf, in charge of the ISI’s activities in Afghanistan
between 1983 and 1987, and Pakistani armed forces became directly
involved in the defense of the base.65 Hekmatyar was also present in
this engagement, defending his position at Jihadwal, at the south-
eastern approach to the Zhawara complex. Under Haqqani’s leader-
ship, the Afghan mujahidin were able to repel the attack for several
weeks, but briefly lost the mountainous facility to the Afghan army
on 19 April 1986. By the evening of that day, however, the mujahidin
pushed the Soviet-backed forces out and recaptured Zhawara; the
Afghan army held the base for only five hours, and was thus unable
to destroy the base or its fortifications.
â•… At the beginning of the siege, Jalaluddin Haqqani had issued an
emergency appeal for support to Peshawar and other commanders
in the region, and a group of Arabs training at the MAK camps in
Pakistan rushed down to Miranshah. The group of Arabs already
working directly with Haqqani—including Abu’l-Walid al-Masri,
Abu Hafs al-Masri, Abu ‘Ubayda Banshiri, Abu Jihad al-Masri, and
Abu ‘Ubayda al-‘Iraqi—all entered Zhawara early and took part in
the battle from the second week of April on.66 The base was under
intense and constant aerial bombardment, and on 6 April a direct
hit caused the collapse of the cave in which Jalaluddin Haqqani was
taking shelter. Many in the cave with Haqqani were killed, and he
was badly wounded and unconscious when he was evacuated.
Assisting in his rescue was another survivor of the cave collapse:
Wa’il Julaydan, also known as Abu’l-Hasan al-Madani, then the
director of the Saudi Red Crescent and later a founding member of
al-Qa’ida.67 On 17 April, a team of Pakistani officers dispatched by
Brigadier Yousaf to fire Blowpipe anti-aircraft missiles from the
heights surrounding the base came under heavy fire, and Abu Hafs
al-Masri and Abu ‘Ubayda al-Banshiri went to help them at their
firing positions. Both of the Egyptians were soon wounded, as were
several of the Pakistani officers, and they were transported together
in the same vehicle to the Zhawara hospital.68

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 B I R T H OF T H E NE XUS

â•… The contingent of MAK-affiliated Arabs from Peshawar, includ-

ing ‘Azzam and Osama bin Laden, arrived at Miranshah on Sunday
20 April, the day after the brief loss of the facility and the beginning
of the withdrawal of the communist forces. They gathered at the
home of Jalaluddin, where ‘Azzam wrote out his will and testa-
ment, eager to join a battle that he thought could very well cost
him€his life.69 In a eulogy delivered after ‘Azzam’s assassination in
1989, discovered after 9/11 on a tape in the cassette library that
had€belonged to Bin Laden in Kandahar, one of his followers con-
firmed that ‘Azzam had first formed the desire for martyrdom at
Jalaluddin’s house that day in 1986.70 According to a recent jihadi
biography of ‘Azzam:
The first opportunity for battle arrived, and the Ansar [the MAK leaders]
went as a group to the Battle of Zhawara. Shaykh ‘Abdallah ‘Azzam and
Usama bin Ladin traveled to Miranshah and stopped at the home of the
mujahid Jalaluddin Haqqani—who never turned back, unlike Sayyaf,
Â�Rabbani or [Ahmad] Shah Massoud. Allegiance was pledged to ‘Azzam as
the amir of the Ansar fighting in that battle, which was the first such oppor-
tunity to participate on the front.71

â•…Haqqani told ‘Azzam and his men on 20 April that it was too
dangerous to cross the border, but the primary sources offer differ-
ing accounts as to what happened next. According to one account,
when the group learned that Hekmatyar’s base at Jihadwal was
under heavy attack, they gave their bay’a (pledge of allegiance) to
‘Azzam as the amir of their party, which dubbed itself the “Brigade
of Strangers,”72 and proceeded to make their way across the border
towards Hekmatyar’s positions. They arrived, however, after the
Jihadwal battle had concluded and were sent back, where they were
ordered to deposit their weapons at Haqqani’s guesthouse in
Miranshah.73 The MAK Arabs returned to Peshawar, and one of
their number—Abu Hajar al-‘Iraqi (Mamduh Mahmud Salim, a co-
founder of al-Qa’ida)—quipped that, having been repeatedly
restrained from exposing themselves to the dangers of battle, they
should call themselves the “Brigade of Dandies.”74
â•… According to other accounts, however, a significant number of
Arabs were able to enter the area of Zhawara after the base was
recaptured by the Haqqanis and assisted in beating back the

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 F OUNT AI NH E AD OF JIHAD

remaining communist forces.75 Abu’l-Walid wrote that ‘Azzam

asked him on 21 April to take some of the MAK volunteers under
the wing of the “Khost Group,” as the Haqqani-affiliated Afghan
Arabs had become known, to stage an attack on the Khost airport,
in two separate groups under the leadership of Abu ‘Ubayda al-
‘Iraqi and ‘Abd al-Rahman al-Masri.76 According to ‘Isam Diraz:
Shaykh Jalaluddin Haqqani told me of the role of the Arab mujahidin and
said that they significantly raised the level the Afghan mujahidin’s morale.
He claimed that the Arabs’ presence was militarily beneficial.77

â•…After the battle, Abu’l-Walid noted in his diaries that the MAK
began at that time to send groups of newly arrived Arabs to the
Zhawara area. During the month of Ramadan after the battle (May
1986), Jalaluddin Haqqani directed these men to Abu’l-Walid to
“entertain” them, and Abu’l-Walid wrote of the first group to
arrive, “this was the largest group of Saudi youth I had ever seen
inside Afghanistan.”78
â•… However significant the Arab involvement in the battle, one thing
is certain—the experience had taught Bin Laden that there were
definite advantages to being based close to the Haqqanis’ fronts.
Having helped ‘Azzam establish the MAK in October 1984, Bin
Laden was well aware that the ever-increasing number of new
recruits were eager for more than target practice at Sayyaf’s camps
on the Pakistan border or soccer matches in Peshawar. The group
of Arabs with Abu’l-Walid had demonstrated that working directly
with the Haqqanis meant access to the battles, and this is what the
growing number of would-be Afghan Arabs languishing in Peshawar
had come for. After the battle Bin Laden invested heavily in repair-
ing and fortifying the damaged base at Zhawara, and, according to
Abu Ibrahim al-Logari, a Yemeni Afghan Arab who was present in
Paktia during this period:

Jalaluddin Haqqani gave him [Bin Laden] three caves at the side of the
[Zhawara] base near the central Afghan kitchen. Abu ‘Abdullah [Bin
Laden] built within these caves until they became like a beautiful home,
walled in the interior with red brick and divided into many rooms, includ-
ing a library, mosque, and several bathrooms. Another cave, extending a
little over 150 meters, was used as a weapons and ammo depot.79

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 B I R T H OF T H E NE XUS

â•… In October of 1986 Bin Laden went on to use his construction

equipment to build a fortified training area at Jaji in northern
�Paktia, on the supply line between Zhawara and Ali Khel. His deci-
sion to establish an independent camp for Arabs within Afghan�
istan led to a split with ‘Azzam, who saw Bin Laden’s projects as a
misuse of resources and a challenge to the MAK’s mission of being
at the service of the Afghan mujahidin parties. Bin Laden dubbed
his camp “Ma’sadat al-Ansar” (the Lion’s Den of the Supporters),
though it quickly became known among the Afghan Arab com-
munity as al-qa’ida al-‘askariyya, or the military base. It was from this
appellation that the name of the al-Qa’ida organization was later
taken,80 and indeed the training camp represented an early stage in
al-Qa’ida’s development. According to the memoirs of Abu Ja’far
al-Qandahari, an Egyptian Afghan Arab who arrived at Peshawar
in the summer of 1988:
It was customary for new arrivals to go to the Sada training camp run by
the Maktab al-Khidamat, but I preferred to go to a new training camp that
had been announced at that time to any and all who sought to carry out
jihad, a training camp in which the course of training would be of a higher
and more strenuous level than that at Sada.81 It was a center which would
winnow out those suitable to be admitted into “al-Qa’ida al-‘Askariyya,”
an organization that had been advertised as forming the nucleus of an
Islamic army capable of fighting jihad anywhere in the world.82

â•… Though the area in Jaji where the Ma’sada camp was built was
under the supervision of Sayyaf’s party, Ma’sada was structurally
integrated with Haqqani operations at Zhawara, and Sayyaf’s front
there was logistically integrated and often dependent on the
Haqqanis’ supply base at Zhawara.83 Abu Ja’far relates that before
proceeding to the advanced training at Bin Laden’s “military base,”
he and a group of other Arabs bound for Ma’sada had to proceed
first to Zhawara via Miranshah and there undergo ten days of pre-
liminary training alongside the Haqqanis’ Afghan trainees.84 To join
the nascent al-Qa’ida, in other words, meant first training with the
Haqqani network.
â•… Bin Laden also managed to win over Abu Hafs al-Masri and
Abu ‘Ubayda al-Banshiri to his project, thus benefiting from their
years of experience in mountain guerrilla warfare with the

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 F OUNT AI NH E AD OF JIHAD

Haqqani network and their prior experiences in the Egyptian mili-

tary. The camp project required people with military training, and
Bin Laden reached out to Abu ‘Ubayda first, who agreed to visit
the site and offer advice on its suitability. During the visit Bin
Laden urged him to stay and be the military leader of the project.
Abu ‘Ubayda recalled later that “Abu ‘Abdullah [Bin Laden]
desired to entrust me with the administration of the site, but on
account of my involvement with my brothers in other operations
in Khost, I agreed only to stay for ten days.”85 Bin Laden ultimately
convinced him to stay on after seeing through the preparation of
the camp, and Abu ‘Ubayda inaugurated the first general training
program as amir of what would become known as al-Qa’ida on 17
February 1987.86 Abu Hafs was initially uninterested in Bin Laden’s
venture and remained fighting with the Haqqanis at Khost, though
after Abu ‘Ubayda began training operations Abu Hafs was finally
convinced to join the effort.87 Abu’l-Walid al-Masri notes that in
this sense Zhawara was a kind of “military academy” for the two
Egyptians that would go on to lead al-Qa’ida’s military committee,
and that in the famous “Battle of Ramadan” at Jaji in the spring of
1987 it was Abu Hafs’ and Abu ‘Ubayda’s expertise that made all
the difference.88
â•… The Ramadan battle at Jaji was a watershed moment for al-Qa’ida
and for the Afghan Arab movement in general, leading to an expo-
nential increase in the number of war volunteers pouring into
�Pakistan and Afghanistan from throughout the Muslim world. As
the Afghan army and Soviet forces moved south through Paktia for
Operation Magistral—the largest and last major communist offen-
sive of the entire war—they encountered Bin Laden’s forces in the
area of Ma’sada, the latter putting up a successful defense of their
position and killing a number of Soviet special forces in the pro-
cess.89 Touted as a major “victory,” it was the first of its kind for an
independent Arab unit in Afghanistan. More important, however,
was the media impact of the battle. Following Abu’-Walid’s exam-
ple, who had for years been filing regular reports from the front
lines of the Haqqanis’ battles for al-Ittihad, Bin Laden had invited
Arab journalists from the Gulf to observe his men at Jaji.90 He even
commissioned a film crew to record their exploits—again, an area

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in which the Haqqanis had been earlier innovators.91 The resulting

growth in volunteers was immediate and dramatic. As Hegghammer
notes, “mid-1987 seems to have represented a tipping point of the
mobilization, after which recruitment transcended personal social
networks …”92 Abu’l-Walid al-Masri made a similar assessment,
calling 1987 the “year of the Arabs in Afghanistan.”93
â•… Though in the midst of a split with Bin Laden’s al-Qa’idat al-
‘askariyya, ‘Azzam’s MAK also benefited from the media-driven
recruitment boom. The Haqqanis’ contribution to and representa-
tion within this proliferating media was extremely significant. The
MAK aggressively publicized the activities of the Arabs fighting in
Paktia, and were now able to present to their Muslim audiences
around the world a clear path to becoming a mujahid, even a mar-
tyr, uncomplicated by the ever-shifting ground of the fractious
Afghan parties in Peshawar. The openness of the Haqqani fronts
became a key selling point in this propaganda; as ‘Azzam himself
states in one of his publications, regarding the MAK’s lead fund-
raiser and recruiter Tamim al-‘Adnani:
When Shaykh Tamim became connected to the Afghan jihad he began to
inform the youth of the Arabian Peninsula about the Afghan cause and to
relate to them the miracles and activities of the mujahidin. He began to
come to Afghanistan, and the first time he came he was told that there were
centers close to Shaykh Jalaluddin. … So the first time he went for jihad his
connection was with Shaykh Jalaluddin Haqqani. There was a commander
of Haqqani’s named Muhammad Hasan and Tamim would relate stories
about him and his bravery …94

â•… The MAK’s flagship propaganda organ, the al-Jihad magazine,

beginning in its first year of publication, printed more than a dozen
stories about and interviews with Jalaluddin Haqqani and several
of his senior commanders.95 In a notable contrast, al-Jihad made
infrequent mention of Osama bin Laden by his nom de guerre Abu
‘Abdullah, and often only in passing. In one of his earliest appear-
ances in the magazine, for instance, he is quoted in a story about a
recent martyr which ends, “and Abu ‘Abdullah said, ‘We offer our
condolences on the loss of our brother Abu’l-Walid al-Sa’udi.’”96
Thereafter Bin Laden is mentioned in several issues, but much less
frequently than the Haqqani leadership.97

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 F OUNT AI NH E AD OF JIHAD

â•… By facilitating access to the fronts, the Haqqanis performed a dual

service to the growing transnational jihadi movement. First, while
other mujahidin parties were loath to involve Arabs in the fighting,
viewing the foreigners as either suicidal madmen or religiously
intolerant bigots, the Haqqanis gave such men the opportunity to
fulfill what they viewed as a sacred duty (fard ‘ayn) to jihad.98 Sec-
ond, such access allowed the Arab jihadis to capture their experi-
ences and repackage them as media products—something the
Haqqanis had been doing themselves since the beginning of the
1980s—which served to vastly expand the Arab jihadis’ interna-
tional resource mobilization capabilities.
â•… The Haqqanis were not immune to the problems posed by the
religious extremism or martyrdom-seeking tendencies of some of
the Arab volunteers. The Haqqani correspondence contained in the
Harmony database reveals that they sometimes had to manage the
consequences of having overzealous and underprepared foreigners
on their battlefields. In a letter written sometime in the first half of
the 1980s to Fathullah Haqqani, Jalaluddin writes of reports he’d
received of an Arab wasting ammunition in ineffective use of his
weapon. Asking that the Arab be sent back from the front “with an
excuse,” he requests that Fathullah communicate the issue to the
field commander “so that in a wise manner the Arabs will be placed
with the right personnel.”99 Abu’l-Walid al-Masri relates that a
young Egyptian named Abu Dujana al-Masri, who worked with a
group of Haqqani’s men on the outskirts of Gardez in the mid-
1980s, was disliked by the Afghan mujahidin for his rigorous prac-
tice of “forbidding evil” (nahi ‘an al-munkar), insisting that the
Afghans desist from what Abu Dujana regarded as lapses in their
adherence to Islamic law. He was notorious for seizing Afghan
mujahidin’s dipping tobacco (naswar), on one occasion grabbing a
local commander’s snuff box and stomping it underfoot, about
which Abu’l-Walid remarked, “If he had not been the guest of
Â�Jalaluddin Haqqani, they would have killed him instantly.”100
â•… In a recent biography of Yunis Khalis, Haji Din Muhammad pro-
vides an account of a clash between Khalis and an unnamed Arab
at Jalaluddin Haqqani’s home in Miranshah during the 1986 Battle
of Zhawara. The assembled Afghans and Arabs were listening to

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the radio for news reports from the front, and when the program
began playing music after one such update had concluded, one of
the Arabs rose and turned it off, shouting “Hey Shaykh! Haram
(forbidden)! Haram!” Khalis asked the man to explain himself with
reference to Islamic law, and in response to the Arab’s feeble
attempts to provide a justification Khalis scolded him by saying,
“Provide some documented reasons, and if you do not have them
with you, well then do not make commands out of place.” Accord-
ing to Haji Din Muhammad, at these words “the Arab became quiet
and no one dared to silence the radio in that meeting.”101
â•… The Egyptian mujahid Abu Ja’far al-Qandahari relates that while
going through his preliminary training at Zhawara before proceed-
ing to the early al-Qa’ida camp he “witnessed a distressing sight”:
In one area two groups had formed for prayer, one Arab and the other
Afghan. When I asked why this was so, I was told that they [the Afghans]
pray with haste and are tardy in performing the ‘asr prayer.102 It hardly
seemed to me that this was sufficient cause. The Afghans were followers of
Yunis Khalis, who had amply demonstrated his affection for and amity
with the Arabs, so why allow such divisions? How could we fight together
if we couldn’t pray together?103
â•…With the arrival of large numbers of new recruits after 1987, the
areas under Haqqani control witnessed an explosion of training
camps serving an extremely eclectic spectrum of ideological inter-
ests and militant causes, and these would continue to proliferate
throughout the 1990s. In 1988 al-Qa’ida officially established itself
as a clandestine, hierarchical organization, and it began to erect its
first training camps: al-Faruq at Zhawara, and the Jihadwal and
Siddiq camps in Hekmatyar’s region at Zhawara’s southeastern
approach.104 These would remain core elements of al-Qa’ida’s infra-
structure until 9/11, and agents of all of al-Qa’ida’s major attacks
during the 1990s would be trained in these camps.105 According to
Jalaluddin Haqqani, the main Haqqani base at Zhawara was itself
renamed in 1989 to the ‘Umar al-Faruq Base, and the main al-Qa’ida
camp in the valley was in turn given the name “al-Faruq.”106 Bin
Laden’s former bodyguard “Abu Jandal” Nasir al-Bahri says of the
early days of al-Faruq:
It was established on the basis of a clear military methodology, a military
college where cadets passed through a number of stages and levels until

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they finally graduated at the command level, as military commanders capa-

ble of leading any jihadist action anywhere. The idea of establishing that
military college was a global idea. Thus, if the jihad in Afghanistan ends,
graduates of the college can go anywhere in the world and capably
�command battles there. Those objectives have actually been achieved
through the success accomplished by the young men who had moved to
many€fronts outside Afghanistan, in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Chechnya, the
�Philippines, Eritrea, Somalia, Burma, and elsewhere.107

â•… Not to be outdone, the MAK established the Khaldan camp in

Khost as well, though the first amir of the camp—Abu Binan al-
Jaza’iri—who was in charge for its first four years, was seldom
present as he was frequently fighting at the Haqqani fronts; he
fought at Khost in 1990 and 1991 and was killed fighting at Gardez
in October 1991.108 The Khaldan camp was noted for the extreme
Salafi bent of its ideological curriculum.109 In contrast, the Yemeni
Abu Ibrahim al-Logari, along with two Saudi Afghan Arabs, estab-
lished Camp Mubarak at Lezi in the later 1980s, which was charac-
terized by its non-Salafi—even anti-Salafi—tone and its non-affilia-
tion with any of the Arab jihadi organizations.110 Another Arab
training camp in Paktia close to the South Waziristan border and
supplied from Azam Warsak was dedicated to training Tajik Islam-
ists involved in the short-lived Tajikistan civil war.111 There was
eventually an Arab mujahidin shura council at Khost responsible
for coordinating the activities of the growing variety of Arab groups
centered in the region.112
â•… Other camps are attested in the sources as well, but the al-Qa’ida
camps around Zhawara appear to have been the destination of
choice for the majority of the new arrivals, and in the Afghan Arab
memoir literature from this period al-Faruq stands out as the most
frequently attended camp. ‘Abdullah Muhammad Fazul, who came
to Peshawar in 1991 and became the leader of al-Qa’ida operations
in East Africa until his death in 2011, described in his memoirs the
massive influx of people into Peshawar during this period and the
proliferation of guesthouses and jihadi organizations. “For training,
though,” he writes, “most went to the al-Qa’ida camps at Jihadwal
and Zhawara [sc. al-Faruq] in Khost.”113 A similar observation about
the relative predominance of al-Qa’ida during this period was made

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in the first ever account of al-Qa’ida in the Western press, a May

1991 magazine article on the Afghan Arabs. After noting that there
was a “multitude of amorphous secret groups” operated by Arabs
in the border areas, the article states that “Qaada [sic], the most
powerful and numerically the largest Arab group, operates several
camps on both sides of the Pakistani–Afghanistan border.”114
â•… The large concentration of foreign fighters and training camps in
Loya Paktia towards the end of the Afghan jihad facilitated the first
large-scale involvement of Afghan Arabs in major battles115—the
battles of Jalalabad (1989), Khost (1990–1), and Gardez (1991).116 The
latter two were fought under the general command of Jalaluddin
Haqqani and witnessed the most extensive integration of foreign
fighters into the order of battle of the entire anti-communist conflict
in Afghanistan. As for the Battle of Jalalabad, the Arabs were ini-
tially frustrated by the refusal of several party commanders to take
them into their ranks. The lead commander for Sayyaf’s forces in
that ultimately disastrous engagement, Commander Saznur, “totally
refused any cooperation with Arab mujahidin at that battle, because
he said that the Arabs were disorganized and were seeking nothing
but martyrdom.”117 Instead, the Arabs fought there under one of
Jalaluddin Haqqani’s HIK colleagues—Haji Khalid (Ruzaddin
Â�Shinwari)—though ultimately the ill-planned attack on the city was
a fiasco and resulted in large losses among both the Afghan and the
Arab mujahidin.118 Jalaluddin sent 300 of his men to take part in the
fight, which came as a surprise to Abu’l-Walid al-Masri, learning of
this while serving as Jalaluddin’s driver during a visit to the Gulf
soon after the battle. Abu’l-Walid was an outspoken critic of the
Jalalabad siege both before and after it took place, and clashed with
the al-Qa’ida leadership at the time over their push to involve the
Arabs.119 According to Abu’l-Walid, when he expressed his criti-
cisms of the debacle to Jalaluddin in the UAE, the latter agreed
entirely.120 In an interview in Manba’ al-Jihad shortly after the battle,
Ma’afi Khan, the commander of the Haqqani forces at Jalalabad,
noted that “the lack of a unified, structured command created a
huge obstacle on our way to success.”121
â•… The Battle of Jalalabad was the first major engagement between
mujahidin and communist forces after the Soviet withdrawal,

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 F OUNT AI NH E AD OF JIHAD

though foreign fighter volunteerism did not diminish with the

removal of the “foreign occupiers.” In fact, 1989–91 saw the largest
numbers of Arabs and other foreign fighters arriving in Afghan�istan,
hailing from more than forty countries.122 This proved a boon for the
Haqqanis, who welcomed hundreds—if not thousands—of these
men into their orders of battle at Khost, conquered by Haqqani-led
forces in the spring of 1991. Khost was the first major city to fall to
the mujahidin, followed soon after by Gardez, losses that were
instrumental in the fall of the communist government of Najibullah
in Kabul in 1992. Participation in the Battle of Khost subsequently
became a badge of honor for Afghan Arab veterans of the war, and
the foreign fighter involvement represented a cross-section of trans-
national jihadism at the time. Noman Benotman, a Khost veteran
and the former leader of the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group, stated
that “there were Saudis, Kuwaitis, Jordanians, Palestinians, Algerians,
Tunisians, Syrians, Libyans and other nationalities in our ranks.”123
The Arabic-language Haqqani network magazine ran a story after
the battle on the Arab martyrs of Khost, which gives obituaries of a
Yemeni, a Saudi, a Qatari, an Algerian, and two Tunisians.124 For the
first time, Arabs fighting in this battle were led by Arab command-
ers who were integrated into the Haqqanis’ chain of command; these
included a Yemeni front led out of Camp Mubarak at Lezi, as well€as
a Jordanian front under the command of Abu’l-Harith al-Urduni.125
Al-Qa’ida’s military leadership also participated in the battle, as did
cadres of the Egyptian al-Jama’a al-Islamiyya (EIG).126 Many of the
leaders of the militant Islamist organizations established in the
1990s, from North Africa to Southeast Asia, got their first taste of
jihad under Haqqani’s command in this fight. It was not just al-
Qa’ida, then, that the Haqqani network had helped foster into being
during the anti-Soviet jihad, but rather a broad spectrum of late
twentieth-century transnational jihadism.

82
 3

THE FOUNTAINHEAD

THE HAQQANI NETWORK, THE TALIBAN,

AND THE RISE OF GLOBAL JIHAD

The decade following the Soviet withdrawal witnessed a devas�

tating civil war in Afghanistan; eruptions of jihadi violence in
�Kashmir, northwestern China, and the former Soviet Central Asian
states; the rise of the Taliban; and the initiation by al-Qa’ida of a
global campaign of political violence against the United States. The
Haqqani network figures prominently in each of these contexts,
though in ways that have up to now been largely unexplored. The
triangle of relations between the Haqqani network, the Taliban,
and al-Qa’ida lie at the heart of this story, one in which the
Â�HaqÂ�qani network fulfilled its ambitions to become the “fountain-
head of jihad.”
â•… During the period between the Soviet withdrawal and the rise of
the Taliban, the activities of the Haqqani network present some-
thing of a paradox. The Haqqanis initially spearheaded efforts at
building a coalition of Afghan mujahidin commanders that sought
to establish an inclusive and broad-based government, one that
would accord significant autonomy to Afghanistan’s distinct
regions. When these efforts failed and the mujahidin parties fell
into civil war, the Haqqanis distinguished themselves by not mak-

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ing a power play for control of Kabul, and instead led a reconcilia-
tion effort that brokered a number of short-lived ceasefires between
Hekmatyar’s and Massoud’s opposing forces in the capital. In this
sense, the Haqqanis appeared as relatively politically moderate in
terms of the mujahidin parties during the early 1990s, and their
stated goals regarding the shape of a post-communist Afghan state
were in some ways similar to those expressed by the US State
Department at the time. Yet the Haqqanis also extended their con-
trol of the southeast during this period, and offered this relatively
secure space as a region of refuge for a growing number of militant
Islamist movements from throughout the world. Most famously,
this included the main camps of al-Qa’ida, which during this period
trained the men who would initiate al-Qa’ida’s campaign of glo-
balized violence against the United States. As a key player in
Afghan politics, then, the Haqqanis focused on stabilizing the coun-
try and protecting their regional autonomy, but this autonomy in
turn was put to the service of an emerging global jihadi milieu.
These two trends would continue to characterize the Haqqani net-
work’s relationship with the Taliban after 1995, with enormous
consequences, as it was their very autonomy from the Taliban that
allowed the Haqqanis to shelter al-Qa’ida as it prepared to carry out
the 9/11 attacks.

The Haqqani Network and the National Commanders Shura

At the beginning of 1989, with the last of the Soviet troops making
their way north out of the country, Pakistan, the United States, and
Saudi Arabia pressured the mujahidin leaders to form the basis of
a transitional government to replace Najibullah’s regime, which
was believed to be too weakened by the Soviet withdrawal to hold
on to power for long. In February 1989, a shura of all the mujahidin
parties was convened for this purpose in Rawalpindi, and the ISI
put Jalaluddin Haqqani in charge of the council.1 The shura was
hampered from the beginning by disunity among the mujahidin
parties and differences of interest in the foreign powers support-
ing€them. Saudi Arabia heavily favored Sayyaf, the ISI favored
�Hekmatyar, and the United States was comfortable with neither,

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 T H E F OUNT AI NH E A D

favoring a negotiated settlement that would prioritize Afghan “self-

determination” and the “sidelining of extremists” like Sayyaf and
Hekmatyar.2 Frustrated with the squabbling of the party leaders at
the shura, Jalaluddin sequestered them in his home toward the end
of February and at one point is said to have extracted an agreement
to a balloting procedure from Hekmatyar at gunpoint.3 The shura
led to the creation of the Afghan Interim Government (AIG), a ven-
ture doomed from the start by the competing ambitions of the
Peshawar leaders and their international backers.4 Jalaluddin
Haqqani quickly became disillusioned with the AIG, and was
quoted in the New York Times in April 1991 after the capture of
Khost saying that “there is no possibility of the AIG to come to
Khost. We did not free it for the AIG.”5 In the Haqqani network
magazines he expressed his dismissal of the interim government
and instead promoted a new national leadership structure that
would bypass the fractious Peshawar-based parties.6
â•… On 7–9 May 1990, Jalaluddin convened a gathering of twenty-
seven major mujahidin field commanders at the Zhawara base to
discuss post-Soviet military strategy.7 The result was the formation
of the National Commanders Shura (NCS), led by Jalaluddin
Haqqani.8 The most prominent leaders of the NCS at first were
Haqqani and his two HIK colleagues, Mullah Malang and Abdul
Haq.9 Though initially composed primarily of Pashtun command-
ers, it eventually grew to include the famous Tajik commander
Ahmad Shah Massoud, Shi’a commanders, and northern military
leaders after a further meeting in October in Kunar Province.10
Hekmatyar and Sayyaf boycotted the meetings and refused to join
the shura—Sayyaf declaring it a CIA attempt to “sabotage their
jihad.”11 After the October meeting the United States reportedly
began to offer support to the NCS, seeing in it an alternative mili-
tary and political solution independent of the ISI and Hekmatyar,
and equipped the NCS leaders with, among other things, sophisti-
cated radio equipment that would enable them to communicate in
Afghanistan and bypass Pakistan’s control of logistics.12 In an
interview published in Manba’ al-Jihad, however, Haqqani criti-
cized the American support and said it would hurt rather than
help their efforts.13

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 F OUNT AI NH E AD OF JIHAD

â•… The platform of the NCS provides a good insight into the
Haqqanis’ political preferences for a post-communist Afghanistan.
While Haqqani insisted that the NCS would pursue a national gov-
ernment based on shari’a law, it would not be a centralized (or
Pashtun-centric) emirate of the type that the Taliban would attempt
to impose in the latter half of the decade, but would instead com-
prise nine regional administrative divisions whose administrations
would be drawn from the mujahidin commanders—not the Pesha-
war party leaders—as well as religious and civic or tribal leaders
from the local areas.14 Though at this time Jalaluddin rejected the
notion of the direct election of state leaders by universal suffrage as
contrary to Islamic law, he did envision the possibility of indirect
election by 3000–5000 delegates “chosen from the people.”15
â•… Haqqani began to establish the rudiments of such an administra-
tive system in his own region after the capture of Khost, arranging
for the establishment of a Khost shura.16 According to Jalaluddin:
In an attempt to establish order and commence reconstruction, a joint
administration has been established in Khost. In it, various departments
such as health, agriculture, reconstruction, education and others have been
organized. To this end, we brought together the commanders, ‘ulama and
tribal elders in a grand meeting. Through this, we created a unified provin-
cial council out of the various tribal factional councils that existed. A com-
mission was chosen from among the provincial council, and was confirmed
by the entire council. Then from among the appointment commission, a
delegation was given responsibility for implementation and appointing
people to the various posts. As such, all the directors and their deputies
have been appointed, and the commission has been given the task of com-
pleting all the appointments throughout the various offices of the admin-
istration. The appointments have been endorsed by all the factions.17

â•… After Haqqani-led NCS forces captured Gardez, the capital of

Paktia, in 1991, a similar system was put in place there, with
Haqqani described as leader of the Gardez shura.18 Another govern-
ing shura was established in Jalalabad and led by Jalaluddin’s HIK
ally Haji ‘Abd al-Qadir. Together these institutions maintained a
relative degree of order in eastern Afghanistan, while much of the
rest of the country became subject to the predations of warlords
and€Kabul increasingly became an urban battleground between
Hekmatyar and Massoud.

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 T H E F OUNT AI NH E A D

â•… As they had done during the anti-Soviet war, the Haqqanis con-
tinued to integrate highland Pashtun tribal modalities of power
sharing and conflict resolution into the post-Soviet system that they
established in the southeast. In 1993, when the Jalalabad governor
Shamali Khan was killed and blame fell on Haji ‘Abd al-Qadir of
the Jalalabad shura, a vengeance claim (badal) was made by the
slain governor’s Ahmadzai tribe. Forces loyal to Hekmatyar joined
the conflict on the side of the Ahmadzai, while Massoud sent forces
from the north to dislodge the pro-Hekmatyar party.19 Jalaluddin
Haqqani, “to prevent further bloodshed,” claims to have stepped in
and convened a peace jirga that brokered a cessation of hostilities
and a commitment from all parties to abide by the terms of an
eight-point resolution.20
â•… The Haqqanis also involved the Arabs in these local political
activities, as evidenced by the Arab mujahidin shura of Khost that
was established after the capture of that city. Around that time the
Yemeni Afghan Arab Abu Ibrahim al-Logari and Shirin Jamal al-
Qurashi, leaders of the Mubarak camp in Lezi, attended a shura
meeting at Bori “as representatives of the Lezi area.” Abu Ibrahim
says there were more than thirty commanders and over twenty
local tribal shaykhs present at the meeting presided over by
�Jalaluddin Haqqani, and which was described by Abu Ibrahim as
“representing the central leadership of Paktia Province.”21 Abu
Ibrahim was bored at the lack of discussion of military issues, but
notes that the council spent hours discussing the distribution of the
spoils of war and administrative committees to be established from
among the parties and tribes.22

The Haqqani Network and the Emergence of Global Jihadism

The first years of the 1990s proved to be fateful in several ways both
for the trajectory of the Haqqani network and for the transnational
militant Islamist movement. On the international level, the Gulf
War radically polarized the already conflict-prone Peshawar scene,
and led to the departure of Bin Laden and much of the al-Qa’ida
leadership to Sudan, where it focused its early efforts on the
Â�Arabian Peninsula.23 The Haqqanis and al-Qa’ida continued to pur-

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 F OUNT AI NH E AD OF JIHAD

sue intertwined lines of development during this period. The Gulf

War proved a critical catalyst for the emergence of global jihadism,
and the Haqqani network again was involved in that redirection of
Islamist violence.
â•… The invasion of Kuwait by Saddam Hussein’s forces in the sum-
mer of 1990 and the subsequent involvement of American military
forces were met with vastly divergent reactions by the Afghan
mujahidin leadership.24 The AIG, under Mujaddidi’s presidency,
offered its support to Saudi Arabia, while Hekmatyar emerged as
the most outspoken supporter of Saddam. Sayyaf was critical of the
Saudi response to the invasion of Kuwait, a position which severely
damaged his relationship with the Saudi regime. The Haqqanis’
response was somewhat more measured, denouncing both the Iraqi
invasion and the American bombing of Iraq. Jalaluddin Haqqani
criticized “some Muslims here who have been demonstrating in
support of Saddam, giving him inappropriate titles like ‘mujahid.’
Before making such declarations, Muslims need to observe caution
and await Islamic rulings on this matter.”25 Though the Haqqani
leaders refrained from directly criticizing the Saudi government,
the latter closed the offices of both Hekmatyar’s HIG and the
Haqqani network in the kingdom. According to Abu Ibrahim al-
Logari, along with the tightened control over Saudi aid groups at
this time, these closures “cut off 90% of what was coming to the
Afghan jihad from Saudi Arabia.”26
â•… Osama bin Laden made an offer to the Saudi government during
this period to dispatch 12,000 of his own trained mujahidin to
defend the kingdom, which it declined. At the same time the AIG
made a similar if less extravagant offer, one that the Saudis
accepted.27 “Several hundred” Afghan mujahidin were sent to Saudi
Arabia in February, while “a second batch of guerrillas would leave
for Riyadh soon. These guerrillas will operate under Saudi com-
mand.”28 Haqqani ally and HIK representative Haji Din Â�Muhammad
was asked by the AIG to detail HIK fighters for the effort, but he
demurred, saying that the issue had not been discussed by the AIG
cabinet.29 It is extremely unlikely that any Haqqani fighters were
involved in this mobilization. Hekmatyar, meanwhile, reportedly
went to Baghdad and offered to send HIG soldiers to fight along-
side Saddam’s army.30

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 T H E F OUNT AI NH E A D

â•… After his offer was rejected, Bin Laden set up the Advice and
Reform Committee in London, through which he issued criticisms
of the Saudi royal family’s involvement of “infidel” troops in the
affairs of the kingdom, though as the name of this organization
indicates, Bin Laden was seeking reform at this stage, not revolu-
tion.31 Nor did Bin Laden reorient the fundamental orientation of
the al-Qa’ida organization at this time, which remained focused on
three interrelated goals: continuing the training operations in
Khost, establishing a presence in the region of the Arabian Penin-
sula (principally Yemen and Somalia), and offering support and
training to revolutionary Islamist groups that had emerged in the
aftermath of the Afghan jihad. The Haqqanis, while continuing
their involvement in al-Qa’ida’s pursuits during this period, also
began to become increasingly global in their jihadi orientation, and
in ways that some evidence suggests decisively influenced the
direction of al-Qa’ida strategy.
â•… One area of cooperation between the two groups was in efforts at
averting the disastrous civil war into which Afghanistan plunged
after the fall of the Najibullah regime. In the spring of 1992, as
�Hekmatyar was amassing his forces to the south of Kabul and Mas-
soud worked to secure the capital, Jalaluddin Haqqani assembled a
reconciliation committee consisting of 300 Afghan commanders and
clerics in an attempt to bring the two opposing factions into nego-
tiations. Obtaining authorization letters from Mujaddidi, the presi-
dent of the by-then-defunct AIG, as well as Rabbani, president of
the UN-brokered transitional government, Haqqani won the
approval of both Hekmatyar and Massoud to come to Kabul and
pursue a peaceful settlement.32 Haqqani would lead the peace com-
mission through 1994, after which the emergence of the Taliban
fundamentally altered the balance of power and Haqqani returned
to Khost.33
â•… Bin Laden lent his support to Haqqani’s reconciliation initiatives
during the same period that he was relocating most of his followers
to Khartoum. According to Rabiah Hutchinson, an Australian
Afghan Arab who was briefly married to Abu’l-Walid al-Masri,
Bin€Laden returned briefly to Peshawar in 1992 and arranged a
�telephone conference between Hekmatyar and Massoud.34 The

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 F OUNT AI NH E AD OF JIHAD

�
Palestinian journalist Jamal Ismail describes a much more signifi-
cant effort on Bin Laden’s part:
In 1991 and 1992 I interviewed him [Bin Laden] more than once. … At that
time … he was head of a reconciliation committee between the Afghan
factions that were at war in some states. He was chosen by the factions as
a neutral party that is supportive of the Afghan jihad in general. … After
1992, when the Afghan mujahedin entered the Afghan capital, and were at
war with each other, which stunned all observers, Osama bin Laden—
along with a number of Islamic activists who were in Peshawar and other
Arab countries—exerted intensive mediation efforts between Hekmatyar,
Masood, and Rabbani, but all these efforts failed.35

â•… While Bin Laden supported the Haqqanis’ peace initiatives in

Afghanistan during this period, the Haqqanis lent their aid to al-
Qa’ida’s earliest efforts in Africa. In the same month that Bin Laden
and much of the senior leadership of al-Qa’ida were settling into
Khartoum, the Haqqanis published a lengthy communiqué and
request for assistance by the Eritrean Islamic Jihad Movement (EIJM)
in the Arabic-language Manba’ al-Jihad. This was the first of such
communications by a non-Afghan organization published in the
Manba’ magazines.36 Leaders of the EIJM were also then enjoying
Sudan’s hospitality, and al-Qa’ida reportedly extended financial aid
and training to the Eritrean Islamic Jihad at this time.37 The EIJM
liaison to al-Qa’ida was reportedly close to Abu ‘Ubayda al-Banshiri,
and the leader of the “militant Salafi faction” of the EIJM—Muham-
mad Ahmad Salih (Abu Suhayl)—is said to have previously fought
in Afghanistan.38 Given this information and the fact that the EIJM
communiqué appeared in Manba’, it seems likely that the EIJM vet-
erans of the Afghan jihad had fought or trained at Haqqani fronts.
â•… The Haqqanis also issued declarations of support during 1991 for
the “jihad” being waged by al-Qa’ida’s new hosts in Khartoum, the
revolutionary Islamist regime of Hassan al-Turabi, against the
southern Sudanese forces of John Garang. In 2002 Bosnian authori-
ties raided the offices of the Benevolence International Foundation
(BIF) in Sarajevo being run by Enaam Arnaout (Abu Mahmud al-
Suri), a co-founder of al-Qa’ida and a veteran of the Haqqani fronts
during the anti-Soviet war. On Arnaout’s computer police found
scanned images of statements written by both Jalaluddin Haqqani

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and Yunis Khalis issued in 1991, calling for support of the Sudanese
jihad.39 Jalaluddin’s letter, written in his own hand under the let-
terhead of “Hezb-e-Islam Afghanistan, Shk Jalaludin Haqani
Office,” reads:
To the Muslims of East and West … From the land of jihad in the path of
God, the Muslim land of Afghanistan, victorious by the permission of God
against the union of infidels, unto my Muslim brothers in general: I give
you glad tidings that the banner of jihad—which remains a duty until the
Day of Resurrection—has been raised from the heart of Africa in Muslim
Sudan. The enemies of God loathe that the Muslims should return to their
religion and to their lord, so the Crusaders, the apostates and infidels have
united in supporting one another in fighting the Muslims [of Sudan], who
are now waiting expectantly for your help and support through your rais-
ing the call, money and your pens, in hope of divine rewards and the inter-
cession of the noble Prophet.40

â•…The correspondence discovered on the BIF computers also docu-

ments the extensive al-Qa’ida infrastructure in and around Â�Zhawara
at this time, referring to “centers which belong to al-Qa’ida” at
Zhawara, Bori, Jihadwal, and Manikandaw, noting that the Khost-
area operations of al-Qa’ida are “in the hands of Abu Hafs.”41 The
files also included numerous receipts and records of transactions
between al-Qa’ida members, including Arnaout, and HIK, for vehi-
cles, weapons, and ammunition, making frequent reference to the
al-Qa’ida training camps in Paktia.42
â•… These areas of cooperation demonstrate that the Haqqani–al-
Qa’ida relationship did not cease with Bin Laden’s move to Africa,
but rather expanded and was considerably internationalized. But
whereas Bin Laden focused his efforts on the Arabian Peninsula,
the rhetoric and activities of the Haqqani network became mark-
edly global during this period. In a series of conferences in Pakistan
convened by the JUI and its jihadist offshoots in 1991–2, Jalaluddin
Haqqani began to identify the United States as the next main enemy
of the Muslim world following the disintegration of the Soviet
Union, a turn which was also reflected in the publications of the
Haqqani network in the first years of the 1990s.
â•… Already in 1988 the Haqqanis began declaring their support for a
range of jihadi causes beyond Afghanistan. Speaking at a confer-

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ence held by Harakat-ul Jihad al-Islami (HuJI) in Gujrat City,

�Pakistan in 1988, Jalaluddin Haqqani stated:
Brothers: Know that we will not lay down our arms once Afghanistan
becomes free. We will fight with and help Muslims in India and Kashmir
to get their freedom from the Hindus; we will help rescue the Palestinians
from the cruelties of the Jews; we hope that God, through us, helps free the
Muslims of Balkh, Bukhara, Tashkent and Samarqand from the yoke of the
Russians. We ask that God will help us keep our arms until the defenseless
Muslims of the world are rescued and freed.43

â•… This rhetoric is remarkably similar to that of al-Qa’ida in 1988.

According to Enaam Arnaout (Abu Mahmud al-Suri):
The al Qaeda idea ran through Osama’s mind for the first time in 1988,
namely after the establishment of al-Masadah and after young Arabs
began to join the jihad in large numbers with the emergence of the signs
of victory in Afghanistan. Osama believed he could set up an army of
young men responding to the jihad call. When he presented the idea to us
he did not speak of jihad against Arab regimes, but of helping Muslims
against the infidel government oppressing them, as was the case in
�Palestine, the Philippines, and Kashmir, especially Central Asia, which
was under the Soviet rule then and no one dreamed that two years later it
would be independent.44

â•… In the same year, the Haqqanis published what appears to be their
first jihadi magazine, issued a year before they began producing the
Manba’ al-Jihad and Nusrat al-Jihad journals in Arabic, Pashto, and
Urdu respectively.45 The Haqqanis’ decision to produce their own
media products and send Jalaluddin on speaking tours at this time
may have been meant to compensate for the loss of resources that
came with the reduction of direct CIA support beginning in 1988.46
Provocatively entitled The Voice of Global Jihad (Sawt al-Jihad al-
‘Alami), their first magazine only appeared in one issue, printed out
of Peshawar in June of 1988, and carried, in addition to articles
about developments in Afghanistan, a statement by the “Blind
Shaykh” ‘Umar ‘Abd al-Rahman calling for revolutionary jihad
against the Egyptian regime. According to Ahmad Zaydan, who
notes that the magazine was backed by the Haqqanis, The Voice of
Global Jihad “was financed and supervised by Egyptians who were
opposed to the Egyptian regime. This might be the first indication

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against the Egyptian regime in Peshawar. Otherwise, before that the

Arab volunteers were restricting their activities to the Afghan
jihad.”47 In 1991, Jalaluddin gave an interview to al-Murabitun, the
Peshawar-based magazine of the Egyptian Jama’a al-Islamiyya (the
Egyptian Islamic Group), in which he said regarding the Arabs in
Afghanistan: “I believe that even if a small group of them go back to
their countries and start jihad there, all of their problems would be
solved, just like jihad has solved our problems. And our Arab broth-
ers are doing well in terms of finances, so that should help too.”48
â•… Through a variety of media, then, by 1988 the Haqqanis were
promoting far-flung defensive jihads against non-Muslim invaders
as well as revolutionary jihadi movements in the Arab world.
Beginning in 1991 they began to promote anti-American militant
activism as well. Speaking at a conference convened by the NCS in
1991, Jalaluddin Haqqani declared:
Jihad continues to be a sacred duty until the infidels are defeated through-
out the world. … God will not bless us for our past jihad. To win His bless-
ings, we have to continue jihad until the end … In the past, we had one
enemy, Russia. But now, our enemies are numerous and stronger because
now America, Britain, China and all non-Muslim countries have backed the
Russians in an attempt to weaken the Muslim community … The premise
that made jihad a sacred duty of all Muslims in the past still holds and
backing the jihad and helping in its path is a duty of all Muslims.49

â•… The following year at a conference in Karachi dedicated to the

Haqqanis and celebrating their contributions to the Afghan and
Kashmiri struggles, Fazl ur-Rehman, the head of the JUI-F, said in
a speech:
The Afghan jihad, which was spearheaded by Mawlawi Haqqani and
other truthful leaders, defeated the Soviet empire. But now there is
another enemy to this jihad. That is America and its conspiratorial policies
that are intended to bring ruin to Afghanistan, the center of jihad, under
American attacks. But we are absolutely certain that people like Mawlawi
Haqqani will give the Americans the same answer they gave to the
�Russians. And we are sure that people like Haqqani will fuel the flames of
jihad worldwide.50

â•… The anti-American tone of Haqqani pronouncements was not

limited to the perception of American “conspiratorial policies” in

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Afghanistan, but was also linked in several Haqqani publications to

the view that US involvement in the Gulf since 1990 was part of a
broader American–Israeli strategy to exercise an oppressive and
anti-Islamic hegemony throughout the Muslim world.51
â•… The Haqqanis’ statements during this period were being backed
up by investment in the training and mobilization of Islamist mili-
tants from Pakistan, Kashmir, Bangladesh, northwestern China,
Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Southeast Asia, and a variety of Arab coun-
tries.52 Though none of our sources document direct ISI material
support to these initiatives, the ISI leadership was making unequiv-
ocal statements of ideological support for just such a regional
expansion of jihad at this time.53 At a meeting of the NCS in
�Rawalpindi in October 1990, Mirza Aslam Beg, Pakistani chief of
army staff, presented a vision of Afghanistan and Pakistan uniting
“to foster Islamic revolutions in the Muslim world,” with special
reference to the former Soviet states and Kashmir.54 Brig. Yousaf, by
then retired from the ISI, described an identical vision in an article
published in a Pakistani daily the following month.55 In the summer
of 1991 several new training camps were established at Zhawara in
partnership with the JUI-linked and ISI-supported Kashmiri jihadi
organizations Harakat ul-Mujahidin (also known as Harakat al-
Ansar) and HuJI.56 One of the Haqqani camps serving this popula-
tion was the Salman al-Farsi camp, established at Zhawara and
described in Manba’ al-Jihad as the main military training camp for
students of the Manba’ al-‘Ulum madrassa near Miranshah.57 At the
Salman al-Farsi camp “Pakistanis, Kashmiris, Filippinos, Bosnian
Muslims, Uighurs from Xinjiang etc. were being trained.”58 When
photojournalist Bob Nickelsberg visited the Zhawara base in 1990
and 1991 he was surprised by the large number of Kashmiri and
Uighurs engaging in training, and Jalaluddin boasted to him about
their presence but declined Nickelsberg’s request to interview some
of the trainees.59 One Uighur separatist in Chinese custody later
claimed to a Chinese journalist that the camps at which the Uighurs
trained were financed by Osama bin Laden.60

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The Furqan Project

The Haqqanis also realized their ambition to support jihad in the
former Soviet CIS states, and in this initiative they worked directly
with al-Qa’ida. Between 1992 and 1995 the al-Qa’ida camps in and
around Zhawara were partially dedicated to the “Furqan Project,”
a training program spearheaded by Abu’l-Walid al-Masri and pro-
viding training and arms to Tajik, Uzbek, Chechen, and other Cen-
tral Asian jihadis in support of anti-regime and irredentist Islamist
movements in their respective countries of origin. Unlike in the
early days of the al-Qa’ida camp at Jaji, when recruits first went
through training at Haqqani camps before proceeding to al-Qa’ida’s
facilities, in this case training was provided in one location and in a
joint fashion, with al-Qa’ida and Haqqani personnel training the
international classes together.
â•… In a book detailing the history of this project, Abu Walid al-Masri
writes that it began with a visit to Peshawar in 1992 by Haq Nazar,
a member of the Shura Council of the Nahda Party of Tajikistan.
Haq Nazar came seeking support from the Afghan Arabs for the
Nahda’s revolutionary efforts in Tajikistan, and over a series of
meetings Abu’l-Walid agreed to set up a training program for
Nahda cadres at al-Faruq in Zhawara. The al-Qa’ida camps were
being run by skeleton crews at this time, most of the organization
having moved to Sudan and Somalia, but Abu’l-Walid met with
Sayf al-‘Adl at al-Faruq and secured al-Qa’ida support for the pro-
ject.61 Al-Qa’ida donated its remaining stores of weapons in
Afghanistan to be used in the training and then shipped north to
the Nahda fighters in Tajikistan. Abu ‘Ata al-Sharqi (Zayd al-
Tunisi) and the remaining al-Qa’ida personnel at the Jihadwal camp
offered training support, as did two members of the Egyptian
Islamic Jihad (EIJ).62 Abu’l-Walid was also able to hire several train-
ers who had been working at camps around Peshawar and who had
fled to Afghanistan after Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif cracked
down on the Peshawar Arabs and ordered their offices in Pakistan
closed. While these Arabs would provide the operational training
to the Central Asians, mullahs from the Haqqani network gave
ideological and religious instruction. Abu’l-Walid writes of the
Tajik trainees, of which the first group numbered 150 young men:

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They were from a country long controlled by communism and knew little
of Islam. Many learned to pray and read the Qur’an for the first time in
their lives. I was determined to keep the influences of Salafism from them,
as they came from a people who were historically Hanafi and of whom
many were Sufis. Thus we agreed with some of the ‘ulama among my
neighbors at the Zhawara base from the Haqqani group (jama’a Haqqani) to
teach them Islam and the rules of shari’a according to the Hanafi school.
We explained to our brother trainers from al-Qa’ida that we were teaching
them the Islamic jurisprudence that prevailed among them in their own
country so that they would not find themselves further isolated in their
own communities. We convinced them [the al-Qa’ida trainers] with diffi-
culty, but our actions were welcomed by the Nahda party.63

â•… The overall training program, according to Abu’l-Walid, was

designed on the model of the Haqqani network and sought to
impart to the Central Asian jihadis the best practices of coordinated
command and centralized force that the Haqqanis had refined dur-
ing the anti-Soviet struggle.
â•… In 1994 Abu Walid escorted the first batch of Tajik graduates and
their al-Qa’ida-donated military supplies north to the Afghan prov-
ince of Taloqan, which borders Tajikistan. To get there at that time
meant crossing several lines of opposing mujahidin groups engaged
in civil war. As one of the few senior mujahidin leaders attempting
to mediate rather than join that conflict, Jalaluddin Haqqani was in
an ideal position to help Abu’l-Walid negotiate the dangerous pas-
sage north, and according to the latter Jalaluddin intervened for
him on numerous occasions during the trip.64 Crossing into the no-
man’s-land between the opposing front lines of Hekmatyar and
Ahmad Shah Massoud south of Kabul, Abu’l-Walid discovered that
the commander in charge of that gray zone was a man despised by
the Arab foreign fighter community for allegedly capturing Arab
fighters and handing them over to Pakistan. He was also, however,
an old friend of Ibrahim Haqqani, one of Jalaluddin’s younger
brothers, and with a letter from Ibrahim requesting safe passage
Abu’l-Walid sailed through the danger zone unmolested with the
men and weapons in his charge.65
â•… There were other mishaps along the way, but finally Abu’l-Walid
and the Tajiks reached Taloqan and delivered the arms to the€Nahda
leadership. While there, Abu’l-Walid met one Tahir Yuldashev,

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an€Uzbek then on the Nahda Shura Council. Abu’l-Walid and

Yuldashev discussed the latter’s ambitions for jihadist action
�
in€Uzbekistan, and after Abu’l-Walid returned to the al-Qa’ida-
Haqqani camps at Zhawara Yuldashev began sending groups of
Uzbeks down to him for training. Four years later Yuldashev
announced the formation of the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan
(IMU), which has been fighting ever since in Central Asia’s Ferghana
Valley. After 9/11 many of the IMU’s activists in Afghanistan fled
with al-Qa’ida into North and South Waziristan, where they are
now estimated to number several thousand.
â•… After beginning the training session for the Uzbeks, Abu’l-Walid
went to Peshawar to meet with a delegation of Chechen mujahidin
that had come seeking support for their struggle against Russia.
Chechen rebel leader Shamil Basayev was among the delegation,
and Abu’l-Walid met with Shamil and discussed the Khost training
operations. Shamil sent six Chechen mujahidin back with Abu’l-
Walid to train at al-Faruq, and Abu’l-Walid writes that in their
physical fitness and military skills they were superior to anyone he
had trained before. After their graduation Abu’l-Walid learned that
they all filled prominent leadership positions in the jihadi move-
ment in Chechnya, and that five of them were eventually killed
fighting the Russians.66 He writes of this period in 1994, when al-
Faruq was filled with new recruits from Tajikistan, thirty-five
Uzbek cadres sent by Yuldashev, and Basayev’s six Chechen
“giants,” as the high point of al-Faruq’s history, characterized by
extremely high morale and enthusiastic involvement by the
Haqqani ‘ulama and other local Afghans.

Abu’l-Walid: Architect of Global Jihad

Recently, two senior al-Qa’ida leaders have made claims that sug-
gest that the Haqqani network played an oblique role in the anti-
American turn on the part of al-Qa’ida at this time. In 2009,
‘Abdullah Muhammad Fazul, the late leader of al-Qa’ida operations
in East Africa and al-Qa’ida’s “confidential secretary” (amin sirr al-
qa’ida), published online a two-volume autobiography which nar-
rates the whole course of his two-decade long career within the

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al-Qa’ida organization. In it, Fazul claims that the “architect of the

strategy” of al-Qa’ida’s anti-American jihad was Abu’l-Walid al-
Masri, “whose great merit it was to have convinced the al-Qa’ida
leadership to confront the United States of America.”67 Killed in
Mogadishu in June 2011, Fazul’s stature within the al-Qa’ida organi-
zation requires that his testimony be given significant weight.
Already by the early 1990s Fazul had risen to a senior position in the
organization, and during the later 1990s he worked directly under
Abu Hafs al-Masri as the latter’s lieutenant in an al-Qa’ida military
committee.68 Bin Laden’s former bodyguard Nasir al-Bahri notes
that while in Afghanistan in the late 1990s Fazul “offered special
and ultra-secret training to certain members of the organization,”69
which Fazul himself reveals to have centered on al-Qa’ida’s quest to
develop chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons.70 During the
later stages of the preparation of the 9/11 plot, Fazul worked in
Kandahar as Khalid Shaykh Muhammad’s personal assistant and
was thus—according to him—the only person in the al-Qa’ida
organization privy to the details of that plot beyond Bin Laden, Abu
Hafs al-Masri, and Khalid Shaykh Muhammad himself.71
â•… More recently, al-Qa’ida’s senior military official Sayf al-‘Adl
addressed a series of letters to Abu’l-Walid that the latter posted on
his website, and in which Sayf also describes Abu’l-Walid as having
been famous in Afghanistan for promoting a strategic focus on a
hegemonic United States. Sayf wrote that Abu’l-Walid, using the
metaphor of pack mules and the mule driver, explained that the
American–Israeli imperial project distributes the burden of subju-
gation among various internally conflicting interests, making revo-
lutionary jihadism against “apostate regimes” the like of a pack
mule bearing a load that furthers the interests of empire. He also
refers to Abu’l-Walid’s involvement in the development of al-
Qa’ida’s strategy when he asks:
Was it not the strategy of al-Qa’ida, which you participated in developing,
to work to weaken the present world order and thus weaken the underly-
ing political establishment so that our people in Arab and Muslim countries
could seize the opportunity and free themselves from the idols weighing
on their chests, both rulers and agents? And today you write that the solu-
tion will be in the hands of the people. Is not what you are writing about a

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success of al-Qa’ida’s strategy which, I repeat, was a strategy you yourself

took part in crafting, and which was a constant point of contention between
al-Qa’ida and other organizations and brought al-Qa’ida severe criticism
because it chose to strike the far enemy rather than the near enemy?72

â•… A series of letters contained in the Harmony database written by

Abu’l-Walid al-Masri from the Zhawara base in 1993 and 1994 to
the al-Qa’ida leadership in Sudan lends support to Fazul’s and
Sayf’s claims. In these letters—the “Five Letters to the Africa
Corps”—Abu’l-Walid writes at length of al-Qa’ida’s lack of strate-
gic focus and Bin Laden’s obsession with the Arab heartlands—that
is, the Arabian Peninsula.73 He bemoans the transition of al-Qa’ida’s
main focus from Afghanistan to the Gulf region, noting that “before
you abandoned the Asian position under the slogan that you were
going to work in the heartland region—the Arab region—you had
totally rejected the concept of movement on the flanks, claiming
that the battle would be decided in the heartland” and that the
route of approach would be to support anti-communist Islamist
movements in Yemen and Somalia.74 Yet after committing to this
strategy and without warning, American forces had appeared in
Somalia, presenting a golden opportunity to al-Qa’ida to strike a
blow at “the Crusaders”:
When you entered Somalia, the Somali arena was barren and futile. The
situation changed, however, after the intervention by America and the
Knights of the Cross. You most resembled a hunter aiming his rifle at the
dead branch of a tree, with no leaves or birds on it. Suddenly, a bald eagle
lands on the branch of the tree, directly in line with the rifle. Shouldn’t the
hunter pull the trigger to kill the eagle or at least bloody it? The American
bald eagle has landed within range of our rifles. You can kill it or leave it
permanently disfigured. If you do that, you will have saved Sudan, Yemen,
Bab al-Mandab, the Red Sea, the Arabian Gulf, and the waters of the Nile.
Could you want more magnificent objectives of war than these?75

â•… According to Fazul, it was after this that al-Qa’ida shifted from
solely focusing on training the Somali Islamist militia known as
al-Ittihad al-Islami (the forerunner of al-Shabab) to working on con-
fronting the American presence in Somalia. By his account, al-
Qa’ida was directly involved in the “Black Hawk Down” incident
in Mogadishu that took place a month after Abu’l-Walid’s letter

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was written and in which nineteen American soldiers were killed.76

Fazul writes:
Somalia was for al-Qa’ida the birthplace of its confrontation with the sole
superpower, and was a single arena in which we were able to apply all that
we had learned in Afghanistan. And don’t forget that this confrontation
would be between the great powers of the “New World Order,” under the
leadership of the Zionist Americans, and the [Muslim] youth, who have
nothing but their souls, submitted to God. It was Abu’l-Walid al-Masri who
hit the mark when he persuaded the al-Qa’ida leadership to focus on the
United States, as it is the chief instigator of the chaos erupting in the
�Muslim world.77

â•… Bin Laden had stated in a number of places that the withdrawal
of American forces after the “Black Hawk Down” incident embold-
ened al-Qa’ida and spurred the organization to plot further attacks,
culminating in the bombings of the US embassies in Kenya and
Tanzania in 1998.78 Again, the perpetrators of these attacks under-
went their training at the Zhawara-based training camps in Khost
prior to being dispatched to Africa.79
â•… Neither Fazul nor Sayf relate this claim regarding Abu’l-Walid’s
influence directly to the Haqqani network. However, if their state-
ments are accurate, the strategic shift in al-Qa’ida’s target selection
and ideology after 1993 would have to be understood as growing,
to a certain extent, out of the long-standing relationship between
the Haqqanis and the al-Qa’ida leadership. Abu’l-Walid, after all,
had a much deeper history with the Haqqanis than he did with al-
Qa’ida—which he claims to have never formally joined, though he
admits to his tenure as amir of the al-Faruq camp during the first
half of the 1990s.80 Abu’l-Walid was still working directly with the
Haqqanis during this period, and had contributed to the Manba’
al-Jihad magazine over the previous three years. He had been based
since arriving in Afghanistan in 1979 at Haqqani headquarters, and
it was from the al-Qa’ida camp established at these headquarters
that he wrote his letters urging al-Qa’ida to confront American
forces in Somalia. He has more recently emerged as a rather staunch
critic of the al-Qa’ida leadership, though he remains a Haqqani
loyalist. For its part, the Haqqani network went on record begin-
ning in 1988 in support of global jihad, and maintained a consistent

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ideological position of enmity for the United States from 1991 on,
and in this the Haqqanis preceded al-Qa’ida by several years. As
will be seen, the Haqqanis’ role in helping to shape al-Qa’ida’s war
on the West was far from over, and after the rise of the Taliban it
would continue to deepen.

The Haqqani Network, al-Qa’ida, and the Taliban: 1994–2001

In 1994, the direction of the Afghan civil war was irrevocably
altered with the rise of a new and obscure party to the conflict: the
Taliban. Centered on the figure of Mullah Muhammad Omar, a
minor player during the anti-Soviet jihad who had, along with his
earliest supporters, fought with the Haqqaniyya-linked parties of
HIK and Harakat, the Taliban was a lowland Pashtun movement
composed mostly of Kandaharis. In this it hailed from a very differ-
ent political culture than that of the highland mujahidin groups like
the Haqqanis, as evidenced first and foremost in the Taliban’s
nationalist ideology and ambitions for national dominance.81 In its
rise to power and eventual consolidation of control over Kabul the
Taliban was assisted by both the Haqqanis and al-Qa’ida—and in
that order—but this support was by no means a foregone conclu-
sion. In fact, the relations between the Haqqanis and al-Qa’ida on
the one hand and the Taliban on the other were marked by mutual
suspicion and conflict from the beginning, and remained turbulent
throughout the period of the Taliban regime. They arguably remain
just as turbulent, if not more so, today.82
â•… The fact that many of the early leaders of the Taliban had been
educated at the Haqqaniyya madrassa in Akora Khattak has often
been noted, but this did not necessarily make them natural allies of
the Haqqanis.83 On the contrary, many of the commanders of what
I have termed the “Haqqaniyya network,” with which the Haqqanis
had worked most closely during the anti-Soviet jihad, emerged in
the mid-1990s as some of the most prominent opponents of the
�Taliban. As already noted, the core leadership of the Haqqani-led
NCS was initially provided by Jalaluddin and the two senior HIK
commanders Mullah Malang and Abdul Haq. Mullah Malang, the
HIK’s most capable Kandahar-based commander during the anti-

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Soviet jihad, opposed the Taliban from the beginning, went into
exile in Pakistan, and later joined Hamid Karzai and other leaders
in Quetta to organize anti-Taliban opposition within Afghanistan.84
Abdul Haq, who fought under Haqqani at Khost before leading
HIK fighters around Kabul in the 1980s, followed a similar path to
Mullah Malang and went back into Afghanistan after 9/11 to rally
anti-Taliban support, only to be killed by the Taliban in October of
2001.85 Haji ‘Abd al-Qadir, the leader of the Jalalabad shura, tried to
maintain its independence from the Taliban but other members of
the shura favored an alliance, so he fled to Pakistan on the eve of
the arrival of Taliban forces in Jalalabad in September 1996, just
four months after Bin Laden’s arrival as his guest.86 Another close
Haqqani ally was Qari Baba, whom Jalaluddin Haqqani singled out
in an interview after Operation Magistral in 1987 as one of three
commanders who had shown solidarity with the Haqqanis in aid-
ing their defense of the Zhawara base—the other two being Mullah
Malang and the Taliban’s chief rival Ahmad Shah Massoud.87 Qari
Baba refused Taliban demands to disarm, and the Taliban’s forceful
extraction of his eventual capitulation was the watershed moment
leading to the Taliban’s capture of Ghazni at the end of 1994.88
â•… The capture of Ghazni was a turning point for the Taliban in the
southeast and forced the Haqqanis to come to terms with the rise
of€this new power now on their very doorstep. Jalaluddin had
remained focused up to that point on the peace commission that he
led out of Jalalabad, still hoping for a political resolution to the civil
war. The ISI was providing military support to Hekmatyar up
through late 1993, though when Benazir Bhutto replaced Nawaz
Sharif in the October elections Pakistan grew increasingly frustrated
with Hekmatyar and began to shift its support to the Taliban in the
south. Hekmatyar’s forces in Khost were second only to the
Haqqanis’ there, and the shifting political winds heightened the
already tense relations between HIG and the Haqqanis, leading to
a confrontation between them over resources on the eve of the
Â�Taliban’s arrival.
â•… The Haqqanis had a long history of troubled relations with
�Hekmatyar. In the 1986 Battle of Zhawara, discussed in Chapter 2,
Hekmatyar released a statement after the communist forces were

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repelled from the base claiming responsibility for the victory. As

Abu’l-Walid put it, “this put yet another black mark on the record
of a relationship that had hardly any white space remaining.”89
Similar conflicts arose after the capture of Khost in 1991, when
Â�Hekmatyar’s forces, having played a relatively minor role in the
fighting, were enabled by the ISI to claim the victory, seizing the
radio station and most of the garrison’s heavy weapons. This was
in violation of pre-campaign agreements, and the ISI refused to
recover any of the war spoils for Haqqani. Hekmatyar then hosted
General Durrani of the ISI and Qazi Hussein Ahmed, amir of the
Pakistani JI, on a triumphant and well-publicized visit to the city,
all of which was met with angry rejoinders in the Haqqani publica-
tions at the time.90
â•… As the Taliban moved north and east out of Kandahar, its fiercest
opposition came from the HIG. As Taliban forces approached
Khost, however, the HIG commander there—Fayez Muhammad,
amir of the Jihadwal base—decided to flee with HIG’s weapons
stores and vehicles. Al-Qa’ida had been renting its training camp at
Jihadwal from the HIG, and Fayez Muhammad moved to seize al-
Qa’ida’s weapons and demanded from Abu ‘Ata al-Sharqi that he
turn over a tractor and other vehicles, saying they were all needed
for the HIG’s fight against Massoud in Kabul. The al-Qa’ida leaders
refused, and when Fayez Muhammad moved to seize their equip-
ment the Haqqani network stepped in and threatened to destroy his
base and expel the HIG from Khost.91 In September Abu ‘Ata
reported on these developments to al-Qa’ida in Sudan, noting that
the situation was much improved on account of the fact that “the
governor of Khost, who is from the Haqqani organization (tanzim
Haqqani), told Fayez Muhammad: ‘By God, if you fire a single shot
we will destroy the Matun citadel’—which belongs to the Hizb
[HIG] in Khost—‘and we will kick you out of Khost’ … These inci-
dents made me feel much more at ease, as Fayiz Muhammad has
begun to face many problems and is daily losing power, and I don’t
think he would dare try repeating what he did to us before.”92 He
also reports that al-Qa’ida representatives had communicated their
outrage to both the HIG offices in Kabul and the vice president of
the JI at a meeting at the Badr camp.93 Fayez Muhammad fled to

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North Waziristan, where according to Abu’l-Walid he sold off all of

the HIG supplies on the local weapons market.94
â•… With the HIG out of the picture, the Haqqanis were the sole
major mujahidin power remaining in Khost, and the provinces sur-
rounding them had all fallen, surrendered, or thrown in their sup-
port to the Taliban. The Mansur family, a long-time Haqqani ally
and one of the strongest mujahidin groups in Paktika, joined the
Taliban in February 1995, and the Taliban began to move from
there into Khost during the third week of same month. According
to Haji Din Muhammad, the deputy leader of HIK and a long-
time€associate of Jalaluddin Haqqani, the latter came to Jalalabad
at this time to consult with Yunis Khalis about how to respond to
the Taliban’s encroachment. In his recent biography of Khalis,
Muhammad writes:
It happened that they [the Taliban] went to Paktika, Khost and Paktia.
Mawlawi Jalaluddin Haqqani, who had a very large military power in
Khost and Paktia, dreaded this kind of development of the Taliban. This
was at a time when the Taliban also did not have an understanding with
the forces of the mujahidin. The Taliban were already in Paktia when
�Mawlawi Jalaluddin Haqqani came to Nangarhar and met with Mawlawi
Khalis. Mawlawi Khalis said to him: do not fight with them; yourself, try
to understand their words, and they also will understand—in order that
there be no blood spilled amongst us.95

â•… Following a pattern established in a series of earlier encounters

with local mujahidin leaders, a Taliban force surrounded Ibrahim
Haqqani’s house and, holding aloft copies of the Qur’an, demanded
that the Haqqanis “surrender” the area to Taliban control. Ibrahim
came out and convinced the Taliban that he would get his brother
Jalaluddin to speak with them, and Ibrahim and his brother Khalil
Haqqani then oversaw a series of negotiations between the Taliban
leadership and the Haqqanis that set the terms of their relationship.
High on the list of priorities was protecting Jalaluddin’s booming
business ventures, especially the scrap metal “export” business
using the Haqqani-controlled Khost airstrip, repaired in 1993 by
their Arab allies, from which the Haqqanis were making millions in
the resale of metals scavenged in some cases from Iraqi heavy
weaponry shipped to the Haqqanis by the CIA in 1991.96 The

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Haqqanis explicitly demanded regional autonomy in return for

recognizing the Taliban, and stressed that the southeastern tribal
culture and local political processes be left alone. They also specifi-
cally required that there be no effort to enforce Kandahari dictates
on the highland tribes.97
â•… Haqqani insiders later told Western writers that the Haqqani
leadership was initially hostile to the Taliban and considered con-
fronting them militarily when they moved into Khost.98 Some have
suggested that the ISI pressured the Haqqanis against this and
encouraged them to lend what proved to be indispensable military
support during a critical moment, as the Taliban struggled to wrest
Kabul from Massoud’s control.99 Whatever the case, following a
series of defeats against Massoud around Kabul in early 1995, the
Taliban were joined there during the summer of 1995 by Jalaluddin
Haqqani and a group of 2,000 fighters from Khost, recruited with
“suitable exhortations over the patriotic role of the border tribes in
ousting Tajik usurpers [Bacha-e Saqqao] in 1929.”100 In other words,
Haqqani’s men were appealed to on the basis of an identity rooted
in a history of fiercely defended highland autonomy, not in terms
of the Taliban’s nationalist agenda. It was only after the Haqqanis
joined the battle in the north that the Taliban succeeded in captur-
ing Kabul, and Jalaluddin was then tasked with confronting
Â�Massoud’s forces on the Shomali plain north of the city.
â•… Despite this provision of military aid, relations between the
Haqqanis and the Taliban continued to be strained. In an interview
with Ahmed Rashid two years after the capture of Kabul Jalaluddin
related that when he arrived with his men in 1995, “he was power-
less to make military decisions[,] and the fact that they were led by
Kandahari officers at the front led to mass desertions. Within two
months Haqqani had only 300 of his new recruits left.”101 Rashid
writes that Haqqani “remained extremely bitter” over being “kept
out of the decision-making process that took place in Kandahar
under Omar, rather than in Kabul.”102
â•… The early relations between the Taliban and al-Qa’ida were even
worse. When Bin Laden arrived in Nangarhar Province in 1996 he
was given hospitality and the freedom to move his family into
primitive dwellings in the Tora Bora Mountains above Jalalabad by

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the Jalalabad shura. The shura’s leader, Haji ‘Abd al-Qadir, opposed
the Taliban and soon after Bin Laden’s arrival fled to Pakistan.
Another of Bin Laden’s protectors, Commander Saznur, who had
been a celebrated commander under Sayyaf during the 1980s, was
killed soon after Jalalabad fell to the Taliban, leaving Bin Laden
without a protector and leading to much anxiety among the Bin
Laden clan.103 The suspicion was mutual. When asked by State
Department officials in 1997 about the Taliban’s relationship with
Bin Laden, Mullah Rabbani, Mullah Omar’s deputy, responded that
“Bin Ladin came to Afghanistan when Haji Qadir controlled
Nangarhar Province. The Taliban did not control that area then.”
The Taliban Foreign Minister Mullah Abdul Jalil “who also
attended the meeting with Rabbani, interjected that Bin Ladin had
lived in caves south of Jalalabad in Tora Bora and the Taliban had
become suspicious. They told him to move out, to live in an ordi-
nary house.”104
â•… Bin Laden’s former bodyguard Nasir al-Bahri also describes the
mutual distrust between Bin Laden and the Taliban in these days,
and says that when the Taliban sent representatives to find out
where Bin Laden stood, the latter refused to meet them personally.
He says that Bin Laden also refused to allow his followers, who
were still actively engaged in training at the various al-Qa’ida
camps around Zhawara, to fight for the Taliban, and refers in this
connection to the negative impression of the Taliban among many
of the Arabs and the circulation of rumors about there being former
communists among their ranks.105 Another “Afghan Arab,” Rabiah
Hutchinson, also reflects on the presence of suspicions about the
Taliban among the Afghan Arabs even at the end of the 1990s: “I
didn’t support the Taliban at all. I had heard a lot of negative
things …”106
â•… In August of 1996, Bin Laden issued from Jalalabad his commu-
niqué entitled “Expel the Polytheists from the Arabian Peninsula,”
the first public indication of the anti-American turn in al-Qa’ida’s
strategy.107 Though falling far short of the sweeping declaration of
global jihad against the United States that al-Qa’ida would issue
two years later, it did call on Muslims to boycott American-made
goods and to wage jihad against “Zionist-Crusader” interests in

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Saudi Arabia. In the following month the Taliban captured Jalalabad,

and Bin Laden’s provocative statements against Western interests
and the meetings with journalists that he arranged in Afghanistan
to promote them would become an immediate bone of contention
between him and the Taliban movement.
â•… In the month after the Taliban’s conquest of Jalalabad, al-Qa’ida
finally offered some support to the Taliban, but this appears to have
been a second-order effect of its alliance with the Haqqanis. In
October of 1996, in response to an urgent appeal for reinforce-
ments€to hold Kabul against a massive counterattack by Massoud,
Jalaluddin led 4,000 of his own men north to support the Taliban.108
It was only at this time that Bin Laden “modified his position
regarding the participation of al-Qa’ida in the ranks of the Taliban
against the Northern Alliance.”109 Nasir al-Bahri and eight other
al-Qa’ida fighters, including Abu’l-Faraj al-Libi and Abu Hafs al-
Masri, went north to join the fight, “though at that time there was
still no coordination between the Taliban command and al-Qa’ida,
which led to much chaos.”110
â•… In early March 1997 Bin Laden invited journalist Peter Bergen of
CNN to visit him in Tora Bora and film an interview. His rhetoric
in this interview went much further than that in “Expel the Polythe-
ists”—and came much closer to the language and ideological tone
of the early-1990s statements of the Haqqanis as well as the writings
of Abu’l-Walid al-Masri. In the course of the interview Bin Laden
refers to the “New World Order” and calls in a less restrictive fash-
ion than in earlier statements for “jihad against the U.S. govern-
ment.”111 A CNN interview was a much more public pronouncement
than the distribution of his 1996 fatwa, and drew the immediate ire
of the Taliban. At the end of March Mullah Omar, citing concerns
for Bin Laden’s security, ordered him and his family to pack up and
relocate to Kandahar, “where the situation is more secure.”112
â•… The Taliban suffered a major setback that summer at Mazar-i-
Sharif, and again the Haqqanis were called in for military aid. As in
the deployment to Kabul in 1996, al-Qa’ida and the Haqqanis
worked together in the siege of Mazar-i-Sharif. Bin Laden report-
edly told Mullah Omar that “we cannot participate further in your
battles. Your commanders are immature. They cannot read the situ-

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ation correctly.” Instead, Bin Laden offered to detail Abu Hafs al-
Masri as a field commander for the battle, on the condition that Abu
Hafs work under Jalaluddin Haqqani rather than with regular Tali-
ban forces.113 Among the highland Pashtun fighters mobilized by
Haqqani for this engagement was Baitullah Mehsud, who would
later become the leader of the Tehrik-e Taliban Pakistan (TTP).114
â•… The Mazar-i-Sharif battle seems to be the last major offensive in
which the Taliban turned to the Haqqanis for aid, and after the
capture of the city Jalaluddin was awarded the sinecure position of
Taliban minister of borders and tribes. As had characterized his
relationship with the Hizb-i Islami Khalis during the anti-Soviet
war, Haqqani was only nominally a Taliban figure, and the south-
ern end of the highland Pashtun region remained largely autono-
mous from Taliban control. This autonomy was obvious to the Arab
jihadi community inside Afghanistan; in a late-1998 tract written in
defense of the Taliban, Abu Mus’ab al-Suri’s refers to Jalaluddin
Haqqani and Yunis Khalis as “non-Taliban ‘ulama.”115 The auton-
omy of the Haqqanis’ “region of refuge” would also prove immenÂ�
sely important to al-Qa’ida, as we will see.
â•… The differences for the lives of ordinary people were striking as
well, and numerous diplomats and aid workers noted the contrast
between Loya Paktia and the rest of Afghanistan as far as the appli-
cation of Taliban law was concerned. In January 1997, US State
Department officials noted that “Haqqani’s tribe, the Zadrans, are
considered more liberal in their treatment of women than the tribes
in the Kandahar area.”116 Between 1995 and 1997 CARE Interna-
tional built thirty coeducational schools in Khost, “believed to be
unique in Afghanistan” at the time, all built “thanks to a well-
known local mujaheddin [sic] commander, Jalaluddin Haqqani,
who has close ties to some Persian Gulf sheiks.”117 According to
several former Haqqani network commanders interviewed in 2009,
“Jalaluddin Haqqani was opposed to some Taliban measures such
as banning music, enforcing beard length, and limiting women’s
access to education.”118 The Haqqanis had distinguished themselves
from other mujahidin groups in this way during the 1980s as well,
as evidenced by the letter in the Harmony database of Haqqani
correspondence with a female administrator of Médecins Sans

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Frontières (Doctors Without Borders) invited by Haqqani to extend

MSF medical aid at Haqqani clinics.119
â•… In another indication of the Haqqanis’ autonomy from the Â�Taliban,
the latter were unable to provide any assistance to Pakistan—upon
whose support the Taliban were dependent—in response to numer-
ous requests from the Pakistani civilian government for the extra�
dition of wanted Pakistani fugitives known to be training in
Haqqani-run camps. In 1996, the Badr camps at Jihadwal were
removed from Hekmatyar’s and the JI’s control, and reportedly
closed.120 Pakistani journalist Rahimullah Yusufzai reported from
Khost in 1997 that these camps had been transferred to Jalaluddin
Haqqani’s control, who reallocated them to al-Qa’ida and the JUI-
linked Harakat ul-Ansar (a merger of Harakat ul-Mujahidin and
Harakat-ul Jihad ul-Islami).121 These, in addition to the already
established camps at Zhawara, were hosting many of Pakistan’s
most-wanted jihadis, charged in a broad variety of international
terrorism incidents, political assassinations, and sectarian murders.
â•… The Pakistani government had been under increasing interna-
tional pressure since 1995 to move against the Haqqani camps and
the terrorist groups training in them. In 1995, six Western tourists
were kidnapped by jihadis in Kashmir, and one of the captives was
beheaded. Blame fell on HUA, which was subsequently listed by
the US State Department as a terrorist group. According to Husain
Haqqani (no relation to the Haqqani network), the former Pakistani
ambassador to the United States, Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto
responded to American pressure by ordering the arrest of HUA’s
leadership. When she turned to Pakistan’s powerful intelligence
agency, however, “the ISI told Bhutto that it had no contact or con-
nection with the organization and failed to arrest anyone. A few
days later, most of Harakut-ul-Ansar’s known leaders surfaced as
leaders of a new formation, Harakat-ul-mujahideen.”122 Two years
later the civilian government changed hands again, with Nawaz
Sharif once again becoming prime minister. Sharif inherited
Â�Bhutto’s problems with the HUA and ISI’s jihadi connections, but
they were made much worse in 1998. After al-Qa’ida bombed two
American embassies in East Africa, the United States responded
with scores of cruise missiles that pounded the camps in Zhawara,

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which, it was subsequently discovered, included not just al-Qa’ida

camps but also those being run by HUA—by then calling itself
Harakat-ul-Mujahidin (HUM). Pakistani journalists who rushed to
the scene of the latter camps reported that the dead included a
number of ISI agents.123
â•… US pressure on Pakistan in the wake of these events was unre-
lenting, but the Americans had little leverage. President Clinton
had earlier slapped sanctions on Pakistan for its nuclear program
and Pakistan’s military establishment felt betrayed and estranged
from its erstwhile ally. Sharif was similarly at odds with the army
over his back-channel efforts on a peace process with India over
Kashmir. By 1999 the international pressure on Sharif over the
camps in Haqqani country was compounded by domestic chaos.
Anti-Shi’a terrorist groups, spin-offs of the HUJI/HUA/HUM, ini-
tiated a campaign of sectarian murder that killed dozens of
Â�Pakistani Shi’a—a campaign that is now being repeated by the same
groups in Baluchistan. Sharif’s government sent a letter to the
�Taliban in Kandahar asking for assistance with the cross-border
sectarian violence. Written in Pashto, this document was discovered
in Afghanistan after the American invasion in 2001. It names nine
of the most-wanted leaders of Pakistan’s anti-Shi’a groups, includ-
ing Riaz Basra and Akram Lahori, both identified as having been
last seen at the HUA camp in Zhawara.124 It also says that these men
were last seen or known to be training at certain camps, among
which the document lists the following:
Harakat-ul Ansar: This camp (mu’askar ‘Umar Faruq) is located in uluswali
[administrative district] Zhawara Gharbuz near Khost. The camp was
established in June, 1991. Maulvi Abdul Jabbar is its director. Presently
there are 300–500 persons under training. The camp is politically affiliated
with JUI-F. It has the backing of Jalaluddin Haqqani.
Jamiat-ul Mujahidin: The camp was established in 1991 in Zhawara and is
headed by Akhtar Hussein Muavia. At present, 30–40 students from AK/
IHK125 are receiving training. This camp also has the backing of Haqqani.
Harakat-ul Jihad al-Islami (Liza): This camp is located in Zhawara and is
sponsored by Maulvi Fazlur Rahman Khalil. Presently, Qari Saifullah
Akhtar is in charge of training. 150–200 students are receiving training
currently. Mawlana Jalaluddin Haqqani is providing local support to it.126

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â•… The Taliban denied any involvement. In the first week of October
1999, Sharif sent a special emissary to meet with Mullah Omar to
press for cooperation on the sectarians taking refuge with the
Haqqanis, specifically discussing Riaz Basra and Saifullah Akhtar.
The Pakistani press reported that “Mullah Umar assured the
�Pakistani envoy that he would continue to raise [his] voice against
terrorism while also taking practical measures to stamp out the
menace.”127 On 11 October Prime Minister Sharif made a one-day
visit to the UAE in order to meet with President Sheikh Zayed bin
Sultan al-Nahyan in Abu Dhabi. The UAE was one of only three
countries to recognize the Taliban, but it was also the Haqqani net-
work’s main base of operations in the Arab world. Shaikh Zayed
had accorded Jalaluddin Haqqani a personal state reception in
1991—the only Afghan mujahidin leader to be given this honor, and
the only such state visit ever made by Jalaluddin (who did not,
contrary to some recent reporting, visit President Reagan at the
White House).128 The Pakistani press reported on the following
morning that Sharif had gone to meet with the UAE leadership in
order to “urge it to use its influence for asking Taliban to close
down these camps.”129 By that evening the news cycle was domi-
nated by events of much greater consequence. Pervez Musharraf
had seized power from Sharif in a bloodless coup and declared
himself chief martial law administrator. The Haqqani camps
remained open, and neither the Taliban nor the Musharraf regime
had any success in curtailing their activities before 9/11.

The Birth of the Turkistan Islamic Party (TIP)

This period also saw the reconstitution at Khost of the former East
Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM) in its current form as the
Turkistan Islamic Party (TIP). Since at least the beginning of the
1990s the Haqqanis had been hosting Uighur separatists from
northwestern China at its training camps, and as already noted
Jalaluddin made numerous references at that time to Haqqani sup-
port for both the Kashmiri and Uighur “jihads.” In a statement
published in 1991 in the Haqqanis’ Urdu-language magazine,
Â�Jalaluddin declared that the “Afghan jihad has inspired Muslims all

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over the world. The jihad in Kashmir is a result of the Afghans’

struggle, and the uprisings of the Muslims of China are inspired by
the Afghans.”130 By the “uprisings” in China Jalaluddin is most
likely referring to the brief Uighur Muslim rebellion centered on
Baren Township in Xinjiang, which took place in April 1990.131 After
this rebellion much of the leadership of the ETIM was impris-
oned€and the group collapsed in 1993. One of its leaders—“Abu
Muhammad” Hasan Makhdum132—was imprisoned in Xinjiang
until 1996, and in 1997 travelled to the Gulf and thence to Khost
where he reestablished the group as the Turkistan Islamic Party.133
â•… Hasan Makhdum was killed in an encounter with Pakistani sol-
diers in Angor Adda, South Waziristan, in 2003, but a series of
interviews with his successor, ‘Abd al-Haqq al-Turkistani, in the
TIP’s Arabic-language magazine details the reorganization of the
group at the Haqqanis’ Khost training camps in 1997. After a brief
term in prison in Urumqi, Xinjiang, ‘Abd al-Haqq, a former stu-
dent€of Hasan Makhdum, was able to leave China and settle in
Islamabad, where he attended classes at the Islamic University and
made contacts with the Uighur separatist diaspora through the
Kashgar Ribat, a guesthouse in Islamabad.134 Through the latter
‘Abd al-Haqq was directed to Miranshah, North Waziristan, where
he was taken across the border to the burgeoning Haqqani training
complex at Khost, where he discovered his old teacher and numer-
ous other Uighurs training at Haqqani and al-Qa’ida camps. Even-
tually the TIP established its own training camps in Khost and in
other regions of Afghanistan, though it apparently continued to
send its members to the camp complex at Zhawara throughout the
late 1990s. ‘Abd al-Haqq even mentions a TIP member that was
killed in the US cruise missile strikes on the Zhawara facilities in
response to the American embassy bombings in Africa in 1998.135
â•… As with al-Qa’ida, the TIP also sent its trainees to fight on the
�Taliban front lines in the north of Afghanistan, and again the
Haqqani network was the initial conduit for their participation in
these battles. ‘Abd al-Haqq states that in the summer of 1999 about
twenty Uighur fighters went to support the efforts against Ahmad
Shah Massoud’s forces north of Kabul, in a group led by long-time
Haqqani ally Saifurrahman Mansur, son of Jalaluddin’s Haqqaniyya

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colleague Nasrullah Mansur.136 After 9/11, Saifurrahman “led the

embittered resistance of over a thousand fighters, including his own
men, those from the Haqqani network, Arabs, Uzbeks, Tajiks and
Chechens, against” the US Operation Anaconda.137 To this list can be
added Uighurs, as ‘Abd al-Haqq also describes the involvement of
the TIP membership in these battles and the eventual retreat of the
Uighurs, along with the other regional and global jihadis, to South
and North Waziristan. According to the recent testimony of a French
jihadi arrested in connection with the Bryant Neal Vinas case and
who trained in the tribal areas in 2007 and 2008, the Uighurs were
the largest single group of transnational jihadis taking refuge with
the Haqqanis in North Waziristan.138
â•… The TIP’s literature further illustrates the interconnected nature
of the training infrastructure around the Zhawara base in the late
1990s, in which local, regional, and global jihadi organizations all
shared resources and facilities. The provision and maintenance of
the autonomous space for these diverse groups to interact and
mutually influence one another is among the Haqqani network’s
most important contributions to the evolution of jihadism during
the 1990s in Khost and more recently in North Waziristan. In a
remarkable obituary for Bilal, the first deputy amir of the TIP who
was killed at Mazar-i-Sharif in November of 2001, the TIP magazine
lists what amounts to a jihadi academic transcript, describing Bilal’s
course of study at the Khost camps. According to the article Bilal
studied politics and Islamic law with Abu Mus’ab al-Suri; creed and
jurisprudence with Abu ‘Abdallah al-Muhajir; a famous Wahhabi
text on tawhid (divine unity) with Abu ‘Amr ‘Abd al-Hakim Hasan
(better known as Shaykh ‘Isa); the book Fiqh al-Sunna with Abu
Hamza al-Muhajir, “the war minister in the Islamic State of Iraq”;
and Fath al-Bari and several hadith texts with Abu’l-Walid al-
Ansari.139 With the exception of Suri, who was independent of al-
Qa’ida during this period, all of these trainers are well-known
figures in al-Qa’ida’s senior leadership.140

The Launch of the Global Jihad

Following Bin Laden’s forced relocation to Kandahar after his CNN
interview, al-Qa’ida increasingly came to rely on the Haqqanis’

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autonomy from the Taliban in Paktia as a launching pad for its

declarations of war on the West, activities that had been expressly
forbidden by Mullah Omar.141 Al-Qa’ida established its operational
headquarters at a camp constructed near the Kandahar airport and
began to provide training to new recruits at this and other camps in
Taliban-controlled Afghanistan, but the Khost camps remained
active up until the American response to the 9/11 attacks. Accord-
ing to Nasir al-Bahri, who accompanied him on trips to the south-
east, Bin Laden frequently visited these camps after the move to
Kandahar and would regularly call on “his friend Jalaluddin
Haqqani” in Khost.142
â•… In April of 1998, Bin Laden and several leaders from other jihadi
organizations operating in Khost convened a press conference at
the al-Siddiq camp in the Zhawara Valley to announce the forma-
tion of the “World Islamic Front for Jihad against the Jews and
Crusaders.”143 This was the most sweeping declaration of global
jihad ever issued by al-Qa’ida, and it called on Muslims worldwide
to “kill the Americans wherever you find them.” Representatives of
the international press were invited ahead of time to attend, and
were escorted across the border into Khost from North Waziristan
by members of Harakat-ul-Ansar, the Kashmir-focused jihadi
organization whose training operations were integrated with the
al-Qa’ida camps at Zhawara.144 Additional high-profile interviews
were arranged with American, British, Canadian, Pakistani, and
Chinese journalists under a similar arrangement at the al-Faruq
camp at Zhawara in May.145
â•… Carried out in direct contravention of Taliban restrictions, these
media events enraged the Taliban leadership and led to severely
strained relations between the Taliban and the Arab jihadis residing
in Afghanistan.146 After a 26 May press conference, Mullah Omar
angrily phoned Rahimullah Yusufzai, a Pakistani journalist present
at that event, to ask how the latter had entered Afghanistan without
a Taliban-approved visa. After Yusufzai explained his presence,
Mullah Omar shouted “How dare he [Bin Laden] give a press con-
ference without my permission! There will be one ruler in Afghan�
istan, either I or Osama bin Laden … I will see to it.”147 According
to the journalist Ahmad Zaydan, who was also present during these

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events, the Arabs in Afghanistan clearly understood that al-Qa’ida

was using its alliance with the Haqqanis to get around Taliban
attempts to restrict their activities:
I learned later from Afghan Arab sources who were there that Usama had
sought to sidestep the Taliban pressure on him by meeting the press in
areas far away from the Taliban city of Kandahar, such as Jalalabad, where
Hizb-i Islami leader Mawlawi Yunis Khalis enjoyed power and good rela-
tions with Usama since the days of the Afghan jihad, or in Paktia, where
Shaykh Jalaluddin Haqqani, the Taliban Minister of Borders and Tribes,
had strong ties with Bin Ladin as well. Haqqani was considered a king in
his region, particularly since he descended from the famous Zadran tribe
of Khost, which had struck terror into a succession of Afghan governments.
He is also known to have established good relations with Pakistani Islamist
groups and the security agencies in Pakistan since the days of Afghan
jihad. This might explain why the declaration of the World Islamic Front
for Jihad Against the Jews and Crusaders in May of 1998 by Bin Ladin,
Zawahiri, and Pakistani figures, was issued in Khost, not Kandahar, or
other areas where the Taliban and Mullah Muhammad Omar enjoyed sig-
nificant influence.148

The Taliban, the Foreign Jihadis, and the Haqqanis: Increasing

Tensions
On 7 August 1998, al-Qa’ida operatives, some of whom had trained
in camps in Khost, carried out near-simultaneous bombings of two
American embassies in Tanzania and Kenya. Thirteen days later the
United States responded with cruise missile strikes on the jihadi
training camps around Zhawara. According to Abu’l-Walid, the
embassy bombings and retaliatory American strikes led to an
immediate and rapid influx of new Arab volunteers into Afghan�
istan, which only exacerbated the fractious tendencies of the many
Arab jihadi groups that had established bases in the country.149
Long-running doctrinal disputes took on new urgency as the for-
eign jihadist groups competed for a share of the freshly mobilized
human resources, and new training camps were hastily built in
various parts of the country.150 “A number of the Arab jihadi leaders
rose in opposition to Bin Laden at this time,” writes Abu’l-Walid,
“all of them affirming the primacy of the domestic fronts against the

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Arab regimes, convinced that a shift to a ‘global confrontation’

against the United States was ill conceived.”151 Those opposing Bin
Laden and his “global jihad” had patrons within the Taliban move-
ment and sought to sideline al-Qa’ida and undermine Bin Laden’s
unique status among the Arab jihadis, leading to the emergence of
pro- and anti-al-Qa’ida factions within the Taliban leadership.152
â•… After the American missile strikes on Zhawara and until the fall
of the Taliban regime following 9/11, al-Qa’ida’s relations with the
Taliban remained tenuous, oscillating between angry fall-outs and
calculated rapprochements, and the Haqqanis’ relations with the
Taliban began to be increasingly marked by open conflict. The pro-
al-Qa’ida faction of the Taliban, backed by Pakistani religious
authorities whom Bin Laden lobbied for intercession on his behalf,
convinced Mullah Omar to reject any consideration of extraditing
Bin Laden to the United States.153 In November of 1998, Bin Laden
was persuaded by Abu’l-Walid to give Mullah Omar a pledge of
allegiance (bay’a) to smooth the tensions, but he agreed to do so
only by proxy, which did little to improve the situation.154 The fol-
lowing month Bin Laden broke the media silence he had main-
tained since the embassy bombings, giving a series of interviews in
a remote, mountainous location on 21 and 22 December in which he
reiterated al-Qa’ida’s bellicose rhetoric against the United States.155
According to Bin Laden’s bodyguard at the time, these interviews
enraged the Taliban leader, who summoned Bin Laden personally
in Kandahar and ordered that he, his family, and followers imme-
diately quit the country.156 Bin Laden reportedly acquiesced but
pleaded for time to prepare for the move, in the meantime working
to gather more support from Pakistani clerics for his position and
persuading Mullah Jalil, the most prominent pro-al-Qa’ida Taliban
leader, to buy al-Qa’ida time from Mullah Omar. Ultimately, it was
a failed assassination attempt on Mullah Omar in Kandahar in 1999
that served to reduce the tension and win Bin Laden a reprieve
from the deportation order. Al-Qa’ida helped the Taliban leader-
ship investigate the bombing of Mullah Omar’s compound, rebuilt
the latter with improved fortifications, and provided the Taliban
leader with a specially trained bodyguard detail, all steps that
helped to patch up the rocky relationship between the two groups

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 T H E F OUNT AI NH E A D

and allow the 9/11 plot to run its course.157 The latter, according to
a number of insider sources, was kept entirely secret from the
�Taliban leadership.158
â•… The source of tensions, however, was never removed, and in
many ways the last three years before the 9/11 attacks marked the
lowest point in the relations between the Taliban on the one
hand€and the foreign jihadis and the Haqqanis on the other. The
Haqqani-controlled region, as already noted, had maintained
�relative autonomy from Taliban law during the mid-1990s and
Jalaluddin Haqqani had personally supported local initiatives such
as schools for girls that directly contravened Kandahar’s policies.
According to former Taliban minister Wahid Muzhda, Jalaluddin
Haqqani’s son Siraj, currently the operational leader of the Haqqani
network, “used to complain to me [in the 1990s] about how heavy-
handed and dogmatic the Taliban were in their interpretation of
Islam.”159 Yet from the end of the 1990s the Taliban appear to have
sought to impose greater control on the Haqqanis’ traditional areas
of influence, with predictable results: the highland tribes in the
southeast rebelled.
â•… Numerous indications of this increased conflict between the
Haqqanis and the Taliban emerged beginning in January 1999,
when Taliban crackdowns on a traditional egg-throwing game in
Khost—declared “un-Islamic” by the Taliban—led to an uprising
by locals who attacked Taliban officials.160 The practice of appoint-
ing Kandahari officials to Taliban posts in the Haqqanis’ areas of
control—a practice that had led to mass desertions of Haqqani’s
men from the northern lines during the mid-1990s—continued to
fuel local anti-Taliban sentiments, and in January of 2000 an anti-
Taliban uprising broke out in Khost and Paktia.161 According to
Iranian press reports, after seizing the local administration the local
rebels demanded that the Taliban either abandon the region or pro-
vide official recognition of local autonomy, including the removal
of all Kandahar-appointed officials.162 Agence France-Presse reported
that locals protested Taliban land appropriation, resource extrac-
tion for the benefit of other regions, and forced conscription, all
elements of a centralizing government policy that the highland
Pashtuns had been violently resisting for generations.163 Ultimately

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the Taliban were forced to relent and replaced the unpopular local
governor with another official.164
â•… As for the Arabs, the Taliban also sought to exert greater control
of the foreign jihadi community after the US embassy bombings in
Africa, and between 1998 and 1999 most of the jihadi camps in
Taliban-controlled Afghanistan were ordered closed.165 Some of the
Arabs in Afghanistan directly rebuked Bin Laden for disobeying
Taliban orders and thus causing trouble for the entire foreign
fighter community, and fears circulated, both at al-Qa’ida camps
and among the other Arab jihadi groups, that the Taliban could
order them all out of the country.166 A number of prominent Afghan
mujahidin leaders opposed to the Taliban convened in 1999 in
Takhar Province in northern Afghanistan—then under the control
of Ahmad Shah Massoud—and issued a fatwa calling for Bin Laden
to be executed.167 When Bin Laden convened a meeting in the sum-
mer of 2000 of Arab jihadi leaders from various groups in Afghani-
stan and issued a further appeal for a united jihadi front against the
United States, he was met with sharp refusals. The Libyan contin-
gent angrily demanded a pledge from the al-Qa’ida leadership that
it would cease provoking the United States.168 The Haqqanis were a
significant exception to this trend of increasing isolation and oppo-
sition to al-Qa’ida during this period. In April of 2001, Jalaluddin
Haqqani personally delivered a letter from Osama bin Laden to
Mullah Omar, in which the al-Qa’ida leader denounced the restric-
tions imposed upon him by the Taliban. “It is surprising,” Bin
Laden wrote, “that the United States is free to do whatever it feels
like and I have been placed under restrictions. History will record
this fact.”169
â•… Apart from the Haqqanis, then, the years between 1999 and 2001
saw growing opposition to al-Qa’ida from every side within
Afghanistan, and the various non-al-Qa’ida Arab jihadi groups,
bearing the brunt of increasing Taliban restrictions, were particu-
larly resentful. They had good reason to be: towards the end of 1999
the Taliban issued a thirteen-point decree that imposed extremely
stringent limitations on all foreign jihadis, amounting to a nation-
wide house arrest of these individuals.170 Aside from numerous
references in the Arab jihadi memoir literature to these restrictions,

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to my knowledge no primary source reflecting this policy from the

Taliban has previously been published. I therefore provide below a
complete summary of the “thirteen points.”
â•… The decree stipulated that all “foreign guests” were to have their
personal information collected by the Taliban administration and
would be issued identity papers; any foreign jihadis resident in
Kabul or at Taliban military centers were to leave immediately and
seek private residence in the provinces and away from provincial
centers, “in order to safeguard the Emirate from becoming a target
of foreign states’ accusations and to prevent disturbances to the
Afghan people.” The foreigners’ housing and food were to be pro-
vided by the organizations that they were associated with, the latter
to maintain liaison relations with the Taliban government. No for-
eign jihadi was to be allowed access to fax, phone, “or any similar
means of communication,” it being “necessary to break off all for-
eigners’ relations with other states.” None were to speak to foreign
journalists or hold press conferences, and they are specifically for-
bidden to release any statement to the Pakistani press. Any for-
eigner wanted for murder in another country—as we have seen,
already an issue for the Taliban vis-à-vis the Haqqanis’ camps for
Pakistani jihadis—“shall not be allowed in the Islamic Emirate,”
and “people who shelter such criminals shall be expelled and pun-
ished.” “Foreign guests” may only participate in jihad “after we
have found a suitable arena,” and such “guests” are admonished
not to “act in a selfishly nationalistic manner or manipulate jihad
according to their own views and desires.” Jihad, point ten of the
statement continues, “has to be conducted only to advance the
word of God, to help victimized Muslims, and to defend ourselves.”
All decrees issued by the Taliban leadership are declared binding
on the foreign jihadi community, and the latter are banned from
establishing offices or representatives outside of the areas allotted
to them for the purpose of residence. Finally, all issues between the
Taliban and the foreign jihadis are to be addressed to Mullah ‘Abd
al-Razzaq, the Taliban interior minister, appointed in the decree as
a “special liaison for foreign guests.”171
â•… Al-Qa’ida’s anti-American jihad, launched from Haqqani head-
quarters, had thus made operating outside of Haqqani-controlled

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territory in Afghanistan an increasingly prohibitive exercise for the

foreign jihadis prior to 9/11. This, along with the deep history
between the Haqqani network and the other regional and interna-
tional militant groups operating in Afghanistan, helps to explain
why it was to the Haqqanis’ refuge in Waziristan, and not the
Â�Taliban’s in Baluchistan, that these groups turned for safe haven
after the American invasion of Afghanistan following the 9/11
attacks in 2001. The nexus of local, regional, and global jihadism
that the Haqqanis had fostered into being over the previous two
decades may have been forced to flee its Haqqani-controlled sanctu-
ary of southeastern Afghanistan, but it did not have far to go to
reestablish itself. In fact, the American-led invasion of Afghanistan
that had succeeded in toppling the Taliban so quickly only man-
aged to force this nexus a few dozen kilometers east, into North
Waziristan, where it has remained ever since, serving as a nerve
center of international jihadism without parallel in any other part
of the world.

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 PART II

CONTINUITY, VALUE, CHANGE, AND THE

HAQQANI NEXUS POST-2001

Introduction
During the decade following the 9/11 attacks, the Haqqani network
would further consolidate its nexus position and act in a manner
similar to prior decades, proving central to the Taliban, Afghan�
istan’s internal conflicts, and Pakistan’s efforts to hedge its position
and cultivate influence on both sides of the Durand Line. Assisted
by the ISI, and leveraging its key characteristics and nexus position,
the Haqqani network quickly emerged as a primary and lethal
driver of anti-Coalition activity inside Afghanistan. The 9/11
attacks and the US response did not cause the Haqqani network to
disassociate itself from al-Qa’ida and its global jihad, but rather
have arguably brought the Haqqanis and al-Qa’ida members even
closer together. The Haqqani network has fostered this closeness by
maintaining its open fronts and by providing protection and a base
from which al-Qa’ida and others could conduct attacks inside
Afghanistan and plan acts of international terrorism. Today, as Part
II illustrates, the activities of the two groups remain deeply inte-
grated across operational and functional lines in Loya Paktia and
North Waziristan. The close bonds between al-Qa’ida and the
Haqqani fighters during the post-2001 period indicate that the ties

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between the two groups are not just historic, but are also now mul-
tigenerational, a fact that is likely to contribute to al-Qa’ida’s lon-
gevity and future development in the region. It is because of these
dynamics that the Haqqani network has emerged as a key pivot
issue between Pakistan and the United States. The irony here is that
the group simultaneously functions as both a strategic asset—
through which Pakistan can shape and secure its interests along the
Durand Line—and a central obstacle—hindering the US ability to
achieve its core objectives in Afghanistan.
â•… Early attempts were made by the United States, the Afghan gov-
ernment, and members of the Haqqani network to reach a political
settlement immediately after 9/11 and in the subsequent years to
follow, but for reasons that remain poorly understood all of these
efforts failed.1 One of the first attempts took place in mid-October
2001, when Jalaluddin Haqqani was brought to Islamabad for a
series of meetings with Pakistani and US officials.2 The one insider
account available about this episode paints a bleak picture that
helps to situate potential missed opportunities and the actions of
the United States and the Haqqani network in the challenging dec-
ade that followed. It also suggests that Jalaluddin Haqqani’s part-
nership with al-Qa’ida was not without its limits. As recounted by
Joby Warrick in October 2001:
Jalaluddin Haqqani had been sanguine about the Taliban’s defeat and was
prepared to switch loyalties, as he had done so often in the past. Pakistani
officials who had dealt with him for decades strongly urged the Americans
to accommodate him and perhaps even give him a token role in the new
Afghan government. But in Washington, Bush officials in the Defense Depart-
ment were not in a mood to bargain. Haqqani had abetted the escape of
Usama bin Laden and might still know his whereabouts. Two rounds of
secret talks were held with Haqqani’s emissaries, in Islamabad and then in
the United Arab Emirates, according to a senior US official intimately familiar
with the events. But at both meetings, the official said, the US side offered the
same terms: unconditional surrender, including Haqqani’s personal acquies-
cence to donning an orange jumpsuit and joining the other detainees at the
newly opened US prison camps at Guantanamo Bay. After a reasonable inter-
val—presumably after Haqqani told military interrogators everything he
knew about Bin Laden—he would be allowed to return home. Haqqani’s
refusal to accept such an offer was a given, the former intelligence official

122
said. “I personally believe that Haqqani was someone we could have worked
with,” the official said. “But at the time, no one was looking over the horizon,
to where we might be in five years. For the policy folks, it was just ‘screw
those little brown people.’”3

â•…Whether Jalaluddin would have been willing to reconcile if the

appropriate offer had been made, or if his disengagement from al-
Qa’ida and the Taliban would have lasted (or been meaningful), all
remain open, and at this point unanswerable, questions. The role
played by the director general of Pakistan’s ISI during this period,
Mahmud Ahmed, also remains somewhat ambiguous. According
to Kathy Gannon, before Jalaluddin met with US officials Ahmed
urged him to hold firm and not to give up the al-Qa’ida network.4
He also reportedly promised Haqqani ISI aid from the Pakistan side
of the border.5 US airstrikes in Afghanistan soon followed, and on
8 October Ahmed was sacked by Pakistani President Pervez
�Musharraf and replaced by Ehsan ul Haq. Any hopes that Pakistani
mediation would bring Jalaluddin to a political settlement evapo-
rated at the end of his meeting with US representatives when he
gave an interview with a Pakistani journalist and vowed to fight on;
“We will retreat to the mountains and begin a long guerrilla war to
reclaim our pure land from infidels and free our country like we did
against the Soviets.”6 It is similarly not known whether Jalaluddin
would have supported an Afghan effort, led around the same time
by his former Hizb-e-Islami (Khalis) colleague Abdul Haq, which
aimed to replace the Taliban, or co-opt some of its members, in
support of a new government.7
â•… Other early outreach efforts involving Jalaluddin’s brother,
�Ibrahim, between 2001 and 2003 appear to have only deepened the
mistrust between all parties, as Ibrahim was “held” for a certain
period by Afghan authorities and later the US military after he
reportedly “surrendered to the Kabul government.”8 According to
some sources, Ibrahim had been sent to explore reconciliation
opportunities with US and Afghan officials, but was detained based
on the urging of Badshah Khan Zadran, a local Haqqani family
rival.9 The animosity deepened after several members of Jalaluddin’s
family were killed in airstrikes and Hamid Karzai (with US sup-
port) attempted to sideline the Haqqanis by elevating Badshah

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Khan Zadran to the governship in Paktia—an attempt which disas-

trously failed.10
â•… Initiatives involving Sirajuddin Haqqani and Karzai administra-
tion officials in 2007 and 2010 and a meeting between US officials
and Ibrahim Haqqani in 2011 (brokered by Pakistan) in Qatar also
fell flat, leaving little hope that a political solution involving the
Haqqanis is currently attainable.11 Unless, that is, one of the major
parties to the negotiations—the Haqqani network, the United
States, Pakistan, or the Afghan government—is willing to recali-
brate its red lines. Given what is at stake for all parties, this seems
unlikely, especially since the US government formally desig-
nated€the group as a Foreign Terrorist Organization in early Sep-
tember 2012.12
â•… The decade following the US invasion of Afghanistan was also
characterized by change and other challenges, especially in the
kinetic dimensions of the war. The US efforts to consolidate its ini-
tial gains against the Taliban and al-Qa’ida were hampered by its
military intervention in Iraq—with Afghanistan being seen as less
of a priority for several critical years. By the time the United States
had turned its attention and resources back to Afghanistan the con-
flict in the country had evolved into a full-blown insurgency. Simi-
lar to the past, during the post-2001 period the Haqqani network
has proven central to the development of the Taliban’s campaign of
violence and the extension of the latter’s writ across Loya Paktia
and regions further afield. Even more challenging (and perhaps
more critical to the Taliban’s long-term strategy) has been a rela-
tively new development: the Haqqani network’s role as spoiler, a
position the group has been able to occupy given its early embrace
of suicide attacks and its deadly and consistent use of the tactic to
conduct attacks in Kabul, which usually generate international
news headlines.
â•… Despite significant setbacks and multiyear operational efforts to
degrade the Haqqani network’s capabilities, the group has proven
itself to be resilient. “Haqqani is the most resilient enemy network
out there,” noted the commander of the US military brigade in
Khost in May 2011.13 Every spring, at the beginning of each fighting
season, the group arrives back in force—having replenished its

124
ranks during the winter lull. It would be a mistake to view the
Haqqani network as anything but capable and determined, but the
group’s regenerative capacity cannot be separated from the value
provided by Pakistan’s nearby border, a central asset which the
group has leveraged for decades to limit its own rate of attrition
and protect its strategic infrastructure, including its leaders.
â•… Another central change has been the transition of the Haqqani
network leadership from father Jalaluddin to son Sirajuddin. While
this transition represents a change in personalities, surprisingly
little has changed in terms of the Haqqani network’s relations, strat-
egy, and outlook during the post-2001 period. As in the past, the
core goal of the group today remains local control and autonomy in
the Loya Paktia/Waziristan corridor. The group also still wants to
see an “Islamic” government in power in Kabul that is guided by
sharia. Extremely little is known about what the group wants
beyond that. Up to this point Sirajuddin has proven himself to be
quite restrained, preferring—like his father—not to seek public
office and to defer to the Taliban rather than challenge the group
and its authority, at least publicly. Whether the young leader is
more ambitious or will remain as deferential to the Taliban in the
future, especially in a post-Mullah Omar world, still remains an
open question, however.
â•… The post-2001 period has also seen a considerable amount of
change in terms of Pakistan’s militant landscape, a dynamic which
has also affected the Haqqani network. These changes have primar-
ily been driven by complications associated with Pakistan’s alliance
with the United States, Islamabad’s policy of selectively differenti-
ating between “good” and “bad” jihadis, the blowback from its
military operations in the FATA and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Prov-
ince (KPP, formerly called the Northwest Frontier Province), and
the escalation of the US drone campaign. When viewed in aggre-
gate, these changes in Pakistan’s militant landscape are character-
ized by two main trends. The first is ideological hybridization,
whereby an increased number of locally oriented, Pakistan-based
militant groups have either been inspired by or now describe their
fight in terms ideologically similar to those defined by al-Qa’ida.14
This change is best typified by the post-2001 operational activity of

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Jaish-e-Mohammad, the emergence of the Tehrik-e-Taliban (TTP) in

2007 and the development of the jihad against Islamabad. Numer-
ous sources, as the following chapters reveal, suggest that some
Haqqani network leaders and lower-level fighters have been con-
siderably influenced by al-Qa’ida’s rhetoric as well.
â•… The second major observable trend is the further blurring of
organizational boundaries between Pakistan-based militant groups,
a change which has in part been facilitated by the co-location of mili-
tant groups in the FATA and the pressure Pakistan has placed on
some groups, but not others. This dynamic has enhanced the
Haqqani network’s importance and value to the Pakistani state since
Islamabad increasingly has fewer militant actors it can rely on and
trust. Yet these conditions have also created new challenges for the
Haqqani network. For example, due to its close ties with Pakistan’s
ISI and the primary actors—al-Qa’ida and the TTP—who are waging
war on Islamabad, the group must now more carefully balance the
tensions inherent in its nexus position. The Haqqani network has
proven itself adept at hedging its position and managing conflicting
ties in the past, but the atmosphere in the FATA now appears to be
more ideologically fractured, making one wonder whether the
group is tired of sitting in the middle and could be pushed to choose
sides and take a more hard and open ideological stance.
â•… The endurance of the Haqqani network as a nexus actor has
always been intimately tied to its trustworthiness and ability to
remain relevant to a diverse mix of actors over time.15 Indeed, when
the Haqqani network is no longer seen as reliable and/or relevant
to the ISI and its interests Pakistan may have less of an incentive to
continue its relationship with the group. The Haqqani network’s
relations with al-Qa’ida and the TTP are guided by similar princi-
ples. Other factors, such as pragmatic considerations (e.g., the local
alliances that are needed to ensure the movement of fighters from
North Waziristan to Khost), deep personal ties, and the limited
partnering options that some of these actors have, also play impor-
tant roles in this calculus. Therefore, to ensure its continued rele-
vance and maintain its nexus position, the Haqqani network must
provide services or other items of value that suit the interests and
needs of its local, regional, and global partners. To that end, Part II

126
provides an assessment of the Haqqani network’s value proposition
to these three—local, regional, and global—group actor categories
during the post-2001 period.16 The breakout of the section’s four
chapters reflects these distinctions (the last chapter explores man-
agement challenges and the tension inherent to the Haqqani net-
work’s nexus position). Attention is specifically given to identifying
what the Haqqani network provides to and receives from each
group category, and how these various parties benefit. By using this
analytical framework we are able to shed light on the nature and
depth of Haqqani network relations and the incentives driving the
Haqqani network and its partners. Such an exploration also reveals
insights into the identity of the Haqqani network and how it has
been able to enhance its local effectiveness as well as serving as a
fountainhead for jihad elsewhere simultaneously.
â•… It is the local dimension which we evaluate first.

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 4

LOCAL

PAKISTANI TALIBAN FACTIONS

AND OTHER LOCAL INSURGENT UNITS

The Haqqani network is best understood as being both an Afghan

and Pakistani organization as its history is intimately and equally
tied to both countries. Jalaluddin Haqqani himself best puts the
cross-border nature of his organization into context: “I am also the
[Taliban] minister for border regions. Our tribes are settled on both
sides of the Durand line since ages. Our houses are divided on both
sides of the border. Both sides are my home. Pakistan is my home.
And besides, my migration hasn’t ended.”1 Afghanistan remains
central to the identity of the Haqqani network, its trajectory as a
battle-tested militant entity and jihadist facilitator, and rise as the
strongest militant entity in Loya Paktia.2 Yet, at the same time, over
the past thirty years Pakistan’s North Waziristan has been as impor-
tant as Loya Paktia to the development and evolution of the
Haqqani network as an insurgent fighting force and local institution
of power. As established in Part I, Jalaluddin settled in North
Waziristan before initiating jihad against the Daoud regime in
1973€and he and his compatriots later retreated there after this jihad
had officially commenced.3 From that point until today, North
WazirÂ�istan has functioned as the Haqqanis’ sanctuary and rear

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resource mobilization base.4 The mountainous geography of the

local terrain and the shelter provided by the international border
has proved invaluable, allowing the Haqqani network to limit its
own rate of attrition when under attack. It is the combination of
these factors—the Afghan and Pakistani components of the organi-
zation—that have led to the Haqqani network’s resilience and
enduring success over time. Understanding how the two faces of
the organization intersect, and how the Haqqani network’s opera-
tions are integrated with and provide value to other local actors on
both sides of the Durand Line is the focus of this chapter, as it is
essential to understanding some of the local dynamics upon which
the Haqqanis’ enterprise rests.
â•… At the local level, the Haqqani network functions as a power bro-
ker and the primary facilitator of a regional, cross-border system of
violence that is based in the Waziristan region and deployed across
the border inside Afghanistan.5 The Haqqani network’s value to
local militant actors on both sides of the border occurs across vari-
ous levels, and it is firmly rooted in the centers for religious and
military instruction in Loya Paktia and North Waziristan that the
Haqqani family have historically operated there. These centers of
learning, all of which are now believed to be based in the FATA, are
useful to entities like the Afghan and Pakistani Talibans because
they help to inculcate an ideological worldview that embraces vio-
lent jihad. This, in turn, makes them ideal places for local militant
factions to recruit new members and to replenish their ranks. Of
equal importance and local value is the Haqqanis’ broad control of
a platform—a network—through which these students and other
recruits can operationalize and apply their knowledge on the bat-
tlefields of Loya Paktia and Afghanistan more broadly. The
Haqqani network similarly functions as a primary partner for TTP
elements from South and North Waziristan to gain entry to the
Afghan jihad and to develop the operational capabilities of their
fighters. The Haqqani network provides additional value to the TTP
by acting as a trusted “office” to mediate disputes and manage vio-
lence between local tribal entities and militant factions, and for enti-
ties like the Mehsud faction of the TTP to negotiate with state
representatives in Islamabad and Rawalpindi.

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â•… Across the border in Afghanistan, the Haqqani network provides

value to the Quetta Shura Taliban in two main areas. First, both
before and after 9/11 the Haqqani network has acted as an impor-
tant regional platform that the Taliban can leverage to project power
and influence in southeastern Afghanistan. In doing so, the Haqqani
network helps the Taliban to extend its brand and project itself as a
cohesive, national (i.e., more than a Kandahari) movement. Second,
given its record for operational effectiveness the Haqqani network
functions as a force multiplier for the Taliban, strengthening the
latter’s campaigns in Loya Paktia and elsewhere.6

Centers for Religious Instruction and Military Training

in Loya Paktia and NWA
Since the mid-1970s the Haqqani network has worked to develop
religious and military infrastructure on both sides of the Durand
Line in the Loya Paktia/Waziristan corridor. According to one esti-
mate provided by Shuhrat Nangyal—the former editor of the
Pashto-language version of Manba’ al-Jihad—the Haqqani network
is affiliated with over eighty madrassas in the tribal areas of
Afghanistan and Pakistan.7 This infrastructure has historically func-
tioned as a mechanism for the Haqqanis to cultivate influence and
provide services and religious instruction to local communities
in€the tribal areas who derive value from these offerings.8 The
Haqqanis’ network of madrassas has also been a tool through which
the organization can propagate its worldview and prepare young,
ideologically motivated recruits to wage jihad in Afghanistan and
other theaters. In that sense the Haqqani network’s religious and
military infrastructure serves as a synergistic source of social and
military power that supplies recruits, and helps to sustain the
Afghan Taliban’s operational prowess over time.
â•… The Haqqani network’s credentials and deep ties to the Dar al-
’Ulum Haqqaniyya madrassa in Akora Khattak lend credibility, and
arguably even prestige, to the religious training that the Haqqani
family provides.9 In addition to filling educational voids left by the
Pakistani government, local community members also likely find
value in Haqqani religious instruction in that, similar to most mad-

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rassas in Pakistan, students at Manba’ ‘Ulum do not have to pay for

tuition, accommodation, food, or access to basic medical care.10
Haqqani-sponsored religious and educational opportunities also
provide a number of other important benefits, such as teachers and
trained imams, for local communities. For some, studying at
Manba’ ‘Ulum is also an entry-point to study at a larger and more
prestigious madrassa, such as Dar al-’Ulum Haqqaniyya or Jamia
Farooqia, located outside of Pakistan’s tribal areas.11 The depth and
continued importance of Haqqani network/Dar al-’Ulum Haqqani-
yya ties is reflected by Nasiruddin and Khalil Haqqani’s presence
at a recent Haqqania graduation ceremony in Akora Khattak in
2010.12 It is believed that another, younger member of the Haqqani
family was one of the graduates.13
â•… The two central pillars of the Haqqani network’s curriculum, as
the organization itself defines it, are ideological preparation for
jihad and military instruction, subjects that are viewed as being
mutually reinforcing.14 An article about the establishment of Manba’
‘Ulum puts the practical and synergistic nature of these two sub-
jects into context:
it was not enough for our scholars and students who study in this institute
[Manba’ ‘Ulum] to only hear the sounds of explosions in the battles that are
fought in the nearby region, and it was not enough for them as well to only
see the vehicles transferring the dead and the injured who have fallen on
the borders by the bullets of the communists, but many of the students did
participate in those battles. In tough times, all the students who are capable
of bearing arms will be called upon to take part and no one would be left
but the minors, and the institute will be almost completely empty, so what
an institute of Sharia sciences is it?!15

â•… The combination of ideological and military training is valuable

to the Haqqani network and the Taliban on two levels. First, it pro-
vides students with an opportunity to prepare themselves reli-
giously for jihad and their participation in, and potential death
from, violent military conflict. Second, it provides local militant
organizations with a supply of committed fighters familiar with
basic military equipment and tactics. For, according to Aziz Khan—
the first administrator of Manba’ ‘Ulum—“by the time they gradu-
ate, every talib [student] will be armed with a good base of Islamic

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knowledge, as well as excellent training in military tactics.”16 It

would be problematic to assume that all graduates from Manba’
‘Ulum engaged in violent jihad in Afghanistan and/or Pakistan, but
the number of students studying at Manba’ ‘Ulum in 1989 (830)
illustrates the utility and surge capacity these students can pro-
vide.17 During the 1990s Dar al-’Ulum Haqqaniyya engaged in a
similar practice, with Sami ul Haq at times closing the madrassa’s
doors and sending its students to fight with the Taliban against the
Northern Alliance in Afghanistan.18

Cohesiveness of the Afghan Taliban and Extension of its Brand

The Haqqani network has a rich history with the Afghan Taliban
and its precursor organizations, but as Thomas Ruttig points out,
“Loya Paktia was never a stronghold of the Taliban movement,
neither during their Islamic Emirate (1996–2001) nor in the phase of
its new incarnation, the post 2001 neo-Taliban insurgency.”19 Upon
entering the territory the Taliban struggled “to impose their orders
on the Tribes of Loya Paktia as they did in the rest of the country.”20
Therefore, ever since Jalaluddin Haqqani first partnered with the
Taliban in 1996 the Haqqani network has functioned as an impor-
tant regional platform for the Taliban to project power and influ-
ence in southeastern Afghanistan. The Taliban affords the Haqqani
network significant organizational autonomy in this area due to the
Haqqani family’s prestige, their control over important logistics
routes, and its proven ability to act as a trusted and capable partner.
The relationship between the two parties is also structured in this
way out of necessity as there are important differences between the
lowland tribes of Loya Kandahar, where the majority of the
Â�Taliban’s leadership is from, and the mountain tribes of Loya Pak-
tia. As some scholars have noted, the Kandahari/Paktiawal split
represents one of the major fault lines of the Afghan insurgency.21
These differences came to the fore on numerous occasions during
Taliban rule when the “Loya Paktia tribes openly resisted what was
perceived of Kandahari dominance.”22 Both the Taliban and
Haqqani network are cognizant of these differences, and the need
to manage them. As Thomas Ruttig notes, the Haqqanis’:

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symbiotic relationship with the “Kandahari” Taleban holds because it is

mutually beneficial. It gives … [the Haqqani network] access to the label of
the Taleban, as the most popular insurgent organization, while the Taleban
are enabled to project presence in regions that have never been their
strongholds and to present themselves as more than a purely Kandahri
movement.23

â•… The Haqqani network therefore essentially acts as a regional

bridge through which the Taliban can localize its representation
and adapt its strategy to the political, social, and tribal landscapes
of Loya Paktia. Due to its local tribal connections and its history in
the region, the Haqqani network is more credible than the Taliban
in these areas and is thus more capable of navigating local issues
successfully. This leaves the Taliban reliant upon the Haqqani net-
work to function as its local representative.
â•… In return, the Haqqani network is given more freedom to operate
autonomously in its control zones. Again, as Thomas Ruttig notes:
The Haqqani and Mansur networks, the Tora Bora front practically operate
under their own command and strategy. They are also not subjected to the
Taleban practice of rotating “provincial governors” and commanders.
Internally, this makes them much more static than the mainstream
“Â�Kandahari” Taleban. At the same time, their pre-Taleban background
gives them organisational autonomy, making them “Taleban-associated
networks” and their leaders a sort of semi-independent warlords.24

â•… The relationship between the Haqqani network and the Taliban
works because it is pragmatic and is guided by a common set of
goals (i.e., to expel foreign invaders, capture Kabul, and install
�sharia). It also works because the Haqqani network publicly defers
to the Taliban. Time and again, the Haqqani network has identified
Mullah Omar as its leader and has deferred—at least in public—to
his guidance. The Haqqani network has even gone so far as to pub-
licly reject the “Haqqani network” label, preferring instead the title
“Taliban.”25 On a practical level, the Haqqani network is also will-
ing to allow the Taliban to take credit for its operations—or at least
those operations where Haqqani network commanders approved
the operation, logistically supported it, and served as the main com-
mand and control element. For example, several hours after the
January 2008 attack against the Serena hotel in Kabul it was not the

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Haqqani network but the Taliban’s main spokesperson Zabihullah

Mujahid who claimed responsibility for the incident.26 Yet, in an
interview six months later, Sirajuddin said that he organized this
attack and the assassination attempt on Afghan President Hamid
Karzai, which was also initially claimed by the Taliban.27
â•… The Haqqani network’s public deferment to the Taliban can also
be seen in digital videos produced by Manba’ al-Jihad, a Haqqani
media production company that operates as a regional component
of the Taliban’s media syndicate. During their introduction Manba’
al-Jihad videos are branded as products of the “Islamic Emirate of
Afghanistan,” but for their duration these videos carry the Manba’
al-Jihad logo and are focused on highlighting attacks in Loya Paktia
and local fighters from Haqqani control zones.28 By branding its
videos in this way and not directly referencing the Haqqani organi-
zation, the Haqqani network reinforces the perception that the
Afghan Taliban is pervasive and strong, and that they are a loyal
partner. Yet the Haqqani network’s decision to brand these videos
as “Manba’ al-Jihad,” which is a historic media brand associated
with the pre-Taliban Haqqani network, indicates that the group
seeks to maintain an organizational identity that is both identifiable
and at least partially distinct from the Quetta Shura Taliban.
Haqqani deference to the Taliban is beneficial because it diminishes
the likelihood of intragroup competition, which has historically
plagued the Afghan mujahidin. That this issue is a concern to the
Quetta Shura Taliban is arguably reflected in an interview Sirajuddin
conducted with Reuters after the attack against the US embassy and
ISAF headquarters in September 2011. After being asked whether
his fighters were behind the attack, Sirajuddin responded: “For
some reasons, I would not like to claim that fighters of our group
had carried out the recent attack on U.S. embassy and NATO head-
quarters. Our central [Taliban] leadership, particularly senior mem-
bers of the shura, suggested I should keep quiet in future if the US
and its allies suffer in future.”29
â•… Portraying the Haqqani–Quetta Shura Taliban relationship along
such simple lines is useful from a strategic communications and
branding perspective, especially since it obscures areas of tension
between the groups, but it does little to elucidate the complex

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nature of the Haqqani–Taliban relationship. For example, it does

not adequately account for the Haqqani network’s level of opera-
tional autonomy and areas where the group exhibits distinct organ-
izational characteristics (i.e., through media, maintaining its own
logistics/supply lines, independent and transnational funding
streams, etc.). This is not to suggest that the Haqqani network is an
entirely separate entity—it isn’t. But conflating the two groups as
Taliban, while useful in some regards, glosses over differences
between the two regional factions and significant areas where the
Haqqani network and the Taliban have historically not seen eye-to-
eye. Three issues that are worth noting include the Haqqani net-
work’s relationships with actors like al-Qa’ida, discussed in Part I,
the Haqqanis more recent use of violent tactics, and the ties each
group has historically had with the ISI. The actual relationship
between the two groups is nuanced and is guided more by Haqqani
respect or trust and public deference to (the younger) Mullah Omar,
but not outright obedience or subordination.30 In that sense, the
relationship functions as a political alliance built upon similar his-
tories, ideological connections, and a common vision of the future
that accommodates each group’s regional preferences.

Military Effectiveness and a Trusted Partner to Enhance

the Taliban’s Operational Impact and Reach
Another way in which the Haqqani network provides value to the
Afghan Taliban is through its military effectiveness and ability to
strengthen the Taliban’s campaigns in regions outside Loya Paktia,
especially in Kabul.31 Such value is not new as since at least 1996 the
Taliban has drawn from the assistance of Jalaluddin Haqqani
and€other members of the Haqqani network to deepen its ranks
and€enhance its fighting capabilities. It is also telling that it was
Jalaluddin Haqqani who the Taliban appointed as its military com-
mander during the US invasion of Afghanistan in October 2001.32
Since that time the Haqqani network has been essential to the rise—
and geographic spread—of the neo-Taliban insurgency inside
Afghanistan. The value of the Haqqani network’s contributions to
the Taliban has been acknowledged by senior Taliban leaders, such

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as Mullah Dadullah, who—before being killed in 2007—confirmed

Jalaluddin’s important role: “There is no doubt that Shaykh
Haqqani and his son lead the battles and draw up military plans.”33
The Haqqani network’s leadership of the Miranshah Shura, and its
representation on the Rahbari Shura (the Taliban’s central coordi-
nating body), similarly highlights the organization’s strategic value
to the Taliban as a trusted military partner.
â•… Over the last several years many analysts have noted an expan-
sion of the Haqqani network beyond its traditional area of influence
in Loya Paktia into Kabul and Wardak and Logar provinces.
Although it is challenging to separate the two actors in Afghani-
stan’s north, in 2009 Haqqani network operatives provided some
support to help the Taliban deepen its insurgency in the region,
which some interpreted as an attempt by Mullah Omar’s group to
strategically “encircle” Kabul and fracture the NATO Coalition.34
While the geographic expansion of the Haqqani network is
extremely useful to the Taliban, the presence of Haqqani command-
ers in these areas is not entirely a new development.35 Indeed, “Six
days after the Saur Coup [in 1978], … [Jalaluddin] Haqqani sent in
secret orders that armed operations must commence in the Shamal,
Logar, and Kabul vicinities.”36 Jalaluddin Haqqani’s support for
attacks in Kabul in 1980 has also been documented.37 Moreover,
during the anti-Soviet jihad one of Jalaluddin’s most important
commanders—Fathullah Haqqani—led fighting units in Logar,
Ghazni, Paktia, and Nangarhar.38 The Haqqani network’s early and
broad geographic reach was matched by the group’s inclusion of
Afghan fighters from regions as far as Herat and Kabul, and from
minority ethnic groups such as the Hazaras.39
â•… What appears to have recently changed is the strength of the
Haqqani network in these areas and the frequency of the group’s
attacks outside Loya Paktia, especially in Kabul, since the rise of the
neo-Taliban insurgency. The intensification of Haqqani network
activity beyond Loya Paktia illustrates the group’s ability to
enhance its operational presence in regions further afield, and to do
so in a way that is acceptable to other local fighting elements.40 This
feat was likely achieved by leveraging old Hizb-e-Islami (Khalis),
Taliban, and other networks and forging a series of tactical alliances

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with local commanders active in Logar, Wardak, Kabul, and north-

ern Afghanistan.41 To avoid competition and conflict in Logar Prov-
ince, for example, the Taliban and Haqqani network established a
commission to select a governor that was acceptable to both par-
ties.42 The kidnapping case of New York Times journalist David
Rohde illustrates Haqqani and Taliban integration in Logar Prov-
ince as Rohde and his two Afghan colleagues were driving through
the province to interview Taliban commander Abu Tayeb (aka
Najibullah Naeem) when they were kidnapped, transported to
North Waziristan, and handed over to Badruddin Haqqani (killed
in August 2012) by Tayeb himself.43 In 2008, Sirajuddin Haqqani is
believed to have played a role in mediating conflict between two
rival Taliban commanders in Logar—Mir Ahmad Gul and Mullah
Abdullah (also known as Mullah Toor)—both of whom were later
dismissed by the Taliban.44 These arrangements, as well as the
Haqqani network’s pragmatism and willingness to subordinate
itself to the Taliban politically, reduce potential friction between the
two parties and help to ensure that these tactical alliances hold.

Local Partnering and Operational Development of Local Pakistani

Taliban Elements
On the other side of the border, the Haqqani network functions as
one of the most important partners in facilitating the operational
integration of Pakistani Taliban fighters from North and South
Waziristan into fighting units in Afghanistan.45 As established in
Part I, during times of crisis and foreign invasion fighters from
different tribal confederacies in Loya Paktia and North Waziristan
have historically cooperated with one another to combat a common
enemy and achieve common aims.46 For example, Zadran and other
tribal groups from Loya Paktia helped Pashtuns living east of the
Durand Line in 1915 and later, in the 1930s and 1940s, the Faqir of
Ipi (Mirza Ali Khan) to fight against the Indian Army (and by
extension British colonialists) in North Waziristan.47 The Faqir of
Ipi’s journey to Khost in 1933 as a part of a lashkar “to join a revolt
against the Afghan King …” illustrates that the movement of
Afghan and Pakistani tribal fighters in this region has historically

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been multidirectional.48 The Haqqani network’s ability to draw

upon these other tribal networks is born out of this history and
sense of intertribal solidarity. Over a thirty-year period this “com-
bination of tribal and ideological loyalties” has, at least in part,
contributed to the Haqqani network’s coherence, effectiveness, and
endurance.49 It is not hard to find examples of the Haqqanis inte-
grating Pakistani tribal fighters to augment their ranks. Prior to the
Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979, the Haqqani and Mansur
networks had “extensive links” with Pakistan’s tribal communities
in North and South Waziristan and they were thus well prepared
to tap into and make use of fighters from these areas.50 This
dynamic is best documented by the Urdu-language version of the
Haqqani network’s magazine—Nusrat ul-Jihad—sections of which
catalogue and pay tribute to fighters from Waziristan who died
fighting under Jalaluddin and his lieutenants during and after the
anti-Soviet jihad.51
â•… This trend continued during the Taliban period, and since the US
invasion of Afghanistan in October 2001 the Haqqani and Mansur
networks have served as the primary partners for Pakistani Taliban
factions from North and South Waziristan to conduct operations in
Loya Paktia.52 The list of Pakistani fighters who were first exposed
to battle under Haqqani commanders and have gone on to form and
assume leadership positions in the TTP is noteworthy.53 Baitullah
Mehsud was a close ally of key Haqqani commanders and fought
with the Taliban (likely under Jalaluddin in the Shomali Plains
north of Kabul), and both Baitullah and his successor Hakimullah
Mehsud helped the Afghan Taliban to regroup after the US inva-
sion.54 Until his death in January 2008 Haqqani commander Darim
Sedgai reportedly served as a liaison between the two groups.55
Jalaluddin Haqqani’s brother-in-law, Haji Mali Khan, a senior com-
mander who was detained by Coalition forces in Paktia province in
October 2011, is believed to have played a similar role.56 In short
biographical notes allegedly written by Hakimullah Mehsud, the
TTP commander emphasized that he, Baitullah Mehsud, and
Abdullah Mehsud (killed in 2007) fought together with Mullah
�Sangeen, a key Haqqani network commander, in Khost province.57
The more recent TTP-sponsored suicide attack by Jordanian opera-

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tive Abu Dujanah al-Khorasani, which killed seven CIA operatives

at a strategic outpost in Khost, was likely conducted with some
form of Haqqani assistance and/or approval.58
â•… This attack, and other supporting evidence, only reinforces the
close personal and operational ties between the Haqqani network
and those who created and continue to develop the TTP. To facili-
tate the integration of fighters from Waziristan, senior Haqqani
leaders are known to vouch for TTP members who want to gain
access to the fight.59 According to Pir Zubayr Shah, “when fighters
under [Mullah] Nazir or [Hafiz] Gul Bahadur [the TTP commander
in North Waziristan] go in [to Afghanistan], they operate under the
Haqqani network and need them to allow access.”60 The Haqqani
network is able to play such a role because their geographic central-
ity and reputation for military effectiveness “gives them influence
over North Waziristan militants who lack their own networks
across the border” in Afghanistan.61 Other sources confirm that
Mullah Nazir is close to Sirajuddin and that Gul Bahadur “coordi-
nates closely with the Haqqani network on both strategy and opera-
tions in Afghanistan.”62 The death of Nazir’s deputy, Maulana
Iqbal, and a mix of other Pakistani fighters in Paktika by Coalition
forces on 11 May 2008 lends additional credence to these claims.63
â•… This is not to suggest that the Haqqani network’s relations with
the various components of the TTP are always smooth. The reality
is undoubtedly more complicated, as divisions are known to exist
within and external to the TTP over a number of issues including
the group’s violent tactics, killing of Muslim civilians, and its reli-
ance on kidnapping to secure funds.64
â•… That being said, the operational ties between the Haqqanis and
TTP are likely driven just as much by their historical relationship as
out of pragmatic necessity given the local geopolitical landscape,
specifically Gul Bahadur’s control of territory in North Waziristan
that abuts the Afghan border in Khost. Ground-level coordination
is facilitated by specific individuals, as it was in the past by the now
deceased Haqqani commander Qari Amil who was charged with
integrating Pakistani fighters into Haqqani operations in Loya
�Paktia.65 The upward integration of Pakistani Taliban fighters into
the leadership of the Haqqani network, or the Taliban’s regional

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coordinating bodies, is less clear, however. Some scholars have sug-

gested that TTP personnel are members of the Miranshah Shura,
although evidence for this remains slim.66 Perhaps more likely is an
informal or parallel structure, where key Afghan and Pakistani
commanders meet to coordinate their activity along the lines of the
meeting that is believed to have been held in Khost between
�Sirajuddin, Hakimullah, Bahadur, and Nazir in September 2009.67
â•… By serving as a platform for operational development and force
projection, the Haqqani network functions as a military incubator
for lethal segments of TTP. This is yet another example of how the
Haqqani network functions—at least indirectly—as a fountainhead
(Manba’) of jihad. In fact, one can argue that the TTP and its jihad
against the Pakistani state are an outgrowth, or at least a partial
result, of the operational intermingling between local and global
actors in Loya Paktia.68 Even though the Haqqani network does not
actively, or publicly, support attacks against the Pakistani state,
they have helped to create and sustain the conditions and relation-
ships that facilitate and drive the jihad against Islamabad. It is true
that the Quetta Shura Taliban and the Haqqani network have tried,
on numerous occasions, to reorient the TTP’s jihad away from
Islamabad towards Afghanistan. The Haqqani network has also put
systems in place to minimize its public association with and partici-
pation in the Pakistan jihad (explored in more detail in the “Man-
agement” chapter). But just as the Afghanistan and Pakistan jihads
are distinct and have separate command chains, the infrastructure
and economy of violence that they create are integrated and mutu-
ally reinforcing, ultimately enhancing the resiliency and longevity
of each jihad. For example, the deployment of Pakistani Taliban
manpower (i.e., suicide bombers and actual fighters) to Loya Paktia
operationally benefits the Haqqani network, and thus also the
Quetta Shura. Yet the benefits of this integration are not unidirec-
tional and limited to the jihad in Afghanistan alone. They are bidi-
rectional and the TTP can also leverage Haqqani network expertise
and resources—either through training or personal contacts—and
incorporate the knowledge and combat experience gained in
Afghanistan to strengthen its campaign against Pakistan.

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Trusted “Office” to Mediate Local Disputes and Negotiate Issues

with the State

The Haqqani network also functions as a trusted “office” to mediate

local disputes between militants and tribal entities and for these
factions to negotiate issues with Islamabad.69 As discussed in Part€I,
Jalaluddin had played central roles in mediating political and tribal
conflict on both the national and regional levels since the 1980s.
After his infamous capture of Khost garrison in 1991, Jalaluddin led
numerous shuras to ensure stability between groups and to aid the
political transition.70 The influence and reputation of Jalaluddin
Haqqani as a trusted and fair actor can also be seen in the geo-
graphic reach of his mediation activities. For example, after Sib-
ghatullah Mujaddidi and Gulbuddin Hekmatyar failed to solve a
dispute between the Ahmadzai Wazir and the Nangarhar Shura
during the early 1990s, Jalaluddin Haqqani and one of his com-
manders stepped in to reconcile the two sides.71 Jalaluddin set up a
commission “to study the situation in detail, hear grievances, and
pave the way for the resolution of all the problems between the two
sides.” The elder Haqqani also made both parties sign a written
agreement which outlined a set of principles that would guide their
interaction and prevent further loss of life.
â•… Sirajuddin and some of his closest advisors have assumed this
role and have similarly been central to a number of recent agree-
ments that have aimed to reduce tension in Pakistan’s tribal areas.
According to local reports, Sirajuddin helped to mediate the 2005
Sararogha peace deal between Baitullah Mehsud and the Pakistani
government.72 In 2006 and 2007, Sirajuddin Haqqani, Mawlawi
Bakhta Jan (deceased), and Afghan commander Mullah Dadullah
established a variety of jirgas to mitigate violence in South
Waziristan between Uzbek militants, backed by Baitullah Mehsud,
and Pakistani Taliban commander Mullah Nazir.73 Tribal sources
described Sirajuddin’s presence and role as being essential to the
eventual agreement between the parties.74 Bakhta Jan and Sirajuddin
played a similar role in 2008 when they helped Pakistan to negoti-
ate a short-lived peace with Baitullah Mehsud and several tribal
leaders in South Waziristan.75

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â•… The mediating hand of the Haqqani network can also been seen
in the establishment of the Shura Ittihad-ul-Mujahidin (SIM) and
the Shura-e-Murakeba, two umbrella groups of Afghan and Pakistani
militant leaders, including Baitullah Mehsud, Gul Bahadur, and
Mullah Nazir, that were respectively created in February 2009 and
December 2011.76 Both were established to unify local militant
groups and to avoid the conflicts that had plagued them in the past.
Several months after the creation of the SIM, Sirajuddin “showed
his sway when the Pakistani Taliban … were on the verge of a
bloody struggle following the death of its leader [Baitullah �Mehsud]
in a US airstrike … He called the major factions to North Waziristan
to settle the dispute, telling them they must ‘follow the path of a
great leader … You should save your bullets for your true enemies,’
said a tribal elder who attended the meeting.”77 Similar to the past,
the influence and geographic reach of the group’s mediating activi-
ties extends today as far as Pakistan’s Kurram Agency where two
brothers of Jalaluddin—Khalil and Ibrahim—reportedly helped to
bring an end (at least temporarily) to hostilities between Sunni and
Shi’a tribal groups there.78 These examples illustrate how the
Haqqani network’s value to local militants and tribal leaders in
Pakistan is a lot broader than their role as a military force.

Haqqani Network Incentives and Benefits to Maintain their

Local Value Proposition
The Haqqani network receives numerous benefits in exchange for
the value it provides to local militant groups like the Afghan and
Pakistani Taliban. When viewed from a strategic perspective, the
Haqqanis’ ability to maintain good relations with tribal and militant
actors in North and South Waziristan is valuable in that it contrib-
utes to the Haqqanis’ local survivability and endurance. It also
helps to ensure that the illicit dimensions of the political economy
of the Loya Paktia and North Waziristan region continues to func-
tion with less obstacles. Not only do the Haqqanis receive added
manpower and expertise from various local TTP factions, but they
can also use their relationship with the TTP as a point of leverage
against Pakistan. Partnering with the Afghan Taliban allows

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the€Haqqani network to enhance the perception of their role in

Afghanistan’s jihad and maintain their relevancy as a leading mili-
tant actor. The Haqqanis’ partnership with the Afghan Taliban also
gives Sirajuddin and his cohort nominal control and oversight of
the geographically central terrain in Loya Paktia, an area to which
the organization’s history is intimately tied.

Strengthening its Local Position and Ensuring

its Long-Term Survival

Cooperating with and providing value to the TTP allows the

Haqqani network to be looked upon as a local partner rather than
an obstacle or unfriendly foe. Given the Haqqani network’s large
support base in North Waziristan and the movement of its fighters
across the border, it needs to maintain good relations, or at least
mutually beneficial alliances, with other powerful militant actors
and tribal leaders in North and South Waziristan. In fact, as a cross-
border insurgent movement, the Haqqani network’s ability to sus-
tain its violent enterprise is predicated on its ability to be seen as a
legitimate and trustworthy local partner—even if this involves
maintaining close relationships with tribal militant groups that are
actively waging war against the Pakistani state. For example, the
Haqqanis and Gul Bahadur need each other in order to ensure the
smooth travel of fighters across the Loya Paktia/North Waziristan
corridor, and their cooperation is likely governed by a standing
agreement that facilitates such movement. One could even go so far
as to state that TTP–Haqqani relations are just as essential, if not
more so, to the long-term survival and endurance of the Haqqani
network as Pakistani state protection.

Maintaining its Financial Position and Role in the

Region’s Local Political Economy

Maintaining these alliances is also beneficial because they help the

Haqqani network to sustain the local conflict economy, preserve
their important role in it, and to facilitate kickbacks to their group
and allies. Loya Paktia has very little arable land, due to the high

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altitudes and mountainous environment in the area. Unlike south-

ern Afghanistan the region does not produce much opium and
locals must rely on other natural resources and enterprises to make
a living. “Smuggling and cross border business in and around
Khost is huge … and is crucial to everyday existence and general
welfare of the Zadrans and Karlanri tribal infrastructure,” notes
veteran journalist Robert Nickelsberg. “This [activity] keeps the
merchant-class happy and complicit.” It also helps to enrich and
reinforce the position of local power brokers: “Smuggling out natu-
ral resources, chromium, for example, from Ghazni province all
travels through and out of Haqqani territory enriching Ghazni pro-
vincial and district governors.”79 Such facilitation arguably comes
at a price and it provides the Taliban, the Haqqani network, and
other insurgents with opportunities to gain political capital and
favors from other local power brokers.80
â•… The Haqqani network financially benefits from these illicit
Â�markets: “You name it, Haqqani smuggles it.”81 For example, the
Â�HaqÂ�qani network “taxes commodities moving through its control
zones, with a particular focus on timber operations, stone and mar-
ble quarries and weapons smuggling … Trucks coming from the
southeast towards Kabul carrying timber and stone for construction
purposes are typically taxed 10–20 percent of their carriage, with
fees negotiable.”82 Sources interviewed by Gretchen Peters also say
that “the Haqqanis receive substantial funds in the form of Hawala
transfers from the Gulf, which are often termed ‘donations,’ but
which in some cases could be better described as ‘security invest-
ments’ by Afghan traders who live in the United Arab Emirates
(UAE) and who want to ensure that the militants do not interfere
with or destroy their businesses or properties back home.”83 In that
sense the Haqqani network function like the mob—protecting
�others while also deepening their own pockets and consolidating
their power. High levels of corruption and the inability of the
NATO Coalition and the Afghan government to provide security in
large swaths of southeastern Afghanistan have only helped to fur-
ther institutionalize these problems.

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Manpower and Expertise from the TTP and Access

to Additional Infrastructure

The Haqqani network receives added manpower and expertise from

the North and South Waziristan factions of the TTP. For example, as
Thomas Ruttig notes, “Since the spring of 2008 in particular, the
Haqqanis’ fighters had been reinforced by a large number of
�Pakistani Taliban from the Wazir, Dawar and Mehsud tribes. Some
sources speak of up to 4,000 of them, mainly based in the Zadran
Arc [in Afghanistan].”84 There are also indications that the TTP
assists the Haqqanis with suicide bomber training.85 As noted by
Pakistani journalist Imtiaz Gul, “In May 2008, Noor Ahmed Wazir
told me in Peshawar that three of his cousins from Miranshah, in
North Waziristan, had already been through suicide attack training
at a camp near Shawal, run jointly by TTP’s Qari Hussain [killed in
October 2010] and Sirajuddin Haqqani.”86 Collaboration in this
realm is believed to extend to Mullah Nazir who supplies suicide
bombers and Gul Bahadur’s deputy—Sadiq Noor—who reportedly
assists the Haqqani network with car bombs.87 Those deployed by
the Haqqani network as suicide attackers in Afghanistan are a mix
of fighters—local Afghans, Afghans raised in Pakistan, Pakistanis,
and foreigners—but the case of captured suicide bomber Rafiqullah
illustrates the deployment of Pakistani youth from Waziristan across
the border to Khost.88 The story of “Ahmad,” another captured sui-
cide bomber, shows how closely the TTP and the Haqqanis cooper-
ate in this realm.89 After Ahmad finished his religious schooling in
Pakistan’s Punjab Province he travelled to Waziristan, where:
His friend took him to a Pakistani Taliban camp, where his hosts welcomed
him and gave him lodging. At first he wanted to leave, but his hosts asked
him to stay for a short while and “learn about Islam.” …
The camp belonged to Maulavi Nazeer [Mullah Nazir], a powerful
�Pakistani Taliban commander. According to Ahmad, many of the fighters
trained under Mr. Nazeer and then went to Afghanistan to fight with the
Haqqanis. Ahmad’s destiny was not to become a fighter, however: He told
his hosts that he would like to become a “martyr,” a suicide bomber.

â•… Nearly seven months passed, then one day Nazeer came to
Ahmad and told him that he had a job for him.

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Some of Nazeer’s men drove Ahmad to the Afghan border. On the other
side, he was met by Haqqani representatives, who led him to a car full of
explosives and a suicide vest. “They told me to drive down a particular
road for a short while, after which I would find some foreign soldiers who
had killed many Muslims,” he recalls.

â•… When Ahmad reached the checkpoint, he realized that he was

about to attack Afghan security forces and not foreigners, and
instead of detonating his charge he turned himself in to local
authorities. Ahmad’s story illustrates the Haqqani network’s use of
Pakistani youth trained and radicalized through TTP channels to
enhance its campaign in Afghanistan. The kidnapping and captivity
of David Rohde similarly highlights the overlap of Haqqani and
TTP resources in Pakistan’s tribal areas, as the Haqqanis used a
facility associated with Baitullah Mehsud in South Waziristan to
hide the captured New York Times journalist.90

TTP as Tool to Gain Leverage over Pakistan

Maintaining close ties with TTP elements and functioning as a

�conduit/liaison between those elements and the Pakistani state
reinforces the Haqqani network’s value to Islamabad. Yet, at the
same time, “Sirajuddin Haqqani is using the TTP as leverage
against Pakistan. Sirajuddin is playing a double game, and the
military in Pakistan believes this very much.”91 A 2007 prisoner
swap between the Pakistani government and Baitullah Mehsud’s
faction of the TTP highlights this dynamic, and how the Haqqani
network is able to use their intermediary position to extract bene-
fits from Pakistan. According to Haqqani commander Mullah
Sangin, in exchange for more than 200 Pakistani security personnel
captured by men loyal to Baitullah, the Pakistani government
released forty-three local Taliban, including three Haqqani family
members—Jalaluddin’s brother Khalil Ahmad, son-in-law Ghazi
Khan, and Dr Fazl-e-Haqqani.92 One can imagine how the release
of these Haqqani family members was a condition likely extracted
by the Haqqani network—or by Baitullah himself—for helping to
facilitate the release of an entire company of Pakistani soldiers.
This case reinforces Pakistan’s dependence upon the Haqqani net-

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work, as well as the group’s awareness of and ability to manipulate

that dependence.

Conclusion
All of these benefits help to enhance the Haqqani network’s central-
ity and its position of power in Loya Paktia and North Waziristan,
two areas which have long been beyond the writ of effective, central
state control. The Haqqani network’s legitimacy and effectiveness
in these areas is derived by the value it provides to local militant
groups and tribal power brokers, and its ability to cultivate an
image that it is acting in their interest. The Haqqani network pri-
marily does this by providing local schools, being a good and capa-
ble military partner, and by allowing Pakistani militants to leverage
its networks and infrastructure in Afghanistan. A series of tactical
and strategic alliances guide cooperation between these actors and
help to ensure the smooth movement of logistics and fighters across
the Afghanistan–Pakistan border. Some of the actions of the
Haqqani network, such as its diplomatic activity in the FATA and
Loya Paktia, also exhibit state-like characteristics, indicating that
the group is not only deeply interwoven into the fabric of each
place, but that its removal from power would create turmoil for
those (i.e., Islamabad) that rely on the Haqqanis to manage local
hostilities. It is thus reflective that journalist Pir Zubayr Shah, a
Waziristan native, viewed the Haqqani network’s primary local role
as being “to make peace with the tribes.”93
â•… This chapter highlights the Haqqani network’s ties to the TTP,
the Afghan Taliban, and other actors, and in doing so it illustrates
that militancy in Loya Paktia is directly associated with multiple
systems of violence, including the violence affecting the Pakistani
state. For the Haqqani network, maintaining good relations with
local militant groups and tribal partners appears to take prece-
dence over its relation to the Pakistani state. In terms of the
Haqqani network’s long-term survival it makes sense that positive
local relations would matter most. Statements made by North
Waziristan TTP commander Hafiz Gul Bahadur echo similar
themes. They also demonstrate Gul Bahadur’s frustration, and his

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wearing patience with Pakistan, given Islamabad’s partnership

with the United States, and his willingness to walk away from talks
with the government.94
â•… US counterterrorism efforts in North Waziristan—orchestrated
primarily through its use of armed drones—are also challenged by
the collective action logic that has increasingly been at play in the
FATA. Take, for example, the calls made in March 2011 by local
North Waziristan tribal leaders to wage jihad against the United
States after a drone killed forty elders who were meeting to discuss
chromite prices in the agency earlier that month.95 This response
illustrates that while drones have been a central tool to target and
degrade al-Qa’ida’s and the TTP’s leaders, their use has enhanced
local resentment of the United States and broadened the organiza-
tional pool of militant actors who now seek revenge, problems
which will likely endure and need to be managed.

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 5

REGIONAL

THE PAKISTANI STATE AND ITS INTER-SERVICES

INTELLIGENCE DIRECTORATE

During the early morning of Monday, 7 July 2008, Hamza Shahkoor,

a twenty-two-year-old Pakistani, rammed his explosive-laden vehi-
cle into the front gate of the Indian Embassy in Kabul.1 The damage
was catastrophic, with the scene being described as one of “utter
devastation.”2 The two Indian diplomatic vehicles that he was fol-
lowing were immediately destroyed. The 100 kilogram bomb,
which was heard miles away, also blew the gates of the embassy
off, damaged several buildings, and destroyed nearby cars.3 The
bodies of Afghan guards, “innocent civilians and shopkeepers,
women and children” and several people waiting in line for an
Indian visa also littered the street.4 Fifty-eight people were killed by
the blast, and more than a hundred were injured.
â•… Hamza had been successful though, at least in the eyes of those
who planned his mission, because—in addition to all the civilians—
Hamza killed Brigadier Ravi Datt Mehta, India’s defense attaché in
Afghanistan. The message that Hamza’s bomb was meant to send
had been delivered: Islamabad viewed India’s increasing influence
inside Afghanistan as a threat. Its strong role in the country would
not be tolerated. Strategic stakes and regional geopolitics were at

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play. It thus was not a surprise when details later emerged that the
young Pakistani bomber had been trained by Laskhar-e-Taiba, and
that the organization trusted with carrying out this mission was the
Haqqani network.5
â•… This is because the Haqqani network has historically functioned
as a proxy through which elements of the Pakistani state have pur-
sued their strategic interests and sought military and political influ-
ence inside the FATA and Afghanistan. The relationship between
the two parties works because it is built on the basis of a shared
history and overlapping interests; and it has been sustained by
necessity and codependence. The Haqqani network has proved use-
ful to the Pakistani state for three decades by functioning as a reli-
able partner which can provide strategic depth (in case of total war
with India) and added military capacity in the tribal areas of
Afghanistan and Pakistan, and do so with a measure of plausible
deniability. The Haqqanis have also been valuable by serving as a
diplomatic liaison, a mechanism through which Islamabad can
shape the local environment in the tribal areas and manage hostili-
ties in ways that suit Pakistan’s interest. Since the rise of the neo-
Taliban insurgency Pakistan has distanced itself from openly
expressing its support for the Haqqani network. This is for good
reason, given the important and lethal role the group plays in
Afghanistan and the causalities they inflict on US, Afghan, and
Coalition troops.
â•… Statements made by senior Pakistani officials, as well as recent
actions taken by the Pakistani government, demonstrate, however,
that the Haqqani network remains a strategic, state asset.6 Consider,
for example, Pakistan’s claims that it can deliver the Haqqani net-
work and reconcile it with President Hamid Karzai’s Afghan gov-
ernment.7 The fact that Pakistan offered up the Haqqanis as a
solution to the Afghan conflict at a time when the United States is
preparing for its withdrawal and is pressuring Islamabad to take
action against the group in North Waziristan indicates that they are
a strategic asset. The timing of Pakistan’s offer seems all too con-
venient, and it reveals that Pakistan has continually refused to
move against the Haqqani network precisely because the organiza-
tion is immensely valuable. In order to better understand how and

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why this is the case, the focus of this chapter is on assessing the
Haqqani network’s value proposition to the Pakistani state.
â•… During the anti-Soviet jihad Jalaluddin Haqqani was a key recipi-
ent of aid from Pakistan and a variety of other donors, including the
United States and several Arab nations. It was during this period
that the Haqqani network solidified its value as a reliable, commit-
ted, and effective partner which was highly capable of achieving
military results in Loya Paktia. Jalaluddin’s facilities in Peshawar,
Miranshah, and Loya Paktia were important hubs of activity. They
were key meeting places where a mix of actors—Afghan fighters,
Arab volunteers, and Pakistanis from various backgrounds—could
get weapons and food, as well as prepare for attacks across the
border.8 With his openness and effectiveness, Jalaluddin quickly
rose to be one of the ISI’s most favored field commanders and the
access he provided would have a significant impact upon Pakistan’s
security establishment in the years to follow. ISI officers frequently
visited his headquarters and advised him during key battles, such
as the one that took place in Zhawara in 1987, where Haqqani and
his men defended their headquarters.9
â•… Jalaluddin also facilitated fighting opportunities for ordinary
Pakistani army officers who sought action inside Afghanistan dur-
ing this period. A personnel letter addressed to Jalaluddin and
�Nizamuddin Haqqani typifies how these interactions transpired and
how Pakistan deliberately masked their role. In the letter, an aide to
Jalaluddin specifically points out that the three military officers, two
of them from Lahore, “have asked us to introduce them as mujahi-
deen, and deploy them.”10 Jalaluddin’s connections to Pakistan’s
military, however, extended far beyond the ordinary rank and file.
In an interview in 2009 former ISI chief Hamid Gul characterized
Jalaluddin Haqqani as a “personal friend” and when Gul sent his
two sons to Afghanistan to wage jihad against the Soviets he made
sure that “they fought alongside Jalaluddin Haqqani’s men.”11 The
intimacy of Jalaluddin’s relations to various spheres of Pakistan’s
military establishment, and the assistance he provided Pakistan’s
army and intelligence service during the 1980s, serve as the founda-
tion to best understand the Haqqani network’s value to Pakistan, as
well as Islamabad’s reluctance to move against the group.

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â•… As established in Part I, after the withdrawal of Soviet forces

Jalaluddin Haqqani continued to provide Pakistani organizations
access to local fighting fronts and centers for their mobilization. It
was the elder Haqqani whose capture of Khost city set the condi-
tions for the mujahidin to eventually take power in Kabul, a feat
which only gave Pakistan more power and influence west of the
Durand Line. By providing Pakistani fighters with training facilities
and continued access to the battlefield, Jalaluddin Haqqani also
played a pivotal role in facilitating the early development and mili-
tary sophistication of many anti-Kashmir groups. Many of the
�Pakistanis who fought with Haqqani would soon shift their atten-
tion and employ the fighting skills and training they had acquired
in Loya Paktia against Indian forces in Kashmir. Some would even
go on to create their own jihadist organizations and become legend-
ary commanders, a dynamic which is best exemplified by individu-
als such as Maulana Fazlur Rahman Khalil and Zakiur Rahman
Lakhvi, who were respectively central to the formation of Harakat
ul-Mujahidin (HuM) and Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT).12 These proxies
provided Pakistan with strategic depth and formed the basis of a
covert army that Rawalpindi deployed—and in some cases contin-
ues to deploy—in order to wage asymmetric war against India in
the contested region of Kashmir.
â•… Jalaluddin Haqqani was not bashful about his influence or impact
upon the Kashmir jihad, and his assistance would pay dividends to
the Pakistani state.13 During a meeting in Karachi attended by some
of Pakistan’s religious elite, including the general secretary of
Jamaat-e-Ulema-e-Islam, Haqqani boasted that “We have trained
thousands of Kashmiri mujahideen, and have made them ready for
jihad.”14 The audience’s respect for Haqqani was reflected by
Farooq Kashmiri, the deputy head of HuM, who told students at
the madrassa to spend their summer in Afghanistan so they could
train under Jalaluddin.15 These and other Pakistani madrassa stu-
dents likely formed the rank and file at a number of HuM–Harakat-
ul-Ansar (HUA) training camps throughout the 1990s, all of which
were based in Loya Paktia and supported by the ISI.16 The Haqqani
network’s direct support for various Kashmiri training camps is
revealed in a 1998 communication from the Pakistani government
to the Taliban.17

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â•… Although Jalaluddin Haqqani initially wanted to confront the

Taliban, and there were some skirmishes between the two groups,
his decision to join and assist the Taliban was critical to the
Â�Taliban’s consolidation of power inside Afghanistan.18 Jalaluddin
brought a depth of military expertise to the Taliban, and it is likely
that the Taliban’s capture of Kabul would not have been possible
without securing an alliance with the man with the most military
influence in Afghanistan’s southeast. Although likely not his intent,
Haqqani’s membership in the Taliban also functioned as another
mechanism through which the ISI could diversify their influence
over Mullah Omar and his movement, something which still holds
true today.19 The ability of Jalaluddin and his lieutenants to train
and raise fighters similarly proved important to the Taliban in a
number of battles in Afghanistan’s north against the Northern Alli-
ance, a force backed by India and other countries.20
â•… Before exploring additional aspects of this history and what can
be discerned about the Haqqani network’s ties to Pakistan’s secu-
rity establishment today, it is important to note that “the exact role
of the Pakistani government in the [Afghan] insurgency is not easy
to pin down.”21 Pakistan’s role is complex and is best understood as
being driven by various actors who are guided by a spectrum of
evolving interests and loyalties. Interestingly, it is the veteran jihad-
ist ideologue Abu Musab al-Suri (captured in Pakistan in 2004)
who, in a lengthy book about the region, most clearly breaks down
the landscape of major actors. “In Pakistan there are political blocs,
the Army bloc, and the Military Intelligence bloc, and it is this tri-
umvirate that rules Pakistan and trades or divides up centers of
power.” Explaining the varied interests of these parties further, al-
Suri adds: that “the American master can still find in it those who
will faithfully serve [America], those who are dedicated to the inter-
ests of Pakistani national security, and those who are completely
sympathetic to the Taliban, the Arab terrorists, and the various
Islamic movements.”22
â•… Adding to these challenges is the fact that Pakistan’s primary (but
not only) interface with militant entities—the ISI—is a military
intelligence organization that operates covertly, sometimes through
(or in partnership with) intermediaries or proxies, such as retired

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military personnel, local Afghans, private companies, and religio-

political parties.23 The ISI and its mission is also fairly broad, with
different offices responsible for different issues, such as external
operations or domestic security.24 Thus while some of the contours
of the Haqqani–ISI relationship are observable, other dynamics
remain obscured. Details about the nature of their interaction often
prove elusive. Accounts about the precise role of the ISI are also
challenging to verify. It is also worth keeping in mind that while
there are areas of cooperation between the two parties, some
sources from the post-2001 period suggest that there is also some
distrust between them—and that Haqqani and Taliban fighters
resent the ISI’s influence over them and that they fear ISI harass-
ment.25 Some of the insurgents’ ire appears to be driven by the
methods employed by the ISI, and particularly actions such as the
ISI’s detention of Afghan insurgent leaders (and in some cases their
family members), which are seen as attempts to coerce those indi-
viduals or manipulate the behavior of the groups they represent.
Frustration also appears to exist over the ISI’s efforts to play mili-
tant groups off of one another—to either shape their trajectories or
make them more compliant, a tactic which has long been used by
the ISI in Kashmir. Yet even if the Haqqani–ISI relationship is not
always smooth, both parties still need each other. The pages that
follow explore this issue by providing insight into the value that
each actor provides to the other. Attention is specifically placed on
the areas where Haqqani–ISI cooperation can be established, or is
strongly suggested.

Spoiler and Kinetic Signaling Tool

Two of the main ways in which the Haqqani network provides
value to the Pakistani state today is by acting as a proxy mechanism
through which the ISI can: (1) kinetically counter Indian activity
and influence in Afghanistan, especially in Kabul, and (2) ramp up
pressure against the United States and the NATO Coalition. Indian
influence in Afghanistan has been of particular concern to Pakistan
since the removal of the Taliban regime in 2001.26 After the Â�Taliban’s
ouster, India moved swiftly and developed a “strong relationship

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with Afghanistan, building and managing infrastructure projects in

what analysts say is a concerted effort to minimize Pakistani influ-
ence in the country.”27 Given its regional trade and security inter-
ests, India has spent US$1.3 billion in Afghanistan on reconstruction
projects since 2001 and as of mid-2010 there were about 4,000 Indian
specialists and security personnel in Afghanistan helping to facili-
tate and protect these initiatives.28
â•… While much of India’s activity could be considered beneficial to
Afghanistan’s development, it still must be viewed through the
historical lens of India–Pakistan interstate rivalry and competition,
especially as both countries prepare for a post-NATO Afghanistan.
To Pakistan, India’s increased activity and presence in Afghanistan
is a direct affront to its security interests. Pakistan’s main worry is
that India is actively attempting to strengthen its influence and eco-
nomic and military posture along Islamabad’s long western front
(in areas like Baluchistan) and to reduce Islamabad’s strategic
depth. It is in this context that the Haqqani network’s value to the
Pakistani state as an instrument to attack and subvert Indian inter-
ests in Afghanistan covertly is best situated and understood.
â•… The two major suicide attacks conducted against the Indian
Embassy in Kabul, the first on 7 July 2008 and the second a little
more than a year later on 8 October 2009, illustrate the Haqqani
network’s role in facilitating important signaling effects vis-à-vis
India and its regional posture.29 As noted in the introduction, dur-
ing the first attack on the Indian Embassy, the most deadly in
Afghanistan at the time, a suicide car bomber killed fifty-eight peo-
ple, including India’s defense attaché. This attack is believed to
have been a joint operation executed by a Lashkar-e-Taiba-trained
suicide bomber who was facilitated locally by the Haqqani net-
work.30 After the attack American intelligence officials claimed that
they had intercepted communications between Haqqani fighters
and members of the ISI, indicating that the latter had helped to plan
and direct the attack.31 In a BBC documentary about Pakistan a for-
mer aide to US Vice President Dick Cheney noted that “Through
information [likely the intercepted communications mentioned
above] and a series of events it became pretty clear the Pakistanis
were behind the Haqqani network, which was behind the bomb-

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ing.”32 Statements made by other members of the attack network,

who were captured after the event, led Afghanistan’s domestic
intelligence agency—the National Directorate of Security—to the
same conclusion.33 Evidence presented to the Bush administration
indicated that the attack had been approved by senior members of
Pakistan’s military and was probably conducted to send a strong
signal to India to limit its role and influences inside Afghanistan.34
â•… Similarly brazen Haqqani attacks directed at Afghan and interna-
tional targets in Kabul over the last several years have formed part
of a broader Taliban strategy to embarrass the Karzai government
and make the US/NATO occupation costly.35 These lethal attacks
aim to instill psychological fear, generate international media atten-
tion, destabilize the Afghan regime, and accelerate the withdrawal
of US and NATO forces from Afghanistan. The connections
between several recent Haqqani network attacks in the capital, such
as those against the Intercontinental Hotel (June 2011) and the US
Embassy and ISAF headquarters (September 2011), and elements of
the ISI strongly suggests that the early withdrawal of US forces is
an objective that both the ISI and Haqqani network share. A little
over a week after the September attack the chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff, Admiral Mike Mullen, publicly accused Pakistan of
supporting the incident. “With ISI support, Haqqani operatives
planned and conducted … the assault on our embassy. We also
have credible intelligence that they were behind the June 28 attack
on the Intercontinental Hotel in Kabul and a host of other smaller
but effective operations.”36 News accounts of the September attack
also reveal that the cell phones recovered from the deceased gun-
man had been used to call “Pakistani intelligence operatives before
and during the assault.”37
â•… Communication intercepts taken during the Intercontental Hotel
attack, which were leaked by Afghan authorities to the press and
broadcast by al-Jazeera, illustrate a similar pattern and support
Â�Mullen’s claims. During the recorded conversations Badruddin
Haqqani—using a Pakistan-based number—can be heard encourag-
ing and providing live instructions to the gunmen.38 The Haqqani
network’s targeted strategy of attrition and focus on Kabul follows
a similar pattern of behavior used by ISI-linked proxies in Indian-
occupied Kashmir.

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Diplomatic “Office” to Shape Militancy and Influence

Local Commanders
The Haqqani network also provides value to the Pakistani state by
acting as a diplomatic liaison, an “office” through which it can
achieve three main functions: manage hostilities, gain access to TTP
leaders, and try to shape the direction and priorities of militant
groups in the FATA, especially those waging jihad against Islama-
bad. As noted earlier, on numerous occasions Jalaluddin, Sirajuddin,
and Haqqani confidante Mawlawi Bakhta Jan (now deceased) have
helped to manage hostilities by mediating a number of cease fire
agreements and peace deals in North and South Waziristan between
the Pakistani state and Pakistani Taliban commanders.39 The
Haqqanis played a significant role in brokering the September 2006
North Waziristan Peace Accord between the Pakistani government
and Hafiz Gul Bahadur (the two parties had been fighting one
another for almost two years).40 Bakhta Jan also reportedly played
a similar role in 2008 when he helped Pakistan negotiate a short-
lived peace with the late emir of the TTP, Baitullah Mehsud.41
â•… Given its influence and ties with a wide range of militants in the
tribal areas, the Haqqani network functions as an important conduit
for Pakistan to gain access to other insurgent leaders and enemies
of the state. Today, this dynamic is best illustrated by the case of
Tariq Azizuddin, Pakistan’s former ambassador to Afghanistan,
who was kidnapped by TTP militants in 2008 while traveling from
Peshawar to Kabul via the Khyber Pass.42 In an interview with Der
Spiegel in 2009 former Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf des�
cribed the Haqqani network’s value in this regard: “He [Sirajuddin
Haqqani] is the man who has influence over Baitullah Mehsud, a
dangerous terrorist, the fiercest commander in South Waziristan
and the murderer of Benazir Bhutto as we know today. Mehsud
kidnapped our ambassador in Kabul and our intelligence used
Haqqani’s influence to get him released. Now, that does not mean
that Haqqani is supported by us. The intelligence service is using
certain enemies against other enemies. And it is better to tackle
them one by one than making them all enemies.”43 Musharraf’s
statement illustrates that members of Pakistan’s intelligence ser-
vices, or individuals associated with those services, have access to

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individuals close to Sirajuddin, if not Sirajuddin himself, and that

the commander has been strategically valuable to the Pakistani
state as a “diplomatic” liaison to the TTP’s leadership.44 Musharraf’s
comments provide insights into Pakistan’s rationale and the practi-
cal, but very problematic, distinction Islamabad makes between
“good” and “bad” Taliban.45
â•… What Musharraf failed to mention during the interview is that in
exchange for Tariq Azizuddin’s freedom Pakistan reportedly paid
a $2.5 million ransom to Baitullah Mehsud and released a number
of TTP militants, as well as Mullah Obaidullah Akhund and �Mansur
Dadullah, two high-ranking members of the Afghan Taliban.46 At
the time of his release Mullah Obaidullah Akhund was a member
of the Quetta Shura and third in command behind Mullah Omar
and his deputy. He was also the most senior Afghan Taliban figure
to have been captured by Pakistani authorities since 2001.47
â•… Even more noteworthy and revealing is how the Pakistani state
uses the access the Haqqani network provides to shape the priori-
ties and interests of other insurgent actors. Over the last several
years Haqqani network leaders have been intimately involved in
numerous efforts to reorient militants conducting jihad against the
Pakistani state to fight against the United States and its allies across
the border in Afghanistan. In June 2006, Sirajuddin Haqqani issued
a circular in South Waziristan “informing militants that while the
‘jihad’ against the United States and the Karzai government would
continue ‘till the last drop of blood,’ fighting Pakistan did not con-
form with the Taliban policy.” The circular went on to add that
“those who do not agree and (continue to wage) an undeclared war
against Pakistan are neither our friends nor shall we allow them in
our ranks.”48 Members of the Haqqani network issued similar
appeals after the 2006 North Waziristan Peace Accord.49
â•… Then, over two and half years later (in February 2009), Sirajuddin
and Bakhta Jan helped to forge the Shura Ittihad-ul-Mujahidin
(SIM), an umbrella group comprised of Afghan and Pakistani mili-
tants, including Baitullah Mehsud, Gul Bahadur, and Mullah
Nazir.50 The announcement of the new alliance came at the end of
the week during which President Obama announced a surge of
17,000 additional American troops into Afghanistan.51 In its first

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official statement the SIM declared that, under the leadership of

Mullah Omar and Osama bin Laden, the alliance would fight the
“infidels” led by presidents Barack Obama, Hamid Karzai, and Asif
Zardari.52 Mullah Omar publicly welcomed the emergence of the
new alliance but reiterated his instructions for fighters to focus on
Afghanistan and not attack Pakistan, emphasizing the need for a
unified front to oppose the US troop surge.53 Several months later,
during an interview with The News in April 2009, Sirajuddin
affirmed that “he had always been pleading with his Pakistani
brothers to focus attention on Afghanistan instead of their fighting
against their own security forces.”54 As the likely beneficiary of
added TTP manpower, the Haqqani network probably had its own
interests in mind, yet many believe that the group undertook these
initiatives on behalf of the ISI or based upon its urging.55 Regardless
of the Haqqani network’s motives, the uptick in TTP attacks in
Pakistan throughout 2009 indicates that the SIM and other reorien-
tation efforts fostered by Sirajuddin were short-lived and failed to
achieve their primary objective.56
â•… It still remains unclear whether the Shura-e-Murakeba, an alli-
ance between Afghan and Pakistani militant groups that was bro-
kered by Sirajuddin Haqqani in late December 2011 to unify groups,
will maintain a similar fighting focus on Afghanistan and cease
attacks against the Pakistani state, and whether it will hold or prove
more productive than the SIM.57

Platform to Shape Afghanistan’s Political Landscape

Across the border the Haqqani network functions as a venue for
Pakistan to shape Afghanistan’s political landscape and ensure that
its interests will be adequately represented in the future. Statements
made by Tariq Fatemi, Pakistan’s former ambassador to the United
States, elucidate Pakistan’s strong reliance on the Haqqani network
as a tool to be used for these objectives.58 Pakistani officials inter-
viewed by Jane Perlez also provide a useful explanation for why
Islamabad is reluctant to give the Haqqanis up: Pakistan does “not
want to alienate Mr. Haqqani because they consider him an impor-
tant player in reconciliation efforts that they would like to see get

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under way in Afghanistan immediately …”59 The fact that Pakistan

publicly announced (as early as mid-2010) its ability to broker a
deal between the Haqqani network, the United States, and Afghan
President Hamid Karzai only solidifies the political utility of the
group as a venue for Pakistani influence inside Afghanistan.60 It is
revealing that Pakistan put the Haqqanis forward as the agent it can
deliver in these proposed talks and not the Quetta Shura Taliban.
This confirms the distinctiveness of the Haqqani network vis-à-vis
the Quetta Shura Taliban and suggests that Pakistan has a closer
relationship with, or arguably more influence over, the Haqqanis.
Historically, the Taliban’s Kandahari leadership was often suspi-
cious of Pakistani motives in their dealings with them, which were
by no means warm, as evidenced in the memoir of former Taliban
minister Abdul Salam Zaeef.61 This suggests that Pakistan actually
has more limited options to influence and affect Afghanistan’s
political landscape than has publicly been recognized, and thus
Islamabad will likely go to great lengths to protect the group.
â•… These examples, from the Taliban period to today, demonstrate
the Haqqani network’s historic value to Pakistan as an effective
military and diplomatic force. When viewed collectively these
examples reveal that the Haqqani network is not a rogue insurgent
group, but rather is a fighting group that at times acts as a paramili-
tary and diplomatic arm of the Pakistani government.62 The inti-
macy of relations and the value the Haqqani network provides to
the Pakistani state also sheds light on Pakistan’s refusal to move
against the group, and why US efforts to facilitate such a shift have
thus far yielded few tangible results.

Haqqani Network Incentives and Benefits to Maintain their

Regional Value Proposition
The Haqqani network provides these services to the ISI for a variety
of reasons and motivations. On one level, Haqqani assistance is tied
to a history of shared interests, common experience, pragmatism,
and ideological affinity. The Haqqani network understands, and
has a deep appreciation for, Pakistan’s regional security interests.
The group has also proven itself willing to support those interests.

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A statement made by Jalaluddin Haqqani in October 2001 puts this

into context.
Let me remind you that on Pakistan’s Eastern border is India—Pakistan’s
perennial enemy. With the Taliban in Afghanistan, Pakistan has an unbeat-
able 2,300 km strategic depth … Does Pakistan really want a new govern-
ment, which will include pro-India people in it, thereby wiping out its
strategic depth? I tell you, the security and stability of Pakistan and
Afghanistan are intertwined. Together, we are strong but separately we
are€weak.63

â•… Such a statement reveals that the Haqqani network and Pakistan
view their security as linked, a partnership which is in direct con-
flict with India and its strategic goals for the region.64 Haqqani
assistance to the Pakistani state is also driven by pragmatic consid-
erations as the Haqqani family is at least partially dependent upon
the ISI to maintain its stronghold in North Waziristan and ensure
the smooth movement of logistics.65 In exchange for services ren-
dered, the Haqqani network receives a number of important bene-
fits that enhance the organization’s effectiveness and ensure its
coherency and survival. The three most important are protection
(i.e., safe haven), operational support, and noninterference with the
Haqqani network’s logistics/business enterprises.

Sanctuary and Protection

A significant amount of debate and conflicting information exists
about the protection Pakistan provides the Haqqani network. On the
one hand, some argue that Pakistan’s inaction or reluctance to
launch a full-scale assault in North Waziristan against the Haqqani
network is entirely pragmatic and reflects the limits of Pakistan’s
army and security services which, in the context of their other cam-
paigns in the KPP and FATA, need to consolidate their gains and are
in danger of being overstretched.66 Such an operation also carries the
risk of provoking a broader conflict between the state and militants
in Pakistan’s Punjab province.67 As Musharraf noted above, Pakistan
needs to prioritize and tackle various insurgent€groups one at a time.
And “[a]s long as they’re not attacking Pakistani targets, say several
Pakistani experts, the Haqqanis are not a priority.”68 One also cannot

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overlook the fact that Pakistan lost 2,421 of its security personnel in
the tribal areas fighting against militant entities that threaten the
state between 2004 and 2010.69 Cooperation between some elements
of the ISI and US representatives, while challenging, has also been
productive, at least as it relates to the capture or killing of al-Qa’ida
operatives in Karachi, Baluchistan, and in some cases Peshawar.70
Pakistan’s noninterference with US drone strikes in the FATA has
also indirectly led to the death of a number of Haqqani fighters, who
were either killed alongside al-Qa’ida or TTP fighters or—in the case
of Haqqani logistician and communications specialist Jan Baz
Zadran—targeted directly.71
â•… People on the other side of the debate point to what Pakistan has
not done (i.e., the passive or indirect protection it provides) and
evidence that ISI elements are actively sheltering Haqqani family
members and other key leaders. Critics point to Pakistan’s “soft”
approach to militancy in North Waziristan, the historical resource
base and power center of the Haqqani network in Pakistan. The
Peace Accord reached in North Waziristan in 2006 (hereafter the
“Accord”) serves as one example of how Pakistan has turned a
blind eye to and exacerbated the militancy problem in the agency.72
While the Accord halted hostilities and temporarily benefited Paki-
stan, some of the agreement’s tenets called upon the Pakistani army
to dismantle its checkpoints in the agency, release militants it had
arrested, and halt air and land operations.73 Pakistan also report-
edly agreed to take the names of the two militants driving much of
the violence off its “Most Wanted” list.74 In return, the militants
agreed to cease all cross-border attacks into Afghanistan and to
refrain from sheltering foreign militants.75 These latter two compo-
nents of the pact were quickly broken—the first as early as mid-
September, when a signatory to the Accord was killed alongside
several other militants during an operation in Paktika Province.76
Not surprisingly, the demands Pakistan accepted were also viewed
as acts that would only strengthen the writ of the Haqqanis in the
agency and allow both the Haqqani network and its global jihadist
allies to consolidate their primary safe haven. At the time such sen-
timents were expressed by Khalid Aziz, the NWFP’s (now Khyber
Pakthunkhwa Province) former chief secretary: “The Agreement is

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bound to fail as it will add to the Taliban’s strength … the Taliban

will now enjoy greater flexibility in organizing their operations
inside Afghanistan because their bases in Waziristan are no longer
imperiled.”77
â•… By almost all accounts this is exactly what happened. Several
months after the Accord, North Waziristan was described—even by
al-Qa’ida members—as having evolved into a Taliban mini-state, a
status which it arguably still enjoys today.78 So instead of actively
pursuing these entities before the TTP even posed a serious threat,
Pakistan posed little resistance and arguably created the space for
North Waziristan’s dangerous jihadist cocktail to further coalesce
and ramp up their campaign in Afghanistan. That December the
commanding general of US forces in Afghanistan acknowledged a
200 percent increase in the number of cross-border attacks being
conducted from Pakistan, a dramatic rise from the previous year.79
While such an increase could also be due to enhanced reporting, the
trend is still a significant one. Less than two years later, in 2008, the
Pakistani government reached a similar and more secretive peace
deal with North Waziristan militants. The deal reportedly con-
tained many of the same provisions as that reached in 2006.80
â•… Since that time the Haqqani network has been left largely unaf-
fected and free to consolidate its influence across North Waziristan.
The most detailed account of the freedom and influence the
Haqqani network and other militants enjoy in the agency is pro-
vided by David Rohde, a New York Times journalist who was kid-
napped and held by the Haqqanis in Pakistan for seven months.81
His comments about North Waziristan and the Haqqani network’s
control in the area are worth quoting at length:82
It [North Waziristan] is an absolute Taliban mini-state. They completely
control the area. There are Pakistani bases throughout the area, but I saw
very little evidence that the Pakistanis were getting out and doing any
patrolling. I mean, it was very clear that the Taliban totally controlled
the€area.
At one point a Taliban commander [Badruddin Haqqani, Sirajuddin’s
brother] took me on a drive in north Waziristan for three hours in broad
daylight. While we were on that drive, we actually ran into a Pakistani
army re-supply convoy. The vehicle in front of us, which had local civilians

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in it, pulled over when they saw the convoy, and all of the civilians got out
of the car.
With our car, we pulled to the side of the road, and suddenly the driver of
the car, who was a well-known Taliban commander, just he got out, and
we stayed in the back seat. Our guard loaded his Kalashnikov rifle and
ordered me to cover my face and to not move. I was thinking, and he cor-
rectly guessed, that maybe Tahir and Asad and I could make a run for it,
and the convoy might save us. But you know, I was amazed to watch this
convoy drive by.
The Pakistani soldiers did look very nervous. They drove by our vehicle
and the Taliban commander driving our car simply smiled and waved
hello to the Pakistani soldiers as this convoy drove past. He was completely
confident and didn’t seem to see them as any major threat.
He then got back in the car and instructed me that that was, in fact, the
Pakistani army that had just driven by. And he explained that under a truce
with the army, all civilian vehicles, you know, have to get out. All the civil-
ians, you know, as the people did in front of us, have to get out of their
vehicle when the army drives past. But for Taliban vehicles, only the driver
has to get out. And to me, that allowed the Taliban to transport prisoners
around the tribal areas that would never be seen and also allowed foreign
militants to hide in the back seat of cars and not be seen. …
What was amazing was the breadth of what the Taliban were carrying out
in the area. I saw [Taliban] road crews, you know, doing road construction.
There were Taliban sort of police patrolling the roads … it was a com-
pletely functioning state and society. …

â•… Rohde’s conclusion was that the Haqqanis controlled the area
with “the de-facto acquiescence of the Pakistani military.”83 His
account has been confirmed by a number of Pakistani journalists
who have spent time in the agency or have contacts there, as well
as several aspiring jihadis who received training in the agency.84 At
this point, there can be no doubt that North Waziristan functions as
a militant stronghold and an important safe haven for the Haqqani
network and a dangerous mix of local and foreign fighters, includ-
ing al-Qa’ida. Pakistan’s continued willingness to overlook North
Waziristan’s militant mix has a number of implications for Pakistan,
Afghanistan, and the United States. Pakistan’s inaction is not only
fueling the Afghan insurgency, but is also providing space for the
Haqqani network to sustain itself financially and for anti-Pakistan

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militants and global jihadis to further coalesce, a dynamic which is

in turn helping to sustain groups like al-Qa’ida. It is revealing that
many of the international terrorist plots disrupted within the last
several years have had direct ties to al-Qa’ida leaders, training
facilities, or other militants based in North Waziristan.85 The case of
Faisal Shahzad, the failed Times Square bomber, and his ties to the
TTP and North Waziristan are particularly instructive in this
regard.86 Given these dynamics, it seems all too convenient that as
“far as the Pakistani military is concerned, there’s always a compel-
ling reason why now isn’t the right time to go there [i.e., North
Waziristan].”87
â•… A mixture of sources suggests that Pakistan is not just turning a
blind eye to militancy in North Waziristan, but that it is actively
assisting the Haqqani network. Accounts provided by Taliban com-
manders tell of how the ISI is helping to facilitate their movement
from Afghanistan to their bases in North Waziristan. One Taliban
commander described how this assistance works: “If I go across the
border, even if the Pakistani authorities know I am a commander
they open the way for me, all the way to the base.”88 A Haqqani
subcommander similarly reported that he only had to phone his
minder to get the roads cleared.89 A former Taliban minister from
southern Afghanistan also claimed to have seen written communi-
cation from Taliban members to Pakistani officials requesting safe
passage across the border. Veteran Pakistani journalist Ahmed
Rashid has documented the existence of communication intercepts
which serve the same purpose.90 Diplomatic cables from the Taliban
period (late 1990s) also highlight the ISI’s issuance of permits and
special licenses to facilitate the movement of vehicles in and out of
Afghanistan.91 Pakistan’s record on this issue demonstrates a his-
torical pattern of behavior and suggests that the claims made by a
number of Taliban and Haqqani commanders today might not be
that far-fetched.
â•… Other sources indicate that Haqqani network leaders are even
being protected by elements of the Pakistani state.92 A Taliban com-
mander recently described Sirajuddin Haqqani’s comfort in North
Waziristan in the following way: “He [Sirajuddin] seems to feel
invulnerable … The ISI protects him.”93 Such activity is not without

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precedent as it is believed that Jalaluddin Haqqani was protected

by Pakistan and at times even resided at a Pakistani officer com-
pound during the 1980s.94 Today, senior members of the Haqqani
network are believed to reside in Pakistan’s settled areas, including
the capital Islamabad.95 In 2010, Khalil and Nassir Haqqani were
both seen at the Haqqaniya madrassa in Akora Khattak with a car
that had Islamabad plates, suggesting that senior members of the
Haqqani family are able to travel across Pakistan freely.96 Nassir
also reportedly maintains “residences in the immediate vicinity of
ISI headquarters in Islamabad” and spends time in Karachi.97
Â�Sirajuddin’s other brother, Muhammad, who was not believed to be
associated with militancy, also lived and studied in Islamabad
before being killed by a drone-fired missile in North Waziristan in
February 2011.98 Actions taken by the Haqqani network in 2010–11
to secure peace between warring tribes in Kurram Agency have led
many to conclude that this activity is part of an ISI-linked effort to
diversify the Haqqanis’ access routes into Afghanistan and to
develop additional safe havens that will allow the group to relocate
resources and personnel to this area.99
â•… There is also evidence suggesting that ISI elements have provided
the Haqqani network with advance warning of raids and drone
attacks. Mullah Nasrullah, a Taliban commander interviewed by
Newsweek in 2008, said that individuals believed to be ISI officers
used to visit Haqqani facilities in Miranshah and meet Sirajuddin
regularly.100 Taliban commanders from other areas have described
having a similar relationship with the ISI.101 A Haqqani defector
also claimed that “Pakistanis used to tip off Sirajuddin whenever a
US missile strike was imminent.”102 A separate document captured
in Afghanistan makes similar accusations.103 While statements such
as these are difficult to corroborate, a former CIA officer inter-
viewed by Matthew Cole shared an account which appears to con-
firm the Haqqani network defector’s claims. The story unfolds as
follows:
The CIA had long known about a mosque and madrassa that the Haqqanis
used as a headquarters in Miran Shah [Pakistan]. The CIA readied a plan
to raid the mosque when surveillance indicated Sirajuddin Haqqani was
present. The CIA plan required approval of a Pakistan Army commander

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in Peshawar. But there was never any Pakistani response, which killed
the€plan. This refusal to cooperate, however, was no longer a surprise to
American operatives. A year earlier, it had been. The CIA’s first attempt to
raid Haqqani, in 2005, had netted nothing. CIA officers discovered that an
ISI officer had warned Haqqani in advance about the raid. “Our guys
couldn’t believe it,” the former CIA officer told me. “CIA had worked on
this thing for some time, and the son of a bitch tipped Haqqani off.” They
presented their evidence to the ISI general in charge, who responded with
embarrassment and apologies.104

â•… According to individuals that New York Times journalist David

Sanger interviewed about the incident, “The account of the warning
sent to the school [madrassa] was almost comical. It was something
like, ‘Hey we’re going to hit your place in a few days, so if anyone
important is there, you might want to tell them to scram.’”105 The
main mosque and madrassa complex that these individuals are
referring to is the Manba’ ‘Ulum madrassa in Danday Darpa Khel,
North Waziristan, one of several madrassa facilities in the tribal
areas run by the Haqqani network.106 Since its establishment in the
1980s Manba’ ‘Ulum has functioned as a mechanism through which
the Haqqani network can provide services such as religious instruc-
tion to the local community, dimensions of which are likely positive
and benign. Yet at the same time, for a significant period Manba’
‘Ulum also functioned as the de facto military headquarters of the
Haqqani network in Pakistan—a key operational hub and meeting
place to coordinate militant activities.107
â•… Pakistani security forces have reportedly raided Manba’ ‘Ulum
multiple times within the past several years. In 2005, Pakistani secu-
rity forces reportedly captured a large cache of weapons and
ammunition, as well as a small remote-controlled “drone” at the
facility.108 Several years later, in 2008, the seminary was raided
again by “hundreds of Frontier Corps and Levies personnel” who
found the facility completely abandoned.109 While it is dangerous to
draw precise conclusions from these two, poorly sourced accounts,
it is still surprising that this important facility was left vacant, leav-
ing one to speculate that the Haqqanis did receive some form of
advance warning. Press reports about a drone attack against
Manba’ ‘Ulum (carried out in September 2008), however, suggest
that the issue of early warning might be more nuanced and com-

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plex, or that the United States is conducting these operations uni-

laterally with increased precision.110 Take, for example, local reports
indicating that two wives and a sister of Jalaluddin Haqqani were
killed alongside twenty militants during the drone strike, or the fact
that Badruddin Haqqani was believed to have been present and to
have only narrowly escaped.111 Stories such as these, if true, indicate
that Pakistan is playing both sides of the conflict: that it is doing just
enough to appease the United States, but not enough to degrade a
lethal militant proxy upon which it still relies to project its power
and achieve its interests.112

Operational Support—Logistics, Materiel, Training, Advising,

and Financial Resources
Of equal importance to the Haqqani network—and its effective-
ness—is the operational support it receives from Pakistan and its
intelligence services. As has been well documented, Pakistan has a
long and rich history of providing operational support to various
insurgent groups, ranging from anti-Soviet resistance commanders
and Mullah Omar’s Taliban to Lashkar-e-Taiba and a mix of other
Kashmiri and sectarian insurgent entities.113 Historically, Pakistan
did not just provide these groups with funds, weapons, and other
materiel, such as communications platforms, to wage war on the
battlefield. The type of operational support and backing that
�Pakistan provided these groups during the 1990s was a lot more
encompassing. It was also very intentional and strategic, as �Pakistan
saw the value of developing a cadre of ideologically committed
militant proxies that it could deploy across the Durand Line and
Kashmir’s Line of Control. In support of this policy, Pakistan
actively facilitated the logistics and the movement of fighters and
materiel to key battlefronts. The ISI provided strategic direction to
many of these militant groups and lent its facilities and military
expertise to help train them, before turning on several of them post-
9/11. During various conflicts the ISI deployed small teams of
�Pakistani military and intelligence personnel to serve as tactical-
level advisors to Afghan fighting units.
â•… Due to its effectiveness and reliability, the Haqqani network has
been one of the key recipients of this assistance for the past three

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decades. Pakistan’s political and military establishment publicly

dismisses the claim that it is still actively supporting the Haqqani
network today, and even charges that these claims are unfounded
and without merit.114 Sirajuddin Haqqani has similarly denied hav-
ing any ties to the ISI.115 It is worth noting that for a larger part of
the Taliban period Pakistan similarly denied their support for the
movement.116 Even before the US invasion of Afghanistan the ISI
reportedly told senior members of the Taliban that they could count
on their support for any future jihad against the Americans.117
Unfortunately for the Afghan government and the United States,
these assurances were not an empty promise. A growing body of
evidence, derived from multiple sources, indicates that Pakistan
continues to provide support to the Haqqani network. The support
offered today mirrors that which Pakistan provided in the past, and
ranges from training and the deployment of tactical advisors in the
field to financial resources and materiel. This assistance is very
practical and helps to sustain the Haqqani group and enhance its
effectiveness on the battlefield. To avoid any diplomatic or military
blowback from its allies, such as the United States, Pakistan care-
fully manages how it operationally assists the Haqqani network.
The testimonials of a number of Taliban and Haqqani fighters
reveal the contours and some details of this assistance, however. A
review of Pakistan’s history of support for Afghan insurgent actors
is equally useful as it situates Pakistan’s behavior and demonstrates
a number of patterns. One of the most insightful is that it appears
that ISI and Frontier Corps personnel still use many of the same
deceptive tactics honed during the Soviet jihad to mask Pakistan’s
support for the Haqqani network and others today.

Strategic and Operational Direction

There are a number of indications that the ISI provides, or at least

attempts to provide, strategic direction to the Haqqani network.118
While details are murky, it is likely that the ISI provides direction
to the Haqqani network in ways that mirror the guidance it pro-
vided to the group in the past. During the anti-Soviet jihad the ISI
was credited with “uniting the mujahidin and forcing them to

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adopt a unified strategy.”119 The Haqqani network was an impor-

tant hub of this strategy. Pakistan’s power to control and direct the
insurgency against the Soviets is revealed by a number of letters to
and from Haqqani network leaders that were captured in Afghani-
stan. For example, in a personal letter to Nizamuddin Haqqani in
1980, Fathullah Haqqani explains the reason why they need to halt
their activity temporarily: “For a few days, the government of Paki-
stan has prohibited the mujahideen from carrying logistical or com-
bat operations. But we will, Inshallah, load up some weapons and
equipments in three to four days [after the prohibition is lifted].”120
Communication logs between Haqqani network leaders and the ISI
from 1989 to 1992 are even more insightful. They show the ISI
�providing tactical-level direction and shaping the activity of an
interlinked network of mujahidin commanders spread across
Afghanistan.121 One message, sent in English the same month Soviet
forces withdrew from Afghanistan, is emblematic of the type of
strategic direction the ISI provided:122
PLEASE ACCEPT HEARTIEST CONGRATULATIONS ON YOUR SUCCESS … THE
SOVIET [sic] WERE UNABLE TO BREAK THE WILL OF GREAT AFGHANISTAN
FREEDOM FIGHTER. AFGHANS NEVER GIVE IN DICTAT [sic] OF A SUPER
POWER. AT THIS JUNCTURE I REQUEST YOU TO UNITE FURTHER DIRECTION
YOUR ENERGIES AGAINST [Afghan President] NAJIB[ullah] SO THAT HIS
GOVT IS FORCED TO TRANSFER POWER TO THE GOVT ANNOUNCED BY THE
MUJAHIDEEN.

â•… Another message addressed specifically to Commander Haqqani

in 1988 is even more specific, and it illustrates the type of direction
and intelligence the ISI gave to Jalaluddin and his other lieutenants.
The Soviets “HAVE LAUNCHED MAJ[OR] OFFENSIVE IN
KANDAHAR. INTENSIFY YOUR JEHAD AND CAPTURE
�
Â�GARDEZ ASP [As Soon as Possible].”123 Other messages are more
tactical and request Jalaluddin’s presence in Islamabad for a meet-
ing or for other commanders to attend a shura at Haqqani’s house
in Miranshah.124 These communications also functioned as a way for
Jalaluddin and other Haqqani commanders to request assistance
and equipment and provide intelligence updates to the ISI.
â•… Similar claims are made about the ISI’s influence over the Taliban
and the Haqqani network today. Several Taliban commanders have

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suggested that during 2003–4 senior Taliban leaders, foreign fight-

ers, and the ISI all helped the Haqqani network, and more broadly
the Taliban, to regroup and fight.125 The ISI is also believed to have
played a role in shaping the two suicide attacks that the Haqqani
network has conducted against the Indian Embassy in Kabul.
Although difficult to confirm, some Taliban commanders assert that
the ISI has representatives on and resources the Miranshah Shura,
a regional decision-making body led by Sirajuddin Haqqani which
is used to coordinate Taliban activity.126 These claims are interesting
in that they suggest that the Haqqani network enjoys less autonomy
and receives more direction from the ISI than previously thought.
Given the history of relations between the Haqqani network and
the ISI, it is likely that the ISI provides some form of direction to the
Haqqani network today, but just how much strategic direction
Â�Pakistan’s intelligence agency offers still remains unclear.

Training

As noted in Part I, Pakistan has a rich history of training Afghan

and Kashmiri mujahidin units. The Haqqani network has often
been a central partner in these initiatives. During the 1990s the ISI
helped numerous Kashmiri militant groups to establish training
camps to prepare Pakistani youth for operations in Indian-occupied
Kashmir.127 Some of these camps—including two Harakat-ul Ansar
(HUA) training facilities struck by US cruise missiles in 1998—over-
lapped with those run by Osama bin Laden and al-Qa’ida.128 Intel-
ligence officials were so confident about the ISI’s support for HUA
that one of them described it in the following way: “We know with-
out any doubt that Harakat-ul-Ansar is very heavily backed by
ISI.”129 Other documents declassified by the US government confirm
Pakistan’s support for HUA.130 A document that Pakistan provided
to the Taliban in late 1998 illustrates that the ISI had intimate
knowledge of who was training at these camps, indicating that the
intelligence group had operatives at those locations or was at least
collecting on them.131
â•… After 9/11, al-Qa’ida and the ISI’s training camp infrastructure in
Loya Paktia was either destroyed or dismantled. But according to

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various sources it did not take long for a conglomeration of militant

actors, including al-Qa’ida, the Haqqani network, other Afghan
Taliban segments, local Pakistani fighters, and the ISI, to build new
training facilities across the border in the mountains of North and
South Waziristan. Elements of the ISI are believed to have supported
new Taliban and Haqqani network camps as early as 2004. An
account provided by a former Haqqani network commander about
the composition of these camps and the ISI’s “train the trainer role”
in them is particularly revealing.132 To protect his identity the former
Haqqani network commander uses the pseudonym “Muhammed.”133
The ISI also began to provide assistance in the Taliban’s own training
camps. The training camps inside both North and South Waziristan, said
Muhammed, required new recruits to go through all the same training.
After the ISI began helping, the labor was divided. In addition to leading
attacks inside Afghanistan, Muhammed helped train young Afghan and
Pakistani men in basic weapons. “I was good at some things, like teaching
how to fire weapons.” While he did that, an Arab or Uzbek trainer might
school a smaller group in remote-controlled bombs or IEDs. An ISI officer,
meanwhile, might teach an even smaller group how to gather intelligence.
Muhammed himself also received training from the ISI that allowed him to
launch more sophisticated attacks across the border. During late 2005,
Muhammed and his platoon operated on the Shawal mountain range in
North Waziristan. From the Shawal peaks he and his men could see
Afghanistan just a few miles away. An ISI captain named Asif Khan trained
him to use a 6-foot rocket called the Sakar-20, a Russian-made device that
is roughly 6 feet long and requires several days to perfect firing.
Capt. Khan, who took orders from another ISI officer whom Muhammed
knew as “Major Doctor Sajit,” spent a week teaching Muhammed how to
position the rocket on the Shawal’s ridgeline to get its maximum range of
30 kilometers. Khan, Muhammed said, also gave the Taliban fighters GPS
devices, taught the men how to calibrate them, and then paid Afghans to
take the device across the border to nearby American and Afghan bases to
pinpoint their locations. With those coordinates, Muhammed could fire the
Sakar-20 with decent precision. “Once I was taught, then I trained my men.”

â•… Other sources appear to corroborate Muhammed’s account of the

ISI’s role, as well as the existence of Haqqani training facilities in
the Shawal region.134 The Haqqani network is also believed to run
training facilities with the TTP in Spinkai Raghzai and Kotkai,

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South Waziristan.135 While little is known about who controls which

camps, the ISI’s presence is reportedly pervasive and the training
provided at ISI-sponsored camps runs the gambit—with one excep-
tion. According to a Taliban commander from Loya Paktia “The
trainers [at the camps] are all Pakistan ISI—they are well trained,
well educated … Training is in all military tactics: attacks, ambuÂ�
shes, IEDs—but not suicide bombers. This training is separate, very
specialist.”136 Most of this specialized training is believed to have
been done by Qari Hussain Mehsud (before his reported death in
October 2010) or at camps associated with him. Given the overlap-
ping ties between militant groups in the FATA this is not surpris-
ing, and it goes without saying that ISI training assistance has one
primary goal—to increase the lethality and military effectiveness of
Haqqani and other fighters. The ISI–Haqqani connection must be
considered at least partly responsible for the markedly more
advanced techniques, tactics, and procedures of the Haqqani net-
work in the Afghan insurgency as compared to other elements,
including the southern Afghan Taliban, who, though also histori-
cally supported by the ISI, do not have the advantage of the conti-
guity of out-of-country training areas and in-country operational
theaters, as the Haqqanis do in North Waziristan and Loya Paktia,
respectively.

Operational Advising and Tactical Field Assistance

Pakistan has a history of embedding ISI and Frontier Corps officers

with the Taliban and Haqqani fighting units, and there are several
indications which suggest that this practice might also be occurring
today. During the anti-Soviet jihad some of these Pakistani officers
just wanted to fight, while others served as advisors.137 In his book,
Bear Trap, the former head of the ISI’s Afghan bureau Muhammad
Yousaf explained that: “The men we sent into Afghanistan were not
spies. They were soldiers from the Pakistan Army serving with the
Afghan Bureau of ISI.” Their mission, he noted, “was to accompany
the mujahideen on special operations.”138 These officers were usu-
ally deployed in three-man teams and were often attached to
Afghan mujahidin units.139 The ISI masked the deployment of these

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soldiers through various forms of deception, which allowed

�Pakistan to maintain a plausible level of deniability.140 During the
Taliban period, members from the Frontier Corps proved useful for
these assignments because they could “easily blend in with the
Afghan Pashtun population” due to their tribal background and
local knowledge.141 For example, shortly after the US invasion of
Afghanistan, Pakistan airlifted—with US approval—a sizeable
number of “Pakistani Army officers, intelligence advisers, and vol-
unteers who were fighting alongside the Taliban” from Kunduz,
Afghanistan.142
â•… Two poorly sourced accounts suggest that Pakistan has deployed
officers to support the Haqqani network and the Quetta Shura
�Taliban during the post-2001 period. According to an uncorrobo-
rated account told by Anthony Shaffer, a US lieutenant colonel who
was part of a leadership targeting cell in Afghanistan, in 2003 the
10th Mountain Division captured a female operating as part of a
Taliban unit in Khost.143 Although this female did not admit to
being an ISI agent during her interrogation, she was carrying
(unspecified) Pakistani documents. Other (unspecified) intelligence
reportedly indicated that she was active with the ISI.144 Another
trace of ISI embedding its operatives emerged in 2007 after a British
Special Forces team conducted a raid in Sangin (Helmand Province)
to capture a Taliban commander based there. The Taliban com-
mander was killed during the raid, but when British soldiers
searched his belongings they reportedly found his Pakistani mili-
tary ID.145 The event led to a rift between Afghan President Hamid
Karzai and British officials who for reasons unknown chose not to
disclose what their soldiers had found.146 Afghanistan’s former
intelligence chief—Amrullah Saleh—has also publicly revealed the
capture of several other serving ISI officers.147 Taliban commanders
interviewed by Matt Waldman have similarly described the pres-
ence of Pakistani field advisors, many of whom are reported to be
Pakistanis from Punjab Province.
â•… Given the risk of alienating the United States and its allies,
�Pakistan needs to hide and mask the presence of these advisors. It
does so by employing simple deception tactics used since at least
the anti-Soviet jihad. Two separate accounts provided by a Haqqani

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and a Taliban commander indicate that to blend-in these soldiers do

not wear uniforms and keep their beards long.148 One of these com-
manders remarked that, “from their looks they were mujahedin.”149
Yet local fighters still know who they are “because of their particu-
lar appearance and manner.”150 According to a Taliban commander
interviewed by Matt Waldman, these officers participate in impor-
tant operations and are “‘well educated, well trained, give strong
orders … use advanced techniques … and develop good plans’.”
Similar to the account provided by Muhammad Yousaf about the
anti-Soviet jihad, when these officers participate in major opera-
tions “there might be up to three such [Pakistani] commanders
involved.”151

Financial Assistance

Contributions from Pakistan have played an important role in help-

ing to sustain the Haqqani network since the 1980s.152 Haqqani com-
munication logs from the anti-Soviet jihad reveal that the ISI paid
the Haqqanis on a monthly basis. Some of this money likely filtered
to the group from the United States. One such message sent out to
all mujahidin stations is typical: “BRS [Brothers] I HAVE HANDED
OVER YOUR SALARY FOR THE MONTH OF FEB[RUARY] TO
YOUR PARTY REP[RESENTATIVE] TODAY. PLS CONFIRM YOU
RECEIVED IT … MAY ALLAH HELP YOU IN JIHAD.”153 Soon
thereafter a message was sent back—the money had been
received.154 But just like the Taliban, the Haqqani network has his-
torically never been dependent upon one source of funding. For
example, during the anti-Soviet jihad the Haqqanis received finan-
cial donations from Pakistan, the Gulf States, the United States,
Iran, and wealthy private donors, such as Osama bin Laden, and
even individuals from Japan.155 The historical sophistication and
reach of the Haqqani network’s fundraising machine is best illus-
trated by Manba’ al-Jihad, the subscription-based magazine estab-
lished by Jalaluddin Haqqani, which, as we have seen, served as a
communications and fundraising tool that was specifically tailored
to different audiences.156 As specified in each magazine, all dona-
tions were to be made directly to a Haqqani network bank account

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in Peshawar or to a number of Haqqani representatives in the

Gulf.157 Although the number of Manba’ subscriptions is not known,
the Urdu version of Jalaluddin’s publication was distributed to a
number of influential mosques and madrassas throughout Pakistan,
including Dar al-’Ulum Haqqaniyya.158 Even if the magazine was
not a strong source of revenue it at least helped the Haqqanis to
solidify their ties to Pakistan’s Islamist parties and religious estab-
lishment, which in turn might have facilitated other donations to
the organization. For instance, limited evidence suggests that Jamiat
Ulema-e-Islam (JUI-S) supported Jalaluddin financially.159 The
Haqqani network also likely made money by reselling scrap metal,
guns, and other weapons they had taken from the battlefield.
â•… Today, the Haqqani network likely still maintains a diverse fund-
ing stream, and the ISI is believed to play a role in sustaining the
group.160 Like most information pertaining to the ISI, details and
sources on this issue are slim and at times they vary, and it is not
clear whether Pakistan’s security establishment provides funds to
the group directly, or just facilitates the movement of funds or
looks the other way. According to one Haqqani source, the ISI pro-
vided Jalaluddin cash not long after the US invasion of Afghanistan
and helped him kick-start his jihad against the Americans.161
Â�Pakistan’s financial support is believed to be so pervasive that one
of these commanders even remarked that “Everyone knows Paki-
stan gives money.”162 (According to US government documents
obtained by the Guardian and other newspapers in 2008, the US
national intelligence officer for South Asia, Dr Peter Lavoy, pos-
sessed evidence to support this view.)163 Statements made by
Haqqani and other Taliban commanders from the southeast also
suggest that Pakistan, similar to the past, is “paying the salaries of
regular fighters and commanders.”164 Information gleaned from the
interrogations of Taliban fighters appears to contradict this latter
point, however, as regular Taliban soldiers are not believed to
“receive salaries or other financial incentives for their work.”165
More likely are payments to the Haqqani senior leadership or the
ISI’s facilitation of materiel.
â•… It is also believed that the Haqqanis continue to receive money
from private donors in the Gulf.166 The Haqqani network also prof-

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its from a sophisticated kidnapping and extortion ring in Pakistan’s

tribal areas, but little is known about how much money the organi-
zation receives from these criminal ventures.167 Some analysts have
speculated that al-Qa’ida financially supports the Haqqani network;
however, no evidence exists to substantiate this claim, although it
is not outside the realm of possibility.
â•… Extremely little is known about how funds from Pakistan are
disbursed to the Haqqani network, or what role the ISI potentially
plays in facilitating other sources of funding, such as those from
chromite smuggling or private donors in Pakistan and the Gulf. It
is reasonable to assume that better financial intelligence and
enforcement since 9/11 has made it harder for the Haqqani network
to receive and manage its funds, especially those being sent directly
to the group and its leaders from abroad.168 If this assumption is
correct, it is likely that the Haqqani network’s fundraising streams
are not as diverse as they were in the past, potentially leaving the
group more financially dependent upon a small group of donors,
illicit and licit income streams, and/or Pakistan and its intelligence
services (and intermediaries).

Weapons and Materiel

A number of sources suggest that Pakistan has also been supplying

the Haqqani network with weapons and other materiel.169 As
has€╛╛already been established, North Waziristan—specifically
Miranshah—has historically functioned as a key logistics and rear
supply base for the Haqqani network during numerous conflicts. It
is also well known that Pakistan used a strategic supply line linking
Miranshah and Khost to resupply the Haqqani network and other
fighters during and after the anti-Soviet jihad. The importance of
this terrain is best illustrated by the fact that Jalaluddin Haqqani’s
main headquarter in Zhawara was positioned along this route, and
was conveniently located so Haqqani could defend and benefit
from it. In 1991, Jalaluddin himself remarked on the region’s impor-
tance: “Khost is one of four strategic places in Afghanistan. It is
very important because Khost has more than tens of routes to
�Pakistan, and more than eleven routes into other parts of Afghani-

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stan. These routes are strategically important because we use them

for shipping weapons and ammunition into the country, and taking
our wounded and dead out.”170 Captured Haqqani communication
logs from the 1989 to 1992 period indicate that when Haqqani fight-
ers needed equipment they would request it from Pakistan and it
would be delivered. One request sent from Jalaluddin in October
1989 is typical: “THE FOLLOWING AMMO VERY NEED FOR
CITY GARDEZ: ONE—SMG 7.62 SHELL, TWO—122M GUN,
THREE—THE 107 MM SHELL …”171
â•… Given this history, it is not surprising that Pakistan used the same
supply routes between Miranshah and Khost to ferry equipment to
the Taliban during the latter half of the 1990s.172 There are even
some indications that Pakistan continues to provide weapons and
other materiel to Haqqani fighters today. Haqqani and Taliban com-
manders recently interviewed by the press tell how the ISI has been
supplying them with weapons and other materiel since at least
2004. One story recounted by a former Haqqani network com-
mander is particularly illustrative: “The rockets were delivered at
night by an ISI logistics officer to a house in Miran Shah. The next
morning … [we] would retrieve them and transport them to the
Shawal peaks.”173 ISI agents reportedly taught Haqqani and other
fighters how to calibrate and use these rockets against US, Afghan,
and Coalition forces in Afghanistan at training camps nestled in the
mountains of Shawal (see the section on training above). These
rockets were fired into Afghanistan “whenever we could get sup-
plied,” according to the former Haqqani commander.174
â•… Another account relayed by a different Haqqani commander
highlights how Pakistan is helping to facilitate the movement of
this materiel and Taliban foot soldiers along old supply routes to
the Afghan border. Pakistani “Police or military vehicles transport
fighters to the border at night … Other trucks loaded with guns and
ammunition arrive separately, which are distributed at the border.
The Pakistani Army, police, intelligence all cooperate …”175 It is
worth noting that Pakistan used similar tactics (i.e., moving mate-
riel at night) during the Taliban period to obfuscate the movement
of equipment and their direct role.176
â•… Pakistan’s historical use of supply lines in North Waziristan and
Khost to assist the Haqqani network and the Taliban lend credence

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to these firsthand testimonials. Such assistance is useful to the

Haqqani network in that it directly facilitates its kinetic activity and
enhances its operational capabilities. Even if these accounts are not
true, Pakistan is at the very least overlooking the movement of this
materiel as the ISI is intimately familiar with supply routes in this
region. One should not forget that the ISI heavily used these supply
routes for twenty years to supply the Haqqani network and other
armed actors.

Conclusion
Pakistan’s support for the Haqqani network is complicated and
responsive to environmental factors, but time and again during
periods of conflict or instability Pakistan has turned to the Haqqani
network—and others—to protect its interests in the tribal areas and
Afghanistan. Some rationalize the ISI’s role in Afghanistan by
Â�arguing that it is “unrealistic to expect ISI not to be engaged [in
Afghanistan], given its interests in regional foreign policy.”177 The
need for the ISI’s regional role in Afghanistan is not in dispute, but
what is at issue is how the ISI is engaged in Afghanistan and the
role it plays as an enabler of groups that operate with al-Qa’ida. The
difference today is that the support provided by Pakistan is no
longer being deployed against the Soviet Union or the Northern
Alliance, but is instead being deployed against Pakistan’s stated
ally—the United States. The implications of this support are equally
concerning as a correlation almost surely exists between the assis-
tance Pakistan provides the Haqqani network and the group’s mili-
tary effectiveness, lethality, and its endurance on the battlefield.
â•… Since 9/11 the United States has provided billions of dollars in
military aid to Pakistan to help degrade al-Qa’ida. Pakistan’s assis-
tance has led to the capture and/or death of a number of senior
al-Qa’ida operatives, and it has come at a significant human cost to
Islamabad. Yet Pakistan’s favored Afghan proxy is also the very
same actor that has served as al-Qa’ida’s primary local enabler for
over two decades (for details see Part I and the next chapter). Given
the ISI’s historical sponsorship of the Haqqani network, it is highly
unlikely that Pakistan has not been aware of this history. Although

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less clear, there is some evidence that the ISI helped, and continues
to a lesser degree, to facilitate these ties, suggesting that Pakistan
could have played a more influential role in the development of
al-Qa’ida than has thus far been recognized.
â•… More tangible is Pakistan’s reluctance to conduct a military
operation against the Haqqani network and the milieu of jihadist
actors sheltered in North Waziristan. Pakistan’s inaction is fueling
the Afghan insurgency and it is also providing space for the
Haqqani network to sustain itself and for anti-Pakistan militants
and global jihadis to further coalesce and influence one another.
Left unchecked, North Waziristan will likely continue to function
as an epicenter of international terrorism and thus only further
strain US–Pakistan ties. The continued operational proximity
between Haqqani and al-Qa’ida commanders also poses challenges
for reconciliation efforts, indicating that it is unlikely that the
Haqqani network will meaningfully disengage from al-Qa’ida and
other global jihadist actors. The fact that Pakistan has offered up the
Haqqani network as a way to end the conflict in Afghanistan is
reflective of the group’s importance and central role, and Islama-
bad’s limited options, but it also makes clear that the United States’
and Pakistan’s future goals for Afghanistan are in tension. While no
options should be taken off the table, any US or Afghan effort to
reconcile with the Haqqani network must do so from a position that
understands the richness of the Haqqani–al-Qa’ida relationship,
and be informed by an acute awareness of the risks that any future
negotiated settlement with the Haqqani network presents. The like-
lihood of the Haqqani option bringing peace to Afghanistan should
also be assessed in relation to the failure of prior negotiated settle-
ments orchestrated by Pakistan between it and tribal militants
based in the FATA, such as the 2006 Miranshah Peace Accord.178

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 6

GLOBAL

AL-QA’IDA AND OTHER GLOBAL JIHADIST GROUPS

In the summer of 2005, a diverse group of international militants

staged a dramatic escape from a US military prison in Afghanistan.
One—a Kuwaiti—had been arrested in Indonesia, another—a
Â�Libyan and protégé of veteran al-Qa’ida trainer Abu Laith al-Libi—
had been picked up in Pakistan. They had been sharing Cell 119
with two other detainees—a Saudi and a Syrian, the latter having
been captured two years earlier in Khost.1 Due to their stature and
experiences with al-Qa’ida, all were sent to the prison at Bagram—
the large military base just north of Kabul. Two of them—the
Kuwaiti, Omar al-Faruq, and the Saudi, Abu Nasir al-Qahtani—
were awaiting transfer to Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.2
â•… The details of their escape on 10 July 2005 are murky. After pick-
ing the locks to their cells, the detainees “changed out of their
bright orange uniforms and made their way through a heavily
guarded military base under the cover of night. They then crawled
over a faulty wall where a getaway vehicle was apparently waiting
for them.”3 Videos featuring the escapees describe their ordeal, and
how they hid behind a pile of barley at one point to avoid being
seen by local Afghan villagers.4 The escape of the four al-Qa’ida
operatives—believed to have been some of the most important in

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custody—was an embarrassment for the US military. The detainees

either benefited from the “perfect storm” of security lapses or were
extremely lucky.5
â•… Some believe that the story is too good to be true, and it very well
might be. An account shared by a Taliban commander claims that
the four detainees did not escape at all, but rather were traded for
a number of Coalition soldiers as part of a secret deal.6 Regardless
of what actually transpired, what matters most is where these
detainees ended up (North Waziristan); who two of them partnered
with (the Haqqani network); and what roles they would eventually
play.7 Perhaps most significant was the trajectory of the Libyan,
Abu Yahya al-Libi (killed in a drone attack in North Waziristan in
June 2012), who in a short period of time rose to become a key ideo-
logue and one of al-Qa’ida’s most important media personalities.8
To many counterterrorism analysts it was Abu Yahya and not
Ayman al-Zawahiri who represented the future of al-Qa’ida.
â•… Given the Haqqani network’s rich and storied history with al-
Qa’ida and a wide range of foreign fighters, it makes sense that the
Bagram escapees ended up in Waziristan and in the Haqqanis’
orbit.9 The Haqqani network walks a fine line though, as thus far
the group has not been a direct participant in global jihadist activ-
ity—despite assisting al-Qa’ida over multiple decades. The group
does not openly advocate for global jihad or publicly support inter-
national terrorist attacks against the United States and its allies
abroad. In its public pronouncements since 9/11, the Haqqani net-
work has instead expressed its concerns and fight in local terms.
The United States is often described by the Haqqani network as an
infidel power that is part of the Zionist–Crusader alliance, and is
defined as an enemy due to its occupation of Afghanistan. America
is also a target of hatred given its policies and actions, many of
which are perceived as being an affront to and in direct conflict
with Islam. Such rhetoric, while vitriolic and anti-American, rein-
forces the view that the Haqqani network is a local actor whose
support for militancy is limited to Afghanistan. Yet Haqqani lead-
ers have long viewed the United States as a broader enemy, and
since at least 1991 the group has openly expressed their support for
jihadis in other areas around the globe.

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â•… The Haqqani network’s support for al-Qa’ida has remained con-
sistent since 9/11. Lethal counterterrorism pressures have brought
the two groups into even greater proximity, and a relentless cam-
paign of drone strikes appears to have reinforced their sense of
shared suffering and personal loss. This was perhaps most apparent
to David Rohde, who along with his translator and driver were held
hostage by the Haqqani network in North Waziristan. After spend-
ing seven months with his captors, Rohde realized that his Haqqani
guards were “really committed to something far broader than sim-
ply driving American troops out of Afghanistan.”10 In addition to
liberating Kabul, they also wanted to create a global Islamic cali-
phate that spanned the Muslim world.11 The Haqqani network’s
appreciation for al-Qa’ida’s worldview became most clear when
Rohde’s guards told him “how eager they were to carry out suicide
attacks in the United States in revenge for the drone strikes.”12
These comments could be dismissed as frustration or mere postur-
ing, or limited to the group’s low-level guards, but they also reveal
important contradictions between how the Haqqani network pub-
licly portrays itself as a local actor and the broader jihadist interests
it has long helped to facilitate. They also reveal that the ideology
and vision of Haqqani network members is potentially evolving.
â•… To be sure, Haqqani support for al-Qa’ida and its global jihad has
not been limited to the ideological domain. As established in Part I,
for the past twenty years the Haqqani network has consistently
been al-Qa’ida’s most important local partner and facilitator in the
region, contributing to the operational development of Bin Laden’s
group in many ways. The reason why the Haqqani network’s role
has not been fully appreciated is because the assistance it provides
to al-Qa’ida and others is locally oriented and most often transpires
in the background. This support is also intentionally masked and
hidden from public view.13 Most important is the Haqqani net-
work’s continued willingness—even today—to “open up” its fronts,
share its infrastructure (i.e., training camps, etc.), and serve as an
operational bridge between local and foreign fighting communities.
On a fundamental level, such openness helped to inspire and mobi-
lize foreign fighters, and it distinguished Jalaluddin Haqqani very
early on from other Afghan mujahidin commanders. This type of

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access has been of historic value to al-Qa’ida because “a majority of

al-Qaida operatives began their militant careers as war volunteers,
and most transnational jihadi groups today are by-products of for-
eign fighter mobilizations.”14
â•… Over the course of more than two decades the Haqqani network
has been at the center of Afghan foreign fighter mobilizations, and
it has been content to let al-Qa’ida and others leverage and use
territory under its influence to plot and plan international terrorist
attacks, develop their capabilities, and sell their message of global
jihad. Haqqani network hosting has been of equal importance and
enduring value to the security and survival of al-Qa’ida post-9/11.
All of these elements of Haqqani support have continued largely
unabated since the late 1980s. And it is revealing that even after
al-Qa’ida’s 1998 fatwa, its attacks on the US embassies in Africa,
9/11, and the slough of recent international terror plots that link
back to North Waziristan and the Haqqanis’ orbit, the Haqqani net-
work has never severed its close operational ties to the group. The
Haqqani network is therefore best understood as functioning as the
most meaningful and enduring platform for the local expression,
and continued incubation, of al-Qa’ida’s global jihad.
â•… The most valuable “service” that the Haqqani network currently
provides foreign fighting entities is local partnering and access to
its operational infrastructure in Loya Paktia and North Waziristan.
As explained in Part I, this access is historic and has been of central
significance to the operational development of al-Qa’ida and the
formal launching of its global jihad.15 A steady stream of statements
made by Jalaluddin Haqqani, beginning as early as 1980 and con-
tinuing under Sirajuddin to this day, establish the Haqqani net-
work’s consistent willingness to open up its fronts and provide
foreign fighters with an operational outlet in Afghanistan. One such
statement recently made by Sirajuddin reveals this willingness:
“The doors are open for all mujahadeen who fight to apply Allah’s
will … We are ready to receive all foreigners, including Arabs, who
want to fight alongside us.”16 While the policy Sirajuddin outlined
is indicative of the Haqqani network’s opportunism, it is immensely
valuable for foreign fighters of all kinds who want to wage jihad
against coalition forces in Afghanistan, especially given the Quetta
Shura Taliban’s efforts to distance themselves publicly from al-

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Qa’ida or foreign fighters.17 Indeed, the Haqqani network’s open

embrace of foreign fighters contrasts sharply with the Quetta Shu-
ra’s reluctance to open its ranks to outsiders.
â•… Access to Haqqani network fronts also provides a number of
important secondary benefits to global jihadist organizations, such
as al-Qa’ida and the IJU. On a very practical level, Haqqani network
access allows transnational jihadis to test new recruits, hone their
capabilities, and deepen their operational expertise.18 It is not lost
that Abu Hafs al-Masri and Abu Ubaydah al-Banshiri fought along-
side Jalaluddin and his men during the anti-Soviet jihad, or that
these men would later rise to become al-Qa’ida’s first and most
influential military commanders. By providing foreign fighters
access to their fronts in Loya Paktia the Haqqani network is foster-
ing transnational militancy and helping to develop the next genera-
tion of battle-tested al-Qa’ida commanders, individuals who, just
like Abu Hafs and Abu Ubayda, could lend their expertise to future
international terrorist plots. This is not to say that al-Qa’ida could
not fight in Afghanistan without Haqqani assistance, but rather that
al-Qa’ida’s effectiveness and ability to operate in Afghanistan
would be even more constrained than it already is without it.
â•… An open invitation to join Haqqani network fighters on the bat-
tlefield also provides al-Qa’ida and the IJU with an opportunity to
deepen their ties with the Haqqani family, making it all the more
unlikely that the Haqqanis will not offer them protection and turn
against those with whom they have suffered in battle. Even more
important, access to the fight in Afghanistan (a classical jihad) is
needed to sustain al-Qa’ida’s relevance and branding as the leader
of the global jihadist movement.19 The access the Haqqani network
facilitates would largely be for naught if it did not also provide a
venue for al-Qa’ida and the IJU to create video footage—material
that is later edited and sent around the world to communicate their
contributions and sustain their campaigns with new financial and
human contributions.

Operational Access and Local Partnering

An essential starting point, in light of debates about al-Qa’ida’s
limited presence in Afghanistan, is to identify the provinces/

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regions where al-Qa’ida is most active inside Afghanistan. A useful

tool in this regard is the attack and martyrdom videos released by
al-Qa’ida through its main digital media production cell al-Sahab.
Norwegian scholar Anne Stenersen recently conducted a review of
over ninety films released by al-Sahab from 2005 to 2009 as part of
its “Pyre for the Americans in the Land of Khorasan” series. Since
most of these videos detail the attack location, she was able to
establish, according to al-Qa’ida’s own reporting, that the highest
concentration of operational films released by al-Sahab during this
time period were filmed in Khost (thirty), followed by Paktika
(fourteen), and Kunar (twelve) provinces.20 Put another way, foot-
age of attacks in Khost and Paktika, territory where the Haqqanis
are the “main executor of Taliban operations,” account for 50 per-
cent of all operational videos released by al-Qa’ida as part of this
seminal series over a four-year period.21 These “films do not neces-
sarily mean that Arab or other foreign fighters took part in the
attacks, but they do imply a connection between the fighting group
and al-Qaeda’s media operation[s].”22 They also reveal that Loya
Paktia functions as a central arena for al-Qa’ida’s operational and
media activity inside Afghanistan. A similar analysis conducted by
Intel Center corroborates Stenersen’s findings.23
â•… Al-Qa’ida’s operational footprint is believed to extend beyond
Loya Paktia and Kunar to provinces such as Logar, Ghazni,
Wardak, Kabul, Zabul, and Nuristan, the first three being areas
where the Haqqani network is also active.24 While these claims are
more difficult to establish with certainty, in an interview in June
2009 the now deceased al-Qa’ida leader Mustafa Abu al-Yazid
asserted that the group has assisted a number of martyrdom opera-
tions in Kabul.25 The complex and strategic character of recent
Haqqani network attacks in Kabul, as well as the tactics used and
similar evolution of al-Qa’ida-linked attacks in Pakistan over the
same period, suggest some level of overlap and collaboration
between the two groups. A multipronged attack carried out in Feb-
ruary 2009 against two Afghan ministries and the Directorate of
Prisons in Kabul that has been tied to the Haqqani network is par-
ticularly illustrative. During the attack, eight individuals—all
reportedly wired to suicide vests—deployed in three teams to their

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respective targets and killed at least twenty people.26 It is notewor-

thy that the Kabul attack took place immediately before a visit by
Special Envoy Richard Holbrooke and days before the Obama
administration was supposed to decide whether to send an addi-
tional 30,000 soldiers to the country.27 If al-Qa’ida cooperation
extends as far as Kabul, it is most likely that al-Qa’ida provides
training, technical expertise, and potentially suicide bombers to
support Haqqani network operations via al-Qa’ida personnel. One
good reason for this is operational security: the farther away from
the border al-Qa’ida members get the more vulnerable, and
dependent upon their Taliban hosts, they become.
â•… The collaborative nature of al-Qa’ida’s activity in Loya Paktia is
confirmed by other material released by jihadist media outlets, as
well as journalistic accounts, interviews with Taliban commanders,
and Department of Defense press releases. Collectively, these
sources prove that a number of al-Qa’ida and IJU fighting units are
horizontally integrated with, and operate alongside, Haqqani net-
work insurgents in Loya Paktia. Most Haqqani network operations
in Loya Paktia are carried out by local fighting columns organized
along subtribal lines. IJU and al-Qa’ida fighting groups are often
small and consist of members from various nationalities, including
local Afghans and Pakistanis, and—at least in the case of al-
Qa’ida—are believed to be led by an Arab commander.28 Although
the Haqqani network and al-Qa’ida have different command and
control hierarchies, al-Qa’ida and other foreign groups are usually
operationally subordinate to the Haqqanis in Afghanistan. Al-
Qa’ida leader Mustafa Abu al-Yazid explained the dynamics of this
relationship in the following way: “our participation in Jihad inside
Afghanistan is that we are under the command of the Islamic Emir-
ate [of Afghanistan] and under the field leaders in the Islamic Emir-
ate on the inside [in Afghanistan]. We participate with them …”29 A
statement made by Sirajuddin Haqqani during an interview in 2008
described the relationship as functioning in the same manner.30
â•… Historically, the Haqqani network either integrated foreign fight-
ers into their fighting columns or allowed these fighters to operate
semi-independently in separate teams alongside them.31 The inte-
gration of al-Qa’ida with other foreign fighters is still guided by the

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same principles today. Several sources of information also indicate,

however, that these local and foreign fighting groups are even more
interwoven and that their command and control hierarchies are not
only overlapping, but are also increasingly blurred, as an account
provided by a Haqqani network defector in 2008 clearly suggests.
After the Taliban’s ouster in 2001, North Waziristan functioned as
one of the main staging grounds for a complex mix of Afghan,
�Pakistani, and foreign fighters.32 According to the Haqqani network
defector, within this mix “there were two main and distinct groups.
One was largely domestic and made up of Afghan and Pakistani
Talibs. The other one was, and is, led by foreign fighters—Arabs,
Uzbeks and Chechens.” The defector claimed that even though “he
served under … Sirajuddin Haqqani” he was a member of the latter
organization, which was led by Abu Laith al-Libi, a jihadist veteran
who was killed in a drone attack in Mir Ali, North Waziristan in
2008.33 Further, even though the defector fought alongside Abu
Laith al-Libi he “did not consider himself al-Qaida … he was
Â�Taliban—but the goal was the same.”34
â•… Specific insights into this integrated relationship can be gleaned
by tracking the activity and statements of individuals, such as Abu
Laith al-Libi, Abu Nasir al-Qahtani, Abu Yahya al-Libi, and Mustafa
Abu al-Yazid, who are believed to have functioned as important
nodes in the al-Qa’ida–Haqqani nexus before their reported deaths
and/or detention.35 According to a Haqqani commander, Abu Laith
al-Libi had close ties with Nasiruddin Haqqani, Sirajuddin’s
brother.36 After their escape from Bagram prison in July 2005, Abu
Yahya al-Libi and Abu Nasir al-Qahtani announced the creation a
sixty-member Afghan and Arab fighting force to wage jihad in
Afghanistan.37 Numerous videos indicate that this group conducted
a number of attacks against Afghan and Coalition forces in Loya
Paktia throughout 2005 and 2006.38 During one of these operations
Abu Nasir al-Qahtani led a group of fighters and attacked a US
military position in Khost.39 The joint nature of this attack was high-
lighted by al-Qahtani himself in a video released by al-Sahab, al-
Qa’ida’s media arm, in which he stated: “We, along with the
brothers in the Taliban movement, carried out an operation against
the US center … in Khost province.”40 In another video released by

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al-Sahab in 2006, al-Qahtani noted that he had been “warmly

received by Taliban” and that they “were happy to have their broth-
ers from al-Qa’ida with them in their fight.”41 In this video al-
Qahtani also gives instructions to fighters through a Pashto
interpreter. Al-Qahtani’s references to the Taliban in these videos
are most likely references to Haqqani-linked fighters, given the
Haqqani network’s dominance and historical influence in Khost.
(According to Thomas Ruttig, 95 percent of the commanders in
Khost are linked to the Haqqani network.)42 A similar video from
2006 shows Abu Yahya al-Libi leading a night operation into
Afghanistan, while another video released by Labayk media shows
Abu Yahya al-Libi teaching a class to local fighters, who in all likeli-
hood were active with the Haqqani network.43 Other information
indicates that Abu Yahya al-Libi served as a liaison between al-
Qa’ida and other Afghan and Pakistani militant groups in
Waziristan and that he worked with Sirajuddin Haqqani to broker
agreements between them.44
â•… Even more convincing is al-Qa’ida’s claim of responsibility for a
multipronged suicide attack against FOB Salerno in Khost in
August 2008.45 During an interview in 2009, al-Qa’ida’s commander
for Afghanistan—Mustafa Abu al-Yazid—said that this attack was
organized by al-Qa’ida and jointly executed with their Taliban part-
ners.46 On several occasions senior Haqqani network leaders have
spoken openly about their close operational relationship with al-
Qa’ida, revealing that there “is no distinction between us … we are
all one.”47 Many security analysts believe that the Haqqani network
participated in, and likely directed, the botched assault on FOB
Salerno.48 The strongest indication of an al-Qa’ida role in the inci-
dent comes from Bryant Neal Vinas, an American al-Qa’ida opera-
tive, who was in North Waziristan at the time of the attack and met
Mustafa Abu al-Yazid, Abu Yahya al-Libi, Yunis al-Mauritania,
Saleh al-Somali, and Rashid Rauf.49 In an interrogation conducted
by Belgian authorities Vinas said that the attack had “been planned
by al-Qa’ida leaders and that it went badly.”50 Vinas had such inti-
mate knowledge of the attack that he was even able to identify one
of the suicide attackers, with whom he had trained.51
â•… A little less than two years later, in May 2010, the Haqqani net-
work led approximately thirty fighters from the TTP, the Islamic

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Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), al-Qa’ida, and the Afghan Taliban

to conduct a similar joint suicide attack against Bagram airbase.52
Although the attack killed one American contractor and wounded
nine NATO soldiers, it is largely believed to have been a failure as
it resulted in the death of eleven of the attackers, including German
al-Qa’ida/IMU operative Bekkay Harrach (also known as Al Hafidh
Abu Talha al Almani), and the detention of several others.53 State-
ments released by the IMU describe the attack as having been con-
ducted in “coordination and cooperation with other jihadi groups”
involving the participation of “Turks, Tajiks, Arabs, Pashtuns and
Afghans.”54 Material recovered from Osama bin Laden’s compound
in Abbottabad, Pakistan, also reveals that Bin Laden knew of
�Harrach, and was impressed by him.55 Before his death, Mustafa
Abu al-Yazid had told Bin Laden that the young German fighter
was on his way to conduct a suicide operation, illustrating that both
al-Qa’ida leaders had awareness of the attack against Bagram dis-
cussed above.56
â•… The death of a Haqqani network family member alongside a vet-
eran al-Qa’ida leader during an attack in Loya Paktia further eluci-
dates this close operational relationship. It is not a coincidence that
Muhammed Omar Haqqani, the son of Jalaluddin and brother of
Sirajuddin, was killed in a firefight in July 2008 along with Abu-
Hasan al-Sa’idi in the Seta Kandao area of Paktia.57 At the time, al-
Sa’idi was believed to be al-Qa’ida’s top military commander in
southeastern Afghanistan. He also reportedly served as the head of
al-Qa’ida’s training camps in Loya Paktia for a period after the anti-
Soviet jihad.58 This incident speaks to the depth of Haqqani network
and al-Qa’ida ties and illustrates how the intimacy of the personal
relationships established during the 1980s and 1990s endure in the
operational sphere today. It is likely that Jalaluddin Haqqani would
not let his eighteen-year-old son fight with just anybody; Abu-
Hasan al-Sa’idi was a trusted confidant. The deaths of other senior
al-Qa’ida members in Loya Paktia also highlight the assistance
likely provided to key al-Qa’ida affiliates and the Haqqani net-
work’s far-reaching ties. Take, for example, the deaths of Abu
Dujanah al-Qahtani, the brother of Abu Nasir al-Qahtani, and Abu
Sulayman al-Utaybi—two important al-Qa’ida members who were

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killed together in May 2008 in Paktia province.59 Prior to his arrival

in Afghanistan, Abu Sulayman al-Utaybi worked as a sharia official
for the Mujahidin Shura Council and was a senior leader of al-
Qa’ida in Iraq (AQI).60 Given the close ties between al-Qa’ida and
the Haqqani network, it is unlikely that the presence of such a high-
profile AQI figure operating in Loya Paktia would have escaped
Haqqani attention.
â•… The record of joint operations between the IJU and the Haqqani
network is equally strong, and it only reinforces the value foreign
fighting groups derive from the access and local partnering the
Haqqanis provide. The nexus between the Haqqani network, al-
Qa’ida, and the IJU is believed to have been facilitated by individu-
als such as Abu Laith al-Libi.61 According to Guido Steinberg, “from
its headquarters in North Waziristan the IJU has joined the Haqqani
network and its escalating fight against coalition forces in Afghani-
stan.”62 Similar to al-Qa’ida, the vast majority of the IJU’s attacks in
Afghanistan were conducted in Loya Paktia.63 The best example of
operational collaboration between the IJU and the Haqqani network
took place in early March 2008 when a German-Turk drove his
truck up to an American base in the Sabari district in Khost and
detonated his suicide charge, killing four.64 The attack was signifi-
cant because the twenty-eight-year-old suicide bomber, Cüneyt
Çiftçi, was Germany’s first.65 Before his arrival in North Waziristan,
Cüneyt Çiftçi was already on the radar of German investigators due
to his links with several of the Sauerland cell plotters.66
â•… What was most revealing about the attack, however, was not the
attack itself but the overlapping media response that transpired
after it. Within several days, the Taliban, the IJU, and the Haqqani
network all claimed responsibility for the incident. The Taliban
moved first and their statement was followed by Sirajuddin
Haqqani, who telephoned The News to provide attack details.67
�Sirajuddin said that he had personally planned the operation and
that one of his fighters from Khost rammed the vehicle-borne sui-
cide bomb into the base.68 Zabihullah Mujahed, a moniker used by
all Taliban spokespersons, also linked the attack to the Haqqani
network.69 After a number of days, the IJU issued a statement about
the incident and released a martyr video of Cüneyt Çiftçi in which

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they described the operation as having been coordinated with the

Taliban.70 According to the IJU, the attack was conducted to avenge
the death of Abu Laith al-Libi—who advised the group.71 Then,
several weeks later, Jalaluddin Haqqani claimed responsibility for
the attack in a rare interview on a Taliban DVD.72
â•… This media whirlwind (explored in further detail below) tells us
a number of things about the relationship between these three par-
ties and the Haqqani network’s sophistication. The fact that all
three parties—the Taliban, the Haqqani network, and the IJU—
released statements around the same time tells us that the attack
was either well integrated or that these actors are very opportunis-
tic. From one perspective, the multiple claims of responsibility sug-
gest that the relationships between the IJU, the Haqqani network,
and the Taliban are so tight that it doesn’t matter who takes credit
for the attack. What is more important is the perception of their
involvement and that they are all able to derive benefit from this
single event. Another theory postulated by Einar Wigen is that the
Haqqani network’s claim of responsibility could be the cost the IJU
has to pay for Haqqani network support and protection.73
â•… The Haqqani network partners with and provides foreign fight-
ing entities operational access to fronts in Afghanistan’s southeast
for two main reasons. First, on a very practical level, foreign fight-
ing entities provide added manpower and diversify the Haqqani
network’s resource mobilization networks (for more detail see
below). Foreign fighters are also useful as they bring a variety of
technical skills that the Haqqani network can use to enhance its
effectiveness. Second, and perhaps more importantly, the Haqqani
network would not enable or serve as the main partner for foreign
fighting entities in Afghanistan if it did not at least tacitly support
what groups like al-Qa’ida aim to achieve, especially when one
considers the risk that Haqqani leaders assume in being associated
with these groups, and the historical ties between them. The
Haqqani network remains attractive to al-Qa’ida and other foreign
fighters because these groups have limited partnering options.
According to Thomas Ruttig, the Haqqani network has also figured
out the right formula for how to integrate small foreign fighting
units by giving them enough flexibility while still maintaining a

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measure of command and control—as the wider Taliban networks

do with their local networks.74
â•… Local partnering and access to Haqqani network infrastructure
helps al-Qa’ida and other transnational jihadist groups to remain
operationally relevant in Afghanistan. Exposure to training camps
and fighting fronts in territory associated with Haqqani units also
functions as a “form of entryism” through which new recruits/
fighters can be further radicalized.75 Therefore, by functioning as an
operational bridge between local and foreign fighter mobilizations,
the Haqqani network has—for the past two and half decades—been
directly facilitating the radicalization of war volunteers.

Enabling Media and al-Qa’ida’s Global Relevance

to the Afghan Jihad
The operational access and local partnering that the Haqqani net-
work provides has a number of important derivative benefits for
al-Qa’ida, the IJU, and other foreign fighting units. One of the most
meaningful is that it provides opportunities for al-Qa’ida and oth-
ers to create local battlefield footage. This is not to say that al-Qa’ida
and foreign fighters could not produce battlefield footage in
Afghanistan without the Haqqanis, but rather that local partnering
makes this a lot easier. This helps to explain why operational videos
shot in Loya Paktia are so predominant in al-Qa’ida’s media
releases. After being filmed in Afghanistan, this digital material is
smuggled back into Pakistan where it is edited, branded, and dis-
tributed around the world as part of a jihadist media campaign.76
Time and again, senior al-Qa’ida leaders have commented on the
importance of media to their operations. For example, in a personal
letter to Mullah Omar, Osama bin Laden mentioned that “It is obvi-
ous that the media war in this century is one of the strongest meth-
ods; in fact, its ratio may reach 90% of the total preparation for the
battles.”77 Ayman al-Zawahiri has made similar comments and
identified al-Qa’ida’s media activity as one of the group’s most
important accomplishments.78 Al-Qa’ida, the Taliban, and the
Haqqani network do not have to win tactical battles—they just need
to create the perception that they are winning. With that in mind,

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operational videos from southeastern Afghanistan function as part

of a web of segmented media products that are designed to influ-
ence public opinion from Dubai to Dallas. They are important pre-
cisely because they help al-Qa’ida and the IJU to communicate their
relevancy and contributions to the fight in Afghanistan—a classical
jihad.79 In a practical sense, these videos also help al-Qa’ida and the
IJU to attract new recruits and demonstrate value to private donors;
inputs which are needed to sustain the global jihad.
â•… Similar to al-Qa’ida, the Haqqani network has long recognized
the value and importance of media.80 Scholars have established the
importance of Peshawar as a central media hub for jihadist actors
during and after the anti-Soviet jihad.81 Less historical attention,
however, has been given to the media produced by militant leaders
such as Jalaluddin Haqqani, who operated in places like Miran
Shah. The fact that the academic and counterterrorism communities
know so little about the Haqqani network’s historical publications
is reflective of how “old” jihadist print media produced from this
region is critically understudied. This is surprising given the lethal-
ity and the important role the Haqqani organization plays today.
Due to this considerable research gap these communities have
largely failed to appreciate how some of the most important media
initiatives conducted by these and other parties continue to be
interlinked. An instructive example in this regard is Jalaluddin
Haqqani’s decision to partner with Abu’l-Walid al-Masri to pro-
duce his Arabic-, Pashto-, and Urdu-language magazine Manba’
al-Jihad.82 It is true that Abu’l-Walid al-Masri was never a formal
member of al-Qa’ida, but—just like Abu Musab al-Suri—for close
to a decade he served as a key al-Qa’ida advisor, strategist, and
trainer.83 Abu’l Walid was without question an intimate associate of
al-Qa’ida’s inner network, and one can imagine how Jalaluddin and
Abu’l Walid’s experiences with Manba’ al-Jihad were shared and
recounted to those who had access to these overlapping networks.
â•… Perhaps because of their shared history, the Haqqani network
appears to have been more understanding and lenient towards al-
Qa’ida’s media operations than Mullah Omar and the Quetta Shura.
For instance, as established in Part I, it is not a coincidence that
Osama bin Laden announced al-Qa’ida’s 1998 fatwa—a declaration

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of war against the United States—and the launch of the World

Islamic Front from the al-Siddiq training camp in Khost and not in
Kandahar. Bin Laden’s 1998 “fatwa” was a defining event in the
history of al-Qa’ida and international terrorism, yet little attention
has been given to the significance of where, specifically in whose
backyard, this press conference was delivered.84
â•… More recently, Sirajuddin and Badruddin Haqqani have shown
an interest in media and both have worked hard to further develop
the Haqqani network’s capabilities in this area.85 The rise in
the€�status and prestige of Sirajuddin has been accompanied by a
similar rise in the group’s digital media profile, suggesting that the
Haq�qani network is learning from or is being advised by more
experienced media hands. The slow, but steady, emergence of
Manba’ al-Jihad as a digital production company speaks to this
trend, as does Sirajuddin’s recent question and answer session in an
Arabic-language jihadist forum (see below for more details), espe-
cially when one considers the connections that are required to facili-
tate such an event. By the authors’ assessment, Sirajuddin Haqqani
is the only known Taliban commander who has conducted this type
of exchange on an Arabic-language forum; an act which is sugges-
tively reminiscent of a question and answer session Ayman al-
Zawahiri conducted on a forum back in December 2007.86 It appears
as though al-Qa’ida-linked media professionals could be assisting
the Haqqani network in these efforts. In an interview in June 2009
Mustafa Abu al-Yazid alluded to such cooperation between the
network and the Taliban.87
â•… There are a growing number of indications that local Haqqani
partnering also extends to the media sphere and that the group is
part of an interlinked media nexus that involves Labayk media, al-
Sahab, Badr-al-Tawheed/Elif Media, and Sawt al-Islam.88 Each of
these production companies function as an independent unit, but at
the same time they also appear to be working together in what could
be characterized as a media consortium. The make-up of production
companies involved in this consortium directly reflects the major
foreign groups sheltered in North Waziristan who fight alongside
the Haqqani network in Loya Paktia. This suggests that Haqqani
network cooperation is not limited to the operational sphere, but

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that it extends to some functional areas as well. The full extent of

cooperation is not known; however, it appears that collaboration
between these entities is mostly focused on the digital realm, and
less on the production of print publications like al-Qa’ida’s Arabic-
language Vanguards of Khorasan magazine. Overlap between these
entities has been revealed through testimonials and can be seen
through their use of borrowed footage, cross-promotion, and guest
appearances, and the connections and circumstances surrounding
the martyrdom of a number of jihadist media personalities.
â•… Before examining this evidence of integration, it is useful to
establish how the media products released by these outlets are dif-
ferent and why these groups have an incentive to coordinate their
activities and assist one another. An essential starting point is the
concept of media segmentation. These entities cooperate with one
another but do not necessarily compete because their media prod-
ucts are tailored to different audiences and segmented across a
number of levels. At its most basic level, media products are seg-
mented within groups between local (or internal) and global (or
external) lines.89 In a 2010 interview Sirajuddin Haqqani explained
this concept and how it guides his group’s approach to media:
Media-wise, we work on two levels, internally and externally. On the inter-
nal level, we present our media materials in accordance with the traditions
and culture of our Afghan people. Our enemies admitted that the Islamic
Emirate has surpassed them in this field. As for the external level, the main
reason for the media’s weakness is the siege imposed on us by the interna-
tional media, which is loyal to the United States and the West. Moreover,
we have limited accesses to the necessary tools.90

â•… This quote indicates that the Haqqani network is conscious of the
different audiences it wants to affect and that it tries to tailor its
messages accordingly. As terrorism scholar Brynjar Lia has noted,
there are clear aims and benefits associated with this distinction:
“Internally, it [jihadist media] seeks to increase and strengthen
morale and provide ideological cohesion; externally, its aims are
proselytising and recruitment, as well as waging psychological
warfare.”91
â•… When viewed from a broader level, jihadist media products are
also segmented across groups. For example, while the majority of

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al-Qa’ida’s videos aim to influence “global” audiences in the Middle

East and the West, Haqqani network videos are tailored to cultivate
“local” influence with populations in Afghanistan and Pakistan.
This is not to say that Manba’ al-Jihad functions as al-Qa’ida’s local
media arm or that al-Qa’ida does not release locally oriented prod-
ucts, but rather that al-Qa’ida and the Haqqani network draw
strength from this segmentation as their products are mutually
reinforcing.92 A third layer of segmentation occurs between catego-
ries of groups (i.e., local groups, global jihadist organizations). This
dimension is illustrated by differences between the media opera-
tions of two global jihadist groups—al-Qa’ida and the IJU—who are
mainly focused on influencing “external” audiences. The IJU pri-
marily tailors many, if not most, of its messages to garner support
from German and Turkish audiences. Al-Qa’ida, on the other hand,
has released several media products tailored to influence these same
audiences, but these audiences do not represent a primary line of
effort for the group. Put more simply, the IJU is mostly focused on
the German and Turkish market. The Turkistan Islamic Party (TIP)
similarly tailors their messages to Uighur and Chinese audiences.
Segmentation across these three different levels is useful as it allows
each group to target their message and cultivate influence with the
population they most want to affect. Segmentation also reduces the
space for media competition between these actors. For these rea-
sons, it is in the interests of al-Qa’ida, the IJU, and the Haqqani
network to segment their products across the consortium.
â•… The players involved in this media nexus are conscious of the
need to separate their activities, minimize public overlap, and care-
fully manage the content of any messages that carry their brand.
Such awareness could help to explain why they do not appear in
one another’s operational videos even though these groups fight
together in Afghanistan. Doing so could distort how each militant
group and its composition and role is seen and understood. For
example, a recent video released by Manba’ al-Jihad called the
“Caravan of the Ghazis” highlights steps taken by the Haqqani net-
work to ensure their videos project a local and not a regional or
global image of the group. A significant portion of the video is
devoted to statements by a number of “martyrs.” All of the state-

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ments except three are directly recorded and delivered by each

fighter in Pashto with accents from southeastern Afghanistan. How-
ever, the last three fighters—Shamsulhaq, Abdul Rahman, and
Noorullah—seem to be foreigners because their statements are nar-
rated in voiceover. It is not known what language they speak, as
their own voices are silenced during the voiceover.93 This could be
read as an attempt by the Haqqani network to mask the involve-
ment of outsiders so they can perpetuate their image as a local actor
in Afghanistan’s conflict.
â•… Abu Laith al-Libi and a number of Arabs who operated within his
orbit in Loya Paktia and North Waziristan were among the primary
drivers of this media nexus after 9/11.94 It appears that Labayk
Media, a media organization that Abu Laith al-Libi founded, func-
tioned as an important venue for al-Qa’ida, local Taliban fighters,
and the IJU to learn from one another, develop their digital media
capabilities, and distribute images of their battle exploits around the
globe. Labayk first began releasing videos in 2005 and the group is
believed to have remained quasi-independent for some time until
integrating its operations with al-Sahab.95 Abu Laith al-Libi’s pas-
sion for media is reflected in a eulogy celebrating his death from an
airstrike conducted in North Waziristan in February 2008. Accord-
ing to this testimonial, Abu Laith al-Libi: “afforded great impor-
tance to the media and his concern with spreading the news of the
operations carried out by his brothers who were proficient in media
issues …”96 The eulogy also commented on the importance of his
media work and the broad impact it reportedly made.
â•… The media appearances of two associates of Abu Laith al-Libi—
Abu Yahya al-Libi and Abu Nasir al-Qahtani—reinforce Anne
Â�Stenersen’s findings about the centrality of Loya Paktia to al-
Qa’ida’s media operations. They also highlight an unstated qualita-
tive dimension to her analysis: that many of the videos featuring
senior al-Qa’ida commanders and ideologues have primarily been
filmed in areas where the Haqqani network exerts the most influ-
ence. After their escape from Bagram prison, Abu Yahya al-Libi and
Abu Nasir al-Qahtani filmed attacks conducted in Loya Paktia for
a number of operational videos released by al-Sahab and Labayk
Media.97 In one video released by Labayk Media in 2005, Abu Nasir

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al-Qahtani recounts and shows video of an attack that Abu Laith

al-Libi and “some brothers from the Taliban” conducted against
FOB Salerno earlier that year.98 The physical presence of senior al-
Qa’ida members and their media role in Loya Paktia is further illus-
trated by the arrest of Abu Nasir al-Qahtani by Coalition forces in
Khost in November 2006. According to Abu Yahya al-Libi, al-
Qahtani was arrested while videotaping the Khost airport.99 Other
independent news reports confirm al-Qahtani’s capture and the
recovery of a camera and a number of weapons during the raid.100
â•… Given the nature of the Haqqani network’s overall control in the
region, there is reason to believe that the attacks carried out by Abu
Laith al-Libi, Abu Yahya al-Libi, and Abu Nasir al-Qahtani inside
Loya Paktia were conducted with Haqqani approval, direct sup-
port, and/or some form of oversight. The circumstances surround-
ing the death of Omar Haqqani, the son of Jalaluddin and brother
of Sirajuddin, in Khost even suggest that the Haqqani network’s
and al-Qa’ida’s media operations in Loya Paktia are integrated at
the tactical level.101 As mentioned previously, Omar was killed
alongside veteran al-Qa’ida commander Abu-Hasan al-Sa’idi.
According to local accounts, Omar was videotaping the operation
when he died.102 What remains unclear is for which group the
younger Haqqani was filming and who would have access to his
material. Additional evidence explored below sheds light on this
issue and other areas of media collaboration between the Haqqani
network, al-Qa’ida, and other foreign groups.
â•… The Labayk videos featuring Abu Yahya al-Libi and al-Qahtani
also provide a useful lens to understand how local footage shot in
Loya Paktia is valuable for recruitment and even touches those con-
victed in international terrorism plots.103 One of the many observers
of Labayk videos was Hammad Khürshid, a young Danish citizen
of Pakistani origin who was convicted in October 2008 of plotting
to conduct a terror attack in Denmark using explosives.104 Moti-
vated by a desire to fight in Afghanistan, Khürshid left Denmark in
2007 and eventually made his way to an al-Qa’ida training camp in
North Waziristan where he learned how to make explosives and is
believed to have met Abu Nasir al-Qahtani and Abu Ubaydah al-
Masri.105 Police surveillance of Khürshid’s apartment indicates that

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he and a co-conspirator watched “suicide bomber martyr videos,

footage of a decapitation and other seditious material” to keep
themselves occupied.106 According to Danish investigators and
notes taken at the court trial, while watching a clip of the four
Bagram escapees Khürshid described al-Qahtani, who he saw in the
video, as a very close friend.107 Labayk media had produced the
video. Captured al-Qa’ida operative Bryant Neal Vinas had linked
in with the same group of trainers during his time in North
Waziristan and had a similar experience. Vinas even appeared in an
al-Qa’ida video with the group’s ideologue Abu Yahya al-Libi.108
The case of Hammad Khürshid indicates the value of al-Qa’ida’s
operational videos and how they can be used not only to recruit,
but also to sustain the commitment of aspiring jihadis who aim to
attack targets in the West.

Borrowed Footage and Overlapping Attack Claims

The fact that media outlets run by al-Qa’ida, the IJU, and the
Haqqani network have used the same video footage suggests that
these groups are directly collaborating, or are at least leveraging
one another’s work. For example, a Labayk Media photo album
released in December 2006 featured material borrowed from an al-
Sahab film distributed several months prior.109 Einar Wigen discov-
ered similar overlap between the IJU and the Haqqani network. In
its claim of responsibility for a suicide attack in Khost on 3 March
2008 the Haqqani network used the same footage of the event as the
IJU.110 However, the footage shown on the Haqqani DVD was
branded by its own media outlet—Manba’ al-Jihad—and not by the
IJU’s media production company Badr al-Tawheed.111 Hanna Rogan
has highlighted the implication of this type of behavior, noting that
“the use of the same footage in productions by Labbayk and as-Sahab
… indicates a certain interaction between the two media founda-
tions, despite their proclaimed distinctiveness.”112 The Haqqani–IJU
example also illustrates the sophistication of the media consorti-
um’s operations, and specifically, how local and global actors are
leveraging the same attack to build cachet with different audiences.
Take, for instance, the fact that both the IJU and the Haqqani net-

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work used different names for the suicide bomber who conducted
the 3 March attack. In material distributed on the Internet, the IJU
identified the bomber as a German-Turk, while Sirajuddin Haqqani
told a Pakistani newspaper that the bomber was named Abdullah
and was a local resident of Khost.113 By acting in this way, both
groups appealed to their primary support base and were able to
portray the same attack to different audiences as being both local
and global. It is as though the attack occurred twice.

Cross-Promotion and Guest Appearances

A more clear and visible indicator of media collaboration among

al-Qa’ida, the IJU, the Pakistani Taliban, and the Haqqani network
is cross-promotion.114 While each of these organizations maintains
their own digital media outlets, a number of guest interviews indi-
cate that al-Sahab, Labayk media, and Badr-al-Tawheed/Elif Media
operate in close proximity to one another and are leveraging each
other’s brands. This activity revolves around a number of key com-
manders and strategists who appear in videos produced both by
their respective organizations and by other aligned groups. For
example, on an internal level, al-Qa’ida members Abu Laith al-Libi,
Abu Yahya al-Libi, and Abu Nasir al-Qahtani have been featured
prominently in a number of Labayk and al-Sahab media produc-
tions.115 Abu Yahya al-Libi’s appearance in a May 2009 IJU video,
which also featured the IJU’s leader, is one example of how cross-
promotion works external to al-Qa’ida.116 The separate appearances
of Mullah Dadullah, Hafiz Gul Bahadur, and Hakimullah Mehsud
in al-Sahab videos illustrates the dual nature of this dynamic and
the use of al-Qa’ida’s media platform to promote Afghan and
Â�Pakistani Taliban leaders. Al-Sahab’s video interview with Haqqani
subcommander Mullah Sangeen suggests that the Haqqani network
also has access to and is benefiting from al-Qa’ida’s media exper-
tise. When viewed in isolation these guest interviews are not that
revealing, but when looked at collectively they demonstrate the
existence of an interlinked media web, which is comprised of the
major local and foreign groups that are based in North Waziristan
and are operationally active with the Haqqani network in Loya

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Paktia. Due to this it can reasonably be assumed that North

Waziristan functions as the primary staging ground and facilitation
point for this type of activity. As indicated above and below, media
collaboration between these groups is not limited to cross-promo-
tion but also includes less visible forms of assistance such as the
sharing of resources and technical expertise.

Martyrdom Biographies and Connections

of Jihadist Media Personalities

The network associated with the December 2009 suicide attack

against FOB Chapman in Khost, which killed seven CIA officers,
also speaks to the broader nature of the Haqqani network’s
media€ties and the existence of an integrated media syndicate in
Wazir�istan.117 It also solidifies the close personal and operational
ties between the Haqqani network, al-Qa’ida, and those who lead
and continue to develop the TTP. The individual who conducted
the attack, Humam Khalil Abu-Mulal al-Balawi (also known as Abu
Dujanah al-Khorasani), was an influential writer on a prominent
Arabic-language jihadist forum (al-Hesbah) who was recruited and
sent by Jordanian and US intelligence agents to the FATA to collect
intelligence on Ayman al-Zawahiri.118 Instead of cooperating with
these authorities, Abu Dujanah joined forces with the TTP and al-
Qa’ida and turned on his intelligence contacts.119 What was most
revealing about the attack was which organization claimed respon-
sibility for it, where it occurred, and the media activity that tran-
spired afterword. The first organization to celebrate the attack
publicly was al-Qa’ida, which noted in its media release that the
“the appropriate media entity will publish his [the suicide bomb-
er’s] story … in a proper production.”120 This statement suggests
that al-Qa’ida had prior knowledge of the attack and that the TTP
was soon planning to release a video about the incident.121 Not long
after, the TTP formally claimed responsibility for the attack through
a series of videos that featured al-Balawi and TTP leader Hakimullah
Mehsud.122 The Haqqani network remained silent on this issue, but
according to Michael Scheuer, “There is no way this operation
would have occurred in Khost without the knowledge and active
support of Jalaluddin Haqqani and/or his son.”123

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â•… Direct Haqqani network ties to al-Balawi are hard to prove and
an account told by Joby Warrick suggests that Sirajuddin Haqqani
refused to meet with him due to his concerns that the Jordanian was
a spy.124 While this might be the case, other information illustrates
that Haqqani network leaders were one person removed from a
network of Arab foreign fighters and media operators linked to the
Jordanian suicide bomber, suggesting that Sirajuddin’s group was
tied to the attack—or at least had knowledge of it. The centerpiece
to this story involves an interview that Sirajuddin Haqqani con-
ducted with al-Balagh media correspondent Abu-Dujanah al-
San’ani (also known as Mohammed Naqaa al-Hamli) in April
2010.125 Less than one month after conducting the interview, that
very same correspondent was killed in North Waziristan while
making a suicide bomb for himself.126 Similar to the Jordanian
Â�suicide bomber, al-Hamali “was also a prolific contributor to
�web-based jihadist social networking forums, particularly the
Â�Falluja Islamic Network.”127 Even more revealing is the death and
background of another jihadist writer from Yemen, Saddam
�Hussein al-Hussami (also known as Ghazwan al-Yemeni), who
had€ties to al-Balawi and al-Hamali and who was also killed in
North Waziristan, albeit several months earlier.128 An analysis of
al-Hussami’s online activity and the jihadist community’s response
to his death by Evan Kohlmann is worth quoting at length:
In early October 2009, al-Yemeni [al-Hussami] had posted a flurry of
requests via the chat forum on behalf of “the Jalaluddin Haqqani Organiza-
tion in the Shadow of the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan.” In one such
message, he appealed, “we, your brothers from the Jalaluddin Haqqani
Organization, have encountered some problems in regards to the subjects
Tawheed and Aqeedah, and we want the email or website of the renowned
shaykhs in this field …”129

â•… Other analysis by Kohlmann confirms that al-Balawi, al-Hamali,

and al-Hussami all knew one another and that al-Hussami had been
trained by al-Qa’ida.130 This suggests that the Haqqani network was
not only connected to this group, but that it was working directly
with it.
â•… While the media connections between the Haqqani network, TTP,
al-Qa’ida, and other groups allows these entities to share and/or

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leverage resources, this type of cooperation also poses risks for

these groups as it illustrates how vulnerable media personnel could
be to precise counterterrorism measures, and the potential cascad-
ing effects that could be achieved by targeting them.131 Shared reli-
ance on similar technicians or media resources suggests that recent
calls made by Sirajuddin for media support might not be limited to
the Haqqani network alone and could be a signal of more pervasive
media problems. A plea made by Sirajuddin in April 2010 on an
Arabic-language forum is illustrative:
I would like to appeal to our Muslim brothers, in particular to the scholars,
intellectuals, writers, businessmen, experts, youth, and media professionals
to help us in our cause and jihad. This help could be by issuing fatwas,
preparing fighters … or by providing media expertise through TV satellite
channels, Islamic news network websites on the Internet, newspapers and
magazines, or by any possible means.132

â•… Due to the Haqqani network’s integration with al-Qa’ida on

the€battlefields of southeastern Afghanistan one could interpret
Sirajuddin’s call as also being a plea for media assistance from the
latter group. Given al-Qa’ida’s strong reliance on media (and it
being an area where the group has usually been strong) such an
admission would likely be more embarrassing for the group. It
would also be an open indication that the group faced deep prob-
lems at the core of its capabilities. Even if this is not the case,
Â�Sirajuddin’s statement establishes that his group faces a shortage of
media equipment and experts which al-Qa’ida, the TTP, the IJU, or
its other militant partners have not been able to fill. These dynamics
remind of us of the blending of media capabilities between and
across groups and the blurring of functional boundaries between
militant groups based in North Waziristan.

“Brotherhood” and Safe haven

Another important benefit that the Haqqani network provides al-
Qa’ida members and other foreign fighters is safe haven. Elements
of the Pakistani state continue to protect the Haqqani family today
because the Haqqani network is “good” Taliban (i.e., they do not
attack the Pakistani state) and still holds value as a strategic asset

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and/or hedge. The central problem with Pakistan’s calculus, how-

ever, is that it assumes the Haqqani network is limited to acting in
a local capacity across the border in Afghanistan and that its activ-
ity can be neatly separated from a number of local and global jihad-
ist groups, such as the TTP and al-Qa’ida, that are waging war
against Pakistan and the United States. The trouble, as established
in Part I, is that the Haqqani network has been intertwined with
and has evolved alongside many of these entities for the past two
decades.133 Its ties are so deep that today the Haqqani network func-
tions as a central nexus between them and is helping to facilitate
their activity and survival.134 It is not an accident that mid- and
senior-level al-Qa’ida commanders are killed alongside Sirajuddin
Haqqani’s brothers in both Afghanistan and Pakistan.135 Nor is it an
accident that the Haqqani network has shared criminal infrastruc-
ture with the TTP.136 David Rohde’s account of the overlap between
the Haqqani network and these other actors in North Waziristan is
particularly revealing:137
In terms of militancy, my [Haqqani network] guards took turns taking
bomb making classes from foreign militants about how to make roadside
bombs that would kill Afghan, American and NATO soldiers in Afghanistan.
I also met and lived with suicide bombers who were coming out of local
[Pakistani] religious schools known as madrases [sic], and clearly there was
a lot of ideological indoctrination going on in local schools, and there were
also foreign militants present even walking around in the bazaars in the
local towns very confident.

â•… One effect of Pakistan’s support for the Haqqani network, given
this overlap, is that ISI protection indirectly contributes to the secu-
rity of groups like al-Qa’ida, the IJU, ETIM/Turkistan Islamic Party,
and the TTP.138 Haqqani sheltering of foreign fighters and al-Qa’ida
personalities is historic, as during the anti-Soviet jihad Jalaluddin
Haqqani provided residences in Miranshah, and likely in Peshawar,
to a number of Arab war volunteers who would later play leading
roles in al-Qa’ida.139 According to Abu’l Walid, in the late 1980s the
Arabs had two main houses in Miranshah, at least one of which was
established by Jalaluddin. This guesthouse was located next to a
“big hospital” and close to Jalaluddin’s primary residence.140 In
April 1986, Abd al-Rahman and Abu Ubaydah attended a meeting

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at the guesthouse to plan operational matters as they were inter-

ested in “forming a group to attack the airport in Khowst.”141 Abu’l-
Walid al-Masri also spent a significant amount of time there and
described how the house functioned as a “workshop for mechanical
and electrical works” to develop and modify weapons, including
rockets.142 A documented exchange between Abu’l Walid and
�Jalaluddin in the spring of 1988 is even more revealing, as it illus-
trates the elder Haqqani’s clear willingness to provide additional
facilities for the Arabs even when the jihad was drawing to a close
and there was discussion of a settlement. It also indicates Jalaluddin’s
future operational plans to cooperate with Abu-‘Abdallah, Osama
Bin Ladin’s nom de guerre, to reclaim the city of Khost.143
Abu’l Walid: What is the story with the settlement?
[J.] Haqqani: Failing, so far, each party is adamant about their opinion
regarding the upcoming new government in Kabul.
Abu’l Walid: What about bringing our families to live in Miranshah after
the settlement; so we can participate in Jihad?
[J.] Haqqani: We will purchase the land adjacent to Manba’ Al-Jihad School
… you agree and decide on your needs as well as the number of families
coming.*
Abu’l Walid: Does your next plan for Khowst include the seizure of Torgar
Mountain?
[J.] Haqqani: We have a plan to attack Torgar in Ramadan and we will
discuss that with Abu-‘Abdallah [Osama Bin Laden]; so what do you
think?

â•… It is also believed that Jalaluddin was one of the key organizers
of al-Qa’ida’s escape from Afghanistan after the toppling of the
Taliban and the events at Tora Bora.144 Indeed, “Ayman al-Zawahiri’s
wife was taking refuge in a Haqqani-owned building on the Afghan
side of the border when she was killed by a U.S. airstrike in late
2001.”145 Also well established is the fact that the Haqqani organiza-
tion, along with other local partners, helped al-Qa’ida to establish
a€safe haven in Pakistan’s tribal areas.146 Some have even identi-
fied€Jalaluddin Haqqani as the key organizer.147 Given this history,

*╇The Manba’ al-Jihad school is likely Haqqani’s Manba’ ‘Ulum madrassa.

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it should not come as a surprise that the Haqqani network con�

tinues to serve as an important protector of al-Qa’ida, IJU, IMU, and
a number of smaller jihadist groups with which it operates in
Afghanistan.148
â•… It is revealing that several al-Qa’ida leaders and Haqqani family
members have been killed alongside one another in drone attacks
conducted in North Waziristan. For example, Abu Haris—al-
Qa’ida’s operations chief in Pakistan—and three other al-Qa’ida
fighters and several Haqqani family members were reportedly
killed in a drone attack against the Haqqani-controlled Manba’
‘Ulum madrasa on 8 September 2008.149 A document captured in
Afghanistan in 2005 provides a very practical example of how the
Haqqani network shelters a mix of foreign fighters and Pakistani
militants.150
Mullah Abdullah is from Logar and has 30 fighters of different nationali-
ties: Afghans; Uzbeks; Chinese; Chechens; and two Arabs. They’ve received
military training from the training camp … It is managed by Mullah
Dawood from Logar, and an Arab is the head of this camp. Under the
supervisions of Mullah Dawood, they arrived in Miran Shah after spending
a night at a Madrassa in the headquarters of Haqqani. Then, under the
guidance of Mullah Dawood, they entered the south of Afghanistan via
Babrak checkpoint. Because of a military clash with Afghan forces as they
were crossing the border, three Pakistanis were injured and one was killed.
After the battle only a limited number of people entered Afghanistan, and
others returned to Miran Shah.

â•… Additional revelation of these close ties also comes from Sirajuddin
Haqqani himself. During an interview with an NBC journalist in
2008 Sirajuddin boasted that, unlike Afghan President Hamid
�Karzai, the Arab and other foreign groups operating alongside him
were “under his control.”151 A recent statement by al-Qa’ida leader
Mustafa Abu al-Yazid confirms Sirajuddin’s claim. Haqqani net-
work protection of al-Qa’ida leaders is not just historic, it is also
being extended to the younger generation of al-Qa’ida fighters as
well; individuals and groups who are likely to play an important
role for al-Qa’ida and other like-minded groups in the future. For
example, it is believed that before his death German-Moroccan al-
Qa’ida fighter Bekkay Harrach lived under the protection of

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�
Sirajuddin Haqqani in North Waziristan.152 Members of the IJU
are€believed to enjoy similar forms of protection, but at some cost.
German scholar Guido Steinberg suggests that to maintain their
presence in Mir Ali, North Waziristan, the IJU “had to enter into an
alliance with the Haqqani network.”153 Since the late 1990s members
of TIP have been present and had infrastructure in territory con-
trolled by Haqqani, and it is likely that the bonds of brotherhood
between these organizations are just as strong today.154 The death
of Abdul Haq al-Turkistani, the leader of TIP, in a recent drone
strike in North Waziristan is an important indication that this might
be the case.155

Haqqani Network Incentives and Benefits to Maintain

their Global Value Proposition
The Haqqani network receives a number of important benefits in
exchange for the value it provides to foreign fighters and global
jihadist groups. Broadly, the Haqqani network has an incentive to
foster its ties to international jihadis and continue providing the
services explored above because such connections diversify the
resource mobilization networks to which the Haqqanis have access.
The Haqqani network can then use these other networks to aug-
ment its capabilities and sustain its operations over the long term,
as diversification makes the organization less susceptible to a single
point of failure. In that sense, access to different resource streams
contributes to the Haqqani network’s resiliency and it can be used
as a point of leverage over other actors, such as the ISI, upon which
the Haqqani network also relies. The most important functional
benefits that the Haqqani network derives from access to global
jihadist resource mobilization networks include: financing, added
manpower, access to technological innovations and technical
experts, and organizational prestige.

Financing
Little public information exists about the financial relationship
between the Haqqani network and global jihadist groups, specifi-
cally al-Qa’ida. While there is no “smoking gun” that al-Qa’ida has

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directly funded the Haqqani network, there is evidence that Osama

bin Laden and al-Qa’ida have provided other critical forms of assis-
tance to the Haqqani network, as well as facilitated financial contri-
butions to the Afghan group. In most cases, this assistance took the
form of services which held monetary value. Perhaps the best
example is Bin Laden’s provision of heavy-construction equipment
during the anti-Soviet jihad to help Jalaluddin Haqqani build his
elaborate headquarters at Zhawara and fortify other fighting posi-
tions in Khost.156 As discussed in Part I, funds from al-Qa’ida con-
tinued to flow into Afghanistan throughout the 1990s, albeit at
lower and sometimes frustrating levels given al-Qa’ida’s presence
in Sudan.157 It is well known that al-Qa’ida bankrolled a number of
jihadist training camps that operated in Khost with some form of
Haqqani oversight.158 Jalaluddin Haqqani likely would not have
allowed al-Qa’ida to operate its camps in his control zones unless
he received something in return. Although unproven, Steve Coll
has speculated that Haqqani financially supported some of al-
Qa’ida’s training camps.159 At a minimum, Jalaluddin Haqqani
likely leveraged the trainers and recruits al-Qa’ida supplied at these
camps to develop his organization’s capabilities, broaden his global
fundraising ties, and curry favor with anti-Kashmir jihadist groups
and Pakistan’s ISI who were also tied to several of these camps.
â•… Funding from state sources dropped off precipitously at the end
of the anti-Soviet jihad, making it likely that it was during the post-
1989 period when donations from private sources and their busi-
ness enterprises became all that more valuable to the Haqqani
family.160 Ever since the late 1970s Jalaluddin Haqqani has had
strong ties to leaders and patrons in the Gulf, and he made numer-
ous trips there before, during, and after the anti-Soviet jihad to raise
funds. Some of these trips were for diplomatic and religious pur-
poses (i.e., to attend the Hajj) but others had a fundraising compo-
nent, and often the purposes of these trips blended together.
According to Steve Coll, while in Saudi Arabia to participate in the
Hajj Haqqani set up tents in Mecca to fundraise among those there
for the pilgrimage.161 Jalaluddin expressed his appreciation for Gulf
support during a trip to the United Arab Emirates in 1991, where
he remarked that his “brothers in the Gulf were the best help to the
Mujahedeen in terms of money, supplies and men as well.”162

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â•… To solicit and collect private donations in the region Jalaluddin

Haqqani established a number of offices and facilitators based in
the Gulf. Those who wanted to contribute could either reach out to
someone in the network or call Haqqani fundraisers located in
Saudi Arabia (Riyadh) or the United Arab Emirates (Abu Dhabi,
Al-Aiyn, Al-Sharqa, Dubai, Bada Zayed) whose numbers were
openly published in every Arabic-language issue of Manba’ al-
Jihad.163 These representatives remained active until at least the
early 1990s. This is not to suggest that all private donors who con-
tributed money to the Haqqani enterprise also donated money to
al-Qa’ida, although it is likely that some did, or that it was only
local Arabs who provided funds through these channels.164 That
being said, given the depth of ties and the historical linkages
between the Haqqani network and al-Qa’ida, it is not unreasonable
to suspect that the former leveraged and benefited from al-Qa’ida’s
fundraising apparatus and list of wealthy Gulf contacts.
â•… A Harmony document summarizing the interrogations of several
Arabs detained by al-Qa’ida and the Taliban on suspicions that they
were spying for foreign intelligence services during the late 1990s
makes this overlap more clear. The document seems to indicate that
a number of individuals who came to join al-Qa’ida during the late
1990s also collected funds for the Haqqani network from private
donors in the United Arab Emirates. In an interview conducted
after his release, one of those detained—Muhammad al-Bayid, who
went by the alias Abu al-Mubtassim (a name which appears in the
captured document)—repudiated the charges against him and
stated that al-Qa’ida members Saif al-Adel, Abu Hafs al-Masri, and
Abu Jandal interrogated him in secret prisons in Kandahar.165 It was
only after Jalaluddin Haqqani and Abu Hareth al-Urdani inter-
vened that Mullah Omar pardoned Abu Mubtassim and let him
go.166 In a recent memoir Abu Jandal corroborated Abu Mubtassim’s
account and provided his own take on this episode.167 Two different
excerpts from the captured document help situate this overlap and
are worth quoting at length:
Interrogation of Abu Talha168
Question: Who are the Afghans that you know and you met previously?

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Answer: Jalal-al-Din Haqqani whom I met in the Emirates and his brother
Khalil [Haqqani].
Question: What happened (illegible) and what was your role in the money
paid to you?
Answer: I swear by Allah that I did not take any money from the Intelli-
gence. But when I went to Pakistan I had a paper from Haqqani, then he
sent Abu al-Harith [al-Urduni] the Jordanian because (illegible). He stayed
at Haqqani’s home. He wrote me a note, and Abu al-Harith [al-Urduni] met
with Rustum Shah the [Pakistan] Minister of Interior in Islamabad.
In the morning, Abu al-Harith came to me accompanied by Haqqani’s son
whose name is Nasir[uddin], who is studying in Miram Shah (illegible),
and I went to Towr Kham, and later to Peshawar, [where] I stayed at Abu
Talha’s (al-Assal) house.

Interrogation of Unidentified Individual169

Question: Who are the Afghans that you know and that you dealt with in
the past?
Answer: I was in the Emirates in touch with the office of Haqqani and I sent
the youth through them, I also collected money for them, and Jalal-al-Din
Haqqani knows me when I was in the Emirates with him and Khost and
Gardiz [sic].

â•…Evidence presented in the trial United State of America vs Enaam

M. Arnaout also highlights how the Benevolence International
Foundation (BIF)—an Islamic charity that provided material sup-
port to al-Qa’ida and Gulbuddin Hekmatyar throughout the
1990s—also provided funds and materiel to Jalaluddin Haqqani’s
parent organization (Hezb-e-Islami) and the individual to whom he
long reported (Yunis Khalis).170 It is also worth mentioning that the
chief executive of BIF—Enaam Arnaout—had personal letters from
both Jalaluddin Haqqani and Yunis Khalis in his possession.171
â•… More recent sources of information indicate that private financial
contributions from the Gulf and al-Qa’ida still help to sustain
the€Haqqani organization. The “old” financial network built by
Jalaluddin at the beginning of the anti-Soviet jihad appears to form
the foundation for these donations. According to Gretchen Peters,
“sources close to the Haqqani family name Abdullah Tanai, a com-
mander based in Miram Shah, as the man responsible for distribut-
ing cash coming through the Hawala network from the Gulf among

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the commanders.”172 Comments recently made by one of these com-

manders is revealing in that he believed that his monthly operating
expenses came from “Gulf countries, especially Saudi Arabia … and
from the ISI.”173 While it is difficult to corroborate this commander’s
claim, an estimate provided by Afghanistan’s financial intelligence
unit placed the value of private Saudi donor contributions to the
Taliban at upwards of US$1 billion over the last four years.174
â•… Some within the US government dispute that these are dona-
tions,€arguing that it is instead laundered money from organized
crime.175 While speculative, the perception of a local politician from
Pakistan’s Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa Province about Haqqani network
funding is just as revealing. When asked by a PBS journalist where
Jalaluddin Haqqani received his money, Afrasiab Khattak replied:
“I think it is Middle East money that is still coming in. He has very
strong Arab connections. Supporters of al Qaeda think that they can
bleed Americans in Afghanistan. And they think they can create a
new front for the United States in [the] tribal areas. So they are
investing money in this fighting.”176 Less speculative and more
Â�concrete is the US government’s recent financial blacklisting of
Nasiruddin Haqqani, the son of Jalaluddin who is referenced in the
al-Qa’ida interrogation document above, on 22 July 2010. According
to the US Treasury Department, from mid-2007 Nasiruddin
Haqqani “reportedly received funding from donations from the
Gulf region, drug trafficking, and payments from al-Qa’ida.”177
Nasiruddin’s uncle and Jalaluddin’s brother, Khalil al-Rahman
Haqqani, was similarly designated on 9 February 2011 for his role
in Haqqani financing and links with al-Qa’ida.178 These designations
confirm Nasiruddin’s and Khalil’s important role in facilitating
these payments and the enduring reach of the Haqqani network’s
fundraising machine to private donors in the Gulf. The more recent
designations of Fazl Rabbi and Ahmad Jan Wazir further refine this
picture, which establishes yet another realm where al-Qa’ida and
Haqqani network operations appear to still overlap.179

Ideologically Motivated Personnel and Knowledge

and Technology Transfer
As has been shown, Jalaluddin Haqqani recognized the benefits of
Arab and other foreign volunteers and how they could be used to

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strengthen his military campaign years before other Afghan com-

manders. Initially, Arab connections were viewed as a source of
funding, but after Arab youth arrived Jalaluddin distinguished
himself by providing them with operational opportunities and
access to his facilities.180 In doing so, Jalaluddin further integrated
Arab and other foreign fighters into the kinetic and logistical infra-
structure of the war. The legacy of this collaboration has been
enduring, and for the past twenty-five years the Haqqani network
has arguably been the most important local actor facilitating this
process.181 In return for leaving its doors open across multiple dec-
ades, the Haqqani network has received and benefited from addi-
tional resources and committed manpower, as well as the networks
and technical skills that these foreign fighters have to offer. For the
Haqqani network, the cost of this added personnel has been low,
given that foreign fighters were historically supported by Islamic
relief organizations and today many are believed to be self-
financed, or at least partially so.182 Put simply, foreign fighters func-
tion as personnel, resource, and technological force multipliers,
inputs which require little financial investment from the Haqqani
network and help the organization to wage a more effective and
deadly campaign.
â•… During the late 1980s and early 1990s the number of foreign war
volunteers in Afghanistan was “never sufficient to swing the mili-
tary balance,” but there was still something qualitatively different
about the Arabs and other foreigners who wanted to fight.183 As
noted by Anthony Davis and many others, “Arab and Sudanese
fighters often fought with great, even suicidal, courage.”184 The
same can be said about the ideological commitment of foreign vol-
unteers who fight alongside the Haqqanis and their partners in
Loya Paktia today. It is significant that some of the suicide bombers
who participate in high-profile attacks in Loya Paktia are foreign
war volunteers. The case of Cüneyt Çiftçi—discussed above—is
particularly illustrative, as the benefit the Haqqani network derived
from this attack can be seen in a long Taliban video that celebrated
the operation and the last moments of his life. After seven years of
silence, Jalaluddin Haqqani made a rare appearance to praise the
attack, stating that: “With God’s help, the United States will leave
Afghanistan with their heads hung in shame.”185

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â•… A Haqqani commander interviewed by Der Spiegel also reflected

on the value of foreign fighters and how they assist his group in
other operational areas. Sirajuddin Haqqani had reportedly been so
impressed by German al-Qa’ida operative Bekkay Harrach’s bomb-
making skills and ability to draw up precise attack plans that
�Harrach, before his death in May 2010, is believed to have served as
an advisor to the group.186 Those foreign fighters who fall into the
Haqqani network’s orbit and return home are also likely of use to
the Haqqanis, as they can solicit donations, distribute media prod-
ucts, and help other foreign recruits make their way to North
Waziristan.
â•… Positioned at the nexus of several foreign fighter mobilizations,
the Haqqani network has historically been able to capitalize on the
ideas, technology, and skills—such as digital editing experience—
that these personnel flows have to offer. The most significant—and
lethal—tactical innovations in Afghanistan since 2001 have been the
proliferation of suicide attacks and the use of IEDs across the coun-
try. As some have noted, al-Qa’ida and its close allies are believed to
have helped to introduce these tactics to the Afghan theater.187 Given
its history of close ties and operational collaboration, the Haqqani
network and a variety of other Afghan Taliban commanders, such as
Mullah and Mansour Dadullah, were well positioned to employ
these tactics and take advantage of related technological innova-
tions.188 One account suggests that in 2004 Mullah Dadullah sent a
team to Iraq to learn from Abu Musab al-Zaraqawi and al-Qa’ida in
Iraq.189 Iraqi groups also helped a local Taliban commander in Khost,
Hamza Sangari, learn how to make shaped charges.190
â•… Afghanistan’s first indigenous suicide bomber—Hafez Abdallah—
reportedly hailed from the region of Khost, suggesting that the indi-
vidual responsible for the January 2004 attack in Kabul could have
been recruited and supported by the Haqqani network.191 Several
years later, in September 2006, “a suicide bomber sent by the
Haqqani network succeeded in killing the hightest-ranking Afghan
official [at the time] … Paktia’s governor Hakim Taniwal.”192 The
fact that the Haqqani network has emerged as the entity most often
responsible for suicide and complex attacks in Kabul lends further
credence to this potential linkage. It is also worth noting that a UN

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study on suicide attacks conducted in Afghanistan from 2001 to

2007 found that “over 80% of suicide attackers pass through recruit-
ment, training facilities or safe houses in North or South Waziristan
en route to their targets inside Afghanistan.”193 This finding is sig-
nificant when one considers the organizational importance and
centrality of the Haqqani network in North Waziristan and reports
about the group’s ties with al-Qa’ida and Pakistani Taliban suicide
trainers, such as Qari Hussain Mehsud (before his death).194 The
Haqqani network’s nexus position helps to ensure that the group
will continue to be in a position to leverage new technologies, tacti-
cal innovations, and the trainers who help deploy them.

Prestige and Ability to Make a Broader Impact

Although currently in decline, al-Qa’ida remains the vanguard of

the global jihadist movement, and association with the group—and
several other groups that fall within its orbit in North Waziristan—
bolsters the Haqqani network’s jihadist credentials, and its reputa-
tion and standing—at least within the jihadist community. Through
local partnering and providing back-end support the Haqqani net-
work knows that their organization has directly contributed—over
multiple decades—to the development and endurance of al-Qa’ida
and its global jihad. The list of foreign fighters who fought with the
Haqqani network reads like a “who’s who” of al-Qa’ida and its
major affiliates, and the international terrorist plots that link back
to North Waziristan and Haqqani-associated training camps/infra-
structure in Khost is equally revealing. By acting as a silent local
partner, the Haqqani network has been able to drive and shape
world events indirectly, and to contribute to a cause which is
broader than its fight in Afghanistan.

Conclusion
The findings from this and the previous two chapters highlight a
pattern of Haqqani network behavior that is in historical continuity
with Part I of this book. This indicates that the Haqqani network
cannot just be seen as a local actor that is only preoccupied with

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local concerns. The group’s facilitation and enabling role of al-

Qa’ida and other global jihadist groups is broader and more impor-
tant than previously understood; it has also been a driving force for
the group since the 1990s.
â•… A review of the Haqqani network’s value proposition also pro-
vides important insights into the logic behind the Haqqani network
(and its nexus position) and the incentives of various actors, specifi-
cally detailing how and in which ways they cooperate with the
group. Assessments of the Haqqani network usually focus on the
military utility of the group, but as the chapters in this part of the
book show, there are other important ways (i.e., by serving as an
“office,” maintaining an accessible platform for violence, etc.)
through which the group is able to provide value to other actors and
enhance their local standing. While some of the Haqqani network’s
local, regional, and global partners have different and conflicting
interests, it appears that all of them have an interest in maintaining
the Haqqanis’ nexus position due to the benefits they receive.
â•… Whether the Haqqani network will modify its behavior and/or
continue to find value in its relationship with al-Qa’ida and the
IJU€(or their potential replacements) in the future remains an
open€question. The Haqqani network could find it in its interest to
disengage from al-Qa’ida, as the costs for hosting al-Qa’ida and
other jihadis in the 1990s were much lower, and their position in
Afghanistan much stronger and relatively assured, than the reality
they face in the next several years. Yet it is not known if these
dynamics will be enough to sway the Haqqani network or if the
sense of shared suffering and the group’s deep history with al-
Qa’ida will be a stronger pull and will help to ensure that the group
will continue to play a behind-the-scenes facilitation role for those
who aim to attack the United States and its allies.

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 7

ENTANGLEMENTS AND MANAGEMENT

OF THE HAQQANIS’ NEXUS POSITION

The Haqqani network is often described as the most lethal insur-

gent actor operating in Afghanistan today, and most analyses of
the group point to this characteristic and the group’s resiliency as
indications of its sophistication and strength. While the Haqqani
network’s operational prowess is impressive and not in dispute,
the real sophistication and endurance of the Haqqanis lies in the
group’s historic ability to manage its interests and maintain the
nexus position upon which its military effectiveness is built. That
the Haqqani network has proven able to provide value to local,
regional, and global actors while simultaneously incorporating
inputs from each actor group into a combined system of violence
which, at least in theory, has been able to keep the interests of each
segmented over time, is no small management feat. To that end,
this chapter provides a brief overview of how the Haqqani net-
work has been able to manage and maintain its nexus position
since 2001 through careful conflict framing and by pursuing a non-
threatening approach with key actors that often have varied and
conflicting interests. In addition, this chapter explores some of the
management challenges the Haqqani network confronts. It also
provides unique insights into redline areas that pose risks for the
group and illustrates how the Haqqani network’s close ties to

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actors like the TTP and al-Qa’ida helps to facilitate other forms of
militancy.

Strategy and Awareness of the Tension Inherent to its

Nexus Position
The Haqqani network has maintained its nexus position over time
by pursuing a strategy of extreme pragmatism. Due to the complex-
ity of Afghanistan’s conflict environment most militant groups are
pragmatic actors, but given its nexus position and the various inter-
ests it must consider the Haqqani network needs to be even more
judicious in how it evaluates the practical consequences of its
actions. The success of such an approach is predicated on the
Haqqani network’s awareness of its position and the structural
necessities, or internal and external constraints, which limit its pub-
lic role and pursuit of power.1 As illustrated in other chapters, the
Haqqani network has limited political goals and it has a history of
subordinating itself to other entities. Jalaluddin Haqqani’s relation-
ship with Hizb-e-Islami (Khalis) and the Taliban prior to 9/11 are
indicative of the group’s constrained approach, as is the Haqqani
network’s public deferment to the Afghan Taliban today. Unlike
many other militant groups, the Haqqani network has little interest
in nationally governing Afghanistan and seeks instead to maintain
its autonomy, control, and influence locally in Loya Paktia and
North Waziristan, while also enabling other entities that aim to
spread jihad elsewhere. The Haqqani network appears confident in
its capabilities and standing and the group is not overly concerned
with receiving public recognition for its actions. The group’s con-
strained approach also helps to explain why its central role in the
development of al-Qa’ida and the emergence of global jihad has
historically been underappreciated.

Careful Conflict Framing and Knowledge of Operational Redlines

Over the course of three decades the Haqqani network has been
able to tell its own story and define its own role as a conflict actor.
To limit the perception of its broad role and impact, the Haqqani

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network consciously portrays itself as a local actor preoccupied

with local concerns. The group has been able to do so through a
deceptive and segmented strategic communications campaign that
masks the variety and depth of the relations it has with a broad mix
of jihadist actors. This has allowed the Haqqani network to tailor its
messages to different audiences. Perhaps the best historical exam-
ple of this is the Haqqanis’ treatment of the role of the Arabs in the
siege and capture of Khost garrison in 1991. In the Pashto- and
Urdu-language versions of Manba’/Nusrat al-Jihad the role of the
Arabs is either ignored or specifically denied, while it is celebrated
in the Arabic-language versions of the same magazine. Segmenta-
tion proved useful to the Haqqani network in this case as it bol-
stered its credentials with Gulf supporters while also distancing the
group from pointed criticism made by Afghan President Najibullah
about the presence of foreign fighters, specifically Pakistanis and
Arabs, in this battle.2
â•… Given the mutually antagonistic interests of entities like the TTP
and Pakistan, and al-Qa’ida and Pakistan for that matter, the
Haqqani network’s knowledge of its red lines and how far it can
push them is central to the success of its strategy and nexus posi-
tion. An anecdotal analysis of the Haqqani network’s communica-
tions post-2001 reveals that the group is guided by two primary
redlines: direct association with either anti-Pakistan militancy or
global jihad, despite having close operational ties with the two pri-
mary actors—the TTP and al-Qa’ida—that are driving these jihads.
The Haqqani network typically only speaks in generalities about its
relations with the TTP and al-Qa’ida and it sometimes rhetorically
distances itself from these redlines for risk of jeopardizing its posi-
tion in Pakistan. For example, in an interview conducted in 2009,
Sirajuddin noted that: “We have asked our allies, whether living in
Pakistan or any other part of the world, to carry out attacks against
Americans only in Afghanistan and not in any other country. Our
policy is that we would not interfere in the affairs of any other
country whether it is an Islamic or non-Islamic country.”3
â•… Even more revealing was Sirajuddin’s non-response to two direct
questions that were asked of him about the Haqqani network’s sup-
port for global jihad in a rare Arabic-forum interview.4 Besides

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making a very vague reference to the TTP’s suicide attack against

FOB Chapman, Sirajuddin carefully sidestepped both questions. It
is likely that Sirajuddin did not respond directly because crossing
this redline would make the Haqqani network even more of a tar-
get€than it already is. As noted by another Haqqani commander,
“Pakistan can pull the rug out from under us at any moment.”5
While the reality of Pakistan’s power is probably not that stark, if
Pakistan was committed to doing so it could further restrict the
Haqqani network’s travel and the movement of its resources and
materiel to and from the FATA. The Haqqani network would argu-
ably not be walking such a fine line or managing its nexus position
so closely if these associations did not pose challenges or vulnera-
bilities for the group. This suggests that while the Haqqani net-
work’s nexus position—and the nature of its various operational
relationships—is a source of its strength it is also a potential weak-
ness as its nexus position presents more ways to disrupt the group.

Managing Redlines: The Challenges of Entanglements,

Spillover, and Blowback
Thus far, the Haqqani network has been able to manage the direc-
tion of its violence and the broader spillover associated with its ties
with al-Qa’ida and the TTP. The Haqqani network does so at a local
level by avoiding public association with the TTP and by issuing
tactical and operational directives, which instruct its fighters to
“stand down” when TTP or other elements conduct an attack
against a Pakistani target.6 According to a source with firsthand
access, Haqqani fighters were ordered (via radio) in one case in
2009 to not participate in an expected clash with Pakistani soldiers.
Haqqani fighters were told that Pakistani Taliban, not Afghan
�Taliban, would fight Pakistani military forces.7 The Haqqanis do not
retaliate against the Pakistani army in North Waziristan for drone
attacks because Sirajuddin knows that doing so “would hurt them
in Afghanistan and threaten their sanctuary if there was all out war
in North Waziristan.”8 The need for such management and opera-
tional de-confliction illustrates the depth of Haqqani/TTP integra-
tion on both sides of the Durand Line. It also demonstrates the

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Haqqani network’s cognizance of this issue and the group’s need to

draw limits and manage where and how its fighters act. A review
of various examples illustrates areas of spillover and how this poses
a challenge for the group.

Association with anti-Pakistan Militancy—the TTP, IJU,

and al-Qa’ida

The Pakistani Taliban has been the primary driver of anti-state vio-
lence in Pakistan since 2007.9 The general statistics are staggering:
between 2007 and 2009, Pakistan’s Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Province
saw a more than 300 percent increase in the number of terrorist
attacks, with 2,586 attacks occurring across all of Pakistan in 2009
alone.10 The number of suicide attacks—a method often used by the
TTP—also rose dramatically, jumping from forty to eighty-four
over the same 2007–9 time period.11 The author was not able to find
any evidence directly linking the Haqqani network to attacks con-
ducted against the Pakistani state, and—given the protection and
support the ISI provides—the group has little incentive to support
anti-Pakistan militancy openly. That is not to say that such support
does not exist or that members of the group have not crossed these
lines, however, as the Haqqani network is well integrated with TTP
factions active in Loya Paktia and both groups share infrastruc-
ture—including training camps—and draw from overlapping
recruitment pools to replenish their ranks.
â•… More relevant and concerning for Pakistan is the role the Haqqani
network plays in maintaining the space for local and global actors
to intermingle and coalesce. While this activity is less visible and on
the surface more passive, the cumulative effect of this historical
fostering has arguably proved more dangerous to Pakistan than any
form of direct Haqqani support for TTP attacks. By continuing such
support—and the web of relationships around which the Haqqani
nexus is built—the Haqqanis have helped to deepen the operational
marriage between local and global militants who are now leading
the Pakistan jihad. According to American al-Qa’ida operative
�Bryant Neal Vinas, the relationship between the two most influen-
tial parties driving this jihad—al-Qa’ida and the TTP—is “so close
that lines between the two organizations were sometimes blurred.”12

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â•… Despite his claims that he sought to reorient their fight, Sirajuddin
Haqqani has openly expressed his sympathy for the TTP and some
of the ideological tenets underpinning their and al-Qa’ida’s jihad
against Islamabad. According to Sirajuddin, “Pakistan was once a
pro-Mujahideen state and now is under U.S. pressure to kill its own
people.”13 Sirajuddin has even gone so far as to publicly state his
willingness to protect the TTP. In an interview in 2008 Sirajuddin
proclaimed that “it has become my moral and religious responsibil-
ity to defend the Pakistani Taliban from US and Pakistani army
attacks.”14 On one level these statements can be understood as a
reflection of the Haqqani network’s pragmatism and as an expres-
sion of local tribal solidarity, as the group needs local tribal support
to ensure its long-term survival. Yet Sirajuddin’s comments also
illustrate how the Haqqani network—just like Pakistan—is hedging
its own bets and playing both sides of the conflict.
â•… Some might dismiss Sirajuddin’s offer of defensive support to
the€TTP as mere posturing, but the danger of this occurring has
Pakistan concerned and Islamabad is actively trying to manage the
Haqqani network to make sure this does not take place. Take, for
instance, the advice Pakistan gave Sirajuddin before launching its
most recent operation in South Waziristan.15 Pakistan specifically
advised the Haqqani leader to “refrain from extending support to
the TTP chief in the face of the military operation [in South
Waziristan].”16 The fact that Pakistan had to advise Sirajuddin not
to support the TTP indicates Pakistan’s misgivings and the local
and tribal bonds that situate the Haqqani–TTP relationship.
â•… Other evidence suggests that the Haqqani network’s commitment
to the TTP is not just pragmatic, but is also increasingly ideological.
This is best demonstrated by the testimony of David Rohde, who,
along with his translator and driver, were held captive by the
Haqqani network in the FATA for seven months. According to
Rohde, in March 2009, his Haqqani network guards “celebrated a
suicide attack in a mosque in the Pakistani town of Jamrud [in
�Khyber Agency] that killed as many as 50 worshipers as they
prayed to God. Those living under Pakistan’s apostate government,
they said, deserved it.”17 News reports about the attack indicated
that the mosque was located “next to a tribal police checkpoint …

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and was crowded with about 250 worshippers, including many

police.”18 The sentiments expressed by Rohde’s Haqqani network
guards are driven by a sense of shared suffering, a desire to strike
back at Islamabad for the drone attacks, and an appreciation for the
TTP and its fight. But this statement also demonstrates the ideologi-
cal influence of al-Qa’ida and the TTP on younger Haqqani mem-
bers, and the very real risk this poses for Islamabad.
â•… It is also likely that the TTP has used materiel, equipment, train-
ing, and operational expertise provided by the Haqqani network in
Afghanistan and the FATA to support and strengthen their cam-
paign against the state. As noted by David Rohde, “One of the
things that was clearest to me in my time in captivity was that the
Haqqanis and the Pakistani-Taliban worked seamlessly together.”19
The level of TTP–Haqqani cooperation became most apparent to
Rohde and his two colleagues when they were transferred from a
Haqqani network safehouse in North Waziristan to one in South
Waziristan in territory controlled by the late TTP leader Baitullah
Mehsud.20 The Haqqani network is able to mobilize and integrate
TTP and other Pakistani Pashtun tribal fighting columns into their
operations in Afghanistan, which begs the question: if Haqqani and
TTP fighters have mutual respect for one another and are willing to
die together on the battlefield in Loya Paktia, where else, and under
what conditions, are they cooperating in the FATA? Several close
Haqqani associates, such as Hafiz Gul Bahadur and Sadiq Noor, are
members of the TTP and at times partake in anti-Pakistan militancy,
but little is known about how these parties cooperate on the
�Pakistan side of the border.21 Although speculative, it is not outside
the realm of possibility that Haqqani fighters provide back-end sup-
port to some TTP elements and do so in a plausibly deniable way.
â•… Similar spillover can be seen with global jihadist groups who are
also attacking Pakistan and are integrated with the Haqqani net-
work in Loya Paktia. The cases of the IJU and al-Qa’ida are particu-
larly instructive of the blowback Pakistan faces from those with
whom the Haqqani network is aligned and support. In October
2006, Pakistani authorities arrested a dozen Pakistanis after finding
a number of rockets attached to cell phones near the president’s
residence and the ISI’s headquarters in Islamabad. The group

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planned to use the rockets to attack these sensitive instillations.22

The group’s ringleader, Khalil Wyne, had trained in North
Waziristan and had a close relationship with the IJU’s late emir,
Ebu Yahya Muhammed Fatih, who reportedly directed the plot.23
â•… Even more telling is an event that transpired close to one year
later. In December 2007, the IJU successfully carried out an attack
against a Pakistani medical convoy in Swat. A video of the attack
released by the IJU’s media outlet—Badr al-Tawhid—clearly shows
charred Pakistani military vehicles and the remains of at least half
a dozen Pakistani soldiers who had been slaughtered.24 While it is
not clear which faction of the IJU conducted the attack, or how well
integrated that element was with the Haqqanis, the Haqqani net-
work did not cease its organizational support for the group after the
event. According to a dataset compiled by the authors, IJU opera-
tives were killed or captured in Loya Paktia alongside Haqqani
network members as recently as May 2009.25
â•… A nearly identical pattern of behavior can be seen with respect to
the Haqqani network’s willingness to serve as a partner for al-
Qa’ida in Afghanistan and the FATA.26 Al-Qa’ida recognizes the
critical role Pakistan plays for the United States in its efforts to sta-
bilize Afghanistan and the broader region, and since 2001 the group
has been working to undermine this relationship and delegitimize
the Pakistani government. Al-Qa’ida accomplishes this in three
primary ways: (1) by providing religious justification and rallying
support for anti-Pakistan militancy; (2) acting as a force multiplier
and advisor to local groups; and (3) serving as a mediator and coali-
tion builder for militant groups within Pakistan.27 Although al-
Qa’ida has only claimed responsibility for a small number of attacks
in Pakistan, it is suspected of working with and through local
groups to actively fight the Pakistani state. In 2003, for example,
al-Qa’ida operative Abu Faraj al-Libi allegedly ordered an assassi-
nation attempt against then President Pervez Musharraf.28 The
double suicide attack that was executed on 25 December 2003 was
reportedly planned by al-Qa’ida but conducted by the Kashmiri
group Jaish-e-Muhammad.29 Ilyas Kashmiri, an al-Qa’ida operative,
is also believed to have played a role in the plot.30 More recently, in
June 2009, a “major terrorist cell” with plans to target Pakistani

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 ENTANGLEMENTS AND MANAGEMENT

President Asif Ali Zardari and a number of provincial chief minis-

ters was reportedly disrupted in Karachi.31 A member of al-Qa’ida
was allegedly involved in the plot.32
â•… These examples are provided not to suggest a primary Haqqani
network role, but rather to illustrate the very dangerous game that
Pakistan has been playing, and the spillover that has likely resulted
from its continued support and protection of the Haqqani family.
The Haqqani network is a distinct organization, yet at the same
time it is also an important enabler of a larger system of violence
that a mix of local and global jihadist actors leverage and plug into
in southeastern Afghanistan. To facilitate this system of violence,
the Haqqani network provides entities attacking and advocating for
jihad against the Pakistani state with logistical and organizational
support, at least as it pertains to Afghanistan. In doing so, the
Haqqani network is directly contributing to the operational devel-
opment of these groups and is reinforcing the strength of their net-
works in Pakistan’s tribal areas, and by extension the protection
they receive. These factors doubtless contribute to the durability
and survival of these entities.
â•… What is surprising is that the blowback associated with Pakistan’s
support for radical Islamists, including the Haqqani network, is
predictable. It is both telling and concerning that one of al-Qa’ida’s
leading strategists and trainers outlined these dangers in the late
1990s. In a book published before 2001, Abu Musab al-Suri pre-
dicted that it was only a matter of time until jihadis would turn
their guns on Islamabad.33
I believe that the regional threat posed by the appearance of the [Afghan]
Taliban and what it has brought about will not be contained. It will spread
northward to the river and into the nations of Central Asia, where the Tali-
ban or their influence will have the ability to mobilize Muslims. Mean-
while, its true influence has taken hold among the elite Muslims and
religious movements in Pakistan that have been set aflame by virtue of the
presence of the Taliban, their victories, and the cries for Jihad that have not
been contained by the river on the Pakistan–Afghanistan border but have
crossed over on the wind and have come to portend great things east of
Afghanistan [in Pakistan] as well.

â•… Unfortunately for Pakistan, al-Suri’s prediction could not have

been more right. His comments reveal that the opening of the

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�
Pakistan jihad has been long in the making and that jihadist vio-
lence in Pakistan is to some degree a by-product of the country’s
own support for the Haqqani network and other militant actors.
Al-Suri’s statement could serve as a reminder to Pakistan that per-
petuating the distinction between “good” and “bad” Taliban creates
space for actors actively seeking to topple the government in Islam-
abad, and in the long-run is only likely to make matters worse. It
also is a reminder that the Haqqani network cannot be meaning-
fully separated from the back-end production of this violence.

Association with Global Jihad and International Terrorism

—al-Qa’ida and the IJU
As documented in Part I, the Haqqani network has long served as a
local enabler of al-Qa’ida and its global jihad. Yet despite these close
ties, the Haqqani network has carefully avoided any direct associa-
tion with international terrorism or the targeting of Westerners
outside of Afghanistan. The question of Haqqani support for inci-
dents of international terrorism, however, needs to also be assessed
through the context and contours of the Haqqani network’s consist-
ent support for al-Qa’ida—specifically, the former’s connection to
key events in al-Qa’ida’s history and the Haqqanis’ unwillingness
to disengage meaningfully from the group since it formally declared
war on the United States in 1998. This makes the Haqqani network
a willing partner and an active participant in al-Qa’ida’s global
jihad, as the Haqqanis have consistently provided the local context
and space for al-Qa’ida to sustain itself and—to a large extent—
extend its jihad to other places. Whether the Haqqani network will
alter its position and disengage from al-Qa’ida, given the death of
Bin Laden and the decline of his group, remains to be seen.
â•… As has been well documented by Paul Cruickshank, since 9/11 the
vast majority of serious international terrorism plots have links back
to Pakistan, and to North Waziristan specifically.34 A review of sev-
eral plots tied to al-Qa’ida and IJU members with whom Haqqani
leaders are known to be associated highlight the danger of the
Haqqanis’ local support for these groups. Before reviewing these
cases it is important to note that they do not form a representative

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sample. They were intentionally selected to illustrate the spillover

associated with individuals that fall into the Haqqani network’s
immediate operational orbit. Further, the planning for these plots is
likely compartmentalized and there is no direct evidence that the
Haqqani network played a role in recruiting the plotters, or that
Haqqani leaders even met them. However, due to the Haqqani net-
work’s known ties with specific al-Qa’ida commanders and the
group’s influence and control over significant operational resources
and infrastructure in Loya Paktia and North Waziristan, these cases
suggest, but do not prove, that these plotters likely received some
form of local assistance (shelter, training, or operational assistance)
from Haqqani members or their close intermediaries. We would be
remiss if we also did not acknowledge that these plotters could just
have easily have been supported by powerful local Pakistani Taliban
commanders, such as Gul Bahadur or Mullah Nazir. While we
acknowledge that suggestions of a Haqqani role in the training of
these plotters is speculative, the history and evidence reviewed in
other chapters of this book make clear that such a connection is not
outside the realm of possibility. We believe these cases are useful as
they illustrate the fine line the Haqqani network must walk and the
group’s close proximity to a number of transnational terrorism plots.

Sauerland Cell—Germany

The first case involves four Germans who were convicted of plot-
ting to attack the Ramstein airbase and several other American-
linked targets in Germany with hydrogen peroxide bombs.35
Although the plotters originally aimed to fight elsewhere, they
eventually made their way to North Waziristan where they were
further radicalized and received training in explosives at camps
affiliated with the Islamic Jihad Union.36 One of the individuals they
met there was the IJU’s leader—Najmiddin Jalolov—who “person-
ally asked cell member Fritz Gelowicz and his fellow militants to
perpetrate a series of attacks on German soil.”37 Abu Laith al-Libi—
who was serving as an advisor to the IJU—also reportedly helped
to plan the attack.38 As revealed earlier, Abu Laith had personal ties
to Nasiruddin Haqqani.39 According to court testimony, members

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of the group appeared in videos released by the IJU’s media out-

let—Badr al-Tawhid.40 After returning to Germany, some of the
plotters were communicating via email with the IJU’s deputy com-
mander who urged them to act and was growing increasingly
impatient with their delays. German authorities disrupted the plot
not long after in September 2007. This case is worth noting because
it is largely recognized as the event which marked the IJU’s emer-
gence as a global jihadist actor. The four Germans implicated in this
plot were also part of a wave of aspiring German jihadis who have
settled in North Waziristan and have joined up with the IJU, Islamic
Movement of Uzbekistan, and al-Qa’ida. Some of these recruits
have been killed and the fate of others is not known, but a select
few have held prominent positions within these organizations, such
as Bekkay Harrach (killed in Afghanistan in January 2011), who
was reportedly close to Sirajuddin Haqqani and was emerging as a
junior leader within al-Qa’ida’s and the IJU’s ranks. It is also worth
noting that after its split from the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan
(IMU) the IJU rose under the tutelage of al-Qa’ida leader Abu Laith
al-Libi and operated in southeastern Afghanistan alongside the
Haqqani network.

Glasvej—Denmark
The second case involves a smaller plot disrupted in Denmark in
September 2007.41 The plot’s ringleader, Hammad Khürshid, sought
to attack multiple targets in Denmark and potentially elsewhere in
Europe using the explosive TATP. After the Pakistani-Dane arrived
at Islamabad’s Lal Masjid (Red Mosque) in the spring of 2007, he
made his way to North Waziristan where he was trained in the
construction and use of explosives by members of al-Qa’ida.
According to intelligence sources, Khürshid is believed to have met
Abu Nasir al-Qahtani and to have been trained by Abu Ubaydah
al-Masri, al-Qa’ida’s late chief of external operations and the archi-
tect of its failed 2006 transatlantic airliner plot.42 (As documented in
Chapter 6, al-Qahtani operated with local Haqqani and Taliban ele-
ments in southeastern Afghanistan.) After he returned to Denmark,
Khürshid remained in contact with Muhammad Ilias Subhan Ali
(a.k.a. Abu Ali), a Pakistani al-Qa’ida facilitator now detained in

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Saudi Arabia.43 Khürshid was arrested by Danish authorities after

testing a batch of TATP in his apartment complex. Similar to the
Sauerland cell, this case illustrates the close connection between this
plot and an al-Qa’ida operative who operated with Haqqani fight-
ers in Loya Paktia.44

Long Island Railroad—New York

The third case, involving American Muslim convert and al-Qa’ida

operative Bryant Neal Vinas, is equally suggestive. Vinas travelled
to Pakistan because he wanted to fight in Afghanistan. After spend-
ing some time in Pakistan’s Mohmand Agency with a local insur-
gent group, Vinas—like the others plotters—made his way to North
Waziristan where he met, took courses from, and was mentored by
al-Qa’ida commanders. During an interrogation by Belgian authori-
ties, Vinas described one course taught by Abu Hafith, an al-Qa’ida
commander who reportedly served for a period as al-Qa’ida’s exter-
nal operations chief.45 While in North Waziristan, Vinas also met
Mustafa Abu al-Yazid, Rashid Rauf, Baitullah Mehsud, Yunis al-
Mauritania, and Attiya Allah and appeared in an al-Sahab video
with Abu Yahya al-Libi.46 On two occasions Vinas attempted to
infiltrate and conduct an operation against Coalition and Afghan
forces in Afghanistan—the first into Kunar Province with a group
led by Shaah Saab and the second into Loya Paktia.47 The account
Vinas provided to Belgian authorities of the second attempt is
worth recounting due to the personalities involved:48
Towards the beginning of Ramadan 2008 [September 2008], Vinas on the
orders of A. S. went to a city known by him in Waziristan near the border
with Afghanistan where he joined a group of fighters led by A. Y. Y. [Abu
Yahya al-Libi]. He was the leader of this group following the death of AL
[Abu Laith al-Libi] earlier in the year. He accompanied a group of Al Qaeda
fighters in two attempts to [conduct] rocket attacks against a U.S. base in
Afghanistan. The rockets were launched from a site in Pakistan. The first
attack was not triggered because of problems with radio communication
and the second [attempt] failed on the base.

â•… It is not known if any Haqqani elements took part in or helped to

facilitate this attack, although it is not outside the realm of possibil-

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 F OUNT AI NH E AD OF JIHAD

ity, especially since Vinas lived in North Waziristan for several

months and was friends with one of the suicide bombers who
attacked FOB Salerno in a coordinated Haqqani–al-Qa’ida assault
in August 2008. Not long after proving himself in these operations,
Vinas “consulted with a senior al Qaeda leader” who “provided
detailed information about the operation of the Long Island Rail
Road system.”49 Vinas agreed to return to the United States to con-
duct the attack, but he was arrested in Peshawar by Pakistani
authorities before he was able to do so. This case is noteworthy
because it also establishes a direct connection between Vinas and
al-Qa’ida leaders, such as Abu Yahya al-Libi, who were known to
operate in the Haqqani network’s immediate orbit.

More Recent Threats against Europe

The death of two British Muslim converts, Abu Bakr and Mansoor
Ahmed, in a drone attack in North Waziristan in December 2010
raises similar questions. Not much is known about these two
�Britons, but it is likely that they were killed due to their connection
to the late Abdul Jabbar (another Briton who had ties to Omar
Khyam—the ringleader of Operation Crevice—and was the sup-
posed leader of a new splinter group called the Islamic Army of
Great Britain) and other European plotters who intended to attack
multiple targets in France, Germany, and the United Kingdom
using small arms and Mumbai-style tactics.50 According to press
accounts, the two men were “handled by the Haqqani faction” and
received training in North Waziristan.51 Although details of the plot
still remain murky, the plot was directed by al-Qa’ida, and some
claim that it was supported by the IJU and the Haqqani network.52
Western security services reportedly learned about the plot from
multiple sources, including Ahmed Siddiqi, a German of Afghan
origin captured by US forces in Kabul in July 2012.53
â•… Collectively, these cases point to a trend of international terror-
ism plots emanating from North Waziristan that all have direct
connections to senior al-Qa’ida and IJU leaders. The survival of
these global jihadist groups and the space needed to plan, train, and
prepare for these plots is rooted in, and dependent on, a local sys-

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tem of facilitators and protectors who make global jihad possible

through the back-end support they provide. While not explicitly a
global terrorist organization, the Haqqani network has long pro-
vided a region of refuge and the space for mobilization and training
that others, like al-Qa’ida, have used to directly attack the United
States, Pakistan, and many other countries. It remains telling that
the Haqqani network has not ceased its support for these entities,
despite a pattern of international terrorist attacks that stretch
back€as far as 1998. What can be established, therefore, is that the
Haq�qani network has made a conscious decision to continue to
shelter and support these groups and—at least indirectly—enable
their external operations.

Conclusion
The Haqqani network derives many benefits from its nexus posi-
tion, and through careful conflict framing and awareness of its
redlines it has proved skilled at managing the tension inherent to
this position over several decades. The group still faces a number
of considerable challenges, however. The most significant of which
is the spillover associated with the Haqqani network’s ties to TTP
and al-Qa’ida, and specifically its proximity to anti-Pakistan mili-
tancy and acts of international terrorism—and what this means for
both Pakistan and the United States in terms of common interests.
As we move forward we can expect considerations, such as the
efforts to further reduce al-Qa’ida’s safe haven, the continuation of
anti-Pakistan militancy, and mounting US pressure for Pakistan to
conduct large-scale operations against the Haqqani network, to
further stress the latter’s ability to navigate its redlines and manage
its nexus position. The push for a political “endgame” in Afghanistan
and the likelihood of a diminished, but still very capable US coun-
terterrorism presence in the region post-2014 could also create new
and pragmatic incentives for the Haqqani network to alter its stra-
tegic calculus and ease the pressure, instead of just following the
status quo.

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 CONCLUSION

This study is the first to systematically explore a trove of primary

sources produced by the Haqqani network and a smattering of
other al-Qa’ida-linked groups from the late 1980s onward. It is
shocking and concerning that thousands of pages of these unique
and revealing sources have been publically available for the last ten
years at a local library in Kabul where, beyond the eyes of local
Afghan readers, they have essentially sat gathering dust.1 That it
took a decade for any Western academic researcher or US and
NATO official to discover and evaluate this material (or similar
archival collections) says a lot about our naiveté, the challenges the
West faced in Afghanistan after 9/11, and how much remains to be
learned. It should also force one to take pause, particularly when
we consider the challenges that lie ahead and that the “most impor-
tant weapon we have against al-Qa’ida [or the Taliban for that mat-
ter] is knowledge.”2
â•… By leveraging these and other unique sources, this study has
aimed to provide a more sophisticated and historically informed
understanding of the Haqqani network—in however small a way. It
has done so by outlining the contours of, and exploring many of the
contextual dynamics associated with, the group’s history, especially
as it pertains to its association with regional and transnational
Islamist militancy. This study has revealed how Jalaluddin Haqqani
and the group that he led emerged as a central, nexus entity during
the 1980s and early 1990s due to their flexible approach, long-term
outlook, and skill in avoiding some of the inter-mujahidin fighting

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that plagued other Afghan Islamist party factions. The group’s geo-
graphic position, ability to deliver battlefield results, and reliability
has also endeared it to Pakistan’s security establishment which—
fearing broader conflict within its borders—currently views it as too
risky to turn against the group, a dynamic which is not likely to
change anytime soon. The second part of this study has also shown
how the Haqqanis have operated as a system, or nexus, during the
post-2001 period by providing value to its local, regional, and global
partners across operational, diplomatic, and support functions.
â•… Material presented in this publication challenges conventional
narratives about the Haqqani network and al-Qa’ida’s early devel-
opment in the Afghanistan–Pakistan region in a number of impor-
tant ways. Prior assessments, for example, have highlighted how
Abdullah Azzam, Maktab al-Khidamat (the Services Bureau), and
several Afghan Islamist party leaders, such as ‘Abd al-Rabb Rasul
Sayyaf and Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, have to varying degrees helped
to shape al-Qa’ida’s early and local trajectory. By broadening the
geographic aperture and source base through which these dynam-
ics have traditionally been examined, this study casts the spotlight
on Jalaluddin Haqqani’s enduring role in these developments and
how his network provided critical assistance and support for al-
Qa’ida at key moments. This book’s contributions to what is known
about the emergence of global jihadism are equally noteworthy, as
they enhance our understanding about where and with whom these
dynamics transpired in Afghanistan during the 1990s. They also
highlight the role played by individuals like Abu’l-Walid al-Masri,
who operated for an extended period in Jalaluddin Haqqani’s inner
circle and, according to the accounts of two al-Qa’ida insiders,
played an important role in shifting al-Qa’ida’s targeting strategy
towards the West.
â•… In revealing this history, this book provides a different and more
nuanced view of the Haqqani network than that which previously
existed on the subject. It is true that at its core the group is primarily
a local actor with local concerns, and that the liberation of Loya
Paktia and withdrawal of foreign forces from Afghanistan remain
the group’s immediate short-term goals. Yet such a view ignores
other dimensions of the organization, as the Haqqani network’s

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actions, outlook, and ties cannot be adequately explained solely in

reference to the Afghan theater. The group has been a key facilitator
of jihadi actors engaged in broader conspiracies and agendas that
reach further afield. Indeed, as revealed in this book, al-Qa’ida’s
global jihad and elements of Kashmir’s regional jihad have, for sev-
eral decades, been shaped by the safe haven, training, combat expe-
rience, propaganda support, resource mobilization, and networking
opportunities facilitated by the Haqqani network.
â•… The Haqqani network, like other militant groups, is driven by
complex motivations. Before publication of this book there were two
primary narratives used to explain the Haqqani network’s support
for al-Qa’ida and its training camps during the mid-1990s. The first
held that Jalaluddin Haqqani provided support to al-Qa’ida for per-
sonal reasons given his close ties to and respect for Osama bin Laden
and other al-Qa’ida leaders, such as Abu Hafs al-Masri, who had
assisted the Afghans and made a number of sacrifices during the
anti-Soviet jihad. This explanation makes intuitive sense, especially
since personal dynamics and the bonds of war have strong explana-
tory power in almost any context. Given the Haqqani network’s
integration of al-Qa’ida and other foreign fighters during the post-
2001 period this logic likely also holds true to this day, as it makes
sense that the Haqqanis—like any military entity—would support
those brothers-in-arms with whom they have suffered in combat.
â•… The second narrative suggests that economic or pragmatic consid-
erations are what drove Jalaluddin to assist al-Qa’ida after Bin
Laden’s return to Afghanistan in 1996. This line of reasoning holds
that Jalaluddin supported the development of al-Qa’ida and its
training camps during this period because this “business” was a
growth industry and another way for him to raise additional funds.
There is some basis for these claims, as both before and after 9/11
Jalaluddin proved skilled at diversifying his income streams and in
capitalizing on new financial opportunities. This explanation runs
into problems though, as there is not much evidence that Jalaluddin
made a lot of money from these training camps or from al-Qa’ida
more broadly. Nor is there much information that outlines what the
elder Haqqani spent his money on beyond his network of madras-
sas, even if these camps were a money-maker. Pragmatism undoubt�

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 F OUNT AI NH E AD OF JIHAD

edly played some role in motivating Jalaluddin and the other

leaders of the network, but relying on this theory alone, especially
in light of other evidence, is not sufficient to fully explain the rea-
sons for the two groups’ ties. It also does very little to answer a
fundamental question about the Haqqani network’s pragmatism:
pragmatism in pursuit of what exactly?
â•… A third explanation suggests that the Haqqani network’s ties to
al-Qa’ida were not just personal, pragmatic, or profit-motivated,
but that they were also driven by Jalaluddin’s and now Sirajuddin’s
religious views and ideological outlook. The content of magazines
produced by Jalaluddin and the operational support and infrastruc-
ture provided by the Haqqani network lend credence to this view
and show that the group’s support for al-Qa’ida pre- and post-9/11
was driven—at least in some part—by sympathy for Bin Laden’s
group and what it aimed to achieve.
â•… What can be learned from this discussion and our review of the
available evidence is that when viewed alone none of these expla-
nations—personal, financial, and ideological—can sufficiently
explain the Haqqani network and its historical bonds with al-
Qa’ida. All have played a role. The challenge for researchers lies in
evaluating these and potentially other motivations to discover how
each should be weighed in relation to the others.
â•… This issue takes on particular relevance given the US plan to tran-
sition from Afghanistan in 2014 and current US and Afghan efforts
to reach a political settlement with the Afghan Taliban and the
Haqqanis. As discussed previously, there are very good reasons to
question whether reconciliation with the Haqqanis is in the United
States’ long-term interests and to be skeptical that any political
agreement with the group—if reached—will hold or actually mean
much. Washington’s search for a political solution to its Afghanistan
imbroglio is understandable, but negotiations with the Haq�qanis
come with considerable risk given the group’s historical and recent
fostering of al-Qa’ida. There is also the risk that efforts to create
peace through a broad-based political settlement for the Taliban
will further fracture the country along ethnic lines, precipitate a
coup within the country, or lead to greater conflict.3 It can only be
hoped that the decision to include the Haqqanis in such talks are

238
 C ONC L US I ON

made based upon facts, a deep understanding of the Haqqani net-

work’s history, and the reality of the situation on the ground, how-
ever hard and challenging that might make things for the relevant
parties over the short term.
â•… The American and NATO troop presence in Afghanistan and the
US drone campaign across Pakistan’s border have been critical to
degrading al-Qa’ida since 9/11. The immediate threat to the United
States has certainly been diminished as a result of these campaigns,
but ten years of war will not be without its own share of new costs.
In many ways, the environment the United States faces on both
sides of the Durand Line is now more charged, complicated, and
openly hostile than before October 2001. How the impact of war
and a sense of shared suffering and personal loss will affect the
region over the mid- to long-term and manifest itself in the devel-
opment of new threats for the most part remains uncertain. The
formation of the TTP and its attempts to attack the West are an
indication that the road will be bumpy, and that the United States
and its allies will face a new range of militant challenges with ties
to the region in the decade ahead.
â•… Any attempt to assess the future of violent jihad within and
beyond the region is a messy and speculative exercise.4 Yet if we are
to use the aftermath of the Soviet departure from Afghanistan and
its impact on the region as a guide, there are two central themes—
change and outputs—that can inform our thinking. Indeed, two of
the primary questions that must be asked are how will Pakistan’s
and Afghanistan’s militant landscapes evolve post-2014 and, more
specifically, what type of organizational and ideological outputs
will emerge from these communities over the next decade as a
result? These questions become more salient when one consid-
ers€that the creation of many jihadi groups, the (re)opening of the
Kashmir jihad, and the early development of al-Qa’ida and its shift
in targeting calculus (from the near to the far enemy) largely tran-
spired after the Soviets had left, not before. It is also worth remem-
bering that the most important decade for al-Qa’ida—the 1990s—also
started off as its quietest. Thus while the United States will likely
shift some of its attention and assets to other areas of the globe, like
Yemen and Africa, and engage other difficult problems, the next

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decade in the region could be even more important, and potentially

as dangerous, as the previous one.
â•… Change in the region’s diverse jihadi landscape is a certainty.
However, evaluating the direction, character, and intensity of that
change—and what will motivate various actors, including the
Haqqani network—is much more difficult. Many jihadis in the
region will be emboldened by the US drawdown and eventual
departure from Afghanistan, viewing the event as a victory in their
quest to reclaim Muslim lands and rid those areas of Western influ-
ence. Inspired, some of these jihadis will continue their efforts to
overthrow the Afghan government, while others will likely turn
their attention and violence elsewhere. Some, if able, could return
home, and yet others—tired from war—could disengage or decide
to play a more positive and less violent role in their communities.
â•… The options vary regarding where this violence may turn.
�Islamabad and its security forces will remain a consistent target of
the TTP and other anti-state Pakistani jihadis if the former continues
to conduct campaigns in the tribal territories and the latter can
maintain their capabilities and manpower. If history is any guide,
many of the jihadi groups active in the region will turn their sights
to Kashmir, or support those that do, to reclaim Indian-occupied
Kashmir from perceived Hindu dominance. Another likely option
for some groups is reorientation to Afghanistan’s neighboring coun-
tries, especially mainland India, where Lashkar-e-Taiba’s three-day
terrorist spectacular in November of 2008 against a mix of local,
foreign, and symbolic targets reaffirmed the potential of active
shooter plots and the value (and attention) gained by hitting hybrid
targets. The pull towards India will most likely affect those groups
with roots in Pakistan’s Punjab or Kashmir. Like the events in Mum-
bai, future high-profile attacks in India will likely aim to manipulate
security tensions between India and Pakistan with the hopes of pro-
voking a broader conflict between the two countries, a scenario for
which al-Qa’ida and others are already preparing.5 The departure
of US and NATO combat forces from the region could also make
it€easier for groups like the IMU and IJU to reinitiate their cam-
paigns in Central Asia, particularly in Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, and
Tajikistan. In search of opportunities these groups could also try to

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hit softer US and Coalition targets there, using Afghanistan, Pakistan,

or a pocket in one of the Central Asian countries as their base.
â•… This assumes of course that the jihadis in the region will be able
to hold things together and avoid infighting within their ranks, and
to do so in the absence of such a visible foreign military presence in
Afghanistan. History does not inspire much confidence in this
regard, as tensions over tactics, access to resources, or local versus
global targeting priorities are predictable points of disagreement
and could derail plans to consolidate their gains.6 Debates and con-
flict over sectarian issues could also create serious turmoil, espe-
cially if these dynamics are further unleashed in Pakistan’s settled
areas and in the Punjab particularly. One thing is certain: lacking
the unifying factor of a full-scale American military presence,
Afghanistan’s and Pakistan’s jihadis will struggle to retain the level
of focus and cohesion that they hitherto enjoyed.
â•… Given current dynamics, it remains an open question as to
whether al-Qa’ida will continue to exist as a coherent or viable entity
over the next several years in the region. It is also unclear how the
group and its strategy will evolve, and who will guide it after the
removal, death, or continued isolation of Ayman al-Zawahiri. Al-
Qa’ida, if anything since 9/11, has certainly proven itself to be
resilient, and Bin Laden’s calls to shift its personnel to Kunar and
Nuristan (more isolated areas), and to regions like Zabul and
Ghazni, indicate that the group intends to persevere, lay low, and
rebuild. There is also the issue of al-Qa’ida’s seasoned members—
personalities like Saif al-Adel and Adnan Shukrijumah—and the
group’s middle-managers and young turks, individuals who are
likely known to counterterrorism operators but not the public, who
will play a role in shaping the future trajectory of the group. The
potential role played by family members of deceased senior al-
Qa’ida militants, such as Bin Laden’s son Hamza, cannot be dis-
counted as well.
â•… Al-Qa’ida’s continued presence in Afghanistan and Pakistan for
the past ten years, even if in small pockets, has also helped to
ensure that the group’s membership is now more local and poten-
tially more deeply intermarried and interwoven into the tapestry of
each place. Although an understudied phenomenon, al-Qa’ida has

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 F OUNT AI NH E AD OF JIHAD

always had a Pakistani current running through its membership

and it is therefore not unreasonable to assume that any future ver-
sion of the group (or whatever potentially replaces it) will be mark-
edly more Pakistani. An uptick in Urdu-language videos released
by al-Qa’ida’s media arm (targeted to Pakistanis) and a series of
attacks allegedly involving insiders in Pakistan’s military indicates
that such a future is one that the group is actively working to culti-
vate. These dynamics suggest that the next generation of al-Qa’ida
in the region could look much different than the first, and be even
more integrated with other Afghan and Pakistani militant groups.
Such a dynamic does not bode well for the future of the US–Pakistan
relationship, especially if spoilers in Pakistan triumph over forces
urging moderation.
â•… So where does this leave the Haqqani network? Like other actors,
the Haqqanis are approaching an inflection point. Given their posi-
tion, the US drawdown, and their ability to withstand decades of
war, the group arguably has little incentive to reconcile, since if
they wait a little longer they will probably achieve their core inter-
ests in the region anyway. That is assuming, of course, that the
status quo holds and the steps the United States is willing to take to
achieve its goals in Afghanistan and North Waziristan do not
change. Judging by the US commitment in pressing the Pakistanis
on the Haqqani issue and Islamabad’s unwillingness to budge and
turn on the group, the latter is by no means a certainty. Significant
change could also be driven by actions taken by the Haqqanis them-
selves, the removal of one or several of the group’s senior leaders,
shifts in the Afghan Taliban’s hierarchy, or in response to Pakistani
military operations.
â•… As the clock ticks down to 2014, two central questions define the
debate for the United States and its allies. First, what role does the
Haqqani network want to play in Afghanistan and Pakistan in the
next five to ten years and what does this mean for the West? Sec-
ond, what type of relationship do the Haqqanis want to have with
al-Qa’ida and like-minded transnational jihadist groups in the
future? The answers to both of these questions are not straightfor-
ward, as the Haqqanis have publicly revealed little about either.
The view provided by this book paints a fairly grim picture with

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 C ONC L US I ON

respect to both of these issues, however, and it is not known how

the Haqqani network will respond to the bundled mix of incentives
and pressures that 2014 entails. Autonomy in Loya Paktia and
nominal leadership of the area has always been prized by the
Haqqani network, and the group is certain to play a strong direct or
indirect role there, as well as in North Waziristan. The Haqqanis
will also almost certainly remain a steady regional partner for the
Afghan Taliban (and elements of the Pakistani state) in the years to
come. Barring significant change, the Haqqanis’ primary role in the
conflict in Afghanistan will remain as a spoiler, a dynamic which is
likely to further strain ties between Washington and Islamabad.
â•… The al-Qa’ida question is one of incentives and at the moment it
appears as though the Haqqani network has little motivation to
maintain its relationship with the remnants of al-Qa’ida and other
global jihadis. On the one hand, with al-Qa’ida’s dwindling num-
bers and waning popularity around the world there does not
appear to be that much in it for the Haqqanis, as maintaining such
associations are sure to invite continued US pressure. The Haqqani
network’s relationship with Pakistan, while not always smooth, is
also critical, and post-2014 the former’s connections to transnational
jihadism could be more problematic for Pakistan than they have
been previously, especially when one considers the role that
�Pakistani ostensibly wants the Haqqanis to play politically in
Afghanistan. On the other hand, the Haqqani network’s historical
and recent behavior does not inspire confidence that it will actually
sever its ties to transnationally oriented jihadis in a meaningful or
permanent way. Ideological sympathy and shared support for the
broader goals that al-Qa’ida represents—surely held by at least
some within the group—would be one important reason for not
doing so, as would a desire to seek revenge for the losses that both
groups have suffered over the last ten years. This skepticism is not
to say that a shift in the Haqqanis’ relationship with al-Qa’ida is
impossible, but rather that such change would mark a significant
break with the group’s previous trajectory over the last two and
half decades.

243
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 p p [1–12]

NOTES

INTRODUCTION

1.╇“Kabul siege ends after 20 hours,” Reuters, 14 Sep. 2011, http://uk.reuters.com/arti-

cle/2011/09/14/uk-afghanistan-attacks-idUKTRE78D0S720110914
2.╇http://armed-services.senate.gov/statemnt/2011/09%20September/Mullen%2009–22–11.
pdf
3.╇Confidential cable from the US Embassy in Kabul dated 18 Jan. 2006, subject line “PRT/
Khost: Bombings In Khost Target Civilians; New Tactic Aimed At ‘anti-Islamic’ Activities,”
released by WikiLeaks at http://wikileaks.org/cable/2006/01/06KABUL265.html. It is
possible that the phrase appeared earlier in cables with a higher classification than those
acquired and released by WikiLeaks.
4.╇Secret cable from US Embassy in Kabul dated 2 July 2006, subject line “NDS Director Saleh
on Insurgency—Causes and Solutions,” released by WikiLeaks at http://wikileaks.org/
cable/2006/07/06KABUL2970.html. In this case the usage is attributed to Amrullah Saleh,
director of the Afghan National Directorate of Security.
5.╇Admiral Moeller described the three main components of the Afghan insurgency as the Tali-
ban, the “Haqqani Tribal Network,” and Hizb-i-Islami Gulbuddin (HIG). A week later, the
US State Department press office introduced the shortened appellation “Haqqani network”
(David McKeeby, “Partnership Key to Progress in Afghanistan, U.S. General Says,” Wash-
ington File, 16 Mar. 2006), though the phrase did not enter common usage in the Western
press until late 2006, following Anthony Cordesman’s editorial “One War We Can Still
Win,” New York Times, 13 Dec. 2006.
6.╇“Afghanistan: Progress Report. Joint Hearing before the Subcommittee on the Middle East
and Central Asia and the Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations of the Committee
on International Relations,” online at http://commdocs.house.gov/committees/intlrel/
hfa26441.000/hfa26441_0f.htm. FATA stands for the Federally Administered Tribal Areas
along Pakistan’s border with Afghanistan.
7.╇Milt Bearden and James Risen, The Main Enemy, New York: Random House, 2003, p.╖312.
Bearden was the CIA station chief in Pakistan from 1986 to 1989.
8.╇Brigadier Mohammad Yousaf and Major Mark Adkin, The Bear Trap: Afghanistan’s Untold
Story, London: Leo Cooper, 1992, p.â•–164.
9.╇Arif Jamal, Shadow War: The Untold Story of Jihad in Kashmir, Brooklyn, NY: Melville House,
2009, p.â•–110.
10.╇Ayman Sabri Faraj, Dhikriyyat ‘Arab Afghan Abu Ja’far al-Masri al-Qandahari, Cairo: Dar al-
Shuruq, 2002, p.â•–25.
11.╇Syed Saleem Shahzad, “How Iran and al-Qaeda made a deal,” Asia Times, 30 Apr. 2010.
Shahzad was tortured and murdered in Pakistan on 31 May 2011, and US government offi-
cials and several human rights organizations have accused the ISI of his killing. Though
undoubtedly a courageous journalist, Shahzad’s reporting was often idiosyncratic and
impossible to verify independently, and many of his claims—including this one about the
Haqqani–Iran relationship—need to be treated with caution until further evidence emerges.
12.╇This is maintained by men who fought in the southeast for the Haqqani network or the Tali-
ban in general in interviews with Ron Moreau and Sami Yousafzai; see Yousafzai and

245
pp [13–24] NOT E S

Moreau, “The Taliban in Their Own Words,” Newsweek, 26 Sep. 2009. A certain Muhammad
Haqqani claims there that “Arab and Iraqi mujahedin began visiting us, transferring the
latest IED technology and suicide-bomber tactics they had learned in the Iraqi resistance
during combat with U.S. forces. … Until 2004 or so, we were using traditional means of
fighting like we used against the Soviets—AK-47s and RPGs. But then our resistance became
more lethal, with new weapons and techniques: bigger and better IEDs for roadside bomb-
ings, and suicide attacks.” See also the critical assessment of the so-called “Iraq effect” in
Afghanistan in Alec D. Barker, “Improvised Explosive Devices in Southern Afghanistan and
Western Pakistan, 2002–2009,” Counterterrorism Strategy Initiative Policy Paper, New
America Foundation, Apr. 2010. (And thanks to one of our anonymous readers for bringing
this latter source to my attention.)
13.╇Manahi al-Shaybani, “Former Saudi Mujahidin Interviewed,” al-Riyadh, 30 Dec. 2003.

1.╇SITUATING THE HAQQANIS: ORIGINS, POLITICAL CULTURE, REGIONAL CONTEXTS

1.╇There are four super-tribal confederacies of the Pashtun tribes, the other three being the
Durrani, the Ghilzai, and the Ghurghusht. The Karlanri confederacy includes (among others)
the Haqqanis’ Zadran tribe as well as the Wazir, Mahsud, Orakzai, Afridi, Jaji, Tani, Mangal,
Khattak, and Khugiani tribes, all of which are also comprised of numerous subtribal segmen-
tal clan units. Not all of the Pashtun tribes inhabiting this region are Karlanri—the Mohmand,
for instance, are a Durrani tribe—but the Karlanri are the predominant population and it is in
this region that all of the Karlanri are concentrated.
2.╇Quoted in James C. Scott, Seeing Like a State, New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1998,
p.â•–396.
3.╇David B. Edwards, “Learning from the Swat Pathans: Political Leadership in Afghanistan,
1978–97,” American Ethnologist, 25, 4 (1998), pp.â•–712–28, at p.â•–714. Edwards is summarizing the
meanings of these terms among Pashtuns (= Pakhtuns) analyzed in the work of Akbar
Ahmed, esp. Millennium and Charisma among the Pathans, London: Routledge and Kegan Paul,
1976.
4.╇Thomas Barfield, Afghanistan: A Cultural and Political History, Princeton, NJ: Princeton Univer-
sity Press, 2010, pp.â•–337f. Barfield is only describing Afghanistan in this passage, but the
characterization holds true for the relationships between the British Raj and now the Pakistani
state on the one hand and the highland Pashtuns of the tribal areas on the other.
5.╇David Edwards, Before Taliban: Genealogies of the Afghan Jihad, Berkeley, CA: University of
California Press, 2002, pp.â•–64f. For details on the history of the “antistate violence” that
Edwards alludes to here, see Louis Dupree, Afghanistan, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University
Press, 1973, Chapters 18–21.
6.╇See, e.g., Olivier Roy, Islam and Resistance in Afghanistan, 2nd ed., Cambridge and New York:
Cambridge University Press, 1990, p.â•–35, where, in emphasizing that “the status of the mullah
is low in the tribal zones,” Roy writes that “To be a Pashtun is to be integrated into a tribal
structure. Priests are outside the tribal system …” For a more nuanced view see Asta Olesen,
Islam and Politics in Afghanistan, Richmond, UK: Curzon Press, 1995.
7.╇This observation is a commonplace in histories of the Taliban, but see, e.g., Ahmed Rashid,
Taliban, New Haven and London: Yale Nota Bene, 2000, p.â•–87; and William Maley, “Interpret-
ing the Taliban,” in Maley (ed.), Fundamentalism Reborn? Afghanistan and the Taliban, New
York: NYU Press, 1998, p.â•–20.
8.╇This insight is most fully elaborated in the work of David Edwards and, more recently, Sana
Haroon’s Frontier of Faith: Islam in the Indo-Afghan Borderland, New York: Columbia University
Press, 2007. The latter writes, regarding the distinctive role of religious leaders in the highland
Pashtun political economy in the early twentieth century: “In the absence of a government,
there were no institutionalised legal or political systems in the frontier Tribal Areas. British
political agents and Afghan authorities each had some authority over some tribes, but because
no single authority extended over the different groups and their interactions in the Tribal
Areas, these administrators could not arbitrate between the clans—even informally. It was
this power vacuum that the mullas were able to fill” (p.€80).
9.╇While there is a rich anthropological literature on Pashtun political culture, both lowland and
highland, the havoc wreaked on these societies since the Soviet invasion has not been system-
atically studied. The reader should thus be cautioned against assuming the appli�cability of
my characterizations of Pashtun political culture to current dynamics on the frontier.

246
 NOT E S p p [24–28]

10.╇On the Hadda Mullah see David B. Edwards, Heroes of the Age: Moral Fault Lines on the Afghan
Frontier, Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1996, Chapters 4 and 5; and Haroon,
Frontier of Faith, passim.
11.╇Edwards, Heroes of the Age, p.╖191.
12.╇Haroon, Frontier of Faith, pp.â•–60–2. On the history of the Deobandi movement in South Asia,
see Barbara Metcalf, Islamic Revival in British India: Deoband, 1860–1900, Oxford and New
York: Oxford University Press, 2005.
13.╇Haroon, Frontier of Faith, p.╖89.
14.╇James C. Scott, The Art of Not Being Governed: An Anarchist History of Upland Southeast Asia,
New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 2009. Scott did not invent either of these
terms, though his is the first attempt to fully elaborate them as cross-cultural comparative
categories.
15.╇Ibid., p.╖23.
16.╇Ibid.
17.╇Ibid., p.â•–289. Scott glosses the function of religion in these contexts as “cosmologies of ethnic
collaboration.”
18.╇Contra analyses that identify supposedly inherent features of Islam as sufficient to explain
anti-colonial and subsequent forms of political violence in the Muslim world; the classical
statement of this view is Bernard Lewis, “The Revolt of Islam,” in Lewis, The Middle East and
the West, New York: Harper & Row, 1966, pp.â•–95–114.
19.╇Howard Hensman, The Afghan War of 1879–80, London: H. Allen and Co., 1881, p.â•–336. Hens-
man was an English journalist “embedded” with the Kurram Valley Field Force. The fiery
cross was a signaling device of the highland Scots clans, used to summon urgent collective
action, and was the historical antecedent of the cross burning by the Ku Klux Klan.
20.╇Scott, The Art of Not Being Governed, pp.╖7f.
21.╇Ibid., p.â•–341 n. 25, where he writes that “analogies to the Pashtuns, Kurds, and Berbers are
less apposite because, in these cases, the people in question have—or better, are assumed to
have—a common culture.”
22.╇On patterns of North Caucasus resistance from antiquity to the twentieth century, see
Michael Reynolds, “Myth and Mysticism: A Longitudinal Perspective on Islam and Conflict
in the North Caucasus,” Middle Eastern Studies, 41, 1 (2005), pp.â•–31–54. The North Caucasus
includes Chechnya and Dagestan, which remain centers of fierce Islamist resistance to Rus-
sian domination in the region.
23.╇These are both Durrani tribal groups, centered in Kandahar and the Swat Valley,
respectively.
24.╇North-West Frontier Province of Pakistan, now called Khyber-Pakh�tunkhwa.
25.╇Barfield, Afghanistan, p.â•–91. “Pakhtun” (actually pronounced pukhtun) is the highland and
eastern pronunciation, while the major lowland groups in Afghanistan pronounce this
“Pashtun.” Linguistic divergence between different “Pashtun” groups is significant and
extends not just to phonemic variation but also to broad lexical differences. See G. Morgen-
stierne, “The Place of Pashto among the Iranic Languages and the Problem of the Constitu-
tion of Pashtun Linguistic and Ethnic Unity,” Pashto Quarterly, 1, 4 (1978), pp.â•–43–55.
26.╇The Turi, for instance, is a Shi’i tribe, as are significant segments of the Bangash and Orakzai,
while the rest of the Karlanri groups are predominantly Sunni. Even among the latter there
are variations, with different groups having reputations for greater or lesser conservatism in
the practice of Sunni Islam—or, more precisely, one of the several “denominations” of Sunni
Islam practiced in the region, including Hanafi, Deobandi (which is itself rooted in the
Hanafi school), Ahl-i Hadith, and “Wahhabi.”
27.╇“Paktika—Governor Katawazay Addresses Security, Development and Tribal Dispute in
Gayan District,” cable from US Embassy, Kabul, dated 25 May 2009, posted online by
WikiLeaks at http://wikileaks.org/cable/2009/05/09KABUL1309.html
28.╇This is not to say that these people would necessarily self-identify as Karlanris. In comments
made on an early draft of this chapter, Thomas Ruttig noted that in his fieldwork in the area
he found that the highland Pashtuns that technically constitute the Karlanri confederacy do
not use this nomenclature, but self-identify instead by tribal or segmental terms. My thanks
to him for sharing this information. One of our anonymous readers seconded this view,
writing that “I have never come across this kind of self-identification.”
29.╇Various writers have given wildly varying estimates of Jalaluddin Haqqani’s date of birth,
but the latter himself identified his year of birth as 1939 in an interview with the Maktab
al-Khidamat’s magazine al-Jihad in 1985; see “Hiwar maftuh ma’ Jalaluddin Haqqani,” al-
Jihad, 2, 13 (Nov. 1985), pp.â•–18–22 at p.â•–18. See also Thomas Ruttig, “Loya Paktia’s Insur-

247
pp [28–32] NOT E S

gency,” in Antonio Giustozzi (ed.), Decoding the New Taliban: Insights from the Afghan Field,
New York: Columbia University Press, 2009, p.â•–95 n. 22. In addition to the sources cited
there, the first mention of Jalaluddin in the English-language Western press also indicates a
birth year of 1939 (Richard Bill, “Afghan Guerrillas Set Sights on Key Target,” Associated
Press, 5 Dec. 1982).
30.╇On Jalaluddin’s birthplace, see “Martyrs in the Path of Truth,” obituary of Muhammad
Isma’il Zabihullah Haqqani, Manba’ al-Jihad (Pashto), 2, 2 (Aug. 1990). Thanks to Kevil Bell
for assistance with the local geography. A map indicating the village of Karezgay can be
found online here: http://www.aims.org.af/maps/provincial/paktya.pdf
31.╇This is according to an informant who visited the region in 2010 and wishes to remain anony-
mous. In his own fieldwork in the region, Thomas Ruttig was told by other locals that they
believed Srana to have been the birthplace of Jalaluddin Haqqani; Ruttig, personal com-
munication with the author, 3 Mar. 2011.
32.╇To be more precise, “the family belongs to the Sultankhel clan of the Prangai subtribe of the
Mezi (a.k.a. Batkhel) subtribe of the Zadran”; Ruttig, “Loya Paktia’s Insurgency,” p.â•–95 n. 21.
33.╇“Portrait of a Mujahid,” Arabia (Dec. 1985), p.â•–20. The fact that Jalaluddin comes from the
family of a Zadran khan underscores the distinctive value placed on religious education
among the Karlanri tribes and plainly contradicts the prevailing view in the literature; see,
for instance, Roy, Islam and Resistance, p.â•–35, stating that “the son of a khan would never
engage in religious studies (at least in the twentieth century…).”
34.╇“Necrology for Muhammad Isma’il,” Manba’ al-Jihad (Arabic), 4 (Nov. 1990). The Haqqani
publications describe only the four brothers, with the birth order of Jalaluddin, Isma’il,
Ibrahim, and Khalil, but other sources refer to other men—or perhaps the same men by
different names—as brothers of Jalaluddin. Jere Van Dyk, for instance, mentions a Nurisam
and an Islahan as younger brothers of Jalaluddin (In Afghanistan: An American Odyssey, New
York: Coward-McCann, 1983, pp.â•–93 and 120), while Pakistani journalist Rafiq Afghan men-
tions a Sayyid Ahmad Shah as Jalaluddin’s brother, “martyred early in the war against the
communists,” leaving three living brothers (as of 2002), Ibrahim, Yusuf, and Khalil; “Gardez,
Gardez,” Ummat (Urdu), 10 Mar. 2002. Sayyid Ahmad Shah was a Haqqani commander and
does appear in the Haqqani publications—see, e.g, “Report on the Funeral of Jalaluddin
Haqqani’s Brother, Shahid Muhammad Isma’il in Miranshah,” Manba’ al-Jihad (Pashto), 2, 2
(Aug. 1990), which includes a photograph of Isma’il Haqqani leaning on Sayyid Ahmad’s
shoulder—but he is not identified there as a Haqqani sibling, and in any case as a “Sayyid”
he was a descendent of the Prophet Muhammad, a line of descent never claimed by the
Haqqani family.
35.╇On the Khost Rebellion and clerical and Karlanri resistance to Amanullah, see Olesen, Islam
and Politics in Afghanistan, pp.â•–133–50; Barfield, Afghanistan, pp.â•–183ff.; and Dupree, Afghani-
stan, p.â•–449.
36.╇Olesen, Islam and Politics in Afghanistan, p.╖149.
37.╇Ibid., pp.╖180f.
38.╇Anthony Davis, “How the Taliban became a Military Force,” in Maley (ed.), Fundamentalism
Reborn, p.â•–60. This episode is further discussed below in Chapter 3.
39.╇Dupree, Afghanistan, p.╖475.
40.╇With the one notable exception being the Shami Pir revolt, a failed assault on Khost in the
year of Jalauddin’s birth by highland tribesmen, led by an Iraqi relative of the deposed
Amanullah’s wife (the “Shami Pir,” Sayyid Muhammad Sa’adi). See Dupree, Afghanistan,
p.â•–479.
41.╇Haroon, Frontier of Faith, pp.â•–159–64.
42.╇Ibid., pp.â•–166–72.
43.╇Sadia Sulaiman and Syed Adnan Ali Shah Bukhari, “Hafiz Gul Bahadur: a Profile of the
Leader of the North Waziristan Taliban,” Terrorism Monitor, 2, 9 (Apr. 2009), pp.â•–4–6. Accord-
ing to one of our anonymous readers, some in the region dispute Gul Bahadur’s descent from
the Faqir of Ipi and maintain that he simply belongs to the same clan. Gul Bahadur’s Waziri
Taliban have had a tense and sometimes violent relationship with the Mehsud-dominated
TTP and are also distinct from the Afghan Taliban led by Mullah Muhammad Omar.
44.╇Arnold Fletcher, Afghanistan: Highway of Conquest, Westport, CT: Green�wood Press, 1982
[1965], pp.â•–250f., who observes that “these Pushtoons had been separated by force from the
Pushtoons of Afghanistan and were now limited, willy-nilly, to a choice between two suc-
cessor states, one of which had no previous existence and thus no possible claim to the
territory.”
45.╇Universal adult suffrage was not extended to the Federally Administered Tribal Areas

248
 NOT E S p p [32–38]

(FATA) until 1996, and the ban on political parties in the FATA was not lifted until the
summer of 2011.
46.╇Dennis Kux, The United States and Pakistan, 1947–2000, Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson
Center Press, 2001, p.â•–19; Rizwan Hussein, Pakistan and the Emergence of Islamic Militancy in
Afghanistan, Aldershot, UK: Ashgate, 2005, Chapter 2.
47.╇See Jamal, Shadow War, pp.╖45ff.
48.╇Fletcher, Afghanistan, p.╖253.
49.╇Ibid., and Olesen, Islam and Politics in Afghanistan, p.╖194.
50.╇On Pakistan’s relations with the Soviets during this period, see the concise account in
Fletcher, Afghanistan, Chapter 18.
51.╇Hussain, Pakistan and the Emergence of Islamic Militancy in Afghanistan, p.╖71.
52.╇Henry Bradsher, Afghanistan and the Soviet Union, Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1985,
p.â•–22.
53.╇Civil and Military Gazette (Lahore), 1 Jan. 1960, quoted in Dupree, Afghanistan, pp.╖534f.
Dupree ends his discussion of this article with the observation, “One can only wonder which
member of the Pakistan Tribal Affairs Department wrote this statement.”
54.╇Hussain, Pakistan and the Emergence of Islamic Militancy in Afghanistan, p.╖72; Dupree, Afghani-
stan, pp.â•–538ff.
55.╇On these developments see Thomas Ruttig, Islamists, Leftists—and a Void in the Center:
Afghanistan’s Political Parties and where they came from (1902–2006), n.p.: Konrad Adenauer
Stiftung, 2006; on the Jawanan-i-Musulman, see Edwards, Before Taliban, Chapter 6.
56.╇Oleson, Islam and Politics in Afghanistan, pp.╖231f. Professor Niazi died in 1970.
57.╇The Kabuli Islamists were not, however, a Muslim Brotherhood movement in anything like
a strict sense, nor can any of the mujahidin parties of the 1980s be considered as such, con-
trary to what is sometimes stated in the secondary literature. See, e.g., Peter Tomsen, The
Wars of Afghanistan, New York: Public Affairs, 2011, p.â•–304, where four of the Sunni mujahi-
din parties are erroneously identified as politically affiliated with the Muslim Brotherhood.
On this issue see Olesen, Islam and Politics, p.â•–253 n. 10.
58.╇On the symmetries of the Kabuli Islamists and their Marxist–Leninist enemies, see Barnett
R. Rubin, The Fragmentation of Afghanistan, 2nd ed., New Haven and London: Yale University
Press, 2002, pp.â•–84f., noting that “both groups believed that revolution would transform
society through the agency of a strong state, yet neither had a program for structuring that
state and financing its activities. Like the state they opposed, both groups ultimately relied
on foreign aid in the struggle for power.”
59.╇David B. Edwards, “The Evolution of Shi’i Political Dissent in Afghanistan,” in Juan R.I. Cole
and Nikkie R. Keddie (eds), Shi’ism and Social Protest, New Haven and London: Yale Univer-
sity Press, 1986, p.â•–218.
60.╇On the history of the JI, see Seyyed Vali Reza Nasr, The Vanguard of the Islamic Revolution: The
Jama’at-i Islami of Pakistan, Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1994.
On Maududi’s influence on Qutb, see John Calvert, Sayyid Qutb and the Origins of Radical
Islamism, New York: Columbia University Press, 2010, pp.â•–158 and 214.
61.╇Farshad Rastegar, “Education and Revolutionary Political Mobilization: Schooling versus
Uprootedness as Determinants of Islamic Political Activism among Afghan Refugee Students
in Pakistan,” PhD thesis: University of California, Los Angeles, 1991, p.â•–11.
62.╇I take the phrase from Roxanne Euben, Enemy in the Mirror: Islamic Fundamentalism and the
Limits of Modern Rationalism, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1999. Euben discusses
Marxist influences on Sayyid Qutb at p.â•–78
63.╇Olesen, Islam and Politics in Afghanistan, p.╖232.
64.╇Edwards, Before Taliban, p.╖238. The JIA would split in the late 1970s, and the offshoot that
maintained the closest ties to the JI during the 1980s was Gulbuddin Hekmatyar’s Hizb-e
Islami Gulbuddin (HIG).
65.╇Also spelled maulvi, maulana, and other variants, the title literally means “master,” akin to
the English honorific “lord” (though there are nuances in local usage that distinguish
between maulvi and mawlana, with the former sometimes having a pejorative sense). The
exact date of Jalaluddin’s enrollment in the Haqqaniyya madrassa is not stated in any of the
primary sources available to me, though his date of graduation is, and he noted in an inter-
view with ‘Abdullah ‘Azzam’s al-Jihad magazine that he had studied there for six years;
“al-Haj Jalaluddin Haqqani in an Interview with the al-Nasiha Magazine,” Manba’ al-Jihad
(Pashto), 2, 5 (Nov. 1990), and “Hiwar maftuh ma’ Jalaluddin HaqÂ�qani,” al-Jihad, 2, 13 (Nov.
1985), p.â•–18.
66.╇Though now the surname of the family that leads the network, the name “Haqqani” is tra-

249
pp [38–42] NOT E S

ditionally taken by many—but not all—graduates of the Haqqaniyya madrasa to indicate

their membership in the elite confraternity of Haqqaniyya alumni.
67.╇The name of the school is often spelled Dar ul-Uloom; Haqqaniyya also has various alternate
spellings. On this institution in the broader context of South Asian madaris, see Muhammad
Qasim Zaman, The Ulama in Contemporary Islam: Custodians of Change, Princeton, NJ: Prince-
ton University Press, 2002, Chapter 5.
68.╇See Mu’in-ud-Din Ahmad Khan, “Sayyid Ahmad Shahid’s Campaign Against the Sikhs,”
Islamic Studies, 7, 4 (1968), pp.â•–317–38.
69.╇Jamal Malik, Colonialization of Islam: Dissolution of Traditional Institutions in Pakistan, New
Delhi: Manohar, 1996, pp.â•–203–5.
70.╇Ibid., p.â•–209. Based on registry data from the madrassa covering the years 1977–84, Malik
found that 16.7 percent of graduates came from Bannu/North Waziristan, and 16.2 percent
from Afghanistan. In all, 87 percent of the graduates originated from the NWFP, the tribal
areas, or Afghanistan. Malik also cites an article from the Haqqaniyya magazine al-Haq from
1981 stating that “an especially high number of students from the Afghan province of Pak-
tia” were attending the school (ibid., p.â•–222 n. 92).
71.╇Manba’ al-Jihad (Pashto), 1, 4–5 (Oct.–Nov. 1989).
72.╇See Edwards, Before Taliban, pp.â•–247f. One of Khalis’ sons was a member of the Muslim
Youth. According to recent research by Kevin Bell, it appears that Khalis completed his
studies with Abdul Haq Akorwi prior to the formal establishment by the latter of the Dar
al-’Ulum Haqqaniyya. While thus not technically a graduate of the Haqqaniyya school,
Khalis was still very much a part of the clerical network associated with the madrassa. Bell,
personal communication, 6 November 2012.
73.╇Roy, Islam and Resistance, p.â•–70. The work in question—Qutb’s Social Justice in Islam, first
published in Egypt in 1949—predates Qutb’s prison years and is not representative of the
advocacy for violent Islamist revolution that would characterize his later writings. On Kha-
lis’ complex relationship with the Muslim Brotherhood and other currents of Islamist
thought, see Kevin Bell, “Yunis Khalis: The Tension between the Historiography and the
Primary Sources,” unpublished MA thesis: Princeton University, 2012.
74.╇Azmat Hayat Khan, “Factional Organization of the Afghan Mujahideens in Peshawar,”
Central Asia (University of Peshawar), 14 (1984), pp.â•–51–73, at p.â•–63.
75.╇Gahez, 40 (Dec. 1969), p.â•–1; trans. from Ashraf Ghani, “Afghanistan: Islam and Counterrevo-
lutionary Movements,” in John Esposito (ed.), Islam in Asia: Religion, Politics, Society, New
York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987, pp.â•–79–96, at p.â•–91. Brackets surrounding
“state” in this quotation are from Ghani.
76.╇Edwards, Before Taliban, p.╖249.
77.╇Ghani, “Afghanistan: Islam and Counterrevolutionary Movements,” p.â•–91.
78.╇Khan, “Factional Organization,” p.â•–55.
79.╇See Edwards, Before Taliban, Chapter 7.
80.╇Rastegar, “Education and Revolutionary Political Mobilization,” p.â•–11. I do not intend to
suggest in using this term that the “traditional Islamic culture” as articulated by groups such
as the Haqqaniyya network is any less a modern construction than the Kabulis’ revolution-
ary discourse, but simply that there was a very different way in which the two groups con-
ceived of the status quo and its relation to particular constructions of “Islamic tradition.”
81.╇On the relative “styles” of JUI and JI political activism, see Joshua White, Pakistan’s Islamist
Frontier: Islamic Politics and U.S. Policy in Pakistan’s North-West Frontier, Arlington, VA: Center
on Faith & International Affairs, 2008, p.â•–26 and passim.
82.╇Ibid., p.╖28.
83.╇Illustrating the closeness of the JUI to the Haqqani Network, Sami ul-Haq, Member of the
National Assembly and leader of one of the two wings of the JUI (JUI-S), at a JUI gathering
in Lahore in Apr. 1991 attended by Jalaluddin Haqqani, declared that “Jamiat Ulema-e Islam
considers Haqqani as of its own body; the JUI does not recognize territorial boundaries.”
“Al-Haj Mawlawi Jalaluddin Haqqani in a General Gathering of the Jamiat Ulema-e Islam in
Lahore,” Manba’ al-Jihad (Pashto), 2, 11 (May 1991).
84.╇Ibid., and Hamid Mir, “The Attack on Maulana Samiul Haq,” Ausaf, 20 Oct. 2001. On Abdul
Haq’s victory in this election, see Sayyid A.S. Pirzada, The Politics of the Jamiat Ulema-i-Islam
Pakistan, 1971–77, Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 2000, p.â•–34; and the bio-
graphical profile of Abdul Haq at the Khyber.org website, online at http://www.khyber.
org/people/ulema/MaulanaAbdulHaq.shtml
85.╇Jalaluddin established the Rahimiyya school with fellow Haqqaniyya alumnus Ahmad Gul,
and was soon joined by other Haqqaniyya students from greater Paktia, all of whom went

250
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on to join Jalaluddin in fighting the Kabul regime; “Interview with Commander Mawlawi
Hanif Shah,” Manba’ al-Jihad (Pashto), 1, 4–5.
86.╇“Al-Haj Jalaluddin Haqqani in an Interview with the al-Nasiha Magazine,” Manba’ al-Jihad
(Pashto), 2, 5 (Nov. 1990).
87.╇Radio Kabul broadcast, 17 July 1973, published in Dawn (Karachi), 18 July 1973; see Hus-
sain, Pakistan and the Emergence of Islamic Militancy in Afghanistan, p.â•–78.
88.╇Hussain, Pakistan and the Emergence of Islamic Militancy in Afghanistan, p.╖79.
89.╇On the ISI list, see Imtiaz Gul, The Most Dangerous Place: Pakistan’s Lawless Frontier, New
York: Viking, 2010, p.â•–2; the figure of 5,000 trainees is cited in Bradsher, Afghan Communism,
p.â•–17.
90.╇Tomsen, Wars of Afghanistan, pp.╖102 and 108. Tomsen was the US State Department special
envoy to the mujahidin from 1989 to 1992.
91.╇Henry Kamm, “Pakistan Officials Tell of Ordering Afghan Rebel Push,” New York Times, 23
Apr. 1989.
92.╇Kux, The United States and Pakistan, p.╖209.
93.╇The town of Nika is currently located in Nika District in northeastern Paktika, contiguous
with the Zadran district of Paktia. “Sahib” is an honorific and term of respect.
94.╇Gomal is located in Gomal District in central Paktika.
95.╇All four of these men became Haqqani commanders during the anti-Soviet jihad. Ahmad
Gul, a Zadran from Nika, Paktika, graduated from the Haqqaniyya madrassa around 1970
and helped Jalaluddin establish their first madrassa in Paktika; he was killed in battle in
Sep. 1985. Fathullah Haqqani, a Zadran from the Wazi Zadran district of Paktia, graduated
from the Haqqaniyya madrassa in 1971 and, with his brother Nizamuddin Haqqani, fought
alongside Jalaluddin from 1973 until his death in Sep. 1985. Fathullah was Jalaluddin’s
deputy and chief military commander of the Haqqani fronts in southeastern Afghanistan
from 1980 to 1985. Mutiullah also fought with Haqqani from the early 1970s, served as
battlefield commander in the 1980s, and went on to become the general director of military
affairs for HIK before his death by landmine in June 1989. See “Martyrs of the Path of
Truth,” Manba’ al-Jihad (Pashto), 1, 2–3.
96.╇The town of Urgun is in the south of the Urgun District of Paktika Province, just to the
south of Nika District.
97.╇Qazi Amin Waqad, whose father was a disciple of the aforementioned Hadda Mullah, was
one of the earliest Muslim Youth activists and was working during this period in
Nangarhar as a madrassa teacher and clandestine Islamist activist. He joined the Peshawar
émigrés in 1975 and later became Hekmatyar’s deputy.
98.╇Mawlawi Aziz Khan, “The First Jihadi Operation in Afghanistan, and the Rising of the
‘Ulama against the Communists,” Manba’ al-Jihad (Pashto), 1, 4–5 (Oct.–Nov. 1989).
99.╇Accounts of these events are given in Roy, Islam and Resistance, pp.╖74ff., and Edwards,
Before Taliban, pp.â•–235ff.
100.╇Ziruk is both a town and a district in northeastern Paktika, sharing borders with the Urgun
and Nika districts of Paktika and the Zadran district of Paktia.
101.╇The ‘Umar-e-Faruq Division was the name given to a group of Haqqani fighters stationed
during the 1980s at a base in the Zhawara valley in Khost, at which al-Qa’ida also estab-
lished a training camp known as al-Faruq.
102.╇ i.e., west, toward Zarghun Shahr District in western Paktika.
103.╇On Mansur, see Ruttig, “Loya Paktia’s Insurgency,” pp.â•–78–83. Ruttig found that the “Man-
sur network” has operated independently of the Haqqani network in recent years, and the
two networks fought under different mujahidin parties during the Soviet war though there
is a long history of cooperation and integrated mobilizations by these two groups from the
1970s to the 1990s, richly documented in the Manba’ al-Jihad volumes as well as the collec-
tion of Haqqani correspondence in the Harmony database.
104.╇“The Historic Battle of Paktia,” Manba’ al-Jihad, 3, 5 (Oct.–Nov. 1991), referencing “personal
diary entries of Mawlawi Haqqani.” An even more colorful account is given in “Portrait of
a Mujahid,” Arabia (Dec. 1985), p.â•–20, where Haqqani’s men are said to have killed thirty
government troops and to have survived in the mountains for a month on “roots, berries
and even leaves and grass” before escaping into Pakistan.
105.╇“Al-Haj Jalaluddin Haqqani in an Interview with the al-Nasiha Magazine,” Manba’ al-Jihad
(Pashto), 2, 5 (Nov. 1990); Edwards, Before Taliban, pp.â•–240 and 328 n. 20.
106.╇Edwards, Before Taliban, p.â•–241. Edward observes that, “Ironically, the assassination precipi-
tated the street demonstrations that led President Daud [sic] to arrest Taraki and Hafizullah
Amin, who then launched the Saur Revolution in April 1978.”

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pp [49–55] NOT E S

107.╇“Portrait of a Mujahid,” Arabia (Dec. 1985), p.â•–20. The author of the profile of Jalaluddin’s
life is not identified, though accompanying it is an interview with Jalaluddin conducted by
Pakistani journalist Muhammad Salahuddin.
108.╇Ibid. (Note that the article refers to the Deh Mazang prison as the “Muzzang prison.”) On
the mass execution of Afghan Islamists that had been arrested under Daoud, see the “UN
Mapping Report on Afghanistan,” Kabul, 2005, p.â•–17. This UN human rights report was
never officially released but was leaked online; see Sari Kuovo, “Facts for reconciliation:
Human rights documentation needed,” Afghanistan Analysts Network, 10 Oct. 2010, available
online at http://aan-afghanistan.com/index.asp?id=1217
109.╇Hussain, Pakistan and the Emergence of Islamic Militancy in Afghanistan, p.╖80.
110.╇Henry S. Bradsher, Afghan Communism and Soviet Intervention, Oxford and London: Oxford
University Press, 1999, p.â•–20.
111.╇Edwards, Before Taliban, p.╖241.
112.╇On the formation and character of the various Sunni parties, see Dorronsoro, Revolution
Unending: Afghanistan, 1979 to the Present, New York: Columbia University Press, 2005,
Chapter 4, and Rubin, Fragmentation of Afghanistan, Chapter 9.
113.╇See AFGP-2002-008624, pp.â•–49–56, “The High Command’s Organizational Principles for the
Mujahidin’s Conduct of Jihad in the Areas of Paktia,” no date. Of the nineteen principles of
organization, eight have to do with defining the rights and responsibilities of the tribes. For
instance, point 3 reads: “In the fronts there must be a tribal council and a base [i.e., a center
of military leadership from the party]. The tribal council shall have responsibility for organ-
izing the local mujahidin and the base shall have the responsibility for organizing the
national and military mujahidin, as well as that of advisory issues. They shall conduct their
administrative tasks in their respective areas.” See also Edwards, Before Taliban, pp.â•–252f.,
noting that he personally witnessed this tribal integration during visits to Haqqani fronts
in Paktia in 1984.
114.╇On these outreach attempts under Taraki, see Edwards, Before Taliban, p.╖82.
115.╇“Afghan Cabinet Official Reported Slain by Villagers,” New York Times, 15 Sep. 1980.
116.╇AFGP-2002-008629, p.â•–84. Parcham was one of two Afghan Marxist–Leninist parties.
117.╇“Afghan Cabinet Official Reported Slain by Villagers,” New York Times, 15 Sep. 1980.
Thomas Ruttig writes, on the basis of interviews with eyewitnesses, that Jalaluddin
Haqqani personally had Faiz Muhammad killed, hosting the minister and his team for
“negotiations” and serving them a rich meal, after which the guests fell asleep and were
killed; Ruttig, “Loya Paktia’s Insurgency,” p.â•–65, and personal communication with the
author, 3 Mar. 2011.
118.╇On JIA’s failure to establish itself in Pashtun regions, see Roy, Islam and Resistance, p.â•–131.
119.╇Yousaf and Adkin, Afghanistan: The Bear Trap, p.╖167.
120.╇Edwards, Before Taliban, p.╖252.
121.╇ Ibid., p.╖249.
122.╇Van Dyk, In Afghanistan, p.╖119.
123.╇Nasr, Vanguard of Islamic Revolution, p.╖172.
124.╇See White, Pakistan’s Islamist Frontier, pp.â•–30ff.
125.╇In one early survey of the Afghan resistance groups, the author lists ninety-five different
resistance parties, representing every shade of the political spectrum in Afghanistan; see
Azmat Hayat Khan, “Afghan Resistance and National Leadership,” Central Asia (Peshawar),
9 (1981), pp.â•–163–77. The calculated limitations on ISI–CIA aid effectively eliminated over
90 percent of these groups, though a number of Shi’i parties managed to win support from
Iran and were headquartered there during the conflict.
126.╇Rubin, Fragmentation of Afghanistan, p.╖196.
127.╇Yousaf and Adkin, Afghanistan: The Bear Trap, p.╖167.
128.╇On the Zakat system, see Malik’s exhaustive analysis in Colonialization of Islam, Chapter 4.
129.╇See the data presented in ibid., Tables 3–4 (A–F); JUI-affiliated madrassas grew from 292 in
1971 to 1097 by Jan. 1984; JI-affiliated madrassas in the same period grew from forty-one to
107.
130.╇White, Pakistan’s Islamist Frontier, p.â•–32.
131.╇According to Haqqani publications, but this could very well be an exaggeration. See Suhrat
Nangyal, “Afghanistan’ Jihad and the Virtuous Victory,” Manba’ al-Jihad (Pashto), 2, 8 (Jan.
1991), excerpting from a book by the same title published in Karachi in 1990 by a certain
Mawlana Hafez Mushtaq Ahmad Abbasi.
132.╇“The Manba’ al-‘Ulum Madrasa as a Major Educational Center,” Manba’ al-Jihad (Pashto),
1, 1 (July 1989).

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 NOT E S p p [55–62]

133.╇“Manba’ al-‘Ulum is a Resource to the Jihad,” Manba’ al-Jihad (Arabic), 1, 1 (Feb. 1990).
134.╇Edwards, Before Taliban, p.╖260.
135.╇Rubin, The Fragmentation of Afghanistan, p.╖194.
136.╇Ibid.
137.╇Edwards, Before Taliban, p.╖262; Roy, Islam and Resistance, p.╖124.
138.╇Roy, Islam and Resistance, pp.â•–152 and 129, notes that Jalaluddin Haqqani had “ousted the
Babrakzay family from their position of influence in the powerful Jadran tribe,” “by virtue
of his energy and military skill,” though he makes no reference in this connection to Paki-
stan’s influence.

2.╇BIRTH OF THE NEXUS: THE HAQQANI NETWORK, FOREIGN FIGHTERS, AND THE
ORIGINS OF AL-QA’IDA

1.╇Steve Coll, Ghost Wars, New York: Penguin Books, 2004, p.╖238.
2.╇Milt Bearden and James Risen, The Main Enemy, New York: Random House, 2003, p.╖312.
Bearden was the CIA station chief in Pakistan from 1986 to 1989.
3.╇These debates are recounted in Abu’l-Walid al-Masri, “Jalaluddin Haqqani: Astura fi tarikh
jihad Afghanistan (1),” al-Sumud, 45 (Feb.–Mar. 2010), pp.â•–34–9, at p.â•–35. This was the first of
a three-part article on the life of Jalaluddin published by Abu’l-Walid in the Taliban’s Ara-
bic-language magazine, based on an unpublished book about the early years of the Afghan
jihad that he had written in 1983. The early outreach of the Peshawar parties to the Arab
world is described in ‘Isam Diraz, Malhamat al-Mujahidin al-‘Arab fi Afghanistan, Cairo, 1989,
pp.â•–7ff.
4.╇The label “strategic asset” was applied to the Haqqanis in 2008 by Pakistani General Ashfaq
Kayani, director of the ISI from 2004 to 2007, subsequently promoted to chief of army staff.
See David Sanger, The Inheritance, New York: Harmony Books, 2009, p.â•–248.
5.╇The term “Afghan Arab” was applied to non-Afghan (and generally non-Pakistani) foreign
Muslim volunteers who came to Afghanistan between 1979 and 1993, though in many cases
these people were not Arabs but rather Southeast Asians, European, American, sub-Saharan
Africans, etc.
6.╇Thomas Hegghammer, “The Rise of Muslim Foreign Fighters: Islam and the Globalization
of Jihad,” International Security, 35, 3 (2010–11), pp.â•–53–94, at p.â•–85; ‘Isam Diraz, Malhamat
al-Mujahidin al-‘Arab fi Afghanistan, Cairo, 1989, pp.â•–5ff.
7.╇Muhammad, al-Ansar al-Afghan fi Afghanistan, p.╖31. Tufail (d. 2009) led the JI until 1987
when he was succeeded by Qazi Hussein Ahmad.
8.╇See Camille Tawil, al-Qa’ida wa akhawatuha: qissa al-jihadiyin al-‘arab, London: Saqi, 2007, 13ff.;
‘Abdallah Anas, Wiladat al-afghan al-‘arab, London: Saqi, 2002; Vahid Brown, “Foreign Fight-
ers in Historical Perspective: The Case of Afghanistan,” in Brian Fishman (ed.), Bombers, Bank
Accounts, and Bleedout: Al-Qa’ida’s Road in and out of Iraq, West Point, NY: Combating Terror-
ism Center at West Point, 2008, pp.â•–16–31; Hegghammer, “The Rise of Muslim Foreign
Fighters.” As noted below, however, Jalaluddin Haqqani claimed in 1980 that there were
already “scores” of foreign fighters among his ranks. This estimate may have been meant to
include Pakistani volunteers, who were indeed significantly represented in the Afghan war
and are not included in the term “Afghan Arab.”
9.╇There are some exceptions to this picture in the literature. For example, a declassified 2001
DIA assessment called Jalaluddin Haqqani “the Jadran [sic] tribal leader most exploited by
ISI during the Soviet–Afghan war to facilitate the introduction of Arab mercenaries”; “Vet-
eran Afghan Traveller’s Analysis of Al Qaeda and Taliban.” Coll, Ghost Wars, also acknowl-
edges the Haqqanis’ special relationship with the early Arab fighters. See also Hegghammer,
“Muslim Foreign Fighters,” p.â•–86.
10.╇For a partial translation of this book, including the text of the fatwa itself, see “The Defense
of Muslim Territories Constitutes the First Individual Duty,” trans. Thomas Hegghammer,
in Kepel and Milelli (eds), Al Qaeda in its Own Words, Cambridge, MA: Belknap/Harvard,
2008, pp.â•–102–9. On the significance of the fatwa for the Afghan Arab phenomenon, see
Hegghammer, “The Rise of Muslim Foreign Fighters,” pp.â•–74f.
11.╇The organization referred to here is an early iteration of the Ittihad party, which was estab-
lished under Sayyaf’s leadership in 1980 and was meant to unite all of the mujahidin parties.
It quickly fell apart as an umbrella organization and Sayyaf carried on the Ittihad as his own
party, with the Haqqanis remaining under HIK.
12.╇“Jalaluddin Haqqani, interview with Sami ‘Abd al-Muttalib,” Al-Ittihad (Abu Dhabi), 11 June

253
pp [62–64] NOT E S

1980 (FBIS trans.). Jalaluddin made similar appeals in other interviews over the course of the
war and in the series of publications produced and distributed by the Haqqani network’s
“Manba’ al-Jihad” publishing house; see, e.g., the “interview with Jalaluddin Haqqani dur-
ing the siege of Khost,” Manba’ al-Jihad (Arabic), 7–8 (Feb.–Mar. 1991), in which Haqqani
said, “Supporting the mujahidin is an obligated duty upon every Muslim because this war
against the atheists and the agents in Kabul is a jihad that is made obligatory for them by
God. The entire umma is in agreement upon this, and I believe it is my right to demand that
all Muslims support the Afghan mujahidin with whatever they can: their money, their souls,
and their prayers.”
13.╇After his assassination, ‘Azzam’s will was published in al-Jihad, 63 (Jan. 1990), pp.â•–58ff., and
at p.â•–58 it is headed with the inscription, “written April 20, 1986 in the home of the heroic
Shaykh Jalaluddin Haqqani.” The will was also published in the first issue of Manba’ al-Jihad
issued by the Haqqanis in 1989; Ahmad Zaydan, The “Afghan Arabs” Media at Jihad, Islama-
bad: PFI, 1999, p.â•–92.
14.╇‘Abdullah ‘Azzam, Ayat al-Rahman fi Jihad al-Afghanistan, Iskandaria: Dar al-Da’wa, 1985
[1984], p.â•–30. On the significance of Ayat al-Rahman for ‘Azzam’s mobilization efforts, see
Thomas Hegghammer, Jihad in Saudi Arabia, Cambridge and New York: Cambridge Univer-
sity Press, 2010, p.â•–41.
15.╇Haqqani was not the only Afghan leader to precede ‘Azzam in declaring support for the
Afghan jihad an individual duty, nor was he the first to reach out for Arab support. In Dec.
1980 several of the Peshawar-based party leaders visited Egypt to thank Sadat for his sup-
port and to seek further aid. Sayyid Ahmad Gilani, leader of one of the parties, was quoted
in al-Ahram on 22 Dec. as saying that “jihad is a personal jihad (jihad al-nafs), a financial jihad
(jihad al-mal), and is obligatory (fard) upon all Muslims.” Muhammad Nabi Muhammadi,
leader of Harakat, was quoted in the same paper on 27 Dec. as saying that “it is the duty
(wajib) of every Muslim to support Afghanistan.” See ‘Isam Diraz, al-‘A’idun min Afghanistan,
Cairo: al-Dar al-Misriyya li’l-Nashr wa’l-I’lam, 1993, pp.â•–56f. These appeals, however, all
emphasized material support and did not go to the extent of inviting volunteer fighters.
Inayatullah Faizi, in “Afghan Political Literature in Peshawar,” in Fazal-ur-Rahim Marwat
and Sayed Wiqar Kakakhel (eds), Afghanistan and the Frontier, Peshawar: Emjay Books Inter-
national, 1993, p.â•–281, lists Farida al-Jihad ‘ala al-jama’a wa’l-afrad (“the duty of jihad upon the
community and individuals”) published in Arabic by Nabi Muhammadi’s Harakat in 1978,
but unfortunately I have been unable to locate a copy of this work.
16.╇Hegghammer argues that ‘Azzam was the innovative advocator of “universal private mili-
tary participation” in his Jihad in Saudi Arabia, p.â•–42.
17.╇Van Dyk, In Afghanistan, p.╖109.
18.╇The Haqqanis also attempted to establish offices at some point in Mashhad, Iran, but in the
one piece of correspondence in the Harmony database concerning this it is said that Iranian
authorities had refused to permit this and that the effort “so far has produced no results”;
AFGP-2002-008681, p.â•–24, undated letter addressed to Jalaluddin Haqqani.
19.╇“Interview with Commander Mawlawi Hanif Shah,” Manba’ al-Jihad (Pashto), 1, 4–5 (Oct.–
Nov. 1989).
20.╇Mawlawi Aziz Khan, “The First Jihadi Operation in Afghanistan and the Rising of the
‘Ulama Against the Communists,” Manba’ al-Jihad (Pashto), 1, 4–5 (Oct.–Nov. 1989).
21.╇Letter from Fathullah Haqqani to Nizamuddin Haqqani and other commanders, 3 July 1980
(AFGP-2002-008587, pp.â•–23–4). The rest of the letter makes clear that this was not simply for
purposes of solicitation but rather that a program was already in place that had buy-in from
donor communities in the Gulf.
22.╇Nearly all of the Afghan Arabs took new names, most often in the form of a kunya (“Abu
So-and-So”), and this eventually became a universal practice in the Afghan Arab training
camps and a central element of identity formation in the culture of the camps.
23.╇Abu’l-Walid al-Masri, “Chats from the Rooftop of the World 1,” written at al-Faruq camp at
Zhawara, Aug. 1994, AFGP-2002-600087, pp.â•–22f. The other two Egyptians who accompanied
him to Afghanistan were a man identified only as “Isma’il” and Ahmad al-Minyawi, son of
Husni al-Minyawi, a famous Muslim Brotherhood activist who fought in Palestine in
1947–8.
24.╇Haji Din Muhammad was a senior official in HIK and brother of Abdul Haq and Haji ‘Abd
al-Qadir, two of HIK’s most capable commanders. All three later opposed the Taliban and,
under Karzai, Haji Din Muhammad was made governor of Nangarhar Province. See Said
Hyder Akbar and Susan Burton, Come Back to Afghanistan, New York: Bloomsbury, 2005,
pp.â•–76ff.

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25.╇This episode is also recounted in Basil Muhammad, al-Ansar al-‘Arab fi Afghanistan, Riyadh:
Lajnat al-Birr al-Islamiyya, 1991, p.â•–89. Abu’l-Walid dates his first meeting with Jalaluddin
to June 1979 in “Jalaluddin Haqqani: Astura fi Jihad Afghanistan (1),” al-Sumud, 45 (Feb.–
Mar. 2010), pp.â•–34–41, at p.â•–34.
26.╇Tomsen, Wars of Afghanistan, p.╖143.
27.╇On Abu’l-Walid’s career see Vahid Brown, “Abu’l-Walid al-Masri: A Biographical Sketch,”
online at http://www.ctc.usma.edu/posts/a-profile-of-abu%E2%80%99l-walid-al-masri.
Abu’l-Walid maintains a blog on which he has made available his voluminous writings and
memoirs, which are indispensable sources for the history of the Haqqanis, al-Qa’ida, and the
Afghan Arab movement in Afghanistan; online at www.mafa.asia. He lived in Iran under
house arrest from 2002 to 2011. After the “Arab Spring” overthrow of Mubarak in Egypt,
Abu’l-Walid was released from Iran and repatriated to his homeland. He occasionally writes
for the Taliban’s Arabic journal al-Sumud, in recent issues of which (vols 45–6, 2010) he
published a multipart hagiography of Jalaluddin Haqqani.
28.╇See below, Chapter 3.
29.╇‘Isam Diraz, al-Qissat al-Damiyyah li’l-Ghazw al-Sufiyiti li-Afghanistan, Cairo: Dar al-‘Itisam,
1988, p.â•–18.
30.╇Zaydan, The “Afghan Arabs” Media at Jihad, p.â•–92.
31.╇Of the small number of prominent exceptions, mention should be made of ‘Abdullah Anas,
who fought with Ahmad Shah Massoud in the Panjshir Valley in 1984, and Abu Khubayb
al-Masri, who fought for one of Sayyaf’s commanders in Kandahar beginning in the same
year; see Ayman Sabri Faraj (Abu Ja’far al-Qandahari), Dhikriyyat ‘Arab Afghan Abu Ja’far
al-Masri al-Qandahari, Cairo: Dar al-Shuruq, 2002, p.â•–49.
32.╇Van Dyk, In Afghanistan, pp.â•–98ff. Ken Guest published a photo of this “Engineer Abdul
Rahman” in his chapter “Afghanistan” in Anthony Rogers et al., Flashpoint: At the Front Line
of Today’s Wars, London: Arms and Armour, 1995, p.â•–18.
33.╇Muhammad, al-Ansar al-‘Arab fi Afghanistan, p.â•–80.
34.╇Ibid., p.â•–106 n. 8; al-Jihad, 44 (July 1988), p.â•–36. For Jalaluddin Haqqani’s praise of ‘Abd al
Rahman, see ‘Isam Diraz, Malhamat al-Mujahidin al-‘Arab fi Afghanistan, Cairo, 1989, pp.â•–36f.
35.╇Ibid., p.╖102. Abu Hafs was killed in the American aerial bombing of Afghanistan following
the 9/11 attacks.
36.╇Ibid. Abu’l-Walid al-Masri provides a number of eyewitness accounts of the battles fought
by this group at Haqqani fronts in the mid-1980s; see, e.g., Mustafa Hamid, Ma’arik al-baw-
waba al-sakhriyya, al-Faruq Camp, Paktia: 1995, p.â•–40, which describes a battle fought in 1984
under the command of Fathullah Haqqani at which Abu Hafs and ‘Abd al-Rahman “fought
with a courage bordering on madness” and earned the epithets “the mad Arabs” (al-‘arab
al-majanin) among the Haqqanis’ Afghan fighters.
37.╇‘Abdullah Anas, Wiladat al-Afghan al-‘Arab, London: Dar al-Saqi, 2002, p.â•–19. When Anas
recounted his story to Peter Bergen in 2005, he said “I’m the fourteenth Arabs [who arrived
in Pakistan to help the Afghan jihad]”; see Bergen (ed.), The Osama bin Laden I Know, New
York: Free Press, 2006, p.â•–29.
38.╇Muhammad, al-Ansar al-‘Arab fi Afghanistan, p.â•–101. This is according to Salih al-Yemeni, who
names another Yemeni, two Egyptians, two Algerians, a Libyan, a Qatari, a Jordanian, and
a Saudi as composing this group.
39.╇Letter from Fathullah Haqqani, dated 3 July 1980 (AFGP-2002-008587, pp.â•–23–4). The trainers
were Ma’afi Khan and Mawlawi ‘Arabi, and the recipients of the letter are asked to treat
them with deference; the recipients are asked to take special care of Mawlawi ‘Arabi, to
“treat [him] well with regard to everything: food, drink, etc.” It is possible that this trainer
was an Arab, as in other Haqqani correspondence field commanders are asked to treat the
Arabs with special deference (see, e.g., AFGP-2002-008578, p.â•–9). That these camps were at
Khost is indicated by the fact that they were set up at Mullah Abdul Rahman’s center, the
latter being indicated elsewhere (AFGP-2002-008576, p.â•–25) as the amir of the Khost front.
40.╇Details on the history of the Zhawara base are drawn from a 175-page book about the base
written in 1991 by Shuhrat Nangyal, the editor of the Haqqanis’ “Manba’ al-Jihad” publica-
tions series; Nangyal, Zhawara at the Dawn of History (Pashto), n.p.: Public Relations Depart-
ment of al-Haj Jalaluddin Haqqani’s Fronts, 1991.
41.╇Yousaf and Adkin, Afghanistan—The Bear Trap, pp.â•–164 and 159.
42.╇Ibid., p.â•–167. There is an abundance of other primary source material that confirms Haqqani’s
status of overall commander and supply master in the region during the 1980s, particularly
the Haqqani correspondence in the Harmony database. Jere Van Dyk, an American journalist

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who visited the Haqqani fronts in Loya Paktia in 1981, encountered a former Pakistani army
major fighting with Haqqani who told him that Jalaluddin Haqqani “has emerged among us.
He is now the leader for all of Paktia Province and for all of southeast Afghanistan,” and
described the manner in which Haqqani had united the groups fighting for the various
Peshawar parties under his command; Van Dyk, In Afghanistan: An American Odyssey, New
York: Coward-McCann, 1983, p.â•–126. Mustafa Hamid, in his voluminous memoirs from the
Afghan jihad, also confirms the impression of Haqqani’s overall leadership.
43.╇Congressman Charlie Wilson visited the Zhawara base in 1987; see Yousaf and Adkins,
Afghanistan: The Bear Trap, p.â•–62.
44.╇Mir Brahmanyar, Afghanistan Cave Complexes 1979–2004: Mountain strongholds of the Mujahi-
deen, Taliban & Al Qaeda, Oxford: Osprey Publishing, 2004, p.â•–54. In addition to this and the
above-cited text by Nangyal, see also Lester W. Grau and Ali Ahmad Jalali, “The Campaign
for the Caves: the Battles for Zhawar in the Soviet-Afghan War,” Journal of Slavic Military
Studies, 14, 3 (2001), online at http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/report/
2001/010900-zhawar.htm
45.╇On Operation Magistral, see Gregory Feifer, The Great Gamble: The Soviet War in Afghanistan,
New York: HarperCollins, 2009, Chapter 6. Ali Ahmad Jalali and Lester W. Grau, Afghan
Guerrilla Warfare, St. Paul, MN: MBI Publishing, 2001 [1995] includes several descriptions of
the battles at Zhawara, including Operation Magistral, by prominent Haqqani command-
ers—indeed, much of this book consists of Haqqani commanders’ descriptions of various
engagements during the war.
46.╇Yousaf and Adkins, Afghanistan: The Bear Trap, pp.â•–164f. Abu’l-Walid, citing the Bear Trap
book, takes exception to Yousaf’s assertion that 40 percent of these supplies were routed
through the Ali Khel base at Jaji in northern Paktia, which was under the primary control of
Sayyaf’s Ittihad party. If this was true, asks Abu’l-Walid, “why didn’t the Soviets single out
Jaji for attacks similar to the attacks on Zhawara?” Ma’arik al-bawwaba al-sakhriyya, p.â•–122.
47.╇DIA assessment, “Veteran Afghanistan traveller’s analysis of Al Qaeda and Taliban, military,
political and cultural landscape and its weaknesses,” 24 Sep. 2001, quoted in B. Raman,
“ISI–Bin Ladin Links: As Seen by the DIA,” South Asia Analysis Group, paper no.â•–791 (17
Sep. 2003), available online at http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/papers8/paper791.html;
cf. Barnett Rubin, Fragmentation of Afghanistan, p.â•–217. Jadran is a frequent alternate translit-
eration of Zadran. The assessment continues by observing that, as Zhawara (called Zahawa
in the DIA document) became Bin Laden’s base, “then serious questions are raised by the
early relationship between bin Laden and Pakistan’s ISI.” According to Abu’l-Walid al-
Masri, many of the contractors were actually Afghans, mostly from Wardak Province
(AFGP-2002-600087).
48.╇See Steve Coll, Ghost Wars, pp.╖156f., and Coll, The Bin Ladens, New York: Penguin, 2008,
p.â•–293. Jamal Ismail, an “Afghan Arab” and journalist, recalls that, in contrast to ‘Azzam,
who was based in Peshawar, “Osama was spending most of his time on the Afghan frontline
with commanders, especially general Jalaluddin Haqqani in Khost” (in Bergen, The Osama
bin Laden I Know, p.â•–47).
49.╇George Crile, Charlie Wilson’s War, New York: Grove Press, 2003, pp.â•–473ff.
50.╇Coll, Ghost Wars, p.╖201.
51.╇Coll, The Bin Ladens, New York: Penguin, 2008, p.â•–294. As Coll notes, “Osama [bin Laden]
would have had no reason to know about Haqqani’s opportunistic work with the CIA, but
he and his Arab volunteers benefitted from it.”
52.╇Rubin, Fragmentation of Afghanistan, p.╖243, makes a similar point.
53.╇Coll, Ghost Wars, p.╖202.
54.╇Jamal, Shadow War, 2009, Chapter 4. According to a Maulana Abdul Bari, a JI official who
was put in charge of this project, Zia had told him at a meeting in Rawalpindi in 1980 that
“the biggest share of the international arms and American financial assistance” would be
given to “whoever trains our boys from Kashmir.” Ibid., p.â•–110.
55.╇According to one source, the Jihadwal base was named after Asadullah Jihadwal, a Zadran
tribesman who was a close comrade of Hekmatyar’s and who was killed early in the war; see
Rafiq Afghan, “Gardez, Gardez,” Ummat (Urdu) 10 Mar. 2002. Regarding the closeness of
Hizb ul-Mujahidin to Hekmatyar, Masood Sarfraz, one of the founders of the former, stated
that its name was derived from the latter’s Hizb-i Islami (Jamal, Shadow War, p.â•–140).
56.╇Jamal, Shadow War, p.╖169.
57.╇AFGP-2002-600088, pp.â•–16–20.

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 NOT E S p p [70–73]

58.╇AFGP-2002-600088, p.â•–18. Mustafa Hamid calls them “jama’at al-mujahidin” and “jama’at
al-jihad al-‘alami,” respectively, but it is clear from the details he provides that he is referring
to the two groups better known in Pakistan as Harakat-ul Jihad al-Islami (HuJI) and Harakat-
ul Mujahidin (HuM).
59.╇Nasrullah Mansur’s collaboration with Haqqani in the 1970s anti-communist activities has
been noted above; that they remained close into the 1990s is evidenced by an account of
Abu’l-Walid of Mansur’s accompaniment of Jalaluddin at the funeral of the latter’s mother
in Miranshah. Abu’l-Walid, the Jordanian Haqqani commander Abu’l-Harith al-Urduni, and
Mansur sat together in the front row; AFGP-2002-600029, p.â•–54.
60.╇These details are confirmed in Mohammad Amir Rana, Gateway to Terrorism, London: New
Millennium, 2003, pp.â•–240f., which describes Harakat-ul Mujahidin as having begun jihad in
Afghanistan “under the leadership of the Afghan commander Jalaluddin Haqqani” in 1984;
and p.â•–264f., which quotes Qari Saifullah Akhtar, the leader of HuJI, to the effect that HuJI
worked with Nasrullah Mansur’s Harakat party during the Afghan jihad.
61.╇“Harakatul Jihad Carried out Bombings on Udichi-Chhayanaut Cultural Function,” Prothom
Alo (Dhaka), 6 Feb. 2007.
62.╇By “significant numbers” is meant scores; none of our sources describe the contingent of
Arabs at Zhawara in this battle as even approaching 100 men; Lawrence Wright, The Looming
Tower, New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2006, cites the figure of sixty in ‘Azzam’s group. It was
not until the Battle of Jalalabad—see below—that the participation of Arabs numbered in the
hundreds.
63.╇Secretary of State Clinton, “Testimony on Afghanistan and Pakistan,” House Foreign Affairs
Committee, 27 Oct. 2011. Online at http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2011/10/176281.
htm
64.╇Yousaf and Adkin, Afghanistan—The Bear Trap, p.â•–167; Jalali and Grau, Afghan Guerrilla War-
fare, p.â•–323. Additional accounts of the battle for Zhawara in English are given in Grau and
Jalali, “The Campaign for the Caves”; Wright, The Looming Tower, p.â•–110, and Coll, The Bin
Ladens, p.â•–285. Wright and Coll both rely on the accounts in Muhammad, al-Ansar al-‘Arab fi
Afghanistan, pp.â•–173ff. (and note that Coll refers to Zhawara as Jawr, a close transliteration
of the name of the base in Arabic).
65.╇The presence of Pakistani military regulars and ISI officers is attested in all of the Arabic
eyewitness sources cited below. Abu’l-Walid claims to have seen Brig. Yousaf inside the
Zhawara base during the later stage of the siege, and directly challenges Yousaf’s claim in
The Bear Trap that the latter coordinated defenses from within Pakistan (Ma’arik al-bawwaba
al-sakhriyya, p.â•–129).
66.╇Mustafa Hamid, Ma’arik al-bawwaba al-sakhriyya, al-Faruq Camp, Paktia: 1995, pp.â•–131f.;
Muhammad, al-Ansar al-‘Arab fi Afghanistan, pp.â•–174ff., which also mentions a number of
other Arab fighters present at Zhawara during the battle before 20 Apr.
67.╇Hamid, Ma’arik al-bawwaba al-sakhriyya, p.â•–126. Julaydan describes these events himself in
Muhammad, al-Ansar al-‘Arab fi Afghanistan, p.â•–174. He was later a participant in the meet-
ings in Peshawar during Aug. and Sep. 1988 at which al-Qa’ida was officially established as
“an organized Islamic faction.” See Bergen, The Osama bin Laden I Know, p.â•–80, where he
appears under his nom de guerre, “Abu al Hasan al Madani.”
68.╇Hamid, Ma’arik al-bawwaba al-sakhriyya, p.â•–132; and Abu Hafs’ own account in Muhammad,
al-Ansar al-‘Arab fi Afghanistan, pp.â•–175f. See also the latter source, p.â•–179 n. 5, observing that
this was the first contact of its kind between Arabs and Pakistanis on the Afghan battlefield,
and that a Pakistani colonel involved in this episode later offered to provide Pakistani army
training to Abu Hafs, who politely declined.
69.╇For the will—dated and indicating location in the first lines—see al-Jihad, 63 (Jan. 1990), p.â•–58.
70.╇Bin Laden audiocassette library, tape no.╖1298, speaker not identified. Thanks to Flagg Miller
for sharing this information with me. On this tape collection, see Flagg Miller, “Insights from
Bin Ladin’s Audiocassette Library in Kandahar,” CTC Sentinel (Oct. 2011).
71.╇Abu’l-Fadl ‘Umar al-Hadushi, “Nubdha mukhtasara ‘an hayat mujaddid al-jihad al-shaykh
al-imam ‘Abdallah ‘Azzam,” posted to the al-Tahadi webforum and available online at
http://www.archive.org/details/alt7dii
72.╇Or, according to Abu Mahmud al-Suri, the “Silent Brigade”; Diraz, Ma’arik Ma’sada al-Ansar,
p.â•–24.
73.╇Muhammad, al-Afghan al-‘Arab fi Afghanistan, p.â•–178. In this account, Bin Laden is noted to
have been angered by ‘Azzam’s order to return to Peshawar, arguing instead that they
should stay and fight.

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74.╇Ibid. In Wright’s account (Looming Tower, p.â•–110), this phrase (katiba al-zurafa’) is translated
as “the Brigade of the Ridiculous.”
75.╇This is according to Abu Mahmud al-Suri (Enaam Arnaout), who says that the “Silent Bri-
gade” “was heavily involved in the battles; a large number of Arabs were wounded, and
many were martyred” (Diraz, Ma’arik Ma’sada al-Ansar, p.â•–24).
76.╇Hamid, Ma’arik al-bawwaba al-sakhriyya, p.â•–136.
77.╇Diraz, Malhamat al-Mujahidin al-‘Arab, p.â•–36.
78.╇Abu’l-Walid al-Masri, AFGP-2002-600096, p.â•–173, entry dated 14 May 1986. Later in the same
diary Abu’l-Walid derisively describes these youths as war “tourists” on short visits from
Saudi Arabia; ibid., pp.â•–177f.
79.╇Mustafa Badi (Abu Ibrahim al-Logari), Afghanistan: Ihtilal al-dhakira, Sana’a: 2003, available
online at http://tokhaleej.jeeran.com/archive/2008/6/597637.html. Abu Ibrahim came to
Afghanistan in 1986 and worked briefly for the MAK before aligning himself with Haqqani
and establishing an independent training camp at Lezi (“Lija” in the Arabic sources), just
north of the Zhawara base.
80.╇According to Bin Laden himself; see Bergen, The Osama bin Laden I Know, p.╖74. The alterna-
tive notion that al-Qa’ida took its name from a “database” of the names of Afghan Arabs, a
claim made to Jason Burke by Saudi intelligence sources (see his Al-Qaeda, London: I.B.
Tauris, 2003, p.â•–293 n. 3) finds no support in the primary source evidence and should be laid
to rest.
81.╇Sada was a MAK/Sayyaf camp located near the town of Sada in the Kurram tribal agency of
Pakistan. According to Muhammad, al-Ansar al-‘Arab, pp.â•–183f., Sada was established after
the first battle at Zhawara in 1986. In an interview with Peter Bergen in 2005, ‘Azzam’s son
Hudhayfa recalled having attended Sada in 1984; Coll repeats this date, citing this interview
in The Bin Ladens: An Arabian Family in the American Century, New York: Penguin, 2008.
However, there is evidence that Southeast Asian trainees began to attend the Sada camp as
early as 1985 (see, e.g., International Crisis Group, “Jemaah Islamiyah in South East Asia:
Damaged but Still Dangerous,” 26 Aug. 2003, p.â•–4).
82.╇Faraj, Dhikriyyat ‘Arab Afghan, p.â•–25. He did not end up joining al-Qa’ida after his training,
and instead went on to fight with one of Sayyaf’s commanders in Kandahar.
83.╇The Haqqani correspondence in the Harmony database documents the logistical coordina-
tion between the Haqqanis and the various other parties operating in the southeast; for
supplying of Sayyaf’s Ittihad, see AFGP-2002-008612, p.â•–49.
84.╇Ibid., p.â•–28. Abu Ja’far’s guide from Zhawara to Jaji was an Iraqi Kurd, and he says that there
were many such people in Afghanistan at the time who came in overland from Iran. Again,
this is a population not likely to be accounted for in the Peshawar-centric view of Afghan
Arab history.
85.╇Muhammad, al-Ansar al-‘Arab fi Afghanistan, p.â•–236.
86.╇Ibid., p.╖243, citing the memoirs of Abu Mahmud al-Suri (Enaam Arnaout), who took part in
the establishment of the camp from the beginning. These same memoirs note that three days
later an Arab returned to the camp “who had been dispatched by Abu ‘Abdullah to work a
bulldozer for Shaykh Jalaluddin Haqqani in Zhawara.”
87.╇Muhammad, al-Ansar al-‘Arab fi Afghanistan, p.â•–249.
88.╇Mustafa Hamid (Abu’l-Walid), Ma’arik al-bawwaba al-sakhriyya, p.â•–133. See also Michael
Scheuer, Through Our Enemies’ Eyes, rev. ed., Washington, DC: Potomac Books, 2006,
pp.â•–108–10.
89.╇For an account of the encounter, see Wright, Looming Tower, pp.╖115ff. Soviet Colonel (now
General) Valerii Vostrotin confirms elements of the account, without mentioning Bin Laden.
Vostrotin’s forces were surprised while making their way down to Zhawara in May 1987 just
south of the Parachinar Ledge (the same area as the Ma’sada camp) when they encountered
a group of black-uniformed insurgents who engaged them in close combat, something nearly
unheard of among Afghan mujahidin. After capturing some of them the Soviets discovered
the fighters were Arab and African-American, armed with American M-14 rifles (Feifer, Great
Gamble, p.â•–230).
90.╇See Hegghammer, Jihad in Saudi Arabia, p.╖45.
91.╇The British cameraman Peter Jouvenal, describing a visit to the Zhawara base in 1982, says
that “They [the Haqqanis] shot videos of executions of Russians and sent them to Saudi
Arabia for fund-raising purposes”; Peter Bergen, Holy War, Inc., New York: Touchstone,
2001, p.â•–57. According to one of our anonymous readers, other mujahidin parties also pro-
duced videos for foreign donor audiences during the war, though lacking evidence I am

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unable to assess how widespread the practice was or whether the Haqqanis were innova-
tors with regard to other Afghan resistance groups.
92.╇Hegghammer, Jihad in Saudi Arabia, p.╖45.
93.╇Mustafa Hamid, Ma’arika al-bawwaba al-sakhriyya, pp.â•–229ff.
94.╇From a compilation of the writings and statements of ‘Azzam in praise of Jalaluddin
Haqqani, included in Husayn bin Mahmud’s “Li-madha yurid al-Amrikan ightiyal Asad
Khurasan?” (Why do the Americans want to assassinate the Lion of Khurasan [Jalaluddin
Haqqani]?) posted to the Fajr forum in 2002, available online at naseh.net/vb/showthread.
php?t=9246. Husayn bin Mahmud is a prominent Salafi-jihadi ideologue and al-Qa’ida
supporter whose writings are popular in the jihad web forums.
95.╇See, e.g., al-Jihad, 1, 5 (Apr. 1985), p.â•–7; 1, 10 (Aug. 1985), pp.â•–25–7; 2, 13 (Nov. 1985),
pp.â•–18–22; 2, 18 (May 1986), pp.â•–6–9; 2, 21 (Aug. 1986), pp.â•–28f.; 3, 28 (Mar. 1987), p.â•–23; 3, 29
(Apr. 1987), p.â•–16; 5, 56 (June 1989), p.â•–14; 7, 83 (Aug.–Sep. 1991), pp.â•–16f.; 8, 85 (Feb. 1992),
pp.â•–12–15.
96.╇al-Jihad, 3, 31 (June 1987), p.╖21. In the following issue, in an article about the Ramadan
battle at Ma’sada, Bin Laden is again mentioned only in a passing reference at the very end
of the article—though prominent attention is given in the body of the text to Abu ‘Ubayda
and his prior experience fighting at Zhawara. Al-Jihad, 3, 32 (July 1987), pp.â•–4–11, at p.â•–11.
97.╇For references to “Abu ‘Abdullah” in later issues, see al-Jihad, 57–8 (July and Aug. 1989),
stories on the Battle of Jalalabad, translated in Bergen, The Osama bin Laden I Know, pp.â•–87f.
98.╇On the negative reputation of the Arabs among other Afghan commanders, see Anthony
Hyman, “Arab Involvement in the Afghan War,” Beirut Review, 7 (1994), pp.â•–73–89, at p.â•–85.
A Saudi volunteer who stayed at al-Qa’ida’s Bayt al-Ansar in Peshawar before proceeding
to train at the al-Faruq camp at Zhawara recalls: “The man in charge of the house explained
to us during a meeting that when we got to Afghanistan, we would witness heresies and
some idolatrous practices. He warned us not to discuss these issues with the Afghans
because they would beat us up or even kill us because they were ignorant rabble.” Manahi
al-Shaybani, “Former Saudi Mujahidin Interviewed,” al-Riyadh, 30 Dec. 2003.
99.╇AFGP-2002-008578, p.╖9 (in Dari).
100.╇AFGP-2002-600096, p.╖195. See also Van Dyk, In Afghanistan, pp.╖99f., which describes the
Egyptian whom Van Dyk encountered working for the Haqqanis in 1980–1 as having held
“the Afghans … in contempt. They, he found, prayed only two or three times a day, and
then only short prayers, and were ignorant of the religion to which they subscribed.”
101.╇Haji Din Muhammad, De Khalis Zhwand, Fan aw And, Peshawar: Pir Chap Khuna, 2007,
passage translated in Bell, “Yunis Khalis,” p.â•–28.
102.╇The third of the five daily prayers in Islam, performed between mid-afternoon and
sunset.
103.╇Faraj, Dhikriyyat, p.╖28.
104.╇According to Abu’l-Walid al-Masri, al-Qa’ida had to rent the land for the latter two camps
from Hekmatyar, though none of the sources mention any such remuneration required for
the camps at Haqqani’s facilities; see Mustafa Hamid, “Abu’l-Walid’s dialogue with Egyp-
tian researcher Leah Farral,” http://allthingscounterterrorism.com/my-dialogue-with-abu-
walid-al-masri/arabic-and-english-versions-of-abu-walids-answers-to-my-questions/english-trans-abu-walids-
fifth-reponse/
105.╇See Nasser al-Bahri, Dans l’ombre de Ben Laden, Paris: Editions Michel Lafon, 2010, pp.â•–104ff.
106.╇Shuhrat Nangyal, Zhawara at the Dawn of History (Pashto), n.p.: Public Relations Department
of al-Haj Jalaluddin Haqqani’s Fronts, 1991, pp.â•–26ff. Prior to the name change of the Zha-
wara base, al-Faruq was known simply as the Zhawara camp.
107.╇Abu Jandal Nasir al-Bahri, in Khalid al-Hammadi, “Bodyguard Interviewed on First Meet-
ing with Bin-Ladin, al-Qa’ida Beginnings,” al-Quds al-‘Arabi, 22 Mar. 2005 (FBIS trans.).
108.╇Abu Qudama Salih al-Hami, Fursan al-farida al-ghayba (posted to jihadi internet forums,
2007), pp.â•–802f. After Abu Binan the Khaldan camp was administered by Ibn al-Shaykh
al-Libi and Abu Zubayda, though contrary to popular accounts it was run independently
of al-Qa’ida. Abu Qudama al-Hami fought under the Haqqanis and was wounded at Khost,
and later became a follower of Abu Mus’ab al-Zarqawi; see Jean Charles Brisard, Zarqawi:
The New Face of al-Qaeda, New York: Other Press, 2005, p.â•–21.
109.╇See Abu’l-Walid’s dialogue with Leah Farral, op. cit.
110.╇See Badi, Afghanistan: Ihtilal al-dhakira.
111.╇Hami, Fursan al-farida al-ghayba, pp.â•–688ff.; the amir of the training camp was Abu ‘Abdullah
al-Filistini and its Arab trainers included Khalil Mahmud Bashir al-Qaryuti, Abu Mahmud,

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and ‘Imad al-Din. Hami describes several of these men as veterans of the Haqqani cam-
paigns at Khost and Gardez.
112.╇Hami, Fursan al-farida al-ghayba, p.╖796.
113.╇Fazul, al-Harb ‘ala’l-Islam, vol.â•–1, pp.â•–57f.
114.╇Salamat Ali, “Cause and Effect,” Far Eastern Economic Review (23 May 1991), p.â•–24.
115.╇This fact was noted by the DIA in 2001: “For the first time, large numbers of Arabs were
observed in Afghanistan during the Soviet withdrawal. One of the key features of the
Paktia border province, in which they [the Arabs] were first established, was that it had no
Russians. … At that point, the Arab visitors were largely linked and reliant on Haqqani’s
mujahideen in Paktia”; DIA assessment, “Veteran Afghanistan traveler’s analysis of Al
Qaeda and Taliban, military, political and cultural landscape and its weaknesses,” 24 Sep.
2001, quoted in B. Raman, “ISI-Bin Ladin Links: As Seen by the DIA.”
116.╇For accounts of these battles and the Afghan Arab involvement, see Mustafa Hamid (Abu’l-
Walid al-Masri), Tharthara fawq saqf al-‘alam (distributed online, 2007–9), vols 4 (on the battle
of Jalalabad), 8 (on Khost), and 9 (on Gardez). Lengthy accounts of these battles from
another Afghan Arab can be found in Hami, Fursan al-farida al-ghayba.
117.╇‘Isam Diraz, Usama bin Ladin yarwi ma’arik Ma’sada al-Ansar al-‘Arab bi-Afghanistan, Cairo:
al-Manar al-Jadid, 1991, p.â•–71, quoting Abu Salman al-Ta’ifa, a Yemeni participant in the
Jalalabad battle.
118.╇On the ISI/CIA planning for the siege, see Coll, Ghost Wars, Chap�ter€10.
119.╇On this see Vahid Brown, Cracks in the Foundation, West Point, NY: Combating Terrorism
Center at West Point, 2007, pp.â•–4f.
120.╇AFGP-2002-600088, p.╖13.
121.╇“Interview with Commander Haji Ma’afi Khan,” Manba’ al-Jihad (Pashto), 1, 1 (July 1989).
In an interview with the MAK’s al-Jihad magazine shortly after the Jalalabad battle, Khalil
Haqqani—Jalaluddin’s youngest brother and a senior leader within the network—also
complained that the failed siege had “drained a huge quantity of materiel” from the muja-
hidin’s stores in the southeast; al-Jihad, 54 (June 1989), p.â•–14.
122.╇See Mohammed Hafez, “Jihad after Iraq: Lessons from the Arab Afghans,” Studies in Conflict
and Terrorism, 32 (2009), pp.â•–73–94, at p.â•–75.
123.╇Mahan Abedin, “From Mujahid to Activist: An Interview with a Libyan Veteran of the
Afghan Jihad,” Jamestown Foundation Spotlight on Terrorism, 3, 2 (May 2005), online at
http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews[tt_news]=178. Benotman
went on to fight at the Battle of Gardez.
124.╇“Martyrs of the Conquest of Khost (Arab Martyrs),” Manba’ al-Jihad (Arabic), 10 (June 1991).
125.╇The siege of Khost became the stuff of jihadi legend and, as noted by Loretta Napoleoni,
“For a mujahed, having participated in the battle of Khost is a sign of prestige; this is why
some people have claimed that al Zarqawi was part of the Arab-Afghan brigade” led by
Abu’l-Harith al-Urduni, though in fact Zarqawi arrived in Afghanistan a month after the
fall of Khost; Insurgent Iraq: Al Zarqawi and the New Generation, New York: Seven Stories
Press, 2005, p.â•–239 n. 2. On the Yemeni front, see Badi, Afghanistan: Ihtilal al-dhakira.
126.╇On al-Qa’ida’s involvement, see Brown, Cracks in the Foundation, pp.â•–5f. The statement there
that Haqqani “operated under the aegis of Gulbuddin Hekmatyar’s Hizb-e Islami” is an
error, and should read “Yunus Khalis’ Hizb-e Islami.” On the EIG’s involvement, see
Mustafa Hamid, Jihad ma bayn nahrayn: Mashru’ Tajikistan, n.p., 2007, p.â•–9. This is the tenth
volume of Hamid’s Tharthara fawq saqf al-‘alam series, posted online in Dec. 2007.

3.╇THE FOUNTAINHEAD: THE HAQQANI NETWORK, THE TALIBAN, AND THE RISE
OF GLOBAL JIHAD

1.╇Rubin, Fragmentation of Afghanistan, p.╖243.

2.╇Ibid., p.╖251. Peter Tomsen, in The Wars of Afghanistan, pp.╖335ff. and Chapter 17, reveals that
there were two de facto US government policies toward the mujahidin at this time: the official
policy of supporting a political settlement process, pursued by the State Department; and a
conflicting policy pursued by the CIA, which continued to back the ISI in its support for a
military solution via Hekmatyar.
3.╇Tomsen, The Wars of Afghanistan, p.╖259, based on an account by Turki al-Faisal, then head of
Saudi intelligence and chief liaison from the royal family to the mujahidin. A similar account,
though lacking any mention of Jalaluddin grabbing a pistol and confronting Hekmatyar, is

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given by ‘Abdullah ‘Azzam, who attended these meetings, in al-Tarbiyya al-Jihadiyya, Pesha-
war: Shahid ‘Azzam Media Center, 1992, pp.â•–157–9.
4.╇Also known as the Interim Islamic Government of Afghanistan (IIGA). The presidency was
given to Sibghatullah Mujaddidi and the prime minister post to Sayyaf, though an ISI bid to
have Hekmatyar made the defense minister collapsed in a contentious dispute that ended
the shura.
5.╇“Afghan Rebels Torn by New Quarrel,” New York Times, 7 Apr. 1991.
6.╇See, e.g., Nusrat al-Jihad (Urdu). 1–2 (Nov.–Dec. 1991).
7.╇“Interviews with the Field Commanders,” Manba’ al-Jihad (Arabic), 16–17 (Feb.–Mar. 1992);
Grau and Jalali, “The Campaign for the Caves,” n. 49.
8.╇It was as leader of the NCS that Shaykh Zayid bin Sultan al-Nahyan, president of the UAE,
welcomed Jalaluddin in 1991 in the first “state visit” accorded to any Afghan mujahidin
leader by the Emirates; Manba’ al-Jihad (Arabic), 11 (July 1991).
9.╇See Afghanistan Forum, 19, 3 (May 1991), p.╖3, where the NCS was announced at a press
conference in Quetta as a “new party” led by these three HIK commanders. Malang was the
HIK’s field commander for Kandahar, while Abdul Haq’s area of operation was Kabul. Both
later opposed the Taliban.
10.╇Rubin, Fragmentation of Afghanistan, p.â•–254. The Haqqanis publicized the involvement of Shi’a
groups in Manba’ al-Jihad, including an interview with Sayyid Muhammad Hasan Jagran, the
most prominent Hazara Shi’i commander of the Revolutionary Council of the Islamic Union
of Afghanistan, a Shi’a mujahidin party led by Sayyid ‘Ali Beheshti. See “Interviews with the
Field Commanders,” Manba’ al-Jihad (Arabic), 16–17 (Feb.–Mar. 1992).
11.╇Afghanistan Forum, 19, 3 (May 1991), p.╖3.
12.╇See Neamatollah Nojumi, The Rise of the Taliban in Afghanistan: Mass Mobilization, Civil War,
and the Future of the Region, New York: Palgrave, 2002, pp.â•–106 and 241 n. 3; Tomsen, Wars of
Afghanistan, pp.â•–396ff.
13.╇“Interview with Mawlana Jalaluddin Haqqani,” Manba’ al-Jihad (Pashto), 1, 10 (Apr. 1990).
14.╇“Mawlawi Jalaluddin Haqqani on the Occasion of the Establishment of a Joint Governance
Body in Khost,” Manba’ al-Jihad (Pashto), 5, 1–2 (Nov. 1993). When asked in an interview to
explain his concept of Islamic government, Jalaluddin responded that “Those in power
should be Muslim. The state law should be Islamic law, and the rulings of shari’a should be
implemented, such as finding justice for the oppressed against the oppressor, rejecting adul-
tery, applying the punishments, waging jihad, etc.” “Interview with Shaykh Haqqani,”
Manba’ al-Jihad (Arabic), 18 (1992).
15.╇Ibid. In 1994, at the height of the Afghan civil war, Jalaluddin even proposed the formation
of “an interim government which will supervise elections under a transitional set-up”;
Naseem Zehra, “Signs of Afghanistan-fatigue in Islamabad,” Inter Press Service (Islamabad),
28 Feb. 1994.
16.╇See “Interview with al-Haj Nizamuddin Haqqani, Deputy Commander of the Southern
Fronts,” Manba’ al-Jihad (Pasho), 3, 1 (July 1991).
17.╇“Mawlawi Jalaluddin Haqqani on the Occasion of the Establishment of a Joint Governance
Body in Khost,” Manba’ al-Jihad (Pashto), 5, 1–2 (Nov. 1993). According to a 1994 letter from
al-Qa’ida leader Abu ‘Ata al-Sharqi, then amir of the al-Qa’ida camp at Jihadwal, to the al-
Qa’ida leadership in Sudan, the Khost governor appointed during this process (‘Abd al-
Qayyum Khan) was “from the Haqqani organization” (tanzim Haqqani). To my knowledge,
this is the first mention of anything akin to the “Haqqani network” in the sense of its current
usage, though earlier Arabic sources sometimes refer to the “Haqqani group” (jama’a
Haqqani).
18.╇Rubin, Fragmentation of Afghanistan, p.╖277.
19.╇Ibid.
20.╇“On the Reconciliation between the Ahmadzai Tribe and the Nangarhar [Jalalabad] Shura,”
Manba’ al-Jihad (Pashto), 5, 1–2 (Nov. 1993). The same article refers to Jalaluddin as one “who
has always been the �messenger of peace, the creator of stability, and the advocate of non�
violence”!
21.╇Badi, Afghanistan: Ihtilal al-dhakira.
22.╇Ibid.
23.╇See Vahid Brown, “Classical and Global Jihad: al-Qa’ida’s Franchising Frustrations,” in Assaf
Moghadam and Brian Fishman (eds), Fault Lines in Global Jihad, New York: Routledge, 2011,
pp.â•–94f.
24.╇For the development of the polarization in Peshawar, see the volumes of Afghanistan Forum
for 1990 and 1991.

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pp [88–92] NOT E S

25.╇“Interview with Jalaluddin Haqqani During the Siege of Khost,” Manba’ al-Jihad (Arabic), 7–8
(Feb.–Apr. 1991).
26.╇Badi, Afghanistan: Ihtilal al-dhakira.
27.╇On Bin Laden’s offer, see Wright, Looming Tower, p.â•–157, where Bin Ladin is said to have
offered 100,000 men. A more plausible account is provided by Bin Laden’s son Omar, who
recalls that his father offered 12,000 men; Najwa bin Laden et al., Growing Up bin Laden, New
York: St. Martin’s Press, 2009, p.â•–82.
28.╇“Afghan guerrillas for Riyadh,” Pakistan Times, 9 Feb. 1991.
29.╇Afghanistan Forum, 19, 2 (Mar. 1991), p.╖4.
30.╇Tomsen, The Wars of Afghanistan, p.╖419.
31.╇See Mamoun Fandy, Saudi Arabia and the Politics of Dissent, New York: Palgrave, 2001, Chap-
ter 6; AFGP-2002-000103. The reforms that Bin Laden proposed, however, were quite radical,
and included calls for the immediate resignation of the king and his brothers.
32.╇“Interview with Shaykh Haqqani,” Manba’ al-Jihad (Arabic), 18 (1992); see also Sharon
Herbaugh, “Mojaddidi Says Deal Near on Hekmatyar’s Demand for Removing Militia,” AP,
17 May 1992; and Anwar Iqbal, “Masoud, Hekmatyar refuse to acknowledge peace accord,”
UPI, 21 May 1992.
33.╇On Haqqani’s reconciliation activities over this period, see, e.g., Anwar Iqbal, “Rival Afghan
mujahideen leaders sign long-awaited peace accord,” UPI, 25 May 1992; John Jennings, “Air
Strikes, Artillery End Kabul Calm,” 9 Feb. 1994; “Temporary cease fire begins in Kabul,” UPI,
15 Feb. 1994; Anwar Iqbal, “Afghans reveal yet another peace plan,” UPI, 28 Apr. 1994.
34.╇Sally Neighbour, The Mother of Mohammed: An Australian Woman’s Extraordinary Journey into
Jihad, Melbourne: Melbourne University Press, 2009, p.â•–198.
35.╇Salah Najm, “Osama bin Laden, the Destruction of the Base,” Al-Jazirah, 10 June 1999, quoted
in Michael Scheuer, Through Our Enemies Eyes, rev. ed., Dulles, VA: Potomac Books, 2007,
p.â•–130 (ellipses in Scheuer).
36.╇“Important Statement from the Eritrean Islamic Jihad Movement in regards to the recent
developments in the Ethiopian and Eritrean arenas,” Manba’ al-Jihad (Arabic), 11 (July 1991).
The statement is notable for its framing of the Eritrean Islamist struggle as nested within a
global confrontation between Islam and an alliance of “Crusaders and Zionists” and their
Arab and Muslim regime “agents.” The Haqqanis published Egyptian jihadist statements in
a magazine that predated the Manba’ series, on which see below.
37.╇Rohan Gunaratna, Inside Al Qaeda, New York: Berkley Books, 2002, pp.╖201ff., based on late-
1990s interviews with Eritrean Islamic Jihad leaders in the Nida’ al-Islam magazine. The
seized computer of Enaam Arnaout (see below) also contains an undated letter addressed by
the EIJM to Osama bin Laden, outlining their history and goals and seeking support with
training and the development of a recruitment infrastructure. Enaam Arnaout computer
files, folder “Tareekh Osama,” images 118–20. Thanks to J.M. Berger for sharing these files
with me.
38.╇See “The Eritrean Islamic Jihad Movement,” in Al-Qai’da’s (mis)Adventures in the Horn of
Africa, West Point, NY: United States Military Academy, Harmony Project, 2006, pp.â•–83–5.
That communiqué has a distinctly “Salafi” tone, stating toward the end that the alliances
between Arab and Muslim regimes and the “Crusaders and Jews” is in violation of the
principle of wala’ wa’l-bara’ (loyalty and disavowal), a central tenet of Salafi ideology.
39.╇See US v. Enaam Arnaout, Government’s Evidentiary Proffer, NDI Eastern Division, 02 CR
892, pp.â•–21 and 37–43; J. Millard Burr and Robert O. Collins, Revolutionary Sudan, Leiden:
Brill, 2003, Chapter 3.
40.╇From the seized Enaam Arnaout computer, file folder “Jabal Daily Reports.” The letterhead
is in English, while the letter is in Arabic and bears Jalaluddin’s signature.
41.╇US v. Enaam Arnaout, Government’s Evidentiary Proffer, NDI Eastern Division, 02 CR 892,
Exhibit 53. Note that these files also included the minutes and memoranda of the meetings
during which al-Qa’ida was formally established; see Bergen, The Osama bin Laden I Know,
pp.â•–75ff.
42.╇Ibid., exhibits 84–98.
43.╇Jalaluddin Haqqani, Is the Afghanistan War a Russian–American War? (Pashto), 2nd ed., n.p.:
Manba’ al-Jihad, 1988–9, p.â•–33. As the preface to this book states, it consists of a transcript of
a long speech that Haqqani made to the HuJI conference.
44.╇Jamal Khashoggi, “Al Qaeda Organization: Huge Aims without Programs or Cells,” al-Hayat,
12 Oct. 1998, as quoted in Scheuer, Through Our Enemies Eyes, p.â•–110.
45.╇The Haqqanis also published a Pashto weekly beginning in 1991 entitled “De Jihad Hindara,”

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though we were unfortunately unable to obtain copies of this until after the completion of
this book.
46.╇Jalaluddin complained of the dwindling American support to State Department envoy Peter
Tomsen in a meeting at his home outside Miranshah in July of 1989; Tomsen, The Afghanistan
Wars, p.â•–300.
47.╇Zaydan, The “Afghan Arabs” Media at Jihad, p.â•–78. Zaydan is our only source that links the
Haqqanis to this magazine, copies of which we were unable to locate. Two knowledgeable
sources in Afghanistan whom we contacted in search of copies of this magazine expressed
skepticism on this point and, though they’d heard of the magazine, did not recall any con-
nection to the Haqqanis.
48.╇“Text of al-Haj Haqqani’s Interview with the Arab al-Murabitun Magazine,” Manba’ al-Jihad
(Pashto), 2, 12 (June 1991).
49.╇“Highlights of Mawlawi Jalaluddin Haqqani’s and Mawlawi ‘Abdullah Zakeri’s Speeches to
a Joint Conference of Afghan Scholars and the Council of Commanders,” Nusrat al-Jihad
(Urdu), 3 (Jan. 1991).
50.╇Fazl ur Rahman, general secretary of the JUI, at a gathering of Islamist leaders in Karachi
addressed by Jalaluddin Haqqani in 1992; “Al-Haj Jalaluddin Haqqani Visits Islamic Madaris
and Societies in Karachi,” Manba’ al-Jihad (Pashto), 3, 9–10 (May 1992). At the same confer-
ence, Mawlawi Faruq Kashmiri, deputy head of Harakat-ul-Mujahidin, called on “all of you
students (taliban) to prepare yourself for jihad, and go to Afghanistan under the leadership
of Mawlana Haqqani on your summer recess time.”
51.╇See, e.g., Nusrat al-Jihad, 3, 4 (Feb. 1991), in which the first article is a long editorial on the
“American conspiracy,” which argues: “America has been interfering in the internal affairs
of the Muslim Gulf states in order to secure the stable flow of oil to the US. Now the oppor-
tunity has arisen to meet the objective. In this war, America has everything to gain and
nothing to lose. Muslims die, their countries are destroyed, they pay for the costs of the war,
while America gets control over the oil fields.” See also the article “The New World Order,”
Nusrat al-Jihad (Urdu), 5 (Mar. 1991), which cites President George H.W. Bush and Henry
Kissinger before arguing that with “the collapse of the Soviet Union, America does not face
a communist threat, and it sees Islam as the next enemy. America is talking about this new
world order as simply a means to repress Islam.”
52.╇See also letters from Jalaluddin Haqqani calling for support of the mujahidin of Bangladesh,
India, and Burma in AFGP-2002-800928; and the following Haqqani articles on the Burmese
Jihad: “Arakan: The Islamic Movement of Burma,” Nusrat al-Jihad, 1, 5 (Mar. 1991), providing
a glowing account of the Rohingya Solidarity Organization (RSO) and its efforts to defend
Burmese Muslims from state repression; and Muhammad Ayyub Munir, “Think about your
Burmese Muslim Brothers,” Nusrat al-Jihad, 2, 3–4 (Jan.–Feb. 1992), again providing aware-
ness-raising information on the plight of Burma’s Muslims.
53.╇Tomsen, The Wars of Afghanistan, p.╖424, suggests direct ISI support for the camps but pro-
vides no evidence.
54.╇According to Ahmad Shah Massoud, who claimed that Beg laid out this vision to him; see
Tomsen, The Wars of Afghanistan, p.â•–416.
55.╇In The Muslim, 21 Nov. 1990, quoted in Tomsen, The Wars of Afghanistan, pp.╖417f.
56.╇On the establishment of these camps in 1991, see AFGT-2002–000079.
57.╇“Manba’ al-‘Ulum is a Resource to the Jihad,” Manba’ al-Jihad (Arabic), 1 (Feb. 1990).
58.╇B. Raman, “An Analysis of United States Bombing of Terrorist Camps in Afghanistan,”
4€Nov. 1998, online at http://www.subcontinent.com/research/sapra_documents/tr_1998_
11_001_s.html
59.╇Don Rassler interview with Bob Nickelsberg, 23 Sep. 2010. Journalist Anthony Davis was
also present during this visit, and confirmed the presence of Uighurs at Zhawara, speaking
with a group of them in Mandarin Chinese.
60.╇The man, identified only as Mutelip [i.e., Mutallab], when asked if the East Turkestan Islamic
Movement (ETIM) leader Hassan Makhsum paid for the training, replied, “No, he did not.
It was financed by the Arabs. (Reporter): Who provided the money? (Mutelip): Bin Ladin
did. Bin Ladin took care of everything, including food, clothing, medical care, and living and
other expenses.” “A Decade of Terror: How are the ‘East Turkistan’ Elements Trained?” Sohu
(Beijing), 25 July 2002.
61.╇Letters in the Harmony database from the al-Qa’ida members in Afghanistan addressed to
the senior leadership in Sudan also attest to al-Qa’ida’s (often ambivalent) involvement in
this project; see Brown, Cracks in the Foundation, pp.â•–11f.

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pp [95–102] NOT E S

62.╇Mustafa Hamid, Jihad ma bayn nahrayn: Mashru’ Tajikistan, p.â•–11. The two Egyptians were Abu
Dujana al-Sharqawi and Abu Tamim al-Sharqawi.
63.╇Hamid, Jihad ma bayn nahrayn, p.╖16. The Hanafi school is one of four Sunni schools of Islamic
jurisprudence, historically predominant in Afghanistan and Central Asia, and is the school
in which the Deobandi movement was originally rooted. Salafis generally reject the four
schools and are hostile to Sufism as deviating from strict Islamic monotheism.
64.╇Ibid., pp.╖20, 30.
65.╇Ibid., p.â•–48. The notorious commander was Mawlawi ‘Abd al-Latif, who belonged to Nabi
Muhammadi’s Harakat.
66.╇Hamid, Jihad ma bayn nahrayn, p.╖39.
67.╇Fazul, al-Harb ‘ala’l-Islam, vol.â•–1, pp.â•–145f. and 167.
68.╇Bahri, Dans l’ombre de Ben Laden, pp.â•–111 and 128 (Bahri refers to Fazul here by the pseudo-
nym “Yacoub al-Dusari”).
69.╇Bahri, Dans l’ombre de Ben Laden, p.â•–128.
70.╇See Fazul, al-Harb ‘ala’l-Islam, vol.â•–1, pp.â•–390ff.
71.╇Ibid.
72.╇“Abir Sabil” (a pseudonym), “Lasna ‘ala ruq’a al-shatranj wa lasna ahjar,” (We are not Pieces
on a Chessboard), message to Abu’l-Walid dated 12 Jan. 2011, posted on 23 Feb. to http://
www.mafa.asia/ar/temp.php?K_Mafa=1061&id1=6&detail=511&cnl=1
73.╇AFGP-2002-600053.
74.╇Ibid., p.╖14 (quoting from the verbatim English translation provided with the declassified
original document and prepared by the Department of Defense; both are available on the
website of the Combating Terrorism Center at West Point).
75.╇Ibid., p.╖2, letter dated 30 Sep. 1993.
76.╇See Fazul, al-Harb ‘ala’l-Islam, vol.â•–1, pp.â•–168ff.
77.╇Ibid., p.╖167.
78.╇See, for instance, the interview with Bin Laden conducted by John Miller for ABC at an al-
Qa’ida camp near Zhawara in May 1998, online at http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/
frontline/shows/binladen/who/interview.html
79.╇To cite but one example, Mohamed Sadeek Odeh came to Khost from the Philippines in Oct.
1990 and trained at al-Faruq at Zhawara before swearing allegiance to Bin Laden in 1992. He
went to Kenya in 1993, took part in the US embassy bombings in 1998, and is currently
serving a life sentence in the United States; see Roy Gutman, How We Missed the Story, Wash-
ington, DC: United States Institute of Peace, 2008, pp.â•–16f. Fazul, the overall leader of the
embassy bombing teams, also trained at al-Faruq before being sent to Africa on this mission;
see my profile of Fazul in Al-Qai’da’s (mis)Adventures in the Horn of Africa, West Point, NY:
United States Military Academy, Harmony Project, 2006, pp.â•–89–105.
80.╇See Abu’l-Walid’s dialogue with Leah Farrall, op. cit.
81.╇On the nationalism of the Taliban regime, see Robert D. Crews, “Moderate Taliban?” in
Robert D. Crews and Amin Tarzi (eds), The Taliban and the Crisis of Afghanistan, Cambridge,
MA: Harvard University Press, 2008, pp.â•–238–73, at pp.â•–263f.
82.╇On more recent conflicts between these various factions, see Vahid Brown, “Al-Qa’ida and
the Afghan Taliban: Diametrically Opposed?” Jihadica, 21 Oct. 2009, available online at
http://www.jihadica.com/al-qa%E2%80%99ida-and-the-afghan-taliban-%E2%80%9
Cdiametrically-opposed%E2%80%9D/
83.╇On the predominance of Haqqaniyya graduates in the Taliban’s upper ranks, see Rashid,
Taliban, Appendix II.
84.╇See Akbar and Burton, Come Back to Afghanistan, pp.â•–76ff.; “Afghan elders ask Taliban to
quit,” The News (Islamabad), 16 Nov. 2001.
85.╇See Ahmed Rashid, Descent into Chaos, New York: Viking, 2008, p.╖88. Former Taliban min-
ister Mullah Zaeef refers to this group of Haqqani allies in his memoirs: “Some of the com-
manders—like Karzai, Abdul Haq, Mullah Malang and Gul Agha Shirzai—were in direct
contact with America and were working with the CIA and FBI.” Abdul Salam Zaeef, My Life
with the Taliban, New York: Columbia University Press, 2010, p.â•–125.
86.╇Gutman, How We Missed the Story, p.╖92.
87.╇“Resistance Commanders on the Situation Inside Afghanistan: Interview with Maulawi
Haqani Commander of the Zadran Front,” Afghan Information Centre Monthly Bulletin, 82 (Jan.
1988), p.â•–13, where Jalaluddin is quoted as saying, “At the beginning of the offensive I sent
messages to the mujahideen [sic] commanders in other provinces to attack Russian troops in
their own areas, such as Commander Qari Baba (Ghazni), Mullah Malang (Kandahar) and

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Masoud (Panjsher). For that reason, they showed solidarity with our front by launching
heavy attacks on the enemy …”
88.╇See Davis, “How the Taliban became a Military Force,” in Maley, Fundamentalism Reborn?
p.â•–52.
89.╇Hamid, Ma’arika al-bawwaba al-sakhriyya, p.â•–137.
90.╇Rubin, Fragmentation of Afghanistan, p.╖255.
91.╇Hamid, Jihad ma bayn nahrayn, p.â•–21; Abu ‘Ata al-Sharqi letter to al-Qa’ida leadership in
Sudan, 4 Sep. 1994, AFGP-2002-800581.
92.╇Letter from Abu ‘Ata al-Sharqi on behalf of the “Jihadwal State” (dawla Jihadwal) to “the
Military Official,” dated 4 Sep. 1994, AFGP-2002-800581, p.â•–5. From the letter it is unclear
exactly what Fayez Muhammad had done to the al-Qa’ida leaders in Khost, though it does
describe the protestations made by the latter to both representatives of Hekmatyar in Kabul
and to Qazi Hussein Ahmed, the leader of the Pakistani JI, during a visit to the Badr camps
at Jihadwal.
93.╇AFGP-2002-800581.
94.╇Hamid, Jihad ma bayn nahrayn, p.╖21.
95.╇Muhammad, De Khalis Zhwand, passage translated in Bell, Yunis Khalis, p.╖61.
96.╇On the Iraqi tank transfers, see Coll, Ghost Wars, p.â•–227. Abu’l-Walid describes the Arabs’
repairs of the Khost airstrip in Jihad ma bayn nahrayn, p.â•–24. He states that the funding for
the repairs was provided by Abu ‘Abd al-Rahman Khadr al-Kanadi. The latter’s teenage
son Omar Khadr was imprisoned in Guantanamo in 2002; see Michelle Shephard, Guanta-
namo’s Child: The Untold Story of Omar Khadr, Mississauga, Ontario: Wiley, 2008.
97.╇Interview with journalist Anand Gopal, 5 Aug. 2011. Gopal was in Khost during this period
and personally interviewed a number of the principals directly involved in these
negotiations.
98.╇Interview with Anand Gopal, 5 Aug. 2011; Ruttig, “Loya Paktia’s Insurgency,” p.â•–65.
99.╇An ISI role is suggested by, e.g., Davis, “How the Taliban became a Military Force,” p.â•–70;
Anand Gopal also mentioned this in our interview, but said that if there was ISI pressure
it was probably not the decisive factor.
100.╇Davis, “How the Taliban became a Military Force,” p.â•–60.
101.╇Rashid, Taliban, p.╖60, citing his interview with Haqqani in Kabul in July 1997.
102.╇Ibid.
103.╇See Najwa bin Laden et al., Growing Up Bin Laden, p.â•–174, where Saznur appears as “Mullah
Nourallah.”
104.╇Cable from American Consulate in Peshawar to SecState, “Afghanistan: Taliban Agree to
Visits of Militant Training Camps, Admit Bin Ladin is their Guest,” Jan. 1997, p.â•–2. Available
online at http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB295/doc06.pdf
105.╇Al-Bahri, Dans l’ombre de Ben Laden, pp.â•–83f. There are in fact strong indications that signifi-
cant numbers of former Afghan communist (Khalqi) officers had joined the ranks of the
Taliban by early 1995 and helped to fill “key gaps in the[ir] fighting capability” (Davis,
“How the Taliban became a Military Force,” p.â•–54). Haji ‘Abd al-Qadir, Bin Laden’s initial
host in Jalalabad, also cited the presence of communist officers in Taliban ranks as one
reason for his opposition to the movement; Kamal Matinuddin, The Taliban Phenomenon:
Afghanistan 1994–1997, Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1999, p.â•–58.
106.╇Neighbour, Mother of Mohamed, p.╖232.
107.╇Translated in Bruce Lawrence, Messages to the World: The Statements of Osama bin Laden,
London: Verso, 2005, pp.â•–24–30.
108.╇Rahimullah Yusufzai and Sunil Narula, “Shifting Battle Lines: The Taliban face their tough-
est test as diplomatic and military pressures mount,” Outlook India, 30 Oct. 1996.
109.╇Al-Bahri, Dans l’ombre de Ben Laden, p.â•–83.
110.╇Ibid., p.╖84.
111.╇See Bergen, Holy War, Inc., Prologue.
112.╇Al-Bahri, Dans l’ombre de Ben Laden, p.â•–82.
113.╇Gutman, How We Missed the Story, p.╖110.
114.╇Abubakar Siddique, “Pakistani Chief’s Death would have Broad Implications,” Radio Free
Europe, 7 Aug. 2009.
115.╇‘Umar ‘Abd al-Hakim (Abu Mus’ab al-Suri), “Afghanistan, the Taliban, and the Battle for
Islam Today,” AFGP-2002-602383, p.â•–22.
116.╇State Department cable from Islamabad to SecState, “Afghanistan: Jalaluddin Haqqani’s
Emergence as a Key Taliban Commander,” Jan. 1997. Available online at http://www.gwu.
edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB295/doc05.pdf

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pp [108–113] NOT E S

117.╇Marc Kaufman, “Schooling of Afghan Girls Goes Ahead,” Philadelphia Inquirer, 28 Feb. 1997.
The story also quotes a Mohammad Ibrahim, described as “a former mujaheddin com-
mander” whose daughter was attending one of the schools. It is possible that this is
Muhammad Ibrahim Haqqani, one of Jalaluddin’s brothers. He is quoted as saying that “the
Talibs do not know Islam or the knowledge of the age. So when it comes to schools, we will
do what we think is the right thing.”
118.╇Anand Gopal, Mansur Khan Mahsud, and Brian Fishman, “The Battle for Pakistan: Mili-
tancy and Conflict in North Waziristan,” New America Foundation, Apr. 2010, pp.â•–7f., online
at http://counterterrorism.newamerica.net/sites/newamerica.net/files/policydocs/
northwaziristan.pdf
119.╇AFGP-2002-008585, p.â•–5 (Pashto), dated 4 July 1985, from “Jamila,” who introduces herself
as head of the local MSF mission, and which begins with well-wishes to “you and your
mujahidin” in an impending attack on Khost. Jamila writes to Jalaluddin that “I was glad
to hear of your decision that you wanted to appoint a doctor for Sarana. In about a month
or so, I will send a Muslim doctor by the name of Ibrahim, who is originally French. He will
visit your clinic and the Ziruk clinic,” and closes by writing, “I hope to meet you in person
and talk to you about our programs so that I will learn your opinion about Paktia and work
here according to your instructions.”
120.╇See Cable from American Consulate in Peshawar to SecState, “AfghanÂ�istan: Taliban Agree
to Visits of Militant Training Camps, Admit Bin Ladin is their Guest,” op. cit.; and the
declassified National Intelligence Daily, Director of Central Intelligence, 30 Sep. 1996, which
observed that “Taliban has closed militant training camps associated with Prime Minister
Hikmatyar, factional leader Sayyaf, and Pakistan’s Jamaat-i-Islami. Taliban has not closed
other camps associated with Usama bin Ladin, Hizbi Islami (Khalis), Pakistan’s Jamiat-
Ulema-i-Islam, and Harakat ul-Ansar, including the HUA’s main training camp at Khowst.”
121.╇Michael Griffin, Reaping the Whirlwind, rev. ed., London: Pluto Press, 2003, p.╖116.
122.╇Husain Haqqani, Pakistan: Between Mosque and Military, Washington, DC: Carnegie Endow-
ment for International Peace, 2005, p.â•–236.
123.╇Rashid, Descent into Chaos, p.â•–113 and 422 n. 8. Rashid writes that journalists “said” that
these ISI casualties were seen and that US diplomats later confirmed this to him, though I
was unable to locate any published reports from the time in which a Pakistani journalist
publicly reported this claim.
124.╇The nine wanted fugitives thus identified are Riaz Basra, his brother Ghulam Shabir,
Muhammad Alsam Moavia, Ijaz Ahmad Tarar, Tariq Mahmud, Abdul Aziz “Kotana,”
Muhammad Zaki, Muhammad Ajmal (“Akram Lahori”), and Muhammad Tanveer Khan.
125.╇This refers to regions of Kashmir occupied by Pakistan and India, respectively.
126.╇AFGT-2002–000079 AFGP-2002-000079.
127.╇The Nation (Islamabad), 7 Oct. 1999.
128.╇Manba’ al-Jihad (Arabic), 11 (July 1991).
129.╇The Nation (Islamabad), 12 Oct. 1999.
130.╇Nusrat al-Jihad (Urdu), 3 (Jan. 1991).
131.╇See J. Todd Reed and Diana Raschke, The ETIM: China’s Islamic Militants and the Global
Terrorist Threat, Santa Barbara, CA: Praeger, 2010, pp.â•–47f.; James Millward, Violent Separa-
tism in Xinjiang: A Critical Assessment, Washington, DC: East–West Center, 2004, p.â•–14.
132.╇This is how his name is given in the TIP’s own Arabic literature, though in secondary
sources, such as the above-cited books by Reed and Raschke and Millward, his name is
spelled Hasan Mahsum.
133.╇‘Abdullah Mansur, “Sira Abi Muhammad rahimuhu Allah,” Turkistan al-Islamiyya, 1 (July
2008), pp.â•–28ff.
134.╇‘Abdullah Mansur, “Liqa ma’a Amir al-Hizb al-Islami al-Turkistani al-Akh al-Mujahid ‘Abd
al-Haqq,” Turkistan al-Islamiyya, 2 (Oct. 2008), pp.â•–5–8; 3 (Feb. 2009), pp.â•–9–12; and 4 (June
2009), pp.â•–8–12.
135.╇Abu’l-Walid also confirms that one “Turkistani” was among the twenty-five people killed
in the strikes on the camps; Mustafa Hamid, Jihad ma bayn nahrayn, p.â•–71.
136.╇On Saifurrahman Mansur, see Ruttig, “Loya Paktia’s Insurgency,” pp.â•–78ff.
137.╇Ibid., p.╖79.
138.╇“Consultation du dossier de Mr BEYAYO,” testimony of Walid Othmani, Jan.–Feb. 2009.
Thanks to Sebastian Rotella for sharing this with me.
139.╇‘Abdullah Mansur, “al-Shahid al-Shaykh Bilal al-Turkistani,” Turkistan al-Islamiyya, 4 (June
2009), pp.â•–19–22.
140.╇The TIP’s recent media products, including the articles discussed above, are thus quite

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explicit about the TIP’s close connections to al-Qa’ida and the Haqqani network, which
marks a departure from some of their earlier rhetoric. Before his death, the first leader of
the TIP denied in an interview in 2002 that the TIP had any connection to al-Qa’ida or
intentions to carry out international terrorist attacks. See Millward, Violent Separatism in
Xinjiang, p.â•–23; Philip Pan, “U.S. Warns of Plot by Group in W. China,” Washington Post, 29
Aug. 2002.
141.╇Abu’l-Walid al-Masri, Qissat al-bay’at al-‘arabiya li-amir al-mu’minin Mullah Muhammad
‘Umar, no date, posted to various jihadi internet forums on 19 and 20 July 2007. See also
Vahid Brown, “The Facade of Allegiance: Bin Ladin’s Dubious Pledge to Mullah Omar,”
CTC Sentinel, 3, 1 (Jan. 2010), pp.â•–1–6, and Brown, Cracks in the Foundation, p.â•–17.
142.╇Al-Bahri, Dans l’ombre de Ben Laden, p.â•–109.
143.╇For the text of the announcement of the Front, see Lawrence, Messages to the World, pp.╖58ff.
Lawrence confuses Fazlur Rahman Khalil of HuJI, one of the signatories to the Front, with
the Pakistani parliamentarian Fazlur Rahman, who leads the Islamist political party
JUI-F.
144.╇Al-Bahri, Dans l’ombre de Ben Laden, p.â•–88.
145.╇On these interviews, see Bergen, The Osama bin Laden I Know, pp.╖194ff.; and Gutman, How
We Missed the Story, pp.â•–128ff.
146.╇On this issue see Brown, “The Facade of Allegiance.”
147.╇Gutman, How We Missed the Story, p.╖129.
148.╇Ahmad Zaydan, Usama Bin Ladin bi-la Qina’, Beirut: al-Sharaka al-‘Alami li’l-Kitab, 2003,
p.â•–130.
149.╇Abu’l-Walid, Qissat al-bay’at al-‘arabiya. For details on these organizations, see Abu Mus’ab
Suri, Da’wa al-muqawwama al-islamiyya al-‘alamiyya, n.p., n.d., pp.â•–727ff., portions of which
are translated in Brynjar Lia, The Architect of Global Jihad: The Life of al-Qa’ida Strategist Abu
Musab al-Suri, New York: Columbia University Press, 2008, pp.â•–247ff.
150.╇Abu’l-Walid, Qissat al-bay’at al-‘arabiya, p.â•–5.
151.╇Ibid., p.╖6.
152.╇Ibid. According to Wahid Mozhdeh, a former official within the Taliban government, the
Taliban’s Foreign Affairs Ministry was almost uniformly opposed to the extension of hos-
pitality to Bin Laden and frequently lobbied Mullah Omar to place him under greater
restrictions, to such an extent that Bin Laden was said to have claimed, “Two entities are
against our jihad. One is the US, and the other is the Taliban’s own foreign affairs ministry.”
Mozhdeh, Afghanistan va panj sal-i sultah-i Taliban, Tehran, 2003, unpublished English trans-
lation, p.â•–53 (thanks to Roy Gutman for kindly sharing this translation with me).
153.╇See al-Bahri, Dans l’ombre de Ben Laden; Gutman, How We Missed the Story, pp.â•–143ff.
154.╇Brown, “Facade of Allegiance.”
155.╇The first interview was given to Jamal Ismail for al-Jazeera and subsequently published in
English as “I Am Not Afraid of Death,” Newsweek, 11 Jan. 1999. The interview on 22 Dec.
was given to Rahimullah Yusufzai for BBC-Arabic, and an English transcript was published
as “World’s Most Wanted Terrorist: An Interview with Osama bin Laden,” ABC News, 2
Jan. 1999. Neither of the stories indicated the location of the interview, but Gutman, How
We Missed the Story, p.â•–157, claims they were given at “a mountain encampment in
Helmand.”
156.╇Al-Bahri, Dans l’ombre de Ben Laden, p.â•–179. Rahimullah Yusufzai relates that, according to
Bin Laden himself, the Dec. interviews were given with Taliban permission; Yusufzai,
“Taliban let Bin Laden Break his Silence,” The News, 6 Jan. 1999. If both Nasir al-Bahri and
Bin Laden are to be believed with regard to this episode, it may be that the content of Bin
Laden’s remarks in these interviews, rather than the fact of having given them, was what
angered the Taliban leader.
157.╇See al-Bahri, Dans l’ombre de Ben Laden, pp.â•–181ff.; and Fazul, al-Harb ‘ala’l-Islam, vol.â•–1,
pp.â•–389ff.
158.╇See Brown, “Facade of Allegiance,” p.â•–5.
159.╇Anand Gopal, “The most deadly US foe in Afghanistan,” Christian Science Monitor, 31 May
2009, online at http://www.csmonitor.com/2009/0601/p10s01-wosc.html
160.╇Edwards, Genealogies of the Afghan Jihad, p.╖299.
161.╇Crews, “Moderate Taliban?” p.â•–265.
162.╇Ibid., citing “Uprising in Eastern Afghanistan—Iranian Radio,” BBC Summary of World
Broadcasts, Voice of the Islamic Republic of Iran, Mashhad, in Persian, 23 Jan. 2000.
163.╇Mohammad Bashir, “Afghan Taliban Replace Unpopular Khost Governon,” AFP, 27 Jan.
2000.

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164.╇Ibid.
165.╇According to al-Bahri, Dans l’ombre de Ben Laden, p.â•–105, between 1998 and 1999, “the Tali-
ban ordered all of the Arab training camps closed, with the exception of those of al-Qa’ida.”
Al-Bahri does not explain why al-Qa’ida’s camps were exempted, but it is noteworthy that
much of al-Qa’ida’s training infrastructure during this period was centered in Haqqani-
controlled territory, where, as has been seen, Taliban restrictions on al-Qa’ida could not be
enforced. Other sources on the camp closures are noted in Brown, “Facade of Allegiance,”
p.â•–5.
166.╇See Brown, Cracks in the Foundation, pp.â•–17f.; Alan Cullison, “Inside Al-Qaeda’s Hard
Drive,” The Atlantic, Sep. 2004, online at http://www.theatlantic.com/doc/200409/culli-
son; and Alan Cullison and Andrew Higgins, “Strained Alliance: Al Qaeda’s Sour Days in
Afghanistan,” The Wall Street Journal, 2 Aug. 2002.
167.╇This is according to a diary of Abu Mus’ab al-Suri discovered in Afghanistan after the
American invasion and dated 1999; the entry itself is not dated. AFGP-2002-002869, p.â•–40.
168.╇Kamil al-Tawil, “Interview with Nu’man bin ‘Uthman (Noman Benotman),” al-Hayah, 1
Dec. 2006.
169.╇Ismail Khan, “Usama bin Laden Reprets Restrictions imposed by Taliban,” Dawn, 3 Apr.
2001. Khan quotes from the letter in his article and notes that the senior Taliban official
Tayyib Agha confirmed the meeting between Jalaluddin and Mullah Omar, while denying
that Jalaluddin had delivered a letter from Bin Laden.
170.╇Translated into Arabic in al-Suri’s 1999 diary (the next dated entry is early Jan. 2000), AFGP-
2002-002869, pp.â•–43–8. Al-Suri refers repeatedly to the “thirteen points” decree throughout
the diary, which also records his efforts to get Taliban officials to clarify certain of its provi-
sions and to relax some of its restrictions.
171.╇Ibid., p.╖48.

PART II: CONTINUITY, VALUE, CHANGE, AND THE HAQQANI NEXUS POST-2001

1.╇See Alex Strick van Linschoten and Felix Kuehn, Separating the Taliban from al-Qaeda: The Core
of Success in Afghanistan, Center on International Cooperation, Feb. 2011; Interview with
Anand Gopal, 9 Jan. 2011.
2.╇Attempts by Afghan authorities were also made around this time as well; see Ruttig, “The
Haqqani Network as an Autonomous Entity,” in Giustozzi, Decoding the New Taliban,
pp.â•–57–88, at p.â•–66.
3.╇Joby Warrick, The Triple Agent: The al-Qaeda Mole who Infiltrated the CIA, New York: Double-
day, 2011, p.â•–111.
4.╇Kathy Gannon, I is for Infidel, New York: Public Affairs, 2005, p.╖94. The CIA came to learn that
Ahmed was giving similar advice to Mullah Omar and meeting with the latter frequently
since mid-Sep.; see Rashid, Descent into Chaos, p.â•–77.
5.╇Gannon, I is for Infidel, p.╖94.
6.╇“Interview with Taliban Commander Maulvi Jalaluddin Haqqani,” The News, 20 Oct. 2001.
7.╇For background on Haq’s initiative see Lucy Morgan Edwards, The Afghan Solution: The Inside
Story of Abdul Haq, the CIA and how Western Hubris Lost Afghanistan, London: Bactria Press,
2011, pp.â•–198–9, 210, 302–3.
8.╇According to Thomas Ruttig, “After that, Omari [sc. Ibrahim Haqqani] was kept first in Logar
in the Afghan army’s headquarters for the Southeast by General Gul Haidar, a confidant of
then Defense Minister (and not yet Marshal) Muhammad Qasem Fahim, and later in a gov-
ernment-run guesthouse in Kabul.” See Thomas Ruttig, “Splitting the Haqqanis with NATO
Reconciliation Air,” Afghanistan Analysts Network, 1 Nov. 2010; Thomas Ruttig, “Talking
Haqqani,” Afghanistan Analysts Network, 1 July 2010, online at http://aan-afghanistan.com/
index.asp?id=873; little information actually exists about the circumstances of Ibrahim
Haqqani’s arrest and his time spent in detention. For additional background see “Former
Taliban Commander Surrenders in Eastern Afghanistan,” AFP, 11 Mar. 2002; Jay Solomon,
“Failed Courtship of Warlord Trips up U.S. in Afghanistan,” Wall Street Journal, 8 Nov. 2007;
Syed Saleem Shahzad, “Through the Eyes of the Taliban,” Asia Times, 5 May 2004 www.
atimes.com/atimes/Central_Asia/FE05Ag02.html; “Taliban Ready to Attack Indian
Embassy,” Ummat (Urdu), 12 July 2003; Dr Wazir Jaffer Zakori, “Jalaluddin Haqqani’s brother,
Ibrahim Haqqani arrested,” Pakistan (Urdu), 19 May 2003; Seth G. Jones, Reintegrating Afghan
Insurgents, RAND, 2011.

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 NOT E S p p [123–129]

9.╇Jay Solomon, “Failed Courtship of Warlord Trips up U.S. in Afghanistan,” Wall Street Jour-
nal, 8 Nov. 2007.
10.╇His name is spelled variously in the English sources (Badshah, Padshah, Bacha, and Pacha).
Badshah Khan was a famous mujahidin leader during the anti-Soviet years, fighting as a
subcommander under Jalaluddin Haqqani in the Saroti Pass, an important stretch of the
Khost–Gardez road. American forces enlisted Khan and his men to aid in the search for al-
Qa’ida leaders and the seizure of the Zhawara complex. In Dec. 2001 Karzai appointed Khan
the governor of Loya Paktia, and Khan used the cash and arms supplied by the United States
to move against Haqqani loyalists in these areas. In late Jan. 2002 Khan’s men laid siege—
unsuccessfully—to Khost city, and in late Apr. he unleashed a rocket attack on Gardez.
Karzai responded in May by sacking Khan and appointing Hakim Taniwal as governor of
Paktia. The United States also began to back off from its support to Khan after the Gardez
bombardment. For background see Jalali and Grau, Afghan Guerrilla Warfare; see pp.â•–149–52;
Griffin, Reaping the Whirlwind, pp.â•–339, 358, 373; Peter Baker, “Bacha Khan’s Private War,”
Washington Post, 4 May 2002; “Afghanistan: Key road in the east reopens,” IRIN, 4 Mar. 2003,
www.irinnews.org/PrintReport.aspx?ReportId=19477; “Pakistan hands over Afghan rebel,”
BBC, 5 Feb. 2004, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/3461351.stm; “Afghan spokes-
man blames Pakistan for bomb attacks,” Pajhwok Afghan News, 24 Dec. 2006; Wolesi Jirga and
Provincial Council Elections homepage, http://d8680609.u106.forthost.com/leadingCandi-
dates.asp?ElectionID=1&ProvinceID=8
11.╇Jay Solomon, “Failed Courtship of Warlord Trips up U.S. in Afghanistan,” Wall Street Journal,
8 Nov. 2007; Ruttig, “Splitting the Haqqanis with NATO Reconciliation Air”; Ruttig, “Talk-
ing Haqqani”; Ahmed Rashid, Pakistan on the Brink: The Future of America, Pakistan and
Afghanistan, New York: Viking, 2012, pp.â•–133–6, 180; Rahimullah Yusufzai, “A Face-Saving
Deal,” Newsline, 1 Jan. 2012.
12.╇For background on this debate see John Walcott and Viola Gienger, “US Reviews Whether
to Designate Pakistan’s Haqqani Network as Terrorists,” Bloomberg, 28 Sep. 2011; Congres-
sional Record—Senate, “Haqqani Network Designation Act,” S8781-S8782, 17 Dec. 2011.
13.╇Joshua Partlow, “Haqqani group poses resilient foe in Afghan war,” Washington Post, 29 May
2011.
14.╇As Thomas Hegghammer notes, ideological hybridization is not a new phenomenon, even
in Pakistan. See Thomas Hegghammer, “The Ideological Hybridization of Jihadi Groups,”
Current Trends in Islamist Ideology, 9, 18 (Nov. 2009), www.currenttrends.org/research/
detail/the-ideological-hybridization-of-jihadi-groups
15.╇For a comprehensive overview of the value and role trust plays between organizations see
Chapter 5 (“Trust Between Organizations”) in Perri 6 et al., Managing Networks of Twenty-
First Century Organizations, New York: Palgrave, 2006, pp.â•–83–118.
16.╇Value proposition is broadly defined as the unique value that a business offers its customers
and/or partners. See Cindy Barnes, Helen Blake, and David Pinder, Creating and Delivering
Your Value Proposition: Managing Customer Experience for Profit, London: Kogan Page, 2009.
For analytical clarity, the “local” plane includes those militant groups that are indigenous to
the tribal areas of Afghanistan and Pakistan, and who are primarily active in one of these
two countries and seek to create change there. The “regional” plane is specifically devoted
to the Pakistani state, given Islamabad’s interests in shaping South Asia’s security environ-
ment and historic use of proxies to counter Indian influence in the region. Groups such as
al-Qa’ida and the Islamic Jihad Union who are primarily motivated by global jihad and
directly engage in acts of international terrorism are included in the “global” plane. The
authors recognize that these categories—while analytically useful—are also at times partially
blurred due to the fluidity of the Afghanistan–Pakistan border, overlapping membership
between groups, and the fact that the activity of several militant actors is not limited to one
specific plane. For example, even though the Pakistani Taliban (TTP) is a local, indigenous
militant group that is primarily concerned with attacking the Pakistani state, the TTP is also
motivated by global jihad and has proven its desire to attack the United States.

4.╇LOCAL: PAKISTANI TALIBAN FACTIONS AND OTHER LOCAL INSURGENT UNITS

1.╇Interview with Taliban Commander Maulvi Jalaluddin Haqqani,” The News, 20 Oct. 2001.
2.╇For background on other militant actors active in Loya Paktia see Ruttig, “The Haqqani
Network as an Autonomous Entity”; Sébastien Trives, “Roots of the Insurgency in the South-
east,” in Giustozzi, Decoding the Taliban, pp.â•–89–100; for a more recent perspective see Jeffrey

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pp [129–133] NOT E S

Dressler, The Haqqani Network: A Strategic Threat, Institute for the Study of War, Afghani-
stan Report, 9 Mar. 2012.
3.╇Mawlawi Aziz Khan, “The First Jihadi Operation in Afghanistan, and the Rise of the Ulema
Against the Communists,” Manba’ al-Jihad (Pashto), 1, 4–5 (Oct.–Nov. 1989); “The Historic
Battle of Paktia,” Manba’ al-Jihad (Pashto), 3, 5 (1991); “Martyrs of the Path of the Truth,”
Manba’ al-Jihad (Pashto), 2, 2 (Aug. 1990); “Alhaj Jalaluddin Haqqani in an Interview with
the Al-Nasiha Magazine,” Manba’ al-Jihad (Pashto), 2, 5 (Nov. 1990).
4.╇For example see Harmony documents AFGP-2002-008581 and AFGP-2002-008582 and the
work of Abu’l-Walid al-Masri, specifically Harmony documents AFGP-2002-600090, pp.â•–23,
34, 45, 57, 86, 92; AFGP-2002-600092, pp.â•–1, 4, 47, 55, 57, 62, 67, 69, 70, 80, 91, 94, 96; AFGP-
2002-600093, p.â•–103; AFGP-2002-600096 pp.â•–53, 64, 73, 304; AFGP-2002-600099, pp.â•–9, 13, 15,
41, 42, 71. All references to page numbers are to the English-language translations of these
documents. Versions of these documents are available online via Abu Walid’s blog http://
mafa.maktoobblog.com/ and website http://mafa.asia/, and some of them in English at
www.ctc.usma.edu
5.╇As established in the introduction to this part of the book, the local section provides a review
of the Haqqani network’s activity and relations with local tribal and militant entities in the
Loya Paktia/Waziristan region. The Haqqani network’s relations with the Pakistani state
and ISI are reviewed in the regional subsection.
6.╇A detailed review of this issue follows. We give credit to Thomas Ruttig for analytically
developing these points.
7.╇Shuhrat Nangyal, “Afghanistan’s Jihad and the Virtuous Victory,” Manba’ al-Jihad (in
Pashto), 8 (Jan. 1991). Shuhrat Nangyal, a prolific Afghan author, was the editor of and a
contributor to the Pashto version of Manba’ al-Jihad and its sister Urdu-language publication,
Nusrat al-Jihad.
8.╇Some suggest that the Haqqani network also cultivates influence by providing financial
support to local tribal elders in Loya Paktia, to include “cash payments, passports, houses
in Pakistan and trips to the Gulf.” See Ruttig, “The Haqqani Network as an Autonomous
Entity,” pp.â•–72–5; for an overview of traditional religious networks in the southeast see
Sébastien Trives, “Roots of the Insurgency in the Southeast,” pp.â•–89–100.
9.╇For reflections on the Haqqani network’s ties to the Haqqaniyya madrassa see “Mawlana
Abdul Haq, an unforgettable face in the Islamic World,” Manba’ al-Jihad (Pashto), 3, 4 (Sep.
1991); for reflections see “Alhaj Mawlawi Jalaluddin Haqqani in a General Gathering of the
Jamiat-e-Ulama-e-Islam in Lahore,” Manba’ al-Jihad (Pashto), 2, 11 (May 1991).
10.╇For an example of a historic Haqqani recruitment advertisement see “Good News for the
Prospective Taliban of the Course of Hadith-e Sharif!” Manba’ al-Jihad (Pashto), 1, 11 (May
1990); see also “Interview with Mawlawi Aziz Khan, Head of the Manba-al Uloom Madrassa
in Miranshah,” Manba’ al-Jihad (Pashto), 2, 1 (July 1990).
11.╇For confirmation of this see “Interview with Mawlawi Aziz Khan, Head of the Manba-al
Uloom Madrassa in Miranshah,” Manba’ al-Jihad (Pashto), 2, 1 (July 1990).
12.╇Pir Zubayr Shah and Carlotta Gall, “For Pakistan, Deep Ties to Militant Network May Trump
U.S. Pressure,” New York Times, 31 Oct. 2011; personal interview with Pir Zubayr Shah,
13€Sep. 2010.
13.╇Personal interview with Pir Zubayr Shah, 13 Sep. 2010.
14.╇While this is the educational philosophy stressed by the Haqqani network, Manba’ ‘Ulum
has also historically taught “new sciences like mathematics, English language, Islamic his-
tory, and few others about physics and medicine.” See “Manba al Uloom is a Resource to the
Jihad: A Beacon of Knowledge that Graduates Jihadist Ulema,” Manba’ al-Jihad (Arabic), 1, 1
(Feb. 1990).
15.╇“Manba al Uloom is a Resource to the Jihad: A Beacon of Knowledge that Graduates Jihadist
Ulema,” Manba’ al-Jihad (Arabic), 1, 1 (Feb. 1990), pp.â•–5–8; “The Manba al-Uloom Madrasa as
a Major Educational Center,” Manba’ al-Jihad (Pashto), 1, 1 (July 1989).
16.╇“The Manba al-Uloom Madrasa as a Major Educational Center,” Manba’ al-Jihad (Pashto), 1,
1 (July 1989).
17.╇“Interview with Mawlawi Aziz Khan, Head of the Manba-al Uloom Madrassa in Miran-
shah,” Manba’ al-Jihad (Pashto), 2, 1 (July 1990).
18.╇Jeffrey Goldberg, “Inside Jihad U.; the Education of a Holy Warrior,” New York Times Maga-
zine, 25 June 2000; Sami ul-Haq has given multiple perspectives on this issue, for examples
see Imtiaz Ali, “The Father of the Taliban: an Interview with Maulana Sami ul-Haq,” Spot-
light on Terror, 4, 2 (23 May 2007); “Head of Islamic School that Spawned Taliban, Insurgents
Offers to Help Afghan Talks,” Washington Post, 1 Nov. 2011.

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19.╇Ruttig, “The Haqqani Network as an Autonomous Entity.”

20.╇Mohammad Osman Tariq Elias, “The Resurgence of the Taliban in Kabul: Logar and
Wardak,” in Giustozzi, Decoding the New Taliban, p.â•–50.
21.╇Some even suggest that this fault line is even greater than the Ghilzai–Durrani gap. See
Ruttig, “The Haqqani Network as an Autonomous Entity,” p.â•–73.
22.╇For examples, see ibid., p.╖73.
23.╇Thomas Ruttig, “The Other Side: Dimensions of the Afghan Insurgency: Causes, Actors and
Approaches to ‘Talks’,” Afghanistan Analysts Network, July 2009.
24.╇Ibid.
25.╇For an example of this see, “Open Interview with Sirajuddin Haqqani, a member of the Shura
Council of the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan and a commander in the southeastern prov-
inces of Afghanistan,” released by the Ansar al-Mujahidin Network, 27 Apr. 2010.
26.╇“Taleban Attack Kabul Luxury Hotel,” BBC, 15 Jan. 2008, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/
hi/7187592.stm
27.╇Carol Grisanti, “Taliban commander: Afghan officials are helping kill Americans,” NBC
News, 30 July 2008.
28.╇A collection of Manba’ al-Jihad videos can be viewed online on a number of video sharing
sites, such as Youtube and LiveLeak.
29.╇Michael Georgy, “Haqqanis to Follow Taliban on Afghan Peace,” Reuters, 17 Sep. 2011;
Another potential explanation for Sirajuddin’s statement, given the timing, is that the group
was pressured by Pakistan’s ISI (or representatives of it) not to claim credit for and/or
associate itself with the attack due to political sensitivities between Pakistan and the United
States. The Haqqani network’s public association with this attack would have arguably only
deepened the divide between the two countries. Admiral Mike Mullen publicly claimed that
both the Haqqani network and individuals connected to the ISI were associated with the
attack. See Elizabeth Bumiller and Jane Perlez, “Pakistan’s Spy€Agency is Tied to Attack on
U.S. Embassy,” New York Times, 22 Sep. 2011.
30.╇Ruttig, “The Haqqani Network as an Autonomous Entity,” pp.â•–61–2.
31.╇As noted by Ruttig, “The Haqqani network stands out for its operational reach and impact,”
see Ruttig, “The Other Side: Dimensions of the Afghan Insurgency.”
32.╇It is not clear how long Jalaluddin Haqqani held this position; John F. Burns, “Taliban Link
Fate of Aid Workers to U.S. Action,” New York Times, 7 Oct. 2001.
33.╇“Today’s Encounter,” Al-Jazeera (Arabic), 31 May 2006.
34.╇Antonio Giustozzi and Christoph Reuter, The Insurgents of the Afghan North, Afghanistan
Analysts Network, Apr. 2011, pp.â•–20–4; Gretchen Peters, Crime and Insurgency in the Tribal
Areas of Afghanistan and Pakistan, Combating Terrorism Center, 15 Oct. 2010, pp.â•–54–5; Jeffrey
Dressler, The Haqqani Network: A Strategic Threat, Institute for the Study of War, Afghanistan
Report 9, Mar. 2012, pp.â•–35–9; for another perspective on the Taliban’s strategy in this area
see Sippi Azarbaijani Moghaddam, “Northern Exposure for the Taliban,” in Giustozzi,
Decoding the Taliban, pp.â•–257–8.
35.╇The authors acknowledge that this issue is complicated by Jalaluddin Haqqani’s partnership
with Hizb-e-Islami Khalis.
36.╇Mawlawi Aziz Khan, “The First Jihadi Operation in Afghanistan, and the Rise of the Ulema
Against the Communists,” Manba’ al-Jihad (Pashto), 1, 4–5 (Oct.–Nov. 1989); see also “Text of
Alhaj Haqqani’s Interview with the Arab Magazine Al Marabtoon,” Manba’ al-Jihad (Pashto),
2, 12 (June 1991); “Mawlawi Haqqani is great commander who, in addition to Khost and
Paktia, has fighters in Ghazni, Wardak, Jalalabad and Herat” see “The Iron Man: Mawlana
Jalaluddin Haqqani,” Manba’ al-Jihad (Pashto), 2, 6 (Dec. 1990).
37.╇See Jalaluddin’s statement in FBIS JN111107, “Rebel Leader Statement,” Doha QNA, 11 June
1980.
38.╇“Martyrs of the Path of the Truth,” Manba’ al-Jihad (Pashto), 1, 2–3 (Aug.–Sep. 1989); for
information about the case of Mutiullah Muti, another of Jalaluddin’s important command-
ers, see “The Islamic Revolution’s Unforgettable Shaheed, Mutiullah Muti,” Manba’ al-Jihad
(Pashto), 3, 7–8 (Jan.–Feb. 1992); see also “The Iron Man: Mawlana Jalaluddin Haqqani,”
Manba’ al-Jihad (Pashto), 2, 6 (Dec. 1990).
39.╇For example, while spending time with Jalaluddin Haqqani in 1981 New York Times journalist
Jere Van Dyk met fighters from all across Afghanistan who were waging jihad with the
Haqqanis in Loya Paktia; see Jere Van Dyk, In Afghanistan: An American Odyssey, p.â•–125.
40.╇Given the lack of granular information about insurgent attacks in Afghanistan and the per-
petrators of these attacks in various areas, it is difficult to assess whether the intensification
of kinetic activity in certain provinces like Logar and Wardak is tied specifically to the

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Haqqani network or reflects an intensification of the insurgency writ large; for an overview
of the conflict’s intensification see Anthony Cordesman, “The Afghan–Pakistan War: The
Rising Intensity of Conflict 2007–2008,” Center for Strategic and International Studies,
12€Aug. 2009; http://csis.org/files/publication/burke/090803_RisingIntensityConflict
20072008.pdf
41.╇Ruttig, “The Other Side: Dimensions of the Afghan Insurgency”; for a perspective on Hizb-
e-Islami and Taliban integration in Logar see Elias, “The Resurgence of the Taliban in Kabul:
Logar and Wardak,” p.â•–53; for insights into the Taliban’s post-2001 development in part of
Ghazni and particularly the challenges between it and Hizb-e Islami Gulbuddin there see
Christoph Reuter and Borhan Younus, “The Return of the Taliban in Andar District: Ghazni,”
in Antonio Giustozzi, Decoding the Taliban, pp.â•–101–18; see also Dressler, “The Haqqani Net-
work: A Strategic Threat,” pp.â•–24–9; as Giustozzi and Reuter note, the Taliban’s expansion
into northern Afghanistan was also due to their apparent success in reaching out and inte-
grating non-Pashtun fighters. See Giustozzi and Reuter, The Insurgents of the Afghan North,
p.â•–15.
42.╇For analysis of the Logar case see Antonio Giustozzi, “One or Many? The Issue of the Tali-
ban’s Unity and Disunity,” Pakistan Security Research Unit, Brief Number 48, 23 Apr. 2009.
43.╇Although the two parties worked together, the relationship between Badruddin Haqqani and
Tayeb was reportedly one of mistrust. See Gretchen Peters, “Haqqani Network Financing:
The Evolution of an Industry,” Combating Terrorism Center, July 2012.
44.╇Elias, “The Resurgence of the Taliban in Kabul: Logar and Wardak,” pp.â•–48–9 and p.â•–55.
45.╇The authors recognize that this is a complicated issue and that the€Haqqani network is not
the only militant entity facilitating such integration, or that the integration of Pakistani
fighters is always necessary.
46.╇These subtribal splits are typified by historical Mehsud and Wazir tribal rifts, see Akbar S.
Ahmed, Resistance and Control in Pakistan, London: Routledge, 2004, p.â•–116.
47.╇See Alan Warren, Waziristan, the Faqir of Ipi, and the Indian Army: The Northwest Frontier Revolt
of 1936–1937, London: Oxford University Press, 2000, p.â•–132; Operations in Waziristan: 1919–
1920, compiled by the General Staff Army Headquarters, India, 1923 (originally published
by the Delhi Central Government Press, 1923, pp.â•–30–1); Brian Robson,€Crisis on the Frontier:
The Third Afghan War and the Campaign in Waziristan 1919–1920, Staplehurst, UK: Spellmount,
2004, p.â•–101; Andrew M. Roe, Waging War in Waziristan: the British Struggle in the Land of Bin
Laden, 1849–1947, Kansas: University Press of Kansas, 2010, p.â•–203.
48.╇Warren, Waziristan, the Faqir of Ipi, and the Indian Army, p.╖85.
49.╇Ruttig, “The Haqqani Network as an Autonomous Entity,” p.â•–72.
50.╇Ibid., p.╖60.
51.╇The biography of Mawlana Qari Lal Mohammad, a fighter from Waziristan, is characteristic
of this integration, see “Shaheed Lal Numa,” Nusrat ul-Jihad (Urdu), 1, 3 (Jan. 1991).
52.╇For background on similar Pakistani integration with the Haqqanis during the Taliban
period see Part I.
53.╇For another perspective on this see Claudio Franco, “The Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan,” in
Giustozzi, Decoding the New Taliban.
54.╇Ruttig, “The Haqqani Network as an Autonomous Entity,” p.â•–76; Gul, The Most Dangerous
Place, p.â•–37; Abubakar Siddique, “Pakistani Taliban Chief’s Death Would Have Broad Impli-
cations,” Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, 7 Aug. 2009, www.rferl.org/content/Pakistani_Tali-
ban_Chiefs_Death_Would_Have_Broad_Implications/1794879.html; before his death
Baitullah Mehsud is also believed to have had a close relationship with detained senior
Haqqani commander Haji Mali Khan, see “Afghanistan Haqqani militant Haji Mali Khan
captured,” BBC, 1 Oct. 2011; for disputes on Baitullah’s role during the Taliban period see
Jason Burke, The 9/11 Wars, New York: Allen Lane, 2011, p.â•–374.
55.╇Ruttig, “The Haqqani Network as an Autonomous Entity,” p.â•–71.
56.╇“Afghanistan Haqqani Militant Haji Mali Khan Captured,” BBC, 1 Oct.€2011; “Nato claims
capture of Haqqani group’s leader,” Dawn, 2 Oct.€2011.
57.╇“Translation of Hakimullah Mehsud’s Handwritten Autobiographical Notes,” NEFA, 3 Oct.
2009, www.nefafoundation.org/miscellaneous/Hakimullahnotetranslation.pdf; Baitullah
Mehsud is also believed to have fought under Jalaluddin before the US invasion, see Imtiaz
Ali, “Baitullah Mehsud—the Taliban’s New Leader in Pakistan,” Terrorism Focus, 9 Jan. 2008;
Hakimullah also reportedly fought in Helmand province, see Mansur Khan Mahsud, “The
Battle for Pakistan: Militancy and Conflict in South Waziristan,” Counterterrorism Strategy
Initiative, Apr. 2010; for background on Abdullah Mehsud and his death see “Former Guan-

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 NOT E S p p [140–143]

tanamo Inmate Blows himself up in Pakistan,” Dawn, 24 July 2007, www.dawn.com/

2007/07/24/welcome.htm
58.╇For a perspective on this issue see Alex Spillius, “CIA suicide bomber ‘worked with bin
Laden allies’,” Telegraph, 7 Jan. 2010.
59.╇Interview with Pir Zubayr Shah, 13 Sep. 2010.
60.╇Ibid.
61.╇Gopal, Mahsud, and Fishman, “The Battle for Pakistan: Militancy and Conflict in North
Waziristan.”
62.╇Integration between Gul Bahadur’s group reportedly even extends to the Haqqanis’ main
seminary, the Manba’ ‘Ulum madrassa, where Bahadur’s deputy—Sadiq Noor—is believed
to serve as an administrator; for this reference and quote see ibid., pp.â•–13 and 15.
63.╇Bill Roggio, “Pakistani Taliban, Iraqi al Qaeda operatives killed in Afghanistan,” Long War
Journal, 11 May 2008; see also “Nine Militants Killed in Air Raid in Afghanistan,” The Hindu,
11 May 2008, www.hindu.com/thehindu/holnus/003200805111441.htm
64.╇For example a number of documents recovered from Osama bin Laden’s compound in
Abbotabad, Pakistan, indicated that several al-Qa’ida leaders were concerned about these
issues. For Adam Gadahn’s view see SOCOM-2012-0000004, pp.â•–14–16; for Bin Laden’s per-
spective see SOCOM-2012-0000010, p.â•–12; and for Abu Yahya al-Libi’s and Attiyah’s see
SOCOM-2012-0000007, p.â•–1.
65.╇For background on Qari Amil, who was recently killed, see “Rebel Commander Killed in
Afghan East,” Pajhwok News, 2 Nov. 2010.
66.╇“The Miranshah shura, in particular, appears to integrate Afghan and Pakistani Taleban and,
possibly, foreign fighters.” See Ruttig, “The Other Side: Dimensions of the Afghan Insur-
gency,” p.â•–62.
67.╇For background see Remy Ourdan, “The Terrorist Threat is in Pakistan,” Le Monde, 5 Jan.
2010.
68.╇The development of the TTP’s jihad against Pakistan is also an outgrowth of Pakistan’s
relationship with the United States, operations the Pakistani military has conducted in the
FATA, and the US drone campaign.
69.╇According to Pir Zubayr Shah, the “local role of the Haqqanis is to make peace with the
tribes.” Interview with the authors, 13 Sep. 2010.
70.╇For example, during the siege of Khost there were at least six shuras, which were tribally
oriented, and one overarching central shura to coordinate the mujahidin’s campaign. Jalalud-
din led the central shura. See “A Short Report on the Great Victory on Khost, and the Joint
Operations Surrounding It,” Manba’ al-Jihad (Pashto), 2, 10 (Apr. 1991); after capturing Khost
in 1991 the Haqqanis established two shuras to help ensure stability and political transition,
as well as aid development, in the region; for detail see “Interview with Alhaj Nezamuddin
Haqqani, Deputy Commander of the Southern Fronts,” Manba’ al-Jihad (Pashto), 3, 1 (July
1991).
71.╇“On the Reconciliation between the Ahmadzai Tribe and the Nangarhar Shura,” Manba’ al-
Jihad (Pashto), 4, 1–2 (Nov. 1993); for background on the Ahmadzai see www.nps.edu/pro-
grams/ccs/Docs/Pakistan/Tribes/Ahmadzai_Wazir.pdf
72.╇“Pakistani Militants ‘Call Truce’,” BBC, 7 Feb. 2008, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_
asia/7232203.stm; for background on the Sararogha deal see Hassan Abbas, “An Assessment
of Pakistan’s Peace Agreements with Militants in Waziristan (2004–2008),” in Daveed Gar-
tenstein-Ross and Clifford D. May (eds), The Afghanistan-Pakistan Theater: Militant Islam,
Security and Stability, Washington, DC: FDD Press, 2010, pp.â•–7–18.
73.╇Mohammad Jamshaid Baghwan, “Head of Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan Tahir Yeldshev
escapes after coming in trap of Mullah Nazir,” Daily Express (Urdu), 22 Mar. 2007; “130 for-
eigners killed in clashes: governor,” Dawn, 24 Mar. 2007.
74.╇“Ceasefire Holding Between Locals, Foreign Militants in Waziristan,” The News, 24 Mar.
2007; “130 foreigners killed in clashes: governor,” Dawn, 24 Mar. 2007; S.H. Khan, “Taliban
Commanders Try To Negotiate for Ending Battle With Pakistani Tribesmen,” Associated
Press, 22 Mar. 2007.
75.╇“Govt to hold talks with militants: Hamid,” The News, 8 Feb. 2008; Gopal, Mahsud, and
Fishman, “The Battle for Pakistan: Militancy and Conflict in North Waziristan.”
76.╇On the SIM see ibid.; Raza Qazi and Sara A. Carter, “Pakistani Taliban Unite Against U.S.,”
Washington Times, 24 Feb. 2009; “Taliban ‘receives $6M for Swat ceasefire’,” Press TV (Iran),
24 Feb. 2009; the SIM was largely a notional organization and is now believed to be defunct;
on Shura-e-Murakeba see Sailab Mehsud, “Taliban Groups Regroup to Fight US Forces,”
Dawn, 3 Jan. 2012, http://www.dawn.com/2012/01/03/al-qaida-taliban-ask-pakistani-

273
pp [143–152] NOT E S

militants-for-help.html; Nadeem Sarwar and Safiullah Gul Mehsud, “Al-Qaeda Tries to

Unite Pakistani Militants,” McClatchy-Tribune Regional News, 22 Dec. 2011.
77.╇Matthew Rosenberg, “New Wave of Warlord Bedevils US,” Wall Street Journal, 20 Jan. 2010.
78.╇“Haqqani’s two sons mediating in Kurram,” Dawn, 21 Oct. 2010, http://news.dawn.com/
wps/wcm/connect/dawn-content-library/dawn/the-newspaper/front-page/haqqanis-
two-sons-mediating-in-kurram-100; for additional background see Jeffrey Dressler and Reza
Jan, “The Haqqani Network in Kurram: The Regional Implications of a Growing Insur-
gency,” Institute for the Study of War, May 2011; Daud Khattak, “A Haqqani Brokered Peace
in Kurram?” AF/PAK Channel, 16 Feb. 2011.
79.╇Don Rassler interview with Bob Nickelsberg, 23 Sep. 2010; while details are murky, the case
of the former Ghazni provincial governor is interesting in this regard, see “US embassy
cables: Afghan provincial governor accused of widespread corruption,” Guardian, 2 Dec.
2010; for background on corruption in Ghazni and reports that officials in the province pay
off Taliban fighters to not be attacked see Richard Opell, “Corruption Undercuts Hopes for
Afghan Police,” New York Times, 8 Apr. 2009; for additional background on the Haqqani
network’s financial ties to Ghazni see Gretchen Peters, Haqqani Network Financing: The Evolu-
tion of an Industry, Combating Terrorism Center, July 2012.
80.╇For background on the history of this region and the complex mix of actors there see “The
Insurgency in Afghanistan’s Heartland,” International Crisis Group, Asia Report, no.â•–207, 27
June 2011.
81.╇Don Rassler interview with Bob Nickelsberg, 23 Sep. 2010.
82.╇Peters, Crime and Insurgency in the Tribal Areas of Afghanistan and Pakistan, p.╖51.
83.╇Ibid., p.╖50.
84.╇Ruttig, “The Haqqani Network as an Autonomous Entity,” p.â•–71.
85.╇Gul, The Most Dangerous Place, p.╖130.
86.╇Ibid.
87.╇Ruttig, “The Haqqani Network as an Autonomous Entity,” pp.â•–64 and€77.
88.╇For additional background on this episode see “Suicide Attacks in Afghanistan (2001–2007),”
United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan, 9 Sep. 2007; this same study found that
“recruitment for suicide attacks in the southeast region primarily takes place in madrassas
in Pakistan’s North Waziristan and those associated with Jalaluddin Haqqani are of particu-
lar salience.” p.â•–66.
89.╇To protect his identity “Ahmad” is a pseudonym, see Anand Gopal, “The Most Deadly US
Foe in Afghanistan,” Christian Science Monitor, 1 June 2009.
90.╇David Rohde and Kristen Mulvihill, A Rope and a Prayer: A Kidnapping from Two Sides, New
York: Viking, 2010, pp.â•–229–30.
91.╇Authors’ interview with Pir Zubayr Shah, 13 Sep. 2010.
92.╇“Pakistan Releases 3 Relatives of Fugitive Taliban Commander Under Swap Deal,” The
Frontier Post, 14 Nov. 2007; for background on Mehsud’s capture of these soldiers see Syed
Shoaib Hasan, “Pakistan Rebels Display Hostages,” BBC, 11 Oct. 2007, http://news.bbc.
co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/7039101.stm
93.╇Authors’ interview with Pir Zubayr Shah, 13 Sep. 2010.
94.╇Haji Mujtaba, “N. Waziristan militant leader threatens Pakistan government,” Reuters, 12
Nov. 2011.
95.╇“North Waziristan drone strike: Tribesmen vow ‘jihad’ against US,” Dawn, 19 Mar. 2011; see
also “Tribesmen threaten the US with holy war,” AFP, 27 Sep. 2011.

5.╇REGIONAL: THE PAKISTANI STATE AND ITS INTER-SERVICES INTELLIGENCE

DIRECTORATE

1.╇For background on Hamza see Praveen Swami, “Kabul Attack: US Warming was Accurate,”
The Hindu, 3 Aug. 2008; www.hindu.com/2008/08/03/stories/2008080360650800.htm
2.╇“Scores Killed by Kabul Embassy Bomb,” al-Jazeera, 7 July 2008.
3.╇Ibid.
4.╇“Kabul Car Blast Kills 41, Including Indian Envoys,” CNN, 7 July 2008.
5.╇Praveen Swami, “Kabul Attack: US Warming was Accurate.”
6.╇“In a transcript passed to Mike McConnell, the Director of National Intelligence in May 2008,
Pakistan’s army chief General Ashfaq Kayani was heard referring to Haqqani as ‘a strategic
asset.’” See Catherine Philp, “Pervez Musharraf was playing ‘double game’ with US,” The
Times (London), 17 Feb. 2009; for debates about Pakistan’s policy see Jayshree Bajoria, “The
ISI and Terrorism: Behind the Accusations,” CFR Backgrounder, 28 May 2009.

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 NOT E S p p [152–156]

7.╇“Pakistan can bring Haqqani to peace talks: official,” Daily Times, 19 Aug. 2011.
8.╇See, for example, Muhammad Amir Rana, Jihad and Jihadi, Lahore: Mashal Books, 2003,
pp.â•–32, 69; and the following Harmony documents written by Abu Walid al-Masri, AFGP-
2002-600090, pp.â•–63, 74; AFGP-2002-600093, p.â•–79; AFGP-2002-600099, pp.â•–14, 26–7, 29, 33.
9.╇Yousaf and Adkin, The Bear Trap.
10.╇Harmony document AFGP-2002-008588, p.╖13.
11.╇Mohammed al-Shafey, “A Talk with the ‘Taliban-Maker,’ Former Pakistani ISI Chief Hamid
Gul,” Al Sharq al-Awsat, Apr. 2009, www.aawsat.com/english/news.asp?section=3&id=16526
12.╇Zakiur Rahman Lakhvi is LeT’s current operations chief and is also believed to be the mas-
termind behind the 2008 terrorist siege of Mumbai. Sources linking Lakhvi to Jalaluddin
Haqqani are extremely thin and should be treated with some skepticism. During the Soviet
period Lakhvi also spent a considerable amount of time in Nuristan. The one source known
to the author is Rana, Jihad and Jihadi, pp.â•–32 and 105.
13.╇Don Rassler interview with Robert Nickelsberg, 23 Sep. 2010.
14.╇Manba’ al-Jihad (Pashto), 3, 9–10 (May 1992); Jalaluddin Haqqani, Is the Afghanistan War the
Russian-American War? (Pashto), edited by Abdulhadi Mullakhail (Manba’ al-Jihad, 1988–9);
for additional background see Roger Howard, “Wrath of Islam: HUA Analyzed,” Jane’s
Intelligence Review, 1 Oct. 1997; Central Intelligence Agency, “Harakat ul-Ansar: Increasing
Threat to Western and Pakistani Interests,” DI TR 96–008, Aug. 1996, www.gwu.edu/~
nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB227/index.htm#10; Anthony Davis, “Pakistan’s war by proxy
in Afghanistan loses its deniability,” Jane’s Intelligence Review, 1 Oct. 1999.
15.╇Manba’ al-Jihad (Pashto), 3, 9–10 (May 1992); Haqqani, Is the Afghanistan War the Russian-
American War?
16.╇During a visit to HUA camps in Paktia in 1996, veteran Pakistani journalist Rahimullah
Yusufzai estimated that there were 300 Pakistani fighters and fifty Arabs training for opera-
tions in Kashmir. Rahimullah Yusufzai’s account is corroborated by Robert Nickelsberg and
a British Journalist who visited Khost around the same time, see US Embassy (Islamabad)
Cable, “Afghanistan: British Journalist Visits Site of Training Camps; HUA Activity
Alleged,” 26 Nov. 1996; Howard, “Wrath of Islam”; Central Intelligence Agency, “Harakat
ul-Ansar: Increasing Threat to Western and Pakistani Interests,” DI TR 96–008, Aug. 1996,
www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB227/index.htm#10; Jason Burke, Al Qaeda:
Casting a Shadow of Terror, London: I.B. Tauris, 2003, p.â•–96; Davis, “Pakistan’s war by proxy
in Afghanistan loses its deniability.”
17.╇Harmony document AFGP-2002-000079; for further analysis see Part I.
18.╇Don Rassler interview with Thomas Ruttig, 25 May 2010; see also FBIS LD2510195295,
“Radio Reports on ‘Fierce’ Taliban Infighting,” Kabul Radio Afghanistan Network (in
Pashto), 25 Oct. 1995; and Ruttig, “The Haqqani Network as an Autonomous Entity,” p.â•–65.
19.╇Pakistan’s desire to diversify its influence in Afghanistan is best seen by the fact that during
the Taliban period it is also believed to have maintained ties to the Northern Alliance. See
Zaeef, My Life with the Taliban, p.â•–125.
20.╇AFGHANews, 11, 10 (Sep. 1995), p.â•–8 as cited in Davis, “How the Taliban Became a Military
Force,” pp.â•–43–64; Neamatollah Nojumi, The Rise of the Taliban in Afghanistan: Mass Mobiliza-
tion, Civil War and the Future of the Region, New York: Palgrave, 2002, p.â•–146; US Embassy
(Islamabad) Cable, “Afghanistan: Jalaluddin Haqqani’s Emergence As a Key Taliban Com-
mander,” 7 Jan. 1997, Confidential, 14pp. [Excised], www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/
NSAEBB295/doc05.pdf; Griffin, Reaping the Whirlwind, p.â•–139; Harmony document AFGP-
2002-602383; see also Ahmed Rashid, Taliban: Islam, Oil and the New Great Game in Central
Asia, London: I.B. Tauris, 2001, p.â•–60; and US Embassy (Islamabad) Cable, “Afghanistan:
Jalaluddin Haqqani’s Emergence As a Key Taliban Commander,” 7 Jan. 1997, Confidential,
14pp. [Excised].
21.╇Antonio Guistozzi, Koran, Kalashnikov, and Laptop: The Neo-Taliban Insurgency in Afghanistan,
New York: Columbia University Press, 2008, p.â•–24; see also Shaun Gregory, “The ISI and the
War on Terrorism,” Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, 30, 12 (Oct. 2007), pp.â•–1013–31.
22.╇Harmony document, AFGP-2002-602383, “Afghanistan, the Taliban and the Battle for Islam
Today,” pp.â•–107–9. This document was authored by Abu Musab al Suri.
23.╇For example see “From [Excised] to DIA Washington, DC [Excised], Cable [Excised] Interser-
vice Intelligence /Pakistan (PK) Directorate Supplying Taliban Forces,” 22 Oct. 1996, Secret,
1 p.â•–[Excised]; see also Mattieu Aikins, “State of the Taliban 2012: the Secret Report,” GQ, 9
Mar. 2012.
24.╇For general background on the ISI see Gregory, “The ISI and the War on Terrorism,”
pp.â•–1013–31.

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pp [156–159] NOT E S

25.╇Julian Borger, “Taliban believe they will take over from US and Nato in Afghanistan—
report,” Guardian, 1 Feb. 2012; “Pakistan Helping Afghan Taliban—NATO,” BBC, 1 Feb.
2012, www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-16821218; Rod Nordland and Alissa J. Rubin, “Tali-
ban Captives Dispute U.S. View on Afghanistan War,” New York Times, 1 Feb. 2012; see also
the concerns raised by Taliban leaders about repercussions and actions taken by the ISI in
Rashid, Pakistan on the Brink, pp.â•–114–15, 119, 125–6.
26.╇Sanjoy Majumder, “India Renews Historic Afghan Ties,” BBC, 25 Aug. 2005, http://news.
bbc.co.uk/2/hi/4188462.stm; Steve Coll, “Letter from Afghanistan: ‘War by Other Means,’”
New Yorker, 24 May 2010.
27.╇“Afghan Bomb Strikes Indian Embassy,” BBC, 8 Oct. 2009, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/
south_asia/8296137.stm?ls
28.╇Simon Tisdall, “India and Pakistan’s proxy war puts Afghanistan exit at risk,” Guardian, 7
May 2010; Jayshree Bajoria, “India–Afghanistan Relations,” CFR Backgrounder, 22 July 2009;
Shantie Mariet D’Souza, “India’s Aid to Afghanistan: Challenges and Prospects,” Strategic
Analysis, 31, 5 (Sep. 2007).
29.╇For another example see Stephen Tankel, Laskhar-e-Taiba: Storming the World Stage, London
and New York: Hurst/Columbia University Press, 2011, p.â•–248; a press report from 2003
suggests that the Indian embassy has long been a target for Afghan insurgents, see “Taliban
Ready to Attack Indian Embassy,” Ummat (Urdu), 12 July 2003.
30.╇Praveen Swami, “Kabul Attack: US Warming was Accurate,” The Hindu, 3 Aug. 2008; www.
hindu.com/2008/08/03/stories/2008080360650800.htm; “The Spy Who Quit: A Conversa-
tion with Amrullah Saleh,” PBS Frontline, 17 Jan. 2011, www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/front-
line/2011/01/video-amrullah-saleh-spy-who-quit.html
31.╇Mark Mazzetti and Eric Schmitt, “Pakistanis Aided Attack in Kabul, U.S. Officials Say,” New
York Times, 1 Aug. 2008; Jay Solomon, “US Ties Pakistani Intelligence to Attack in Kabul,”
Wall Street Journal, 2 Aug. 2008; Mark Mazzetti and Eric Schmitt, “Afghan Strikes by Taliban
Get Pakistan Help, U.S. Aides Say,” New York Times, 25 Mar. 2009.
32.╇“Secret Pakistan: Double Cross,” BBC (Documentary), 26 Oct. 2011; see also the actions taken
by Stephen R. Kappes, the CIA’s deputy director, after this attack (as well as other cases), as
referenced in Mark Mazzetti et al., “Pakistan Aids Insurgency in Afghanistan, Reports
Assert,” New York Times, 25 July 2010.
33.╇“The Spy Who Quit: A Conversation with Amrullah Saleh,” PBS Frontline, 17 Jan. 2011,
www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/2011/01/video-amrullah-saleh-spy-who-quit.html
34.╇“Secret Pakistan: Double Cross,” 26 Oct. 2011.
35.╇For example, a suicide truck bomb targeting Coalition forces killed thirteen US troops in the
capital on 29 Oct. 2011. The Haqqani network was believed to have been the responsible
party. See Rob Nordland, “12 Americans Die as Blast Hits Bus in Afghanistan,” New York
Times, 29 Oct. 2011; Rob Nordland, “Attacks on Foreigners in Capital get Afghan Faction’s
Message Across,” New York Times, 30 Oct. 2011.
36.╇Official Transcript, “Hearing to Receive Testimony on the U.S. Strategy in Afghanistan and
Iraq,” Senate Armed Services Committee, 22 Sep. 2011, http://armed-services.senate.gov/
Transcripts/2011/09%20September/11–70%20-%209–22–11.pdf
37.╇David Martin, “Cell Phones Link Pakistan to U.S. Embassy Attack,” CBS, 23 Sep. 2011, www.
cbsnews.com/stories/2011/09/23/eveningnews/main20110965.shtml
38.╇See www.youtube.com/embed/U1l6zJz6f7s; Lashkar-e-Taiba gunmen used a similar tactic
during their Nov. 2008 siege of Mumbai. These phone conversations can also be downloaded
from YouTube.
39.╇Gopal, Mahsud, and Fishman, “The Battle for Pakistan: Militancy and Conflict in North
Waziristan”; M. Ilyas Khan, “The Afghan-Pakistan Militant Nexus,” BBC News, 1 Dec. 2009.
40.╇Sadia Sulaiman, “Hafiz Gul Bahadur: A Profile of the Leader of the North Waziristan Tali-
ban,” Terrorism Monitor, 7, 9 (10 Apr. 2009); Gopal, Mahsud, and Fishman, “The Battle for
Pakistan: Militancy and Conflict in North Waziristan”; Pazir Gul, “Waziristan Accord
Signed,” Dawn, 6 Sep. 2006; for the text of the Sep. 2006 North Waziristan Peace Accord, see
“North Waziristan Peace Pact,” PBS Frontline, 3 Oct. 2006, www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/
frontline/taliban/etc/nwdeal.html
41.╇Gopal, Mahsud, and Fishman, “The Battle for Pakistan: Militancy and Conflict in North
Waziristan.”
42.╇“Kidnapped envoy Tariq Azizuddin appeals for steps for his release,” The News, 19 Apr.
2008, www.thenews.com.pk/updates.asp?id=43779; “Taliban hold kidnapped Pakistan
envoy to Afghanistan,” Associated Free Press, 19 Apr. 2008.

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 NOT E S p p [159–163]

43.╇“Interview with Pervez Musharraf,” Der Spiegel, 7 June 2009; see also “Pakistan Ambassador
Freed,” BBC News, 17 May 2008, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/7406083.stm
44.╇According to Thomas Ruttig, Darim Sedgai acted as the Haqqani network’s liaison to Baitul-
lah Mehsud’s faction of the TTP, see Ruttig, “The Haqqani Network as an Autonomous
Entity,” p.â•–72.
45.╇For a thorough review of this issue see Chapter 6 (“Good Jihadi/Bad€Jihadi”) in Tankel,
Laskhar-e-Taiba: Storming the World Stage, pp.â•–119–72.
46.╇Mushtaq Yusufzai, “Kidnapped ambassador freed,” The News, 18 May 2008; Ismail Khan,
“Azizuddin is Home After 97 Days,” Dawn, 18 May 2008; Candace Rondeaux and Pamela
Constable, “Pakistan Launches Search For Missing Envoy to Kabul,” Washington Post, 13 Feb.
2008; “Taliban Commanders Exchanges for Ambassador,” Jane’s Terrorism and Security Moni-
tor, 10 June 2008.
47.╇Mian Abrar, “Pakistan swapped Dadullah for Tariq Azizuddin,” The News, 28 May 2008.
48.╇Ismail Khan, “Forces, Militants Heading for Truce,” Dawn, 23 June 2006, www.dawn.
com/2006/06/23/top2.htm; Magnus Norell (ed.), “Militancy in the Pakistani Federally
Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) and Afghanistan,” Swedish Research Defense Establish-
ment, FOI-R-2727-SE, Feb. 2010.
49.╇Intikhab Amir, “Holes in the Pact,” Herald, 1 Oct. 2006.
50.╇Gopal, Mahsud, and Fishman, “The Battle for Pakistan: Militancy and Conflict in North
Waziristan,” p.â•–10; Raza Qazi and Sara A. Carter, “Pakistani Taliban Unite Against U.S.,”
Washington Times, 24 Feb. 2009; “Taliban ‘receives $6M for Swat ceasefire’,” Press TV (Iran),
24 Feb. 2009; the SIM was largely a notional organization and is now believed to be defunct.
51.╇Mark Hosenball, “More Forces for Afghanistan: Obama will send 17,000 U.S. troops,” News-
week, 17 Feb. 2009.
52.╇Haji Mujtaba, “Waziristan Taliban set up shura to wage jihad,” Daily Times, 23 Feb. 2009; for
the text of the SIM’s official announcement, see GEO TV, 24 Feb. 2009.
53.╇BBC Monitoring, “Afghan Taliban chief asks militants to halt attacks on Pakistan Army,” 25
Feb. 2009; “Mullah Omar orders halt to attack on Pak troops,” The News, 24 Feb. 2009; “Mul-
lah Omar asks Taleban not to attack Pakistani forces,” Ausaf, 25 Feb. 2009.
54.╇Mushtaq Yusufzai, “No Moderates in Taliban Ranks: Haqqani,” The News, 17 Apr. 2009,
www.thenews.com.pk/top_story_detail.asp?Id=21576; although difficult to confirm, one
source claims that Sirajuddin Haqqani, two deputies to Mullah Abdullah Zakir, Abu Yayha
al-Libi, and a representative from the Eastern Turkistan Islamic Movement met with Baitul-
lah Mehsud in June 2009 and urged him to reorient his fighters towards Afghanistan, see Bill
Roggio, “Senior al Qaeda and Taliban Leaders Met with Baitullah,” Long War Journal, 21 June
2009, www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2009/06/senior_al_qaeda_and.php
55.╇Afghan sources “say that at the behest of the ISI, Haqqani may now be trying to persuade
his ally Mehsud to cease his attacks against Pakistan and to focus on Afghanistan instead,”
see Ron Moreau and Sami Yusufzai, “Pakistan’s Dangerous Double Game,” Newsweek; Raza
Qazi and Sara A. Carter, “Pakistani Taliban Unite Against U.S.,” Washington Times, 24 Feb.
2009.
56.╇In fact, one month after the SIM was forged Pakistani Taliban commander Mullah Nazir (a
key signatory to the SIM) reaffirmed his commitment to wage jihad against the Pakistani
state in a video released by al-Sahab.
57.╇According to some accounts, Abu Yahya al-Libi also played a key role in brokering the
alliance. For background see Sailab Mehsud, “Taliban Groups Regroup to Fight US Forces,”
Dawn, 3 Jan. 2012, www.dawn.com/2012/01/03/al-qaida-taliban-ask-pakistani-militants-
for-help.html; Nadeem Sarwar and Safiullah Gul Mehsud, “Al-Qaeda Tries to Unite Paki-
stani Militants,” McClatchy-Tribune Regional News, 22 Dec. 2011; Amir Mir, “Siraj Haqqani
exposes military-militants peace deal,” The News, 14 Feb. 2012.
58.╇Jane Perlez, “Rebuffing U.S., Pakistan Balks at Crackdown,” New York Times, 14 Dec. 2009.
59.╇Ibid.
60.╇Kathy Gannon, “Pakistan says it can bring Haqqani to peace talks,” Associated Press, 18 Aug.
2011.
61.╇See Abdul Salam Zaeef, My Life with the Taliban.
62.╇The chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and thus by extension sections of the US intelli-
gence community, have reached a similar conclusion. See Official Transcript, “Hearing to
Receive Testimony on the U.S. Strategy in Afghanistan and Iraq.”
63.╇“Interview with Taliban Commander Maulvi Jalaluddin Haqqani,” The News, 20 Oct. 2001.
64.╇For more on the need to understand the geography of conflict in the south and India’s goals

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pp [163–167] NOT E S

in the region see Robert Kaplan, South Asia’s Geography of Conflict, Center for New American
Security, Aug. 2010.
65.╇For a perspective on this issue see the statements of Admiral William H. McRaven in Nick
Paton Walsh, “Tripling Afghanistan’s ‘community Watch with AK-47s’,” Security Clearance
(CNN blog), 11 Dec. 2011, http://security.blogs.cnn.com/2011/12/11/tripling-afghanistans-
com�munity-watch-with-ak-47s/
66.╇“Times Square Bomb Attempt Puts Focus on Pakistan,” NPR Interview with David Rohde,
Transcript, www.npr.org/templates/transcript/transcript.php?storyId=126536285; “Paki-
stan Army pays heavy price in Taliban war,” Dawn, 20 May 2010.
67.╇For background see Mujahid Hussain, Punjabi Taliban: Driving Extremism in Pakistan, New
Delhi, India: Pentagon Security International, 2012.
68.╇Ron Moreau and Sami Yusufzai, “Pakistan’s Dangerous Double Game,” Newsweek; see also
Fareed Zakaria, “Terrorism’s Supermarket: Why Pakistan keeps exporting jihad,” Newsweek,
7 May 2010.
69.╇“Pakistan Army pays heavy price in Taliban war,” Dawn, 20 May 2010.
70.╇For insights into some of these successes and the trials and tribulations of this relationship
see Terry McDermott and Josh Meyer, The Hunt for KSM, New York: Little, Brown and
Company, 2012, pp.â•–194–221, 242–8.
71.╇According to a dataset compiled by the New America Foundation, the Haqqani network is
believed to have been targeted by at least twenty-six drone strikes since 2004, eleven of
which occurred in 2010. Peter Bergen and Katherine Tiedemann, “The Year of the Drone: An
Analysis of U.S. Drone Strikes in Pakistan, 2004–2010,” Counterterrorism Strategy Initiative
Paper, updated as of 11 Nov. 2010, http://counterterrorism.newamerica.net/drones
72.╇Pakistan has conducted several large military operations in North Waziristan, but the
Haqqani network has never been the primary target of these larger operations, see Pazir Gul,
“Further on Manhunt Launched for Clerics Behind Pakistan Tribal Clashes,” AFP, 7 Mar.
2006; Behroz Khan, “5,000 more troops sent to Pak-Afghan border,” The News, 14 Sep. 2005.
73.╇“North Waziristan Peace Pact,” PBS Frontline, 3 Oct. 2006, www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/
frontline/taliban/etc/nwdeal.html; Rahimullah Yusufzai, “47 Tribal elders also signed
peace accord,” The News, 20 Oct.€2006.
74.╇“Arms swapped in Waziristan,” Dawn, 7 Sep. 2006; Thomas H. Johnson and M. Chris Mason,
“No Sign Until the Burst of Fire: Understanding the Afghanistan-Pakistan Frontier,” Inter-
national Security, 32, 4 (Spring 2008), p.â•–56.
75.╇“North Waziristan Peace Pact,” PBS Frontline, 3 Oct. 2006, www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/
frontline/taliban/etc/nwdeal.html
76.╇See case of Maulana Abdul Kalam and four others in Intikhab Amir, “Holes in the pact,”
Herald, 1 Oct. 2006.
77.╇Ibid.
78.╇Carlotta Gall and Ismail Khan, “Taliban and Allies Tighten Grip in North of Pakistan, New
York Times, 11 Dec. 2006, www.nytimes.com/2006/12/11/world/asia/11pakistan.html?_
r=1; Guido Steinberg, “The Return of al-Qaida,” SWP Comments, 22 (Dec. 2007); for al-
Qa’ida’s perspective on this see “A Statement Concerning Last Events in Waziristan,”
Palestine’s Dialogue Forum, https://www.paldf.net/forum/showthread.php?p=457622,
9€Mar. 2006.
79.╇Andrew Gray, “Taliban step up cross-border attacks-U.S. military,” Reuters, 17 Jan. 2007,
www.reuters.com/article/idUSISL240273
80.╇Carlotta Gall, “Leadership Void Seen in Pakistan,” New York Times, 24 June 2008 www.
nytimes.com/2008/06/24/world/asia/24pstan.html?pagewanted=2
81.╇For an account of his captivity see David Rohde, “7 Months, 10 Days in Captivity,” New York
Times, 17 Oct. 2009, www.nytimes.com/2009/10/18/world/asia/18hostage.html
82.╇“A Reporter’s Tale of Ambush and Captivity,” NPR (Fresh Air), 27 Oct. 2009, www.npr.org/
templates/transcript/transcript.php?storyId=114173568; see also Harmony document
AFGP-2004-0011048; David Rohde, “‘You Have Atomic Bombs, but We Have Suicide Bomb-
ers,’” New York Times, 19 Oct. 2009.
83.╇David Rohde, “‘You Have Atomic Bombs, but We Have Suicide Bombers,’” New York Times,
19 Oct. 2009.
84.╇Gul, The Most Dangerous Place, Chapter 4; see comments made by Pakistani journalist Ashraf
Ali in James Rupert, “‘Biggest Threat’ to U.S. in Afghanistan Is Aided by Pakistanis,” Bloomb-
erg News, 8 Oct. 2008; on the perspective of aspiring jihadis see Burke, The 9/11 Wars, p.â•–384.
85.╇For a breakdown of these plots and their ties to North Waziristan see Paul Cruickshank, “The

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Militant Pipeline: Between the Afghanistan–Pakistan Border Region and the West,” Coun-
terterrorism Strategy Initiative Policy Paper, Feb. 2010.
86.╇As are the dynamics of several other plots. For more information see Chapter 7.
87.╇Fareed Zakaria, “Terrorism’s Supermarket: Why Pakistan Keeps Exporting Jihad,” News-
week, 7 May 2010.
88.╇Matt Waldman, “The Sun in the Sky: The Relationship between Pakistan’s ISI and Afghan
Insurgents,” Crisis States Discussion Papers, June 2010, p.â•–13.
89.╇Ruttig, “The Haqqani Network as an Autonomous Entity,” p.â•–76.
90.╇Rashid, Descent Into Chaos, p.╖223.
91.╇See Zaeef, My Life with the Taliban, p.╖125; see also US Consulate (Peshawar) Cable,
“Afghan-Pak Border-Relations at Torkham Tense,” 2 Oct. 1996, Confidential, 6
pp.â•–[Excised].
92.╇Bruce Riedel, “Pakistan and Terror: Eye of the Storm,” AAPSS, July 2008, p.â•–32; the “ISI of
Pakistan and other militias are clearly protecting the Taliban in the open,” Harmony docu-
ment AFGP-2004-011048.
93.╇Ron Moreau, “Pakistan’s Dangerous Double Game,” Newsweek, 13 Sep. 2008; see also
http://armed-services.senate.gov/statemnt/2011/09%20September/Mullen%2009–22–11.
pdf
94.╇Ruttig, “The Haqqani Network as an Autonomous Entity,” p.â•–66.
95.╇For a reflection of this see Pir Zubayr Shah and Carlotta Gall, “For Pakistan, Deep Ties to
Militant Network may Trump U.S. Pressure,” New York Times, 31 Oct. 2011.
96.╇Interview with Pir Zubayr Shah, 23 Sep. 2010; for other claims about “Taliban leaders
travelling in cars with official ISI license plates,” see Graeme Smith, “We must do some-
thing about Pakistan,” Globe and Mail, 2 Sep. 2006.
97.╇This quote is from “Pakistan Helping Afghan Taliban—NATO,” BBC, 1 Feb. 2012; see also
Madiha Sattar, “ANP leaders said military protected Haqqanis, other militants,” Dawn, 23
May 2011; Rod Nordland and Alissa J. Rubin, “Taliban Captives Dispute U.S. View on
Afghanistan War,” New York Times, 1 Feb. 2012; and “2009: ANP on military’s deals with
militants,” Dawn, 23 May 2011; Karachi data point is from author’s interview with Pir
Zubayr Shah, 23 Sep. 2010.
98.╇Interview with Pir Zubayr Shah, 23 Sep. 2010.
99.╇Dressler and Jan, “The Haqqani Network in Kurram.”
100.╇Ron Moreau, “Pakistan’s Dangerous Double Game,” Newsweek, 13€Sep. 2008.
101.╇Waldman, “The Sun in the Sky,” p.â•–14.
102.╇Moreau, “Pakistan’s Dangerous Double Game.”
103.╇Harmony document AFGP-2004-0011048.
104.╇Matthew Cole, “Killing Ourselves in Afghanistan,” Salon.com, 10 Mar. 2008; James Rupert,
“‘Biggest Threat’ to U.S. in Afghanistan Is Aided by Pakistanis,” Bloomberg News, 8 Oct.
2008; Matthew Aid, Intel Wars: The Secret History of the Fight Against Terror, New York:
Bloomsbury, 2012, pp.â•–108–13.
105.╇David E. Sanger, The Inheritance: The World Obama Confronts and the Challenges to American
Power, New York: Harmony Books, 2009, p.â•–253. Given the context David provides it is
likely that those he interviewed worked at the National Security Agency were those who
processed the communications intercepts.
106.╇Harmony document AFGP-2004-0011048; according to other sources, the Haqqani network
is affiliated with over eighty madrassas in Pakistan, see Manba’ al-Jihad (Pashto), 2, 8 (Jan.
1991).
107.╇For background on the Manba’ ‘Ulum madrassa see Part I.
108.╇Behroz Khan, “5,000 more troops sent to Pak-Afghan border,” The News, 14 Sep. 2005; Iqbal
Khattak, “40 Militants Killed in North Waziristan,” Daily Times, 30 Sep. 2005; “Pakistani
Law Enforcers Intensify Hunt for Haqqani,” Pajhwok Afghan News, 7 Mar. 2006.
109.╇Shaiq Hussain, “U.S. Missiles Said To Kill 20 in Pakistan Near Afghan Border,” Washington
Post, 9 Sep. 2008; “Forces raid Haqqani’s madrassa in N Waziristan,” The News, 30 July 2008.
110.╇Some sources suggest that a compound near Manba’ ‘Ulum was targeted by a drone strike
in 2007. See Ismail Khan, “Missile Kills 5 in Northwest Pakistan; U.S. Denies Attack,” New
York Times, 3 Nov. 2007.
111.╇Shamim Shahid, “US Drones Bomb Madrassa in NW,” The Nation, 9€Sep. 2008, www.nation.
com.pk/pakistan-news-newspaper-daily-english-online/print/Politics/09-Sep-2008/
US-drones-bomb-madrassa-in-NW
112.╇Pakistan has a rich history of betting on both sides. See Zaeef, My Life with the Taliban,
pp.â•–125 and 126.

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113.╇During the anti-Soviet jihad the United States and Saudi Arabia bankrolled and provided
key weaponry to the Afghan resistance. It should also be noted that some of the sectarian
groups previously fostered by the Pakistani state are now waging jihad against their former
backer. For details on Pakistan’s historic support for insurgent groups see Husain Haqqani,
Pakistan: Between Mosque and Military, Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for Interna-
tional Peace, 2005; Jamal, Shadow War; Stephen Tankel, Lashkar-e-Taiba: Storming the World
Stage; Praveen Swami, India, Pakistan and the Secret Jihad: the Covert War in Kashmir (1947–
2004), London: Routledge, 2007.
114.╇For example, see comments made by Lieutenant-General Ahmed Shuja Pasha in “Pakistan
Never Backed Haqqani network: ISI Chief,” Reuters, 30 Sep. 2011.
115.╇Interview with ABC-News, 1 Aug. 2008 as cited in Gul, The Most Dangerous Place, p.╖162.
116.╇US Embassy (Islamabad), Cable, “[Excised] Believe Pakistan is Backing Taliban,” 6 Dec.
1994, Secret, 3 pp.; US Embassy (Islamabad), Cable, “Senator Brown and Congressman
Wilson Discuss Afghanistan with Pakistani Officials,” 14 Apr. 1996, Confidential, 4 pp.
117.╇Zaeef, My Life with the Taliban, p.╖147; the ISI also reportedly advised Jalaluddin Haqqani
not to give up Osama bin Laden, see Gannon, I is for Infidel, p.â•–94.
118.╇Seth Jones, In the Graveyard of Empires: America’s War in Afghanistan, New York: W.W.
Norton & Co., 2010; Missy Ryan and Susan Cornwell, “U.S. says Pakistan’s ISI supported
Kabul embassy attack,” Reuters, 22 Sep. 2011; “COMISAF’s Initial Assessment,” unclassified
version, 30 Aug. 2009, pp.â•–2–10, available at: www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/
article/2009/09/21/AR2009092100110.html; Matthieu Aikins, “State of the Taliban 2012:
The Secret Report,” GQ, 9 Mar. 2012; Jason Burke, “Guantanamo Bay files: Pakistan’s ISI
spy service listed as a terrorist group,” Guardian, 25 Apr. 2011.
119.╇Zaeef, My Life with the Taliban, p.╖105.
120.╇Harmony document AFGP-2002-008587, pp.â•–23–4; another document captured in Afghani-
stan shows Pakistan’s interest and involvement in more tactical and less strategic details,
with the ISI instructing the Taliban to disrupt road-building in northeastern Afghanistan,
see Harmony document AFGP-2005-0003302.
121.╇For examples see Harmony documents AFGP-2002-008582, pp.╖9, 11, 12, 13; AFGP-2002-
008581 p.â•–1.
122.╇Harmony document AFGP-2002-008581, p.╖1.
123.╇Harmony document AFGP-2002-008582, p.╖13.
124.╇Harmony document AFGP-2002-008581 and AFGP-2002-008582.
125.╇Matthew Cole, “Killing Ourselves in Afghanistan,” Salon.com, 10 Mar. 2008; Sami Yusufzai,
“Taliban in their Own Words,” Newsweek, www.newsweek.com/2009/09/25/the-taliban-
in-their-own-words.html; Waldman, “The Sun in the Sky,” p.â•–17; Declan Walsh, “Taliban
officials brought in from the cold: authorities pin hopes on reconciliation effort to break
insurgency,” Guardian, 19 May 2005.
126.╇Waldman, “The Sun in the Sky,” p.â•–10; for additional suggestions of the ISI’s role at other
Taliban coordination meetings (not official shuras) see Jason Burke, “Guantanamo Bay files:
Pakistan’s ISI spy service listed as terrorist group,” Guardian, 25 Apr. 2011.
127.╇Harakat-ul Mujahidin, Harakat-ul Jihad Islami, Hizb-ul Mujahidin, and Harakat-ul Ansar
all had camps in Loya Paktia; the best source on the history of these camps is Muhammad
Amir Rana’s work, Jihad in Kashmir and Afghanistan, no date, and Jihad and Jihadi.
128.╇The two HUA camps hit were the Khalid-bin-Waleed and Muawia camps; see Rana, Jihad
in Kashmir, pp.â•–127–8; one of the individuals at the al-Farouq camp during the cruise missile
strike was Hassan al-Khamiri, who was the emir of the camp at that time, but would later
serve as one of the suicide bombers for al-Qa’ida’s attack against the USS Cole in 2000. See
Ali H. Soufan, The Black Banners: The Inside Story of 9/11 and the War Against al-Qaeda, New
York: Norton, 2011, p.â•–329.
129.╇Howard, “Wrath of Islam.”
130.╇For example, see Central Intelligence Agency, “Harakat ul-Ansar: Increasing Threat to
Western and Pakistani Interests,” DI TR 96–008, Aug. 1996, www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/
NSAEBB/NSAEBB227/index.htm#10
131.╇Harmony document AFGP-2002-000079.
132.╇Matthew Cole, “Killing Ourselves in Afghanistan,” Salon.com, 10 Mar. 2008; Aid, Intel Wars,
pp.â•–108–13; for another perspective on the ISI’s support for the insurgency and training for
Taliban units in the south of Afghanistan see Sarah Chayes, “Denying Pakistan,” Los Ange-
les Times, 23 Nov. 2011, http://articles.latimes.com/2011/nov/23/opinion/la-oe-chayes-
pakistan-role-in-afghanistan-20111123; and Ahmed Rashid, “Nato’s top brass accuse
Pakistan over Taliban aid,” Telegraph, 6 Oct. 2006.

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133.╇Cole, “Killing Ourselves in Afghanistan.”

134.╇“All commanders reported that significant numbers of their fighters attend training camps
in Pakistan that are run or backed by the ISI … Emphasizing the continued importance of
such training, a south-eastern commander said that, ‘of the 280 fighters in our district, some
80 percent were trained in Pakistan,’” Waldman, “The Sun in the Sky,” p.â•–15; see also Gul,
The Most Dangerous Place, p.â•–130.
135.╇See Appendix in Gul, The Most Dangerous Place.
136.╇Waldman, “The Sun in the Sky”; according to Matthew Aid, the US intelligence community
held a similar view, see Aid, Intel Wars, pp.â•–111–12; for similar claims about Pakistani mili-
tary assistance to insurgents in Zabul Province see Jason Burke, “Guantanamo Bay files:
Pakistan’s ISI spy service listed as a terror group,” Guardian, 25 Apr. 2011.
137.╇Harmony document AFGP-2002-008588, p.╖13.
138.╇Yousaf and Adkin, The Bear Trap.
139.╇Davis, “Pakistan’s ‘war by proxy’ in Afghanistan loses its deniability.”
140.╇Bajoria, “The ISI and Terrorism: Behind the Accusations.”
141.╇“IIR [Excised] Pakistan Involvement in Afghanistan,” 7 Nov. 1996, Confidential, 2
pp.â•–[Excised].
142.╇Seymour Hersh, “The Getaway: Questions Surround a Secret Pakistani Airlift,” New Yorker,
28 Jan. 2002; Jason Burke, The 9/11 Wars, pp.â•–61–2.
143.╇See the interviews of Lt Col Anthony Schaffer and Mullah Khasim in Secret Pakistan, BBC,
www.bbc.co.uk/programmes/b016n0js/episodes/guide. The documentary can be viewed
on Youtube; See also Lt Col Anthony Schaffer, Operation Dark Heart, New York: Thomas
Dunne Books, 2010, p.â•–67.
144.╇Ibid.
145.╇Waldman, “The Sun in the Sky,” p.â•–12; Christina Lamb, “Taliban leader killed by SAS was
Pakistan officer,” Sunday Times, 12 Oct. 2008, www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/
asia/article4926401.ece
146.╇Ibid.; see also Guistozzi, Koran, Kalashnikov, and Laptop.
147.╇“The Spy Who Quit: A Conversation with Amrullah Saleh,” PBS Frontline, 17 Jan. 2011,
www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/2011/01/video-amrullah-saleh-spy-who-quit.html
148.╇For a historical account of the ISI’s use of this tactic see Yousaf and Adkin, The Bear Trap,
p.â•–114.
149.╇Cole, “Killing Ourselves in Afghanistan.”
150.╇Waldman, “The Sun in the Sky.”
151.╇Ibid.
152.╇Rashid, Descent Into Chaos, p.╖417.
153.╇Harmony Document AFGP-2002-008581, p.╖17.
154.╇Harmony Document AFGP-2002-008582, p.╖7.
155.╇For the Iran link see Harmony Document AFGP-2002-008681-24; for€the link to Japan see
Harmony Document AFGP-2002-008583, pp.â•–11–12.
156.╇The Urdu version of this magazine is titled Nusrat al-Jihad.
157.╇For confirmation of the existence of Haqqani offices in the Gulf, specifically in the United
Arab Emirates, see any Arabic edition of Manba’ al-Jihad and Harmony document
AFGP-2002-800775.
158.╇In a letter published in Manba’ al-Jihad (Pashto), 2, 10 (Apr. 1991), son of Abdul Haq
Haqqani, Anwar-ul Haq Haqqani, and Mawlana Fazul Rahim from Jamia-e Ashrafiya in
Lahore personally requested that copies of Nusrat ul-Jihad be sent to the Haqqania madrassa
and Jamia-e Ashrafiya.
159.╇“Alhaj Mawlawi Jalaluddin Haqqani in a General Gathering of the Jamiat-e-Ulama-e-Islam
in Lahore,” Manba’ al-Jihad (Pashto), 2, 11 (May 1991).
160.╇Cole, “Killing Ourselves in Afghanistan”; Waldman, “The Sun in the Sky”; Aid, Intel Wars,
pp.â•–108–13.
161.╇Cole, “Killing Ourselves in Afghanistan.”
162.╇Waldman, “The Sun in the Sky,” p.â•–14.
163.╇Declan Walsh, “Wikileaks cables: ‘US aid will not stop Pakistan supporting militants’,”
Guardian, 30 Nov. 2010, www.guardian.co.uk/world/2010/nov/30/wikileaks-us-aid-
pakistan-militants; for the full context see “181529: Allies find briefing on Afghanistan NIE
‘gloomy’,” The Hindu, 19 Mar. 2011, www.thehindu.com/news/the-india-cables/the-
cables/article1551330.ece
164.╇Waldman, “The Sun in the Sky,” p.â•–19.
165.╇Matthieu Aikins, “State of the Taliban 2012: the Secret Report,” GQ, 9 Mar. 2012; a “senior

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Pakistani religious figure with close ties to the [Haqqani] network” who was interviewed
by Gretchen Peters also believed that “the Haqqanis were no longer reliant on the ISI for
funding, and did not take orders from the intelligence agency.” Peters, Haqqani Network
Financing: the Evolution of an Industry, p.â•–38.
166.╇For a review of the material related to this issue see Chapter 6 and specifically the US
Treasury Department designations of several Haqqani leaders; see also Peters, Crime and
Insurgency in the Tribal Areas of Afghanistan and Pakistan; Peters, Haqqani Network Financing:
The Evolution of an Industry.
167.╇Peters, Crime and Insurgency in the Tribal Areas of Afghanistan and Pakistan.
168.╇For a discussion of this see Gul, The Most Dangerous Place, p.╖195.
169.╇Waldman, “The Sun in the Sky,” p.â•–19; see also Ahmed Rashid, “Nato’s top brass accuse
Pakistan over Taliban aid,” Telegraph, 6 Oct. 2006.
170.╇“Text of Alhaj Haqqani’s Interview with the Arab Magazine Al Marabtoon,” Manba’ al-Jihad
(Pashto), 2, 12 (June 1991).
171.╇Harmony document AFGP-2002-008581, p.╖11.
172.╇From [Excised] to DIA Washington, DC [Excised], Cable “[Excised]/Pakistan Interservice
Intelligence/ Pakistan (PK) Directorate Supplying the Taliban Forces,” 22 Oct. 1996, Secret,
1 p.â•–[Excised].
173.╇Cole, “Killing Ourselves in Afghanistan”; Waldman, “The Sun in the Sky,” p.â•–19; Mark
Mazzetti et al., “Pakistan Aids Insurgency in Afghanistan, Reports Assert,” New York Times,
25 July 2010; for similar accusations involving Pakistani border control posts “assisting
insurgent attacks” in southeastern Afghanistan see Paul Watson, “On the trail of Taliban’s
support; more signs suggest a Pakistani role in aiding the Afghan insurgency,” Los Angeles
Times, 24 Dec. 2006.
174.╇Cole, “Killing Ourselves in Afghanistan.”
175.╇Waldman, “The Sun in the Sky,” p.â•–18; Watson, “On the trail of Taliban’s support.”
176.╇From [Excised] to DIA Washington, DC [Excised], Cable “[Excised]/Pakistan Interservice
Intelligence/ Pakistan (PK) Directorate Supplying the Taliban Forces,” 22 Oct. 1996, Secret,
1 p.â•–[Excised].
177.╇US Embassy (Islamabad) Cable, “Afghanistan: [Excised] Criticizes GOP’s Afghan Policy;
Says It Is Letting Policy Drift,” 16 June 1998, Confidential, 2 pp.
178.╇For background on these deals, see Abbas, “An Assessment of Pakistan’s Peace Agreements
with Militants in Waziristan (2004–2008),” pp.â•–7–18.

6.╇GLOBAL: AL-QA’IDA AND OTHER GLOBAL JIHADIST GROUPS

1.╇Bill Roggio, “Senior al-Qaeda Commander in Afghanistan Killed in US Airstrike,” Longwar

Journal, 31 July 2008.
2.╇Eric Schmitt and Tim Golden, “Details Emerge on a Brazen Escape in Afghanistan,” New
York Times, 4 Dec. 2005.
3.╇Ibid.
4.╇“Al-Qaeda Members Describe Escape from Bagram,” Al-Arabiya, 18€Oct. 2005.
5.╇Schmitt and Golden, “Details Emerge on a Brazen Escape in Afghanistan.”
6.╇Michael Hirsh, “Qaeda Prison Break,” Newsweek, 13 Nov. 2005, www.thedailybeast.com/
newsweek/2005/11/13/qaeda-prison-break.html
7.╇Omar al-Faruq, who served as al-Qa’ida’s operations chief for Southeast Asia, was killed in
Sep. 2006 by British Special Forces in Basra, Iraq. See “Senior Militant Killed in Iraq,” BBC,
25 Sep. 2006; The Syrian—Abu Abdallah al-Shami—was killed in 2008 by an airstrike in the
Afghanistan/Pakistan region. Abu Nasir al-Qahtani was captured again by US forces in
Khost, Afghanistan, in Nov. 2006. See Roggio, “Senior al-Qaeda Commander in Afghanistan
Killed in US Airstrike.”
8.╇Declan Walsh and Eric Schmitt, “Drone Strike Killed No.â•–2 in Al-Qaeda, U.S. Officials Say,”
New York Times, 5 June 2012.
9.╇As Thomas Hegghammer and others have pointed out, foreign fighters are too often con-
flated with and assumed to be international terrorists or members of al-Qa’ida. Such confla-
tion ignores variance in foreign fighter populations and their motivations, as not all foreign
fighters aim to become members of al-Qa’ida. The cases of Najibullah Zazi and Hammad
Khurshid are illustrative, as they both initially travelled to Pakistan to fight with the Taliban
in Afghanistan and not with al-Qa’ida.
10.╇“A Reporter’s Tale of Ambush and Captivity,” NPR (Fresh Air), 27 Oct. 2009, www.npr.org/
templates/transcript/transcript.php?storyId=114173568

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11.╇David Rohde, “‘You Have Atomic Bombs, but We Have Suicide Bombers,’” New York Times,
19 Oct. 2009.
12.╇“A Reporter’s Tale of Ambush and Captivity.”
13.╇Deception and cover and denial tactics play an important role in war. Evidence that speaks
to these dynamics is reviewed below in this and the following chapter. See specifically, for
example, Jalaluddin’s role in obfuscating the role of Arabs in the 1991 battle for Khost (p.
221) and discrepancies between how the IJU and the Haqqani network represented a Mar.
2008 attack (pp. 193, 202–203).
14.╇Hegghammer, “The Rise of Muslim Foreign Fighters: Islam and the Globalization of Jihad,”
pp.â•–53–94.
15.╇See Part I for a thorough review of sources.
16.╇“Afghanistan: Taliban leader says Osama bin Laden still ‘alive’,” Adnkronos International, 14
Apr., no year; see also FBIS LD60927, “Abu-Dhabi Paper Interviews Rebel Leader,” al-Ittihad
(Arabic), 11 June 1980, p.â•–12; “Interview with Taliban Commander Maulvi Jalaluddin
Haqqani,” The News, 20 Oct. 2001; Nawa-e-Afghan Jihad (Urdu), 2, 10 (Nov. 2009).
17.╇Vahid Brown, “Al-Qa’ida and the Taliban: Diametrically Opposed?” Jihadica, 21 Oct. 2009.
18.╇For a discussion of how foreign fighter mobilizations empower transnational terrorist groups
see the conclusion to this subsection and Thomas Hegghammer’s work cited above.
19.╇For a perspective on this see Vahid Brown, “Classical and global jihad: Al-Qa’ida’s franchis-
ing frustrations,” in Assaf Moghadam and Brian Fishman (eds), Fault Lines in Global Jihad:
Organizational, Strategic, and Ideological Fissures, New York: Routledge, 2011, pp.â•–88–117.
20.╇For a breakdown of all provinces see Anne Stenersen, “Al Qaeda’s Allies: Explaining the
Relationship between al Qaeda and Various Factions of the Taliban after 2001,” Counterter-
rorism Strategy Initiative Paper, 19 Apr. 2010.
21.╇Guido Steinberg, “A Turkish al-Qaeda: The Islamic Jihad Union and the Internationalization
of Uzbek Jihadism,” Strategic Insights, July 2008; the most comprehensive assessment of
actors in southeastern Afghanistan is provided by Ruttig, “The Haqqani Network as an
Autonomous Entity,” pp.â•–57–89.
22.╇Stenersen, “Al Qaeda’s Allies: Explaining the Relationship between al Qaeda and Various
Factions of the Taliban after 2001,” p.â•–4.
23.╇Intel Center, “Jihadi Video Production Group Breakout by Afghan Province v1.0,” 28 Oct.
2008.
24.╇The Haqqani network is not known to be active in Zabul, Kunar, or Nuristan. For back-
ground on ties that al-Qa’ida and other aligned foreign militant groups have to Zabul,
Ghazni, and Kunar and Nuristan see Harmony document SOCOM-2012-0000015, p.â•–1; see
also Sebastian Abbot, “Drone Strike Kills al-Qa’ida Leader,” Associated Press, 30 May 2012;
Paul Cruickshank and Tim Lister, “NATO on alert for influx of foreign fighters in southern
Afghanistan,” CNN, 24 May 2011.
25.╇“Mustafa Abu al-Yazid’s Interview on al-Jazeera,” NEFA, 22 June 2009.
26.╇Richard Oppel Jr., Abdul Waheed Wafa, and Sangar Rahimi, “20 Dead as Taliban Attackers
Storm Kabul Offices,” New York Times, 12 Feb. 2009; Anand Gopal, “Coordinated Kabul
assault shows Taliban strength,” Christian Science Monitor, 12 Feb. 2009.
27.╇Ibid.
28.╇Stenersen, “Al-Qaeda’s Allies: Explaining the Relationship between Al-Qaeda and Various
Factions of the Taliban post 2001.”
29.╇“Mustafa Abu al-Yazid’s Interview on al-Jazeera,” NEFA Foundation, 22 June 2009.
30.╇Carol Grisanti and Mushtaq Yusufzai, “Taliban commander: Afghan officials are helping kill
Americans,” NBC News, 30 July 2008.
31.╇For examples see Part I and AFGP-2002-600088, p.╖18; while several future leaders of al-
Qa’ida had close ties to or at times fought under the direction of Haqqani in Paktia, there
were a number of Arab fighters who rose to leadership positions under Haqqani but never
joined al-Qa’ida. One such individual was Abu al-Hareth al-Urduni, a Jordanian, who Abu’l-
Walid al-Masri described as being the “Emir (Commander) of the main Arab group at
Khost.” AFGP-2002-600090, p.â•–4.
32.╇Sami Yousufzai, “The Taliban in their Own Words,” Newsweek, 26 Sep. 2009.
33.╇Abu Laith al-Libi is believed to have had a strained relationship with al-Qa’ida at times. For
background see Guido Steinberg, “Renewing Leadership: The Role of Egyptians and Libyans
in al-Qaeda’s Senior Leadership,” Janes IHS Defense, Jan. 2012, p.â•–11, www.swp-berlin.org/
fileadmin/contents/products/fachpublikationen/sbgrenewingleadership_02.pdf; on his
role during the early days of the US invasion of Afghanistan see Burke, The 9/11 Wars, p.â•–57;
on Abu Laith’s death see Rashid, Descent into Chaos, p.â•–390.

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pp [190–192] NOT E S

34.╇Cole, “Killing Ourselves in Afghanistan.”

35.╇For example, in June 2009 Abu Yahya al-Libi and Sirajuddin Haqqani were both reportedly
part of a delegation which tried to convince Baitullah Mehsud to negotiate a truce with
Islamabad, as “Haqqani and al-Qaeda leaders were watching the army’s advance through
South Waziristan and worried that their territory might be next.” Warrick, The Triple Agent,
p.â•–72.
36.╇Gopal, Mahsud, and Fishman, “The Battle for Pakistan: Militancy and Conflict in North
Waziristan,” pp.â•–6–7.
37.╇“Arab Escapees Set up 60-Strong Group to Fight Coalition Forces in Afghanistan,” Pajhwok
News (in Dari), 8 Dec. 2005.
38.╇“Mujahideen Breaking in One of the Apostates’ Centers,” Jihad Archive, www.jarchive.info;
“First Operation Against the Americans After the Escape From Baghram Prison,” Jihad
Archive, www.jarchive.info
39.╇“Terrorism Incident Report: Afghanistan, 2002–2007,” IntelCenter, p.â•–203; “Holocaust of the
Americans,” al-Sahab, Dec. 2005.
40.╇“Breaking in an Apostates’ Center in Khost,” Jihad Archive, www.jarchive.info
41.╇“First Operation Against the Americans After the Escape From Baghram Prison,” Jihad
Archive, www.jarchive.info
42.╇Ruttig, “The Haqqani Network as an Autonomous Entity,” p.â•–59.
43.╇“Mujahideen Breaking in One of the Apostates’ Centers,” Jihad Archive, www.jarchive.info;
for additional reflections of Abu Yahya al-Libi’s presence in Khost see Mushtaq Yusufzai,
“US now says Somali, not al-Libbi killed in drone hit,” The News, 13 Dec. 2009; for other
video see Hanein Network, www.hanein.info/vb/showthread.php?t=139908&page=1
44.╇Nadeem Sarwar and Safiullah Gul Mehsud, “Al-Qaeda Tries to Unite Pakistani Militants,”
McClatchy-Tribune Regional News, 22 Dec. 2011; Declan Walsh and Eric Schmitt, “Drone Strike
Killed No.â•–2 in Al Qaeda, U.S. Officials Say,” New York Times, 5 June 2012.
45.╇“Mustafa Abu al-Yazid’s Interview on al-Jazeera,” NEFA, 22 June 2009; it is worth noting
that the Taliban also claimed responsibility for this attack, see Matt Dupee, “FOB Salerno
Withstands 2-Day Taliban On-Slaught,” Long War Journal, 18 Aug. 2008.
46.╇“Mustafa Abu al-Yazid’s Interview on al-Jazeera,” NEFA, 22 June 2009.
47.╇“An Interview with the Director of Military Affairs in Paktika: Mawlawi Sangeen,” al-Sahab,
English translation provided by Dar al Murabiteen Publications, no date.
48.╇Ron Moreau, “Pakistan’s Dangerous Double Game,” Newsweek, 13 Sep. 2008; “Unravelling
Haqqani’s Net,” Jane’s Terrorism and Security Monitor, 30 June 2009.
49.╇Vahid Brown’s interview with Sebastian Rotella 11 Aug. 2010; see also Sebastian Rotella and
Josh Meyer, “A young American’s journey into al-Qa’ida,” Los Angeles Times, 24 July 2009;
Paul Cruickshank, “Al-Qaeda’s 2008 plan to hit Long Island Railroad Revealed,” CNN, 23
Apr.€2012.
50.╇Belgian interrogation summary of Bryant Neal Vinas.
51.╇Paul Cruickshank, Nic Robertson, and Ken Shifman, “From Long Island to Lahore: The Plot
to Bomb New York,” CNN, 21 May 2010, http://edition.cnn.com/2010/CRIME/05/14/
bryant.neal.vinas.part2/index.html; Sebastian Rotella and Josh Meyer, “A young American’s
journey into al-Qa’ida.”
52.╇According to congressional testimony provided by General David Petraeus in June 2010, “the
Hakkani [sic] network … clearly commanded and controlled the operation …” See “Hearing
to Continue to Receive Testimony on the Situation in Afghanistan,” Senate Armed Services
Committee, 16 June 2010, p.â•–14, http://armed-services.senate.gov/Transcripts/2010/06%20
June/10–53%20-%206–16–10.pdf
53.╇For background on the assault see Liam Stack, “Bagram Attack Kills U.S. Contractor,
Wounds Nine NATO Soldiers,” Christian Science Monitor, 19 May 2010; for background on
Bekkay Harrach see the United Nations’ “Al-Qaida and Taliban Sanctions Committee Record
for Harrach” (at www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2009/sc9667.doc.htm); on his death see
Yassin Musharbash, “Al-Qaida Fighter from Bonn Believed Dead,” Der Spiegel, 19 Jan. 2011.
54.╇Bill Roggio, “IMU claims 2010 attack on Bagram airbase was executed ‘in coordination and
cooperation with other jihadi groups,’” Long War Journal, 19 Oct. 2011.
55.╇Harmony document SOCOM-2012-0000019, pp.â•–30–1. In the document Bekkay Harrach is
referred to by his kunya: Abu Talha al-Almani.
56.╇Harmony document SOCOM-2012-0000019, pp.â•–30–1.
57.╇“Al-Qa’idah commander killed in Afghan east,” Pajhwok Afghan News (in English), 13 July
2008; “Haqqani’s son killed in Paktia,” The News, 11 July 2008.

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 NOT E S p p [192–197]

58.╇“Al-Qaeda Commander Dies in Fight with US and Afghan Forces,” Jane’s Terrorism and
Insurgency Centre, 16 July 2008.
59.╇Evan F. Kohlmann, “Dossier: Shaykh Mustafa Abu al-Yazid (aka Shaykh Saeed),” NEFA,
June 2008; “The ‘Martyrdom’ of Abu Sulaiman al-Otaibi,” NEFA, 11 May 2008; Bill Roggio,
“Al-Qa’ida Operatives Killed in Afghanistan were Saudis,” Long War Journal, 13 May 2008.
60.╇Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, AQI’s deceased leader, reportedly fought with Jalaluddin and his
men in 1991 during their capture of Khost, see the article by Fu’ad Husayn in Al Quds al
Arabi, 13 May 2005; Abu Sulayman al-Utaybi was reportedly dismissed from his position by
Abu Omar al-Baghdadi before heading to Afghanistan. For background see Nibras Kazimi,
“Interesting: Abu Suleiman al-‘Uteibi Killed in Afghanistan,” Talisman Gate (Blog), 11 May
2008, http://talismangate.blogspot.com/2008/05/interesting-abu-suleiman-al-uteibi.html
61.╇For reflections of Abu Laith al-Libi’s role see Steinberg, “A Turkish al-Qaeda.”
62.╇Ibid.
63.╇Wigen, “Islamic Jihad Union.”
64.╇For a review of other joint attacks see ibid., specifically the cases of Abu Müslim Kurdi (June
2008) and Ebu Ömer Lezgi (Nov. 2008).
65.╇Matthias Gebauer, Yassin Musharbash, and Holger Stark, “Berlin’s Worst Nightmare: Ger-
many’s First Suicide Bomber in Afghanistan?” Der Spiegel Online, 15 Mar. 2008.
66.╇Ibid.; Steinberg, “A Turkish al Qaeda.”
67.╇Mushtaq Yusufzai, “Taliban Attack US Military Camp in Khost,” The News, 4 Mar. 2008.
68.╇Ibid
69.╇Carlotta Gall, “Old-Line Taliban Commander Is Face of Rising Afghan Threat,” New York
Times, 17 June 2008.
70.╇“IJU Press Release,” 6 Mar. 2008.
71.╇Ibid.
72.╇Wigen, “Islamic Jihad Union”; Carlotta Gall, “Old-Line Taliban Commander Is Face of Rising
Afghan Threat,” New York Times, 17 June 2008; www.spiegel.de/international/world/
0,1518,543768,00.html
73.╇Wigen, “Islamic Jihad Union.”
74.╇Don Rassler’s interview with Thomas Ruttig, 25 May 2010.
75.╇This “form of entryism” concept is borrowed from Jason Burke, Al Qaeda: The True Story of
Radical Islam, London: I.B. Tauris, 2004, p.â•–220.
76.╇As Hanna Rogan notes, “There appears to be not one jihadist media strategy and one media
campaign, but rather a number of strategies …” see Hanna Rogan, “Al-Qaeda’s online media
strategies: From Abu Reuter to Irhabi 007,” Norwegian Research Defense Establishment,
2007, p.â•–117.
77.╇Harmony document AFGP-2002-600321; for similar reflections on how al-Qa’ida views
media and its importance see seventeen of the internal al-Qa’ida documents that were recov-
ered from Bin Laden’s compound in Abbottabad, Pakistan, and were released by the Com-
bating Terrorism Center. This material can be viewed and downloaded via www.ctc.usma.
edu/posts/letters-from-abbottabad-bin-ladin-sidelined
78.╇“I say to you that we are in a battle, and that more than half of this battle is taking place in
the battlefield of the media.” See “Letter from al-Zawahiri to al-Zarqawi,” http://ctc.usma.
edu/harmony/pdf/CTC-Zawahiri-Letter-10–05.pdf; Ayman al-Zawahiri, Exoneration, no
date.
79.╇Various scholars have noted that al-Qa’ida’s strategic communications consistently empha-
size three main points/goals: propagation, legitimization, and intimidation, see the work of
Steve Corman and Jill S. Schiefelbein, “Communication and Media Strategy in the Jihadi War
of Ideas,” Consortium for Strategic Communication, 20 Apr. 2006; and Hanna Rogan, “Abu
Reuter and the E-Jihad: Virtual Battlefronts from Iraq to the Horn of Africa,” Georgetown
Journal of International Affairs (Summer/Fall 2007), p.â•–94.
80.╇See Harmony document AFGP-2002-008575-47-48; Bergen, Holy War, Inc, p.╖57.
81.╇See the work of Ahmed Zaidan, Brynjar Lia, and Thomas Hegghammer.
82.╇In addition to writing for al-Ittihad newspaper, Abu Walid is also believed to have played a
role in the production of al-Mujahid, which was produced by Jamiur Rahman, who primarily
operated in Afghanistan’s northeast. See Zaydan, The “Afghan Arabs” Media at Jihad, p.â•–92.
83.╇For additional background on Abu’l-Walid al-Masri see Vahid Brown, “Abu’l Walid al-
Masri: A Biographical Sketch,” Combating Terrorism Center, no date; for background on
al-Suri see Lia, The Architect of Global Jihad, 2008.
84.╇This significance of this has been noted by Ahmed Zaydan, “I learned later from Afghan

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Arab sources who were there that Usama had sought to sidestep the Taliban pressure on
him by meeting the press in areas far away from the Taliban city of Kandahar, such as
Jalalabad, where Hizb-i Islami leader Mawlawi Yunis Khalis enjoyed power and good
relations with Usama since the days of the Afghan jihad, or in Paktia, where Shaykh Jala-
luddin Haqqani, the Taliban Minister of Borders and Tribes, had strong ties with Bin Ladin
as well … This might explain why the declaration of the World Islamic Front for Jihad
Against the Jews and Crusaders in May of 1998 by Bin Ladin, Zawahiri, and Pakistani
figures, was issued in Khost, not Kandahar, or other areas where the Taliban and Mullah
Muhammad Omar enjoyed significant influence.” It is also believed that Bin Laden asked
Jalaluddin’s former boss, Yunis Khalis, for permission to hold the press conference; see
Ahmad Zaydan, Usama Bin Ladin bi-la Qina’, Beirut: al-Sharaka al-‘Alami li’l-Kitab, 2003,
p.â•–130.
85.╇For information on Badruddin Haqqani’s media role see David Rohde, “‘You Have Atomic
Bombs, but We Have Suicide Bombers,’” New York Times, 19 Oct. 2009; Rohde and Mulvi-
hill, A Rope and a Prayer, pp.â•–157–61.
86.╇For background on Zawahiri’s question and answers session see Jarret Brachman, Brian
Fishman, and Joseph Felter, “The Power of Truth? Questions for Ayman al-Zawahiri,”
Combating Terrorism Center, 21 Apr. 2008.
87.╇See “Mustafa Abu al-Yazid’s Interview on al-Jazeera,” NEFA, 22 June 2009.
88.╇Labayk media and al-Sahab are productions companies affiliated with al-Qa’ida; Badr-al-
Tawheed and Elif media are production companies associated with the IJU; Sawt al-Islam
is a production company associated with the Eastern Turkistan Islamic Movement (ETIM),
recently renamed as the Turkistan Islamic Party (TIP). Earlier videos released by ETIM
were branded with the logo “Turkistan.”
89.╇As Hanna Rogan notes, another useful distinction is segmentation between friendly and
adversarial audiences; see Rogan, “Al-Qaeda’s online media strategies.”
90.╇“Open Interview with Sirajuddin Haqqani, a member of the Shura Council of the Islamic
Emirate of Afghanistan and a commander in the southeastern provinces of Afghanistan,”
released by the Ansar al-Mujahidin Network, 27 Apr. 2010.
91.╇Brynjar Lia, “Al-Qaeda Online: Understanding Jihadist Internet Infrastructure,” Jane’s
Intelligence Review, 1 Jan. 2006.
92.╇Ustadh Ahmad Farooq serves as al-Qa’ida’s head of dawah and media in Pakistan, and the
Urdu-language videos that feature him are a reflection of al-Qa’ida’s efforts to influence
local audiences in Pakistan.
93.╇“Caravan of the Ghazis,” Manba’ al-Jihad (in Pashto), second video, Sep. 2009, available at
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=A4abacEjO4A, accessed on 29 July 2010.
94.╇Abu Laith al-Libi is believed to have worked as an independent commander before offi-
cially joining al-Qa’ida in 2007. According to Anne Stenersen, “Abu al-Layth al-Libi’s sol-
diers were known as majmu’at Abu al-Layth (Abu al-Layth’s group).” See “Al Qaeda’s Allies:
Explaining the Relationship between al Qaeda and Various Factions of the Taliban after
2001,” Counterterrorism Strategy Initiative Paper, 19 Apr. 2010.
95.╇Brynjar Lia, “Jihadi Web Media Production: Characteristics, Trends, and Future Implica-
tions,” paper presented at “Check the Web” Conference on “Monitoring, Research and
Analysis of Jihadist Activities on the Internet—Ways to Deal With the Issue” in Berlin on
26 and 27 Feb. 2007; “Lessons from the Life of Abu-al-Layth,” Shumukh Al-Islam Network,
https://shamikh1.net/vb/showthread.php?t=16023
96.╇“Lessons from the Life of Abu-al-Layth,” Shumukh Al-Islam Network, https://shamikh1.
net/vb/showthread.php?t=16023
97.╇“Mawlawi Nur Muhammad Raid in Khost,” Jihad Archive, www.jarchive.info
98.╇“Abu-Nasir al-Qahtani, the Mujahid Poet,” Jihad Archive, www.jarchive.info, 21 Oct. 2005;
according to a foreign fighter who served under Abu Laith al-Libi, the al-Qa’ida leader
commanded a group of 300 to 500 fighters; Belgian interrogation document provided to the
authors.
99.╇“Tora Bora Interview with Sheikh Abu Yahya al-Libi,” www.al-jahafal.com/vb/show-
thread.php?t=676; Abu Nasir al-Qahtani’s media role is revealed in al-Sahab videos and its
“Holocaust of the Americans” series.
100.╇“U.S.: Senior al Qaeda leader captured in Afghanistan,” CNN, 13 Nov. 2006, www.cnn.
com/2006/WORLD/asiapcf/11/13/afghan.capture/index.html; Rahimullah Yusufzai,
“Al-Qaeda man rearrested,” The News, 13 Nov. 2006; see also Fahd al-Riya’I, “Interview
with Saudi Tribal chief Shaykh Ja’far al-Qahtani, father of Terror Suspect ‘Abu Nasir’ al-
Qahtani,” Ukaz (Arabic), no date.

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101.╇“Al-Qa’idah commander killed in Afghan east,” Pajhwok Afghan News, 13 July 2008; “Haqqa-
ni’s son killed in Paktia,” The News, 11 July 2008.
102.╇Ruttig, “The Haqqani Network as an Autonomous Entity,” p.â•–74.
103.╇They have also helped to enhance the reputation and personal brand of all three al-Qa’ida
members, especially Abu Yahya al-Libi.
104.╇Soren Astrup and Moren Skjoldager, “Prosecutor: 22 Year-Old Knew al-Qa’ida Leader,”
Politiken, 4 Sep. 2008.
105.╇Interview with Morten Skoldager, 5 Aug. 2010; Morten Skoldager, Truslen indefra: De danske
terrorister, Lindhardt og Ringhof, Denmark, 2009; see also Laura Marie Sorensen, “Al-
Qaeda-leder trænede dansk terrorist,” Politiken (Danish), 11 Oct. 2009, http://politiken.dk/
indland/article807742.ece
106.╇Julian Isherwood, “Guilty of Planning Terrorism,” Politiken (in English), 21 Oct. 2008.
107.╇Interview with Morten Skoldager, 5 Aug. 2010.
108.╇Sebastian Rotella and Josh Meyer, “A young American’s journey into al-Qa’ida,” Los Angeles
Times, 24 July 2009.
109.╇Rogan, “Al-Qaeda’s online media strategies.”
110.╇Wigen, “Islamic Jihad Union”; Carlotta Gall, “Old-Line Taliban Commander Is Face of
Rising Afghan Threat,” New York Times, 17 June 2008; Matthias Gebauer, “Bavarian Taliban
Video: The Smiling Suicide Bomber,” Der Spiegel, 27 Mar. 2008, http://www.spiegel.de/
international/world/0,1518,543768,00.html
111.╇International Crisis Group, “Taliban Propaganda: Winning the War of Words?” 24 July
2008.
112.╇Rogan, “Al-Qaeda’s online media strategies.”
113.╇German officials have noted that the bomber, Cüneyt Çiftçi, also went by the name Saad
Ebu Furkan; see Matthias Gebauer, Yassin Musharbash, and Holger Stark, “Berlin’s Worst
Nightmare: Germany’s First Suicide Bomber in Afghanistan?” Der Spiegel Online, 15 Mar.
2008; Sirajuddin Haqqani identified the bomber as Abdhullah, see Mushtaq Yusufzai, “Tali-
ban Attack US Military Camp in Khost,” The News, 4 Mar. 2008.
114.╇The concept of cross-promotion is borrowed from Joanna Nathan, “Reading the Taliban,”
in Giustozzi, Decoding the New Taliban, p.â•–33.
115.╇The official status and affiliation of Labayk media is not entirely clear. Some have specu-
lated that Labayk media is affiliated with the Taliban, others argue that it is closer to al-
Qa’ida and al-Sahab. The authors believe the latter affiliation is now more accurate.
116.╇Jeremy Binnie and Joanna Nathan, “The Evolving Role of Uzbek-led Fighters in Afghani-
stan and Pakistan,” CTC Sentinel, 2, 8 (Aug. 2009).
117.╇FOB Chapman reportedly functions as a CIA outpost used to collect intelligence, see Mark
Mazzetti, “CIA Takes on Bigger and Riskier Role on Front Lines,” New York Times, 31 Dec.
2009.
118.╇For background on al-Balawi’s biography and his jihadist media credentials see Warrick,
The Triple Agent.
119.╇During his time in North Waziristan, al-Balawi met al-Qa’ida’s operations chief for Paki-
stan—Abdullah Said al-Libi—who invited al-Balawi to stay in his compound; “drank tea
with [al-Qa’ida leader] Atiyah Abd al-Rahman” (now deceased); was introduced to al-
Qa’ida’s operations chief for Afghanistan Sheikh Saeed al-Masri (also known as Mustafa
Abu al-Yazid; also now deceased); and served as a doctor for TTP leader Baitullah Mehsud.
Al-Balawi was also interviewed by al-Qa’ida’s Vanguards of Khorasan magazine. See War-
rick, The Triple Agent, particularly p.â•–154.
120.╇“Statement on the Abu-Dujanah Al-Khurasani Raid (May God Accept Him) To Infiltrate the
Fortresses of the Americans,” Al-Qa’ida General Command, 6 Jan. 2010.
121.╇Such integration is not surprising. See quote from Bryant Neal Vinas in Cruickshank, “The
Militant Pipeline.”
122.╇For example, see http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=RTZQTC6ucVI
123.╇Alex Spillius, “CIA suicide bomber ‘worked with bin Laden allies’,” Telegraph, 7 Jan. 2010.
124.╇Warrick, The Triple Agent, pp.â•–79–80.
125.╇“Interview with Sirajuddin Haqqani,” al-Balagh Media Center, 13€Apr. 2010.
126.╇“Yemeni Bombmaker Martyred in Waziristan,” Flashpoint Partners, 9€May 2010. For back-
ground on al-San’ani, see Evan Kohlmann, “Al-Qa’ida’s Yemeni Expatriate Faction in
Pakistan,” CTC Sentinel, 4, 1 (Jan. 2011).
127.╇Kohlmann, “Al-Qa’ida’s Yemeni Expatriate Faction.”
128.╇Ibid.
129.╇Ibid.

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130.╇For example, as noted by Kohlmann, “Allah awarded them to spend Eid there in the highest
levels of Paradise, with their beloved ones and brothers Ghazwan al-Yemeni, Abu Dujanah
al-Sanaani, and Abu Dujanah al-Khorasani. Just as He gathered them in life, He has gath-
ered them in the afterlife.” Ibid.
131.╇The Nov. 2011 death in Karachi of an al-Qa’ida-linked Global Islamic Media Front (GIMF)
official Abd al Moeed bin Abd al Salam (from Yemen) could serve as an important example
here, as Moeed “created local media groups and Jihadi websites and forums in … Urdu,
English, Bengali, and Pashto.” Moeed’s death was announced through a statement issued
by GIMF in Dec. 2011, which praised him for his work supporting al-Qa’ida and the TTP.
Interestingly, several weeks after Moeed’s death the TTP released a statement claiming
responsibility for the death of three Pakistani Rangers in Karachi, who were reportedly
killed to avenge the death of Moeed. These dynamics suggest that Moeed was a fairly
important and well-known player in GIMF. For background on all of these details see
“Statement on the Martyrdom of One of Its Commanders and Knight of Knights: The
Brother Abu Umar—May Allah Accept Him,” GIMF statement, 8 Dec. 2011, in the author’s
possession; Bill Roggio, “Al Qaeda announces death of Karachi-based media operative,”
Long War Journal, 8 Dec. 2011; Adil Jawad and Faraz Khan, “Gulistan-e-Jauhar grenade
suicide: FIA report casts doubts on Rangers’ claims,” Express Tribune, 5 Dec. 2011; Bill
Roggio, “Pakistani Taliban take revenge for slain al Qaeda media operative,” Long War
Journal, 15 Dec. 2011.
132.╇“Open Interview with Sirajuddin Haqqani, a member of the Shura Council of the Islamic
Emirate of Afghanistan and a commander in the southeastern provinces of Afghanistan,”
released by the Ansar al-Mujahidin Network, 27 Apr. 2010; see also “Interview with Siraj
Haqqani,” al-Balagh Media Center, 13 Apr. 2010.
133.╇For an exploration of this history see Part I of this book.
134.╇One of our anonymous readers suggested that there have been instances where the
Haqqanis abandoned foreign fighters, leaving them to be captured or killed by Pakistani
security forces. Unfortunately, we were not able to locate any evidence or accounts of such
occurrences. It is unclear if this has transpired.
135.╇“Al Qaeda commander dies in fight with US and Afghan forces,” Jane’s Terrorism and Insur-
gency Centre, 16 July 2008; “US Drone Kills Key al-Qa’ida Commander in Waziristan,” Geo
TV, 20 Feb. 2010, www.geo.tv/2–20–2010/59655.htm
136.╇David Rohde, “A Drone Strike and Dwindling Hope,” New York Times, 20 Oct. 2009.
137.╇“A Reporter’s Tale of Ambush and Captivity,” NPR (Fresh Air), 27 Oct. 2009, www.npr.
org/templates/transcript/transcript.php?storyId=114173568
138.╇Bruce Riedel made a similar point in 2008, stating that “the environment Pakistan tolerates
inside its borders has allowed bin Laden and al Qaeda to continue to thrive there.” See
Bruce Riedel, “Pakistan and Terror: Eye of the Storm,” AAPSS, 618, July 2008; for another
perspective see Gul, The Most Dangerous Place, pp.â•–165–6.
139.╇Jalaluddin Haqqani had a political office in Peshawar, see “Interview with Commander Haji
Mohammad Ibrahim,” Nusrat al-Jihad (Urdu), 1, 9 (July 1991); he also had a number of resi-
dences there, see Harmony document AFGP-2002-600099, p.â•–33; see also Harmony docu-
ment AFGP-2002-800775, p.â•–53; for historical examples of the Haqqanis providing facilities
for Arab fighters and future members of al-Qa’ida see the writing of Abu Walid al-Masri,
specifically, AFGP-2002-600099, pp.â•–12 and 17; AFGP-2002-600096, p.â•–75; AFGP-2002-
600099, pp.â•–12–14. All references to page numbers are to the English-language translations
of these documents. Versions of these documents are available online via Abu Walid’s blog
http://mafa.maktoobblog.com/ and website http://mafa.asia/
140.╇Harmony document AFGP-2002-600099, pp.╖12 and 17.
141.╇Harmony document, AFGP-2002-600096, p.╖75.
142.╇Harmony document, AFGP-2002-600099, pp.â•–12–13.
143.╇Harmony document AFGP-2002-600099, p.╖14.
144.╇For background and various perspectives on the actors involved see accounts provided by
Peter Bergen, “The Battle for Tora Bora,” The New Republic, 240, 23/24 (30 Dec. 2009); Philip
G. Smucker, Al-Qaeda’s Great Escape: The Military and the Media on Terror’s Trail, Dulles, VA:
Brassey’s, 2004; Dalton Fury, Kill bin Laden: A Delta Force Commander’s Account of the Hunt
for the World’s Most Wanted Man, New York: St. Martin’s Press, 2008; Lucy Morgan Edwards,
The Afghan Solution: The Inside Story of Abdul Haq, the CIA and how Western Hubris Lost
Afghanistan, Bactria Press: London, 2011, p.â•–79; Burke, The 9/11 Wars, pp.â•–61–72; Gary Bern-
sten and Ralph Pezzullo, Jawbreaker: the Attack on Bin Laden and al-Qaeda—a Personal Account

288
 NOT E S p p [208–212]

by the CIA’s Field Commander, New York: Crown Publishers, 2005; Najwa bin Laden, Omar
bin Laden, and Jean Sasson, Growing up Bin Laden; John Kerry, “Tora Bora Revisited: How
we Failed to Get Bin Laden and Why it Matters Today,” A Report To Members of the Com-
mittee on Foreign Relations, US Senate, 30 Nov. 2009.
145.╇Rashid, Descent Into Chaos, pp.╖99 and 268.
146.╇Mark Mazzetti and Eric Schmitt, “CIA Outlines Pakistan Links with Militants,” New York
Times, 30 July 2008; it also appears that the Haqqani network provided protection to the
IMU and its leaders after they moved to North Waziristan, given tensions in South
Waziristan. See Gul, The Most Dangerous Place, pp.â•–58 and 69.
147.╇Rashid, Descent Into Chaos, p.╖268.
148.╇These global jihadist groups hosted a range of different actors, including Hafiz Gul Bahadur
and a number of Pakistani Taliban leaders, for details see Barbara Sude, “Al Qaeda Central:
An Assessment of the Threat Posed by the Terrorist Group Headquartered on the Afghani-
stan–Pakistan Border,” Counterterrorism Strategy Initiative Paper, Feb. 2010, p.â•–6; see also
Magnus Norell (ed.), “Militancy in the Pakistani Federally Administered Tribal Areas
(FATA) and Afghanistan,” Swedish Research Defense Establishment, FOI-R-2727-SE,
Feb.€2010.
149.╇“Guard: Al Qaeda Chief in Pakistan Killed,” CNN, 9 Sep. 2008; Mushtaq Yusufzai, “Three
more US attack victims succumb to injuries,” The News, 10 Sep. 2008; Isambard Wilkinson,
“Pakistan condemns US troop crossborder raids from Afghanistan,” Telegraph, 11 Sep. 2008;
three years after Abu Haris’ death his replacement (Abu Hafs al-Shahri) was also killed in
North Waziristan. According to one account he was killed with a Haqqani commander who
went by the name Hafezullah. See Bill Roggio, “Abu Hafs al Shahri confirmed killed in
Predator strike in Pakistan,” Long War Journal, 17 Sep. 2011.
150.╇Harmony document, AFGP-2005-0003302.
151.╇Carol Grisanti and Mushtaq Yusufzai, “Taliban commander: Afghan officials are helping
kill Americans,” NBC News, 30 July 2008.
152.╇“German security forces name citizen as leading Al Qaeda attack planner,” Jane’s Terrorism
and Insurgency Centre, 27 Jan. 2009.
153.╇Guido Steinberg, “A Turkish al Qaeda”; Wigen, “Islamic Jihad Union.”
154.╇For background on this relationship see Part I and Jin Yan and Wu Qi, “Asan Mahsum and
his East Turkistan Islamic Movement Plan, Carry Out Terrorist Activities in China,” Sanlian
Shenghuo Zhoukan, no date; “How are ‘East Turkistan’ Elements Trained?” Sohu, 25 July
2002.
155.╇“Militant Leader Killed in N. Waziristan Drone Strike,” Dawn, 1 Mar. 2010.
156.╇Fathullah Haqqani initially established facilities in Zhawar for Jalaluddin in 1981, see
“Inside Afghanistan—The Strongest Jihadi Center in Zhwar is Named After Hazrat-e
Omar,” Nusrat al-Jihad (Urdu), 1, 9 (July 1991); see also Scheuer, Through our Enemies’ Eyes,
pp.â•–96–7; for videos, satellite imagery, and photos of Zhawar see: www.globalsecurity.org/
military/world/afghanistan/zhawar-kili.htm
157.╇Local frustrations of those who remained in Afghanistan during this period are best cap-
tured by Abu’l-Walid al-Masri, see Brown, Cracks in the Foundation; and Harmony docu-
ment AFGP-2002-60053, p.â•–31.
158.╇Harmony documents AFGP-2002-600106 and AFGP-2002-800581; according to Steve Coll,
“The first infrastructure [i.e., training camps] of Al Qaeda was essentially supervised by
Haqqani,” see www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/taliban/interviews/coll.html
159.╇According to Steve Coll, “He was their Afghan patron in many ways,” see ibid.
160.╇During the 1990s Jalaluddin Haqqani still received some state funding. For example, in the
early 1990s Saudi Arabia provided Jalaluddin Haqqani with money to build a number of
schools and a university in Khost; see “Mawlawi Jalaluddin Haqqani in an Interview with
Manba-al Jihad,” Manba’ al-Jihad (Pashto), 4, 1 (Sep. 1992); Jere Van Dyk corroborated these
findings, “it is an open secret that the Haqqanis built the main mosque in Khost with Saudi
money,” interview with Don Rassler, 1 Apr. 2010; there is some evidence that the CIA
funded initiatives during the 1990s—such as the Commanders’ Shura—in which Jalalud-
din Haqqani played a major role. But there is no evidence that covert funding from the
United States was earmarked specifically for Haqqani during this period, although this is
possible.
161.╇See www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/taliban/interviews/coll.html
162.╇“To Our Muslim Girls,” Manba’ al-Jihad (Arabic), 1, 5 (Dec. 1990).
163.╇The first delegation sent by Jalaluddin Haqqani to fulfill these duties in the Gulf was headed

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by Mawlawi Aziz Khan. He and a number of other “brothers” worked in the Gulf for five
years until they were replaced by several other people, see Mawlawi Aziz Khan, “The First
Jihadi Operation in Afghanistan, and the Rising of the Ulama Against the Communists,”
Manba’ al-Jihad (Pashto), 1, 4–5 (Oct.–Nov. 1989).
164.╇One must also consider that the UAE is the home of the world’s largest Pashtun diaspora
community outside of Pakistan, see Doris Buddenberg and William A. Byrd (eds), “Afghan-
istan’s Drug Industry: Structure, Functioning, Dynamics and Implications for Counter-
Narcotics Policy,” UNODC, Nov. 2006, p.â•–166.
165.╇Muhammad al-Shafi’i, “Five Arabs, including a Saudi, are Detained by al-Qa’ida Organiza-
tion on Charges of Spying,” Al-Sharq al-Awsat, 20 June 2000.
166.╇Ibid.
167.╇Nasser al-Bahri, Dans l’ombre de Ben Laden, pp.â•–161–5; for additional insight into this issue
see Kevin Jackson’s three-part blog series “‘A believer is not stung twice out of the same
hole’: the longstanding issue of security within the ranks,” Alleyesonjihadism (blog),
http://alleyesonjihadism.wordpress.com/2012/06/
168.╇Harmony document AFGP-2002-800775, p.╖3.
169.╇Harmony document AFGP-2002-800775, p.╖38.
170.╇“Government’s Evidentiary Proffer Supporting the Admissibility of Coconspirator State-
ments,” 02 CR 892, United States District Court, Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Divi-
sion; for an overview of al-Qa’ida’s use and affiliation with various Islamic charities,
including BIF, see Victor Comras, “Al Qaeda Finances and Funding to Affiliated Groups,”
in Jeanne K. Giraldo and Harold A. Trinkhunas (eds), Terrorism Financing and State
Responses: A Comparative Perspective, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2007, pp.â•–115–32.
171.╇“Government’s Evidentiary Proffer Supporting the Admissibility of Coconspirator State-
ments,” 02 CR 892.
172.╇Peters, “Crime and Insurgency in the Tribal Areas of Afghanistan and Pakistan,” Combat-
ing Terrorism Center, Oct. 2010, p.â•–37.
173.╇Waldman, “The Sun in the Sky,” p.â•–19.
174.╇Anthony Loyd, “Terror link alleged as Saudi millions flow into Afghanistan war zone,” The
Times, 31 May 2010; “The CIA recently estimated that Taliban leaders and their allies
received $106 million in the past year from donors outside Afghanistan,” see Craig Whit-
lock, “Diverse Sources Fund Insurgency In Afghanistan,” Washington Post, 27 Sep. 2009.
175.╇Don Rassler’s interview with Gretchen Peters, 22 Jan. 2011.
176.╇Senator Afrasiab Khattak is the president of the Awami National Party in the recently
renamed Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa Province of Pakistan; see interview with Afrasiab Khattak,
www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/taliban/etc/script.html
177.╇“Treasury Targets Taliban and Haqqani Network Leadership: Treasury Designates Three
Financiers Operating in Afghanistan and Pakistan,” US Treasury Press Release, 22 July
2010; other sources confirm Nasiruddin’s financial role, Interview with Pir Zubayr Shah, 23
Sep. 2010; see also Gopal, Mahsud, and Fishman, “The Battle for Pakistan: Militancy and
Conflict in North Waziristan.”
178.╇“Treasury Targets the Financial and Support Networks of al-Qa’ida and the Taliban,
Haqqani Network Leadership,” US Treasury Department Press Release, 9 Feb. 2011.
179.╇For background on Fazl Rabbi see www.treasury.gov/resource-center/sanctions/OFAC-
Enforcement/Documents/taliban_notice_06212011.pdf; www.un.org/sc/committees/
1988/NSTI15712E.shtml; for background on Ahmad Jan Wazir see www.treasury.gov/
resource-center/sanctions/OFAC-Enforcement/Documents/taliban_notice_06212011.pdf;
www.un.org/sc/committees/1988/NSTI15912E.shtml
180.╇Harmony document AFGP-2002-600096, p.╖228; see also Harmony document AFGP-2002-
600093, p.â•–57.
181.╇As noted in Part I, other Afghan political and mujahidin leaders, such as Ahmed Shah
Masoud and Abdul Rasul Sayyaf, also played important roles facilitating the movement
and integration of foreign fighters, although not as early or as consistently as Jalaluddin
Haqqani.
182.╇Although it is not known if similar practices are followed in Afghanistan/Pakistan, internal
al-Qa’ida in Iraq records illustrate how foreign fighters were contributed to al-Qa’ida after
their arrival, see Brian Fishman (ed.), Bombers, Bank Accounts and Bleedout: al-Qa’ida’s Road
in and out of Iraq, Combating Terrorism Center, July 2008.
183.╇Anthony Davis, “Foreign Combatants in Afghanistan,” Jane’s Intelligence Review, 1 July 1993.
184.╇Ibid.

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185.╇Matthias Gebauer, “‘Bavarian Taliban’ Video: The Smiling Suicide Bomber,” Der Spiegel, 27
Mar. 2008.
186.╇“The Threat from Within: A German Islamist Rises up Al-Qaida’s Ranks,” Der Spiegel, 27
Jan. 2009; Bin Laden was impressed by Harrach as well. See Harmony document SOCOM-
2012-0000019, p.â•–30.
187.╇For a reflection of this see the mention of Mullah Dadullah’s interview with al-Jazeera in
2006, “Suicide Bombings in Afghanistan,” Jane’s Islamic Affairs Analyst, 1 Sep. 2007.
188.╇Mullah Dadullah, who served as a suicide attack trainer for the Afghan Taliban, later went
on to wage a brutal campaign of violence in southern Afghanistan, see Johnson and Mason,
“No Sign Until the Burst of Fire,” pp.â•–41–77.
189.╇Franco, “The Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan,” p.â•–283.
190.╇Seth Jones, “Pakistan’s Dangerous Game,” Survival, 49, 1 (Spring 2007), p.â•–22; for a more
skeptical analysis of these claims see Alec D.€Barker, “Improvised Explosive Devices in
Southern Afghanistan and Western Pakistan, 2002–2009,” Counterterrorism Strategy Initia-
tive Policy Paper, New America Foundation, Apr. 2010.
191.╇“Suicide Bombings in Afghanistan,” Jane’s Islamic Affairs Analyst, 1 Sep. 2007.
192.╇Ruttig, “The Haqqani Network as an Autonomous Entity,” p.â•–69.
193.╇Christine Fair, “Suicide Attacks in Afghanistan (2001–2007),” United Nations Assistance
Mission to Afghanistan, 9 Sep. 2007.
194.╇Gul, The Most Dangerous Place, pp.â•–138–9.

7.╇ENTANGLEMENTS AND MANAGEMENT OF THE HAQQANIS’ NEXUS POSITION

1.╇Limited research has been done on “constrained pragmatism.” For two perspectives see H.
Elaine Mayo, “Toward Collective Praxis in Teacher Education: Complexity, Pragmatism and
Practice,” thesis, University of Canterbury, 2003 and Richard Posner, How Judges Think,
Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2008.
2.╇In a series of televised speeches to Pashtun and Tajik elders during this period President
Najibullah criticized the role of foreigners fighting in Afghanistan, Khost, and Jalalabad,
www.youtube.com/watch?v=pnvIrb8L9hk&NR=1. He gives speeches to the gatherings of
Pashtun and Tajik elders in the country, appealing to them to support the government
because the foreigners are there fighting to destroy Afghanistan. He mentions that every
night he shows Arab and Pakistani captives on national television, pleading guilty of fight-
ing in Afghanistan. He mentions Khost and Nangarhar; we would like to thank Ahmed for
helping us to understand this point.
3.╇“Taliban’s Sirajuddin Haqqani Shrugs Off $5m Bounty,” AfPax Insider, 4 July 2009.
4.╇“Interview with Sirajuddin Haqqani,” al-Balagh Media Center, 13 Apr. 2010.
5.╇Gopal, Mahsud, and Fishman, “The Battle for Pakistan: Militancy and Conflict in North
Waziristan,” p.â•–13.
6.╇Authors’ interview with anonymous source, Mar. 2010.
7.╇Ibid.
8.╇Authors’ interview with Pir Zubayr Shah, 13 Sep. 2010.
9.╇For an overview of this problem see Christine Fair and Seth G. Jones,€“Pakistan’s War
Within,” Survival, 51, 6 (Dec. 2009–Jan. 2010), pp.â•–161–88.
10.╇Derived from statistics provided in Ian S. Livingston and Michael O’Hanlon, “Pakistan
Index: Tracking Variables of Reconstruction and Security,” Brookings Institution, 8 Dec.
2010; for attack numbers see “Pakistan Security Report 2009,” Pak Institute for Peace Studies,
Jan. 2010.
11.╇Lolita C. Baldor, “Terrorist Attacks Spike in Pakistan, Afghanistan,” Huffington Post, 26 Apr.
2010, www.huffingtonpost.com/2010/04/29/terrorist-attacks-spike-i_n_556343.html; for a
breakdown of these attacks see https://wits.nctc.gov/ or http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/
12.╇Cruickshank, “The Militant Pipeline.”
13.╇Carol Grisanti and Mushtaq Yusufzai, “Taliban commander: Afghan officials are helping kill
Americans,” NBC News, 30 July 2008.
14.╇Ibid.
15.╇For a review of Pakistani military operations in South Waziristan and the FATA see Fair and
Jones, “Pakistan’s War Within.”
16.╇Shaiq Hussain, “Ditch Mehsud or face action,” The Nation, 29 July 2009.
17.╇David Rohde, “You Have Atomic Bombs, but we have Suicide Bombers,” New York Times,
19 Oct. 2009.

291
pp [225–231] NOT E S

18.╇“Deadly Blast Hits Pakistan Mosque,” BBC, 27 Mar. 2009, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/

7967594.stm; see also “Death Toll in Jamrud Mosque Suicide Attack Hits 70,” Pakistan Trib-
une, 27 Mar. 2009, www.paktribune.com/news/index.shtml?212987
19.╇NPR interview, 6 May 2010, www.npr.mobi/templates/transcript/transcript.php?story
Id=126536285
20.╇David Rohde, “A Drone Strike and Dwindling Hope,” New York Times, 20 Oct. 2009.
21.╇Gul, The Most Dangerous Place, p.â•–37; Gopal, Mahsud, and Fishman, “The Battle for Pakistan:
Militancy and Conflict in North Waziristan.”
22.╇Ronald Sandee, “The Islamic Jihad Union (IJU),” NEFA, 14 Oct. 2008; Steinberg, “A Turkish
al-Qaeda.”
23.╇A Pakistani investigator with intimate knowledge of the case explained the ties back to North
Waziristan in the following way: “while the fingers were in Islamabad, the tail was in
Mirali.” See Ismail Khan, “Rocket Attack Plan was Approved by Al Qaeda,” Dawn, 4 Nov.
2006; Ebu Yahya Muhammed Fatih was killed in a drone attack in Mir Ali, North Waziristan
in Sep. 2009.
24.╇IJU video: Islami Cihad Ittehad Operasyonlari: Murtedlerin Sonu.
25.╇This dataset is current as of June 2010.
26.╇For background on this integration see Chapter 6.
27.╇For background see Don Rassler, “Al-Qa’ida’s Pakistan Strategy,” CTC Sentinel, June 2009.
28.╇“Attack on Musharraf; 5 Get Capital Punishment,” Pakistan Times, 28 Aug. 2005; “Arrests
Follow Musharraf Attack,” BBC, 27 Dec. 2003.
29.╇B. Raman, “Jihadis Strike at Pak Army and ISI Again,” South Asia Analysis Group, 25 Nov.
2007.
30.╇Bruce Riedel, Deadly Embrace: Pakistan, America and the Future of Global Jihad, Washington, DC:
Brookings Institution Press, 2011, p.â•–77.
31.╇“Seven Qaida Commanders Enter Pakistan,” Daily Times, 4 June 2009; “ISI is Not a Rogue
Agency: Riedel,” Dawn, 6 June 2009; the Long War Journal claims that Prime Minister Gilani
and General Kiyani were also targets. For more, see Bill Roggio, “Al Qaeda Operatives
Targeting Pakistani Leaders,” Long War Journal, 4 June 2009.
32.╇Ibid. It should also be noted that significant disagreements exist among academics and
counterterrorism professionals about the strength of the links between al-Qa’ida and
Lashkar-e-Taiba.
33.╇Harmony document AFGP-2002-602383.
34.╇Cruickshank, “The Militant Pipeline.”
35.╇For background on the plot see Simone Kaiser, Marcel Rosenbach, and Holger Stark, “Opera-
tion Alberich: How the CIA helped Germany foil terror plot,” Der Spiegel, 10 Sep. 2007;
Guido Steinberg, “Trial and Error: How a Failed Plot Revealed a Movement,” Jane’s Intelli-
gence Review, 16 Apr. 2010.
36.╇Steinberg, “A Turkish al-Qaeda”; Souad Mekhennet and Michael Moss, “Europeans Get
Terror Training Inside Pakistan,” New York Times, 10 Sep. 2007, www.nytimes.
com/2007/09/10/world/europe/10germany.html
37.╇Yassin Musharbash, “Mastermind behind German Terror Plot: Jihadi Leader Reported Killed
in US Drone Attack,” Der Spiegel, 18 Sep. 2009, www.spiegel.de/international/world/
0,1518,649978,00.html
38.╇Guido Steinberg, “Al-Qaida and Jihadist Terrorism post 2001,” in Mark Pieth, Daniel The-
lesklaf, and Radha Ivory (eds), Countering Terrorist Financing: The Practitioner’s Point of View,
Basel: Basel Institute on Governance, 2009, p.â•–8.
39.╇For a review of the IJU/Abu-Laith al-Libi linkage see Chapter 6; for insight into the link
between Abu Laith al-Libi and the Haqqani network see Gopal, Mahsud, and Fishman, “The
Battle for Pakistan: Militancy and Conflict in North Waziristan,” pp.â•–6–7.
40.╇Yassin Musharbash and Marcel Rosenbach, “Explosions in the Sand,” Der Spiegel (German),
10 Aug. 2009.
41.╇We personally thank Morten Skoldager and representatives from the Danish Defense Intel-
ligence Service for the assistance and information they provided about this plot.
42.╇Morten Skoldager, Truslen indefra: De danske terrorister, Lindhardt og Ringhof, Denmark,
2009; see also Laura Marie Sorensen, “Al-Qaeda-leder trænede dansk terrorist,” Politiken
(Danish), 11 Oct. 2009, http://politiken.dk/indland/article807742.ece; Sebastian Rotella, “A
Look Inside al-Qaeda,” Los Angeles Times, 2 Apr. 2008; al-Masri reportedly trained Bekkay
Harrach during the same timeframe.
43.╇“According to the U.S. authorities, Abu Ali was a liaison between the senior leadership of
al-Qaeda and its rank-and-file members around the world. Abu Ali arranged travel, pro-

292
 NOT E S p p [231–241]

cured false documents and assisted in other ways the rank and file al-Qaeda members who
were sent out into the world to carry out terrorist actions.” [Translated from Danish]; see
Skoldager, Truslen indefra.
44.╇Abu Nasiruddin al-Qahtani was captured in Khost and is now detained in Saudi Arabia, see
sources above.
45.╇As Cruickshank notes, “Abu Hafith” could be a reference to Bekkay Harrach; see Cruick-
shank, “The Militant Pipeline,” footnote 148; Belgian interrogation summary of Bryant Neal
Vinas.
46.╇Vahid Brown interview with Sebastian Rotella; see also Sebastian Rotella and Josh Meyer,
“A young American’s journey into al-Qa’ida,” Los Angeles Times, 24 July 2009; see also Paul
Cruickshank, Nic Robertson, and Ken Shifman, “From Long Island to Lahore: The Plot to
Bomb New York,” CNN, 21 May 2010, http://edition.cnn.com/2010/CRIME/05/14/bryant.
neal.vinas.part2/index.html
47.╇For background see Paul Cruickshank, “Al-Qaeda’s 2008 plan to hit Long Island Railroad
Revealed,” CNN, 23 Apr. 2012.
48.╇Belgian interrogation summary of Bryant Neal Vinas.
49.╇Paul Cruickshank, Nic Robertson, and Ken Shifman, “From Long Island to Lahore: The Plot
to Bomb New York,” CNN, 21 May 2010, http://edition.cnn.com/2010/CRIME/05/14/
bryant.neal.vinas.part2/index.html
50.╇For background on Abdul Jabbar and his ties see “UK and Taliban links of drone death man
Abdul Jabbar,” BBC Newsnight, 11 Oct. 2010, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/programmes/
newsnight/9080165.stm
51.╇“Two al-Qaeda Leaders Arrested in Pakistan Last Month,” Daily Times, 21 Dec. 2010.
52.╇“Al-Qaida Plans: Bin Laden Said to have Financed European Terror Plot,” Der Spiegel, 2 Oct.
2010, www.spiegel.de/international/europe/0,1518,720879,00.html; Amir Mir, “Drones
Trying to Wipeout White Jihadis in Waziristan,” The News, 9 Oct. 2010.
53.╇Matthias Bartsch, Yassin Musharbask, and Holger Stark, “Fears of€Mumbai Redux: The Story
behind Germany’s Terror Threat,” Der€Spiegel, 22 Nov. 2010, www.spiegel.de/international/
germany/0,1518,730377,00.html

CONCLUSION

1.╇Many of these sources are also currently being digitized in partnership with the University of
Arizona by a grant sponsored by the US National Endowment for the Humanities.
2.╇Soufan, The Black Banners, p.╖xxii.
3.╇For good background see Dexter Filkins, “After America: Will civil war hit Afghanistan when
the U.S. leaves?” New Yorker, 9–16 July 2012, pp.â•–54–67.
4.╇As reviewed in the introduction, the author recognizes that the term jihad has multiple mean-
ings. For clarity all references to jihad in the following paragraphs refer to violent jihad.
5.╇For background on al-Qa’ida’s posturing vis-à-vis India see Mustafa Abu al-Yazid, “Speech
to the People of Pakistan,” al-Sahab, 26 Mar. 2009.
6.╇For reflections of disagreements over tactics in Waziristan see SOCOM-2012-0000007. For a
broader investigation of fault lines within and external to the region’s jihadi community see
Assaf Moghadam and Brian Fishman (eds), Fault Lines in Global Jihad, New York: Routledge,
2011.

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Zakori, Wazir Jaffer, “Jalaluddin Haqqani’s brother, Ibrahim Haqqani arrested,” Pakistan (Urdu),
19 May 2003.
Al-Zawahiri, Ayman, Exoneration, no date.
Zaydan, Ahmad, Usama Bin Ladin bi-la Qina’, Beirut: al-Sharaka al-‘Alami li’l-Kitab, 2003.

Harmony Documents
AFGP-2002-000079
AFGP-2002-000103
AFGP-2002-002869
AFGP-2002-008576
AFGP-2002-008578
AFGP-2002-008582
AFGP-2002-008583
AFGP-2002-008587
AFGP-2002-008588
AFGP-2002-008612
AFGP-2002-008624
AFGP-2002-008629
AFGP-2002-008575-47-48
AFGP-2002-008681
AFGP-2002-008681-24
AFGP-2002-60053
AFGP-2002-600029
AFGP-2002-600053
AFGP-2002-600087
AFGP-2002-600088
AFGP-2002-600090
AFGP-2002-600092
AFGP-2002-600093
AFGP-2002-600096
AFGP-2002-600099
AFGP-2002-600106
AFGP-2002-600321
AFGP-2002-602383
AFGP-2002-800581

304
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AFGP-2002-800775
AFGP-2002-800928
AFGP-2004-0011048
AFGP-2004-011048
AFGP-2005-0003302
SOCOM-2012-0000004
SOCOM-2012-0000007
SOCOM-2012-0000010
SOCOM-2012-0000015
SOCOM-2012-0000019

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 INDEX

Abdallah, Hafez: first indigenous ing (2008), 2, 9, 150, 157, 173;

Afghan suicide bomber, 216 Jalalabad, 5, 87, 105–6; Kabul, 1,
al-‘Adl, Sayf: 98, 241 5, 9, 27, 30–2, 36–42, 48–9, 55, 57,
Afghan Civil War (1989–92): 83; 63, 71, 82, 84, 89, 101, 103, 105,
Battle of Jalalabad (1989), 81–2; 107, 112, 119, 123–4, 134, 136–9,
Battle of Khost (1990–1), 81–2; 145, 150, 154–6, 159, 173, 183,
Battle of Gardez (1991), 81–2 188, 216, 232, 235; Kandahar, 24,
Afghan Interim Government 35, 73, 101, 108, 110, 162; Khost
(AIG): 89; creation of, 85; mem- Province, 2, 5, 9, 13, 51, 65–7,
bers of, 88 76, 80, 85–6, 89, 91, 97, 100, 103,
Afghan Services Bureau (MAK): 105, 111, 113–15, 117, 124, 126,
72–4, 236; al-Jihad, 77; establish- 139–41, 176, 179, 183, 188, 190–1,
ment in Peshawar (1984), 65; 201–2, 204, 218; Kunar Province,
founding of (1979), 64; members 22, 85, 231; Logar Province, 40,
of, 61, 77; training camps of, 80 137–8, 188; Loya Paktia, 5, 9, 13,
Afghanistan: 10–11, 15, 21, 23, 33, 22, 34, 66, 81, 108, 121, 129–31,
71, 76–7, 82, 157, 181, 187–8, 199, 133–4, 136, 138, 140, 143–4, 148,
219, 225, 236; Baluchistan, 110, 153–4, 173, 175, 186, 188–9, 192,
120, 157, 164; borders of, 5, 69, 197, 200–1, 223, 225, 229, 231,
74, 81, 125, 131, 140, 148, 160, 243; military of, 34–5, 52, 67, 72,
225; Durand Line, 4, 22, 32, 35, 152; Nangarhar Province, 105–6,
51, 122, 129–30, 138, 154, 222, 137; NATO/ISAF presence
239; Ghazni Province, 137, 188; in, 16–17, 135, 137, 156–8, 240;
government of, 5, 9–10, 33, 48, Nuristan Province, 188; Opera-
123–4, 152, 171, 240; Herat, 50, tion Enduring Freedom (2001–),
137, 145; Indian embassy bomb- 71, 124, 136, 139, 158, 178, 240;

307
 IND E X

Paktia Province, 28, 42, 67–8, 75, Azizuddin, Tariq: former Paki-
86–7, 91, 117, 124, 137, 140, 164, stani Ambassador to Afghani-
188, 193; Paktika, 22, 27; Soviet stan, 159; kidnapping of, 159–60
Invasion of (1979–89), 4–7, 13, ‘Azzam, ‘Abdullah: 8, 73, 75, 236;
17, 21, 31, 40, 53, 56, 59–61, 63–4, fatwa issued by (1984), 62–3;
67–8, 70–1, 76, 78, 83, 90, 96, leader of MAK, 61, 64, 77; The
139, 153–4, 171–2, 176–7, 192, Defense of Muslim Territories
196, 239; Takhar Province, 118; (1983), 62; The Signs of the Merci-
Taloqan Province, 96; Tora Bora, ful in the Jihad in Afghanistan
107, 208; Wardak Province, (1983), 62
137–8, 188; Zabul Province, 188
Ahmadzai: 87 Baba, Qari: 102
Ahmed, Mahmud: Director Gen- Bahadur, Hafiz Gul: 143–4, 146,
eral of ISI, 123 225, 229; family of, 31; media
Ahmed, Mansoor: associates of,
appearances of, 203; member of
232; death of (2010), 232
SIM, 160; TTP commander in
Ahmed, Qazi Hussein: amir of JI,
North Waziristan, 140, 148
103
al-Bahri, Nasir: 114; bodyguard to
Akhtar, Saifullah: 111
Osama Bin Laden, 79, 98, 116
Akhund, Mullah Obaidullah:
Bakr, Abu: associates of, 232;
member of Quetta Shura Tali-
death of (2010), 232
ban, 160
al-Balawi, Humam Khalil Abu-
Akorwi, Abdul Haq: family of, 39;
Mulal (Abu Dujanah al-Kho-
founder of Dar al-‘Ulum Haqqa-
rasani): alleged connection to
niyya, 38
Haqqani network, 205; influence
Allah, Attiya: 231
Algeria: 28 of, 204
Ali, Muhammad Ilias Subhan Baluch: insurgency movements,
(Abu Ali): 230–1 21; nationalism, 43
Amil, Qari: 140 Bangladesh: 32, 70, 94; Liberation
Ammanullah, King: 56 War (1971), 21, 42
Anas, ‘Abdullah: memoirs of, 66 al-Banshiri, Abu ‘Ubayda (Ali
AQI, see al-Qa’ida in Iraq Amin al-Rashidi): 72, 75, 90,
Arnaout, Enaam: (Abu Mahmud 207–8; first military leader of
al-Suri): 92; chief executive of al-Qa’ida, 66
BIF, 213; co founder of al- Basayev, Shamil: 97
Qa’ida, 90 Basra, Riaz: 111
Atatürk, Mustafa Kemal: 29 al-Bayid, Muhammad(Abu al-
Aziz, Khalid: former chief secre- Mubtassim): pardoned by Mul-
tary of NWFP, 164 lah Muhammad Omar, 212

308
 IND E X

Beg, Mirza Aslam: Pakistani chief Bush, George W.: administration

of army staff, 94 of, 158
Belgium: 231
Benevolence International Foun- CARE International: schools built
dation (BIF): funding of Hezb-e- by, 108
Islami, 213; personnel of, 213 Carter, Jimmy: foreign policy of,
Benotman, Noman: former leader 64
of Libyan Islamic Fighting Chechnya: 95, 97
Group, 82 Cheney, Dick: US Vice President,
Bhutto, Benazir: electoral victory 157–8
of (1993), 102; murder of, 159 China: 83, 94, 111; financial aid
Bhutto, Zulfikar Ali: administra- provided for anti-Soviet jihad
tion of, 43; President of Pakistan, by, 59; Muslim population of, 3,
42, 44; trial and execution of 112; Xinjiang, 112
(1979), 53; visit to USA (1973), 44 Çiftçi, Çüneyt: 215; suicide bomb-
ing conducted by (2008), 193–4
Bin Laden, Osama: 7–8, 64, 68,
Clinton, Bill: foreign policy of, 110
73, 75, 79, 87–90, 94, 98, 118,
Cold War: 21, 59
192, 195, 211, 237, 241; as Abu
Commonwealth of Independent
‘Abdullah, 77, 208; assassination
States (CIS): 95
of (2011), 228; CNN interview
Cuba: Guantanamo Bay, 183
(1997), 107, 113–14; ‘Expel the
Polytheists from the Arabian
Dadullah, Mullah: 203, 216; death
Peninsula’ (1996), 106; family
of (2007), 137
of, 241; fatwa issued by (1998),
Daoud Khan, Muhammad: 35, 46,
196–7; founding of Advice and
49, 51, 55, 129; Afghan Defense
Reform Committee (1990), 89;
Minister, 33; Afghan Prime Min-
leader of World Islamic Front ister, 33; anti-purdah measures,
for Jihad Against Jews and 35; coup d’état led by (1973), 36,
Christians, 70, 114, 197; move to 43; reform policies of, 34
Afghanistan (1996), 105–6; re- Dar al-‘Ulum Haqqaniyya: 39, 49,
lationship with Taliban, 107–8, 132–3, 178; founding of (1947),
114, 116, 118; supporters of, 60, 38; graduation ceremonies of,
237–8 132; students of, 38, 40, 42, 55,
Bosnia and Herzegovina: Sarajevo, 63; ties to Haqqani network, 131
90 Dawar: 146
Brezhnev, Leonid: General Sec- Denmark: 201, 230
retary of Central Committee of
CPSU, 50 Egypt: 7; Cairo, 37; military of,
Buddhism: 26 65, 76

309
 IND E X

Egyptian al-Jama’a al-Islamiyya Haq, Abdul: 85, 123; member of

(EIG): 82; factions of, 90; mem- HIK, 101
bers of, 90; al-Murabitun, 93 Haq, Mawlana Sami-ul: 133; fam-
Engels, Friedrich: writings of, 40 ily of, 38–9; head of JUI-S, 38
Haqqani, Badruddin: 170; death of
Falluja Islamic Network: 205 (2012), 138
al-Faruq, Omar: imprisonment of, Haqqani, Fathullah: 39, 63; fight-
183 ing units led by, 137
Fatemi, Tariq: former Pakistani Haqqani, Ibrahim Khan: family of,
Ambassador to USA, 161 29, 96, 123, 143; participation in
Fazul, ‘Abdullah Muhammad: Qatar meeting (2011), 124
death of (2011), 80, 98; leader Haqqani, Jalaluddin: 7, 30, 39,
of al-Qa’ida operations in East 45–6, 48–9, 52, 55, 61, 67–8, 70–1,
Africa, 80, 97 78, 81, 87, 91, 93, 102–4, 111–12,
First Gulf War (1990–1): belliger- 114, 118, 129, 139, 153, 155, 172,
ents of, 12; Invasion of Kuwait
177, 180, 185–6, 194, 196, 207–8,
(1990), 88; political impact of,
211–12, 214–15, 235, 238; back-
87–8
ground of, 28, 31, 38, 42; capture
Foreign Broadcast Information
of Khost garrison (1991), 142,
Service (FBIS): 15
221; declaration of jihad (1973),
France: 232
31, 33, 46, 129; family of, 14,
Free Pashtunistan movement:
28–9, 31, 96, 117, 123, 139, 143,
members of, 32
147, 168, 170, 201, 204, 214;
founder of Haqqani network,
Gahez: 39
Gahez, Minhajuddin: founder of 28; ideology of, 91; Islamabad
Gahez, 39 meetings (2001), 122–3; leader of
Gandhi, Mohandas: 30 NCS, 85–6; visit to Saudi Arabia,
Garang, John: military forces led 211
by, 90 Haqqani, Khalil: 168; family of, 29,
Gelowicz,Fritz: 229 143, 147, 214
Germany: 28, 192, 232; Ramstein Haqqani, Mawlawi Nizamuddin:
airbase attack plot (2007), 39, 72, 153, 172
229–30 Haqqani, Muhammad: death of
Giustozzi, Antonio: 15 (2011), 168; family of, 168
Gopal, Anand: 15–16 Haqqani, Nasiruddin: 168; associ-
Gorbachev, Mikhail: speeches of, ates of, 229; family of, 190
71 Haqqani, Omar: death of (2008),
Gul, Hamid: former chief of ISI, 192, 201
153 Haqqani, Sirajuddin: 124–5, 141–2,

310
 IND E X

144, 147, 160–1, 167, 171, 189, tionship with IJU, 193, 195, 202,
191, 197–8, 203, 205–6, 209–10, 219; relationship with Pakistani
221; family of, 14, 117, 168, 186, state, 11, 152–3, 159, 161–3, 170–
190, 201; leader of Miranshah 3, 206, 228, 242–3; relationship
Shura, 173; military leader of with TTP, 126, 146–8, 205, 222–3,
Haqqani network, 13; role in 233; role in Indian embassy
creation of SIM (2009), 160; bombing (2008), 152; smug-
support for TTP, 224; training of gling activity of, 145; support
suicide bombers, 146 provided to Taliban, 107–8, 131,
Haqqani network: 1–3, 8–9, 15, 135–6, 148; supporters of, 33;
17–18, 22–3, 27, 30, 38, 41, 45, 48, territorial presence of, 5, 12, 117,
51–2, 56–60, 101, 105, 121, 124, 119–20, 129–30, 137, 140, 145,
127, 129, 132, 134, 142–3, 148, 164, 169, 189, 203, 219, 225; The
153, 155, 157, 162, 171, 174, 179, Voice of Global Jihad, 92; ties to
181, 184, 194–5, 198–9, 202–3, Dar al-‘Ulum Haqqaniyya, 131;
210, 215–18, 223, 227, 232, 235, Zhawara facility, 5–6, 8, 66–70,
237, 243; alleged connection 72–5, 79–80, 85, 91, 95, 99–100,
to Humam Khalil Abu-Mulal 106, 109, 113–14, 116, 179, 211
al-Balawi, 205; alliance with Harakat-i Inqilab-i Islami: 40–1,
al-Qa’ida, 11–12, 75, 113, 115, 52, 101; members of, 51
121–2, 126, 178–9, 182, 185, 195, Harakat ul-Ansar (HUA): 110; for-
204–5, 211–12, 214, 218, 222, 226, mation of, 109; training camps
228–9, 233, 237–8; assault on operated by, 109, 154, 173
FOB Salerno (2008), 232; clients Harakat-ul Jihad al-Islami (HuJI):
of, 6–7, 9, 15; designated as 94, 109–10; branches of, 70;
Foreign Terrorist Organization Gujrat City conference (1988), 92
(2012), 124; former US direct Harkat-ul Jihad al-Islami al’Alami
support for, 4–6, 104; funding (HuJI): members of, 70
of, 5, 214; ideology of, 12–13, Harkat ul-Mujahidin (HuM): 94,
100–1, 138, 184, 236; madras- 109–10, 154; members of, 70
sas network of, 131, 168, 209; Harrach, Bekkay (Al Hafidh Abu
Manba’ al-Jihad, 3, 14, 45–6, 65, Talha al Almani): 216; death of
81, 85, 90, 92, 94, 100, 131, 135, (2011), 192, 209–10, 216, 230
177–8, 196–7, 199, 202, 212, 221; Hazaras: 137
members of, 13, 24, 53, 78, 95, Hekmatyar, Gulbuddin: 14, 37, 44,
113, 121, 126, 130, 139–40, 142, 48, 73, 84, 86, 88–9, 96, 102–3,
147, 160, 167, 172, 174, 185, 190, 109, 142, 213, 236; leader of HIG,
216, 222, 225–6, 228–9; Nusrat 50, 52–3, 70; supporters of, 65,
al-Jihad, 14, 92, 139, 221; rela- 84

311
 IND E X

Hinduism: 33, 240 Iraq: Baghdad, 88; military of, 88;

Hizb-i Islami Afghanistan: col- use of IEDs in, 12
lapse of, 50 al-‘Iraqi, Abu ‘Ubayda: 66, 72, 74,
Hizb-i Islami-Gulbuddin (HIG): 76
88, 102; arsenal of, 103; financial Iran: 11, 43, 177
aid provided by ISI, 53; Jihad- Iraq: Operation Iraqi Freedom
wal facility, 70; members of, 50, (2003–11), 124
52, 56, 70; offices of, 103 Islam: 33, 184; Hajj, 211; political
Hizb-i Islami-Khalis (HIK): 40–1, use of, 7; Qur’an, 26, 52, 104;
52, 81, 86, 101, 137, 220; mem- Ramadan, 54; Shi’a, 11, 110, 143;
bers of, 50, 85, 101, 104; funding Sunni, 11, 24, 38, 41, 49
of, 213 Islamic Jihad Union (IJU): 18,
Hizb ul-Mujahidin: associates of, 187, 194, 196, 200, 203, 206–7,
69 209, 232, 240; attack on medi-
ul-Haq, General Zia: 6, 53–4, 56–7;
cal convoy in Swat (2007), 226;
alliance with JI, 69; background
Badr al-Tawheed, 197, 202, 226,
of, 53; coup d’état led by (1977),
230; members of, 10, 189, 210,
53; Zakat Ordinance (1980), 54–5
226, 228–30; relationship with
al-Hussami, Hussein (Ghazwan
Haqqani network, 193, 195, 202,
al-Yemeni): 205
219
Hussein, Saddam: 88
Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan
(IMU): 191–2, 209, 230, 240;
improvised explosive device
formation of (1998), 97; media
(IEDs): use in Iraq, 12
created by, 199
India: 1, 9, 24, 29, 42, 151; Brit-
Islamism: 4, 17, 37–42, 44, 48,
ish Raj, 23; Congress Party, 30;
50, 178, 236; Deobandi, 13, 30;
conflict with Pakistan, 3, 163;
military of, 138; Mumbai attacks militant, 8, 28, 82, 84, 87, 235;
(2008), 232, 240; Partition (1947), Pashtun, 38, 56; radical, 57;
30–1; political influence in revolutionary, 90; Sunni, 38, 41,
Afghanistan, 156–7; presence in 49
Kashmir, 154, 158, 173, 240; sup- al-Ittihad al-Islami: training of, 99
port for Northern Alliance, 10 Ittihad Party: financial aid pro-
Indonesia: 28, 183 vided by ISI, 53; formation of
International Security Assistance (1980), 51
Force (ISAF): bombing of head-
quarters of (2011), 158; presence Jabbar, Abdul: associates of, 232
in Afghanistan, 135 Jaish-e-Mohammad: 125–6; at-
Iqbal, Maulana: death of (2008), tempted assassination of Pervez
140 Musharraf (2003), 226

312
 IND E X

Jaji: 29 presence in, 154, 158, 173, 240;

Jalil, Mullah: 116 Line of Control, 170; use of
Jalolov, Najmiddin: leader of IJU, proxy groups in, 158
229 Kashmiri, Ilyas: role in attempted
Jamiat-i Islami (JI): 38, 41, 53, 109; assassination of Pervez Mush-
founding of (1941), 37; ideology arraf (2003), 226
of, 37; madrassas network of, Kenya: Nairobi 100; US embassy
70; members of, 37–8, 53, 103; bombing (1998), 100, 109, 113,
political alliances of, 69–70 115, 118
Jamiat-i Islami Afghanistan (JIA): Khalil, Maulana Fazlur Rahman:
financial aid provided by ISI, 53; 70, 154
formation of (1972), 38; mem- Khalis, Yunis: 40, 50, 57, 78, 91,
bers of, 50 104, 108, 213; background of, 39;
Jamiat Ulema-e-Hind: branches founder of HIK, 40
of, 30 Khan, Abdul Ghaffar: leader of
Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam (JUI): 30, 38, Khudai Khidmatgar, 32
91; factions of, 38, 178; madrassa Khan, Babrak: family of, 56
run by, 54; member of MRD, 53; Khan, Ghazi: family of, 29, 147
members of, 38–40, 42, 93, 154 Khan, Haji Mali: detained by Co-
Jamiat Ulema-e-Sarhad (JUS): alition forces (2011), 139; family
branch of Jamiat Ulema-e-Hind, of, 139
30 Khan, Isma’il: commander of JIA,
Jan, Mawlawi Bakhta: 142; role in 50
creation of SIM (2009), 160 Khan, Khwaja Muhammad: family
al-Jaza’iri, Abu Binan: death of of, 28–9
(1991), 80 Khan, Ma’afi: forces led by, 81
jihadism: 8, 132, 198; global, 7–8, Khan, Mawlawi ‘Aziz: 39, 63; writ-
12, 88, 120, 207, 236; national, ings of, 45
82; revolutionary, 98; Salafi, 13 Khan, Mirza ‘Ali: Faqir of Iqi,
Julaydan, Wa’il (Abu’l-Hasan al- 31–2, 138; leader of Free Pash-
Madani): director of Saudi Red tunistan movement, 32
Crescent, 72 Khan, Muhammad Isma’il: family
of, 29
Karzai, Hamid: 123, 161, 176; Khan, Shamali: death of (1993), 87;
administration of, 124, 152, 160; Governor of Jalalabad, 87
attempted assassination of, al-Khorasani, Abu Dujanah:
135; exile of, 102; President of suicide bombing conducted by
Afghanistan, 135, 162, 209 (2011), 140
Kashmir: 31, 33, 41, 60, 83, 94, 112, Khost Rebellion (1924–5): 56;
156, 237, 239; Indian military impact of, 29

313
 IND E X

Khrushchev, Nikita: visit to Kabul, Malang, Mullah: 85; death of

34 (2001), 102; member of HIK, 101
Khudai Khidmatgar: 33; members Mansur, Nasrullah: 49–50; family
of, 32 of, 112–13; members of Harakat-
Khugiani: 29 i Inqilab-i Islami, 51
Khürsid, Hammad: arrest and Mansur, Saifurrahman: family of,
conviction for plotting attack in 112–13
Denmark (2008), 201–2, 230–1; Marx, Karl: writings of, 40
background of, 230 Marxism: 40
Khyam, Omar: leader of Islamic al-Masri, Abd al-Rahman: 66, 74;
Army of Great Britain, 232 death of (1988), 65
Khyber, Mir Akbar: assassination al-Masri, Abu Hafs: 72, 75, 98, 108,
of (1978), 49 237
Kuwait: Iraqi Invasion of (1990), al-Masri, Abu Ubaydah: 201; chief
88 of external operations for al-
Kyrgyzstan: 240 Qa’ida, 230
al-Masri, Abu’l Walid (Mustafa
Lakhvi, Zakiur Rahman: 154 Hamid): 72, 74, 77–8, 95–7, 103,
Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT): 154, 170; 115, 196, 208; background of,
suicide bombers trained by, 157 64–5; ‘Five Letters to the Africa
Lenin, Vladimir: writings of, 40 Corps’ (1993–4), 99–100; influ-
al-Libi, Abu Faraj: role in at- ence of, 98
tempted assassination of Pervez Massoud, Ahmad Shah: 37, 44,
Musharraf (2003), 226 84, 86, 89, 96; assault on Kabul
al-Libi, Abu Laith: 183, 201, 203; (1996), 107; commander of JIA,
associates of, 229; death of 50; territory controlled by, 118
(2008), 190, 194 Maududi, Abu’l-‘Ala: founder of
al-Libi, Abu Yahya: 184, 191, 201, JI, 37, 53; writings of, 37, 53
232; death of (2012), 184; escape al-Mauritania, Yunis: 191, 231
from prison (2005), 190, 200; Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF):
media appearances of, 200, 203 personnel of, 108–9
Libyan Islamic Fighting Group: Mehsud, Abdullah: death of
members of, 82 (2007), 139
al-Logari, Abu Ibrahim (Mustafa Mehsud, Baitullah: 139, 143, 147,
Badi): 88; training camps estab- 160, 231; leader of TTP, 108, 159;
lished by, 80, 87 member of SIM, 160; support for
Uzbek militants, 142; territorial
Makhdum, Hasan: death of (2003), influence of, 225
112 Mehsud, Hakimullah: commander

314
 IND E X

of TTP, 139, 204; media appear- Mullah-I Lang: leader of Khost

ances of, 203 Rebellion, 29
Mehsud, Qari Hussain: special- Mullen, Admiral Mike: chairman
ized training conducted by, 175, of US Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1, 158
217; training of suicide bombers, Musharraf, Pervez: 159; attempted
146 assassination of (2003), 226;
Mehta, Brigadier Ravi Datt: death President of Pakistan, 123; rise
of (2008), 151 to power (1999), 111
Mengal, Sardar Ataullah: 43 Muslim Brotherhood: 7; al-Mutja-
Moeller, Rear Admiral Robert: ma, 62; wings of, 37
testimony to US Senate, 2 Muslim Youth (Jawanan-i-Mu-
Movement for the Restoration of sulman): 39–40; formation of
Democracy (MRD): members (1969), 36; members of, 48–9
of, 53
Muhammad, Faiz: Afghan
bin al-Nahyan, Sheikh Zayed:
Minister of Frontier and Tribal
Emirati Prime Minister, 111
Affairs, 51; Afghan Minister
Najibullah, Muhammad: 84, 221;
of Interior, 51; assassination of
President of Afghanistan, 71;
(1980), 52
removed from power (1992),
Muhammad, Haji Din: 49, 78–9;
82, 89
deputy leader of HIK, 104
Najmuddin, Mullah: 24
Muhammad, Khalid Shaykh: role
Nasrullah, Mullah: 168
in planning of 9/11 attacks, 98
National Awami Party (NAP):
Muhammad, Prophet: 27
coalition with JUI parties, 43
Muhammadi, Muhammad Nabi:
National Commanders Shura
39, 57; background of, 40;
founder of Harakat-i Inqilab-i (NCS): 86, 93; capture of Gardez
Islami, 40, 51 (1991), 86; creation of (1990), 85;
Mujahid, Zabihullah: spokesper- members of, 101; Rawalpindi
son moniker for Taliban, 135, meeting (1990), 94
193 National Directorate of Security:
Mujahidin Shura Council: mem- 158
bers of, 193 National Islamic Revolutionary
Mujaddidi, Sibghatullah: 142 Council: formation of (1980), 56
mujahidin: 12, 15, 30, 37, 40–1, 53, nationalism: 105; Baluch, 43;
61–2; financial aid and train- ethno-, 43; Pashtun, 43, 57
ing provided to, 5, 59, 64, 68–9; Nazir, Mullah: 141–3, 229; mem-
members of, 14, 54, 59, 65, 67; ber of SIM, 160
supporters of, 7; Voice of Af- Niazi, Ghulam Muhammad: back-
ghanistan, 67 ground of, 37

315
 IND E X

Nickelsberg, Bob: 15 239; Federally Administered

Nixon, Richard: administration of, Tribal Areas (FATA), 22, 125–6,
44; foreign policy of, 44–5 130, 148–9, 152, 163, 182, 204,
Noor, Sadiq: 225; alleged role in 222, 225; Frontier Corps, 44,
preparations of car bombs, 146 46, 170–1, 175; government of,
Northern Alliance: 133, 181; 34, 41, 44, 109, 131, 142, 154–5,
members of, 10, 107; supporters 162, 226, 228; Gujrat City, 92;
of, 10 Independence of (1947), 30–1;
North Atlantic Treaty Organiza- Inter-Services Intelligence Di-
tion (NATO): 145, 235; mili- rectorate (ISI), 1, 5–6, 14, 44,
tary forces of, 192; presence in 51–5, 67–9, 71–2, 84, 94, 102–3,
Afghanistan, 16–17, 135, 137, 105, 109–10, 121, 123, 126, 136,
156–8, 240 153, 155–6, 158, 161–4, 167–8,
North Waziristan Peace Accord 170–5, 178, 180–2, 207, 210–11,
(Miranshah Peace Accord) 214, 223, 225; Islamabad, 10, 23,
(2006): 160, 182; signatories of, 41, 68, 113, 122, 125–6, 130, 142,
159, 164 147–8, 151–3, 160–1, 163, 224–5,
228, 240, 242; Karachi, 93, 154,
Obama, Barack: 161; announce- 164, 227; Khyber Pakhtunkhwa
ment of US troop surge in Province (KPP)/North-Western
Afghanistan (2009), 160 Frontier Province (NWFP), 32–4,
Omar, Mullah Muhammad: 105–6, 43, 55, 125, 163, 214; Lahore,
111, 114, 116, 118, 125, 136–7, 153; madrassas in, 54–5, 131–2;
155, 160–1, 170, 195; attempted military of, 5, 9, 12, 14, 42, 57,
assassination of (1999), 116; 68–9, 113, 147, 153, 166, 170, 176,
background of, 101; leader of 180, 222, 226; National Assem-
Taliban, 101; pardoning of Abu bly, 38; North Waziristan, 2–3,
Mubtassim, 212 5–6, 8–9, 12, 27, 30–1, 39, 45–6,
57, 67, 97, 104, 113–14, 121, 126,
Pakistan: 15, 21–3, 32, 34, 39, 44, 129–30, 138–40, 143–4, 148–9,
48, 52, 68, 76, 84, 94, 109, 119, 152, 163–7, 169, 174–5, 179–80,
121–2, 124, 141, 147–8, 169, 182, 184–6, 190, 193, 197, 200,
177–8, 182, 195, 199, 207–9, 233, 202–7, 209–10, 216–17, 220,
236, 241–2; Abbottabad, 192; 228–32, 242; Peshawar, 4, 11, 30,
Bajaur, 22; borders of, 5, 69, 74, 35, 38, 46–7, 51, 56, 59–61, 65–7,
81, 125, 131, 146, 148, 160, 225, 73, 77, 80, 85, 89, 92–3, 95, 97,
239; conflict with India, 3, 163; 146, 153, 159, 164, 168, 196, 207,
Durand Line, 4, 22, 30, 32–3, 232; Punjab Province, 43, 146,
122, 129–30, 138, 154, 170, 222, 163, 176, 240–1; Quetta, 56, 102;

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 IND E X

Rawalpindi, 84, 94, 130; rela- with Haqqani network, 11–12,

tionship with Haqqani network, 75, 113, 115, 121–2, 126, 178–9,
11, 152–3, 159, 161–3, 170–2, 182, 185, 195, 204–5, 211–12,
206, 228, 242–3; Sindh, 43; South 214, 218, 222, 226, 228–9, 233,
Waziristan, 22, 80, 97, 113, 130, 237–8; assault on FOB Salerno
138–9, 142, 160, 174–5, 217, 224 (2008), 232; ideology of, 84, 116,
Pakistan Peoples Party (PPP): 119, 125, 186, 224, 226, 228, 233;
electoral performance of, 42–3; influence of Battle of Ramadan
ideology of, 41 (1987) on, 76; members of, 11,
Pashtun: 17, 26–8, 46, 48, 50, 15, 64, 66, 73, 80–1, 87, 90–1, 95,
55–6, 86–7, 118, 192; Durrani, 97, 100, 103, 113, 121, 149, 164–5,
26; Ghilzai, 26; Ghurghusht, 183–4, 186–9, 191–2, 201–3,
26; insurgency movements, 21; 206–7, 209, 216, 223, 225, 227–31,
Islamism, 38, 56; nang, 22, 24–5; 237, 241; military committee
nationalism, 43, 57; qalang, 22, of, 65; origins of, 79; tactics of,
25; territory inhabited by, 22–5, 11–12, 89, 98; presence in Sudan,
31–3, 35–6, 55, 108 87, 95, 99; al-Sahab, 188, 190,
Pathan, Merajuddin: Governor of 197, 202–3; supporters of, 214,
Khost, 2 224; training camps of, 6, 8, 13,
People’s Democratic Party of 64, 79–80, 84, 91, 97, 100, 103,
Afghanistan (PDPA): formation 106, 109–10, 113–14, 118, 192,
of (1965), 36, 38; Khalq faction, 197, 211; US embassy bombings
36; members of, 50; Parcham (1998), 100, 109, 113, 115, 118;
faction, 36 Vanguards of Khorasan, 198
purdah: concept of, 29; opposition al-Qa’ida in Iraq (AQI): 216; mem-
to, 35 bers of, 193
Qais: descendents of, 27
al-Qadir, Haji ‘Abd: 86 al-Qandahari, Abu Ja’far (Ayman
al-Qahtani, Abu Dujanah: death Sabri Faraj): memoirs of, 75
of, 192; family of, 192 Qatar: 124
al-Qahtani, Abu Nasir: 191, 201; al-Qurashi, Shirin Jamal: 87
escape from prison (2005), 190, Qutb, Sayyid: influence of, 39
200; family of, 192; imprison-
ment of, 183, 190; media appear- Rabbani, Burhanuddin: 37, 44, 89;
ances of, 200–1 founder of JIA, 50, 53
al-Qa’ida: 2, 9–10, 15, 17–18, 71, Rabbani, Mullah: 106
81–2, 92, 97, 101, 123, 166, 174, al-Rahman, Abd: 207
181–2, 189–91, 199, 210–11, 218, ur Rahman, Mawlana Fazl: head
220–1, 230, 235–6, 240–3; alliance of JUI-F, 38, 93

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 IND E X

Rauf, Rashid: 191, 231 Shahzad, Faisal: attempted bomb-

al-Razzaq, Mullah ‘Abd: Taliban ing of Times Square (2010), 167
Interior Minister, 119 Sharif, Nawaz: administration of,
Reagan, Ronald: 111 110; electoral defeat of (1993),
Rohde, David: 207; kidnapping of 102; Pakistani Prime Minister,
(2009), 185, 224–5 95; visit to UAE (1999), 111
Russian Empire: 26 al-Sharqi, Abu ‘Ata: training sup-
Ruttig, Thomas: 15–16 port provided by, 95
Shinwari: 29
al-Sa’idi, Abu-Hasan: al-Qa’ida Shukrijumah, Adnan: 241
commander in Afghanistan, 192 Shura-e-Murakeba: establishment
Salih, Ahmad (Abu Suhayl): 176; of, 143
background of, 90 Shura Ittihad-ul-Mujahidin (SIM):
Salim, Mamduh Mahmud (Abu 161; establishment of (2009),
Hajar al-‘Iraqi): co-founder of 143, 160; members of, 160
al-Qa’ida, 73 Siddiqi, Ahmed: capture of (2012),
Sangari, Hamza: 216 232
Saqqao, Bacha: 31 Sikhism: 33, 38
Saudi Arabia: 48, 63, 68, 84, 88, al-Somali, Saleh: 191
214, 231; financial aid provided Somalia: 89, 95, 99; Battle of Moga-
for mujahidin by, 59, 68–9; dishu (1993), 99–100; Mogadi-
funding government of, 88; shu, 98
provided to Haqqani network, Soviet Union (USSR): 26, 35, 181;
5; Mecca, 42, 211; Riyadh, 212 collapse of (1991), 91; Com-
Saudi Red Crescent: personnel of, munist Party of Soviet Union
72 (CPSU), 50, 71; Invasion of
Sawr Revolution (1978): 50, 59–60 Afghanistan (1979–89), 4–7, 13,
Sayyaf, ‘Abd al-Rabb Rasul: 37, 53, 17, 21, 31, 40, 53, 56, 59–61, 63–4,
61, 236; supporters of, 65, 84 67–8, 70–1, 76, 78, 83, 90, 96, 139,
Second Anglo-Afghan War 153–4, 171–2, 176–7, 192, 196,
(1878–80): 26 239; military of, 67; Moscow, 4,
Shah, Hanif: 39 33, 71
Shah, King Nadir: reign of, 30 Stalin, Josef: writings of, 40
Shah, King Zahir: 35; accession of Sudan: Khartoum, 89; presence of
(1933), 36; family of, 33; reform al-Qa’ida in, 87, 95, 99
policies of, 36–7 Sufism: 24, 26; murids, 25; pirs, 25
Shah, Pir Zubayr: 15 al-Suri, Abu Musab: 108, 113, 196,
Shahid, Sayyid Ahmad: 38 216, 227; capture of (2004), 155
Shahkoor, Hamza: role in Indian
embassy bombing (2008), 151 Tablighi Jama’at: 7

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 IND E X

Tajikistan: 94, 240; borders of, 96; 174–5, 206–7, 220–1, 240; ideol-
Civil War (1992–7), 80; Nahda ogy of, 224; Mehsud faction of,
Party, 95 130; members of, 108, 139–41,
Tajiks: 30, 50, 85, 105; territory 146, 148–9, 159–60, 164, 191, 204,
inhabited by, 52 225; relationship with Haqqani
Taliban: 8, 17, 30, 83–4, 86, 102, network, 126, 146–8, 205, 222–3,
105, 110–11, 114, 119, 123, 125, 233; sponsoring of suicide
132–4, 154, 170–1, 192, 194, 197, bombÂ�ing activity, 139–40; sui-
220; factions of, 116, 129–30; cide bombing of FOB Chapman
fall of (2001), 120, 156, 190, 208; (2009), 204, 222; supporters of,
ideology of, 13, 101, 105; insur- 224
gency activity of, 124, 136, 155, Third Anglo-Afghan War (1919):
175; land appropriation, 117–18; 30
members of, 9, 31, 40, 101, Tomsen, Peter: 44
116–17, 119, 135–6, 138, 140, 156, Tufail, Mian Muhammad: leader
162, 167, 175–7, 190, 200, 203, of JI, 61
216–17, 222, 229, 242; Quetta al-Turabi, Hassan: 90
Shura, 131, 135, 141, 160, 162, Turangzai, Haji Sahib: 24
176, 186–7, 196; Rahbari Shura, Turkestan Islamic Movement
137; relationship with ISI, 168, (ETIM): collapse of (1993), 112;
172–3, 180; relationship with reconstituted as TIP, 111, 207
Osama Bin Laden, 107–8, 114, Turkistan Islamic Party (TIP): 10,
116, 118; rise of (1994), 23–4, 57, 112; formerly ETIM, 111, 207;
101–2; supporters of, 104, 131; media created by, 199; members
territory controlled by, 102–3, of, 112, 210
106–7, 118–19, 155, 165; use al-Turkistani, ‘Abd al-Haqq: 112;
of Haqqani network support, leader of TIP, 210
107–8, 135–6, 148
Taniwal, Hakim: Governor of United Arab Emirates (UAE): 63,
Paktia, 216 81, 145, 211; Al-Ain, 212; Abu
Tanzania: Dar es Salaam, 100; US Dhabi, 62, 64, 111, 212; Bada
embassy bombing (1998), 100, Zayed, 212; Dubai, 196, 212; Al-
109, 113, 115, 118 Sharqa, 212
Taraki, Nur Muhammad: 59, 63; United Kingdom (UK): 232;
President of Democratic Repub- London, 89; military of, 176;
lic of Afghanistan, 50 Parliament, 32
Tayeb, Abu (Najibullah Naeem): United Nations (UN): 89, 216–17;
kidnapping activities of, 138 members of, 32
Tehrik-e Taliban Pakistan (TTP): United States of America (USA):
9, 11, 126, 143, 147, 165, 167, 11–12, 18, 28, 34–5, 44, 68, 71,

319
 IND E X

83–4, 91, 94, 106, 116, 122, 125, War On Terror: 21

149, 161, 166, 170–1, 176, 182, Waziri: 28, 146
184, 207, 218, 233, 238, 241–2; Wikileaks: diplomatic cables
9/11 attacks, 4, 17–18, 73, 79, leaked by, 15, 27
97–8, 102, 111, 113–14, 116–17, Wilson, Charlie: 68
120–1, 131, 170, 173, 179, 181, World Islamic Front for Jihad
184, 186, 200, 220, 228, 235, Against Jews and Crusaders:
237–9, 241; Central Intelligence formation of (1997), 70, 197;
Agency (CIA), 5–6, 51, 59, members of, 114, 197
68–9, 85, 92, 104, 140, 168, 204; Wyne, Khalil: background of, 226
Defense Intelligence Agency,
68; Department of Defense, 14; al-Yazid, Mustafa Abu: 189–90,
financial aid provided for muja- 197, 209, 231; al-Qa’ida com-
hidin by, 59; former direct sup- mander in Afghanistan, 191;
port for Haqqani network, 4–6,
death of, 192
104; government of, 178, 214;
Yemen: 89, 99, 205, 239
military of, 12, 16–17, 124, 152,
Yousaf, Brigadier Muhammad:
158, 160–1, 165, 176, 183–5, 241;
177; Bear Trap, 175; forces led
Senate, 1–2; State Department,
by, 72
84, 108–9; Treasury Department,
Yuldashev, Tahir: 96–7
214; Washington DC, 1
al-Urduni, Abu’l-Harith: military
Zadran, Badshah Khan: 123–4
forces led by, 82
Zadrans: 27, 29, 108; prominent
al-Utaybi, Abu Sulayman: death
families of, 55–6; Sultankhel
of, 192; member of AQI, 193;
clan, 28; Uprising (1933), 30
sharia official for Mujahidin
Shura Council, 193 Zaeef, Abdul Salam: memoirs of,
Uthmanzai Wazir: 31 162
Uzbeks: 95, 97, 142, 190 Zardari, Asif Ali: 161; President
Uzbekistan: 94, 97, 240; govern- of Pakistan, 227; targeting of,
ment of, 3 226–7
al-Zarqawi, Abu Mus’ab: 216
Vinas, Bryant Neal: 223; associates al-Zawahiri, Ayman: 184, 195, 204,
of, 202; background of, 231–2 241; family of, 208

320