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 Operational Design
Distilling Clarity from Complexity
for Decisive Action

Jeffrey M. Reilly, PhD

Department of Joint Warfare Studies
Air Command and Staff College

Air University Press

Air Force Research Institute
Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama

August 2012
 Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Reilly, Jeffrey M.
Operational design : distilling clarity from complexity for decisive action / Jeffrey
M. Reilly.
p. cm.
Includes bibliographical references and index.
ISBN 978-1-58566-221-0 (alk. paper)
1. Operational art (Military science) 2. Military planning. 3. Military art and
science—Decision making. I. Title.
U162.R36 2012
355.401—dc23
2012025006

Disclaimer

Opinions, conclusions, and recommendations expressed or implied within are solely

those of the author and do not necessarily represent the official policy or views of the
Air Command and Staff College, the Air Force Research Institute, Air University, the
United States Air Force, the Department of Defense, or any other US government
agency. Cleared for public release: distribution unlimited.

AFRI
Air Force Research Institute

Air University Press

Air Force Research Institute
155 North Twining Street
Maxwell AFB, AL 36112-6026
http://aupress.au.af.mil

ii
 Contents
List of Illustrations iv
About the Author ix
Preface xi

1 The Process of Operational Design 1

2 Developing an Operational Approach 21

3 Methodology for Understanding and

Employing Operational Design 31

4 Establishing the Link between Operational

Design and Decision Analysis 59

5 Operational Design and Counterinsurgency 83

Abbreviations 119
Bibliography 123
Index 131

iii
CONTENTS

Illustrations
Figures

1 Peninsula Campaign, 1862 3

2 Understanding the operational environment 6
3 Mapping actor relationships and systemic links 12
4 Frame-of-reference theory 15
5 Perception of Iranian decision making 16
6 Complexity of Iranian decision making 17
7 Different perceptual patterns 18
8 Macro and micro perceptual patterns 18
9 Egyptian courses of action at the Battle of
Megiddo in 1479 BC 22
10 Elements of operational design 24
11 Separation of operational design and art in the
joint operation planning process (JOPP) 26
12 Separation of the 13 elements of operational
design into distinct operational design and art
elements and their relationship to the JOPP 27
13 Relationship between operational art and
design 28
14 Operational design’s cognitive map 32
15 The cognitive map and the four national
instruments of power 33
16 Relationships among end state, objectives,
effects, and tasks 38
17 Battle of the Bach Dang River 39
18 Characteristics of a center of gravity 41

iv
 CONTENTS

19 Systems perspective of operational

environment 43
20 Critical-factor analysis model 43
21 Relationship between the Iraqi COG at the
operational level of war and the Kari system
decisive point during Operation Desert Storm 45
22 Critical-factor analysis of Iraqi command and
control and the Kari system 46
23 Relationship between the coalition’s COG at
the strategic level of war and the decisive point
of Israel during Operation Desert Storm 47
24 Southwest Pacific in World War II: physical
line of operation 48
25 Operation Overlord: decisive points along
logical lines of operation 49
26 Transformation of COGs as an operation’s
objectives change 50
27 Transformation of the relationships among
the levels of war 51
28 The multifarious nature of arranging
operations 52
29 Integration of commander-driven
operational design with the joint operation
planning process 60
30 Cognitive map outlining an initial strategy 61
31 Notional arrangement of modules into force
packages 64
32 War gaming by phase 65
33 War gaming by decisive points 66
34 War-gaming sections 67

v
CONTENTS

35 North Vietnamese alteration of strategy,

1965–72 68
36 Action-reaction-counteraction war-gaming
sequence 70
37 Notional war-gaming time line for one move 71
38 The DST composed of map graphic and
synchronization matrix 72
39 DST analysis to commit operational reserve 74
40 Decision support matrix with decision criteria
for a warning order and execute order 75
41 CCIRs’ direct correlation to decision criteria
established in the DSM 77
42 CJTF refined cognitive map 78
43 The Vicksburg Campaign 79
44 The classic clash of wills 84
45 The MACV’s systems analysis 85
46 COIN effectiveness: understanding the system
and demonstrating an enduring commitment 87
47 Map of the operational environment 90
48 Hypothetical Kajaki Dam operational
environment map 91
49 Traditional operational design and the
relationships among levels of war 92
50 COIN design and the relationships among
levels of war 94
51 RIP/TOA has significant impact on objectives
and operational continuity 96
52 Synchronizing operational design relationships
among levels of war 98

vi
 CONTENTS

53 ISAF’s regional commands 101

54 Key terrain districts in Afghanistan 101
55 Tactical-level COIN design 102
56 Traditional COIN defense patterns 104
57 RF/PF responsibility for rural hamlet security 108
58 Notional COIN DST 112
59 Measuring the governance confidence gap 115

Tables

1 Relationships among national strategic

end state, military end state, and termination
criteria 37
2 Identifying centers of gravity 41
3 Annual security-force fatality totals 105
4 Status of the SOI as of September 2009 107

vii
 About the
Author

Dr. Reilly is a retired Army officer with 26 years of active-duty

service. He began his service as a draftee and served 28 consecutive
months in Vietnam, Thailand, Laos, and Cambodia. His theater-level
planning and operations experience includes serving as a theater-
level combined and joint operations officer, Plans division chief, and
member of the “two major theater war” plans team. He is an adjunct
faculty member for the NATO School’s Operational Planning Course,
a frequent speaker at the USAF Weapons Instructor Course, and a
member of the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff ’s Military Educa-
tion Coordination Council Working Group. Dr. Reilly has also given
a number of presentations at international defense colleges, including
the Ethiopian Defense Staff College in Addis Ababa and the Polish
National Defense University in Warsaw. Additionally, he conducted
research on design in Afghanistan during 2010 and 2011. He cur-
rently serves as director of joint education at the Air Command and
Staff College.

ix
 Preface

Correct theories, founded upon right principles, sustained

by actual events of wars, and added to accurate military
history, will form a true school of instruction for generals.
If these means do not produce great men, they will at least
produce generals of sufficient skill to take rank next after the
natural masters of the art of war.
—Antoine Henri de Jomini
The Art of War

The exploration of operational design is a transformative venture.

It represents a tremendous leap in intellectual theory that will have
far-reaching implications on the future of planning. In spite of its ob-
vious importance, however, design remains shrouded in the inherent
complexities that cloak the operational level of war and the concepts
involved in campaign planning. Perhaps even more significant is the
fact that we have collectively failed to empower the intrinsic relation-
ship between design and decision analysis. The value of design is not
just providing a mechanism to construct a campaign plan. Its true
value rests in its fundamental capability to facilitate decision making.
If approached deliberately, design provides a foundational basis for
formulating preplanned decision points and creating the structure
for linking decision analysis to emergent opportunities. Linking op-
erational design with decision analysis substantially reduces the risk
associated with an operation and increases the probability of a plan
surviving first contact.
This analysis takes a didactic approach. It attempts to demystify
the aura surrounding operational design by presenting a theoretical
framework for comprehending its fundamental precepts. The goals
of this analysis are threefold: provide a methodological example for
understanding and applying design, show how design enhances deci-
sion making and risk analysis, and investigate the major differences
between design in major combat operations and design in counter­
insurgency (COIN).
The contents of this study should not be construed as either pre-
scriptive or mechanistic. Warfare is a multifaceted entity conducted
in evolving operational environments and against complex, adaptive
adversaries. Design is not a sequential methodology or a simplistic

xi
PREFACE

checklist. It is a foundational part of operational art that provides the

crucial element of structure. This heuristic examination of design
simply searches for a way to explain design’s intricate structural rela-
tionships and highlight the intrinsic potential for deliberately craft-
ing decision analysis. When commanders and staffs approach opera-
tional design from this perspective, we move one step closer to the
natural masters of the art of war.

Illustrations were created by the author unless otherwise noted.

xii
 Chapter 1

The Process of Operational Design

Operational design’s principal purpose is to distill clarity from com-

plexity for decisive action. This factor is frequently overlooked in the in-
tellectual discourse that surrounds the exploration of design. The reasons
for this include a tendency to focus on the complexity of operational
environments and a reticence to link the process of design to a structure
focused on decision making. Operations invariably occur in multi-
faceted environments. No commander ever has perfect information, all
of the resources he or she desires, or enough time. The process of op-
erational design, however, is not about discovering complexity. Design is
about creating operational vision from complexity and offsetting the
uncertainty embedded in operations with effective decisions.
Although there are no precise formulas for developing design,1 at-
taining effectiveness requires a structural basis that joint force com-
manders (JFC) and their staffs can understand and apply. Many con-
temporary theorists, however, refuse to accept structure as a key
component of design. They feel structure leads to prescription and
diminishes the intellectual exploration of each operation’s unique
mission requirements and environmental characteristics. This per-
ception has a degree of validity, but it is also myopic. As long as JFCs
and their staffs recognize the iterative nature of planning, differences
in mission requirements, and distinctive environmental anomalies,
structure is an invaluable organizational tool.
Structure simply provides the basic parameters for focusing critical
thinking and guiding design’s intellectual discourse toward key plan-
ning goals.2 When adequate structure is absent, intellectual discus-
sions founder and critical thinking disintegrates. This impairs the
ability to judiciously assess the environment, identify the problem re-
quiring resolution, and develop an operational approach that sup-
ports commander-level decision making.
Decision making is centrifugal to design’s structure because it de-
termines who has the initiative and ultimately who wins. Operational
environments are constantly in a state of change, and when staffs as-
sist commanders in understanding decision criteria and risk mitiga-
tion, the commanders are much more likely to act decisively. How-
ever, when the design process lacks the structure to focus on decisions,
2 │ the process of operational design

commanders can fall prey to excessive analysis and potentially cata-

strophic forms of indecision. A classic illustration of this is Gen
George B. McClellan’s Peninsula Campaign during the American
Civil War.
At 2:00 a.m. on 22 July 1861, less than a day after the Union’s hu-
miliating defeat at Manassas, Virginia, a telegram directed General
McClellan to take command of the Army of the Potomac.3 McClellan
was far from an average officer. He had studied under Prof. Dennis
Hart Mahan at the US Military Academy, was versed in Jomini, and
in 1846 graduated second in a class of 59 cadets. He also participated
in Gen Winfield Scott’s amphibious landings at Vera Cruz during the
Mexican War, and in 1855 he was one of three American officers sent
to Europe to study the Crimean War. McClellan left the Army in 1857
and by 1860 was the president of the Ohio and Mississippi Railroad.
When the Civil War began, he was credited with crushing organized
southern resistance in northwest Virginia through the engagements
at Rich Mountain and Corick’s Ford. In terms of organizational and
administrative skills, combat experience, and intellect, McClellan
personified the exact type of leader needed to regalvanize and lead a
dispirited force.
Between July and October 1861, McClellan meticulously orga-
nized and trained a fighting force of 120,000 men. McClellan, how-
ever, was reluctant to use this force and act decisively. He believed
that the Confederate forces confronting him outside Washington
were numerically superior to the army he had forged. To assess the
Confederate strength, McClellan authorized Allan Pinkerton to con-
duct reconnaissance missions and espionage behind Confederate
lines. Pinkerton estimated that the Confederate forces consisted of
115,000 men and over 300 pieces of artillery. In fact, the Confederate
forces led by Gen Joseph E. Johnston numbered fewer than 45,000 at
their peak—less than 40 percent of what McClellan believed was op-
posing him. By January 1862 President Lincoln was totally dismayed
with McClellan’s lack of initiative, exclaiming, “If General McClellan
does not want to use the Army for some days, I would like to borrow
it provided I could see how it could be made to do something.”4 Presi-
dent Lincoln and many of the other Union leaders pressed McClellan
to mount an overland campaign to seize the Confederate capital of
Richmond. McClellan resisted, however, because in his estimation an
overland campaign would entail attacking over 100 miles through
hostile terrain, crossing multiple rivers, and maintaining a tenuous
 the process of operational design │ 3

supply line. To McClellan’s credit he developed one of the American

Civil War’s most imaginative and ambitious campaign plans. The
plan focused on leveraging the Union’s naval superiority and achiev-
ing an asymmetric advantage over the Confederate forces. Originally
known as the Urbana Plan, it called for bypassing the Confederate
forces entrenched around Manassas and Centerville and conducting
an amphibious assault to seize Richmond. President Lincoln had sev-
eral major reservations about the risk involved in the plan, and he
subjected it to several military councils. However, when McClellan
persisted in advocating his plan, President Lincoln eventually gave it
tacit approval.
On 7 March 1862, however, Gen Joseph E. Johnston, forewarned of
McClellan’s plan, repositioned the Confederate forces around Manassas
to positions south of the Rappahannock River. When the Confederates
vacated their defensive positions, reporters went forward and discov-
ered Quaker guns (wooden logs set up to replicate cannons) and de-
fenses that were far from impregnable. Undeterred, McClellan revised
his plan and sought approval to land Union forces farther south in the
vicinity of Fort Monroe. On 17 March 1862, a Union naval force of 400
ships began transporting 121,500 men, 44 artillery batteries, and over
15,000 horses to the Virginia peninsula (fig. 1).5

Figure 1. Peninsula Campaign, 1862. (Courtesy of Florentine Films)

4 │ the process of operational design

By early April, McClellan had amassed approximately 55,000 sol-

diers in front of the Confederate defenses at Yorktown. But again
McClellan was reticent to act. His plan had been disrupted by not
receiving command of the 12,000-man force at Fort Monroe and the
loss of McDowell’s Corps, which was redirected to protect Wash-
ington, DC.
In the meantime, the Confederate forces under Gen John B.
Magruder employed a series of deception operations that convinced
McClellan the Confederates had a much larger force. In actuality,
Magruder had a force of fewer than 13,000 men stretched along a
12-mile line, and his superior General Johnston considered the de-
fenses untenable. On 3 May 1862, before McClellan could attack,
Johnston began withdrawing the Confederate forces and ordered
James Longstreet to conduct a delaying action near Williamsburg.
On 15 May at Drewry’s Bluff, Confederate forces defeated an attempt
by McClellan to conduct a simultaneous attack using Union naval
forces along the James River. This tactical setback created a major
psychological disruption for McClellan.
As McClellan’s lead forces came within six miles of Richmond, the
Chickahominy River overflowed its banks and split the Union forces
before they could attack. The Confederates seized this opportunity
and attacked McClellan at Seven Pines on 31 May. The battle resulted
in 790 Union soldiers killed, 3,594 wounded, and approximately 647
captured. Confederate losses included 980 killed, 4,749 wounded,
and 405 missing.6 The most significant casualty was Gen Joseph E.
Johnston. When General Johnston was wounded, Robert E. Lee took
command of the Army of Northern Virginia. Although McClellan
subsequently had numerous opportunities to seize the initiative, he
persisted in waiting for reinforcements and optimal weather conditions.
McClellan’s campaign culminated in the Seven Days’ Battles from
25 June to 1 July 1862. The Union and Confederate forces fought six
major engagements during this time, and the only Union defeat was
at Gaine’s Mill. At the battle of Malvern Hill on 1 July 1862, the final
battle of the campaign, Lee’s forces conducted a series of disjointed
frontal assaults on Union defensive positions and lost heavily. Con-
federate losses exceeded 5,300 casualties. In spite of this, McClellan
refused to counterattack and instead withdrew to Harrison’s Landing
on the James River. The campaign losses for both sides were appall-
ing. The Confederates suffered 20,614 casualties, and the Union
forces 15,849. On 3 August 1862 McClellan’s forces began withdraw-
 the process of operational design │ 5

ing from the peninsula, thus ending a campaign that could have sub-
stantially altered Southern resistance. The effects of McClellan’s cam-
paign, however, were not isolated to the Virginia peninsula. When
General Lee understood that McClellan’s forces were withdrawing, he
committed his forces to destroy the Union forces under General Pope
at the Second Battle of Manassas on 29 and 30 August 1862.
In retrospect, McClellan’s Peninsula Campaign was a viable plan.
McClellan created a sophisticated plan that used an indirect ap-
proach, exploited the Union’s naval superiority, and focused on a key
decisive point, the Confederate capital of Richmond. McClellan dem-
onstrated exceptional innovation in logistics and naval gunfire sup-
port and even attempted to use two observer balloons to provide
intelligence on enemy movements. His primary faults, however, re-
volved around over-analyzing his adversary’s capabilities, failing to
take decisive action, and not conducting a realistic risk assessment.
Collectively these omissions made McClellan extremely vulnerable
to not one but a series of Confederate deception operations. Although
Alan Pinkerton’s inflated intelligence summaries are partially to
blame for this, the Confederates had exhibited a clear pattern of using
deception to mask their limited military capacity. They used decep-
tion throughout 1861 and 1862 in their defenses immediately outside
Washington, DC, at Manassas, at Centerville, and again during the
Peninsula Campaign at Yorktown. The crucial liability in McClellan’s
campaign design was in McClellan’s own inflexibility and indecisive-
ness. The outcome of his plan might have been dramatically different
if he had incorporated better decision making and risk analysis tools
in his design.

Understanding the Operational Environment

The process of operational design is an analytical fusion of strate-
gic direction, the operational environment, and the problem requir-
ing resolution. The result of design is the development of an opera-
tional approach that engenders flexibility through incisive decision
making and balanced risk analysis. Understanding the environment
is the initial step and foundational basis for the entire design process.
The environment is a multifarious, interactive, and constantly evolv-
ing series of systems. It encompasses not only the immediate area of
operations, but also all areas, actors, and factors that either influence
6 │ the process of operational design

or have the potential to influence the area of operations. The concept

of understanding the environment is not new, but the methodology
has been modified to support a more holistic critical analysis of the
environment’s systemic interconnectivity. Understanding the environ-
ment also yields a structural origin for envisioning key aspects of de-
sign such as end-state conditions, objectives, centers of gravity (COG),
decisive points, lines of operation, and adversary perspectives.
The construct of framing the environment consists of two inter­
related subsystems that foster a shared understanding of the environ-
ment’s interconnectivity and a mechanism for identifying the problem
requiring resolution (fig. 2). The two subsystems are the observed
system and the desired system.7 The observed system is an analytical
depiction of the environment as it currently exists. It consists of regu-
larly interacting, interdependent, and independent elements that af-
fect the joint operations area and ultimately the mission. Planners
begin framing the environment by examining key factors such as
principal actors and their interrelationships; cultural relationships;
historical context; physical geography; instruments of power; ele-
ments of power; and political, military, economic, social, informa-
tion, and infrastructure (PMESII) elements.

Historical
Context

1910 1945 1950 1953 1955 1968 1990 1993–94 1994 1998 2005 2010
Japanese Rule Independence Korean War Armistice Juche Blue Soviet Collapse Nuclear Crisis Kim Jong Il Taepodong Test Nuclear Weapons Yeonpyeong Island
House Declaration

Desired System Instruments of Environmental

Desired
Power
- Diplomacy
Frame
Political End
- Information
State
- Military
Barriers P - Economics
Tension
Time M
E Launch
Adversary’s Site
Desired Political S
End State I
I
Other Actors
(Friendly/Adversary)

Elements of Power
Cultural
- Geography
Environment
- Population

Observed System

Figure 2. Understanding the operational environment

 the process of operational design │ 7

The Observed System

There is no exact alchemic prescription for visualizing the ob-
served system because the observed system is a construct of what one
has the capability to see and understand. The term “observed system”
does not necessarily convey that what one is observing is the system
as it actually exists. Not all variables are readily visible or have evolved
sufficiently to be systemically linked. Some operational environments
evolve over time and may not be self-evident. An illustration of this is
Operation Iraqi Freedom during the period 2003–2006. Iraq was en-
gulfed in almost uncontrollable sectarian violence, complex interac-
tions among tribes, clans, and other groups, and international inter-
ference by Iran. Not until late 2005 and early 2006 could crucial
patterns of activity be identified to create the foundation for the allied
surge’s success.
Another critical realization is that not all observed systems are
openly accessible and access to an environment’s systemic informa-
tion is not always equal. As a result, the accuracy of a depiction of an
observed system is dependent upon two essential variables: access to
information and the ability to critically analyze that information. An
example of this is the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK).
Most nations have very limited access to North Korea, and this di-
rectly affects what can be observed and mapped within the DPRK’s
environmental context. Concepts such as the DPRK’s juche are super-
ficially understood by the West but have a tremendous impact on
North Korea’s national “will to act.” First proclaimed by Kim Il-sung
in 1955, juche has evolved as part socio-political and part religious
philosophy that justifies major policy decisions.8 Juche serves as an
unknown determinant in what the West perceives as irrational acts of
provocation, such as the sinking of the South Korean ship Cheonan in
March 2010 and the shelling of Yeonpyeong Island in January 2011.
The ability to critically analyze information within the observed
system is equally as important as access to information. When plan-
ners develop the observed system, they must be able to analyze avail-
able information in depth and comprehend what the information
implies for operations. For example, the current illiteracy rate in Af-
ghanistan is approximately 72 percent. Although this seems like an
innocuous bit of information for an underdeveloped nation, it has a
major effect on operations and mission success. Illiteracy affects op-
erations in Afghanistan in several important ways. First, illiteracy is
8 │ the process of operational design

the single biggest obstacle undermining the building of effective Af-

ghan security forces. Only 14 percent of the individuals entering the
Afghan armed forces are literate.9 Security forces cannot be effective
unless they can read and write orders and understand basic manuals
associated with tactics, administration, equipment, and maintenance.
Literacy is an important enabler to professionalize security forces, re-
duce corruption, enhance stewardship, and increase recruiting.10 The
magnitude of Afghan illiteracy presents an incredible challenge for
the NATO Training Mission–Afghanistan, and it dramatically slows
the ability to field Afghan National Army and Afghan National Police
forces. The NATO Training Mission has made literacy a priority, but
as of May 2011, only 50 percent of the armed forces were projected to
be literate at the first-grade level by January 2012.11
The second way illiteracy affects operations in Afghanistan is in
information operations (IO). If the majority of the population cannot
read or write, the mechanism used to communicate IO has to be
modified to accommodate that factor. Traditional IO methodologies
do not work among illiterate populations. In October 2010 the Inter-
national Council on Security and Development (ICOS) conducted a
survey of 1,500 men in northern and southern Afghanistan. Sixty-
eight percent of the respondents in the Helmand and Kandahar prov-
inces had seen photos of the planes striking the Twin Towers on 9/11.
However, 92 percent of those respondents could not relate the photos
to the events of 9/11 or identify the role those events played in inter-
national intervention.12 Additionally, it is important to stress that our
adversaries understand how to leverage illiteracy to support their IO.
The traditional agent of change in Afghanistan is the mullah. How-
ever, many mullahs are either illiterate or functionally illiterate. The
Taliban exploit this by providing interpretations of written docu-
ments such as the Koran to justify acts of violence.
However, perhaps the most significant implication illiteracy has
for operations is on the future of a nation. In today’s international
environment, no nation can compete effectively or be self-sufficient
without an educated workforce. Illiteracy also implies that decades of
investment will be required to create that workforce, which should be
accounted for in the development of end-state conditions.
The intent of highlighting illiteracy is not to dramatize the effects
of illiteracy but to underline the need to critically analyze all variables
identified in the observed environment. Access to information is im-
portant. However, understanding what the information means is a
 the process of operational design │ 9

vital element in projecting the accuracy of what planners observe. In

many instances military planners will simply not have the skill re-
quired to interpret key variables. Accurately depicting the observed
system requires an expansive diversity of expertise. It is virtually im-
possible for military planners to be experts in areas such as inter­
national economics, foreign relations, forensics, and ethnography.
Consequently, it is essential to integrate other government agencies,
nongovernmental organizations, and specialists as early as possible
into the design process. It is crucial to meticulously describe the ob-
served system as precisely as possible if planners are going to leverage
a genuine understanding of the desired system’s potential.

The Desired System

The environment’s desired system analyzes the perceived tension
between the strategic political direction provided by national or multi­
national authorities and the adversary’s desired political end state.
This analysis examines not only the tensions between friendly and
adversary political end-state conditions but also time, other actors
capable of influencing the end state, and barriers to the operation.
A common misperception in the dissection of friendly and ad-
versary desired political end states involves the intricate nature of
what an actor wants to do and what an actor is willing to do. A
subtle but significant difference between these two contrasts affects
the derivation of key planning assumptions, branches, and sequels.
An illustration of this is China’s theory of unrestricted warfare. In
February 1999 senior Chinese colonels Qiao Liang and Wang
Xiangsui published Unrestricted Warfare in response to perceptions
about US global power projection. Unrestricted Warfare advocates
going beyond traditional boundaries when necessary to achieve na-
tional political objectives. Qiao and Wang describe unrestricted
warfare as the use of “supra combinations” that transcend the con-
fines of the military sphere:
These things make it clear that warfare is no longer an activity confined only
to the military sphere, and that the course of any war could be changed, or its
outcome decided, by political factors, economic factors, diplomatic factors,
cultural factors, technological factors, or other nonmilitary factors. Faced
with the far-reaching influence of military and non-military conflicts in every
corner of the world, only if we break through the various kinds of boundaries
in the models of our line of thought, take the various domains which are so
10 │ the process of operational design

completely affected by warfare and turn them into playing cards deftly shuf-
fled in our skilled hands, and thus use beyond-limits strategy and tactics to
combine all the resources of war, can there be the possibility that we will be
confident of victory.13

This text signals a willingness to use cyber warfare, information

operations, and terrorism to attack both military and nonmilitary
targets. These targets would include financial institutions, power
grids, water supplies, and other key infrastructure components. In
Qiao’s words, “The first rule of unrestricted warfare is that there are
no rules, with nothing forbidden.”14
As planners deliberate aspects of what an adversary wants to do
and is willing to do, they must be cognizant of time. The temporal
dimension has an effect far beyond being a limited resource. Plan-
ning in a time-compressed environment is extraordinarily difficult,
but time is also crucial in determining how long it will take to achieve
the desired political end state and how long the effects must last.
When national or multinational authorities promulgate strategic di-
rection, they must have an acute awareness of the “will” to achieve the
end state and the conditions necessary to maintain that “will.” Mili-
tary operations are expensive in terms of lives and financial burden,
and there is a direct correlation between the level of ambition and
cost. As the cost of a military operation goes up, the level of ambition
and “will” goes down. This is a common phenomenon associated
with most wars, and it is evident in the support for operations in Af-
ghanistan. In 2011 the Congressional Research Service estimated the
cost of Operation Enduring Freedom at approximately $2 billion per
week.15 This financial burden, combined with almost 3,000 Inter­national
Security Assistance Force (ISAF) members killed in action, has
caused a marked decrease in US and coalition support for the war. A
CNN survey conducted in the United States between 17 and 19 De-
cember 2010 revealed that 63 percent of those surveyed opposed the
war. This is not meant to judge operations in Afghanistan but simply
to emphasize the fact that planners must understand the impact of
time on national and coalition support for military operations.
Another aspect of time planners must consider is the relationship
between the desired political end state and how long the conditions
established by military operations will last. A phrase often used to
describe political end state conditions is “long-term regional stability.”
The problem is that long-term is never adequately defined. Does long-
term mean 10 years, 20 years, or longer? The answer has a major im-
 the process of operational design │ 11

pact on the effectiveness of military operations and the development

of termination criteria. On 27 July 1953 an armistice terminated ma-
jor hostilities on the Korean peninsula. The armistice created a
160-mile-long and 2.5-mile-wide demilitarized zone (DMZ) between
the Republic of Korea and the DPRK. When the armistice was signed,
North Korea was not able to bring significant effects on the Republic
of Korea. However, by the early 1990s advances in artillery systems,
surface-to-surface missiles, and the DPRK’s nuclear program drasti-
cally altered regional stability. It is crucial to grasp the fact that long-
term regional stability does not necessarily constitute an indefinite
state of being.
Just as time affects the desired system, other actors have a dynamic
capability to influence the political end state. As planners develop the
construct for the desired system, they should assess the possible ef-
fects—both positive and negative—of all actors on desired end-state
conditions. Some actors will be allies, some overt adversaries, some
neutral, and some neutral with the potential to intervene. It is abso-
lutely imperative to map actor relationships, understand their sys-
temic links, and develop actions that will set the conditions for
achieving the political end state. Mapping actor relationships assists
planners with identifying strategic and operational assumptions and
guides the development of associated branches and sequels. Addition-
ally, it provides the strategic-level vision for whole-of-government,
intercombatant command, and multinational coordination.
Any investigation of systemic actor relationships (fig. 3) must also
include an examination of how the actors make decisions. Decision-
making theory is supported by many studies that include the rational
actor, cognitive, cybernetic, and polyheuristic models. However, ac-
tors draw from a diverse set of frames of reference to make decisions,
and there is no universal decision-making pattern. The key is recog-
nizing the differences in the patterns and their impact on operations.
Of course, an ally’s decision making can have just as dramatic an ef-
fect on an operation as an adversary’s.
In March 2002, the planning for Operation Iraqi Freedom hinged
on the creation of a northern front that would attack Iraq through Tur-
key. By early 2003, however, US equipment was sitting on ships circling
in the eastern Mediterranean Sea, waiting for the outcome of negotia-
tions with the Turkish government.16 On 1 March 2003 the Turkish
Parliament decided in a 264–251 vote to veto the deployment of an
estimated 62,000 US personnel onto Turkish soil to attack Iraq.17 This
12 │ the process of operational design

Saggita
UN Alliance Use DIE Dacro
Stability Stability IOPs
HA Energy Key Systemic
Deter Links
Use Long
DIE Term
May Allow IOPs Defeat
SPOD/APOD
Perseus Vulpecula
Use Build
Stability BLA Regional
Aquila Autonomous Hegemony
Regional Batari
COIN State
Hegemony Population
MA
HA Short
Must Be Restrained from Term
Direct Intervention Build MO M3
Auriga
Survival
Isolation Delphi
Use
DIE
IOPs Corvus
Cetus

Alliance Possible Intervention

Adversaries Population Block Relationship
Neutral Alliance Actions Break Relationship

Figure 3. Mapping actor relationships and systemic links

demand probably did not seem unreasonable to most US military per-

sonnel because the United States was offering $30 billion in grants and
loan guarantees and putting pressure on Europe to accept Turkey into
the European Union. But without intimate knowledge of Turkey, its
domestic politics, and its strategic concerns, this proposal was extra­
ordinarily unrealistic. The outcome was not only a denial of using Tur-
key as a northern front, but also severely strained US-Turkish relations.
The last segment of analyzing the desired system is identifying
barriers to the desired political end state. Determining barriers facili-
tates analysis of a critical aspect of planning that is often missing:
expectation management. When a plan is formulated or undergoes a
major revision, political leaders must understand the full scope of the
plan’s capabilities and its limitations. This fosters a more realistic ex-
amination of planning assumptions and promotes better decision
making and risk analysis. Barriers exist in many forms, including
time, force levels, interagency disputes, intergovernmental organiza-
tions, and numerous other key factors. As planners identify barriers,
they must conduct a thorough assessment of the barriers’ impacts on
the desired political end-state conditions and raise critical issues to
the political authorities for decisions. A realistic appraisal of barriers
assists JFCs and their staff with conveying an accurate depiction of
what can and cannot be accomplished, and it frames expectation
 the process of operational design │ 13

management for political leaders. It also provides JFCs with a basis to

make effective recommendations when political leaders direct a
change in operational-level resources.
In August 2009, GEN Stanley McChrystal dramatically revised
Operation Enduring Freedom’s strategy. He transformed the opera-
tional focus to population-centric operations, revitalized theater
command and control, created an ISAF operational headquarters,
and pushed for an accelerated growth of Afghan security forces. The
new strategy, however, was confronted by a number of operational
limitations. The environment was almost totally devoid of critical lo-
gistics infrastructure, and the adversary was increasingly embold-
ened, aggressive, and adaptive. As a result, General McChrystal re-
quested 40,000 additional personnel to execute the strategy. But when
President Obama reviewed General McChrystal’s strategy, he cut the
requested forces by 10,000 personnel. This change altered the focus of
the strategy; however, it maintained essentially the same objectives
and political expectations. Political leaders expected the revised
strategy to have the same striking success as the 2007 surge in Iraq.
By July 2010 political leaders were requesting metrics to assess the
strategy’s effectiveness, in spite of the fact that the strategy’s forces
had not even fully closed in the theater. The result was a political
miscue that emboldened insurgent efforts. The president announced
his intent to initiate a withdrawal of forces in 2011 without meeting
the operational conditions necessary for a withdrawal. This message
was later corrected, but to the Taliban, Haqqani network, and other
insurgent groups, it was an informational windfall. The point is that
barriers and expectations must be reassessed during any reframing of
the environment or revision of the strategy and not just during the
development of the strategy.
The process of examining barriers during the analysis of the de-
sired system is directly linked to correctly identifying the problem
requiring resolution. As obvious as it seems, operational limitations
significantly affect the ability to solve the problem identified by po-
litical leaders. Excessive operational limitations may not only prevent
mission success but also precipitate a new set of problems that political
leaders are unprepared to deal with or accept. Consequently, cor-
rectly identifying the core problem that actually requires resolution is
a centrifugal component of the design process.
14 │ the process of operational design

Identifying the Problem Requiring Resolution

One of the most important parts of the analysis of the observed
and desired systems is the identification of the specific problem re-
quiring resolution. Identifying the problem and understanding its
surrounding context are vital to determining how to solve the prob-
lem. This step assists planners with recognizing what is possible and
what is not possible. Additionally, it mitigates the possibility of solv-
ing the wrong problem.
Identifying the problem requires a comprehensive exploration of
the contextual and environmental factors causing the tension be-
tween the desired political end states of friendly parties and those of
adversaries. Isolating the underlying causes of tension empowers a
much more precise methodology of what needs to be acted upon to
achieve the desired political end state. To do this effectively planners
must understand the potential to change the environmental condi-
tions, the operational limitations, and the full implications of chang-
ing the environmental system. Grasping the environment’s potential
is important because the action taken may not only solve the problem
but also prevent future problems. Identifying operational limitations
is crucial to determining such factors as prohibited and required mili-
tary actions, rules of engagement, diplomatic support agreements,
and host nation requirements. Changing any contextual feature of
the environment has second- and third-order effects on the environ-
mental system. Planners need to project the potential implications of
desired changes and screen those changes for possible threats to US
national, coalition national, and regional national interests.
When analysis of the problem is completed, the result should be a
clear, concise problem statement identifying the problem being solved
and how it will be resolved. Of course the entire design process is it-
erative, and the problem statement may require several revisions to
reach maturity. An example of an initial problem statement might be:
Country X’s overt military actions in the Caspian region threaten access to
vital energy resources and international economic stability. The coalition
seeks freedom of access to key energy resources and the establishment of the
conditions necessary for long-term regional stability. Country X must be de-
terred from further aggression or risk coalition military intervention. Coali-
tion forces will defend the territorial integrity of Country Y and ensure inter-
national access to energy resources.
 the process of operational design │ 15

Frame-of-Reference Theory
Before JFCs and their staff begin the development of an opera-
tional approach, they must validate their frame of reference for both
the operational environment and problem identified. Frames of ref-
erence are double-edged swords. All individuals naturally use sche-
mata to frame contextual elements and problems (fig. 4).18 Conse-
quently, in complex environments there is an innate tendency to
focus on systemic similarities of previously learned schemata rather
than identifying and investigating systemic anomalies. Isolating and
examining the operational environment’s systemic anomalies is an
intrinsic element of forming schemata. The challenge is to ensure that
the schemata used in the design process are correct.

Dialectical Tension

New Schemata
Schemata

Observation New Observation

Original Original
Frame of Reference Frame of Reference

Figure 4. Frame-of-reference theory

One of the most common mistakes planners make is “mirror im-

aging,” especially in unfamiliar cultural contexts. When the mind
confronts new surroundings, it imposes schemata on the incoming
sensory data. Noted developmental psychologist Jean Piaget theorized
that the mind either assimilates new sensory data into existing sche-
mata or modifies the schemata to incorporate the new data.19 Both of
these constructs have a certain basis of validity, but identifying the
best way to combine data and schemata is situation-dependent. The
key is to understand the dialectical tension between these two con-
structs and how they empower critical thinking skills.
16 │ the process of operational design

An illustration of mirror imaging is an American attempting to

comprehend Iran’s national-level decision making (fig. 5). To most
Americans, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad is the president of Iran and as
such is Iran’s principal decision maker. The American democratic
ideal influences this perspective because we view officials elected by
the electorate as the key components of the national decision-making
system. As a result, we might perceive Iran’s president, Parliament,
and Assembly of Experts as the integral elements of all systemic po-
litical decision making. The danger of this point of view is it relegates
key Iranian appointed officials such as the supreme leader, Guardian
Council, Expediency Council, and Cabinet to mere influencers.

Appointed by
Elected by Electorate Unelected/Appointed
Elected Institutions

President Armed Forces

Cabinet

Parliament Guardian Council Head of Judiciary

Screens Candidates

Assembly of Experts Supreme Leader Expediency Council

Figure 5. Perception of Iranian decision making

Iran’s political decision-making system possesses a far more intricate

nature. Figure 6 provides a cursory depiction of just how complicated
Iranian decision making is in reality. Iran is a theocratic democracy, and
the supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, exerts a central role in all
decision making. As the supreme leader, Ayatollah Khamenei (not the
president) is commander-in-chief of the armed forces, and he alone has
the power to declare war, neutrality, or peace. Additionally, the supreme
leader appoints and can dismiss the supreme commander of the Islamic
Revolutionary Guard Corps, the leaders of the judiciary, and even the
state media networks. He also has the authority to appoint six of the
Council of Guardians’ 12 members. This council is a dominant force in
the oversight of Iranian parliamentary activities and determines which
candidates are qualified to run for public office. The supreme leader’s
power base is amplified in two other significant ways. He controls the
Expediency Council, which mediates disputes between Parliament and
the Council of Guardians, and he has approximately 2,000 clerical field
operatives positioned throughout the government.20
 the process of operational design │ 17

Iranian Decision Making

Supreme Leader
Commander in chief of armed forces Armed Forces
Heads intelligence and security Regular Army
Appoints and dismisses judiciary Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps
Assembly of Experts
Elects Supreme Leader
President
Nominal head of Supreme National
Determines who can Security Council
run for Assembly of Determines economic policies
Experts

8 Vice Presidents 22 Ministers

Council of Expediency Council
Mediates disputes between
Guardians Parliament and
Examines all laws passed by Parliament Council of Guardians
Parliament Unicameral

Judiciary
Appointed

Elects
Electorate Elected by Electorate

Figure 6. Complexity of Iranian decision making

When properly understood, these details provide a much different

perspective on Iranian planning, decision, and execution cycles.
When planners use frames of reference, they must ensure the frames
are accurate visualizations or at least acknowledge key information
voids and adjust their schemata. Thus it is important to leverage in-
teragency analysis and seek assistance from specialists.

Understanding Gestalt Theory

Another critical aspect of understanding frames of reference is
Gestalt theory. Christian von Ehrenfels and other German psycholo-
gists such as Max Wertheimer used Gestalt theory to explain percep-
tual patterns of wholeness and totality. This concept attempts to de-
scribe how people organize visual elements as a whole and stresses
that what they actually see may not be the sum of the parts. In es-
sence, Gestalt theory questions the derivation of patterns of whole-
ness and advocates a deeper critical analysis of perceptions. In Max
Wertheimer’s words, “Here too we find science intent upon a system-
atic collection of data, yet often excluding through that very activity
precisely that which is most vivid and real in the living phenomena it
studies. Somehow the thing that matters has eluded us.”21
18 │ the process of operational design

The significance of Gestalt theory is that as we develop the frame-

work for the operational environment’s observed and desired systems,
we must be cognizant of different ways to visualize systemic charac-
teristics. Figures 7 and 8 show examples of this. In figure 7, one indi-
vidual may see a vase, and another may see two heads facing each
other. In figure 8, a person with a macro perspective sees the letters L and
H. However, a person with a micro perspective may see a collection of
small Hs forming the letter L and small Ls forming the letter H. One
of these patterns represents reality, and the other is an aberration.

Figure 7. Different perceptual patterns

H L L
H L L
H L L
H L L L L LL L L
H L L
H L L
L L
HHHHHHH
L L
Figure 8. Macro and micro perceptual patterns
 the process of operational design │ 19

Gestalt analysis emphasizes the criticality of viewing the environ-

ment from multiple perspectives to form a metacognitive under-
standing of the environment’s complexity and interconnectivity. JFCs
and their staffs must understand this because it has a tremendous ef-
fect on the development of the operational approach. If the perceived
observed and desired systems are inaccurate, the discrepancies will
have a cascading impact on the operational approach’s end-state con-
ditions, objectives, centers of gravity, decisive points, lines of opera-
tion, phasing, and assumptions.

Notes

(All notes appear in shortened form. For full details, see the appropriate
entry in the bibliography.)
1. de Czege, “Systemic Operational Design,” 2.
2. This monograph defines critical thinking as a judicious evaluation of com-
monly accepted beliefs and assumptions.
3. McPherson, Battle Cry of Freedom, 348.
4. Stackpole, From Cedar Mountain to Antietam, 1.
5. Sears, George B. McClellan, 167–69.
6. Johnson and Buel, eds., Battles and Leaders of the Civil War, vol. 2, The Struggle
Intensifies, 219.
7. Joint Warfighting Center Doctrine Pamphlet 10, Design in Military Opera-
tions, 8.
8. Ch'oe, Lee, and de Bary, eds., Sources of Korean Tradition II, 419.
9. US Government Accountability Office, Afghanistan Security, 24.
10. US Department of Defense, Report on Progress toward Security and Stability
in Afghanistan, April 2011, 20.
11. Mora, “Half of Afghan Military Forces Won’t Achieve 1st Grade Literacy
Level by 2012.”
12. International Council on Security and Development, Afghanistan Transition,
26–28.
13. Qiao and Wang, Unrestricted Warfare, 191.
14. Ibid., 2.
15. See Belasco, The Cost of Iraq, Afghanistan, and Other Global War on Terror
Operations since 9/11, 28–31.
16. Kapsis, “The Failure of U.S.-Turkish Pre-War Negotiations.”
17. See Mintz, “How Do Leaders Make Decisions?,” 8.
18. See Bartlett, Remembering.
19. See Piaget and Inhelder, Memory and Intelligence.
20. Maleki, “Decision Making in Iran’s Foreign Policy.” See also Afrasiabi and
Maleki, “Iran’s Foreign Policy after 11 September.”
21. Wertheimer, “Gestalt Theory.”
 Chapter 2

Developing an Operational Approach

The operational approach is the “commander’s description of the

broad actions the force must take to achieve the desired military end
state.”1 When JFCs and their staffs initiate the development of an op-
erational approach, they must recognize the fundamental differences
between the functions of operational design and the functions of op-
erational art. The function of operational design is important because
it determines how design relates to operational art and integrates into
the joint operations planning process. Design is part of operational
art, but the elements of design operate as discrete entities during the
development of an operational approach. Effective planning and
problem-framing relies on an unbiased approach to mission analysis.
When operational art dominates the elements of design too early in the
planning process, it unduly influences the process with predisposed
courses of action (COA). This stifles critical thinking and prevents
the development of innovative solutions to problems.
The operational approach to design is not new. It is as old as war-
fare itself. When man first used a stick to sketch an operational con-
cept in the dirt, he developed the ability to cognitively link objec-
tives with maneuver. In 1479 BC one of Egypt’s greatest pharaohs,
Thutmose III, used operational design to subdue a rebellion of
Canaanite kings and princes at Megiddo.2 Generally regarded as the
first recorded battle in history, Megiddo provides crucial insights into
the development of operational design and the integration of opera-
tional art. Based on what we know about Thutmose’s campaign, his
operational design reflected a remarkably sophisticated analysis of
end-state conditions, objectives, effects, center of gravity, assump-
tions, and phases.3
The battle at Megiddo originated in a Canaanite quest to topple
Egyptian regional domination. Encouraged by Egyptian domestic
difficulties, the king of Kadesh formed a coalition of states to contest
Egypt’s hegemony. The coalition selected the key terrain in and
around the walled fortress of Megiddo to defend its interests. This
terrain included the vital lines of communication running from
Egypt to Palestine, Syria, and Mesopotamia. When the Egyptians dis-
covered this threat to their national interests, their army conducted a
22 │ developing an operational approach

phased march of approximately 230 miles to the Yehem crossroads.

At Yehem, Thutmose III held a war council to assess intelligence
gathered on the Canaanite dispositions and to determine the best
course of action. Thutmose had three possible axes of advance to at-
tack the Canaanite coalition (fig. 9). The first was to the north toward
Yokneam. This axis was defended by coalition infantry. The second
was in the center leading directly into Megiddo. It was lightly de-
fended with nearby chariots, but the terrain was restrictive and not
favorable for deploying forces if attacked during the march. The third
was to the south, and like the north axis, it was defended by infantry.

Infantry
Yokneam
Megiddo
Chariots
Infantry

Taanakh
Aruna

Egyptian Egyptian
Axis of Council
Advance at Yehem

Figure 9. Egyptian courses of action at the Battle of Megiddo in 1479 BC.

(Based on Yohanan Aharoni, Carta’s Atlas of the Bible [Jerusalem: Carta,
1964]: 32.)
 developing an operational approach │ 23

During the mission analysis, Thutmose’s generals were predis-

posed to eliminate any COA associated with the center axis of ad-
vance. They begged Thutmose not to select the center route because
of the restrictive terrain. Egyptian records reflect this opposition:
“Let our victorious lord proceed according to the design of his heart
therein, but do not cause us to march upon this impassable road.”4
Thutmose, however, overruled his generals’ objections. Based on
intelligence reports, he had an accurate assessment of where the Ca-
naanites had deployed their forces. He determined that attacking
along the center axis would surprise his adversaries and allow him to
crush the decisive point of Megiddo. Leading the Egyptians himself,
Thutmose attacked along the center axis, catching the Canaanite co-
alition by surprise. This allowed Thutmose to deploy his forces in
front of Megiddo before the Canaanite forces could redeploy and en-
gage the Egyptians. When the two forces finally met, the Egyptians
routed the Canaanites so fast that their retreating forces had to be
hauled up the walls of Megiddo because the gates to the city were
locked shut. The Egyptian attack, however, bogged down when the
Egyptian forces stopped to pillage the coalition’s encampment. This
critical delay afforded the Canaanite forces the opportunity to es-
cape into the fortress of Megiddo, robbing the Egyptians of a quick,
decisive victory. The Egyptians laid siege to the city for five months,
and eventually Megiddo surrendered. In spite of the lengthy siege,
Thutmose achieved his desired strategic end-state conditions. His
reign was never challenged by another rebellion, and the defeat of the
coalition’s forces forced other towns in the Syrian zone of influence to
submit to Egyptian hegemony.5
Since Megiddo, the basic intellectual framework that military
planners have used throughout history has changed very little. The
contemporary explanation of operational design, however, remains
unclear. Current joint doctrine establishes a clear purpose for opera-
tional design, but the analytical process underpinning joint planning
remains vague.6
There are two principal reasons for this. First, although opera-
tional design is primarily an intellectual exercise based on experience
and judgment, it has a defined structural component. Second, joint
doctrine does not distinguish operational design and operational art
as two distinct entities. In 1995 the keystone document Joint Publica-
tion (JP) 3-0, Doctrine for Joint Operations, introduced the 14 facets
of operational art. In subsequent iterations of joint doctrine, these
24 │ developing an operational approach

facets evolved into the 13 elements of operational design.7 As a result,

operational design and art have become blended with little explana-
tion of their inherent distinctions. The current JP 3-0, Joint Opera-
tions, and JP 5-0, Joint Operation Planning, define operational design
and operational art as follows:
[Operational design is] the conception and construction of the intellectual
framework that underpins joint OPLANs and their subsequent execution. . . .
Operational design extends operational art’s vision with a creative process that
helps commanders and planners answer the ends–ways–means–risk ques-
tions.8 (emphasis in original)
[Operational art is] the cognitive approach by commanders and staffs—sup-
ported by their skill, knowledge, experience, creativity, and judgment—to de-
velop strategies, campaigns, and operations and organize and employ military
forces by integrating ends, ways, and means.9
The thought process helps commanders . . . visualize how best to effectively
employ military capabilities to accomplish their mission.10

These definitions present operational design and art as two sepa-

rate but related functions. However, current doctrine does not delineate
which of these elements relate to design and which relate to art. Using
the above definitions, operational design elements should assist com-
manders and their staffs in creating a planning framework, and op-
erational art elements should support the development of strategy
during the COA-development step of the joint operation planning
process (JOPP). Figure 10, based on JP 5-0, comes very close to illus-
trating this separation.

Elements of Operational Design

Termination Direct and indirect approach

Military end state Anticipation
Objectives Operational reach
Effects Culmination
Center of gravity Arranging operations
Decisive points Forces and functions
Lines of operation and lines of effort

Figure 10. Elements of operational design. (Based on JP 5-0, Joint Op-

eration Planning, 11 August 2011, III-18.)
 developing an operational approach │ 25

Why is it so important to separate these two concepts? The principal

reason is to have a focused organizational structure that unambigu-
ously articulates the preliminary vision for the operational approach.
Dividing operational design and art into two separate entities pro-
vides commanders and their staffs with an impartial organizational
structure for problem framing during the initiation and mission-
analysis steps of the JOPP. Prematurely introducing complex opera-
tional art concepts such as anticipation, forces and functions, and
operational reach into the mission-analysis step detracts from prob-
lem framing by developing a solution before the full nature of the
problem has been determined. The significance of this organizational
shift to separate operational design and art is that it reduces the ten-
dency to interject preconceived solutions and strategies into the
JOPP’s mission-analysis step. This approach maximizes the potential
for developing unbiased COAs. Once operational design creates the
framework for informed vision, planners can use strategy to integrate
operational art into the JOPP’s COA-development, analysis, and
comparison steps.
JP 1-02, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associ-
ated Terms, defines strategy as a prudent idea or set of ideas for em-
ploying the instruments of national power in a synchronized and in-
tegrated fashion to achieve theater, national, and/or multinational
objectives. Strategy provides a crucial mechanism for integrating op-
erational design and art by outlining the planning guidance for COA
development. Figure 11 shows a methodology for integrating opera-
tional design and art into the JOPP. This methodology uses opera-
tional design to begin structuring the operational approach in an un-
biased environment during the JOPP’s initiation and mission-analysis
steps. Once the initial operational approach is framed, the JFC can
introduce strategy to integrate operational art into the structure es-
tablished by the elements of operational design. The challenge pre-
sented in our current joint doctrine is determining which elements of
operational design support problem framing and which support
strategy development.
An analysis of the 13 elements of operational design and the re-
quirements for developing an operational approach reveal eight
inter­related elements that provide a basic cognitive framework for
problem framing. These elements are end state, objectives, effects,
centers of gravity, decisive points, lines of operation, arrangement of
operations, and assumptions. Seven of these eight elements are listed
26 │ developing an operational approach

Initiation Receive Strategic Direction

Operational Design
Conduct JIPOE
Mission Analysis Develop Mission Statement
Present Mission Analysis Brief
Issue Planning Guidance

COA Development Develop COA Options Operational Art

Identify Decision Points Integration of
COA Analysis / War Gaming Determine Governing Factors Operational Design
and
Operational Art
COA Comparison Compare COAs to Governing Factors

COA Approval Present COA Decision Brief Operational Art

and Design Continue
Plan/Order Issue Plan/Order through Planning and
Execution

Figure 11. Separation of operational design and art in the JOPP

in joint publications as doctrinal elements of operational design. The

only element not so listed is assumptions. Assumptions are included
here as an element of operational design since they provide the core
framework for all plans and are arguably the primary reason for most
plans’ failures. Assumptions help frame what a plan is going to do and
what it is not going to do. They articulate major decision points and
catastrophic risk and identify the branches and sequels required to
mitigate risk.
In contrast to the design elements, the operational art elements
focus on the development of strategy. They integrate with operational
design during the JOPP’s COA-development step to communicate
the organization and employment of forces. These elements assist
JFCs in formulating an initial strategy and providing guidance to the
staff for COA development during the JOPP.
This deliberate bifurcation of operational design and art simplifies
their integration into the JOPP by delineating key responsibilities
along the lines of problem framing and military strategy develop-
ment (fig. 12). This action does not relegate operational art to a sub-
ordinate position below operational design. In actuality, operational
design is subordinate to operational art (fig. 13). When national or
multinational leaders provide strategic direction, JFCs and planners
 developing an operational approach │ 27

Joint Operation Planning Process

Problem Framing Strategy Development

Operational Design
End State Operational Art Strategy
Objectives Direct vs. Indirect
Effects Operational Reach
Centers of Gravity Anticipation Concept
Decisive Points Culmination of Plan/Order
Lines of Operation/Effort Forces and Functions Operation
Arrangement of Operations
Assumptions
COA COA
Development Approval
Initiation
Analysis
Mission Analysis
Comparison

Figure 12. Separation of the 13 elements of operational design into

distinct operational design and art elements and their relationship to
the JOPP

use operational art to build the design structure. This structure then
provides the analytical basis for understanding the environment,
identifying the problem, and developing an operational approach.
Design assists JFCs with creating a cognitive map to visualize the the-
ater strategy and provide the guidance necessary for COA develop-
ment. JFCs and planners use operational art to develop COAs based
on the vision embodied in the commander’s design. As planners ana-
lyze and war-game COAs, they can identify key preplanned decisions
that leaders must make. These activities also present a focal point to
formulate emergent opportunities that exploit projected environ-
mental conditions or enemy actions. This deliberate integration of
operational art and design forms a critical foundation for examining
risk, comparing COAs, and selecting a COA. When a COA is finally
selected, the JFC uses operational art and design to refine the cogni-
tive map and solidify the operational vision that synchronizes tactical
actions to accomplish operational objectives.
Recently several eloquent articles have described the complex ori-
gins and interactions among strategy, operational art, and design.
However, these intellectual endeavors have little utility unless com-
 National/Multinational Receive
Strategy Strategic
Direction

Operational
Art

Operational
Frame the
Design
- Understand the Environment Problem
Establish Vision for Operational Design Assists
- Define the Problem
- Develop Operational Approach
Theater Strategy Operational Art in Linking a
— Create Initial Cognitive Map Series of Major Operations
Build Decision Develop COAs to Accomplish Strategic
Support Objectives by Providing a
Identify Preplanned
Template Cognitive Vision
Decisions

Formulate Emergent
Reframe the
Opportunities
Problem
around Key
Decisions
Develop Decision
Support Matrix
Refine Cognitive Map Operational Art
Refine Operational Synchronizes Tactical
Vision Actions to Accomplish
Operational Objectives
Direct Tactical Execution

Figure 13. Relationship between operational art and design

 developing an operational approach │ 29

manders and their staffs have a design methodology they can both
understand and use. As this analysis continues, it describes a meth-
odology that can be used to comprehend design and employ it to
provide clarity in visualizing the operational approach.

Notes
1. Joint Publication (JP) 5-0, Joint Operation Planning, 11 August 2011, III-5.
2. For a description of Megiddo, see Fuller, A Military History of the Western
World, vol. 1, 4–7.
3. Gabriel and Boose, Great Battles of Antiquity, 53.
4. Nelson, “Battle of Megiddo,” 22. See also Pritchard, Ancient Near Eastern Texts
Relating to the Old Testament, 234.
5. Gabriel and Boose, Great Battles of Antiquity, 59.
6. Dickson, “Operational Design,” 23.
7. JP 3-0, Doctrine for Joint Operations, 1 February 1995, III-10.
8. JP 3-0, Joint Operations, 11 August 2011, II-4.
9. JP 5-0, Joint Operation Planning, 11 August 2011, GL-13.
10. Ibid., I-5.
 Chapter 3

Methodology for Understanding

and Employing Operational Design

A number of methodologies of varying complexity and focus ex-

plain how to construct an operational design for a campaign plan.
Examples include the effects-based approach to operations, systemic
operational design, and numerous fusion models. The methodology
described in this analysis rests on the eight interrelated design ele-
ments discussed in chapter 2. It is presented in a sequential format
based on conventional operations to provide foundational knowl-
edge for understanding operational design’s basic framework. How-
ever, it should be emphasized that this methodology is not prescriptive.
Operational design is an iterative process and not necessarily a sequential
methodology. Additionally, different types of operations have distinc-
tive effects on how JFCs and their staffs develop supporting opera-
tional designs to frame problems and enhance decision making.
One of operational design’s key products is a cognitive map. This
map assists JFCs and their staffs with envisioning an entire operation.
It also allows them to assess the congruency of critical links among
the national strategic end state, military objectives, effects, centers of
gravity, decisive points, and lines of operation.
The cognitive map evolves through several iterations as the JOPP
progresses. During the JOPP’s initiation and mission-analysis steps,
the JFC develops a basic map that outlines the initial campaign strategy
and provides guidance to the staff on course-of-action development.
As the vision for a campaign unfolds during the JOPP’s course-of-
action analysis, comparison, and selection steps, a more detailed map
should emerge that depicts phases and even stages within phases.
There is no specified format for the cognitive map. The format should
support the commander’s ability to visualize the entirety of the cam-
paign or operation. It should also assist the JFC in identifying critical
decision points and serve as a tool to communicate his vision to civil-
ian leaders, allies, and component commanders. Additionally, the
format should aid the staff in checking the links among the elements
of operational design and ensure the best possible alignment and ar-
rangement of operations for accomplishing the national strategic end
32 │ methodology for employing design

state. Figure 14 gives an example of a simplified cognitive map and

the alignment of key elements of design.

Centers of Gravity

Phase I Phase II Phase III

Line of Operation/Effort
Assessment of
Strategic National
Strategic End
State
Decisive Points

Line of Operation/Effort
End
Operational Objectives State

Decisive Points
Effects Determination of
Line of Operation/Effort Military End State and
Termination Criteria
Tactical
Assumptions:
Time
Decisive Points Politics
Forces
Enemy

Figure 14. Operational design’s cognitive map

Because there is no standardized interagency planning process,

the cognitive map also provides a valuable communication mechanism
for interagency coordination. Arraying the elements of operational
design in a cognitive framework conveys key military operational
concepts in a format that diverse agencies can grasp relatively quickly.
It also presents a methodology for integrating the four national in-
struments of power linking the strategic and operational levels of op-
erations, as well highlighting interagency decision points (fig. 15).

Understanding End State,

Objectives, Effects, and Tasks
The point of origin for developing an operational approach is an
analysis of strategic guidance and a comprehension of the national
strategic end state. Joint Publication (JP) 1-02 defines end state as “the
set of required conditions that defines achievement of the command-
er’s objectives.”1 The gravity of employing the military instrument of
power, however, mandates a clear understanding of strategic purpose
bounded by a national strategic end state and a military end state. The
president and the secretary of defense provide strategic guidance es-
 methodology for employing design │ 33

Strategic
Diplomatic End State

Economic

Information

Military

Obj

Conditions for Success

Obj
Op Strat
CoG CoG
Obj

Obj

Figure 15. The cognitive map and the four national instruments of power

tablishing a set of national strategic objectives that should culminate

in the accomplishment of the national strategic end state. The na-
tional strategic end state describes the president’s political, informa-
tional, economic, and military vision for the region or theater when
operations conclude.2 These broadly expressed conditions provide
the basis for determining the military end state and the termination
criteria necessary for concluding military activities.
However, the derivation of strategic guidance is extraordinarily
complex and dynamic. Guidance originates from numerous sources,
the most common of which are strategic-level policy statements.
These statements include the National Security Strategy, National
Defense Strategy, National Military Strategy, Guidance for the Em-
ployment of the Force, Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan, and national
security presidential directives. For example, the 2008 National De-
fense Strategy outlines five objectives:
•  efend the Homeland
D
• Win the Long War
• Promote Security
• Deter Conflict
• Win our Nation’s Wars3
Strategic guidance can also be derived indirectly from interagency
and even international directives, such as United Nations (UN) Secu-
rity Council resolutions. Additionally, strategic direction can evolve
34 │ methodology for employing design

out of executive-level addresses to the nation. One example of the latter

is the development of the national strategic objectives forming the
original end-state conditions for Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF).
On Tuesday, 11 September 2001, the history of our nation changed.
Between the hours of 8:45 and 10:00 a.m., terrorists hijacked four
commercial airplanes and crashed two into the World Trade Center,
one into the Pentagon, and one into a field in rural Pennsylvania.
Pres. George W. Bush articulated the end-state conditions for the en-
suing OEF in a joint session of Congress on 20 September. Those con-
ditions were broadly described as the destruction of terrorist training
camps and infrastructure within Afghanistan, the capture of al-Qaeda
leaders, and the cessation of terrorist activities in Afghanistan.4 By
the time the first strikes of OEF occurred on 7 October, the end-state
conditions had expanded. On that date, Secretary of Defense Donald
Rumsfeld amplified the president’s guidance at a Department of De-
fense news conference.5 He stated that the operation’s objectives were
to convince Taliban leaders that the harboring of terrorists is unaccept-
able, acquire intelligence on al-Qaeda and Taliban resources, develop
relations with groups opposed to the Taliban, prevent the use of Af-
ghanistan as a safe haven for terrorists, and destroy the Taliban mili-
tary, allowing opposition forces to succeed in their struggle. Also,
military force would help facilitate the delivering of humanitarian
supplies to the Afghan people. The initial phase of OEF demonstrates
the acute situational awareness JFCs and their staffs must have to
plan effectively. Planners must understand that end-state conditions
are dynamic and often emanate from nontraditional sources.
Another illustration of the complexity involved in assessing and
understanding the national strategic end state is the development of
objectives for Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm. Initially,
when Pres. George H. W. Bush addressed Congress on 5 August 1990,
three days after Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait, the US national policy ob-
jectives in the Persian Gulf were to:
• B
 ring about the immediate, complete, and unconditional with-
drawal of all Iraqi forces from Kuwait
• Restore Kuwait’s legitimate government
• E
 nsure the security and stability of Saudi Arabia and other Per-
sian Gulf nations
• Ensure the safety of American citizens abroad
 methodology for employing design │ 35

By 15 January 1991, on the eve of initiating air operations, these

objectives had changed dramatically because of Iraq’s refusal to with-
draw from Kuwait and the UN’s approval to use force. The national
strategic end-state conditions evolved into:
• D
 estroy Iraqi capability to produce and employ weapons of
mass destruction
• Destroy Iraqi offensive military capability
• Cause the withdrawal of Iraqi forces from Kuwait
• Restore the legitimate government of Kuwait6
During the iterative planning process, military planners have an
obligation to seek clarification on unclear or ambiguous national
strategic objectives that form the basis for the desired end state. Plan-
ners must assess the plausibility of attaining strategic, operational,
and tactical objectives and understand exactly what they mean. For
instance, if an objective says “reduce weapons of mass destruction,”
does this mean reduce weapons of mass destruction by a percentage,
or destroy their employment and production capabilities? Another
example is “halt enemy forces.” Does this mean simply stop the enemy
forces, or is the expectation to bring the enemy to a culmination
point where he can no longer mount offensive operations or attain his
objectives? The repercussions of misunderstanding the desired stra-
tegic end state are dramatically significant because of its link to the
military end state and other corresponding objectives.
The military end state is military specific. It describes the national
strategic end-state conditions that the military instrument of power
will direct its efforts to achieve. The military end state is a set of re-
quired conditions that define the achievement of all military objec-
tives. It normally represents a point at which the president no longer
requires the military instrument of national power as the primary
means to achieve remaining national objectives.7 The military end
state reflects the conditions established by the national strategic end
state; however, it is more specific and normally incorporates support-
ing conditions, such as a UN Security Council resolution, associated
with the other national instruments of power.
Although the termination of military operations is a political deci-
sion, effective planning cannot occur without a precise vision of the
military end state and its associated termination criteria. Termina-
tion criteria are “the specified standards approved by the President
36 │ methodology for employing design

and/or the Secretary of Defense that must be met before a joint op-
eration can be concluded.”8 Knowing when to terminate military op-
erations and how to preserve achieved advantages is essential to
achieving the national strategic end state. The conditions, derived
from the military end state and national strategic end state, contrib-
ute to developing termination criteria that must be met before con-
cluding military operations. Termination criteria require planners to
consider a wide variety of operational issues and anticipate the nature
of post-conflict operations.9 Termination criteria are dynamic. They
evolve throughout the JOPP and are usually not evident until after
the JOPP’s course of action analysis and war-gaming step. Therefore,
it is probably more efficient to use the military end-state conditions
as the initial termination criteria until the COA analysis is complete.
Planners should also realize that termination criteria can change
significantly during the execution of an operation because national or
multinational leaders may opt to modify directed strategic end-state
conditions to pursue less aggressive goals or take advantage of envi-
ronmental opportunities. As a result, termination criteria are essen-
tially in draft form until the strategic leadership directs the cessation
of military hostilities. Once cessation is directed, planners need to
review the termination criteria and refine them to meet leader expec-
tations and environmental conditions. Table 1 shows an example of
the relationships among a national strategic end state, a correspond-
ing military end state, and termination criteria.
The analysis of the national strategic end state, military end state,
and termination criteria, in conjunction with an assessment of the
operational environment, provides the basis for determining objec-
tives. Objectives are “clearly defined, decisive, and attainable goal[s]
toward which every operation is directed.”10 They describe the political,
economic, informational, and military goals necessary to accomplish
the desired end state. Examples of military objectives are:
• D
 eter Vulpecula’s forces from armed intervention into the coun-
try of Auriga
• Enable humanitarian assistance in Auriga
• If deterrence fails, defend Auriga from Vulpeculan intervention
JFCs and their staffs support and clarify objectives by developing
measurable, desired strategic and operational effects and assessment
indicators. An effect is a physical and/or behavioral state of a system
 methodology for employing design │ 37

Table 1. Relationships among national strategic end state, military

end state, and termination criteria

National Strategic Military Termination

End State End State Criteria
International peace • P eace and security of • P reconflict sover-
and security in the Auriga restored eignty and borders
Zoran Sea region • UNSCR 1783 imple- of Auriga intact
restored with full mented, restoring a • The flow of hu-
implementation of all secure environment manitarian aid into
UN Security Council for the provision of and evacuation out
resolutions (UNSCR) humanitarian as- of Auriga uninter-
and the sovereignty sistance rupted by armed
and territorial integrity attacks
of Auriga preserved • Regional peace and
security no longer • Vulpecula no lon-
threatened by armed ger able to mount
conflict offensive opera-
• WMD threat elimi- tions
nated • Vulpecula’s
weapons of mass
destruction (WMD)
employment,
production, and
storage capabilities
eliminated

that results from an action, a set of actions, or another effect. Effects

are conditions derived from objectives and exist in two forms, de-
sired and undesired. Desired effects describe the conditions neces-
sary within the operational environment for achieving an objective.
Undesired effects reflect the conditions to be avoided because they
would inhibit the accomplishment of an objective. This analysis in-
creases operational- and tactical-level understanding of the opera-
tion’s purpose and the commander’s intent. Additionally, this align-
ment provides the basis for operational-level assessment. If the effects
correctly describe the achievement of the objective, JFCs have a
mechanism for assessing the effectiveness of their operations. The
conditions signified in the effects aid in determining tasks for com-
ponents, subordinate-level units, and low-density/high-demand as-
sets. Tasks are implied actions describing the accomplishment of de-
sired effects or the avoidance of undesired effects. Figure 16 highlights
this intrinsic interrelationship and the inherent links among end
state, objectives, effects, and tasks. This is not the sole means for ei-
38 │ methodology for employing design

Level Guidance End state describes the set of

conditions to meet conflict
National strategic Strategic end state termination criteria.
Objectives Objectives prescribe friendly
goals.
Theater strategic Military end state
Objectives Effects describe the conditions
Effects related to the objectives.
Tasks • Desired effects describe
conditions needed to
Operational Military end state achieve objectives.
Objectives • Undesired effects describe
Effects conditions that will impede
Tasks achievement of objectives.
Tasks describe friendly actions to
Tactical Mission create desired effects or preclude
Objectives undesired effects.
Tasks
Mission describes the
organization’s essential task or
task(s) and purpose.

Figure 16. Relationships among end state, objectives, effects, and tasks

ther qualitatively or empirically measuring operational progress, but

it represents a crucial assessment foundation for JFCs.
The concept of linking end state, objectives, effects, and tasks is far
from a novel approach. History is full of examples. One of the most
sophisticated illustrations occurred during the Mongol conquest of
Vietnam in 1287–88. During the thirteenth century, the Mongol
sphere of influence extended from China to Eastern Europe, and very
few nations were capable of withstanding the Mongols’ power. In
1287 they invaded Vietnam to expand their regional influence. When
the Vietnamese were confronted by the Mongol onslaught, their na-
tional strategic end-state conditions were simple: regime survival and
withdrawal of the Mongol forces. To achieve these end-state condi-
tions, the Vietnamese, led by Tran Hung Dao, adopted a deliberate
strategy of strategic withdrawal. The objectives were to extend the
Mongol lines of communication beyond their capability to sustain
their force and to lure the Mongols into terrain where they could not
use their dominant force, their cavalry. The desired effect was the
withdrawal of the invading Mongol forces. Another closely related
Vietnamese objective was denial of Mongol freedom of movement on
the land surface. The Vietnamese accomplished this by tasking their
forces to destroy prominent bridges and interdicting key road net-
works. The cumulative effect created by this combination of objec-
 methodology for employing design │ 39

tives, effects, and tasks was to force the Mongols to withdraw along
the river system. Using Ngo Quyen’s victory over the Chinese in 938
as an example, Tran Hung Dao calculated that these actions would
cause the Mongols to withdraw their forces via the Bach Dang River
system (fig. 17).11

Mongol Conquest of Vietnam

9 April 1288

Vietnamese
Ships Battle Site

Spikes

Mongol Ships

Bach Dang River

Haiphong

Figure 17. Battle of the Bach Dang River

After studying tidal projections, Tran directed that sharpened

poles be cut, tipped with iron, and embedded in the river just to the
north of modern-day Haiphong. On 9 April 1288, a small flotilla of
Vietnamese shallow-draft boats engaged the Mongol fleet at high
tide. When the Mongol fleet deployed for decisive action, the Viet-
namese feigned retreat upriver and drew the Mongols after them in
hot pursuit. As the tide fell, thousands of Vietnamese boats attacked
the Mongol fleet at a prearranged point. When the Mongol fleet at-
tempted to retreat to the sea, it was hopelessly caught in Tran’s barrier
system of iron-tipped poles, losing an estimated 400 ships and 6,000
men.12 The Vietnamese ability to link effects to objectives and desired
end-state conditions had a significant impact on their successful re-
sistance to Mongol domination.
40 │ methodology for employing design

Aligning the End State, Objectives, and

Effects with Centers of Gravity
An operation’s end state, objectives, and effects have limited viability
until they are aligned with a detailed systems analysis of the enemy
and friendly centers of gravity. Joint doctrine defines center of gravity
(COG) as “the source of power that provides moral or physical
strength, freedom of action, or will to act.”13 COGs are often de-
scribed using the Clausewitzian notion “hub of all power.” From this
perspective, if you destroy the COG, you cause the entire system to
collapse. However, this is rarely the case because COGs are almost
always protected and our adversaries are complex adaptive systems.
What our doctrine does not clearly state is the purpose of a COG. The
principal purpose of a COG is focus. Identifying COGs at the three
levels of war establishes a clear delineation of priorities and responsi-
bilities. It also produces a congruency mechanism that links actions
at all three levels of war. The COG focus at the strategic level of war
should create a directional foundation for the operational level of
war, which should do the same for the tactical level of war. Assessing
the dynamic characteristics of a COG bonds the desired end state,
objectives, and effects with the strategy designed to defeat, destroy,
neutralize, or protect a COG. However, the characteristics of a COG
are far from simple. Figure 18 indicates why COG identification is
often an elusive challenge.

Identifying a COG
Identifying a COG requires three important analytical and itera-
tive steps. The first step is identifying the existing COGs at each level
of war. The second step is a critical-factor analysis of each of those
COGs to identify the decisive points and lines of operation leading
into the COG. The final step is an analysis of how operations may
shape and transform the COGs.
Determining a COG is a key step omitted from doctrine, and it
requires a disciplined methodology. Contemporary doctrine focuses
on critical-factor analysis without elaborating on how a COG itself is
identified. The danger of this approach is aligning the end state, ob-
jectives, and effects against the wrong COG. At a minimum, JFCs and
their staffs should consider enemy and friendly actors, their interests
 methodology for employing design │ 41

Exists at each
Contains many level of war Mostly physical at
intangible elements operational and
at strategic level tactical levels

Often depends
on factors of time Is a source of leverage
and space

Can shift over Center of Allows or

time or between Gravity enhances
phases (COG) freedom of action

Dependent upon May be where the

adversarial enemy's force is most
relationship densely concentrated

Linked to objective(s) Can endanger one's

own COGs
May be
transitory in
nature

Figure 18. Characteristics of a center of gravity. (Reprinted from JP

5-0, Joint Operation Planning, 11 August 2011, III-23.)

and intent, key systems supporting those actors in the operational

environment, and their strengths, weaknesses, and potential courses of
action. This establishes a deliberate foundation for subsequent critical-
factor analysis and reduces the potential for focusing on preconceived
notions. Table 2 illustrates one method of arranging data and analyz-
ing key systems to identify potential COGs of different actors. This
type of analysis can also facilitate the assessment of political assump-
tions concerning a nation’s support for, neutrality to, or hostility to an

Table 2. Identifying centers of gravity

Systems Weak- Courses of

Actor Objective Analysis Strengths nesses Action
Political
Military
Economic
Social
Infrastructure
Information
42 │ methodology for employing design

operation. However, it is imperative to link all COG assessments with

friendly objectives and desired end-state conditions. As objectives
and end-state conditions change, there is a high probability that the
adversary’s COGs will change. Additionally, there is a possibility the
friendly COG may change.
It is also important to emphasize that identifying COGs requires a
fundamental understanding of the three levels of war. Each level has
specific functions, which should be examined to determine the de-
sired effects at that level. The strategic level of war establishes national
or multinational strategic security objectives and guidance and de-
velops and uses national resources to achieve these objectives. Ac-
tivities at this level include establishing national and multinational
military objectives, sequencing initiatives, defining limits and assess-
ing risks for the use of military and other instruments of national
power, and providing military forces and other capabilities in accor-
dance with strategic plans.14 The operational level links the employ-
ment of tactical forces to achieving the strategic end state. At the op-
erational level, commanders conduct campaigns and major operations
to establish conditions that define the end state.15 The tactical level
involves the employment and ordered arrangement of forces in rela-
tion to each other.16 Comprehending the functions of each level of
war helps JFCs and their staffs identify the correct COGs and provide
the right focus.

Conducting Critical-Factor Analysis

As figure 19 indicates, a COG is almost never a single node. COGs
usually consist of multiple nodes with interconnecting relationships
to the operational environment’s systemic architecture.
The critical-factor analysis model (fig. 20) developed by Joe Strange
and amplified in Jack Kem’s Campaign Planning: Tools of the Trade
provides an analytical tool for assessing a COG’s key nodes.17 This
model examines three factors related to a COG: critical capabilities,
critical requirements, and critical vulnerabilities.
Critical capabilities are crucial enablers for a COG to function and
are essential to accomplishing an adversary’s objectives. Critical re-
quirements are the conditions, resources, and means that enable a
critical capability to become fully operational. Critical vulnerabilities
are those aspects or components of critical requirements that are de-
 IDENTIFYING CENTERS OF GRAVITY

Information

Infrastructure
Social
Military

Node

Link

Operational
Center of
Gravity (COG)
Economic
Strategic COG Political

Figure 19. Systems perspective of operational environment. (JP 5-0,

Joint Operation Planning, 26 December 2006, IV-11.)

Center of Gravity Critical Capability

Source of power that provides Means that are considered crucial
freedom of action, physical strength, enablers for the adversary’s COG to
and will to fight function and essential to the
accomplishment of the adversary’s
assumed objective(s)

Critical Vulnerability Critical Requirement

Aspects or components of the
adversary’s critical requirements Those essential conditions,
which are deficient or vulnerable to resources, and means for a critical
direct or indirect attack that will capability to be fully operational
create decisive or significant effects
disproportionate to the military
resources applied

End State / Objective:

Figure 20. Critical-factor analysis model

44 │ methodology for employing design

ficient or vulnerable to direct or indirect attack achieving decisive or

significant results. Examining these critical factors identifies the deci-
sive points that reveal the keys to attacking and preserving COGs.
Centers of gravity are often confused with decisive points, but
these two entities have distinct differences. A decisive point is a geo-
graphic place, specific key event, critical factor, or function that, when
acted upon, allows commanders to gain a marked advantage over an
adversary or contribute materially to success. Decisive points offer a
mechanism for affecting a protected COG. COGs and decisive points
should always be considered in relation to one another and never in
isolation. Decisive points are also used to develop lines of operation
that provide a vision for how to organize and employ US and coali-
tion military efforts. Additionally, an analysis of COGs enables JFCs
to identify the physical or geographic points, major events, functions,
and systems that will ensure unified action during the campaign.
Decisive points belong to one of four basic categories: physical, key
events, functional, and systemic. Examples of physical decisive points
are major cities, rivers, straits, islands, command posts, and airspace.
Key events include initial lodgment of friendly forces, culmination of
the enemy’s strategic reserves, establishment of bridgeheads, and
elections. Functional and systemic decisive points are closely related
to key events because they are either intangible or multifaceted, but
they are different because of their purpose. Functional decisive points
correspond to specific tasks or functions. Illustrations include estab-
lishing early warning; gaining air superiority; conducting reception,
staging, onward movement, and integration (RSOI); and protecting
the force. Systemic decisive points affect a node or combination of
nodes within a system. Examples include a power-generation plant
controlling an electrical grid, a fiber-optic link enabling telecommu-
nications, and computer servers facilitating critical aspects of financial
transactions. Analyzing decisive points assists JFCs and their staffs in
determining and prioritizing the best methodology for affecting an
adversary’s COGs and seizing the initiative.
Operation Desert Storm is a classic case in point illustrating the
connectivity between COGs and decisive points. During the construct
of the operational design for Operation Desert Storm, the coalition
identified the Iraqi command and control system as the operational
COG. One of the decisive points protecting this COG was the Iraqi
Kari system, an integrated air-defense command and control (C2)
system that provided tracking and targeting information for Iraqi
 methodology for employing design │ 45

fighter aircraft and surface-to-air missiles (fig. 21). The Kari system
included French and Italian long-range and short-range radars capable
of detecting aircraft flying as low as 50 feet. Additionally, the system
was augmented with a Japanese RM-835 ground-based system capable
of tracking electronic emissions and Chinese Nanjing low-frequency
radars.18 This collective arrangement of equipment gave the Iraqis a
dynamic early warning system capable of identifying the launch of air
operations against their strategic and operational COGs.

IRAQI C2

Decisive Point
Protected COG
Decisive Point

Decisive Point

Kari System
KARI System

Figure 21. Relationship between the Iraqi COG at the operational

level of war and the Kari system decisive point during Operation
Desert Storm

Although no doctrinal critical-factor analysis was conducted dur-

ing the planning for Operation Desert Storm, analysis of the Kari
system revealed several key vulnerabilities. The system, controlled by
four sector operation centers, consisted of a number of diverse radar
systems with limited repair parts. Additionally, the system’s 500 ra-
dars were located at approximately 100 geographically dispersed sites
with fragile communications links and limited power.
A contemporary critical-factor analysis of the Kari system (fig. 22)
shows the relationships of the Iraqi command and control COG to its
critical capabilities, critical requirements, and critical vulnerabilities.
It also indicates how analysts assessed critical vulnerabilities to deter-
mine where to attack. On 16 January 1991, the coalition selected and
destroyed two radar clusters separated by 60 miles of open desert,
opening the way for coalition aircraft to attack other decisive points
related to Iraqi command and control.
46 │ methodology for employing design

Critical Factor Analysis

Critical
Vulnerabilities
Critical Critical
Requirements Capabilities
Diversity
of Radar Integrated
Communicate Orders
Types Communications System Center of
Gravity
Geographic
Integrated Air
Dispersion Control Forces
Defense System
of KARI System Protection

Iraqi C2
Supply of
Equipment Provide Early
Communication Links
Parts Warning

Fragile
Communication Early Warning Enable
Links Systems Intelligence

Power
Supply

Figure 22. Critical-factor analysis of Iraqi command and control and

the Kari system

It is important to emphasize that operational design requires plan-

ners to identify both friendly and enemy COGs and friendly and enemy
decisive points. Any design that does not assess friendly COGs and
decisive points creates a serious flaw in the operation. Analyzing
friendly COGs and decisive points identifies what the friendly forces
must protect and allows the friendly forces to prioritize defensive op-
erations and the use of scarce resources.
Desert Storm offers another illustration of linking decisive points
to centers of gravity. During Desert Storm, Iraq identified the coali-
tion’s strategic COGs as the coalition itself. In an effort to destroy the
coalition, the Iraqi military fired Scud missiles into the state of Israel
hoping to bring Israel into the conflict and disintegrate critical Arab
support for the coalition. As a result of Iraq’s strategy, coalition forces
had to position Patriot air defense systems in Israel and modify air
operations to protect Israel (fig. 23).
As JFCs and their staffs evaluate decisive points, they determine
the most important ones and designate them as decisive points for
 methodology for employing design │ 47

Desert Storm Coalition

Protected COG

Decisive Point
Israel

Figure 23. Relationship between the coalition’s COG at the strategic

level of war and the decisive point of Israel during Operation Desert
Storm

the campaign. These designated decisive points become the basis for
developing lines of operation (LOO), visualizations of a campaign’s
concept of operations that link tactical and operational objectives to
the end state.19 LOOs define the orientation of the force in time and
space or purpose in relation to an adversary or objective. LOOs also
assist JFCs in synchronizing military activities directed at a series of
strategic and operational objectives to attain the military end state.
An operation’s LOO can be described as physical, logical, or both.
JP 5-0 defines a physical LOO as “a physical line that defines the inte-
rior or exterior orientation of the force in relation to the enemy or
that connects actions on nodes and decisive points related in time
and space to an objective(s).”20 An example of a physical LOO is Gen-
eral MacArthur’s island-hopping campaign in the Southwest Pacific
during World War II. MacArthur maneuvered his forces along a geo-
graphic line of operation from Australia to New Guinea and then to
the Philippines (fig. 24).
A logical LOO is “a logical line that connects actions on nodes and
decisive points related in time and purpose with an objective(s).”21 A
logical LOO focuses on depicting an arrangement of tasks, effects,
and objectives. The Allied liberation of Western Europe provides an
excellent illustration of a logical LOO. On 12 February 1944, the Allied
combined chiefs of staff gave General Eisenhower a one-page direc-
tive ordering the reconquest of Western Europe. Using the Allied
48 │ methodology for employing design

Figure 24. Southwest Pacific in World War II: physical line of operation.
(Reprinted from Charles R. Anderson, Papua Campaign Brochure, US
Army Center of Military History, n.d.)

combined chiefs of staff ’s guidance, General Eisenhower and his staff

developed seven key decisive points aligned along a logical LOO for
the campaign (fig. 25). Those decisive points were (1) establish a
lodgment on the coast of Normandy, (2) conduct a breakout and
build up a logistics base, (3) pursue the enemy on a broad front with
three Army groups, (4) secure ports in Belgium and Brittany, (5) build
up logistics in the vicinity of the Rhine, (6) complete the destruction
of the enemy forces west of the Rhine, and (7) launch the final attack
as a double envelopment.22 What is important to note is that this
plan’s execution did not deviate significantly from its original intent.
The visualization of a concept of operations normally has multiple
interconnected LOOs reflecting the simultaneous accomplishment of
key tasks and objectives. The interconnectivity between lines of op-
eration can also be used to show key decision points that connect the
concept of operation with branches and sequels.
 methodology for employing design │ 49

Operation Overlord

1. Land on Normandy coast

2. Build up resources

3. Pursue broad front with two Army groups

4. Secure ports in Belgium and Brittany

5. Build log base in vicinity of Rhine

6. Complete destruction of enemy forces west of Rhine

7. Launch final attack as double envelopment

Figure 25. Operation Overlord: decisive points along logical lines of

operation

How Operations Shape and Transform COGs

Planners must remain cognizant of the fact that COGs are dy-
namic. They can change based on the success or failure of military
operations, changes in national policy, modifications to objectives,
and enemy actions. As an example, a JFC designates an adversary’s
operational reserve as the COG at the operational level of war. His
intent is to focus coalition forces on bringing the enemy to the culmi-
nation point, depriving him of attaining his military objectives. How-
ever, once coalition forces destroy the exploitation force, what is the
new COG at the operational level of war? The reason for raising this
issue is planners must think ahead to ensure that the relationships
among LOOs, decisive points, COGs, objectives, effects, and the end
state are properly aligned. Additionally, the identification of COG
transformations assists commanders in setting the preparatory con-
ditions necessary for executing the next phase of the operation. This
does not mean that planners should approach COGs from a purely
linear perspective. As figure 26 implies, the focus directed at COGs
can overlap phases of an operation with components being directed
to conduct asymmetric attack and establish the conditions required
50 │ methodology for employing design

COGs Are Dynamic

Levels of War

Strategic Leadership

Operational Operational
C4ISR
Reserve

Second Homeland
Tactical Front Line
Echelon Defense
Forces
Forces Forces

PH II PH III PH IV
Seize Initiative Dominate Provide Stability

Figure 26. Transformation of COGs as an operation’s objectives change

for future phases. In general, COGs at the strategic level of war will
rarely change as an operation progresses. At the operational level of
war, COGs may change slightly, and at the tactical level they will most
probably change.
It is also important to understand that the relationships among the
levels of war change based on national strategic objectives and the
complexities of the operational environment. If attainment of na-
tional strategic objectives requires conventional military operations,
then the relationships among the three levels of war will more than
likely be arranged in a hierarchical fashion. However, if military
forces are employed in irregular warfare operations, the relationships
among the levels of war are much more dynamic. In irregular war-
fare, seemingly insignificant actions at the tactical level of war can
have immediate repercussions on the operational and strategic levels
of war. Figure 27 shows the contrast in how different types of opera-
tions shape and transform the relationships among the levels of war.

The Arrangement of Operations

The arrangement of operations to accomplish military objectives
and national strategic end-state conditions is one of the most impor-
 methodology for employing design │ 51

Strategic
Level
of War

Strategic
Level
Operational of War
Level
of War
Operational Tactical
Level Level
of War of War
Tactical
Level
of War

Figure 27. Transformation of the relationships among the levels of war

tant decisions a JFC will make. This decision involves a detailed con-
sideration of how LOOs align with friendly and enemy COGs and the
vertical and horizontal relationship of decisive points between LOOs.
Figure 28 depicts the multifarious nature of these relationships and
the challenges in determining how best to arrange operations.
Commanders assess a host of essential factors when determining
how to arrange and link related military operations. These factors in-
clude the geography of the joint operation area, available strategic lift,
changes in command structure, force protection, logistics, adversary
reinforcement capabilities, and public opinion.23 The doctrinal tool
for arranging the sequential and simultaneous nature of operations is
phasing. JP 5-0 defines phases as “definitive stage[s] of an operation
or campaign during which a large portion of the forces and capabili-
ties are involved in similar or mutually supporting activities for a
common purpose.”24
Phasing helps JFCs and their subordinates to visualize how an entire
operation will unfold and to determine force, resource, and time re-
quirements. The principal benefit of a phase is that it assists command-
ers in achieving major objectives by planning manageable subordinate
operations to gain progressive advantages. Phases can be sequential or
52 │ methodology for employing design

BP COGS END
VP STATE
Intervention
LOCAL AIR
DETERRENCE

SUPERIORITY
ACHIEVED LOCS VP DETERRED CJTF FOC
EARLY ARF FOC
SECURED FROM EARLY IN AUR+SAG
SA NAVAL IN JOA INTERVENTION
SUPERIORITY VP MIL
ACHIEVED FORCES
BP
Loss Port BLA ISOLATED
FROM VP
INSURGENCY

Capability
COUNTER-

DENY BLA SUPPORT

SECURE PROVIDE TRAIN
FROM BATARI
KEY BASIC AUR
OUTSIDE SUPPORT TO
FACILITIES SERVICES FORCES BLA
DJERA MT BLA SPLIT
NEUTRALIZED
BLA MIL
SP ORGANIZATION
VP
BLA Joins Gov’t
ASSISTANCE

DETERRED
HUMAN

INTEGRATION HUMANITARIAN
WITH LOCAL ASSISTANCE
AUR / PER
AUTH/IO/NGO ENABLED
STABILITY
NEO FREE ACCESS
ENABLED TO REGION/
AU AU
SECURITY RESOURCES
STABILIZED
STABILITY

FORCES
SECURITY

ACCESS TO HA
AND

ACHIEVE INFO UNIMPEDED

CAPELLA IA UNIMPEDED
DOMINANCE
SECURED ACCESS TO
ENERGY CONDITIONS
FOR TOA
BP TO UN FORCES
Collapse of
AUR Gov’t

Key to abbreviations
ARF Alliance Reaction Force JOA joint operations area
AU Aurigan LOCs lines of communications
AUR country of Auriga MIL military
AUTH authority MT mountain
BLA Batari Liberation Army NEO noncombatant evacuation operation
BP branch plan NGO nongovernmental organization
CJTF combined joint task force PER country of Perseus
COGs centers of gravity SA situational awareness
FOC full operational capability SAG country of Sagitta
HA humanitarian assistance SP sequal plan
IA international airport TOA transfer of authority
INFO information UN United Nations
IO information operations VP country of Vulpecula

Figure 28. The multifarious nature of arranging operations

simultaneous, and they can overlap. A transition from one phase to

another, say from defensive to offensive operations, signals a change in
emphasis. During planning, commanders establish conditions that
should be met before transitioning to or initiating a new phase.
Joint doctrine provides extensive information on phases, but it
does not state how phases are structured. Phases consist of six key
entities: objectives, effects, start and end times, major tasks, priority
of effort, and the desired phase transition or initiation criteria.
 methodology for employing design │ 53

A template of this phase structure is as follows:

Phase I – Deter
Objectives: Deter aggression and prepare for hostilities.
Effects: Adversary’s leadership recognizes the coalition’s resolve
and understands the risk of using military force; theaterwide force
protection established in the event of attack.
Commences: Commences upon receipt of unambiguous warning.
Ends: Ends when hostilities are initiated.
Tasks: Monitor and confirm intelligence indicators; institute op-
erational security directives; implement force protection measures;
coordinate flexible deterrent options; flow force enhancements; em-
ploy counter special operations forces (SOF) operations; prepare re-
ception, staging, onward movement, and integration assets; update
pre–air tasking order.
Priority of Effort: First to air component command, followed in
order by special operations component command, naval component
command, and land component command.
Phase Transition or Initiation Criteria: Force protection established;
command, control, communications, computers, and intelligence (C4I)
protected; aerial and sea ports of debarkation prepared to receive
follow-on forces; sea lines of communication secured; command pre-
pared for hostilities.
Upon completion of each phase, planners must meticulously ensure
that their operational design integrates all four of the national instru-
ments of power. If planners focus solely on the military instrument of
power, they lose control of the operational design by not leveraging
the other three instruments of power. All diplomatic, informational,
military, and economic courses of action should be forged into a single
unified course of action. Additionally, the operational design should
carefully examine potential first-, second-, and third-order effects of
all military and nonmilitary actions.
For instance, if the strategic objective is to deter aggression, the
operational design should incorporate other aspects such as an op-
erational assessment of possible UN resolutions, the role of the me-
dia, the freezing of assets, and the imposition of economic sanctions.
Failing to synchronize or deconflict nonmilitary initiatives can have
severe and unintended consequences. As an illustration, if the De-
partment of State were to implement a unilateral or uncoordinated
54 │ methodology for employing design

plan to impose sanctions on a country such as North Korea, it could

well provoke hostilities. This could produce cataclysmic results, espe-
cially if the theater headquarters were not prepared to respond.

Assumptions: The Forgotten

Element in Operational Design
Joint doctrine defines an assumption as “a supposition on the cur-
rent situation or a presupposition on the future course of events, ei-
ther or both assumed to be true in the absence of positive proof, nec-
essary to enable the commander in the process of planning to
complete an estimate of the situation and make a decision on the
course of action.”25 This complex definition, however, obscures the
critical role that assumptions play in operational design. As a result,
planners often see the primary role of assumptions as simply a tool to
continue planning and not as a key framework element in operational
design. Assumptions endow operational design with the ability to iden-
tify the greatest risk to an operation. This crucial ability assists JFCs
and their staffs with determining branches and sequels, pinpointing
decision points, and developing the initial commander’s critical in-
formation requirements (CCIR).
Failure to properly assess assumptions can have catastrophic and
historic consequences, as it did at the battle of the Teutoburger Wald
in 9 AD.26 This obscure battle changed Rome’s vision of hegemony
and quite possibly history. It began as a campaign to subdue rebellious
Germanic tribesmen, and it ended in the halting of Roman expansion
beyond the Rhine River. At the time of this battle, the Romans were
the masters of operational design. They had superior organization,
training, and advanced technology and were confronting an adver-
sary they had previously slaughtered like cattle. However, they failed
to identify two critical assumptions. The first assumption was that the
Germanic tribesmen serving in the Roman army would remain loyal
allies. The second was that the Roman legions would be able to de-
ploy their forces and not have to fight on the march in the forests.
In the battle, an alliance of Germanic tribes under the military
leadership of Arminius defeated the XVII, XVIII, and XIX Roman
legions under Quinctilius Varus. According to the Roman historian
Gaius Cornelius Tacitus, the Roman legions, composed of more than
20,000 men, were ambushed in the forests of the Teutoburger Wald
 methodology for employing design │ 55

and annihilated by Arminius’s warriors. Those who survived were

crucified, buried alive, or sacrificed to the Germanic gods. The battle
is significant because it marked the end of Rome’s expansion into the
Germanic frontier.27 Additionally, this defeat shows that Roman over-
confidence trivialized its assessment of assumptions.
In many ways the assumptions derived during operational design
define the overall quality of an operation plan (OPLAN). If planners
approach an OPLAN’s assumptions as just another mechanical step
in the JOPP, the probability of a plan surviving first contact decreases
substantially. Assumptions are not merely a list in the OPLAN for
enhancing the plausibility of the operational design. They require con-
stant vigilance, and they should neither be forgotten nor discarded
because they identify the greatest risk to the successful execution of
the OPLAN. Consequently, in case an assumption proves not to be
true, a corresponding branch or sequel should be developed in advance
to prevent disaster and ensure success of the campaign. This emphasis
on assumptions in turn creates a foundation for establishing CCIRs
that assist the JFC in making effective decisions during execution. It
does this by focusing CCIRs toward the most critical decisions a JFC
must make. Of course if an assumption is invalidated, any decisions
based on that assumption should be immediately reexamined.28
Another indicator of the quality of an OPLAN’s operational design
is the correlation of assumptions to the levels of war. As planners de-
velop assumptions, they should align those assumptions with the ap-
propriate level of war capable of planning and executing the branch or
sequel. For example, consider an assumption concerning the availability
of strategic lift for the initial phases of a campaign. An operational-
level headquarters has almost no ability to influence the development
of a branch or sequel involving strategic lift because it does not con-
trol the assets. These assets are controlled at the strategic level of war,
and any assumptions concerning them should be incorporated into
the strategic guidance and planning. This aligns responsibility for
planning any associated branches or sequels for strategic lift with the
level of war most capable of executing the branch or sequel. It also
keeps the operational level of war from planning a branch or sequel it
cannot execute. This, however, does not mean that the operational-
level headquarters can ignore assumptions made at the strategic level.
JFCs and their staffs must still plan appropriate responses, but their
responses to strategic-level assumptions are tailored to planning areas
they can affect.
56 │ methodology for employing design

Assumptions have three basic characteristics. They should be logical,

realistic, and essential for the planning to continue.29 There are no
“cookie cutters” for determining assumptions. But there are some
common categories of assumptions to consider in operational design.
These categories are time, politics, forces, and the enemy.30
At the operational level of war, time is arguably the most important
assumption, especially for power-projection nations. Time drives the
ability to prepare, deploy, and generate forces. It also influences the ef-
fectiveness of execution, cost, and everything related to an operation. If
an operation assumes C = D based on an unambiguous warning, then
deployment and the operation begin simultaneously. (C-day is the un-
named day on which deployment for an operation begins or is to begin.
D-day is the unnamed day on which a particular operation begins or is
to begin.) If C = D - 5, then deployment begins five days prior to the
beginning of the operation. If either of these assumptions proves to be
false, then a branch or sequel must be available for execution.
Political assumptions encompass a wide range of issues such as ac-
cess to host nation support, basing rights, overflight routes, and na-
tion neutrality. As with all assumptions, political assumptions are
inherently complex and must be constantly assessed for changes
through focused CCIRs. An example is the assumption that China
would not commit military forces to combat during the Korean War.
On 7 October 1950, the UN General Assembly approved a British-
sponsored resolution authorizing UN Command (UNC) forces to
occupy all of North Korea. This resolution was based on the belief
that China would not commit combat forces to support the North
Koreans. At the time, Chinese communist forces (CCF) were still
battling 400,000 Nationalist Chinese forces for control of China. The
Chinese economy was in shambles, and the CCF were underequipped
and undertrained. In spite of these challenges, on 19 October 1950
China introduced an initial Chinese People’s Volunteer Force (CPVF)
estimated at 260,000 men. The CPVF fought throughout the duration
of the Korean War and suffered over 539,000 casualties.31 It is inter-
esting to note that China may have decided as early as August 1950 to
intervene in Korea, but there was little if any attempt to collect and
evaluate CCIRs against this assumption.32
Assumptions about enemy forces are critical also, and it is vitally
important to never “assume away” an enemy capability. Examples of
enemy assumptions include where the enemy’s main effort will be,
when the enemy’s activities will culminate, and whether the enemy
 methodology for employing design │ 57

will use weapons of mass destruction. Historically, many plans have

failed because they underestimated an enemy’s capability and did not
have a requisite branch or sequel prepared to counter that capability.
Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) gives us an excellent example. Dur-
ing the planning for OIF a central assumption was that regular Iraqi
army units would “capitulate and provide internal security.”33 This as-
sumption was a key element in the decision to limit the amount of
combat power deployed to Iraq, and it had a significant impact on the
effectiveness of stability operations when this proved to be false.
Forces are another category of assumptions vital to power-projection
nations because they have significant and complex interrelationships
with all categories of assumptions. If a power-projection nation mis-
judges an assumption about forces, dire consequences can follow.
Most assumptions in this category revolve around the availability of
forces for employment. These include not only US forces, but also
such assets as prepositioned war stocks, maritime prepositioned sets
afloat, and coalition forces.
It is also important to understand that assumptions can have cas-
cading effects on decisions made about forces. OIF is again an excel-
lent illustration. The decision that OIF’s force structure was sufficient
to accomplish the strategic end state proved to be severely flawed for
several interconnected reasons. First, this decision was directly linked
to three critical planning assumptions:
1) The Iraqi regular army would “capitulate and provide internal
security.”
2) Iraqi resistance was unlikely.
3) Postwar Iraq would not be a US military responsibility.
Second, on 23 May 2003 the Coalition Provisional Authority dissolved
the Iraqi Army, which the US Central Command (USCENTCOM)
commander had assumed would provide internal security. Third, a
Government Accountability Office (GAO) analysis observed that the
OIF OPLAN did not document risk mitigation strategies in case as-
sumptions were proven wrong. According to a 2006 report by the
Joint Center for Operational Analysis, OIF planning did not examine
the consequences of assumptions, which contributed to the inability
of coalition forces to prevent the breakdown of civil order in Iraq.34
OIF highlights the direct correlation among assumptions, opera-
tional design’s planning framework, and decision analysis. Proper
58 │ methodology for employing design

development of assumptions allows JFCs and their staffs to frame risk

and determine risk levels. Assumptions also identify major decision
points for JFCs. Planners must make every effort possible to validate
or invalidate assumptions prior to reaching critical decision points.

Notes
1. Joint Publication (JP) 1-02, Department of Defense (DOD) Dictionary, 126.
2. US Army War College, Campaign Planning Primer AY 07, 10.
3. US Department of Defense, 2008 National Defense Strategy, 6.
4. Bush, President’s Address to a Joint Session of Congress and the American People.
5. US Department of Defense press briefing, Rumsfeld and Myers.
6. National Security Directive 54, Responding to Iraqi Aggression, 2.
7. JP 5-0, Joint Operation Planning, 11 August 2011, III-19.
8. JP 1-02, DOD Dictionary, 367.
9. JP 5-0, Joint Operation Planning, 26 December 2006, III-9.
10. JP 1-02, DOD Dictionary, 265.
11. Grant, ed., 1001 Battles That Changed the Course of World History, 181–86.
12. Chapius, A History of Vietnam from Hong Bang to Tu Duc, 84.
13. JP 3-0, Joint Operations, 11 August 2011, GL-6.
14. JP 5-0, Joint Operation Planning, 26 December 2006, GL-22.
15. Ibid., GL-19.
16. Kem, Campaign Planning.
17. Ibid. and Strange, Centers of Gravity and Critical Vulnerabilities.
18. Gordon and Trainor, The Generals’ War, 105.
19. US Army War College, Campaign Planning Handbook, 93.
20. JP 5-0, Joint Operation Planning, 26 December 2006, IV-20.
21. Ibid.
22. D’Amura, “Campaigns,” 42–51. See also Pogue, Supreme Command, which
provides a description of General Eisenhower’s wartime command, focusing on the
general, his staff, and his superiors in London and Washington and contrasting Al-
lied and enemy command organizations.
23. JP 5-0, Joint Operation Planning, 11 August 2011, III-35.
24. Ibid., IV-33.
25. JP 1-02, DOD Dictionary, 30.
26. Fuller, Military History of the Western World, 239.
27. Wells, The Battle That Stopped Rome.
28. US Army War College, Campaign Planning Handbook, 38.
29. JP 5-0, Joint Operation Planning, 11 August 2011, IV-8.
30. US Army War College, Campaign Planning Primer, 17.
31. Li, Millett, and Yu, Mao’s Generals Remember, 6.
32. Jian, “Sino-Soviet Alliance,” 26.
33. US Army, On Point.
34. US Joint Forces Command, Operation Iraqi Freedom May 2003 to June 2004.
 Chapter 4

Establishing the Link between Operational

Design and Decision Analysis

In recent years numerous publications have expanded the explora-

tion of operational design beyond our current joint doctrine. Their
focus has been how to integrate operational design into the JOPP and
what role commanders play in the process. As a result, operational
design is evolving as a leader-driven process oriented on problem
framing. The intellectual process of problem framing is extremely
valuable for developing a solution; however, deriving a correct solu-
tion does not necessarily guarantee success. To have success, the
commander must apply decision analysis to implement the solution.
The difference between problem framing and decision analysis is that
decision analysis produces decision criteria to aid a commander in
making the best decision.
The structure that operational design provides shapes decision
analysis directly and indirectly throughout the JOPP. However, there
are three critical junctures in the JOPP where operational design has
the potential to significantly influence the effectiveness of decision
analysis. The first juncture is in the JFC’s overarching vision for the
theater or operational strategy. The second is during course analysis
and war gaming, and the third is just after the selection of the ac-
cepted course of action. Figure 29 illustrates these junctures and the
commander/staff operational design interaction during the JOPP.
As an example of design’s link to decision analysis, if the forward
edge of the battle area (FEBA) is penetrated by a major force, the cor-
rect decision may be to commit the operational reserve. But if the
reserve is committed too soon or too late—or along the wrong axis—
it may result in a catastrophic failure.
The cognitive map’s holistic view, combined with its capacity to
identify decision points, is one of the principal reasons why opera-
tional design should be a commander-driven process that integrates
into the JOPP. In contrast, the JOPP is primarily a staff-driven pro-
cess that takes its direction from the JFC’s vision embedded in the
command’s operational design. Operational design should begin at
the initiation of the JOPP and continue through to the completion of
the plan or the execution of the order. The primary reason for this is
60 │ establishing the link

Joint Operations Planning Process Operational Design

(Staff Driven) (Commander Driven)
Commander/Staff Receive Guidance
Interaction Assess End State
Initiation Determine Objectives and Effects
Conduct COG Factor Analysis
Define Initial Assumptions

Initial Guidance to Staff

and Components
Mission Analysis
Determine Decisive Points
Draft Lines of Operation/Effort
Refine Assumptions
Provide Planning Guidance 1 Present Initial Cognitive Map
to Staff and Components Provide Overarching Strategy

COA Development
Receive Input from Components and Interagency

COA Analysis 2 Develop Decision Support Template (DST)

and War Gaming and Synchronization Matrix
Provide DST and Synchronization Matrix to Components and Interagency
COA Comparison Receive Input from Components and Interagency

Conduct COA Decision Support Analysis

Identify Branches and Sequels
Prepare Risk Assessment

COA Approval 3 Develop Decision Support Refine Cognitive Map

Matrix Finalize Assumptions
and Prepare CCIR

Plan or Order Development Operational Design Completed

Figure 29. Integration of commander-driven operational design with

the joint operation planning process

that operational design should set the foundation for the analysis of
preplanned and emergent-opportunity decisions.

Overarching Vision for Strategy

As the JFC completes the initiation and mission-analysis steps of
the JOPP, one of the products he should develop is a preliminary vi-
sion of the theater or operational strategy. Strategy has been charac-
terized by terms such as annihilation, attrition, deterrence, decapita-
tion, disaggregation, and diffusion. JP 1-02 defines theater strategy as
“concepts and courses of action directed toward securing the objec-
tives of national and multinational policies and strategies through the
synchronized and integrated employment of military forces and
other instruments of national power.”1 The vision the JFC constructs
functions as a guideline for COA development. It should be as ge-
neric as possible so that it does not prejudice courses of action, but it
 establishing the link │ 61

should also have enough structure to ensure that the staff under-
stands what the commander wants. One methodology embedded in
operational design for achieving this is the cognitive map described
in the previous chapter.
A cognitive map reflects the intrinsic relationships among LOOs,
decisive points, centers of gravity, objectives, effects, and the end-
state conditions. This visualization assists JFCs with determining the
arrangement of multiple LOOs and assessing the risks associated
with assumptions. But most importantly, the cognitive map identifies
initial decision points critical to the success of the operation. Note that
decision points are different from decisive points. A decision point is
a position in space and time when the commander or staff anticipates
making a key decision concerning a specific course of action.
Figure 30 depicts a JFC’s initial cognitive map developed prior to
providing COA guidance. The map indicates decisive points, LOOs,
enemy COGs, objectives, and end-state conditions. The map also de-
notes two key decision points that will shape the strategy. The first
decision point on the deter LOO identifies the crucial point where
deterrence fails. This decision point will mandate a military recom-

Lines of Operations with

Decisive Points and Decision Centers of
Points Deterrence Fails Gravity

Deter
Strategic
Decision
Point Level
Secure
FDOs
Force
NEO APODs
Leadership
Protection
SPODs

Sequel
Combat Operations Termination
Operational
Level
Enemy Decision
Initiate Def. Off.
Point
Exploitation
Ops Forces
Pre ATO Ops Collapse Forces
Sequel
Security and Stability Tactical
Level
UN Insurgent
HA Eco. Assumptions:
Reconstruction Handoff Forces
Time
Politics
Forces
Enemy

Figure 30. Cognitive map outlining an initial strategy

62 │ establishing the link

mendation and a political decision to use force. The staff should take
this guidance and incorporate it into courses of action being devel-
oped. The second decision point on the combat operations LOO
identifies a decision to recommend termination of combat opera-
tions. In this case, planners assess that the enemy has limited strategic
objectives and will sue for peace prior to friendly forces achieving all
military termination criteria. This preplanned decision point allows
the JFC to formulate recommended decision criteria for political
leaders and determine how it affects the theater strategy and the at-
tainment of national or multinational strategic objectives. The main
point of this example is that developing a sound operational design
enhances the JFC’s ability to envision the best strategy for the opera-
tion or campaign. This strategy, linking the application of military
force to the attainment of national or multinational strategic objec-
tives, forms the basis for COA development.
When JFCs incorporate their strategic vision into COA develop-
ment, the staff ’s productivity increases significantly. This also pre-
vents the myopic exploration of divergent (e.g., preemptive and non-
preemptive) courses of action. Directing the development of a
nonpreemptive course of action is largely an unproductive activity
because of the exceptional risk to the military force involved. No one
should expect a US or multinational military force to stand idly by
while an adversary strikes a blow. The more astute guidance is to de-
velop courses of action with branches and sequels that give political
leaders the flexibility to use military force if deterrence fails. This type
of guidance also forms a much better foundation for identifying gov-
erning factors to select the best course of action.
In operational design it is imperative to understand that a large
number of factors shape theater strategy, but one of the most critical
influences on strategy is power projection. The Mongol conquest of
Transoxiana, modern day Uzbekistan, provides a relevant example
for today. In 1218 a Mongol caravan with emissaries was transecting
the territory of Transoxiana ruled by Shah Ala al-Din Muhammad II.
One of the Shah’s governors, Inalchuq, interdicted the caravan in the
vicinity of Otrar and slaughtered its 450–500 occupants. This event
occurred as the Mongols were heavily engaged in the conquest of north
China. As a result, instead of applying military force Genghis Khan
sent three emissaries to the Shah: two Mongols and a Muslim. The
Shah shaved the two Mongols, beheaded the Muslim, and sent his
head back to Genghis Khan with the two Mongol ambassadors. Out-
 establishing the link │ 63

raged at this provocation, Genghis assembled 90,000 men and marched

to Transoxiana.2 The initial engagement occurred along the Syr Darya
River in the Fergana Valley. The Shah’s forces, with an estimated 400,000
men, defeated the Mongol attack. However, Genghis used this set-
back to fix and envelop the Shah’s forces. The Mongols marched north
and attacked the city of Otrar, capturing the governor, Inalchuq, who
had attacked the Mongol caravan. The Mongols put Inalchuq to death
by pouring molten silver into his eyes and ears and continued their
attacks.3 Stunned by the Mongol advances, the Shah’s forces were para-
lyzed. The Mongols then attacked the strategic cities of Bukhara and
Samarkand, causing the Shah’s forces to completely collapse.
At first glance the salient lesson appears to be that a strategy of
asymmetric attack caused catastrophic psychological paralysis. But the
real lesson in the Mongol strategy is power projection. The Mongols
were able to project a light, lethal force over 2,000 miles across the Tien
Shan Mountains without the aid of a modern transportation system.
Today this lesson is just as important as it was in 1219–20. You can
have an adaptive and sophisticated strategy, but before you can bring
force to bear you must be able to get to the fight. This basic requirement
places some significant limitations on strategy. As JFCs develop their
strategy, they must judiciously assess the combat power needed to
achieve the strategic political objectives and their ability to project that
power. Assuming that there will be time to build a complete force is
high risk. The international community has learned through Opera-
tions Desert Shield, Desert Storm, Allied Force, and Iraqi Freedom that
if an opponent is afforded the freedom to build combat power, the con-
sequences are grave. Strategic lift will limit the initial agility of strategy
in most current operational environments. Therefore, JFCs are initially
left with a baseline choice of a denial or halt strategy. A halt strategy
focuses on simply stopping the enemy. In contrast, a denial strategy
concentrates on bringing the adversary to culmination, preventing him
from accomplishing his military and political objectives. Both of these
approaches have a tremendous impact on COA development. Com-
manders cannot develop a cogent concept of operations or a scheme of
maneuver without knowing how their force builds.
Based upon the JFC’s strategy, power projection should build on
four rudimentary and integrated force modules: command, control,
communications, computers, and intelligence, surveillance, and recon-
naissance (C4ISR); combat power; force protection; and sustainment.
Each of these modules can be combined into joint and multinational
64 │ establishing the link

force packages designed to accomplish specific objectives. The intent

here is not to conduct a transportation feasibility analysis before devel-
oping and analyzing courses of action. Rather, the main point is for the
JFC to have strategy guidance that incorporates a force flow vision. Fig-
ure 31 provides a conceptual overview of modularly arranging forces
into force packages to accomplish specific deployment objectives. In
this case, based on the operational environment, the JFC gives C4ISR
the initial priority of force flow to build situational awareness. As the
force flow progresses, the priority shifts to force generation, then inter-
diction, and finally to combat forces for maneuver. The force flow then
continues in the form of additional packages until all of the JFC’s forces
have closed in theater. Arranging forces in modules and packages pro-
vides enhanced operational flexibility to the JFC.
Additionally, understanding force-generation priorities empowers
a JFC’s ability to maximize the effectiveness of a deterrence phase
and, if required, have the force necessary to accomplish the national
strategic objectives. The basic principles of the construct “strategic
preclusion” are valid. JFCs should develop a strategy that employs
joint maneuver and interdiction forces capable of moving with such
speed and with such overmatching lethality that a potential enemy
cannot “set” his forces and operate at an advantage.4

Power Projection and

Theory of Strategic Preclusion
FDO/Situational Awareness Force Generation
Package Package
Sustainment
Sustainment
Protection

Protection
Combat
Combat

Power
C4IISR

C4IISR
Power

Force
Force

C-Day 7 14

Interdiction Maneuver
Package Package
Sustainment

Sustainment
Protection

Protection
Combat

Combat
Power

Power
C4IISR
C4IISR

Force

Force

14 21 C+28
Figure 31. Notional arrangement of modules into force packages
 establishing the link │ 65

Course of Action Analysis and War Gaming

The second juncture at which operational design’s framework in-
fluences decision analysis is during the COA analysis and war-gaming
step. Most of the war gaming conducted today is automated; however,
manual war gaming provides JFCs the opportunity to evaluate
courses of action against a complex, adaptive adversary. Manual war
gaming is one of the most difficult activities in the JOPP. It requires a
well-defined structure, discipline, extensive preparations, and re-
hearsals. In spite of these costs, war gaming provides an operational
fidelity that is invaluable to the JFC. It sets the foundation for the
development of the decision support template (DST) and the deci-
sion support matrix (DSM).
The structure of a war game is composed of the war-gaming tech-
nique, the war-gaming staff, and the physical layout of the war-gaming
space. The selection of the war-gaming technique depends on the
amount of time available to war-game and the JFC’s focus. The two
most commonly used techniques are war gaming by phase and by
decisive points. The JFC and his staff can use one or a combination of
the techniques. War gaming by phase is the most comprehensive ap-
proach and usually requires the most time (fig. 32). This technique
assists the JFC with assessing specific phases or an entire operation.
War gaming by decisive points provides the JFC and his staff the
ability to focus on a geographic area, key event, function, or critical
factor during a specific period of time (fig. 33). Examples of such

Phase 1 Phase 2 Phase 3 Phase 4 Phase 5 COA

OPFOR COA

Cycle 1 Cycle 2 Cycle 3

Figure 32. War gaming by phase. (Reprinted from Führungsakademie

der Bundeswehr, Wargaming: Guide to Preparation and Execution
[Hamburg, Germany: Führungsakademie der Bundeswehr, 2006], 8.)
66 │ establishing the link

Base
COA
DP DP
of DP DP DP COG
Ops
DP DP

OPFOR COA

Cycle 1 Cycle 2

Figure 33. War gaming by decisive points. (Reprinted from Füh-

rungsakademie der Bundeswehr, Wargaming Guide to Preparation and
Execution [Hamburg, Germany: Führungsakademie der Bundeswehr,
2006], 8.)

decisive points include a constrained sea line of communication,

lodgment operations, and key command and control transitions.
The staff organization supporting war gaming normally consists of
four to five major sections: the executive section, support section,
blue cell, white cell, and red cell (fig. 34). The executive section directs
and controls the war game. The section’s war-gaming director has
overall responsibility for executing the JFC’s guidance during the war
game. The coordinator facilitates preparation and setup of the war
game, and the referee adjudicates blue- and red-cell moves. The sup-
port section consists of the component liaison officers (LNO) and
operational analysts, who provide detailed analysis of component
contributions and joint functions. The blue cell consists of joint plan-
ning group (JPG) members responsible for developing, executing,
and assessing the effectiveness of the friendly course of action being
war-gamed. The white cell is optional. Its primary role is playing non-
belligerent actors who may have a significant effect on a course of
action. A good example of this is China’s potential effect on courses
of action involving the Korean peninsula. Each of these elements has
crucial responsibilities in war gaming, but perhaps the most impor-
tant cell impacting decision analysis is the red cell.
As a JPG forms, one of the JPG director’s first tasks is establishing
a dedicated red cell to analyze enemy courses of action. The red cell
should do much more than simply plan red moves. It should prepare
 establishing the link │ 67

Executive Support
Director of War Gaming
Coordinator LNOs
Referee OA-Experts
Scribe

Chain of Command
Support

Red Cell Blue Cell White Cell

Spokesman Spokesman Spokesman
Scribe Scribe Scribe
JOPG JOPG Other

Figure 34. War-gaming sections. (Reprinted from Führungsakademie

der Bundeswehr, Wargaming Guide to Preparation and Execution
[Hamburg, Germany: Führungsakademie der Bundeswehr, 2006], 8.)

a red operational design focused at a minimum on the enemy’s most

likely and most dangerous courses of action. The operational design
should identify enemy assumptions, branches, sequels, and associ-
ated decision points. Additionally, the red cell should analyze how
red leaders collect intelligence, make decisions, and conduct their
planning, decision, and execution cycle.
Understanding adversarial decision making is an absolutely essential
planning element for JFCs because it links the application of military
force to the attainment of national strategic end-state conditions. In
simple terms, when friendly forces face an adversary, they are trying
either to deter that adversary from action or compel him to take an
action. The cumulative effects of inappropriately applied military
force may move friendly forces further away from attaining the na-
tional strategic end-state rather than closer. To set the foundations for
this analysis, the red cell should analyze the enemy’s decision making
model. The tendency for most westerners is to approach decision
making from a rational model based on cost-benefit association.
How state and nonstate actors make decisions, however, is far more
complex than this, especially when one considers the effects of cul-
68 │ establishing the link

tural, ideological, and religious dimensions. When the red cell has
the ability to replicate the adversary’s decision-making model, it sub-
stantially enhances the effectiveness of war gaming and builds a key
perspective for the JFC to make friendly force decisions. Compre-
hending the enemy’s decision analysis model will also yield indica-
tions of whether or not the enemy is altering his strategy.
During the Vietnam War the North Vietnamese skillfully alter-
nated the emphasis of their strategy between conventional and un-
conventional operations (fig. 35). In 1965 the North Vietnamese
Army (NVA) and National Liberation Front (NLF) attempted to use
battalion-sized conventional attacks to achieve their objectives. As
the Americans applied conventional forces to counter this maneuver,
the NVA shifted to irregular warfare. Unable to accomplish its strate-
gic objectives through irregular means, the NVA launched the Tet
offensive of 1968. When this failed, it reverted back to irregular war-
fare. In 1972, as the Americans attempted to withdraw their forces
under the policy of Vietnamization, the North Vietnamese launched
the Nguyen Hue (Chiến dịch Xuân hè) or Eastertide offensive. This
offensive cost the NVA over 125,000 lives; however, it set them in a

Predicting Effects
The Vietnam Paradigm

120
110 Exploit Conventional
100 with Warfare
# NVA Bn or Larger Attacks

90 Conventional
Assets
80
70
Exploit
60 with
50 Unconventional
40 Assets
30 Irregular
20 Warfare

10

1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972

Years

Figure 35. North Vietnamese alteration of strategy, 1965–72

 establishing the link │ 69

strategic position to overrun the South Vietnamese government in

1975.5 The focal point of this historical anecdote is not the alternation
of strategy, but the use of the red cell to predict alternations.
All sections involved in war gaming must understand the sequence
for the war game and approach it in a disciplined manner. Discipline
emanates from two sources of the war-game structure. The first is the
designation of the spokesmen for the red, blue, and white cells. Each
cell should ideally have only one spokesman, who must be able to
fully articulate the team’s actions. This minimizes potentially dis-
tracting discussions that fail to contribute to the war-game process.
The second source is time, and it serves as the principal means for
instilling discipline in the war-game process. This element of struc-
ture keeps the war game from disintegrating into a series of peripheral
discussions about a course of action. When the JPG decides to con-
duct a war game, it requires a tremendous investment in time and
resources. If the JPG director allows the structure to disintegrate, the
return on investment is significantly diminished. The intent of war
gaming is threefold: to assist the JFC in selecting the best course of
action, identify COA modifications, and conduct decision analysis.
The war-gaming sequence, combined with strict time limitations,
provides the vital element of discipline. A notional sequence for one
war-game move is depicted in figure 36. The war-gaming sequence
used most often is a basic action-reaction-counteraction move cul-
minated by a cognition phase.
Prior to the first move, the war-gaming coordinator explains to all
sides how the war game will be executed. Then the war-gaming direc-
tor sets the context of the operational environment by reviewing the
strategic setting, salient characteristics of the area of responsibility
(AOR), the belligerents, and key events leading up to the start of the
war game. With this foundation established, the blue and red cells
preview the courses of action to be war-gamed, their order of battle,
and the disposition of their forces. Based on this information, the
war-gaming director decides which side has the initiative.
When the war-gaming cells begin the action step of the war game,
the team with the initiative provides an overview of its activities dur-
ing the designated operational time frame. The opposing team is then
allowed to ask any questions for clarification, and the referee adjudi-
cates any controversial activities identified during the sequence.
When this concludes, the scribes from the executive section and red,
blue, and white cells record the results.
70 │ establishing the link

Initial Situation

War-game overview

Review of strategic setting

Red/blue overview of COAs

Red/blue current order of battle described

Decision on red or blue initiative

Action Reaction Counteraction

Team with initiative Opposing team identifies Team with initial initiative
describes initial actions actions observed identifies actions observed

Opposing team asks Opposing team describes Team with initial initiative
questions for clarification reactions describes counteractions

Umpire adjudicates Team with initial initiative Team with initial initiative asks
asks questions for clarification questions for clarification
Scribes record results
Umpire adjudicates Umpire adjudicates

Scribes record results Scribes record results

Cognition Phase

Figure 36. Action-reaction-counteraction war-gaming sequence

In the reaction step, the side without the initiative identifies the
opposing side’s actions it observed and summarizes its reactions.
When it finishes, the opposing team asks questions for clarification,
and the referee adjudicates any controversial activities. The scribes
record the results and insights from this step. Figure 37 shows this
sequence in a time line.
The side with the initiative then begins the counteraction step by
describing what it observed during the reaction step and giving an
overview of its counteractions. When this concludes, the side without
the initiative asks questions for clarification, and the referee provides
adjudication, if necessary. The scribes then record the results and in-
sights from this step.
The most important step in a war-game move is the cognition
phase. During this step the component LNOs, subject matter experts,
and operational analysts are polled for their insights on the war-game
move. The scribes review their conclusions for the plenary war-game
group. The focal points for this analysis are decision points, decision
 establishing the link │ 71

Initial Situation

(10 min.)
War-game overview
(5 min.)
Review of strategic setting

Red/blue overview of COAs (3 min.)

Red/blue current order of battle described (3 min.)

Decision on red or blue initiative (1 min.)

Action Reaction Counteraction

Team with initiative (3 min.) Opposing team identifies (1 min.) Team with initial initiative (1 min.)
describes initial actions actions observed identifies actions observed

Opposing team asks (1 min.) Opposing team describes (3 min.) Team with initial initiative
(3 min.)
questions for clarification reactions describes counteractions

Umpire adjudicates Team with initial initiative (1 min.) Team with initial initiative (1 min.)
asks questions for clarification asks questions for clarification
Scribes record results (1 min.)
Umpire adjudicates Umpire adjudicates

Scribes record results (1 min.) Scribes record results (1 min.)

Teams’ conclusions (1 min.)

Components’ personnel insights (5 min.)
Cognition Phase Team scribes’ review (1 min.)
Director’s conclusions (1 min.)

Figure 37. Notional war-gaming time line for one move

criteria, CCIRs, risk, and recommended modifications to the course

of action. The war-gaming director then determines the conclusions
from the move and directs that the appropriate changes be recorded
in the COA decision support template.
A DST is a graphic record of the war game consisting of the con-
cept of operations graphics and the synchronization matrix. It “de-
picts decision points, timelines associated with movement of forces
and the flow of the operation, and other key items of information
required to execute a specific friendly course of action.”6 The DST
also identifies named areas of interest (NAI) and target areas of inter-
est (TAI). NAIs are the geographical areas where “information that
will satisfy a specific information requirement can be collected.
Named areas of interest are usually selected to capture indications of
adversary courses of action, but also may be related to conditions of
the operational environment.”7 TAIs are “the geographical area[s]
where high-value targets can be acquired and engaged by friendly
forces. Not all target areas of interest will form part of the friendly
course of action; only target areas of interest associated with high
72 │ establishing the link

priority targets are of interest to the staff. These are identified during
staff planning and war gaming. Target areas of interest differ from
engagement areas in degree. Engagement areas plan for the use of all
available weapons; target areas of interest might be engaged by a single
weapon.”8 Figure 38 shows a decision support template combining
decision graphics with a synchronization matrix.

Decision Support Template

DP 1

Synchronization Matrix
Activity/Time D-20 D-10 D-Day D+1 D+2 D+3 D+4 D+5 D+10
Phase Deterrence Seize Initiative Dominate
OPFOR

LCC
Components

MCC
ACC
SOCC
POTF
JIACG
C2
Intel
Functional

Sustainment
Areas
Joint

Info Ops
Civil Affairs
MILDEC
Decision Pts
Assessment

Branch
Sequel
CCIR
Risks

Figure 38. The DST composed of map graphic and synchronization

matrix
 establishing the link │ 73

Key to abbreviations in figures 38–42

AA avenue of approach JIACG joint interagency coordination
ACC air component commander group
ATO air tasking order LCC land component commander
AUR country of Auriga MCC maritime component com-
Bde brigade mander
BLA Batari Liberation Army MEB Marine expeditionary brigade
C2 command and control MILDEC military deception
C4ISR command; control; com- NAI named area of interest
munications; computers; and OEF operational exploitation force
intelligence, surveillance, and Op. res. operational reserve
reconnaissance OPFOR opposing force
CCIR commander’s critical informa- Ops operations
tion requirement PER country of Perseus
CHOP change of operational control POTF psychological operations task
CJTF combined joint task force force
COG center of gravity Pts points
COIN counterinsurgency SOCC special operations component
DP decision point commander
FEBA forward edge of the battle area SOF special operations forces
FOM freedom of movement TAI target area of interest
HA humanitarian assistance TBM theater ballistic missile
Info information Vul Vulpeculan
Intel intelligence WARNORD warning order
IO information operations WMD weapons of mass destruction
JFLCC joint force land component
commander

Decision Support Matrix

The third juncture in the JOPP where operational design has the
potential to enhance decision analysis is after the JFC approves the
course of action. Once the JFC approves a course of action, it forms
the basis for the plan’s strategic concept, providing an opportunity to
develop a decision support matrix and finalize assumptions. The col-
lective analysis derived from the DST’s record of enemy actions,
friendly actions, NAIs, and TAIs establishes a crucial foundation for
determining key decision points. JP 1-02 defines a decision point as
“a point in space and time when the commander or staff anticipates
making a key decision concerning a specific course of action.”9 How-
ever, identification of decision points is only half a DST’s value. The
other half is formulating the decision criteria for the JFC’s preplanned
decisions and emergent opportunities. This information is captured
in a decision support matrix that records each key preplanned deci-
sion and decision criteria that evolve from the DST analysis and re-
finement of assumptions.
The following heuristic example links the war-gaming analysis
captured in the DST (fig. 39) with the creation of a DSM. One of the
most crucial decisions a JFC may have to make is the commitment of
 NAI 1
FEBA A
X

X
FEBA B TAI 1
X
DP 2

NAI 3
XX
TAI 3

NAI 2
FEBA A
XX

Decision Support Template

Phase II Seize Initiative
Commences: G-Day (the day on which an order is Tasks:
or is due to be given to deploy a unit) - Defend FEBA A
Ends: - Establish local air superiority
- G+20 or culmination of enemy forces - Conduct special reconnaissance
- Establish local sea superiority
Objectives: - Secure Capella International Airport (CIAP)
- Deny enemy attainment of objectives - Generate force for dominate phase
- Set conditions for offensive operations
- Stabilize Aurigan government Priority of Effort:
LCC, ACC, MCC, SOCC
Effects:
- Force enemy to culminate forward of FEBA A Phase Transition Criteria:
- Interdict enemy exploitation forces Enemy forces culminated forward of FEBA A; conditions
- Delegitimize BLA insurgency set for offensive operations
Time G+1
ENEMY Multidivision atk along coastal AAs in Perseus and Auriga; Sptd
Vul by insurgents
BLA Threatening Bde size penetration FEBA A; OEF moving toward coastal AA NAI 1
- Insurgents blocking LLOCs vic. Aurigan capital of Capella
CJTF Main body in Sagitta. Coalition Response Force (CRF) BCT+ in Perseus. Priority of effort:
Denial ops vic Perseus coastal AA
LCC Perseus’s forces at < 70%; tactical reserve committed
ACC Local air superiority vic Perseus coastal AA
Defensive counterair-APODS, Perseus SPODs
Counterland (CAS/AI) – priority of effort Perseus Coastal AA
Strategic attack of Vulpeculan WMD employment sites
MCC Move SAG (MD) to vic Perseus Nth Coast SPODs; establish local sea superiority vicinity
Perseus coast; conduct countermine ops; prepare to CHOP MEB to LCC
Intel Priority of ISR to NAI 1 and TAI 1
IO Highlight Vulpeculan aggression; humanitarian crisis; impact on world energy resources
PSYOPS Conduct leaflet drops in BLA areas announcing CJTF commitment to Aurigan govt.
C2 Forward CP in Sagitta; TAC vicinity port of Vermillion
Force Protection Priority of effort: APODs; SPODs; TAAs; LOCs
Decision Points Decision point 2: CHOP MEB to LCC as operational reserve; commit operational reserve for
employment vicinity TAI 1.
Branches Move CJTF main body through Sagitta and attack Vulpecula to force withdrawal of forces
from Perseus
CCIR Priority: Decision criteria for decision point 2 (commitment of operational reserve)
Risk High Risk – Mitigate risk through deployment of air and naval power

Figure 39. DST analysis to commit operational reserve

 establishing the link │ 75

the operational reserve. This is such a critical decision because when

the operational reserve is committed, the joint force risks culmina-
tion. If the reserve is committed too soon or too late, or along the
wrong axis, the force may experience catastrophic failure. In the DST
shown in figure 39, the JFC faces a multidirectional attack without
the ability to employ a fully operational combined joint task force
(CJTF). He risks losing his seaports of embarkation (SPOE), and a
major enemy force is penetrating the forward edge of the battle area
(FEBA). Does he commit the reserve or not? By framing the problem,
the JFC knows intuitively to commit the reserve. However, even
though this is a correct decision, how the decision is executed deter-
mines the decision’s outcome. Framing the problem and determining
the correct solution do not necessarily guarantee success. In this case,
the war game has identified the early commitment of the operational
reserve as a critical decision the JFC must make. The JFC and the staff
examine this decision point and the information recorded on the
DST from the war game and develop decision criteria that will be
recorded in the DSM.
Figure 40 provides an example of a DSM format identifying the
decision point, TAI, NAI, event, decision required, decision criteria,
assets available for employment, and CJTF actions related to this ex-
ample. This format deliberately separates decision criteria and CJTF
actions into the information required for a warning order and the
information required for an execute order. This builds flexibility for

Decision Support Matrix MCO

DP TAI NAI Event Decision Req Decision Criteria Assets CJTF Actions
Vul forces Authorize JFLCC to Vul forces threaten Bde-size Authorize preparation actions to
LCC
engage FEBA A issue warning order penetration of FEBA A CHOP MEB
1 #1 #1 in strength to operational ACC
Vul OEF preparing to move Issue warning order
along coastal reserve (MEB) to
316th Armor Bde vicinity NAI 1 MCC
AA and block penetration of Revise CJTF guidance letter
FEBA A
operational FEBA A along Perseus’s forces at < 80% SOF
Submit ATO input
exploitation coastal AA strength Perseus and
forces (OEF) CHOP MEB
WARNORD moving toward
CHOP MEB to JFLCC Auriga forces
coastal AA

Perseus’s forces Deploy MEB ashore Vul Bde at > 70% strength has LCC Issue execution order to CJTF
Execute Order unable to block
penetration of Vul
penetrated FEBA A
ACC and coalition forces
Air and fires are insufficient Redesignate operational reserve
forces Authorize JFLCC to MCC
alone to stop penetration
commit MEB to block
SOF
FEBA A penetrated penetration of FEBA Perseus’s forces < 70%
by Vul 1st A along coastal AA strength Perseus and
Echelon Bde Perseus’s reserve already Auriga forces
committed

Notes: Assume maximum enemy movement rate (mounted) in contact to be .5 km/hr

Estimate Vul movement time between FEBA A and FEBA B to be 24 hrs
Estimate minimum preparation time for MEB to block Vul penetration of FEBA A to be 24 hrs

Figure 40. Decision support matrix with decision criteria for a warn-
ing order and execute order
76 │ establishing the link

the JFC and his components by allowing them to initiate preparations

without committing forces prematurely.
It is impossible to forecast every decision a JFC must make; how-
ever, key preplanned decisions can be identified. Preplanned decisions
are those the JFC and the staff know they must make. They include,
but are not limited to, major branches and sequels discovered during
the JOPP’s COA analysis and war-gaming step, planning assump-
tions, priorities of effort, phase transitions, and time-sensitive targets.
We have already emphasized that each planning assumption re-
quires a branch or sequel, but also each branch and sequel require a
separate DST and DSM. If the planning assumptions are correctly
identified and an assumption proves not to be true, the success of the
entire operation or campaign is at risk.
The decision criteria embedded in the DSM provide a JFC an ana-
lytical tool for measuring risk and synchronizing the actions of friendly
forces. They also assist a JFC in visualizing the timing of operations.
If the DSM’s decision is properly constructed, the JFC will have a
much better gauge of when to issue a warning order and when to is-
sue an execute order. The collection of DSMs formed from the deci-
sion analysis becomes a playbook of decisions that allows the JFC to
review and study key decisions well before execution. Although JFCs
will always have to rely on coup d’oeil, decision analysis aided by a
DSM reduces the risks of ineffective or poorly thought-out plans and
decision points.
The DSM also provides a structure for enhancing the effectiveness
of CCIRs. JP 3-0 defines a CCIR as an information requirement iden-
tified by the commander as critical to facilitating timely decision
making. A CCIR’s two key elements are priority intelligence require-
ments (PIR) and friendly-force information requirements (FFIR). PIRs
establish intelligence-support priorities that the commander and staff
need to understand about an adversary or the operational environ-
ment. FFIRs identify information the commander and staff needs to
understand concerning the status of the friendly force and support-
ing capabilities. The information derived from a DSM’s decision cri-
teria corresponds directly to the PIRs and FFIRs that the JFC needs to
make a decision. Using the DSM decision criteria established in fig-
ure 40, figure 41 presents an example of how the DSM focuses CCIRs.
The decision required is to commit the operational reserve to stop an
enemy penetration of FEBA A along the coastal avenue of approach.
The PIR and FFIR for this decision are taken directly from the DSM’s
 establishing the link │ 77

Decision Point Decision Required CCIR Remarks

Commit operational PIR FFIR Latest time

reserve to stop penetration information of
of FEBA A along coastal value: D+4
Vul forces threaten Perseus’s forces at
avenue of approach Bde size penetration less than 80%
1 WARNING ORDER: of FEBA A strength

Authorize JFLCC to issue Vul OEF preparing

warning order to op. res. to move 316th Armor
(MEB) to block penetration Bde vicinity NAI 1
of FEBA A along coastal AA

CHOP MEB to JFLCC

EXECUTIVE ORDER: Vul Bde at greater Air and fires are

than 70% strength insufficient alone to
Deploy MEB ashore has penetrated stop penetration
FEBA A
Authorize JFLCC to commit Perseus’s forces less
MEB to block penetration of than 70% strength
FEBA A along coastal AA
Perseus’s reserve
already committed

Figure 41. CCIRs’ direct correlation to decision criteria established in

the DSM

decision criteria and aligned with a time-sensitivity estimate indicat-

ing the latest time the information is of value. This focuses the collec-
tion and analysis of CCIRs against specific priority JFC decisions.
Throughout the JOPP the cognitive map is constantly refined to cap-
ture the JFC’s operational vision. This map provides the JFC the ability
to communicate his vision to political leaders, allies, combatant com-
manders, interagency organizations, intergovernmental organizations,
nongovernmental organizations, and subordinate components. This
communication mechanism links all three levels of war and serves as a
blueprint for the operation or campaign. Figure 42 illustrates a refined
cognitive map. The cognitive map and the analysis in the DST and
DSM are essential elements for making effective decisions.
We must emphasize that not all decisions can be relegated to a
nice, neat, preplanned format. Adversaries are complex, adaptive
systems, and they are always capable of doing the unexpected. How-
ever, JFCs can shape emergent opportunities through both pro­
active and reactive operational maneuvers. The challenge is estab-
lishing a decision analysis framework that supports taking advantage
of emergent opportunities.
78 │ establishing the link

CJTF Lines of Operation

Lines of OBJECTIVES
Phase I Phase II Phase III Phase IV Operational
Operation Deter Seize Initiative Stabilize Enable COG Operational Strategic

Prevent escalation
Preclusion
1
1 2 6 9
Vul :
Demonstrate alliance
resolve to deter Vul
and widening of
conflict E
C4ISR

2 N
4
COIN
A B C D E
Counter BLA Restore security and
D
11 13 insurgency stability in AUR and
PER
BLA
5 Ensure
S
Security
37
Contribute to
restoration uninterrupted
access to region and
T
8 12 14
A
of regional peace and
security its energy sources

Aurigan
T
10 Security E
Forces Ensure safety of
Enable HA alliance nationals in
AUR
Enable evacuation
3 4 5 and HA ops Ensure FoM for HA

DECISIVE POINTS
Main Plan Sequel
1. IO dominance achieved 6. Vul isolated 12. Energy resources secured A. FEBA A defended
2. Lodgment secured 7. Govt. locations secured 13. BLA begins negotiation B. Air superiority established
3. Capella Int. Airport secured 8. Strategic infrastructures secured 14. Aurigan security forces capable C. Vul OEF culminated
4. Allied noncombatants secured 9. Vul ceases BLA support D. TBM/WMD threat neutralized
5. HA ops enabled 10. Kandar Valley secured E. Vul offensive forces destroyed
11. Insurgency contained

Decision Points End state: A peaceful, stable, and secure region with the
1. Initiate sequel 1 – deterrence fails sovereignty of each state secure within internationally recognized
2. Commit op reserve to FEBA A borders, not threatened by external aggression, with respect for the
3. Aurigan government collapses human rights of each individual and with freedom of access to the
4. Vul terminates hostilities international community.
5. BLA collapses

Figure 42. CJTF refined cognitive map

Shaping Emergent Opportunities

One of military history’s most masterful illustrations of shaping
emergent opportunities is Gen Ulysses S. Grant’s decision analysis
during the Civil War’s Vicksburg campaign. Located 250 feet above
the Mississippi River, the Confederate city of Vicksburg dominated
transportation and supply along the river. It was a strategic choke point
vital to the interests of both the North and the South and a crucial
objective for the Union forces.
In the fall of 1862, Grant mounted an initial campaign to seize
Vicksburg but failed after his logistics trains were destroyed at Holly
Springs on 20 December, by Confederate general Earl Van Dorn. In
spite of this setback, however, Grant immediately began analysis of
three courses of action to seize Vicksburg. The first was to dredge a
new channel in the Mississippi River allowing Union forces to bypass
the artillery dominating approaches to Vicksburg. The second in-
volved bypassing Vicksburg by opening an axis of advance through
the bayous between Providence and the Red River in Louisiana. The
third concentrated on finding an overland route on the west side of
the Mississippi.10 Although there was no formal doctrine at this time,
 establishing the link │ 79

Grant’s decision analysis demonstrated a mastery of operational de-

sign’s principal concepts. He combined the constructs of center of
gravity, lines of operation, and decisive points with deception to
shape emergent opportunities.
At the beginning of Grant’s second campaign to seize Vicksburg,
the Union and Confederate forces were almost evenly matched. Both
sides had approximately 50,000 men. Realizing this, Grant developed
and executed a deception plan consisting of several diversions to con-
fuse, fix, and realign Confederate force ratios. Grant ordered Maj Gen
Frederick Steele to attack north of Vicksburg and destroy Confeder-
ate supplies and livestock. This attack, in conjunction with movements
of Sherman’s forces and Col Benjamin Grierson’s famed cavalry raid,
diverted Confederate attention north and concealed Grant’s move-
ments on the west side of the Mississippi. But Grant’s boldest decision
was to cut his own supply lines.
On 30 April 1863, Grant crossed the Mississippi River below
Vicksburg at Bruinsburg (fig. 43) and was faced with two choices: halt
and build up logistics or cut his supply lines and continue the attack.
Grant seized the opportunity to continue the attack. His decision

Figure 43. The Vicksburg Campaign. (Reprinted from Vicksburg Na-

tional Military Park, map of the Vicksburg Campaign, http://www.nps
.gov/vick/planyourvisit/park-maps-and-brochure.htm.)
80 │ establishing the link

analysis assumed that if he waited for supplies, his adversaries, Con-

federate lieutenant generals John C. Pemberton and Joseph Johnston,
would be able to unite forces and reinforce Vicksburg with fresh
troops.11 Grant’s methodical decision analysis process enabled him to
envision how the campaign should unfold and established the condi-
tions necessary to keep his adversaries off balance. His forces swept
Confederate forces aside at Port Gibson on 1 May and continued on
to Raymond where he again defeated the Confederates. At Raymond,
Grant was confronted with Confederate forces to his west at Vicks-
burg and to his east at Jackson. At this critical point, he made the
decision to halt his assault on Vicksburg and attack the city of Jackson
to prevent the Confederate forces under Johnston from linking up
with Pemberton’s forces at Vicksburg. After defeating this threat to
his east flank, Grant moved westward to seize Vicksburg. His forces
defeated the Confederates at Champion Hill and again at the Big
Black River Bridge, and by 17 May were ready to begin the assault on
Vicksburg. Grant’s initial assaults on Vicksburg on 17 and 22 May
failed, and he was forced to conduct siege operations. The cumulative
effect of the siege operations, however, took its toll on the Confeder-
ate forces, and on 4 July 1863, Vicksburg surrendered.
In spite of the delay caused by the siege, Grant achieved a tremen-
dous victory at Vicksburg. For the South, the fall of Vicksburg was a
monumental strategic and psychological loss. A large part of Grant’s
success was due to his decision analysis and his ability to formulate
decision criteria. Grant used his preplanned decision analysis to de-
velop viable responses to emergent opportunities.
Shaping emergent opportunities draws from the cognitive vision
ingrained in operational design’s decision analysis. The DST de-
rived from the analysis and war gaming of COAs provides a critical
framework for examining the effects of friendly and enemy actions
on the campaign. Every action of a friendly or enemy force will
most likely precipitate some form of reaction or counteraction. An-
ticipating these actions and counteractions is vital. JFCs and their
staffs must be able to envision key decisions and establish clearly
defined decision criteria. The creation of specific decision criteria
not only provides a metric for commanders to assess decisions, but
also focuses the collection efforts of the CCIR. This minimizes the
passing of irrelevant information through the collection system and
speeds up analysis. It is important to emphasize that no one can
predict with 100 percent accuracy what an adversary will do. Ad-
 establishing the link │ 81

versaries are complex, adaptive, thinking systems. However, as JFCs

and their staffs construct their campaign, a deliberate and disci-
plined analysis of potential decisions will provide an effective ap-
proach to exploiting emergent opportunities.

Notes
1. JP 1-02, Department of Defense (DOD) Dictionary, 370.
2. de Hartog, Genghis Khan, 86–98.
3. Greene, 33 Strategies of War, 181.
4. US Army, Army Strategic Planning Guidance, 14–15.
5. Thayer, War without Fronts.
6. JP 1-02, DOD Dictionary, 98.
7. Ibid., 249.
8. Ibid., 361.
9. Ibid., 99.
10. Catton, Grant Moves South, 323; and Bearss, Vicksburg Campaign, 427.
11. Badeau, Military History, 162–63.
 Chapter 5

Operational Design and

Counterinsurgency

One of the common oversights embedded in doctrinal practices is

applying foundational principles to all operational environments
without assessing their relevance or impact. This is certainly the case
in applying operational design to major conventional operations and
counterinsurgency (COIN) operations. There are significant differ-
ences between these two types of operations. For both, as Clausewitz
stated long ago, “the political object is the goal, war is the means of
reaching it, and the means can never be considered in isolation from
their purposes.”1 However, destruction of the enemy’s armed forces in
a COIN environment does not necessarily guarantee the attainment
of the political objective.2 This factor has a significant impact on a
planner’s approach to operational design. The planner must recog-
nize the intricate nature of an insurgency’s root causes and craft a
design framework that supports the analysis of those complexities.
Some traditional aspects of operational design, such as center of
gravity and arrangement of operations by phase, may not relate or
function in the same manner as they do in major conventional op-
erations because of the COIN’s complexity.
Joint Publication (JP) 3-24, Counterinsurgency Operations, defines in-
surgency as “the organized use of subversion and violence by a group or
movement that seeks to overthrow or force change of a governing au-
thority.”3 In contrast, COIN is the “comprehensive civilian and military
efforts taken to defeat an insurgency and to address any core grievances.”4
The distinction between major conventional operations and COIN op-
erations is not just the fight for governance. There is also a dramatic dif-
ference in the temporal dimension that affects operational design.
Most analysts acknowledge that a commitment to conduct COIN
operations is often a commitment to decades of support. The root
causes of insurgencies usually evolve over lengthy periods of time,
and they are not going to be eradicated in a few months or even years.
A recent RAND study of COIN campaigns since 1945 found that the
successful ones lasted an average of 14 years and the unsuccessful
ones an average of 11 years.5 However, we must also understand that
COIN is a race against time. The counterinsurgent must produce a
84 │ operational design and counterinsurgency

balanced mixture of short-term and long-term results to solidify the

support of the people. As David Galula states, “The counterinsurgent
needs a convincing success as early as possible in order to demon-
strate that he has the will, the means, and the ability to win.”6 As fig-
ure 44 indicates, over time the counterinsurgent’s will to succeed and
his level of ambition decline markedly. As time elapses and the cost
goes up in lives and dollars, support for a COIN diminishes. This is
especially true for democratic nations waging COIN operations. In
any 10-year period, democratic nations undergo a series of business
and election cycles that directly affect the level of COIN ambition and
the will to win. Time will most often favor the insurgent. Conse-
quently, a COIN design should shape the natural trajectory working
against the will to win by showing immediate improvements in se-
lected key areas. This requires a sophisticated design that fuses an
understanding of the system with the ability to promote a sense of
enduring commitment to the host nation. Maximum campaign effec-
tiveness is achieved only when these two entities are integrated.

Governing Authority
Cost
Lives/$
Sanctuary
COIN
Will Security
to
Succeed Destabilization
and COIN design should
shape a vision that
Level of Services stabilizes the natural
Ambition trajectory of
Shadow insurgencies to foster
Governance the will to win.

Governance
Power
Consolidation
Economic Will
Development

5 10 15 Years
Figure 44. The classic clash of wills
 operational design and counterinsurgency │ 85

The initial focal point to increase campaign effectiveness is to

under­stand the system. Systems analysis is far from a new concept in
the COIN environment. The United States used systems analysis ex-
tensively in the COIN effort during the Vietnam War. The Military
Assistance Command Vietnam (MACV) defined a system as “a com-
plex of interdependencies between parts, components and processes
that involve discernible regularities of relationship.” This definition
also refers to a system as the interdependency between the complex
and its surrounding environment.7 Figure 45 provides a macro view
of the systems analysis developed by the MACV.
This analysis was augmented with numerous research studies such
as Douglas Pike’s War, Peace, and the Viet Cong that provided a stra-
tegic perspective on the Vietnamese communist strategy of dau tranh
(struggle). This strategy focused on the unremitting use of military
and nonmilitary force over long periods of time in pursuit of an ob-

Other
Support Communist
from Support
USSR Neutral and
Free World
Support North Support
from
China
Vietnam
War-Making
and Support
Enemy Enemy
Capabilities
Use of Use of
Laos Cambodia
DMZ

National Borders and Boundaries

Air Space

Territorial Waters

Enemy Base Areas,

Caches, Camps
Provinces
Enemy Military Activity

Districts
Local VC Areas

Villages, Precincts, Hamlets

VC Infrastructure and
Other Support

Figure 45. The MACV’s systems analysis. (Reprinted from Combined

Intelligence Center Vietnam, The Enemy System: Subregion 1, Research
and Analysis Study ST 70-01, 24 August 1970, figure 1.)
86 │ operational design and counterinsurgency

jective and possessed a dual character: the armed struggle and the
political struggle. Pike referred to the individual fighting the political
struggle as
the man in the black pajama of the Vietnamese peasant. His mission is to steal
the people away from the government. His concern is almost exclusively con-
trol of the people, as distinguished from the big-unit war, where the concern
is “control” of the enemy’s army. He seeks to achieve this through programs
designed to control the people, programs augmented and made possible by as
much (and as little) military effort as is required.8

The intent of the MACV’s analysis was to develop a conscious tar-

geting effort against the total enemy system by acting on subsystem
components. The enemy system was seen as complexes consisting of
one or more base areas, travel routes, commo-liaison stations, and
other elements that allowed it to functionally regenerate itself despite
the loss of single elements. The systems model developed by the
MACV encompassed the enemy subsystem, the Viet Cong Infra-
structure (VCI), the military subsystem, the rear services subsystem,
and an assessment of the system’s strengths and weaknesses.9
Although the US failed in Vietnam, the MACV’s systems analysis
was an effective COIN tool. Between 1967 and 1972, the percentage
of government-secured population rose from 42 to 80.10 During that
same time frame the Viet Cong’s force strength declined by 50 per-
cent, and by 1972 only 20 percent of the communist forces in South
Vietnam were Viet Cong. The rest were North Vietnamese regulars or
North Vietnamese in traditional Viet Cong units.11 We should re-
member that South Vietnam’s final capitulation was the result of a
North Vietnamese conventional invasion backed by 165,000 soldiers,
massive amounts of artillery, and over 600 tanks.
In spite of the US failure in Vietnam, systems analysis provides a
crucial tool for today’s COIN operations. Examining an insurgency
begins with understanding “the system” (fig. 46). This requires de-
fining what the system is and linking that system to campaign ef-
fectiveness. The framework for systems analysis is not just a political,
military, economic, social, information, and infrastructure (PMESII)
systems correlation. The systems analysis should reflect a compre-
hensive examination of the desired end state, related objectives, his-
torical context, relevant actors, and effects of culture. Additionally,
the framework should analyze potential barriers to COIN opera-
tions such as security, corruption, illiteracy, financial system, ethnic
divisions, religious diversity, and enemy sanctuary. Identifying bar-
 operational design and counterinsurgency │ 87

COIN Design
Understand the System
Religious

P
Diversity
Desired
Political End Corruption
State

M
Security
Capacity
Demonstrate Enduring
Commitment
Insurgent
Historical
Context E Barriers
Sanctuary

Cultural
Integration
Build Trust,
Confidence,
Relationships
COIN
Campaign

Actors
(Friendly/Adversary)
S Governance
Capacity Knowledge Actions
Effectiveness

I Financial
System
Cultural

I
Illiteracy
Environment
Ethnic
Divisions

Figure 46. COIN effectiveness: understanding the system and demon-

strating an enduring commitment

riers allows planners to scope the true context of the problem, ana-
lyze priorities, and determine a realistic balance of short- and long-
term desired results.
Once COIN planners frame the system, the focus becomes how to
engender a sense of enduring commitment to the host nation. COIN
forces must earn the trust and confidence of the host nation. One
method for accomplishing this is through cultural integration. The
process of cultural integration provides a mechanism for guiding
COIN forces in working within the host nation’s culture. Planners
assess the critical junctures where culture will have a dominant effect
in galvanizing popular support for COIN efforts. Planners should use
the historical, social, and anthropological information derived from
the systems analysis along with human terrain mapping to develop a
cultural integration process that links directly to policy actions.
There are three primary reasons why cultural integration is im-
portant. First, the insurgent uses the host nation’s culture to com-
municate with the population and gain support. This use of culture
empowers the clandestine infrastructure to project shadow gover-
88 │ operational design and counterinsurgency

nance. Second, when COIN forces operate outside of a culture, they

alienate the population and render policy objectives ineffective.
COIN forces must develop and disseminate narratives, symbols,
and messages that resonate with the population’s preexisting cul-
tural system.12 Third, governing authority is the focus for all COIN
operations. The counterinsurgent reaches a position of strength
only when his power is embedded in the host nation’s political or-
ganization and it is firmly supported by the population.13
The challenge for COIN commanders and their staffs is how to
digest the voluminous information emanating from the systems
analysis and correlate that information to policies that provide the
population with security, services, and governance. One method is
recording the salient systems analysis information on an opera-
tional environment map. Using Afghanistan as an example, figure
47 depicts a generalization of historical, social, cultural, and secu-
rity issues confronting the International Security Assistance Force
(ISAF). The concept of operational environment mapping is neither
a new nor a revolutionary idea. It simply provides a way to create a
holistic vision for the commander by connecting systemic parts to
the operational environment.
Although mapping the operational environment appears sim-
plistic, it requires significant critical insight to distinguish the
links between systemic parts. The Kajaki Dam in Helmand Prov-
ince, Afghanistan, is an excellent heuristic example. This dam
provides one of the most crucial services in Afghanistan—elec-
tricity. A 2006 survey conducted by the Asia Foundation found
that 25 percent of Afghanistan’s population listed the lack of elec-
tricity as their greatest problem. The only problem rated higher
was unemployment. Progress in providing electricity has been
systematically stalled. In 2001 approximately 6 percent of the popu-
lation had access to electricity. By 2010 only 497,000 of the ap-
proximately 4.8 million households in Afghanistan had access to
the national power grid.14 This is well below the developmental
goal of providing power to 65 percent of urban and 25 percent of
rural households.
Figure 48 presents a hypothetical map of the Kajaki Dam’s opera-
tional environment. The map highlights key PMESII factors and the
tremendous problems associated with security. But the map fails to
show the seams between the interagency vision, the host-nation gov-
ernment’s requirement for immediate progress, and the military’s
 operational design and counterinsurgency │ 89

ability to provide security. The United States Agency for International

Development’s (USAID) vision for the dam is a long-term objective
to provide cheap electricity to areas of Kandahar, Kajaki, Sangin,
Musa Qala, and Lashkar Gah. The Afghan government, however, is
under intense pressure to supply electricity to its constituents now,
and the failure to provide this service undermines the government’s
authority to govern.
The holdup is the military’s ability to create a secure environ-
ment, not only in the area around Kajaki, but also in the surround-
ing districts where the hydroelectric plant’s power cables traverse.
Since 2006 numerous military operations have supported the Ka-
jaki Dam development. Progress, however, was hindered because a
third turbine required to generate additional power could not be
moved along the route to the dam. In 2008 over 2,000 British sol-
diers escorted the third turbine generator to the dam site. Despite
this, the turbine was still not operational in 2010 because the ce-
ment and other materials required to emplace the turbine could not
be transported along the route to Kajaki. The other potential answer
to this problem is to supply the population in these areas with gen-
erator banks. This form of energy is more expensive, but it is easier
to construct, requires less security, and is more responsive to the
people’s needs.
Ironically, the beneficiary of the Kajaki Dam dilemma is the Taliban.
The failure to make the dam operational highlights the Government
of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan’s (GIROA) inability to provide
the basic essentials of security and services to its people. Additionally,
the Taliban’s control of the surrounding districts indirectly presents it
with a dual source of income to fund its operations. It diverts energy
from the Kajaki hydroelectric plant to irrigate poppy fields for opium
production and charges the local citizenry for the electricity that does
come from the plant. The Helmand provincial government estimates
it loses $4 million a year in electricity revenue to the Taliban.15
The Kajaki Dam illustrates the need to connect systemic parts, es-
pecially between the different levels of war. Creating a map of the
operational environment empowers cognitive vision, but it does not
present a means to analyze interconnecting systemic parts. One solu-
tion to this is combining the map of the operational environment
with traditional aspects of operational design.
 Op Design: Systems Analysis
1893 1919 1947 1949 1965 -1971 1973 1979 1989 1992 2001 2002 2003 2008 2009 2010

Durand Line King Amanullah India Golden Age Indo-Pak Golden Age Soviet Soviet Najibullah US OIF Pakistan ISAF Strategy Lisbon Conf.
ISAF
King Abdur Rahman Partition Starts Wars Ends Invasion Withdrawal Collapse Intervention Elections Change
National Identity Forming Influence of Pakistan 30 + Years of War
Information
Military Economic CIVCAS
ANSF Kabul Conf ISAF Strategy
Local Security Hydro-Electric Elections
Police Torkham Gate Lisbon Conf.
CIVCAS Mining Threat Objective
Pak Sanctuary
Pak ISI
HQN – Haqqani Withdrawal of all foreign forces from
Social Network (Zadran Afghanistan and the reestablishment of
Challenges Loya Jirga T Tribe) the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan
Political B
Islam
Rule of Law Issues TB – Taliban Restore Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan
Sharia Law
Elections H H
Tribes/Clans I I
Illiteracy
Pashtunwali G K
Corruption Infrastructure H
Dari-Pashto I T TTP – Tehrik-e Establish fundamentalist Islamic
Opium Production Water B
G Taliban PAK government in Pakistan
Reintegration Electricity T
Roads H N
I T H H S HIG – Hezb-e Islami Establish Sunni Islamist state under
Health Care B Q Q
G M Gulbuddin Gulbuddin Hekmatyar
Education N N
T
B HIK – Hezb-e Islami Regain historical control of Nangahar
Barriers
T Khalis
• TB/HQN Sanctuary in Pakistan B
• Cultural Understanding of Afghanistan T
T
• Security Capacity P TNSM – Tehrik Implement Sharia Law in PAK
H Nefaz-E Shariat
• CIVCAS Q
• Corruption Mohammdi
N
T
• Narco-Trafficking T T
• Illiteracy B P T
B Elements of Insurgent Influence
• Financial System
• Shadow governance
T Pakistan
B
• Population intimidated and/or coerced
• Insurgents have freedom of movement
• Friendly freedom of movement limited
ISAF Focus Cultural
Strategic Minerals • Infrastructure development disrupted
• National through local governance improved Qawm • Economic capacity truncated
• Security in key population centers Key Trade Routes Deobandi Islam
• Security connected between regions Pashtunwali
• Friendly freedom of movement assured Jirga
• Major infrastructure projects ongoing Human Terrain (Durrani, Ghilzay…)
Hoqooq
• Economic corridor sustainable Baksheesh

Figure 47. Map of the operational environment

 Helmand Province Kajaki Dam

Helmand Province
23,058 square miles
Mountainous to north
Desert plain in south
Helmand River runs throughout
Source of water and electricity
Economy
Poppy cultivation
Barley, cotton, wheat
Apricots, grapes, melons
Animal husbandry
Ring road = main artery
Capital: Lashkar Gah
Population: up to 1.4 million
94% rural
Kajaki Dam
Ethnic composition
Vital to development plans
Mainly Pushtun
Electrifying southern Afghanistan
Barakzai: 32%
Increasing cultivation
Noorzai: 16%
Dam under renovation
Alokzai: 9%
Taliban controls surrounding areas
Eshaqzai: 5%
Some Baluch in south
Literacy rate: 4% Alizai Tribe
Regional Taliban HQ
Part of Durrani Confederation
Traditional Taliban Stronghold
Hasanzai Leader: Sher Mohamed Akhundzada
Opposed by some Insurgent Influence and Capability
Located in: Not Assessed
Baghran
INS Limited Capability
Alizai Musa Qala
Naw Zad INS Demonstrated Capability
Kajaki Districts INS Effective Capability
Dominated Helmand until 1994
Jalozai Returned to power in 2001
Reprisals taken against Eshaqzai

Figure 48. Hypothetical Kajaki Dam operational environment map

92 │ operational design and counterinsurgency

Relationship between the Traditional

Aspects of Operational Design and
Irregular Warfare’s COIN Operations
Assessing any type of operation begins with an understanding of
the levels of war or operations. Many planners talk past each other
because of confusion over what level of war they are discussing, and
nowhere is it more confusing than in COIN operations. No two in-
surgencies are the same. They differ in their root causes, operational
environments, and insurgent forces. Additionally, insurgent actions
at the tactical level draw immediate attention from all levels of war,
and this phenomenon blurs responsibilities, interagency integration,
and command relationships. Figure 49 presents a traditional view of
the levels of war and corresponding operational designs. COIN op-
erations have an inherent complexity, and insurgencies cannot usually
be resolved through quick, decisive military action. As a result, there
are different types of interactions among the levels of war. These inter-

Phase Phase

Diplomatic

Economic
Strategic Strategic Strategic
Information COG End State

Military

Phase Phase

Security Obj
Operational
Termination Criteria
Military End State

Services Obj Strategic

Operational
COG
Governance COG
Obj

Economic
Obj
Development

Phase Phase
Security
Tactical Obj
Termination Criteria
Military End State

Services Obj Operational Strategic

Tactical COG
Governance COG End State
Obj

Economic
Obj
Development

Figure 49. Traditional operational design and the relationships among

levels of war
 operational design and counterinsurgency │ 93

actions require much more detailed coordination than the traditional

model and change the way we visualize operational design elements.
In COIN operations, the interrelationships among the levels of
war move away from a hierarchical structure to a much more inte-
grated and complex arrangement similar to figure 50. The reason for
this shift is the pervasive complexity embedded in a COIN’s opera-
tional environment and the scope of the interagency interactions
necessary for success. In this model, the tactical level of war rests on
top of the operational and strategic levels because tactical actions are
what everyone sees first, and those actions can have immediate ef-
fects on both of the other levels. For example, on 30 September 2010
two NATO helicopters crossed into Pakistan’s Kurram tribal region
and fired on a Mandata Kandaho border patrol post, killing three
Pakistani soldiers. Within hours, Pakistani authorities ordered a halt
to all trucks and oil tankers ferrying supplies to the ISAF’s forces
through Afghanistan’s Torkham Gate checkpoint.16 This tactical con-
frontation resulted in a 10-day blockade of the Torkham Gate area
and the destruction of an estimated 150 trucks by Pakistani and Taliban
attackers.17 This situation was serious enough to require international
mediation at the strategic level to reach resolution.
The integrated arrangement shown in figure 50 also supports the most
common view of the center of gravity in COIN environments. In major
conventional operations, identifying COGs at each level of war provides
a mechanism for focusing military forces during the campaign’s phases.
In COIN operations, the complexity of coordinating military, inter-
agency, intergovernmental, and nongovernmental organizations may
necessitate the identification of a single COG to achieve a focus of efforts.
Military planners naturally tend to concentrate their COG analysis on
the enemy’s forces. The problem for planners in many COIN contexts is
that there may not be a single entity that constitutes a homogenous insur-
gency. In Iraq, military forces have been confronted by Sunni, Shia, and
al-Qaeda operatives and numerous criminal networks. The same is true
for Afghanistan, where insurgents come from multiple groups, including
the Quetta Shura Taliban, the Haqqani network, the Hezb-e-Islami
Khalis (HIK), Hizb-l Islami Gulbuddin (HIG), and the Tehrik-i-Taliban
(TTP). Each of these groups has different objectives. Although it appears
counterintuitive, identifying a single COG to support COIN operations
may actually provide better focus.
One of the most often cited COGs in COIN operations is the host
nation’s population. This concept directs the focus of COIN opera-
 Phase Phase

Diplomatic

Economic
Strategic Strategic
Information COG End State

Military

Strategic

Governing
Authority

Operational Tactical
LOE KTD
Stage Stage
Security Obj LOE KTD
Provinces
Services Obj
Operational
Strategic
LOE KTD
COG COG
Governance Obj
LOE KTD

Military End State

Economic

Termination Criteria
Obj RIP RIP
Development TOA TOA
RIP
TOA

Figure 50. COIN design and the relationships among levels of war
 operational design and counterinsurgency │ 95

tions at security, services, governance, and economic development

for the people. What this concept misses, however, is the fact that
COIN forces can focus almost exclusively on the population and fail
to subdue the insurrection. COIN forces can provide security, ser-
vices, and even economic development for the population and not
succeed because the people have too little confidence in the host na-
tion’s governing authority. Any gains in security, services, and eco-
nomic development are ephemeral unless they inspire confidence in
the governing authority. Additionally, as figure 50 depicts, governing
authority must be ensured simultaneously at all three levels of war to
produce success. The strategic level of war has the responsibility for
transforming or developing a form of government that is legitimate
in the eyes of the people and coordinating the international support
for that government. The operational level coordinates security, sta-
bility, and economic development operations throughout the nation
to highlight the host nation’s ability to govern effectively. Last, but no
less important, the tactical level has the burden of execution. The face
at the forefront for all three levels of war should be the host nation.
Focusing on governing authority also functions similarly to a Janus
strategy. On one side, COIN forces support and facilitate the host na-
tion’s governance. But on the other side, COIN operations should
also concentrate on neutralizing the insurgent’s governing authority.
Using this perspective, the strategic level focuses on denying inter­
national support and sanctuary to the insurgents. The operational
level coordinates and directs military operations aimed at neutraliz-
ing the insurgent’s clandestine infrastructure and denying the ability
to establish shadow governance. The tactical level once again has re-
sponsibility for executing the operations.
The COG is not the only area in which operational design is ap-
plied differently for COIN operations than for major conventional
operations. Because of the temporal dimension of war, the arranging
of operations is another area in which there are critical differences.
Although major conventional operations can last years, COIN opera-
tions may last decades. As a result, arranging operations into phases
may not be effective. If a COIN campaign’s stability-operations phase
lasts years, how does the operational level of war coordinate and di-
rect operations against an adaptive adversary with friendly forces and
headquarters rotating in and out of a theater? In that type of environ-
ment, the use of phases makes it almost impossible to maintain con-
96 │ operational design and counterinsurgency

tinuity of effort, develop assessments, and simultaneously adjust to

an ever-changing operational context.
The answer is to break phases into stages and follow the relief in
place/transfer of authority (RIP/TOA) process (fig. 51). Stages allow
phases to be broken into smaller, more manageable portions of time
to direct and adjust operations. One of the greatest obstacles to the
ongoing efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan is the lack of continuity
between units rotating in and out of theater. Whether it is an Army
brigade combat team (BCT) replacing a Marine regimental combat
team (RCT) in al-Anbar, Iraq, or an Army BCT replacing another
Army BCT in Afghanistan’s Regional Command (RC) East, the
operational-level headquarters must subdivide phases to ensure
transitional continuity. Units have been rotating in and out of Af-
ghanistan and Iraq since 2002, and as the commanders have changed,
the vision for success has also changed.
In 2008 a BCT from the 101st Air Assault Division rotated into Af-
ghanistan and began work on the Khost-Gardez road system. The ob-
jective was similar to the Kunar model explained in David Kilcullen’s
Accidental Guerrilla.18 The purpose of the road was not simply to de-
velop infrastructure. The road was a means to project combat power
for security, stimulate economic growth by creating access to markets,
and simultaneously demonstrate governing authority. In 2009 the
BCT’s RIP/TOA occurred; the next BCT rotated in and focused on dif-

RIP/TOA Effect

Security Obj
Termination Criteria
Military End State

Services Obj
Operational Strategic
COG COG
Governance Obj

Economic
Development Obj

Stage RIP Stage

TOA
Figure 51. RIP/TOA has significant impact on objectives and opera-
tional continuity
 operational design and counterinsurgency │ 97

ferent priorities. Work on the road system came to a virtual standstill.

When the BCT from the 101st Air Assault Division rotated back to
Afghanistan in 2010 and found that their progress on the road had
stopped, they immediately refocused on the road. The purpose of this
anecdote is not to judge the commanders from either of the BCTs, but
to highlight the challenges of maintaining continuity during a lengthy
phase. Unfortunately, this example is far from unique, and a break-
down in continuity occurs not only between military units but also
between agencies and multi­national organizations. The danger is that
this inconsistency degrades the host nation’s confidence in the United
States’ ability to foster an enduring international commitment.
Establishing continuity and consistency in a COIN operation de-
pends on three salient factors: a standardized structure for opera-
tional design at all three levels of war, an in-depth appreciation for
local security, and the ability to understand and conduct assessment.
The notion of developing a standardized structure for operational de-
sign faces significant opposition because many fear it will lead to pre-
scription and a checklist mentality. There is a marked difference,
however, between dictating how a commander develops a design and
standardizing how the design is recorded and used for synchroniza-
tion across the levels of war. It is unhealthy to put constraints on how
a commander develops a design. A commander must have flexibility
in formulating a design so that it supports his or her vision for execu-
tion. But not establishing a framework for operational design is similar
to conducting the JOPP and not recording the end product in accor-
dance with the five-paragraph format for plans and orders. Further-
more, an operational design must be understood not only by US and
multinational military forces, but also by the interagency and multi-
national organizations participating in the COIN. It should facilitate
synchronization and leverage the national instruments of power at all
three levels of war. This cannot be achieved without a common
framework that serves as an integrating mechanism.
COIN design at the strategic and operational levels is closely re-
lated to the design developed for major conventional operations. The
core of the design is based on the relationships among the end state,
objectives, effects, and COG(s) and the identification of decisive
points and lines of operation.
Figure 52 depicts a notional structure attempting to align actions
at the strategic and operational levels of war based on a common
framework. This cognitive map is a starting point to ensure both levels
 COIN Strategic Decision Analysis
Objectives
Deny al-Qaeda safe haven
Diplomatic
Progress - Pakistan govt. supports safe- haven denial
- al-Qaeda in Afghanistan (AQIA) isolated and marginalized
- ISI support to Taliban eliminated

Lisbon Pakistan Reverse Taliban momentum

Loya Peace Kabul
Conf. Limited
Jirga Conf. Conf.
Progress
- GIROA rule of law established
- Taliban isolated
Economic - Queta Shura marginalized

Deny TB overthrow
Economic Afghan Electric Water Mining 1390 Strategic of GIROA
Corridors Financial Grid System Budget
System
End State
COG - GIROA governance
Disrupt, Dismantle,
Information confidence gap minimized
Defeat AQIA
GIROA - Government corruption
reduced to norm
Opium Afghan ANSF Legitimacy
CIVCAS Corruption Reintegration
Production Governance Capacity Strengthen capacity of
to Govern ANSF and GIROA
Initiate
Military Withdrawal - ANSF at sufficient levels to defend against Taliban
- ANSF capable of providing local security

ANSF/GIROA lead responsibility for future

ANSF Population
Economic Surge
Capacity Secure Limit
Corridors - Capable, functioning GIROA
Secure Withdrawal
- Confidence gap minimized
- Rule of law established

Figure 52. Synchronizing operational design relationships among levels of war

 COIN Operational Decision Analysis
Objectives
Deny insurgent sanctuary
RC East - HQN ineffective
Security
- Limited AQIA support to QTB

Local Pop. Economic KTDs Neutralize QTB

Surge ANA ANP
RC South Security Centers Corridors Functioning
Secured - GIROA governance expanded
Long Term - GIROA services effective
Services - ROL functioning
- Corrupt leaders removed
- Queta Shura delegitimized
Election Water Health Education Transportation Operational
Short Term Protect GIROA
Grid System Care
COG
- High-profile terror attacks reduced
Afghan Governance ANSF - 80% KTDs secured
- HWYs 1, 3, 5, and 7 secured
Security
Presidential District Rule of Anti- Self- Build host-nation security capacity
Election Elections Law Corruption Reliance Capacity
- ANSF at sufficient levels to defend
against Taliban
Economic Development - ANSF capable of providing local
HWY #7 security

ANSF/GIROA lead responsibility

HWY #1 for future
KTDs Economic Employment Alternative Economic
Corridors Opium Prod. Sustainment - ANSF leads security ops

Figure 52. Synchronizing operational design relationships among levels of war (continued)
100 │ operational design and counterinsurgency

of war are working in conjunction with one another and not working
at cross purposes. It identifies key decision points, relationships
among lines of operation, points at which the two levels of war are
not synchronized, and the potential impact of improperly aligned
stages and RIP/TOAs.
At the tactical level of war, complexity has an enormous impact on
the development of the cognitive map. Tactical commanders face a
great diversity of challenges, such as different insurgent groups operat-
ing in their area of operations, ethnic and tribal enclaves, and vast dif-
ferences in area resources and host-nation political leaders’ capabilities.
To meet the challenges emerging out of the US COIN experiences in
Iraq and Afghanistan, the organizational structure of the combined
joint operations area (CJOA) is evolving. This is clearly seen in Afghan-
istan, where the CJOA structure is based on regional commands (RC),
key terrain districts (KTD), and area-of-interest districts. This type of
CJOA organization is not a new concept. It has been used in varying
degrees since ancient times. This organizational approach, however,
provides a fresh perspective on battlespace ownership and focusing op-
erations. In this concept, the operational-level headquarters oversees a
series of regional commands. The regional commands coordinate all
regional civil-military activities conducted by the military elements in
a number of different provinces. An illustration of this is seen in the
ISAF’s regional command organization of Afghanistan (fig. 53).
To maximize the effectiveness of COIN operations, each of these
regional commands has undergone a district-level key terrain assess-
ment to identify key terrain districts and area-of-interest districts.
KTDs contain concentrated populations, major centers of economic
productivity, key infrastructure, and key commerce routes. Area-of-
interest districts exert influence on KTDs and facilitate information
collection and operational resource support.19 Additionally, the ISAF
has linked the KTD system to economic corridors that support the
vision for economic development. Figure 54 illustrates Afghanistan’s
KTDs, area-of-interest districts, the Ring Road, and the border cross-
ing points that generate the majority of Afghanistan’s revenue.
The ISAF and its operational-level headquarters, the ISAF Joint
Command, have a specific set of selection criteria for designating
KTDs and area-of-interest districts. However, planners should un-
derstand that the physical location of KTDs may also be an important
consideration for selection. In Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and
Practice, David Galula describes the optimum geographic environments
 RC (North)

RC (West) RC (East)

RC (South)

RC (Southwest)

Figure 53. ISAF’s regional commands

#6 – Shayr Khan Bandar

#3 – Hairatan

#7 – Torah Ghundey
#4 – Islam Qal’eh

#1 – Tor Kham

#8 – Ghulum Khan

#5 – Zaranj #2 – Wesh (Chaman)

Key Terrain District (81)

Area of Interest District (41)
Border Crossing Point

Figure 54. Key terrain districts in Afghanistan

102 │ operational design and counterinsurgency

and physical shapes for both insurgencies and COINs. He states that
the most favorable shape for an insurgency is a land-locked blunt star
and for COIN operations an island shaped like a pointed star.20 Al-
though Galula does not elaborate on the rationale for these shapes,
the primary consideration is undoubtedly security of the population.
What is significant about Galula’s main point is that KTDs should be
positioned where they collectively provide maximum security for the
population. A commander may not have the luxury of conducting
COIN operations on an island shaped like a pointed star, but he or
she may be able to artificially create those conditions.
Doctrinal changes are also affecting the articulation of tactical-
level cognitive maps. Recently JP 5-0, Joint Operation Planning (revi-
sion final coordination), introduced the term lines of effort (LOE) to
the joint lexicon. LOEs establish operational and strategic conditions
by linking multiple tasks and missions.21 If we combine the impact of
RIP/TOAs on operational continuity, KTDs, economic corridors, and
LOEs with the overarching focus on governing authority, the cogni-
tive map at the high tactical level may resemble figure 55. In this
model, the operational-level headquarters issues guidance to RCs on
objectives using stages and RIP/TOAs to delineate overlapping respon-
sibilities between units. The stage defines what the common objectives/
tasks are and the RIP/TOA describes the specific KTD conditions units
must achieve to meet their responsibilities towards those objectives/
tasks. The tactical units assuming responsibility for the RC then use

Regional
Command

LOE KTD(s)

Provincial-
LOE KTD(s)
Level
Governing
LOE KTD(s)
Authority
LOE KTD(s)

Stage RIP Stage RIP

TOA TOA
Figure 55. Tactical-level COIN design
 operational design and counterinsurgency │ 103

that guidance to develop LOEs aimed at the directed KTD tasks. The
cumulative impact of the LOEs and KTD tasks should be directed at
enhancing the provincial-level governing authority.
Some examples of tactical-level LOEs are:
• Expanding governance of KTDs along Highway 7.
• S ecuring freedom of movement along Highway 1 to facilitate
economic opportunity for KTDs A, B, and C.
• S ecuring the economic corridor from Gardez-Khost (GK) to
Highway 1 to increase stability for KTDs D, E, F, and G.
• Building local security force capacity in KTDs H, I, and J.
The overall objectives of providing a common structural frame-
work for operational design are continuity and unity of effort. Units
and agencies responsible for executing COIN operations need as
much clarity as possible. This can happen only with an understand-
ing of everyone’s roles and a vision for integration. Additionally, a
common framework affords the ability to visualize risk and leverage
interdependencies between agencies to mitigate that risk.

Centrifugal Force of Local

Security in COIN Operations
The chances of two insurgencies being the same are nil, but local
security is a decisive point that deserves planners’ explicit attention.
Security is the first principle of warfare, and nowhere is it more im-
portant than in COIN operations. Almost every aspect of COIN de-
pends either directly or indirectly around local security. As a result,
local security is a crucial decisive point along the security line of op-
erations. In spite of this fact, local security remains an area plagued
by mistakes. When COIN forces build host-nation security capacity,
there is a consistent tendency to concentrate almost solely on con-
ventional forces. Local security in actuality requires a deliberate lay-
ering of forces. Conventional forces are good at conducting strike
operations in insurgent-controlled areas and assisting in the estab-
lishment of security in contested areas. But conventional forces are
not optimal for static security or law and order.
The traditional defense pattern for successful COIN operations (fig.
56) uses conventional forces to establish a security belt that enables
104 │ operational design and counterinsurgency

Remote Area Operation SOF

OGA
Operation

Insurgent Controlled Area

Friendly
Controlled
Area

Base
Camp Contested
Area

Consolidation Local
Operation Village
Strike Operation Security
by Conventional
Forces Regional
District
Forces

Figure 56. Traditional COIN defense patterns

local security to take place. This is done in concert with special opera-
tions forces that prepare insurgent-contested areas for the introduction
of local security forces. After this foundation is established, local secu-
rity forces assume security responsibility for consolidation operations
and the introduction of police forces. Local security forces tie into po-
lice operations and bring the population under government control.
This widespread dispersion of forces provides better protection for the
people and frees conventional forces to strike insurgent refuges.
The classic mistake is handing off responsibility for local security
to police forces before the necessary conditions have been established
for their success. Handing off local security to an unprepared police
force is a critical and unforgiving vulnerability. A key illustration of
this is the Brookings Institution’s data on Afghan security force casual-
ties, 2007–09 (table 3).22 In addition to those casualties, Afghanistan’s
Ministry of the Interior reported 595 police officers killed and 1,345
wounded during the first six months of 2010. There are numerous
reasons for the disparity of casualties between the Afghan National
Army (ANA) and the Afghan National Police (ANP). Two of the pri-
mary causes are training and equipment. The ANP are neither trained
nor equipped to face the security environment they are being thrust
into. The ISAF has made Herculean strides to correct these deficien-
cies, but there is still a missing dimension in Afghanistan’s security—
the intermediate layer of local security forces.
 operational design and counterinsurgency │ 105

Table 3. Annual security-force fatality totals

2007 2008 2009

Afghan National Army 209 226 282
Afghan National Police 803 886 646

Known by names such as territorial defense and civil defense, local

security has a significant effect on all three levels of war. At the tacti-
cal level, once conventional forces have established an initial security
belt, local security enables stabilization to take place. It does this by
insulating the population from insurgent demands for food, money,
medicine, and other resources and by reducing the fear of insurgent
reprisals for passing intelligence information to COIN forces. This
not only increases insurgent vulnerabilities, but also generates confi-
dence in the reconstitution of governing authority.
At the operational level of war, local security provides the founda-
tion for expanding infrastructure and lines of communication. There
is an unmistakable relationship among infrastructure, lines of com-
munication, and a government’s ability to project power. The signifi-
cance of this relationship is seen in the priority and frequency of in-
surgent attacks on infrastructure and lines of communication.
Underdeveloped lines of communication favor insurgencies, and the
sabotage of critical infrastructure constitutes a fundamental element
in most insurgent strategies. In most cases, insurgents do not have
the military capability to overtly gain power. They accomplish this
indirectly by destroying the government’s economic base. This accen-
tuates economic crises, creates unemployment, inflates the cost of liv-
ing, and perpetuates a fertile base for recruitment.
During the insurgency in El Salvador (1979–92), one of the
Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front’s (FMLN) key objectives
was preventing productive economic activity. A captured insurgent
document outlined the following areas for systematic destruction:
fuel pipelines, electricity grids, railroads, telephonic communica-
tions, and agricultural export crops.23 The FMLN’s targeting of infra-
structure had another deliberate and insidious effect. It generated
capital flight and inhibited international investment. From 1979 to
1980, over $2 billion fled El Salvador for Miami.24
The ability to limit and prevent the types of insurgent depredations
described above rests with the realization of the intrinsic impact that
local security forces have on the operational environment. Investing
106 │ operational design and counterinsurgency

in local security is one of the wisest investments COIN forces can

make. However, local security’s contributions are not confined to the
dimension of physical security at the tactical and operational levels of
war. Local security can also serve as a strategic COIN function. If
implemented properly, local security is a catalyst for inducing the
populace to support the host-nation governing authority. Individuals
who commit themselves to local security, especially at the village
level, demonstrate a clear rejection of the insurgent movement.25 This
commitment decisively strips away support for the insurgency and
imperils the insurgent’s strategic center of gravity, the ability to exert
governing authority.

Models for Implementing Local Security

There are numerous models for establishing intermediate local se-
curity forces. However, the two basic ones are arming local tribes-
men, similar to the Sons of Iraq (SOI), and the Vietnam-era regional/
popular forces model. Both have advantages and disadvantages, and
both function best in specific operational contexts. The SOI are Iraqi
civilians who have voluntarily allied with US forces to provide security
against insurgents and militias at the local level.26 The movement be-
gan slowly during 2005 in al-Anbar Province. Known as the al-Anbar
Awakening Council, groups of Sunnis, some of them former mili-
tants, banded with US military forces against al-Qaeda. The US forces
gradually turned local security responsibility over to these groups,
paying members $10 per day. By late 2007 the SOI included both
Sunnis and Shiites, and groups were active in eight of Iraq’s prov-
inces, with a membership numbering over 73,000.27 The SOI had over
100,000 by 2008. Table 4 shows the status of the SOI in 2009.
The impact of the SOI combined with the military surge is readily
evident. Civilian casualties dropped from a high of 34,500 in 2006 to
3,000 in 2009, and US military fatalities dropped from 905 to 149 dur-
ing the same time frame.28 The challenge with the SOI model is its ad
hoc nature. It worked in a specific environmental context; however, its
long-term effect remains unknown. The Iraqi central government is
reticent to integrate these groups into the national-security force struc-
ture and is gradually phasing them out of their security role.
Tens of thousands of SOI members are still without full employ-
ment, despite the Iraqi government’s pledge to provide police posi-
 operational design and counterinsurgency │ 107

Table 4. Status of the SOI as of September 2009

Location of SOI Group(s) Date of Transfer Number of SOIs

Baghdad and immediate vicinity 1 October 2008 ~51,000
Diyala/Qadisiyah Provinces 1 January 2009 ~11,000
Anbar/Babil/Wasit Provinces 1 February 2009 ~12,000
Ninewa/Tamim/Salahuddin Provinces 1 April 2009 ~20,000

Reprinted from Michael E. O’Hanlon and Ian Livingston, Iraq Index: Tracking Variables of Re-
construction & Security in Post-Saddam Iraq (Washington, DC: Brookings, 31 October 2010), 9.

tions and vocational training. In March 2010 only 40 percent of SOIs

were fully transitioned into full-time jobs.29 Distrust between the
SOIs and the Iraqi central government has been building consistently
with SOI complaints of late paychecks, failure to pay salaries, and ar-
rests of its members.30 Many fear that these conditions are generating
an incensed Sunni population that is potentially dangerous to the fu-
ture stability of Iraq. Evidence is seen in numerous allegations of SOI
members defecting back to al-Qaeda. Arming tribes can be an expe-
dient approach to fostering local security; however, it can be high risk
and in the long run work against stability. The key is ensuring that the
host nation keeps its pledges.
The Vietnam-era regional/popular forces model is a much more
deliberate and integrated method of fostering local security. The re-
gional forces (RF) were company-sized elements that operated in a
district or province. The popular forces (PF) operated as platoon-
sized forces and were usually assigned to a specific village or static
security task such as guarding key infrastructure, roadways, and water-
ways. Both of these forces worked in conjunction with the national
police. Although they remained predominantly in their home prov-
inces and villages, the RFs’ and PFs’ principal loyalty was to the cen-
tral government.
The basic concept of using these forces predates the American in-
volvement in Vietnam, but it was not until after 1965 that their great-
est expansion occurred. In 1965 the total force structure for RFs, PFs,
and national police was 320,000. By 1972 these forces numbered
664,000.31 Their work was exceptionally dangerous, and they suffered
horrendous casualties. However, they were also very effective. Evi-
dence to support their effectiveness is seen in figure 57 showing the
forces and their corresponding responsibility for the security of the
108 │ operational design and counterinsurgency

Percent of
South Vietnamese Responsibility for Rural
Population Hamlet Security
60

50

40
PF
30
RF
20 National Police
10

0
1969 1970 1971 1972

Figure 57. RF/PF responsibility for rural hamlet security. (Based on

data from Hamlet Evaluation System Computer Tapes, 1969–72, in
Southeast Asia Statistical Summary, Office of the Assistant Secretary of
Defense (Comptroller), 14 February 1973.)

population. At first glance it appears that the RF/PF effectiveness di-

minishes between 1969 and 1972, but closer analysis shows the op-
posite effect on local security. As the RFs’ and PFs’ responsibility for
security declined, they were being replaced by greater numbers of
national police, indicating a more secure environment. In COIN op-
erations, security forces transferring their responsibility for securing
the population to police forces is a major sign of a return to normalcy.
Between 1969 and 1972, the national police’s responsibility for the
security of the population increased more than three times from 5 to
17 percent. This relationship also correlates with the South Vietnamese
government’s expansion of security.
Another indicator of the RFs’ and PFs’ viability is their impact on
the Viet Cong Infrastructure, the clandestine organization that com-
manded the majority of communist operations, established shadow
governance, and conducted most of the terrorism against the popula-
tion. Together the RFs and PFs accounted for a larger share of VCI
 operational design and counterinsurgency │ 109

killed or captured than any other force. In 1970 they were responsible
for 50 percent of the VCI killed or captured and in 1971 approxi-
mately 39 percent. As Thomas Thayer points out in War without
Fronts, the RFs and PFs were the most cost-effective forces of the
Vietnam War. They secured more territory than any other force, in-
creased friendly-force ratios, and inflicted between 23 and 33 percent
of the total communist combat deaths. They accomplished this while
receiving only 4 percent of the total war budget.32
Effectiveness in the RF/PF model does not originate from simply
emplacing another layer of security at the local level. Planners need
to understand efficiency and how to generate the local security forces’
commitment to the host nation’s governing authority. An option that
is often ignored is establishing a mechanism for recycling conventional-
force manpower. Under this concept conventional force members
that have completed their term of service are either placed into or
recruited for local security. Many nations operate with militaries
founded on a system of conscription that obligates individuals to a
certain number of years of service. Once they complete their term of
service, these individuals return to their homes without further obli-
gation. The cost of not leveraging this efficiency is significant. Be-
tween mid 1981 and January 1983—during El Salvador’s Civil War—
over 7,000 Salvadoran soldiers were trained at Fort Benning, Georgia.
By June 1983 only half of these soldiers were still on active duty, and
of the ones trained in 1981, only 15 percent remained.33 The failure to
harness this manpower for local security was amplified by the cost of
the soldiers’ training. The cost of training El Salvador’s Bellosso bat-
talion, 500–600 men, was $8 million.34
Galvanizing the population to support local security is an excep-
tionally difficult task. Local security patrols represent a direct chal-
lenge to insurgents for control of the population, making them high
visibility targets. The simplest and perhaps most effective method of
gaining popular support is by expanding the populace’s material reli-
ance on the government. In many situations this can be done at a
negligible cost. Areas worthy of investment include:
• medical care for wounded personnel,
• immunizations, aspirins, and other common drugs,
• agricultural information on crops, agronomy, and animal husbandry,
• education for children and adult literacy programs,
110 │ operational design and counterinsurgency

• well digging, and

• loans for fertilizer and water pumps.
The RF/PF model possesses a number of distinct advantages; how-
ever, it also has a number of disadvantages. The creation of RF/PF
local security forces is a slow and resource-intensive process. It requires
additional manpower, trainers, and equipment. Its principal strength
is that it can be shaped to demonstrate loyalty to the central govern-
ment, but that loyalty must not be allowed to devolve into assassina-
tion squads. During El Salvador’s civil war, the civil defense force,
Organización Democrática Nacionalista (ORDEN), created many of
the conditions that ignited the war and prolonged it. During 1980
alone, ORDEN was suspected of committing 861 political murders.35
Structuring the host-nation security capacity is one of the most
significant decisive points in a COIN operation. Whatever model
planners use, they must understand the gravity of local security and
match it to the operational context. Matching the wrong model to the
wrong context can have catastrophic consequences.

Making Decisions and Supporting Decision

Analysis in the COIN Environment
Decision making and decision analysis are different in COIN envi-
ronments than in major conventional operations in several impor-
tant ways. The first is temporal. During major conventional opera-
tions, most command-level decisions evolve in a time-compressed
planning-decision-execution (PDE) cycle. Moving large forces and
changing component orders such as the air tasking order often re-
quire decisions to be adequately executed within a 72- to 96-hour
period. In a COIN environment, most decisions emanate out of an
extended PDE cycle. The principal reason for this is that very few
military actions in a COIN mandate immediate responses. Most de-
cisions in COIN operations are long-term projections involving the
implementation of governance policies, the oversight of economic
development projects, and the improvement of basic services. There are
exceptions, however, including the commitment of a quick-reaction
force, the kinetic engagement of a high-value target, and the daily
battle for dominance in information operations.
 operational design and counterinsurgency │ 111

Decision making in COIN operations also differs in the coordina-

tion, approval authority, and time required to obtain approval. In a
COIN, effectiveness stems from the comprehensive involvement of
the host nation, allies, intergovernmental organizations, other US
government agencies, and, in some cases, key nongovernmental or-
ganizations. Many decisions are made by consensus, and approval
authority can necessitate the involvement of national and multi­
national leaders.
Another difference is that targeting decisions may be more com-
plex in a COIN environment than in conventional operations. An il-
lustration of this is the kinetic engagement of a high-value insurgent
target. In today’s environment, the process is not as simple as identi-
fying, nominating, locating, and engaging the target. Attacking a tar-
get entails compiling evidence against the target, reviewing the legality
of engaging the target, and conducting a thorough collateral damage
estimate. Additionally, the decision maker should analyze what re-
moval of that target means to the insurgent system. Timing is every-
thing, and in some cases removal of a high-value target can actually
work against COIN efforts—for example, if the high-value target is
making overtures toward reintegration. Of course, targeting is not con-
fined to kinetics. Another kind of targeting is the removal of corrupt
officials. As for kinetic targeting, the decision maker must gather legal
evidence and analyze the effect of removing an official on the host
nation’s political system. Counterinsurgents must also determine
whether to bring that official to trial, relieve him or her of duties, or
marginalize his or her influence by empowering other officials.

COIN Decision-Support Tools

The diversity of decisions that confront COIN commanders demands
the development and use of a variety of skillfully crafted decision-
support tools. One of the most critical is the decision-support tem-
plate, just as it is in major conventional operations. A COIN DST is
very similar to the ones used in major conventional operations. It
consists of an operational diagram depicting the major operations
and objectives of the CJOA and a comprehensive synchronization
matrix (fig. 58). In a COIN environment, synchronization may re-
quire the identification of such details as Gregorian and Persian years,
 Create
Stimulate Economic
Commerce Corridor

Gregorian Year 2010 2011

Month 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12

Persian Year 1388 1389 1390

Season Winter Spring Summer Fall Winter Spring Summer Fall

Key
Parliamentary 1390 Budget
Events 1389 Budget Kabul Conf. LISBON Conf. Reintegration
Elections
Nauroz Al-Hajj Nauroz
Key Dates Al-Hajj
Victory of Muslim Ramadan (11 AUG – 9 SEP) Victory of Muslim
Ashura
Ashura Nation (28 APR) Independence Day (19 AUG) Nation (28 APR)

Haqanni
HIG Quetta
HIK Shura Reconciliation
TTP Meeting

ANSF ANP: 109K by Oct ‘10 ANA: 171.6K by Oct ‘11

IJC OMID I OMID II
RC South Mastarak
RC Southwest Hydro Power
RC East KG Road GG Road Revenue Growth Torkham Gate
RC Center Security Kabul Conf.
RC North KTDs 1-5
RC West KTD Economic Corridor
Rip/TOA RC South RC Southwest RC East

Figure 58. Notional COIN DST

 operational design and counterinsurgency │ 113

seasons, budgets, key cultural dates, major insurgent and friendly-

forces activities, and the roles of other governmental agencies.
The DST assists commanders and staffs with identifying key inter-
active links and critical junctures for assessment. This is vitally im-
portant because the lengthy nature of COIN operations makes it ex-
ceptionally difficult to pinpoint key decision points and adapt
operations to an ever-changing operational environment and adap-
tive adversaries.
Although we can war-game certain aspects of COIN operations,
real analysis must be focused on the collection and examination of
longitudinal data. This data should focus primarily on the insurgent’s
effectiveness in exerting governing authority and the population’s at-
titude toward the host nation’s governing authority. Longitudinal
data is an intrinsic ingredient in developing incisive assessment crite-
ria. If it is accurate, longitudinal data provides the ability to assess the
COIN strategy and even more significantly to show the subtle types
of progress that lead to success. This is absolutely crucial for gaining
and maintaining domestic and international support for the COIN.
Intergovernmental organizations, nongovernmental organizations,
and individual nations are reluctant to make monetary donations or
provide assistance if progress cannot be articulated. Longitudinal as-
sessment tools in a COIN are difficult to set up because they must
measure effects over multiple periods of time in a continuously
changing operational environment. However, if constructed properly
longitudinal assessment is invaluable.
During the Vietnam War the United States experimented with a
number of methodologies to determine Vietnamese popular attitudes.
However, it was not until January 1967 that the United States began
in earnest to institutionalize assessment. This was almost four years
after the 2 January 1963 Battle of Ap Bac, which signaled the United
States’ ever-growing involvement in Vietnam. In 1967 the Defense
Department instituted the Hamlet Evaluation System (HES) to mea-
sure pacification. The intent of the HES was to construct a device to
measure the status of the US-led Revolutionary Development Pro-
gram in over 12,000 Vietnamese hamlets. In October 1969 the US
Pacification Studies Group developed the Pacification Attitudinal
Analysis System (PAAS) to depict rural South Vietnamese attitudes
toward political and economic development and security. This was
followed up in March 1971 with efforts to capture urban Vietnamese
perspectives. Both the HES and PAAS had developmental problems
114 │ operational design and counterinsurgency

that are commonly associated with an evolving assessment system.

They struggled with what information to collect and how best to col-
lect it. Additionally, as the HES and PAAS changed their methodolo-
gies, what they were measuring changed, which artificially limited
the validity of their data. For example, in 1971 the HES changed its
scoring system to give greater weight to political factors affecting se-
curity.36 This in turn had an impact on what constituted insurgent
forces and how security was measured.
In spite of their limitations, the HES and PAAS experience offer
numerous lessons. One of the key lessons is to have an assessment
plan when COIN operations begin. When the United States experi-
mented with the HES and PAAS in Vietnam, data collection and au-
tomated multivariate regression analysis were in their infancy. Addi-
tionally, computer automation was virtually in the “stone age.” This
factor severely inhibited US assessment efforts and created a delay in
developing a comprehensive analysis system. Being unable to holisti-
cally assess the insurgency during the early days of US involvement
fostered an overreliance on kinetic options that may have worked
against the COIN efforts. It also wedded assessment to a dependence
on friendly and enemy casualty data to measure success.37 Another
lesson from the HES and PASS era is to develop an understanding of
how strategic end-state conditions, objectives, effects, and COGs
form the core of longitudinal assessments. If the COG is governing
authority, the objectives and effects should assess the progress of the
host nation’s governing authority and the effectiveness of COIN ac-
tions taken to neutralize the insurgent’s governing authority. When
the HES and PAAS came into being, there was no real longitudinal
assessment plan. As a result, when these systems began measuring
different variables and defining insurgents differently, the data could
not accurately reflect the potential causality of long-term effects.
Perhaps one of the greatest lessons derived from the HES and
PAAS experience is that two factors—development and security—ac-
counted for 95 percent of the common variance in the HES data. The
development factor indicated 50 to 60 percent of the common vari-
ance, and security represented 40 to 50 percent. Analysis of the HES
security data also revealed strong correlations between hamlet secu-
rity and the Viet Cong’s ability to tax and recruit.38
Today COIN forces have access to a sophisticated array of assess-
ment tools, postmodern technology, and the lessons of the past. How-
ever, assessment in COIN operations is still lagging. The most promi-
 operational design and counterinsurgency │ 115

nent problems encountered in Afghanistan are attitudinal, cultural,

and human, and commanders show a surprising passivity to collect-
ing information that is not enemy driven.39 Overlooked in contempo-
rary COIN operations is the potential validity of the HES’s common
variance correlations concerning development and security. Numer-
ous International Security Assistance Force organizations are collect-
ing data on both of these factors; however, the data is not providing
commanders or political leaders the assessment mechanisms they re-
quire to make critical decisions. Host-nation attitudinal data provides
invaluable insight into the population’s perception of progress and its
support for the governing authority. This data may also yield a tilt line
indicating the minimum support from the population necessary for
success. The concept of the tilt line is to provide the commander a
decision tool for modifying or changing the COIN strategy. Figure
59, derived from unscientific ABC News/BBC/ARD poll data on Af-
ghans’ positive perceptions of local conditions, presents a theoretical
illustration of this concept. The data, similar to the HES, orients on
longitudinal analysis of living conditions and security, where most of
the common variance for assessing COIN operations traditionally
exists. The dotted line is a trend line indicating where the population’s
support for the Afghan governing authority should be maintained to
meet the minimum conditions necessary for success.

Positive
Perceptions
of Local 100
Conditions 90 Living Conditions Minimum Support
80 for Success
70
Governance
60 Confidence
Security Gap
50
40
30
20
10

2005 2006 2007 2008

Time
Figure 59. Measuring the governance confidence gap
116 │ operational design and counterinsurgency

When perceptions of living conditions and security go above or

dip below this line, the perceptions produce a benchmark to measure
confidence in the Afghan governing authority. In figure 59, there is a
clear indication of a precipitous decline in confidence in the govern-
ing authority beginning in 2006. As the confidence gap grows,
mounting evidence suggests that the strategy may need to be modi-
fied to ensure success. If this data were more scientific and had been
analyzed against other environmental factors, it might have shown a
clear decision point for the commander.
The intent of this example is not to state that living conditions and
security are the sole determining factors in a COIN. Data analysis
requires a 360-degree examination of the operational environment to
ensure that something as simplistic as a drought or flood has not cor-
rupted the data and implied findings. What this example is trying to
show is that commanders need better decision-making tools to sup-
port the demands of multifaceted COIN operations.

Conclusion
Design is on the verge of a doctrinal breakthrough that will have a
far-reaching impact on how JFCs and their staffs develop campaigns.
Forging design’s future, however, requires a methodology that can be
explained, understood, and applied. This methodology must also in-
corporate the foresight to visualize the salient differences between the
design used for major conventional operations and the design em-
ployed in irregular warfare. These radically different operational con-
texts require distinctive methodological approaches that distill clarity
for commanders and staffs. Regardless of the operational context,
however, operational design’s effectiveness revolves around linking
design to decision making and risk analysis. In the future, planning,
decision, and execution cycles will be significantly compressed. JFCs
and their staffs will face complex networks of nation-state and non-
nation-state adversaries, a proliferation of critical technology, crip-
pling cyber attacks, and denial of the electromagnetic spectrum.
Overcoming these challenges mandates a vision that will expedite ef-
fective decision making and institutionalize approaches to accurately
assessing risk. When this occurs, well-developed plans will survive
first contact.
 operational design and counterinsurgency │ 117

Notes
1. Clausewitz, On War, 87.
2. Metz, “Counterinsurgent Campaign Planning,” 61.
3. Joint Publication (JP) 3-24, Counterinsurgency Operations, GL-6.
4. Ibid., GL-5.
5. Jones, Counterinsurgency in Afghanistan, 10.
6. Galula, Counterinsurgency Warfare, 55.
7. Combined Intelligence Center Vietnam, The Enemy System, 2–3.
8. Pike, Viet-Cong Strategy of Terror, 17–18.
9. Combined Intelligence Center Vietnam, The Enemy System, 2–3.
10. US Department of Defense, Southeast Asia Statistical Summary, Table 3, 14
February 1973.
11. Thayer, War without Fronts, 32.
12. McFate and Jackson, “Object beyond War,” 13.
13. Galula, Counterinsurgency Warfare, 54–56.
14. Blackledge, Lardner, and Riechmann, “After Years of Rebuilding, Most Af-
ghans Lack Power.”
15. Trofimov, “U.S. Rebuilds Power Plant.”
16. Cloud, Rodriguez, and King, “Pakistan Closes Border Crossing.”
17. Rising, “Pakistan to Reopen Border Crossing Used by NATO.”
18. Kilcullen, Accidental Guerrilla, 70–109.
19. US Department of Defense, Report on Progress toward Security and Stability
in Afghanistan and United States Plan for Sustaining the Afghanistan National Secu-
rity Forces, 34.
20. Galula, Counterinsurgency Warfare, 25.
21. JP 5-0, Joint Operation Planning, revision final coordination.
22. Livingston, Messera, and O’Hanlon, Afghanistan Index, 13.
23. Gibb, “Where Will All the Soldiers Go?,” 47–48.
24. Manwaring and Prisk, El Salvador at War, 357.
25. Bacevich et al., American Military Policy in Small Wars, 40.
26. Rubin and Farrell, “Awakening Councils by Region.”
27. O’Hanlon and Livingston, Iraq Index, 3–12.
28. Ibid., 3.
29. DePetris, “Remember the Sons of Iraq?”
30. Harari, “Uncertain Future for the Sons of Iraq,” 3.
31. Thayer, War without Fronts, 157.
32. US Department of Defense, Southeast Asia Analysis Report, 32–34.
33. Oriofsky, “Operation Well Being Begins,” 448.
34. Craves, “Foreign Assistance Resource Problems,” 26.
35. Americas Watch Committee and Lawyers Committee for International Hu-
man Rights, Free Fire, 4.
36. Thayer, War without Fronts, 145–51.
37. Bjelajac, “Guidelines for Measuring Success in Counterinsurgency,” 1.
38. Sweetland, Item Analysis of the HES (Hamlet Evaluation System), 3.
39. Flynn, Pottinger, and Batchelor, Fixing Intel, 4.
 Abbreviations

AA avenue of approach
ACC air component commander
ANA Afghan National Army
ANP Afghan National Police
ANSF Afghan National Security Forces
AOR area of responsibility
APOD aerial port of debarkation
ARF Alliance Reaction Force
ATO air tasking order
AU Aurigan
AUR country of Auriga
AUTH authority
BCT brigade combat team
Bde brigade
BLA Batari Liberation Army
Bn battalion
BP branch plan
C2 command and control
C4I command, control, communications, computers,
and intelligence
C4ISR command; control; communications; computers;
and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance
CCF Chinese communist forces
CCIR commander’s critical information requirement
CHOP change of operational control
CIVCAS civilian casualty
CJOA combined joint operations area
CJTF combined joint task force
CMH Center of Military History
COA course of action
COG center of gravity
COIN counterinsurgency
CPVF Chinese People’s Volunteer Force
Def. defensive
DMZ demilitarized zone
DP decision point
120 │ abbreviations

DPRK Democratic People’s Republic of Korea

DSM decision support matrix
DST decision support template
FDO flexible deterrent option
FEBA forward edge of the battle area
FFIR friendly-force information requirement
FMLN Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front
FOC full operational capability
FOM freedom of movement
GAO Government Accountability Office
GIROA Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan
HA humanitarian assistance
HES Hamlet Evaluation System
HIG Hizb-l Islami Gulbuddin
HIK Hezb-e-Islami Khalis
HQN Haqqani network
IA international airport
ICOS International Council on Security and
Development
IJC International Security Assistance Force Joint
Command
INS insurgent
IO information operations
ISAF International Security Assistance Force
ISI Inter-Services Intelligence (Pakistan)
JFC joint force commander
JFLCC joint force land component commander
JIACG joint interagency coordination group
JIPOE joint intelligence preparation of the operational
environment
JOA joint operations area
JOPP joint operation planning process
JP Joint Publication
JPG joint planning group
JPME joint professional military education
KTD key terrain district
 abbreviations │ 121

LCC land component commander

LNO liaison officer
LOC line of communications
LOE line of effort
LOO line of operation
MA military action
MACV Military Assistance Command Vietnam
MCC maritime component commander
MCO major combat operation
MEB Marine expeditionary brigade
MILDEC military deception
NAI named area of interest
NEO noncombatant evacuation operation
NGO nongovernmental organization
NLF National Liberation Front
NVA North Vietnamese Army
OA objective area
OEF Operation Enduring Freedom, operational
exploitation force
Off. offensive
OGA other government agency
OIF Operation Iraqi Freedom
OPFOR opposing force
OPLAN operation plan
Ops operations
PAAS Pacification Attitudinal Analysis System
PDE planning-decision-execution
PER country of Perseus
PF popular forces
PIR priority intelligence requirement
PMESII political, military, economic, social, information,
and infrastructure
POTF psychological operations task force
QTB Quetta Shura Taliban
RC regional command
RCT regimental combat team
RF regional forces
122 │ abbreviations

RIP/TOA relief in place / transfer of authority

ROL rule of law
RSOI reception, staging, onward movement, and integration
SA situational awareness
SAG country of Sagitta
SOCC special operations component commander
SOF special operations forces
SOI Sons of Iraq
SP sequal plan
SPOD seaport of debarkation
SPOE seaport of embarkation
TAA tactical assembly area
TAI target area of interest
TBM theater ballistic missile
TOA transfer of authority
TRADOC Training and Doctrine Command
TTP Tehrik-i-Taliban
UN United Nations
UNC UN Command
UNSCR UN Security Council resolution
USAID United States Agency for International Development
USCENTCOM US Central Command
VC Viet Cong
VCI Viet Cong Infrastructure
VP country of Vulpecula
Vul Vulpeculan
WARNORD warning order
WMD weapons of mass destruction
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 Index

9/11 (11 September 2001), 8, 34 veillance, and reconnaissance

actor, 5–6, 9, 11–12, 40–41, 66–67, 86 (C4ISR), 63–64, 73
Afghan National Army (ANA), 8, 104–5 commander’s critical information re-
Afghan National Police (ANP), 8, 104–5 quirement (CCIR), 54–56, 71, 73–74,
Afghanistan, 7–8, 10, 13, 34, 88–89, 93, 76–77, 80
96–97, 100–101, 104–5, 115–16 Confederate forces (US Civil War),
al-Anbar Awakening Council, 106 2–5, 78–80
al-Qaeda, 34, 93, 106–7 confidence gap, 115–16
area of interest, 71–73, 100 counterinsurgency (COIN), 73, 83–88,
area of operations, 5–6, 100 92–95, 97, 100, 102–6, 108, 110–16
Army of Northern Virginia, 4 course of action (COA), 21–27, 36, 41,
Army of the Potomac, 2 53–54, 59, 60–67, 69, 71, 73, 76, 78
Asia Foundation, 88 critical capability, 42, 45
assumptions (in operational design), 9,
critical requirement, 42, 43, 45, 54
11–12, 19, 21, 25–26, 41, 54–58, 61,
critical vulnerability, 42–43, 45
67, 73, 76
critical-factor analysis, 40–46, 65
Bach Dang River, 39 culture, 6, 9, 15, 86–88, 113, 115
barriers, 9, 12–13, 39, 86
Battle of Ap Bac, 113 decision analysis, 57, 59, 65–66, 68–70,
Brookings Institution, 104 73, 76–80, 110
Bush, Pres. George H. W., 34 decision criteria, 1, 59, 62, 73–77, 80
Bush, Pres. George W., 34 decision making, 1, 5, 11–12, 16–17,
31, 67–68, 76, 110–11, 116
C4ISR. See command; control; com-
munications; computers; and intel- decision point, 26, 31–32, 48, 54, 58–59,
ligence, surveillance, and recon- 61–62, 67, 70–71, 73–75, 76, 100,
naissance 113, 116. See also decisive point
Canaanite forces, 21–23 decision support matrix (DSM), 65,
center of gravity (COG), 6, 19, 21, 25, 72–73, 75–77
31, 40–42, 44–47, 49–52, 61, 73, 79, decision support template (DST), 65,
83, 93, 95, 97, 106, 114 71–77, 80, 111–13
Cheonan, 7 decisive point, 5–6, 19, 23, 25, 31, 40,
China, 9, 38–39, 45, 56, 62, 66 44–49, 51, 61, 65–66, 79, 97, 103,
Civil War (US), 2–3, 78, 109–10 110. See also decision point
Clausewitz, Carl von, 40, 83 Democratic People’s Republic of Korea,
cognitive map, 27, 31–33, 59, 61, 77–78, 7. See also North Korea
97, 100, 102 Desert Shield. See Operation Desert
COIN. See counterinsurgency
Shield
combat power, 57, 63, 96
Desert Storm. See Operation Desert
combined joint task force (CJTF), 52,
Storm
73–75, 78
desired system, 6, 9, 11–14, 18–19
command; control; communications;
computers; and intelligence, sur- Eastertide offensive, 68
132 │ index

effects (as an element of operational de- irregular warfare, 50, 68, 92, 116
sign), 5, 8, 10–11, 14, 21, 25, 31–32, Israel, 46–47
36–40, 42, 47, 49, 52–53, 57, 61, 67,
Janus strategy, 95
74, 80, 86, 93, 97, 113–14
Johnston, Gen Joseph, 2–4, 80
Egypt, 21–23
joint doctrine, 23, 25, 40, 52, 54, 59
El Salvador, 105, 109–10
joint operation, 24, 36, 41, 43, 51, 60, 102
elements of operational design, 21,
joint operation planning process
24–27, 31–32, 93
elements of power, 6 (JOPP), 24–27, 31, 36, 55, 59–60,
end state, 25, 40, 49, 86, 97; end-state 65, 73, 76–77, 97
conditions, 6, 8, 19, 21, 23, 34, 36, Joint Publication 3-0, 23–24, 76
39, 42, 50, 61, 114; military end Joint Publication 3-24, 83
state, 21, 24, 32–33, 35–38, 47; po- Joint Publication 5-0, 24, 41, 43, 47, 51,
litical end state, 9–12, 14; strategic 102
end state, 31–38, 42, 50, 57, 67 Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan, 33
execute order, 75–76 juche, 7
Farabundo Martí National Liberation Kajaki Dam, 88–89, 91
Front, 105 Kandahar Province, 8, 89
force protection, 51, 53, 63, 74 Kari system, 44–46
frame-of-reference theory, 15 Kem, Jack, 42
Galula, David, 84, 100, 102 key terrain district (KTD), 100–103
Genghis Khan, 62 Kilcullen, David, 96
Gestalt theory, 17–18 Kim Il-sung, 7
Grant, Ulysses S., 78–80 Kuwait, 34–35
Guidance for the Employment of the Lee, Gen Robert E., 4–5
Force, 33 levels of war, 40, 42, 45, 47, 49–51, 55–56,
Hamlet Evaluation System (HES), 108, 77, 89, 92–95, 97–100, 105–6
113–15 Lincoln, Pres. Abraham, 2–3
Haqqani network, 13, 93 lines of effort (LOE), 102–3
Helmand Province, 8, 88–89 lines of operation (LOO), 6, 19, 25, 31,
Hezb-e-Islami Khalis, 93 40, 44, 47–49, 51, 61–62, 79, 97, 100
illiteracy, 7–8, 86. See also literacy literacy, 8, 109. See also illiteracy
information operations (IO), 8, 10, 52, MacArthur, Gen Douglas, 47
73–74, 110 Magruder, Gen John B., 4
instrument of power, 6, 32–33, 35, 53, 97 Malvern Hill, 4
insurgency, 74, 83, 86, 92–93, 102–3, McChrystal, Gen Stanley, 13
105–6, 114 McClellan, Gen George B., 2–5
insurgent, 13, 84, 87, 92, 95, 100, 104–6,
Megiddo, Battle of, 21–23
111, 113–14
Military Assistance Command Viet-
International Security Assistance Force
nam (MACV), 85–86
(ISAF), 10, 13, 88, 93, 100–101,
mirror imaging, 15–16
104, 115
Mongol Empire, 38–39, 62–63
Iran, 7, 16–17
Iraq, 7, 11, 13, 34–35, 44–46, 57, 63, 93, named area of interest (NAI), 71, 73–75
96, 100, 106–7 National Defense Strategy, 33
 index │ 133

National Liberation Front, 68, 105. See Republic of Korea, 7, 11

also North Vietnamese Army and Revolutionary Development Program,
Viet Cong 113
National Military Strategy, 33 Richmond, VA (in US Civil War), 2–5
National Security Strategy, 33 RIP/TOA, 96, 100, 102
NATO, 8, 93 risk analysis, 5, 12, 116
North Korea, 7, 11, 54, 56. See also Rumsfeld, Donald, 34
Democratic People’s Republic of Saudi Arabia, 34
Korea Second Battle of Manassas (US Civil
North Vietnamese Army, 68, 86. See War), 5
also National Liberation Front and September 11, 2001. See 9/11
Viet Cong Seven Days’ Battles (US Civil War), 4
Obama, Pres. Barack 13 Shah Ala al-Din Muhammad II, 62–63
objectives, 6, 9, 13, 19, 21, 25, 27, 31–42, Shiites, 93, 106
47–53, 60–64, 68, 74, 78, 83, 86, South Korea. See Republic of Korea
88–89, 93, 96–97, 102–3, 105, 111, 114 South Vietnam, 69, 86, 108, 113. See
observed system, 6–7, 9 also Vietnam
Operation Desert Shield, 34, 63 Southwest Pacific, 47–48
Strange, Joe, 42
Operation Desert Storm, 34, 44–47, 63
structure (in operational design), 1, 25,
Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF),
27, 59, 65, 69, 76, 97, 100
10, 13, 34, 73–74
Sunnis, 93, 107
Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF), 7, 11, 57
sustainment, 63
Operation Overlord, 49
synchronization matrix, 71–72, 111
operation plan (OPLAN), 24, 55, 57
systems analysis, 40–41, 85–88
operational art, 21, 23–28
operational environment, 5–6, 15, 18, Taliban, 8, 13, 34, 89, 93
36–37, 41–43, 50, 64, 69, 71, 76, target area of interest (TAI), 71–75
88–91, 93, 105, 113, 116 tasks (and operational design), 32, 37–39,
operational planning, 24 44, 47–48, 52–53, 73–74, 102–3
Organización Democrática Nacional- termination criteria, 11, 33, 35–37, 62
ista (ORDEN), 110 Tet offensive, 68
Teutoburger, 54
Pacification Attitudinal Analysis Sys- Thayer, Thomas, 109
tem (PAAS), 113–14 Thutmose III, 21–23
Pakistan, 93 time (as a factor in operational design),
Peninsula Campaign (US Civil War), 9–12, 51, 56, 65, 69, 84, 96
2–3, 5 Torkham Gate, 93
Persian Gulf, 34 Transoxiana, 62–63
phases: of an operation, 21, 31, 34, Turkey, 11–12
49–53, 55, 64–65, 74, 76, 83, 93,
Union forces (US Civil War), 2–5, 78–79
95–97; of a war game, 65, 69–70
United Nations (UN), 52–53, 56
Pike, Douglas, 85–86
United Nations Security Council, 8, 33,
planning-decision-execution cycle, 110
35, 37
PMESII, 6, 86, 88 United States Agency for International
Qiao, Liang, 9–10 Development (USAID), 89
Quetta Shura Taliban, 93 unrestricted warfare, 9–10
134 │ index

Urbana Plan, 3 Wang, Xiangsui, 9

US Pacification Studies Group, 113 war game, 36, 59, 65–73, 75–76, 80
Vicksburg, MS (in US Civil War), 78–80 warning order, 73, 75–76
Viet Cong, 85–86, 108, 114. See also Wertheimer, Max, 17
National Liberation Front and World War II, 47–48
North Vietnamese Army Yeonpyeong Island, 7
Vietnam, 38–39, 86, 106–7, 114. See
also North Vietnamese Army and
South Vietnam
 Operational Design
Distilling Clarity from Complexity for Decisive Action

Air University Press Team

Chief Editor
Demorah Hayes

Copy Editor
Tammi K. Dacus

Quality Review
James Howard

Cover Art, Book Design, and Illustrations

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Print Preparation and Distribution

Diane Clark
 A retired Army officer with extensive theater-level planning
experience, Dr. Jeffrey Reilly serves as director of joint education
at the Air Force's Air Command and Staff College. In 2010,
2011, and 2012, he conducted field research on operational design
in Afghanistan. His study examines the elements of operational
design and shows how design facilitates decision making to
reduce operational risks and increase the likelihood that a mili-
tary plan survives first contact. He argues that although opera-
tional design is an iterative process, structure is a key component
of design that focuses critical thinking and moves planners from
peripheral intellectual discussions to core planning issues. He also
contends that current joint doctrine does not adequately distin-
guish operational design from operational art, which may lead
military planners to develop a solution before the full nature of
the problem has been understood. Reilly provides a theoretical
framework for understanding design and applying it to major
combat operations as well as counterinsurgencies. Numerous
historical and hypothetical examples show how operational
design influences the outcome of military engagements.

AFRI~~~
AIR FORCE RESEARC H INSTITUTE

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