Development of a National Nuclear

Forensics Library: A System

for the Identification of Nuclear
or Other Radioactive Material
out of Regulatory Control

International Atomic Energy Agency

Vienna
ISBN 978–92–0–108218–3
IAEA NUCLEAR SECURITY SERIES AND RELATED PUBLICATIONS
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DEVELOPMENT OF A NATIONAL NUCLEAR
FORENSICS LIBRARY:
A SYSTEM FOR THE
IDENTIFICATION OF NUCLEAR
OR OTHER RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL
OUT OF REGULATORY CONTROL
 The following States are Members of the International Atomic Energy Agency:

AFGHANISTAN GERMANY PALAU

ALBANIA GHANA PANAMA
ALGERIA GREECE PAPUA NEW GUINEA
ANGOLA GRENADA PARAGUAY
ANTIGUA AND BARBUDA GUATEMALA PERU
ARGENTINA GUYANA PHILIPPINES
ARMENIA HAITI POLAND
AUSTRALIA HOLY SEE PORTUGAL
AUSTRIA HONDURAS QATAR
AZERBAIJAN HUNGARY
REPUBLIC OF MOLDOVA
BAHAMAS ICELAND
ROMANIA
BAHRAIN INDIA
BANGLADESH INDONESIA RUSSIAN FEDERATION
BARBADOS IRAN, ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF RWANDA
BELARUS IRAQ SAINT VINCENT AND
BELGIUM IRELAND THE GRENADINES
BELIZE ISRAEL SAN MARINO
BENIN ITALY SAUDI ARABIA
BOLIVIA, PLURINATIONAL JAMAICA SENEGAL
STATE OF JAPAN SERBIA
BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA JORDAN SEYCHELLES
BOTSWANA KAZAKHSTAN SIERRA LEONE
BRAZIL KENYA SINGAPORE
BRUNEI DARUSSALAM KOREA, REPUBLIC OF SLOVAKIA
BULGARIA KUWAIT SLOVENIA
BURKINA FASO KYRGYZSTAN SOUTH AFRICA
BURUNDI LAO PEOPLE’S DEMOCRATIC SPAIN
CAMBODIA REPUBLIC SRI LANKA
CAMEROON LATVIA SUDAN
CANADA LEBANON
SWEDEN
CENTRAL AFRICAN LESOTHO
SWITZERLAND
REPUBLIC LIBERIA
CHAD LIBYA SYRIAN ARAB REPUBLIC
CHILE LIECHTENSTEIN TAJIKISTAN
CHINA LITHUANIA THAILAND
COLOMBIA LUXEMBOURG THE FORMER YUGOSLAV
CONGO MADAGASCAR REPUBLIC OF MACEDONIA
COSTA RICA MALAWI TOGO
CÔTE D’IVOIRE MALAYSIA TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO
CROATIA MALI TUNISIA
CUBA MALTA TURKEY
CYPRUS MARSHALL ISLANDS TURKMENISTAN
CZECH REPUBLIC MAURITANIA UGANDA
DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC MAURITIUS UKRAINE
OF THE CONGO MEXICO UNITED ARAB EMIRATES
DENMARK MONACO UNITED KINGDOM OF
DJIBOUTI MONGOLIA GREAT BRITAIN AND
DOMINICA MONTENEGRO NORTHERN IRELAND
DOMINICAN REPUBLIC MOROCCO UNITED REPUBLIC
ECUADOR MOZAMBIQUE
OF TANZANIA
EGYPT MYANMAR
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
EL SALVADOR NAMIBIA
ERITREA NEPAL URUGUAY
ESTONIA NETHERLANDS UZBEKISTAN
ESWATINI NEW ZEALAND VANUATU
ETHIOPIA NICARAGUA VENEZUELA, BOLIVARIAN
FIJI NIGER REPUBLIC OF
FINLAND NIGERIA VIET NAM
FRANCE NORWAY YEMEN
GABON OMAN ZAMBIA
GEORGIA PAKISTAN ZIMBABWE

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 DEVELOPMENT OF A NATIONAL
NUCLEAR FORENSICS LIBRARY:
A SYSTEM FOR THE
IDENTIFICATION OF NUCLEAR
OR OTHER RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL
OUT OF REGULATORY CONTROL

INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY

VIENNA, 2018
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DEVELOPMENT OF A NATIONAL NUCLEAR FORENSICS LIBRARY: A SYSTEM FOR THE IDENTIFICATION OF NUCLEAR OR
OTHER RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL OUT OF REGULATORY CONTROL
IAEA, VIENNA, 2018
IAEA-TDL-009
ISBN 978–92–0–108218–3

© IAEA, 2018

Printed by the IAEA in Austria

November 2018
 FOREWORD

Nuclear forensics supports measures to prevent and respond to a nuclear security event by providing
information on the origin and history of nuclear and other radioactive materials out of regulatory control
in the context of international legal instruments and national laws related to nuclear security. An
important element of a nuclear forensics examination is the ability of a State to determine whether
nuclear and other radioactive material in that State is consistent with domestic holdings. A national
nuclear forensics library can facilitate interpretation of findings and assist States in this making this
determination.

There is growing recognition of the importance of nuclear forensics in enhancing a State’s nuclear
security infrastructure. IAEA General Conference resolutions on nuclear security regularly endorse
work in the field of nuclear forensics, including the establishment of national nuclear material databases
and libraries. A key finding of the 2014 IAEA International Conference on Advances in Nuclear
Forensics: Countering the Evolving Threat of Nuclear and Other Radioactive Material out of Regulatory
Control was the role of a national nuclear forensics library in aiding data interpretation and furthering
nuclear security investigations. This publication follows IAEA Nuclear Security Series No. 15, Nuclear
Security Recommendations on Nuclear and Other Radioactive Material out of Regulatory Control,
which encourages States to assess their nuclear forensics capabilities, including consideration of a
national nuclear forensics library.

The preparation of this publication involved extensive consultations with Member States, beginning in
2010 and continuing through the drafting process. The IAEA is grateful to these Member States for their
many valuable comments and other contributions to this publication.
 EDITORIAL NOTE

This publication has been prepared from the original material as submitted by the contributors and has not been edited by the editorial
staff of the IAEA. The views expressed remain the responsibility of the contributors and do not necessarily represent the views of the
IAEA or its Member States.

Neither the IAEA nor its Member States assume any responsibility for consequences which may arise from the use of this publication.
This publication does not address questions of responsibility, legal or otherwise, for acts or omissions on the part of any person.

The use of particular designations of countries or territories does not imply any judgement by the publisher, the IAEA, as to the legal
status of such countries or territories, of their authorities and institutions or of the delimitation of their boundaries.

The mention of names of specific companies or products (whether or not indicated as registered) does not imply any intention to
infringe proprietary rights, nor should it be construed as an endorsement or recommendation on the part of the IAEA.
Security related terms are to be understood as defined in the publication in which they appear, or in the guidance that the publication
supports. Otherwise, words are used with their commonly understood meanings.

An appendix is considered to form an integral part of the publication. Material in an appendix has the same status as the body text.
Annexes are used to provide practical examples or additional information or explanation. Annexes are not integral parts of the main
text.

The IAEA has no responsibility for the persistence or accuracy of URLs for external or third party Internet web sites referred to in this
publication and does not guarantee that any content on such web sites is, or will remain, accurate or appropriate.
 CONTENTS
1. INTRODUCTION .............................................................................................................................. 1

1.1. Background ............................................................................................................................ 1

1.2. Objectives .............................................................................................................................. 2
1.3. Scope...................................................................................................................................... 2
1.4. Structure ................................................................................................................................. 2
2. DESCRIPTION OF A NATIONAL NUCLEAR FORENSICS LIBRARY ...................................... 3

2.1. Rationale for the Development of a National Nuclear Forensics Library ............................. 3
2.2. Scope of a Library.................................................................................................................. 4
2.3. Development Process ............................................................................................................. 5
2.3.1. Human resources ......................................................................................................... 6
2.3.2. Use of existing information......................................................................................... 6
2.3.3. Understanding of signatures in materials .................................................................... 7
2.3.4. Nuclear or other radioactive material sample archive ................................................. 7
2.3.5. Library sustainability .................................................................................................. 8
3. DATA RESOURCES TO SUPPORT A NATIONAL NUCLEAR FORENSICS LIBRARY .......... 9

4. USE OF A NATIONAL NUCLEAR FORENSIC LIBRARY TO SUPPORT THE

IDENTIFACTION OF NUCLEAR AND OTHER RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL OUT OF
REGULATORY CONTROL ..................................................................................................... 10

4.1. Initial Material Characterization to Support the Investigation ............................................. 11

4.2. Development of a Data-Informed Analytical Plan .............................................................. 11
4.3. Comparative Analyses ......................................................................................................... 11
4.3.1. Point-to-point comparisons ....................................................................................... 13
4.3.2. Point-to-model comparisons ..................................................................................... 14
4.3.3. Point-to-population comparisons .............................................................................. 15
5. INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION TO ASSIST IN THE IDENTIFICATION OF NUCLEAR
AND OTHER RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL OUT OF REGULATORY CONTROL ............ 17

REFERENCES ..................................................................................................................................... 19

ANNEX I .............................................................................................................................................. 21

SUMMARY OF PROCESSES INVOLVING NUCLEAR MATERIAL OR APPLICATIONS OF

RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL RELEVANT TO NUCLEAR FORENSICS ............................. 21

I-1. General Information ............................................................................................................. 21

I-2. Specific Information: Nuclear Fuel-Cycle Processes and Radioactive Source Applications ..
............................................................................................................................................ 22
I-3. Tables of Material and Information Categories ................................................................... 23
ANNEX II ............................................................................................................................................. 35

REPRESENTATIONS OF HYPOTHETICAL LIBRARY DATA FOR THREE DISTINCT

MATERIALS ............................................................................................................................. 35

ANNEX III............................................................................................................................................ 41

DESCRIPTION OF UNITS FOR MATERIAL AND DATA CHARACTERISTICS TO SUPPORT A

NATIONAL NUCLEAR FORENSICS LIBRARY ................................................................... 41
 1. INTRODUCTION

1.1. BACKGROUND

To address the threat posed by nuclear and other radioactive material out of regulatory control, the
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) is assisting States in the use of nuclear forensic science
to investigate incidents involving such material.

“Nuclear forensic science or nuclear forensics is a discipline of forensic science involving the
examination of nuclear and other radioactive material, or of other evidence that is contaminated with
radionuclides, in the context of legal proceedings” (see Ref. [1]). A nuclear forensic examination
consists of a measurement of the characteristics of nuclear or other radioactive material found out of
regulatory control, a comparison of its measured characteristics with reference information, and an
interpretation by a subject matter expert to formulate nuclear forensic findings that answer
investigative questions in accordance with national laws and procedures. 1 2 This comparison step can
be facilitated by using a National Nuclear Forensics Library. The comparison step is often an
important part of an investigation of nuclear or other radioactive material found out of regulatory
control, and may assist in determining the origin and history of the material out of regulatory control.

A ‘National Nuclear Forensics Library’ (hereafter, Library), is a national system for the identification
of nuclear and other radioactive materials found out of regulatory control. It comprises reference
information and subject matter expertise on nuclear and other radioactive materials produced, used, or
stored within a State that may be used to identify the materials out of regulatory control. A Library
enables comparisons to information on known materials and data obtained from analytical
measurements of nuclear or other radioactive materials found out of regulatory control. In
combination, the resources contained in the Library support the examination of nuclear or other
radioactive material found out of regulatory control to evaluate information and formulate nuclear
forensic findings, i.e. make determinations on material origin and history [1, 2].

Use of the information contained in this publication is voluntary. Both the establishment of a Library
and the principles of organizing a Library remain the prerogative of a State.

1
Reference information refers to data that is collected nationally to meet legal, regulatory, or quality assurance
requirements, i.e. nuclear material accountancy records, import-export certificates, and material specification
certificates that, inter alia, include the physical, chemical, elemental and isotopic properties of nuclear and other
radioactive materials that may have been collected for purposes not related to nuclear forensics. Reference
information may be found in, for example, nuclear research laboratories, academic institutions, regulatory
bodies, and material production, nuclear, medical, industrial, or other facilities.
2
A subject matter expert is an individual who specialize in the nuclear fuel cycle or production of radioactive
sources, and could assist in making determinations on nuclear or other radioactive material found out of
regulatory control. Depending on the judicial system in place nationally, a subject matter expert may be an
official person or institute/organization that has satisfied specific requirements defined by national laws.

1
1.2. OBJECTIVES

The objectives of this publication are:

 To provide policy makers, competent authorities, law enforcement officials, and technical
personnel with information about the role and benefit of establishing and using a Library as
part of a nuclear security investigation;
 To impart context for the use of a Library to identify the origin and history of nuclear or other
radioactive material found out of regulatory control.

This publication seeks to assist States that choose to develop a Library tailored to their individual
circumstances, national legal requirements, and security needs.

1.3. SCOPE

This publication provides the rationale for the development of a Library and addresses how a State
may use a Library in investigations of nuclear and other radioactive material out of regulatory control.
Additionally, it provides information helpful to understand and organize information on nuclear and
other radioactive material within the State, relevant to nuclear forensics, based on nuclear processing
steps, radioisotope source types, and radioisotope source applications.

This publication does not include detailed information on the establishment of a Library; the
establishment of a material sample archive; legal, policy, and financial aspects regarding the
establishment or use of a Library; what, if any, information can be shared with other States; or advice
on how to conduct nuclear forensic examinations. Guidance on conducting nuclear forensic
examinations is provided in (see Ref. [1]), Nuclear Forensics in Support of Investigations (Nuclear
Security Series No. 2-G).

1.4. STRUCTURE

The remainder of this publication is organized as follows: Section 2 describes the rationale and
practical considerations for development and maintenance of a Library. Section 3 presents data
resources that may support a Library. Section 4 illustrates the application of a Library for
identification of nuclear or other radioactive material encountered out of regulatory control. Section 5
provides a context how a Library can facilitate international cooperation to identify nuclear and other
radioactive material out of regulatory control. Annex I provides information on various categories of
nuclear and other radioactive material and material signatures from stages of the nuclear fuel cycle
and radioactive source production that may be associated with a State’s Library. Annex II provides an
example of a data structure from a hypothetical Library. Finally, Annex III lists preferred reporting
units for Library data.

2
 2. DESCRIPTION OF A NATIONAL NUCLEAR FORENSICS LIBRARY

A National Nuclear Forensics Library is a national system for the identification of nuclear and other
radioactive materials found out of regulatory control. A Library is composed of subject matter
expertise and reference information on nuclear and other radioactive materials produced, used, or
stored within a State that may be used to identify these materials.

Reference information on the characteristics of nuclear or other radioactive material produced, used,
or stored within a State contributes to the State’s ability to assess whether nuclear or other radioactive
material found out of regulatory control originated within the State or outside the State. Information
that contributes to a Library may already exist in a State, having been collected at other times and for
other purposes, e.g. a national registry of radioactive sources. The timely availability of nuclear
forensics reference information may strengthen the ability of subject matter experts to formulate
nuclear forensic findings and assist investigations.

Subject matter experts use a Library to interpret results from analysis of nuclear or other radioactive
materials found out of regulatory control and formulate nuclear forensic findings in response to
queries from investigators regarding the nature of the material. Subject matter expert judgement is
essential for comparisons and formulation of high confidence nuclear forensic findings.

The physical properties, chemical and elemental composition, isotopic ratios, and other signatures of
the material may provide information on the material’s provenance, manufacture, and processing and
serve as important indicators of the materials’ origin, history, and intended use (see Ref. [2]).3 The
interpretation of these signatures allows nuclear forensics to both assist investigations and serve as a
preventive measure to deter the diversion of nuclear and other radioactive materials (see Ref. [1]).

A State may choose the most effective way to establish its Library. As such, a State may decide to
establish a Library as a consolidated set of subject matter expertise and databases or as a distributed
model relying on subject matter expertise and databases from a variety of locations and agencies
involved in nuclear and radioactive production, use, or storage.

2.1. RATIONALE FOR THE DEVELOPMENT OF A NATIONAL NUCLEAR FORENSICS

LIBRARY

Illicit trafficking of nuclear and other radioactive material is of national and transnational concern.
When nuclear and other radioactive material is detected out of regulatory control, States should be
prepared to respond appropriately, including applying nuclear forensics in support of investigations.

3
For the purposes of this publication, a signature is a characteristic or a set of characteristics that enables that
nuclear or other radioactive material found out of regulatory control to be compared with reference materials to
make determinations on origin and history.

3
The use of a Library may assist investigators in answering various questions regarding nuclear and
other radioactive materials found out of regulatory control. These questions can include assessments
to identify intended material uses, possible origins, connections between different cases involving
illicit trafficking, and pathway or trafficking route analysis. Consideration of the types of questions
investigators may ask during the response to a nuclear security event, can inform a State in
determining how to best develop a Library. Examples of such questions may include the following:

 Is the material consistent with the State’s holdings?

 What is the material and what threat does it pose?
 What is the intended use of the material?
 From which nuclear fuel cycle process does the material originate?
 Is there more material missing?
 Which facilities are associated with the manufacture, use, or storage of the material?
 Does the material share a common origin with a material from another case?
 Is environmental or biological evidence contaminated with radionuclides connected to a bulk
material source?

The combination of reference information and subject matter expertise that contribute to a State’s
Library can enhance confidence in assessments of possible material origin or history, and whether
material is consistent with a State’s holdings. Furthermore, a Library can ensure availability of
information and subject matter expertise necessary to facilitate credible and timely decisions, and
coordination between investigators, forensic scientists, and other relevant entities.

It is the prerogative of the State to decide how a Library may be developed and support a nuclear
forensics examination, and when and if it is appropriate to request external assistance.

2.2. SCOPE OF A LIBRARY

A Library is commensurate with the nuclear fuel cycle within the State, or by parties within the State,
and the size and complexity of its nuclear and other radioactive material holdings. The development
and maintenance of an effective Library involves a coordinated national effort to collect and use
reference information and subject matter experts within the State (see Fig. 1).

Nuclear forensic conclusions are often drawn using information inherent to nuclear and other
radioactive material, such as physical properties, chemical and elemental composition, and isotopic
ratios arising from geological or manufacturing processes. These indicators, often referred to as
signatures, form the basis for nuclear forensic comparisons and are the information at the core of a
Library. However, for States with smaller inventories of nuclear and other radioactive material, non-
technical indicators such as serial numbers and labels for radioactive sources may be sufficient to
identify whether material is consistent with State holdings.

4
 FIG. 1. Association between a States’ existing reference information, subject matter expertise, and a Library.

2.3. DEVELOPMENT PROCESS

The development of a Library involves, at a minimum, the identification of responsible organizations,

personnel, as well as data and information resources. This includes identifying and organizing existing
reference information related to nuclear and other radioactive material in the State, as appropriate,
including information related to the production and use of radioactive sources. The subject matter
expertise within the State can be used to determine reference information relevant for inclusion in a
Library.

A single batch of nuclear or other radioactive material is assumed to incorporate unique signatures.
For each batch, the general information, such as the name and address of the material custodian,
supplier address, and batch identification with specific isotopic, chemical, and physical data, can
assist investigators in identifying the material. The Library may also include information pertaining to
material from intermediate production processes, for example, process samples.

The development and maintenance of a Library is a continual process of surveying, collecting,

organizing, and interpreting information about nuclear and other radioactive material produced, used,

5
and stored in the State and maintaining the subject matter expertise necessary for interpretation of
analytical results. In particular, to develop and maintain a Library, it may be necessary for a State to
sustain subject matter expertise in nuclear and other radioactive material characterization, laboratory
techniques and the infrastructure necessary for a nuclear forensic analysis, and comparative methods
for material identification.

States may need to consider whether additional resources or policy endorsements would be necessary
to ensure their Library effort is successful and sustainable. Depending on a State’s interests and needs,
it may also involve the allocation of resources and personnel to verify and harmonize data, to analyse
nuclear or other radioactive material found out of regulatory control, and possibly to develop and
apply new nuclear forensics techniques. It is also important to consider the possibility of receiving
assistance from partner nations to support a State’s ability to identify material, and how this assistance
might be integrated into the State’s nuclear security infrastructure. Consideration may include whether
existing law enforcement or diplomatic information sharing mechanisms are sufficient to facilitate
needed regional or international dialogue regarding nuclear forensic examination.

2.3.1. Human resources

Subject matter experts from various technical disciplines such as nuclear engineers, radiochemists,
geochemists, nuclear fuel-cycle specialists, reactor physicists, and statisticians, may contribute to
nuclear forensic interpretations. However, more training of subject matter experts may be needed to
ensure an understanding of investigative requirements, for example, in maintaining the chain of
custody (see Ref. [1]).

States that do not produce nuclear or radioactive materials nor have indigenous subject matter
expertise on the material they use and store may not have subject matter experts that are suitably
experienced to interpret information on nuclear or other radioactive material found out of regulatory
control. Such States may choose to seek training and development opportunities through bilateral
exchanges or through offerings from IAEA and the Nuclear Forensics International Technical
Working Group.

2.3.2. Use of existing information

Available reference information regarding known nuclear and other radioactive material holdings may
be considered for inclusion in a Library. For example, a State may consider incorporating information
related to nuclear and other radioactive material available in nuclear material databases, material
analysis reports, documentation and expertise from manufacturers, historic document archives, and
information from past investigations. A significant portion of this reference information may have
been collected for purposes other than nuclear forensics and may be found in, for example, nuclear
research laboratories; academic institutions; regulatory bodies; and material production, nuclear,

6
medical, or industrial facilities. Such information might include nuclear material accountancy records,
import-export certificates, and material specification certificates.

Other aspects may need to be considered when including information in a Library. When preparing
for an examination as part of an investigation, subject matter experts should consider the quality,
validity, and limitations of data used, as these aspects may impact the defensibility of nuclear forensic
findings during an investigation and subsequent prosecution. The comparability of data may also
require consideration during an investigation, for example, data from different sources may need to be
converted to a standard format, e.g. International System of Units (SI), before performing comparative
analysis. Because the development of the Library involves a continual process, reference information
can be included later.

2.3.3. Understanding of signatures in materials

Signatures derived from nuclear forensics analysis of nuclear or other radioactive material found out
of regulatory control are compared to signatures of known material to help determine whether the
material out of regulatory control is consistent or inconsistent with material produced, used or stored
within the State.4

A comprehensive understanding of a State’s materials helps subject matter experts to identify unique
signatures and allows for subsequent interpretation of analytical results. This understanding will
enhance a State’s ability to analyse nuclear or other radioactive material found out of regulatory
control, or its traces, with known materials. It may also help to recognize information gaps that need
to be filled.

It may be useful for a State to develop a methodology for the discriminating material signatures, for
example, by identifying the major and minor isotopes, age of the material, and its physical
dimensions. As samples of nuclear and other radioactive material may possess many signatures,
subject matter experts within a State may consider determining which of those signatures may assist
nuclear forensic examiners in determining if materials encountered out of regulatory control are or are
not consistent with a State’s material holdings.

2.3.4. Nuclear or other radioactive material sample archive

Nuclear forensic findings can be effectively formulated by comparing the characteristics of materials
found out of regulatory control (including traces, if necessary) with nuclear or other radioactive
material samples existing within the State with known manufacturing parameters and characteristics.
States may find it useful to support their Library with a collection of relevant nuclear and other

4
For the purposes of this publication, known material refers to materials under domestic regulatory control and
with documented characteristics.

7
radioactive materials, for example, material samples from nuclear fuel cycle operations within the
State, as feasible.

In States where nuclear and other radioactive materials are produced, samples are often stored at the
production sites. In these circumstances, a distributed archive model may be more practical than a
centralised archive structure.

Archive samples can be studied in detail to identify unique material characteristics and signatures, for
validating analytical procedures and training personnel in nuclear forensic analytical and investigative
methods.

2.3.5. Library sustainability

Once a Library has been developed, the bureaucratic, legal, and financial mechanisms for sustaining it
need to be considered. Such mechanisms can take various forms, and would benefit from the inclusion
of all competent authorities and interested parties involved in a nuclear forensics examination.

As part of sustaining its Library, a State might consider mechanisms for continuously updating the
reference information considered to be part of the Library. As information is collected by institutions
such as nuclear research laboratories, academic institutions, regulatory bodies, and material
production facilities for various purposes, a State may consider developing mechanisms to better
catalogue the types of reference information available for comparison with nuclear and other
radioactive materials encountered out of regulatory control.

A State may consider provisions to maintain subject matter expertise associated with this information
through knowledge transfer to subsequent generations of subject matter experts. This can be
augmented through training programmes for specialties in nuclear science, for example, technologists
and analysts specializing in nuclear material, environmental sampling, and nuclear fuel-cycle
activities.

A State may also consider exercising a Library capability regularly to ensure Library resources are
available and subject matter experts are capable of responding to queries from investigators. Such
exercises, which can be carried out nationally or internationally, may represent real-world scenarios of
actual investigations of nuclear and other radioactive material found out of regulatory control.5 During
such exercises, subject matter experts—analysts and technologists—will gain an understanding of
how their results and assessments inform the investigative process. The outputs from these exercises
will allow subject matter experts to refine the nuclear forensic analytical process and to ensure nuclear
forensic findings will be able to meet investigative requirements.

5
Nuclear Forensics International Technical Working Group Galaxy Serpent Exercises.

8
 3. DATA RESOURCES TO SUPPORT A NATIONAL NUCLEAR
FORENSICS LIBRARY

Characteristic data of materials are an important component of a Library. It is used by subject matter
experts to help formulate nuclear forensics findings on whether nuclear or other radioactive material
found outside of regulatory control is consistent with materials used in the State.

When deciding which data resources are potentially valuable to include in a Library, a State might
first assess what nuclear or radioactive material exists within the State (please see Table 1 for
examples of nuclear and other radioactive material processes and applications and related materials).
Reflecting economic, technical, or personnel constrains, a State may choose to prioritize its Library
efforts by initially focusing on understanding information associated with nuclear or other radioactive
material deemed of highest concern, for example, nuclear-weapons-usable nuclear material or highly
radioactive sources. The size and complexity of a State’s Library scales with a State’s nuclear or other
radioactive material holdings, for example, a State with small inventories of radioactive material
holdings might find it adequate to keep track of sealed sources using a list of serial numbers, labels,
and other parameters rather than a full catalogue of data characteristics.

TABLE 1. Nuclear and Other Radioactive Material Processes and Applications and Related Materials Relevant
to Nuclear Forensics.

Nuclear and Other Radioactive Material Processes

and Applications Related Materials
Uranium mining, milling, and extraction Ore, Ore concentrate, e.g. U3O8 (yellow cake)

Uranium conversion UF6, UF4, UO2, UO3, U3O8, uranyl nitrate, uranium metal
and alloys
Uranium enrichment and uranium and mixed-oxide (MOX) UF6, UF4, UCl4, UO2, U3O8, ThO2, MOX powder, uranium
fuel fabrication metal, pellets, rods, plates, elements, scrap, fuel assemblies,
scrap
Irradiated (spent) nuclear fuel Spent fuel
Reprocessing Plutonium nitrate, uranyl nitrate, plutonium oxide, uranium
oxide, mixed oxide, other actinides
Radioactive waste processing, handling, and storage Radioactive waste forms
Radiography, well logging sources, sterilizers, and Sealed radioactive sources
therapeutic medicine
Tracer studies, research and development, diagnostic or Unsealed radioactive sources
therapeutic medicine, and irradiated targets

Consideration of the sources of reference information and relevant subject matter expertise is
necessary to support a Library. Subject matter experts can also help analyse information for patterns
or trends that enhance a State’s ability to determine distinguishing characteristics for the identification
of its own materials. A detailed description of data characteristics potentially useful for material
identification can be found in Annex I and in Ref. [2].

9
 4. USE OF A NATIONAL NUCLEAR FORENSIC LIBRARY TO SUPPORT THE
IDENTIFACTION OF NUCLEAR AND OTHER RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL OUT OF
REGULATORY CONTROL

If a nuclear security event occurs in a State, a Library can provide valuable support to the
investigation. The Library can support investigators during several phases of a nuclear forensic
examination, including the following:

 Initial material characterization;

 Development of a data-informed nuclear forensic analytical plan;
 Comparative analysis to identify possible material origins and process history.

The use of a Library can help investigators answer questions in relation to various evidence sample
types, including the following:

 Bulk nuclear or other radioactive material;

 Items contaminated with radionuclides;
 Biological samples, i.e. urine, blood, hair, and tissue contaminated with radionuclides;
 Environmental or geological samples associated with the nuclear or other radioactive
material [1].

For all these examples, data from a nuclear forensic analysis may be compared to data in a State’s
Library in conjunction with subject matter expert assessment to help provide insight into material
provenance, production history, or to assist investigators to understand where nuclear or other
radioactive material was diverted out of regulatory control.

As data is returned from a nuclear forensics examination, for example when data is obtained in the
field, a Library can be used to evaluate material characteristics to provide investigative leads. If a
nuclear forensic analysis is conducted, subject matter experts may provide valuable input into the
development of a nuclear forensic analytical plan to ensure the characteristics necessary for evaluating
production history, provenance, or any other forensic questions are included in the plan. As additional
data becomes available during analysis, further consultations with subject matter experts may identify
archived samples appropriate for comparative analysis. Once an analysis is complete, answers to
queries from investigators in concert with a description of any additional work needed, can contribute
to high confidence nuclear forensic findings. Each of these three aspects is discussed in more detail in
the following sections.

When conducting nuclear forensics analysis and interpreting resultant data, it is important to note that
limitations exist concerning the use of a Library, and care should be taken when communicating
findings to investigators. Data characteristics of nuclear or other radioactive material may or may not
be consistent, with a given uncertainty, with data contained in a Library. If the characteristics of

10
nuclear or other radioactive material found out of regulatory control material are assessed to be
consistent with a State’s holdings, it is not necessarily an indication of origin of the nuclear or other
radioactive material. Often, a nuclear forensics examination may not definitively identify the origin of
nuclear and other radioactive materials, but its ability to exclude possible sources can contribute to the
goals of an investigation.

4.1. INITIAL MATERIAL CHARACTERIZATION

The initial characterization of nuclear and other radioactive material or its traces found out of
regulatory control in the field can produce valuable information that can be used to formulate nuclear
forensics findings. This information can include, for example, results from non-destructive analysis of
nuclear and other radioactive material, or its traces, associated with evidence (see Ref. [1]).

Based on the initial and subsequent laboratory characterization, it is possible to identify material
characteristics (isotopic compositions, elemental compositions, physical form). Subject matter experts
may use these characteristics to query databases and compare with other information sources and
material archives to further guide nuclear forensic analysis.

4.2. DEVELOPMENT OF A DATA-INFORMED NUCLEAR FORENSICS ANALYTICAL PLAN

Considering the nature and amount of the nuclear or other radioactive material found out of regulatory
control, the results of its initial and subsequent characterizations, as well as, the availability of
relevant archive samples and information from databases, nuclear forensics examiners might seek
guidance from the Library when developing a data-informed analytical plan for material identification.
As an analytical plan is iterative and deductive, it can be adjusted as the results from the comparative
analyses are obtained (see Ref. [1]).

Close collaboration between all stakeholders, i.e. investigators, nuclear forensics examiners, and
subject matter experts, is necessary to ensure timely and effective exchange of information to support
an investigation. This collaboration ensures laboratory analyses are prioritized and that the only
analyses performed are those necessary to answer investigative questions and provide opportunity to
advise the technical scope of the investigation.

4.3. COMPARATIVE ANALYSES TO IDENTIFY POSSIBLE MATERIAL ORIGINS AND

PROCESS HISTORY

A key feature of a State’s Library is the ability to compare data from a nuclear or other radioactive
material found out of regulatory control to other sources of existing data, such as reference
information, to help answer investigative questions. In some cases, following characterization, a
Library might be used to compare a nuclear or other radioactive material found out of regulatory
control with either a material from an archive, or with a technical specification for a material from a

11
known source. In other cases, questions regarding possible origin or process history can be answered
through comparison to modelled data or populations of data from databases.

Examples of how comparative analysis performed by a State’s Library might support a nuclear
security investigation include the following:

 Linking multiple cases involving the same material or materials;

 Connecting evidence contaminated with trace or micro-particles of material to a bulk
material;
 Determining whether a nuclear material is consistent with the technical specifications for a
material produced in a particular facility;
 Determining whether a radioactive source is consistent with the specifications for a source
produced by a particular supplier.

Subject matter experts may use three types of comparative analyses for determining associations
between a nuclear or other radioactive material found out of regulatory control and characteristics of
actual or modelled materials. These three comparison types include the following:

 Point-to-point comparisons, where characteristics from a nuclear or other radioactive material

found out of regulatory control are compared directly to characteristics from a known
material; for example, characteristics of an archive comparator sample or the technical
specifications for a particular material;
 Point-to-model comparisons, where characteristics from a nuclear or other radioactive
material found out of regulatory control are compared to modelled data; for example,
comparing measured isotopic composition to data predicted from the consumption of nuclear
fuel in a reactor (i.e. burn-up);
 Point-to-population comparisons, where characteristics from a nuclear or other radioactive
material found out of regulatory control are compared to populations of data for similar
materials; for example, comparing trace element concentrations in a uranium ore concentrate
to databases of trace element concentrations measured in uranium ore concentrates produced
at various plants.

Various outcomes are possible from the comparative analysis of a nuclear or other radioactive
material found out of regulatory control with archive materials, based on the degree of similarity in
the characteristics of the materials. These outcomes include:

 All measurable characteristics within the limits of uncertainty are the same, indicating the
characteristics of the nuclear or other radioactive material found out of regulatory control are
consistent with known materials;

12
  Some measurable characteristics are the same, indicating the nuclear or other radioactive
material found out of regulatory control may be related and potentially share a common origin
or process history with known materials;
 No measurable characteristics are the same, indicating the nuclear or other radioactive
material found out of regulatory control are unlikely to be related with known materials;
 Measurements are inconclusive and an assessment of a relationship between a nuclear or
other radioactive material found out of regulatory control in question and archive samples is
not possible with known materials.

These possible outcomes of a comparative analysis, combined with subject matter expert evaluation,
are used to formulate nuclear forensic findings of the history of the material. Subject matter expert
judgement is important in reaching a finding when comparing data from different sample types; for
example, archive samples, trace radionuclide evidence, or samples with large differences in the
magnitude of measurement uncertainty. Subject matter experts often use their judgement to evaluate
the likelihood or confidence in a nuclear forensic comparison assessment.

When the comparative analysis indicates that the parameters and characteristics of the nuclear or other
radioactive material found out of regulatory control coincide with one of the materials from the
archive, a preliminary nuclear forensic finding is possible. However, in cases where only certain
characteristics of the nuclear or other radioactive material found out of regulatory control coincide
with materials from the material archives, a preliminary nuclear forensic finding may not be possible.
Such a situation may occur, for example, when the quantity of a bulk sample is very small. In this
case, certain essential characteristics of the materials may be determined with uncertainties exceeding
the difference in the characteristics of different materials. In such cases, based on the comparison, the
subject matter expert may make a determination that regulatory control might have been lost over any
of the materials whose characteristics, within the measurement accuracy, coincide with characteristics
of material found out of regulatory control.

4.3.1. Point-to-point comparisons

Point-to-point comparisons are instances where characteristics from a nuclear or other radioactive
material found out of regulatory control are compared directly to characteristics from a known
material; for example, characteristics of an archive comparator sample, or the technical specifications
for a particular material.

The comparative analysis of nuclear and other radioactive materials found out of regulatory control
(or their traces) with samples from a material archive is a reliable identification mechanism. In an
ideal situation, an analysis of nuclear or other radioactive material found out of regulatory control and
archived materials would be performed in the same laboratory, by the same subject matter experts,
using the same methods (see Fig. 2). However, performing a wide variety of analyses using a single

13
laboratory is rarely possible. Analysis of samples using similar methods but in different laboratories is
also an acceptable practice, and it is a common practice to compare data from analyses completed by
different laboratories. Moreover, the coincidence of results based on the analyses of different
laboratories using the same methods strengthens the assessment confidence. If the results are
inconsistent, additional study may be required. In this case, it is important to understand data quality
and any issues that may limit comparability.

FIG. 2. Comparison of uranium isotopic ratios with analytical uncertainty for a hypothetical nuclear or other radioactive
material found out of regulatory control sample with a known sample within the analytical uncertainty.

4.3.2. Point-to-model comparisons

Point-to-model comparisons are instances where characteristics from a nuclear or other radioactive
material found out of regulatory control are compared to modelled data; for example, comparing
measured isotopic composition to modelled reactor burn-up data.

Cases may arise where archive samples or data from the characterization of samples similar to a
nuclear forensic sample are not available for comparative analysis. In this event, Library subject
matter experts may employ modelling techniques (i.e. reactor modelling,) to evaluate the material
characteristics.

14
Therefore, it is important to consider how subject matter expertise in modelling characteristics of
nuclear or other radioactive materials is to be included as part of a State’s Library. Often, expertise in
predictive modelling of material characteristics is associated with subject matter expertise in nuclear
fuel-cycle or radioactive source production operations. Common examples include modelling of
reactor fuel burn-up, uranium enrichment, and process chemistry. Fig. 3 shows a hypothetical
comparison of a nuclear or other radioactive material found out of regulatory control with modelled
reactor burn-up data. Fig. 3 illustrates how the material is likely consistent with one type of fuel, but
unlikely consistent with another type of fuel.

Fig. 3. Comparison of uranium isotopic ratios for a hypothetical unknown uranium material found out of regulatory control
to modelled pressurized water reactor (PWR) burn up data.

As with any comparative analysis, subject matter experts may assess and communicate any limitations
associated with the nuclear forensic findings regarding the consistency between a nuclear or other
radioactive material found out of regulatory control and modelled characteristics.

4.3.3. Point-to-population comparisons

Point-to-population comparisons are instances where characteristics from a nuclear or other

radioactive material found out of regulatory control are compared to populations of data for similar
materials; for example, comparing trace element concentrations in a uranium ore concentrate to

15
databases of trace element concentrations measured in uranium ore concentrates produced at various
fabrication facilities.

Nuclear forensics point-to-point matching, as described in Section 4.3.1, is often not possible. In this
case, point-to-population comparisons may be able to be used to associate the nuclear or other
radioactive material found out of regulatory control with classes of material characterized by
combinations of known quantifiable features (e.g. isotope ratios, chemical composition, impurities,
and physical characteristics).

To facilitate such comparisons, a Library may contain information that enables data comparisons to be
performed that compare data from nuclear or other radioactive material found out of regulatory
control with data from populations of known materials, with the goal of excluding or including
material produced, used, or stored within the State (see Fig. 4). Taken together, these data
comparisons aim to determine the appropriate signature combinations that identify a material as
consistent or inconsistent with a State’s holdings. Sometimes, advanced statistical analysis techniques,
including multivariate comparisons, may be required to identify consistency of the nuclear or other
radioactive material found out of regulatory control with populations of known materials.

Fig. 4. Use of pattern classification to associate a hypothetical nuclear or other radioactive material found out of regulatory
control with existing data element (signature) fields.

16
A hypothetical example of this association is illustrated in Fig. 4. In this example, statistical
techniques are used to associate the discriminating features of the hypothetical nuclear or other
radioactive material found out of regulatory control with three known classes designated by the blue,
red, and green fields. In the case shown in Fig. 4, features of the nuclear or other radioactive material
found out of regulatory control may be consistent with characteristics represented by the blue and red
clusters, but it is unlikely that the nuclear or other radioactive material found out of regulatory control
is consistent with the green cluster. Thus, class information represented by the green cluster may be
excluded from further consideration, and as a result, the investigative leads can be narrowed.

5. INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION TO ASSIST IN THE IDENTIFICATION OF

NUCLEAR AND OTHER RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL OUT OF REGULATORY
CONTROL

International cooperation can facilitate investigations of nuclear or other radioactive materials found
out of regulatory control, including through information exchange, investigative assistance, and
provision of assistance for nuclear or other radioactive material analysis (see Ref. [1]). Sharing of
information and assistance occurs at the discretion of the State, and States are in no way obligated to
share sensitive or proprietary information.

The international exchange of experience and good practices can increase a State’s ability to identify
and assess the origin or process history of nuclear or other radioactive material found out of
regulatory control. In addition, potential Library information exchange between States, either bilateral
or undertaken in association with an international organization, may assist a State in answering a
variety of questions to support the investigation of a nuclear security event. This information
exchange can include, but is not limited to the following:

 Whether characteristics of nuclear or other radioactive material encountered out of regulatory

control are consistent with material used, produced, stored, or transported in another State;
 Whether comparative analysis of nuclear or other radioactive material encountered out of
regulatory control can be carried out using samples of materials located within another State;
 Whether a State can request to use another State’s capabilities, to include subject matter
experts, to assist with the nuclear forensic examination. Such assistance may be relevant for
States lacking the capability to perform comprehensive nuclear forensic analysis.

Cooperation, including the exchange of information relating to the nuclear forensic examination, can
be undertaken between States using several types of mechanisms, including existing and informal
arrangements.

17
Information exchange can be carried out through official channels, consistent with national law and
international obligations, including international police organizations or at the direction of national
investigative authorities. To facilitate information exchange, States may consider establishing national
arrangements for supporting requests for information or assistance from the Library.

The exchange of information and experiences and best practices among subject matter experts is also
important for enhancement of national systems for identifying and assessing the origin and history of
materials. Exchanges of experience and best practices between subject matter experts and
investigative authorities can help to identify possibilities for collaboration between States, to develop
capabilities, or to obtain practical investigation assistance. Such exchanges can take place during
international scientific conferences, technical meetings, and exercises. Approval from national
authorities may be required for participation in like exchanges or clearance of information presented
or published.

18
 REFERENCES

1. INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY, Nuclear Forensics in Support of

Investigations, IAEA Nuclear Security Series No. 2-G (Rev.1), IAEA, Vienna (2015).
2. INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY, Identification of High Confidence Nuclear
Forensics Signatures: Results of a Coordinated Research Project and Related Research, IAEA
TecDoc 1820, IAEA, Vienna (2017).
3. INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY, Nuclear Security Recommendations on
Nuclear and Other Radioactive Material out of Regulatory Control, IAEA Nuclear Security Series
No. 15, IAEA, Vienna (2011).

19
 ANNEX I

SUMMARY OF PROCESSES INVOLVING NUCLEAR MATERIAL OR

APPLICATIONS OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL RELEVANT TO NUCLEAR
FORENSICS

The organizational scheme for linking nuclear fuel-cycle processes and radioactive source
applications, and corresponding data categories is presented in Tables I1–10. Each table represents a
process step in the nuclear fuel cycle or the type of radioactive source and includes the key material
characteristics corresponding to each process step. For each process step, the associated material
characteristics are assigned a data discriminator of high, medium, or low denoting the significance of
the key material characteristic’s contribution to a nuclear forensic signature; for example, its ability to
be a distinguishing feature.

I-1. GENERAL INFORMATION

In addition to the material data and information contained in Tables I-1 – I-10, general information for
inclusion in Library may include the following:

 Data record date (date of inclusion into a Library);

 Name and address of the custodian of the nuclear and other radioactive material (e.g.
production or storage facility or installation);
 Name and address of the analytical laboratory and laboratory identification number with the
date of analysis of the nuclear and other radioactive material, if applicable;
 Country of origin of the nuclear and other radioactive material;
 Name and address of the producer and/or supplier (i.e. originator) of the nuclear and other
radioactive material;
 Nuclear and other radioactive material batch identification and process date from supplier (to
the extent possible, such information may already be available within a State, and such
existing information is helpful for a Library);
 Shipper (or carrier) and receiver information, including dates;
 Data evaluation information (e.g. determination of data quality, pedigree and completeness);
 Variation in the range of a data characteristic (e.g. technical specifications); for example,
fresh low-enriched uranium used in commercial light-water reactors typically ranges in
isotopic enrichment between 3 to 5% 235U;
 Information acquisition date, including stating if archived information was used.

General information topics associated with materials information in a Library will depend on a State’s
requirements. Thus, States will include topics of general information they deem appropriate for their
needs, and these topics may differ from the suggested topics listed above.

21
I-2. SPECIFIC INFORMATION: NUCLEAR FUEL-CYCLE PROCESSES AND RADIOACTIVE
SOURCE APPLICATIONS

Analytical measurement data included in a Library can use consistent units to help facilitate timely
and meaningful comparisons. SI units can be used; isotopic compositions may be reported as atom
238 235
ratios, with all isotopes of uranium reported relative to U, e.g., U/238U, and to 239
Pu, e.g.
Pu240/Pu239, for plutonium. Sometimes, due to existing data streams or other circumstances, it may be
easier to capture data in the Library using non-SI units. For this reason, careful attention is needed to
ensure unit agreement between data from disparate sources.

Radionuclide or isotope ratio measurement results can be reported with a reference date to facilitate
quality comparative analysis. This is especially true for measurements that include shorter-lived
241
radionuclides, e.g. Pu (fourteen years). Inclusion of measurement reference dates or production
dates may also help facilitate the application of radiochronometry measurements to help identify
whether a nuclear or other radioactive material found out of regulatory control is consistent with
materials found in the Library. For example, if the 230Th/234U ratio measured in uranium fuel indicates
it is 30 years old, and the only plant in a State producing material began operations 10 years ago, then
based on age alone the nuclear or other radioactive material found out of regulatory control is not
consistent with material produced in the State. Radiochronometers are generally only applicable to
relatively pure materials, typically found in the later stages of the fuel cycle, and it is important to
understand limitations of radiochronometry measurements if they are to be effectively used as nuclear
forensic signatures.

It is also important to include available analytical uncertainties for each measurement result included
in a Library. Ideally, analytical uncertainties would be estimated using internationally accepted
practices; for example, those practices found in the Guide for the Estimation of Uncertainty in
Measurement (GUM).6 Acknowledging that data included in the Library may have been generated for
other purposes, e.g. for process quality control, uncertainties may not always be available. In these
cases, data may still be valuable, but a thorough understanding of any limitations concerning data
accuracy or poor precision is important before including data in a Library or using data for a
comparative analysis.

In summary, when beginning to develop a Library, the first step is for the State to identify responsible
organizations, personnel, and data and information resources. The second step is to refer to Tables I1–
10, as they pertain to the State’s fuel-cycle activities, type of radioactive sources, and material

6
Joint Committee for Guides in Metrology, Evaluation of measurement data — Guide to the expression of
uncertainty in measurement, JCGM 100-2008 (2008).

22
holdings, as a general guide to organizing existing data and associated expertise in the context of
material production processes and use of material.

I-3. TABLES OF MATERIAL AND INFORMATION CATEGORIES

The scheme to organize a Library builds upon sequential steps. Initially, the applicable nuclear fuel-
cycle processes are determined by the State based on its experience and nuclear security requirements.
Then, for each nuclear fuel-cycle process step selected, key discriminating material characteristics,
e.g. isotope abundance and trace element concentration, are identified. Finally, a data discriminator
(high, medium, or low) is assigned to each material characteristic to indicate the characteristic’s
impact as a parameter for comparing materials with different production histories.

Tables of information categories and material characteristics may be helpful to include in a State’s
Library (see Annex III). These tables are not intended to be data input templates (i.e. fill-in tables).
States may adopt or modify this structure as they deem appropriate to meet their needs for a Library.

The tables specifically include characteristics and processes associated with uranium and plutonium,
because these are the most common. Further, the tables are applicable to other fuel cycles, such as
thorium. Depending on the needs of a State, the tables could be adapted where applicable to other fuel
cycles and the characteristics that would be included in a Library would be similar. For example, for a
thorium fuel cycle, Table I3 on conversion would be the same but with thorium replacing uranium in
the table.

23
TABLE I-1. GEOLOGICAL DEPOSITION (ORE AND ORE DEPOSITS)

Data
Characteristic Characteristics – Data Elements Discriminator Notes
Geology  Mine location High Relevant description of the geology of
 Geological formation the material (ore) deposit and body
(e.g. vein, sedimentary deposit, etc.)
 Deposit types
 Mining technique
 Colour
Mineralogy  Minerals present Low Mineral identified as part of
 Chemical composition of minerals exploration and mining processes

 Volume percentages of minerals

Uranium  Uranium concentration Low Typically expressed in g/tonne
concentration  Uranium concentration uncertainty
Uranium isotopes  Isotope ratios (238U in the Low 235U/ 238U and
denominator) 234U/ 238U

 Isotope ratio uncertainty

Stable isotopes  Isotope name High Add isotope ratios similar to Pb
 Use standard units for particular Per mil (‰) for C, O, N, S
isotope system 87Sr/86Sr ratio for Sr

 Uncertainty εNd for Nd

Isotope ratios for Pb (204Pb/208Pb,
207Pb/208Pb, 206Pb/208Pb)

Trace elements  Trace element concentration High Typically expressed in µg/g sample
 Trace element concentration
uncertainty

24
TABLE I-2. URANIUM MINING, MILLING, AND EXTRACTION (ORE CONCENTRATE,
YELLOWCAKE)

Data
Characteristic Characteristics – Data Elements Discriminator Notes
Chemical form  Compound name High e.g. U3O8, ((NH4)2U2O7)
 Stoichiometry deviation
Physical characteristics  Density Low Density expressed in g/cm3

Morphology/  Lattice structure Low Descriptive shape of

crystallography  Aspect ratio individual grains (e.g. round,
oval, square, smooth, rough)
 Porosity
 Colour
 Particle size (and distribution)
 Shape
 Surface features (e.g. striations)
Uranium concentration  Uranium concentration Low Expressed in g/g
 Uranium concentration uncertainty
Uranium isotopes  Isotope ratios (238U in the Low 235U/ 238U and
denominator) 234U/ 238U

 Isotope ratio uncertainty

Uranium decay series  Isotope name High Radioactive disequilibrium
radionuclides  Activity concentration indicates chemically
processed materials
 Activity concentration uncertainty
Stable isotopes  Isotope name High Per mil (‰) for C, O, N, S
87Sr/86Sr ratio for Sr
 Use standard units for particular
isotope system εNd for Nd
 Uncertainty Isotope ratios for Pb
(204Pb/208Pb, 207Pb/208Pb,
206Pb/208Pb)

Trace elements  Trace element concentration High Typically expressed in µg/g

 Trace element concentration sample
uncertainty
Process information (in  Mining and milling process High Process facility description,
context of how it affects  Location of processing site location of plant and dates of
material) production
 Dates when production occurred
(range)

25
TABLE I-3. URANIUM CONVERSION, ENRICHMENT AND FUEL PRODUCTION (INCLUDING UF6,
UF4, UO2, UO3, U3O8, URANYL NITRATE, DEPLETED URANIUM, LOW ENRICHED URANIUM AND
HIGHLY ENRICHED URANIUM, PELLETS, RODS/PLASTES, SCRAP AND WASTE)

Data
Characteristic Characteristics – Data Elements Discriminator Notes
Physical characteristics  Density High Density expressed in g/cm3
 Solid, liquid, gas Plans, technical drawings
 Mechanical properties (e.g., tensile strength, or photographs of pellets,
hardness, ductility, etc.) rods and plates (as
available)
 Description of fuel (pellet) and dimensions
(rods, plates)
 Cladding information
 Serial numbers (as applicable)
Morphology/  Lattice structure Medium Descriptive shape of
crystallography  Aspect ratio individual grains (e.g.
round, oval, square,
 Porosity smooth, rough)
 Colour
 Particle size (and distribution)
 Shape
 Surface features (e.g. striations)
Chemical form  Compound name High

Elemental concentration  Uranium concentration Medium Expressed in g/g

(to include burnable  Uranium concentration uncertainty
poisons in pellets)
 Burnable poisons (e.g. Gd or B)
Trace elements  Trace element concentration Medium Typically expressed in
 Trace element concentration uncertainty µg/g sample

Uranium isotopes  Isotope ratios (238U in the denominator) High 235U/238U, 234U/238U,
236U/238U, 233U/238U,
 Isotope ratio uncertainty 232U/238U

Process information (In  Process type Medium Process description (e.g.

context of how it affects  Date range for production fluorination), location of
material) plant and dates of
 Location of processing site production
Container  Container type High Primarily for UF6
 Volume
 Dimensions

26
TABLE I-4. MIXED OXIDE FUEL (MOX) FUEL FABRICATION: POWDER, PELLETS, RODS, SCRAP
AND WASTE

Data
Characteristic Characteristics – Data Elements Discriminator Notes

Physical characteristics  Description for fuel (pellet, pebble, etc.) and High Density expressed in
dimensions (for rods, plates, etc.) g/cm3
 Density Plans, technical drawings
or photographs of rods,
 Solid, liquid, gas
plates and pellets
 Mechanical properties (e.g. tensile strength,
hardness, ductility, etc.)
 Cladding information (type)
 Fuel coating information

Serial number  Serial number High Could be individual serial

numbers or ranges of
serial numbers associated
with a particular design

Morphology/  Lattice structure Medium

crystallography (for fuel  Aspect ratio
and cladding material)
 Porosity
 Colour
 Particle size (and distribution)
 Shape
 Surface features (e.g. striations)
 Plutonium homogeneity (i.e. distribution
within the matrix)

Chemical form  Compound name (for U and Pu High

components)

Elemental concentrations  Element concentration High Expressed in g/g sample

 Element concentration uncertainty To include U and Pu
burnable poisons (e.g. Gd
or B)

Trace elements  Trace element concentration Medium Typically expressed in

 Trace element concentration uncertainty µg/g sample

235U/238U, 234U/238U,
Uranium isotopes  Isotope ratios (238U in the denominator) High
236U/238U, 233U/238U,
 Isotope ratio uncertainty 232U/238U

238Pu/239Pu, 240Pu/239Pu,
Plutonium isotopes  Isotope ratios (239Pu in the denominator) High
241Pu/239Pu, 242Pu/239Pu
 Isotope ratio uncertainty

Process information (In  Process type High Process description,

context of how it affects  Date range for production location of plant and dates
material) of production
 Location of processing site

27
TABLE I-5. FRESH NUCLEAR FUEL (ASSEMBLIES, ELEMENTS FOR POWER OR RESEARCH
REACTORS; ISOTOPE PRODUCTION CAPSULES)

Data
Characteristic Characteristics – Data Elements Discriminator Notes
Physical characteristics  Description for fuel assembly and dimensions High Plans, technical
(for rods, plates, etc.) drawings or
 Cladding information (type) photographs of
nuclear fuel
 Assembly structure assemblies
Serial number  Serial number High Could be individual
serial numbers or
ranges of serial
numbers associated
with a particular
design
Chemical form  Compound name High

Elemental concentrations  Element concentration High Expressed in g/g

 Element concentration uncertainty sample
To include U and Pu
burnable poisons (e.g.
Gd or B)
Trace elements  Trace element concentration Low Typically expressed in
 Trace element concentration uncertainty µg/g sample

Uranium isotopes  Isotope ratios (238U in the denominator) High 235U/238U, 234U/238U,
236U/238U, 233U/238U,
 Isotope ratio uncertainty 232U/238U

Plutonium isotopes  Isotope ratios (239Pu in the denominator) High 238Pu/239Pu,

240Pu/239Pu,
 Isotope ratio uncertainty 241Pu/239Pu,
242Pu/239Pu

Process information (In  Process type High Process description,

context of how it affects  Date range for production location of plant and
material) dates of production
 Location of processing site

28
TABLE I-6. IRRADIATED (SPENT) NUCLEAR FUEL

Data
Characteristic Characteristics – Data Elements Discriminator Notes
Physical characteristics  Description for fuel assembly and dimensions High Plans, technical drawings
(for rods, plates, etc.) or photographs of nuclear
 Cladding information (type) fuel assemblies
 Assembly structure
 Surface oxide thickness
Serial number  Serial number High Could be individual serial
numbers or ranges of
serial numbers associated
with a particular design
Chemical form  Compound name High

Elemental concentrations  Element concentration High Expressed in g/g sample

 Element concentration uncertainty To include U and Pu
burnable poisons (e.g. Gd
or B)
Trace elements  Trace element concentration Low Typically expressed in
 Trace element concentration uncertainty µg/g sample

Uranium isotopes  Isotope ratios (238U in the denominator) High 235U/238U, 234U/238U,
236U/238U, 233U/238U,
 Isotope ratio uncertainty 232U/238U

Plutonium isotopes  Isotope ratios (239Pu in the denominator) High 238Pu/239Pu, 240Pu/239Pu,
241Pu/239Pu, 242Pu/239Pu
 Isotope ratio uncertainty
Irradiation history  Reactor type High
 Burn-up (to include, actinides and fission
products)
 Assembly power history
 Operating records
 Load and discharge dates
 Radiation level

29
TABLE I-7. REPROCESSING (PLUTONIUM NITRATE, URANYL NITRATE, PLUTONIUM OXIDE,
URANIUM OXIDE, MIXED OXIDE, OTHER ACTINIDES)

Data
Characteristic Characteristics – Data Elements Discriminator Notes
Physical characteristics  Description for fuel (pellet, pebble, etc.) and Low Density expressed in
dimensions (for rods, plates, etc.) g/cm3
 Density
 Solid, liquid, gas
 Mechanical properties (e.g. tensile strength,
hardness, ductility, etc.)
 Cladding information (type)
 Fuel coating information
Chemical form  Compound name High

Elemental concentrations  Element concentration High Expressed in g/g

 Element concentration uncertainty sample

Trace elements  Trace element concentration High Typically expressed in

 Trace element concentration uncertainty µg/g sample

Uranium isotopes  Isotope ratios (238U in the denominator) High 235U/238U, 234U/238U,
236U/238U, 233U/238U,
 Isotope ratio uncertainty 232U/238U

Plutonium isotopes  Isotope ratios (239Pu in the denominator) High 238Pu/239Pu,

240Pu/239Pu,
 Isotope ratio uncertainty 241Pu/239Pu, 242Pu/239Pu

Process information (In  Process type High Process description,

context of how it affects  Date range for production location of plant and
material) dates of production
 Location of processing site

30
TABLE I-8. RADIOACTIVE WASTE PROCESSING, HANDLING, AND STORAGE (HIGH LEVEL
RADIOACTIVE WASTE)

Data
Characteristic Characteristics – Data Elements Discriminator Notes
Serial number  Serial number (e.g. container or cask) High Could be individual
serial numbers or ranges
of serial numbers
associated with a
particular design
Physical characteristics  Activity High Density expressed in
 Density g/cm3
 Solid, liquid, gas (general description of Total activity or dose
matrix) rate
 Mass
 Dimensions
Elemental concentrations  Element concentration High Expressed in g/g sample
 Element concentration uncertainty
Major isotopes  Isotope name High Expressed as activities in
 Isotope activity Bq, include reference
date
 Isotope activity uncertainty
Process information (In  Process type High Process description,
context of how it affects  Date range for production location of plant and
material) dates of production
 Location of processing site
Container  Container type High
 Volume
 Dimensions

31
TABLE I-9. TYPES OF RADIOACTIVE SOURCES: SEALED

Data
Characteristic Characteristics – Data Elements Discriminator Notes
Description of the source or  Source type (emission type, intended use) High Identifying information
package  Quantity from the supplier
 Description and dimensions
 Encapsulation or cladding
 Serial number
 Radiograph or photograph
 Shipping and receiving history
Source activity information  Activity High Activities in Bq,
 Reference date of the activity [neutron/sec] with a
radioactive decay
 Neutron intensity or flux
reference date
Chemical form  Compound name High

Elemental concentrations (in  Element concentration High Expressed in g/g

matrix)  Element concentration uncertainty sample

Major and minor isotopes  Isotope name High Expressed as activities

 Isotope activity in Bq, include
reference date
 Isotope activity uncertainty

32
TABLE I-10. TYPES OF RADIOACTIVE SOURCES: UNSEALED

Data
Characteristic Characteristics – Data Elements Discriminator Notes
Description of the source or  Source type (emission type, use type) High Identifying information
package  Quantity from the supplier
 Description and dimensions
 Radiograph or photograph
 Shipping and receiving history
Source activity information  Activity High Activities in Bq, with a
 Reference date of the activity radioactive decay
reference date
Chemical form  Compound name High
Elemental concentrations  Element concentration High Expressed in g/g sample
 Element concentration uncertainty
Major and minor isotopes  Isotope name High Expressed as activities in
 Isotope activity Bq, include reference
 Isotope activity uncertainty date

33
 ANNEX II

REPRESENTATIONS OF HYPOTHETICAL LIBRARY DATA FOR THREE DISTINCT

MATERIALS

The three Library data representations below serve only as a hypothetical guide of what a Library
entry might contain. These representations are not prescriptive templates for the design of a Library or
the corresponding data entries.

The fields encompass reference information. Entries in a Library will likely include fields appropriate
to all categories of nuclear and other radioactive material.

35
TABLE II-1. HYPOTHETICAL LIBRARY DATA SUMMARY FOR Sr-90 SEALED SOURCE

MATERIAL: Sr-90 Sealed Source DATA RECORD DATE: 18 October 2012

CUSTODIAN/OWNER: ANALYTICAL LABORATORY:
Medical Research Institute Not Applicable; Vendor Data
4371 Waterfall Drive
Capital City, Westland
COUNTRY OF ORIGIN: SUPPLIER:
Northland RADTECH, Inc.
3001 Main Street
South Village, Northland, 60032
SHIPPER/CARRIER: DATA VETTING:
PDP, Ltd.; Waybill No. 40512432 Vendor Data: Model XZAP90-SR
DATE INFORMATION ACQUIRED: FINAL DISPOSITION (if known):
28 June 2012 RAD Surplus, Ltd
CHARACTERISTICS— DATA DATA
CHARACTERISTIC ELEMENT Sr-90 SEALED SOURCE DISCRIMINATOR
SUPPLIER Packaging Type Al alloy backing covered with High
INFORMATION 0.05mm thick Al foil
Drawings / Photographs (with
scale)

Description and Dimensions Active core deposited on Al alloy

backing d=143mm × h=1.5mm
DESCRIPTION OF Encapsulation or Cladding Active core deposited on Al alloy High
SOURCE / PACKAGE backing and covered by 0.05mm
thick Al foil,
d=143mm × h=1.5mm
Serial Number 5C0-(801-218)
Radiograph / Photograph Not Provided
Shipping / Receiving History PDP Ltd.
Waybill No. 40512432
PHYSICAL Activity (Bq) 1 to 10 GBq High
CHARACTERISTICS Reference Date of Activity 31 March 2012
OF SOURCE Description and dimensions Diameter of emitting surface 113mm
Serial Number 5C0-(801-218)
Radiograph / Photograph Not Provided
90Sr/90Y
CHEMICAL FORMS Compound Name High
ELEMENT Element Name Strontium / Yttrium High
CONCENTRATION Element Concentration Not Provided
Uncertainty Not Provided
90Sr/90Y
ISOTOPES Isotope Name High
Activity, Uncertainty Not Provided

36
TABLE II-2. HYPOTHETICAL LIBRARY DATA SUMMARY FOR HIGHLY ENRICHED URANIUM
(HEU) METAL

GENERAL
DATA
INFORMATION CHARACTER-
DISCR-
CHARACTERISTIC ISTICS-DATA SAMPLE A—HEU
MATERIAL: IMIN-
Sample A-HEU ELEMENTS
ATOR
DATA RECORD PHYSICAL Rod/ plate/ 4.5808-5.0915g High
DATE: 18 CHARACTERISTICS pellet
October 2012 information
CUSTODIAN/ Density (g/cm3) No density given for
OWNER: sample, only for angular
Special Uranium inclusion
Inc. Surface Angular inclusions
7482 Fern Dr. roughness
Malibu, North Dimensions of Large cylindrical mass of
City 45045 nuclear fuel inner diameter ~32mm
ANALYTICAL pellets (~44mm actual)
LABORATORY: Cladding Not Provided
Dunlap Lab (material,
COUNTRY OF thickness)
ORIGIN: Plans/ drawing
Southland
SUPPLIER:
Uran-E-Um, LLC
892 Elm Street.
Geomat,
Southland 20012
BATCH ID AND
PROCESS
ITEM DESCRIPTION Serial number Hollow Log 1958 High
DATE:
format
Hollow Log 1943,
8 April 2003 MORPHOLOGY Grain/ particle 0.0086 ±0.0035 (mm) Medium
size
SHIPPER/
CARRIER: Shape grains Angular, dendritic, cuboidal
PDP, Ltd Colour metallic silver
Waybill No. CHEMICAL FORM Compound Uranium metal High
V283HG4 name
DATE ELEMENTAL Element name Medium
INFORMATION CONCENTRATION Element Total all %U-isotopes, get
ACQUIRED: 25 concentration 100% U in sample, were
April 2011 measured
Uncertainty n.a.a
TRACE ELEMENT Trace element Pu, Np, Al, B, C, Ca, Co, Medium
CONCENTRATION name Cr, Cu, Er, Fe,Mg, Mn, Mo,
Ni, P, Pd, Re, W, Zr
Trace element Pu: 0.0063-0.0081, Al: 10-
concentration 215, B: 7-10, C: 260-1700,
(µg/g) Ca: 3.4-56.2, Co: 0.59-1.74,
Cr: 9.99-115, Cu: 8.0-37.3,
Er: 0.16-8.23, Fe: 77.8-220,
Mg: 0.22-34.9, Mn: 3.78-
22.5, Mo: 51-380, Ni: 38-
164, P: 10.1, Pd: 0.31-3, Re:
17.5-18, W: 34.2-69, Zr:
1.62-2200, Np-237:4.41-5.5
(µg/g)
Uncertainty Pu: 0.00024-0.0057 (µg/g)
URANIUM ISOTOPIC Isotopic ratios Ratios not given, % each High
COMPOSITION (238U in the isotope given 238U: 5.49-
denominator) 6.35, 235U: 92.5-93, 234U:
0.89-1.1,

37
 236U: 0.346-0.3884, 233U:

32.9E-6-0.0006, 232U: 0.1-

1.25E-8 (atom %)
238U: 0.0026-0.5, 235U:
Isotope
abundance 0.004-2.64, 232U: 0.0004-
uncertainty 0.09, 236U: 0.00056-0.5,
233U: 4.4E-6-0.0003, 232U:

0.03-0.3E-8 (atom)
PROCESS Process type Cast on May 22, 2003 High
INFORMATION 3 parent items all briquettes
formed from machine
Date and turnings (made Hollow log
duration of the 1943 cast on Apr 8, 2003) +
process pallet scrap (consolidation
item 1046 created Mar31,
2003)
Location of
Caesium Special Materials
processing site
a n.a.: not applicable.

38
TABLE II-3. HYPOTHETICAL LIBRARY DATA SUMMARY FOR LOW ENRICHED URANIUM (LEU)
NUCLEAR FUEL ASSEMBLY

MATERIAL: LEU FUEL ASSEMBLY DATA RECORD DATE: 18 OCTOBER

2012
BATCH ID AND PROCESS DATE: ANALYTICAL LABORATORY: NOT
MARCH 1959 APPLICABLE, VENDOR DATA
COUNTRY OF ORIGIN: EASTLAND SUPPLIER: EASTLAND ELECTRIC CO.
CUSTODIAN/OWNER: SHIPPER/CARRIER:
ELECTRO-NUCLEAR INC. CSP, INC
STEADY POWER AVENUE 2930 TRANSPORT LANE
NEW CITY, EASTLAND 82934 NEW CITY, EASTLAND 60032
DATA VETTING: DATE INFORMATION ACQUIRED:
VENDOR DATA: ASSEMBLY X320 ARCHIVED INFORMATION, MARCH
1959
CHARACTERISTICS — ARCTIC REACTOR 1 DATA
CHARACTERISTIC DATA ELEMENTS (MARCH 1959) DISCRIMINATOR
PHYSICAL Density of fuel pellets Not Provided High
CHARACTERISTICS Dimensions 0.494 d × 0.5 high (in) form
segment, 0.563 o.d. × 28 long (in),
4 segments form a rod 117 long
(in)
Cladding (material, Zircaloy-2, 0.03 (in)
thickness)
Rod information 6×6 fuel rods in square assembly
Assembly structure - 488 fuel channels
plans, schematic
drawings, or
photographs (with scale)

SERIAL NUMBER Serial number Not Provided High

CHEMICAL FORM Compound name UO2 High

39
ELEMENT Element name Not Provided High
CONCENTRATION Element concentration
Uncertainty
TRACE ELEMENT Trace element name Not Provided Low
CONCENTRATION Trace element
concentration
Uncertainty
URANIUM Isotope ratios (238U in Uranium enrichment: 1.5% High
ISOTOPIC the denominator) Enriched U-235
COMPOSITION Isotope ratio uncertainty Not Provided
PLUTONIUM Isotope ratios (239Pu, in Not Provided High
ISOTOPES FOR the denominator)
MOX FUEL Isotope ratio uncertainty
PROCESS Date and duration of the Not Provided High
INFORMATION process
Location of processing Arctic Electric Co.
site

40
 ANNEX III

DESCRIPTION OF UNITS FOR MATERIAL AND DATA CHARACTERISTICS TO

SUPPORT A NATIONAL NUCLEAR FORENSICS LIBRARY

Using a standardized set of units for nuclear and radioactive material characteristics in a Library
facilitates rapid comparative analyses. The conversion of units to a standardized set has the advantage
of facilitating comparability between all materials in a Library. Additionally, if unit conversions are
completed prior to entering data into a Library, a verification step can be completed to reduce the
risks of unit conversion errors during Library queries.

The following is a list of units for describing material characteristics in a Library. Generally, they are
SI or centimetre–gram–second system units, and were selected for ease of comparing a diverse set of
materials from across the fuel cycle and a wide variety of radioactive sources. It is up to each State to
decide if these units are appropriate for their Library, and in some cases, where a State only has a very
limited number of materials; it might be simpler to use alternative units. For example, if a State only
mines uranium ore, it might be more appropriate to express uranium concentration in ore in units of
g/tonne or g/kg instead of the recommended units of g/g, which are generally more useful for
comparing uranium concentrations for nuclear fuel cycle materials.

TABLE III-1. RECOMMENDED UNITS FOR DESCRIBING MATERIAL CHARACTERISTICS IN A

NATIONAL NUCLEAR FORENSICS LIBRARY

Characteristic Recommended Units Rational

Elemental concentrations for major g/g Used for elements with concentrations >0.1% by weight.
constituents Alternatively, it can include all elements intended to be a
part of a material, for example all of the elements present in
a metal alloy. For most fuel-cycle materials or large
radioactive sources, expressing concentrations in g element
/ g material is suitable.

Trace element concentrations µg/g Used for elements with concentrations <0.1% by weight.
Alternatively, trace elements are sometimes defined as
those elements that are impurities, or elements present in a
material but not intentionally added.

Uranium isotopic compositions Atom ratios: While uranium isotopic compositions are often expressed as
232U/238U, 233U/238U, atom percent, mass percent, or even just 235U enrichment
234U/238U, 235U/238U, level, these units are not ideal for Library use. By using
236U/238U ratios, all uranium materials in a Library are directly
comparable, regardless of how many isotopes were
determined in a particular material. If using atom or mass
percent, materials with differing numbers of isotopes
measured require isotopic compositions to be renormalized
based on the sample with the fewest isotopes measured
before they can be compared.

41
Characteristic Recommended Units Rational

Plutonium isotopic compositions Atom ratios: While plutonium isotopic compositions are often expressed
238Pu/239Pu, in atom percent or mass percent, these units are not ideal for
240Pu/239Pu, Library use. By using ratios, all plutonium materials in a
241Pu/239Pu, Library are directly comparable, regardless of how many
242Pu/239Pu, isotopes were determined in a particular material. If using
atom percent or mass percent, materials with differing
numbers of isotopes measured require isotopic
compositions to be renormalized based on the sample with
the fewest isotopes measured before they can be compared.

Density g/cm3 Alternately, the SI unit of kg/m3 would also be appropriate.

Particle size µm Depending on the sophistication of the Library, this could

capture average particle size, or complete histograms of
particle size distributions.

Porosity or specific surface area m2/g Typical units for porosity or specific surface area
measurements using Brunauer–Emmett–Teller (BET)
theory and similar methods.

Carbon stable isotopes Per mil (‰) Expressed as δ13C.

Nitrogen stable isotopes Per mil (‰) Expressed as δ15N.

Oxygen stable isotopes Per mil (‰) Expressed as δ15O.

Strontium stable isotopes Atom ratio 87Sr/86Sr

Lead stable isotopes Atom ratios

204Pb/208Pb,
207Pb/208Pb,
206Pb/208Pb,

143Nd/144Nd
Neodymium stable isotopes εNd isotope ratios

Activity Bq Used for radionuclide activity in radioactive sources.

Specific activity Bq/g The activity of a radionuclide relative to the total mass of
the element present (e.g. 50Bq 60Co/g Co). Used to describe
the radiochemical purity of radionuclides.

Neutron intensity n/s Used to express the intensity of neutrons from neutron
sources, e.g. 252Cf or 241AmBe sources.

42
@ No. 25

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 Development of a National Nuclear
Forensics Library: A System
for the Identification of Nuclear
or Other Radioactive Material
out of Regulatory Control

International Atomic Energy Agency

Vienna
ISBN 978–92–0–108218–3