Journal Pre-proof

Reward, Punishment, and Prosocial Behavior: Recent Developments and Implications

Junhui Wu, Shenghua Luan, Nichola Raihani

PII: S2352-250X(21)00172-X
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.copsyc.2021.09.003
Reference: COPSYC 1250

To appear in: Current Opinion in Psychology

Received Date: 29 July 2021

Revised Date: 31 August 2021
Accepted Date: 2 September 2021

Please cite this article as: Wu J, Luan S, Raihani N, Reward, Punishment, and Prosocial Behavior:
Recent Developments and Implications, Current Opinion in Psychology, https://doi.org/10.1016/
j.copsyc.2021.09.003.

This is a PDF file of an article that has undergone enhancements after acceptance, such as the addition
of a cover page and metadata, and formatting for readability, but it is not yet the definitive version of
record. This version will undergo additional copyediting, typesetting and review before it is published
in its final form, but we are providing this version to give early visibility of the article. Please note that,
during the production process, errors may be discovered which could affect the content, and all legal
disclaimers that apply to the journal pertain.

© 2021 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

REWARD, PUNISHMENT, AND PROSOCIAL BEHAVIOR 1

Reward, Punishment, and Prosocial Behavior: Recent Developments and Implications

f
oo
Junhui Wu1,2*, Shenghua Luan1,2, Nichola Raihani3

r
1
-p
CAS Key Laboratory of Behavioral Science, Institute of Psychology, Chinese Academy of
re
Sciences, Beijing 100101, China
lP

2
Department of Psychology, University of Chinese Academy of Sciences, Beijing 100049,

China
na

3
Department of Experimental Psychology, University College London, London WC1H 0AP,
ur

UK
Jo

Author Note

* Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to Junhui Wu, Institute of

Psychology, Chinese Academy of Sciences, No. 16 Lincui Road, Chaoyang District, Beijing

100101, China. Email: [email protected].

REWARD, PUNISHMENT, AND PROSOCIAL BEHAVIOR 2

Abstract (115 words)

Reward and punishment change the payoff structures of social interactions and

therefore can potentially play a role in promoting prosocial behavior. Yet, there are boundary

conditions for them to be effective. We review recent work that addresses the conditions

under which rewards and punishment can enhance prosocial behavior, the proximate and

ultimate mechanisms for individuals’ rewarding and punishing decisions, and the reputational

and behavioral consequences of reward and punishment under noise. The reviewed evidence

f
oo
points to the importance of more field research on how reward and punishment can promote

r
-p
prosocial behavior in real-world settings. We also highlight the need to integrate different
re
methodologies to better examine the effects of reward and punishment on prosocial behavior.
lP

Keywords: reward, punishment, sanctions, reputational benefits, prosocial behavior

na

Highlights (optional)
ur

 Both reward and punishment can promote prosocial behavior but are costly to enact.
Jo

 Reward is less costly than punishment to implement when prosociality is rare.

 Decisions to reward and punish are driven by different emotions and motives.

 How reward and punishment operate under noise is important to address.

REWARD, PUNISHMENT, AND PROSOCIAL BEHAVIOR 3

Reward, Punishment, and Prosocial Behavior: Recent Developments and Implications

1. Introduction

Prosocial behavior refers to a broad category of behaviors (e.g., helping, volunteering,

charitable donation, and cooperative behavior) that are generally beneficial to others but often

at a personal cost to the actor [1]. Prosocial behavior is critical for interpersonal relationships,

groups, and societies at large to function well. For instance, engaging in prosocial behavior

can enhance the actor’s well-being [2,3], can improve employees’ performance in

f
oo
organizational settings [4], and is critical to solve global social dilemmas, such as climate

r
-p
change and mitigating pandemics [5,6]. Researchers across different disciplines have
re
examined the antecedents of prosocial behavior. In particular, reward and punishment have
lP

been identified as two major structural solutions that change the payoffs of different courses

of actions and thus can promote prosocial behavior [7,8].

na

Reward and punishment are both temporarily costly actions that result in an
ur

immediate benefit or cost for the rewarded or punished target, respectively. Reward is
Jo

typically targeted at prosocial actors, whereas punishment is more often levelled at free riders

in social interactions [8–10]. Early research focused mainly on whether reward and

punishment can increase prosocial behavior, often in laboratory experiments using social

dilemma paradigms (e.g., public goods game; see Figure 1 for illustrations) [11,12], and a

large-scale meta-analysis indicated that reward and punishment have similar-sized positive

effects on prosocial behavior [7]. Yet, a closer examination of existing studies shows mixed

evidence [10,13], suggesting that there might be boundary conditions for reward and

punishment to be effective.
REWARD, PUNISHMENT, AND PROSOCIAL BEHAVIOR 4

In this review, we summarize recent developments pertaining to three major questions

(see Figure 2 for an overview): (a) do reward and punishment promote prosocial behavior

and, if so, when? (b) why and when are people willing to reward or punish? (c) what are the

reputational and behavioral consequences of reward and punishment under noise? We end by

discussing the implications of these developments for future research.

2. When do reward and punishment promote prosocial behavior?

Reward and punishment are both behaviors that require the actor to pay a short-term

f
oo
cost, but they differ in the consequences for the target: reward generates immediate payoffs

r
-p
for the target, whereas punishment does the opposite. Hence, punishing free riders typically
re
reduces collective payoffs and thus can often be less efficient than simply withholding help
lP

from free riders [9]. In addition, punishment can sometimes prompt retaliation rather than

prosocial behavior in public goods games, thereby lowering contributions to public goods
na

[10,14]. This negative consequence is particularly likely when punishment behaviors are
ur

believed to stem from malign motives [15] or perceived to be less legitimate [16]. For
Jo

instance, punishment enacted by an uninvolved bystander (third-party punishment) or

through a democratic process of majority vote (democratic punishment) are both typically

perceived as more legitimate than direct punishment by the targets’ interaction partner(s), and

may therefore be more likely to induce targets’ prosocial behavior (for a review, see [10]).

Some studies have found that reward can be more likely than punishment to promote

prosocial behavior, such as inducing more contributions to public goods [17]. However, both

reward and punishment can also have negative effects, such as crowding out individuals’

intrinsic motivation to act prosocially [18,19]. Moreover, although third-party reward (i.e., an
REWARD, PUNISHMENT, AND PROSOCIAL BEHAVIOR 5

uninvolved bystander rewards a prosocial actor), also known as indirect reciprocity, can

theoretically maintain prosocial behavior among unrelated strangers, there has been no

consensus on what social rules that people use to assess others’ actions (e.g., whether helping

a free rider is good and deserves to be rewarded) can best promote prosociality through

indirect reciprocity [20]. In order for indirect reciprocity to sustain prosocial behavior,

theoretical models require that individuals should discriminate between justified defection

and unjustified defection, such that an actor who refuses to help a free rider is perceived as

f
oo
good and gets rewarded [21]. Yet, recent evidence suggests that people evaluated justified

r
-p
defectors as neither good nor bad [22], which deviates from theoretical predictions. As a
re
result, it is unclear whether in the real world, such social rules are frequently used and work
lP

effectively to sustain prosocial behavior through indirect reciprocity.

Notably, punishment and reward may be most effective when they are used in tandem,
na

rather than separately. In particular, theoretical evidence from evolutionary models shows that
ur

reward is essential to establish prosociality when prosociality is rare in the group, whereas
Jo

punishment is instrumental to maintain prosociality when the number of prosocial actors

exceeds a certain threshold [5,23].

3. Why and when are people willing to reward or punish?

Here we ask what proximate and ultimate mechanisms underpin individuals’ tendency

to reward or punish others in social interactions (see Figure 2 for an overview). One general

finding is that when given the choice, people typically prefer to reward prosocial actors (or to

perform other positive actions such as compensating the victim) than to punish norm

violators [24–26]. Rewarding decisions by third-party observers may be prompted by the

REWARD, PUNISHMENT, AND PROSOCIAL BEHAVIOR 6

positive affect they experience when they learn about others’ prosocial behavior, and this

positive affect may prompt their decisions to reward those prosocial actors [27]. People are

also more prone to reward prosocial actors who are authentically motivated to care about

others’ welfare and are perceived as genuinely moral, such as when prosocial acts are targeted

at lower-power recipients (see Figure 2) [28]. Notably, individuals who reward prosocial

actors or compensate the victim are more positively evaluated by third-party observers and

are also more likely to be chosen as potential interaction partners than punishers [29–31].

f
oo
Such opportunities for reputational benefits may help illuminate the ultimate (evolutionary)

r
-p
explanations for why people are willing to pay to reward prosocial actors.
re
In contrast to rewarding decisions, more research has focused on the motives
lP

prompting punishment decisions. Evidence suggests that people willingly pay to punish norm

violators in experimental settings and such punishment is subjectively rewarding [32].

na

Negative emotions, particularly anger and moral outrage, seem to reliably predict punishment
ur

decisions [33–35], including third-party punishment [36]. Indeed, introducing a time delay
Jo

between norm violations and punishment decisions has been found to reduce punishment

behavior [37], which is consistent with the idea that punishment is prompted by negative

emotions. Similarly, evidence suggests that people also punish less often and more mildly

when they make punishment decisions before (instead of immediately after) the occurrence of

others’ norm violations [38]. But not all punishment is motivated by anger: For example,

third-party punishment can also be motivated by compassion toward the victims [39], as well

as punishers’ incidental feelings of gratitude induced by recalling past events (e.g., recalling a

time that they were grateful) [40].

REWARD, PUNISHMENT, AND PROSOCIAL BEHAVIOR 7

Some recent studies also suggest that people tend to attune their punishment decisions

to the potential benefits of changing the target’s behavior and the costs of potential retaliation

[34]. For instance, people are more likely to engage in third-party punishment to deter the

target from acting against their own interests when they expect future interactions with the

target [41,42]. People are also more likely to punish when they value the victims’ welfare and

perceive that the harm to the victims has produced a net cost to themselves (i.e., the punisher

has a stake in the victims’ welfare), for example, when the victims are their siblings and close

f
oo
friends rather than their acquaintances [33,43]. In addition, people with higher power or

r
-p
social status, who are less likely to be retaliated against, are expected to punish [44] and are
re
indeed more willing to punish norm violators [34,45].
lP

Finally, individuals’ group membership can affect when and how they choose to

reward or punish others. As third-party observers, people tend to punish selfish behaviors
na

committed by outgroup members more harshly than similar behaviors committed by ingroup
ur

members, which helps protect their ingroup members from exploitation or harm by the
Jo

outgroup in the future [41,46]. Also, during intergroup conflicts, people are often more

willing to punish free riders and reward cooperators within their group at some personal

costs, because this enhances within-group cooperation, thereby making group success more

likely (see Figure 2) [47].

The ultimate causes for punitive sentiment to be under positive selection also include

the opportunities for reputational benefits (particularly for third-party punishers) [48], but

some punishment may also be favored because it improves the punisher’s payoffs or status

relative to the payoffs or status of the target [10,49].

REWARD, PUNISHMENT, AND PROSOCIAL BEHAVIOR 8

4. Reward and punishment under noise

Experimental research often assumes perfect monitoring, such that everyone can

observe everyone else’s actual behavior and can reward or punish appropriately [11,12]. Yet,

real-life social interactions often contain “noise”—unintended errors that cause discrepancies

between intended outcomes and actual outcomes [50]. Such noise may cause imperfect

monitoring and false reputations (e.g., prosocial actors are perceived as free riders), and

f
mislead people to reward prosocial actors who are actually free riders and to punish free

oo
riders who are actually prosocial actors. Inappropriate rewarding and punishing behaviors

r
-p
caused by noise may eventually undermine prosocial behavior and affect the reputations of
re
rewarders and punishers. For instance, studies exploring how leaders’ reputations are affected
lP

by noise-induced mistakes in punishing or rewarding others found that mistaken punishment

na

damages leaders’ reputation, whereas mistaken reward does not [51]. This may occur because

punishment is a harmful act and is therefore judged more negatively than reward when it is
ur

applied inappropriately. Moreover, noise may hinder the positive effects of reward and
Jo

punishment on prosocial behavior. For instance, when there is a higher degree of noise,

people tend to increase their punishment expenditures, but punishment cannot maintain a

high contribution level and even harms group payoffs in such situations due to the possibility

of mistakenly punishing high contributors [52]. Other evidence from evolutionary models on

institutional reward and punishment suggests that for intermediate and high levels of noise,

reward performs best in eliciting higher contribution levels and group welfare, whereas

punishment fails to maintain a high contribution level and thereby reduces group welfare

[53].
REWARD, PUNISHMENT, AND PROSOCIAL BEHAVIOR 9

Undoubtedly, to better understand how reward and punishment can be used to

promote prosocial behavior in real-life situations, it is important for future research to pay

more attention to the effects of reward and punishment on prosocial behavior under noise,

which have been relatively understudied (see Figure 2). It is also important to note that

people in real-life situations can also learn about others’ behavior through gossip when they

cannot directly observe these others’ behavior. Gossip may be best able to overcome the

problem of noise when it comes from multiple independent sources [54].

f
oo
5. Implications and conclusions

r
-p
Existing research on reward and punishment, largely relying on evolutionary models
re
and laboratory experiments, has suggested that reward and punishment are generally effective
lP

means to promote prosocial behavior. Yet, peer punishment seems to work less efficiently

than reward and other forms of punishment, such as third-party punishment and democratic
na

punishment [5,55–57]. Notably, punishments enacted in the laboratory often differ from those
ur

observed in real-life social interactions (e.g., [43,58]), because people in real-life situations
Jo

can often intervene in multiple ways, including through direct physical or verbal

confrontation, and indirect reputation-based strategies, such as social avoidance and gossip

[34]. Both field and laboratory studies have shown that gossip and social image concerns can

promote prosocial behavior more efficiently than punishment [59,60]. It is possible that

people may first gossip about others’ norm violations and then coordinate their punishment

behaviors if gossip alone does not work. In addition, how reward works compared to indirect

strategies (e.g., social avoidance and gossip) has been relatively understudied. Future

research can use multi-trial tasks to examine the dynamic changes in the uses of reward,
REWARD, PUNISHMENT, AND PROSOCIAL BEHAVIOR 10

punishment, and indirect reputation-based strategies, and how they can be combined to more

efficiently promote and sustain prosocial behavior.

Another observation from this selective review is that there has been a plethora of

research using evolutionary models to investigate the optimal conditions for reward and

punishment to promote and sustain prosocial behavior [5,23,53,61]. However, whether results

from evolutionary models can accurately reflect individuals’ behavioral patterns in

experiments and real-life interactions remains unknown. For example, although modeling

f
oo
results suggest that the best strategy to solve social dilemmas is to use reward first and then

r
-p
switch to punishment when the number of prosocial actors reaches a certain threshold [5,23],
re
this prediction has not yet been tested in empirical studies. To provide more useful insights
lP

for policy makers, future research needs to integrate modeling approaches with behavioral

and field studies to generate more ecologically valid and robust findings with regard to the
na

effectiveness of different structural solutions.

ur

To conclude, despite the overall effectiveness of reward and punishment in promoting

Jo

prosocial behavior, we should be aware of the boundary conditions for them to work

effectively without harming collective welfare. In addition, decisions to reward and punish

are driven by different emotions and motives, which can provide useful insights into how to

encourage the provision of reward and punishment systems to enhance prosocial behavior.

Notably, more field research is needed on how reward and punishment, compared to indirect

reputation-based strategies such as social avoidance and gossip, promote prosocial behavior

in “noisy” real-world settings.

REWARD, PUNISHMENT, AND PROSOCIAL BEHAVIOR 11

Funding

This work was supported by funding from the National Natural Science Foundation of

China (71901028) to Junhui Wu, funding from Chinese Academy of Sciences (Y8CX153006)

to Shenghua Luan, and funding from Royal Society University Research Fellowship and

Leverhulme Trust to Nichola Raihani.

Conflict of interest statement

Nothing declared.

f
r oo
-p
re
lP
na
ur
Jo
REWARD, PUNISHMENT, AND PROSOCIAL BEHAVIOR 12

References

Papers of particular interest, published within the period of review, have been highlighted as:

* of special interest

** of outstanding interest

1. Penner LA, Dovidio JF, Piliavin JA, Schroeder DA: Prosocial behavior: Multilevel

perspectives. Annu Rev Psychol 2005, 56:365–392.

https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev.psych.56.091103.070141

f
oo
2. Curry OS, Rowland LA, Van Lissa CJ, Zlotowitz S, Mcalaney J, Whitehouse H:

r
-p
Happy to help? A systematic review and meta-analysis of the effects of
re
performing acts of kindness on the well-being of the actor. J Exp Soc Psychol 2018,
lP

76:320–329. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jesp.2018.02.014

3. Hui BPH, Ng JCK, Berzaghi E, Cunningham-Amos LA, Kogan A: Rewards of

na

kindness? A meta-analysis of the link between prosociality and well-being.

ur

Psychol Bull 2020, 146:1084–1116. https://doi.org/10.1037/bul0000298

Jo

4. Yaakobi E, Weisberg J: Organizational citizenship behavior predicts quality,

creativity, and efficiency performance: The roles of occupational and collective

efficacies. Front Psychol 2020, 11:758. https://doi.org/10.3389/fpsyg.2020.00758

5. Góis AR, Santos FP, Pacheco JM, Santos FC: Reward and punishment in climate

change dilemmas. Sci Rep 2019, 9:16193. https://doi.org/10.1038/s41598-019-52524-

** A mathematical model on a N-player Collective-Risk dilemma (CRD) reveals that rewards

are essential to initiate cooperation when cooperation level is low, whereas punishment helps
REWARD, PUNISHMENT, AND PROSOCIAL BEHAVIOR 13

maintain cooperation when a certain level of cooperation is reached. Thus, the best strategy to

solve challenging social dilemmas is to use reward and punishment in tandem.

6. Jin S, Balliet D, Romano A, Spadaro G, van Lissa CJ, Agostini M, Bélanger JJ,

Gützkow B, Kreienkamp J, Leander NP, et al.: Intergenerational conflicts of interest

and prosocial behavior during the COVID-19 pandemic. Pers Individ Dif 2021,

171:110535. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.paid.2020.110535

7. Balliet D, Mulder LB, Van Lange PAM: Reward, punishment, and cooperation: A

f
oo
meta-analysis. Psychol Bull 2011, 137:594–615. https://doi.org/10.1037/a0023489

r
8. -p
van Dijk E, Molenmaker WE, de Kwaadsteniet EW: Promoting cooperation in social
re
dilemmas: The use of sanctions. Curr Opin Psychol 2015, 6:118–122.
lP

https://doi.org/10.1016/j.copsyc.2015.07.006

9. Ohtsuki H, Iwasa Y, Nowak MA: Indirect reciprocity provides only a narrow

na

margin of efficiency for costly punishment. Nature 2009, 457:79–82.

ur

https://doi.org/10.1038/nature07601
Jo

10. Raihani NJ, Bshary R: Punishment: One tool, many uses. Evol Hum Sci 2019, 1:e12.

https://doi.org/10.1017/ehs.2019.12

11. Fehr E, Gächter S.: Altruistic punishment in humans. Nature 2002, 415:137–140.

https://doi.org/10.1038/415137a

12. Ozono H, Kamijo Y, Shimizu K: The role of peer reward and punishment for

public goods problems in a localized society. Sci Rep 2020, 10:8211.

https://doi.org/10.1038/s41598-020-64930-4

13. Noussair CN, van Soest D, Stoop J: Punishment, reward, and cooperation in a
REWARD, PUNISHMENT, AND PROSOCIAL BEHAVIOR 14

framed field experiment. Soc Choice Welfare 2015, 45:537–559.

https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-014-0841-8

14. Dreber A, Rand DG, Fudenberg D, Nowak MA: Winners don’t punish. Nature 2008,

452:348–351. https://doi.org/10.1038/nature06723

15. Muñoz-Herrera M, Nikiforakis N: Experimental evidence shows that negative motive

attribution drives counter- punishment. 2020.

https://nyuad.nyu.edu/content/dam/nyuad/academics/divisions/social-science/working-

f
oo
papers/2020/0056.pdf

r
16. -p
Gross J, Méder ZZ, Okamoto-Barth S, Riedl A: Building the Leviathan-Voluntary
re
centralisation of punishment power sustains cooperation in humans. Sci Rep 2016,
lP

6:20767. https://doi.org/10.1038/srep20767

17. Heine F, Strobel M: Reward and punishment in a team contest. PLoS One 2020,
na

15:e0236544. https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0236544
ur

18. Chao M: Demotivating incentives and motivation crowding out in charitable

Jo

giving. Proc Natl Acad Sci U S A 2017, 114:7301–7306.

https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.1616921114

19. Gneezy U, Meier S, Rey-Biel P: When and why incentives (don’t) work to modify

behavior. J Econ Perspect 2011, 25:191–210. https://doi.org/10.1257/jep.25.4.191

20. Okada I: A review of theoretical studies on indirect reciprocity. Games 2020,

11:27. https://doi.org/10.3390/g11030027

21. Panchanathan K, Boyd R: A tale of two defectors: The importance of standing for

evolution of indirect reciprocity. J Theor Biol 2003, 224:115–126.

REWARD, PUNISHMENT, AND PROSOCIAL BEHAVIOR 15

https://doi.org/10.1016/S0022-5193(03)00154-1

22. Yamamoto H, Suzuki T, Umetani R: Justified defection is neither justified nor

unjustified in indirect reciprocity. PLoS One 2020, 15:e0235137.

https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0235137

23. Chen X, Sasaki T, Brännström Å, Dieckmann U: First carrot, then stick: How the

adaptive hybridization of incentives promotes cooperation. J R Soc Interface 2015,

12:20140935. https://doi.org/10.1098/rsif.2014.0935

f
oo
24. Heffner J, FeldmanHall O: Why we don’t always punish: Preferences for non-

r
-p
punitive responses to moral violations. Sci Rep 2019, 9:13219.
re
https://doi.org/10.1038/s41598-019-49680-2
lP

25. Jordan JJ, Hoffman M, Bloom P, Rand DG: Third-party punishment as a costly

signal of trustworthiness. Nature 2016, 530:473–476.

na

https://doi.org/10.1038/nature16981
ur

26. Molenmaker WE, de Kwaadsteniet EW, van Dijk E: The impact of personal
Jo

responsibility on the (un)willingness to punish non-cooperation and reward

cooperation. Organ Behav Hum Decis Process 2016, 134:1–15.

https://doi.org/10.1016/j.obhdp.2016.02.004

27. de Kwaadsteniet EW, Rijkhoff SAM, Dijk E Van: Equality as a benchmark for

third-party punishment and reward: The moderating role of uncertainty in social

dilemmas. Organ Behav Hum Decis Process 2013, 120:251–259.

https://doi.org/10.1016/j.obhdp.2012.06.007

28. Inesi ME, Adams GS, Gupta A: When it pays to be kind: The allocation of indirect
REWARD, PUNISHMENT, AND PROSOCIAL BEHAVIOR 16

reciprocity within power hierarchies. Organ Behav Hum Decis Process 2021,

165:115–126. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.obhdp.2021.04.005

29. Dhaliwal NA, Patil I, Cushman F: Reputational and cooperative benefits of third-

party compensation. Organ Behav Hum Decis Process 2021, 164:27–51.

https://doi.org/10.1016/j.obhdp.2021.01.003

** This research examined the consequences of punishing the perpetrators or compensating

the victims across 24 studies involving various norm violation contexts. Overall,

f
oo
compensating victims leads to more reputational and partner choice benefits than punishing

r
-p
perpetrators, and individuals’ decision to compensate or punish depends on injunctive and
re
descriptive norms.
lP

30. Lee Y, Warneken F: Children’s evaluations of third-party responses to unfairness:

Children prefer helping over punishment. Cognition 2020, 205:104374.

na

https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cognition.2020.104374
ur

31. Ozono H, Watabe M: Reputational benefit of punishment: Comparison among the

Jo

punisher, rewarder, and non-sanctioner. Lett Evol Behav Sci 2012, 3:21–24.

https://doi.org/10.5178/lebs.2012.22

32. de Quervain DJF, Fischbacher U, Treyer V, Schellhammer M, Schnyder U, Buck A,

Fehr E: The neural basis of altruistic punishment. Science 2004, 305:1254–1258.

https://doi.org/10.1126/science.1100735

33. Lopez LD, Moorman K, Schneider S, Baker MN, Holbrook C: Morality is relative:

Anger, disgust, and aggression as contingent responses to sibling versus

acquaintance harm. Emotion 2021, 21:376–390. https://doi.org/10.1037/emo0000707

REWARD, PUNISHMENT, AND PROSOCIAL BEHAVIOR 17

34. Molho C, Tybur JM, Van Lange PAM, Balliet D: Direct and indirect punishment of

norm violations in daily life. Nat Commun 2020, 11:3432.

https://doi.org/10.1038/s41467-020-17286-2

** This longitudinal study on interventions to norm violations in daily life reveals that

whether people tend to directly confront the offender or gossip about the offender depends on

situational cues (e.g., power asymmetry, moral wrongness of norm violations, and valuation

of offenders) about the benefits of changing others’ behavior and the risk of retaliation.

f
oo
35. Tybur JM, Molho C, Cakmak B, Cruz TD, Singh GD, Zwicker M: Disgust, anger,

r
-p
and aggression: Further tests of the equivalence of moral emotions. Collabra
re
Psychol 2020, 6:34. https://doi.org/10.1525/collabra.349
lP

36. Ginther MR, Hartsough LES, Marois R: Moral outrage drives the interaction of

harm and culpable intent in third-party punishment decisions. Emotion 2021,

na

https://doi.org/10.1037/emo0000950
ur

37. Wang CS, Sivanathan N, Narayanan J, Ganegoda DB, Bauer M, Bodenhausen G V.,
Jo

Murnighan K: Retribution and emotional regulation: The effects of time delay in

angry economic interactions. Organ Behav Hum Decis Process 2011, 116:46–54.

https://doi.org/10.1016/j.obhdp.2011.05.007

38. Molenmaker WE, de Kwaadsteniet EW, van Dijk E: The effect of decision timing on

the willingness to costly reward cooperation and punish noncooperation:

Sanctioning the past, the present, or the future. J Behav Decis Mak 2019, 32:241–

254. https://doi.org/10.1002/bdm.2110

39. Pfattheicher S, Sassenrath C, Keller J: Compassion magnifies third-party

REWARD, PUNISHMENT, AND PROSOCIAL BEHAVIOR 18

punishment. J Pers Soc Psychol 2019, 117:124–141.

https://doi.org/10.1037/pspi0000165

40. Vayness J, Duong F, DeSteno D: Gratitude increases third-party punishment. Cogn

Emot 2020, 34:1020–1027. https://doi.org/10.1080/02699931.2019.1700100

41. Delton AW, Krasnow MM: The psychology of deterrence explains why group

membership matters for third-party punishment. Evol Hum Behav 2017, 38:734–

743. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.evolhumbehav.2017.07.003

f
oo
42. Krasnow MM, Delton AW, Cosmides L, Tooby J: Looking under the hood of third-

r
-p
party punishment reveals design for personal benefit. Psychol Sci 2016, 27:405–
re
418. https://doi.org/10.1177/0956797615624469
lP

43. Pedersen EJ, McAuliffe WHB, Shah Y, Tanaka H, Ohtsubo Y, McCullough ME:

When and why do third parties punish outside of the lab? A cross-cultural recall
na

study. Soc Psychol Personal Sci 2020, 11:846–853.

ur

https://doi.org/10.1177/1948550619884565
Jo

** This cross-cultural recall study reveals that in real-life social interactions, third-party

observers’ anger and punishment behavior toward the transgressors depend on how much

they value the welfare of the transgressor and the victim.

44. Gordon DS, Lea SEG: Who punishes ? The status of the punishers affects the

perceived success of, and indirect benefits from, “moralistic” punishment. Evol

Psychol 2016, 14:1–14. https://doi.org/10.1177/1474704916658042

45. Redhead D, Dhaliwal N, Cheng JT: Taking charge and stepping in: Individuals

who punish are rewarded with prestige and dominance. Soc Personal Psychol
REWARD, PUNISHMENT, AND PROSOCIAL BEHAVIOR 19

Compass 2021, 15:e12581. https://doi.org/10.1111/spc3.12581

46. Jordan JJ, McAuliffe K, Warneken F: Development of in-group favoritism in

children’s third-party punishment of selfishness. Proc Natl Acad Sci U S A 2014,

111:12710–12715. https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.1402280111

47. Gneezy A, Fessler DMT: Conflict, sticks and carrots: War increases prosocial

punishments and rewards. Proc R Soc B Biol Sci 2012, 279:219–223.

https://doi.org/10.1098/rspb.2011.0805

f
oo
48. Mifune N, Li Y, Okuda N: The evaluation of second- and third-party punishers.

r
-p
Lett Evol Behav Sci 2020, 11:6–9. https://doi.org/10.5178/lebs.2020.72
re
49. Deutchman P, Bračič M, Raihani N, McAuliffe K: Punishment is strongly motivated
lP

by revenge and weakly motivated by inequity aversion. Evol Hum Behav 2021,

42:12–20. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.evolhumbehav.2020.06.001
na

50. Van Lange PAM, Ouwerkerk JW, Tazelaar MJA: How to overcome the detrimental
ur

effects of noise in social interaction: The benefits of generosity. J Pers Soc Psychol
Jo

2002, 82:768–780. https://doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.82.5.768

51. de Kwaadsteniet EW, Kiyonari T, Molenmaker WE, van Dijk E: Do people prefer

leaders who enforce norms? Reputational effects of reward and punishment

decisions in noisy social dilemmas. J Exp Soc Psychol 2019, 84:103800.

https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jesp.2019.03.011

** Findings from three studies reveal that leaders’ decisions to reward and punish positively

affect their reputations in noise-free situations, but their decisions to reward more positively

affect their reputations than decisions to punish when there is noise in the situation.
REWARD, PUNISHMENT, AND PROSOCIAL BEHAVIOR 20

52. Grechenig KR, Nicklisch A, Thöni C: Punishment despite reasonable doubt - A

public goods experiment with uncertainty over contributions. J Empir Leg Stud

2010, 7:847–867. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1740-1461.2010.01197.x

53. Dong Y, Sasaki T, Zhang B: The competitive advantage of institutional reward.

Proc R Soc B Biol Sci 2019, 286:20190001. https://doi.org/10.1098/rspb.2019.0001

54. Hess NH, Hagen EH: Psychological adaptations for assessing gossip veracity. Hum

Nat 2006, 17:337–354. https://doi.org/10.1007/s12110-006-1013-z

f
oo
55. Ambrus A, Greiner B: Individual, dictator, and democratic punishment in public

r
-p
good games with perfect and imperfect observability. J Public Econ 2019,
re
178:104053. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jpubeco.2019.104053
lP

56. Chen H, Zeng Z, Ma J: The source of punishment matters: Third-party

punishment restrains observers from selfish behaviors better than does second-
na

party punishment by shaping norm perceptions. PLoS One 2020, 15:e0229510.

ur

https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0229510
Jo

* Two experiments reveal that third-party punishment is more effective than second-party

punishment in enhancing other potential partners’ normative beliefs (i.e., beliefs that unfair

distributive behavior is unusual and unacceptable) and prosocial behavior.

57. Pfattheicher S, Böhm R, Kesberg R: The advantage of democratic peer punishment

in sustaining cooperation within groups. J Behav Decis Mak 2018, 31:562–571.

https://doi.org/10.1002/bdm.2050

58. Balafoutas L, Nikiforakis N, Rockenbach B: Direct and indirect punishment among

strangers in the field. Proc Natl Acad Sci U S A 2014, 111:15924–15927.

REWARD, PUNISHMENT, AND PROSOCIAL BEHAVIOR 21

https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.1413170111

59. Grimalda G, Pondorfer A, Tracer DP: Social image concerns promote cooperation

more than altruistic punishment. Nat Commun 2016, 7:12288.

https://doi.org/10.1038/ncomms12288

60. Wu J, Balliet D, Van Lange PAM: Gossip versus punishment: The efficiency of

reputation to promote and maintain cooperation. Sci Rep 2016, 6:23919.

https://doi.org/10.1038/srep23919

f
oo
61. Fang Y, Benko TP, Perc M, Xu H, Tan Q: Synergistic third-party rewarding and

r
-p
punishment in the public goods game. Proc R Soc A Math Phys Eng Sci 2019,
re
475:20190349. https://doi.org/10.1098/rspa.2019.0349
lP
na
ur
Jo
REWARD, PUNISHMENT, AND PROSOCIAL BEHAVIOR 22

f
r oo
-p
re
lP
na
ur

Figure 1. Illustrations of payoff structures in a public goods game and a dictator game, and
Jo

the administration of reward and punishment in these games. Reward: assigning 1 MU to a

target costs the rewarder 1 MU, and benefits the target by 3 MUs; Punishment: assigning 1

MU to a target costs the punisher 1 MU, and costs the target by 3 MUs. MU = monetary unit.
REWARD, PUNISHMENT, AND PROSOCIAL BEHAVIOR 23

f
r oo
-p
re
lP

Figure 2. Overview of the proximate and ultimate mechanisms of rewarding and punishing
na

decisions, as well as the boundary conditions for the effects of reward and punishment on
ur

prosocial behavior. R = applies to reward, P = applies to punishment.

Jo
 Credit Author Statement

Junhui Wu: Conceptualization, Writing – original draft, Visualization. Shenghua

Luan: Writing – review & editing. Nichola Raihani: Conceptualization, Writing – review &

editing.

f
r oo
-p
re
lP
na
ur
Jo
Declaration of interests

☒ The authors declare that they have no known competing financial interests or personal relationships
that could have appeared to influence the work reported in this paper.

☐The authors declare the following financial interests/personal relationships which may be considered
as potential competing interests:

of
ro
-p
re
lP
na
ur
Jo