[2024] 6 S.C.R.

259 : 2024 INSC 397

Col. Ramneesh Pal Singh

v.
Sugandhi Aggarwal
(Civil Appeal No. 6137 of 2024)
08 May 2024
[Vikram Nath and Satish Chandra Sharma,* JJ.]

Issue for Consideration

Matter pertains to the guardianship of two minor children till they
attain the age of majority.

Headnotes
Guardian and Wards Act, 1890 – ss. 7, 9 and 25 – Custody
of two minor children – Family Court granted permanent
custody of minor children to the father-serving Army Officer
and provided visitation rights to the mother – However, the
High Court set aside the order and granted the parties shared
custody of the minor children – Challenge to:
Held: Principal consideration whilst deciding an application for
guardianship under the Act in exercise of its parens patriae
jurisdiction would be the ‘welfare’ of the minor children – Dispute
must be decided on the basis of a holistic and all encompassing
approach including inter alia the socio economic and educational
opportunities made available to the minor children; healthcare and
overall well being of the children; the ability to provide physical
surroundings conducive to growing adolescents; the preference
of the minor children as also stability of surroundings of the minor
children – On facts, unwavering and strong desire of the children to
continue to reside with the father – Said desire/preference although
in itself cannot be determinative of custody of the children, but must
be given due consideration – As regards, upbringing and welfare
of the minor children, the Indian Armed Forces provides a robust
support system to the kin of its officers which undoubtedly, aids in the
mental stimulation, growth and overall development of personality
of a child – Nothing on record to suggest that the interests and
welfare of the minor children were in any manner affected during
their stay with the father – Furthermore, the father could not have
been said to have engaged or propagated ‘alienating behaviour’ as
alleged by the mother – High Court failed to appreciate the said
* Author
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nuance and proceeded on an unsubstantiated assumption that

allegations of parental alienation could not be ruled out, despite
the stark absence of any instances of ‘alienating behaviour’ having
been identified by any Court – High Court neither correct nor
justified in interfering with the order passed by the Family Court
– In view thereof, it is just and appropriate that the custody of the
minor children is retained by the father, subject to the visitation
rights of the mother as granted by the Family Court. [Paras 8, 12,
13, 14, 16, 24-27]
Child and family welfare – Child custody dispute – ‘Parental
alienation syndrome’-PAS – Concept of:
Held: ‘Parental alienation syndrome’-PAS is a thoroughly
convoluted and intricate phenomenon requiring serious
consideration and deliberation – Recognising and appreciating
the repercussions of PAS certainly shed light on the realities of
longdrawn and bitter custody and divorce litigations on a certain
identified sect of families – However, there can be no straitjacket
formula to invoke the principle of PAS laid down by this Court in
*Vivek Singh’s case – Courts ought not to prematurely and without
identification of individual instances of ‘alienating behaviour’,
label any parent as propagator and/or potential promoter of such
behaviour – Said label has far-reaching implications which must
not be imputed or attributed to an individual parent routinely –
Courts must endeavour to identify individual instances of ‘alienating
behaviour’in order to invoke the principle of parental alienation so
as to overcome the preference indicated by the minor children.
[Paras 18-20, 22, 23]
Child and family welfare – Child custody dispute – Upbringing
and welfare of the minor children – Effect of the nature of
employment of father serving in Indian Armed forces:
Held: Indian Armed Forces provides a robust support system to
the kin of its officers so as to ensure minimal disruption in the
lives of the civilian members of an officer’s family – This support
system includes residential accommodation, a network of army
schools, hospitals and healthcare facilities – Moreover, various
extra-curricular activities, recreational clubs; and other social
and cultural functions are made available for the benefit of the
kin of officers of the Indian Armed Forces – Said support system
undoubtedly, aids in the mental stimulation, growth and overall
development of personality of a child. [Para 16]
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Col. Ramneesh Pal Singh v. Sugandhi Aggarwal

Case Law Cited

*Vivek Singh v. Romani Singh [2017] 2 SCR 312 :
(2017) 3 SCC 231 – held inapplicable.
Jitender Arora v. Sukriti Arora [2017] 1 SCR 707 : (2017)
3 SCC 726; Nil Ratan Kundu v. Abhijit Kundu [2008] 11
SCR 1111 : (2008) 9 SCC 413; Mausami Moitra Ganguli
v. Jayant Ganguli [2008] 8 SCR 260 : (2008) 7 SCC 673;
Vishnu v. Jaya (2010) 6 SCC 733; Lahari Sakhamuri v.
Sobhan Kodali [2019] 5 SCR 240 : (2019) 7 SCC 311;
Gaurav Nagpal v. Sumedha Nagpal [2008] 16 SCR 396 :
(2009) 1 SCC 42; Rosy Jacob v. Jacob A. Chakramakkal
[1973] 3 SCR 918 : (1973) 1 SCC 840; V. Ravi Chandran
(Dr.) (2) v. Union of India [2009] 15 SCR 960 : (2010)
1 SCC 174; Tejaswini Gaud v. Shekhar Jagdish Prasad
Tewari [2019] 7 SCR 335 : (2019) 7 SCC 42; Shazia
Aman Khan and Ors. v. The State of Orissa and Ors.
[2024] 3 SCR 10 : 2024 INSC 163 – referred to.
Re C (‘parental alienation’; instruction of expert) [2023]
EWHC 345 (Fam) – referred to.

List of Acts
Guardian and Wards Act, 1890; Protection of Women from Domestic
Violence Act, 2005.

List of Keywords
Guardianship; Custody of minor children; Visitation rights; Shared
custody; Parens patriae jurisdiction; Upbringing and welfare’ of
the minor children; Socio economic and educational opportunities;
Healthcare and overall wellbeing of the children; Physical
surroundings conducive to growing adolescents; Preference of
minor children; Stability of surroundings of minor children; Desire/
preference of minor child; Indian Armed Forces, robust support
system to kin of its officers; Mental stimulation, growth and overall
development of personality of child; Alienating behaviour’; ‘Parental
alienation syndrome’-PAS; Principle of parental alienation.

Case Arising From

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 6137 of 2024
From the Judgment and Order dated 11.10.2023 of the High Court of
Delhi at New Delhi in MATAPP (FC) No. 132 of 2020
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Appearances for Parties

Vivek Chib, Sr. Adv., Prabhas Bajaj, Priyanshu Tyagi, Rishav Rai,
Ms. Unnatu Jhunjhunwala, Ms. Mansi Gupta, Rithvik Mathur, Ms.
Manmeet Kaur Sareen, Advs. for the Appellant.
Ms. Vandana Sehgal, Mohit Yadav, Advs. for the Respondent.
Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court
Judgment
Satish Chandra Sharma, J.
Introduction
1. Leave granted.
2. The present appeal preferred by the Appellant seeks to assail the
correctness of an order dated 11.10.2023 passed by a Division
Bench of the High Court of Delhi at New Delhi (the “High Court”)
in M.A.T. APP (F.C.) 132 of 2020 (the “Impugned Order”). Vide the
Impugned Order the High Court partly allowed the appeal preferred
by the Respondent against an order dated 22.08.2020 passed by the
Learned Family Court, West, Tis Hazari Court (the “Family Court”)
in GP No. 45/17 (Old GP No. 75 of 2015) whereby the Family Court
granted permanent custody of minor children to the Appellant and
provided visitation rights to the Respondent (the “Underlying Order”).
Pertinently, vide the Impugned Order, the High Court set aside the
Underlying Order; and accordingly granted the parties shared custody
of the Minor Children (defined below).
Factual Background
3. The facts and proceedings germane to the contextual understanding
of the present lis, are as follows:
3.1. The marriage between (i) the Appellant i.e., now serving as
a Colonel in the Indian Armed Forces presently posted at
Jalandhar, Punjab; and (ii) the Respondent i.e., now employed
as a teacher in Delhi Public School, Gurugram - was solemnized
on 22.12.2002 at Delhi, in accordance with Hindu/Sikh rites and
rituals. Two minor children were born out of the wedlock i.e., (i)
a 15 (fifteen) year old daughter (hereinafter “SSU”); and (ii) a 12
(twelve) year old son (hereinafter “SSH”) (hereinafter, SSU and
SSH shall collectively be referred to as the “Minor Children”).
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Col. Ramneesh Pal Singh v. Sugandhi Aggarwal

3.2. In December 2013, the Appellant having been promoted to

the rank of Colonel in the Indian Armed Forces, was posted to
serve in the Jammu and Kashmir. Accordingly, it was decided
that the Respondent together with the Minor Children would
reside in New Delhi. The relationship between the Parties
deteriorated significantly; and thereafter took a turn for the
worst on 08.08.2015, forcing the Respondent to leave the
matrimonial home for 1 (one) night. Upon returning the next day
i.e., 09.08.2015, the Respondent found the residence locked,
and the Appellant along with the Minor Children unavailable at
aforesaid residence.
3.3. The Respondent was constrained to file (i) a missing children’s
report on 19.08.2015; and thereafter (ii) an application under
Section 12 of the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence
Act, 2005 (the “DV Act”) on 17.08.2015. Subsequently, the
Respondent learnt that the Minor Children along with the
Appellant were residing in Gulmarg, Jammu and Kashmir and
were scheduled to move to Bikaner, Rajasthan in furtherance of
the nature of the Appellant’s service. Aggrieved, the Respondent
filed a petition under Section 7, 9 and 25 of the Guardian and
Wards Act, 1890 (the “Act”) before the Family Court seeking
custody of the Minor Children on 21.11.2015. On the other
hand, the Appellant filed a similar petition seeking custody of
the Minor Children before the Learned Principal Jude, Family
Court, Bikaner, Rajasthan.
3.4. This Court vide an order dated 29.03.2017, transferred the
custody petition filed by the Appellant before the Learned
Principal Jude, Family Court, Bikaner, Rajasthan to the Family
Court in Delhi. Thereafter, vide an order dated 16.10.2017, the
Family Court granted interim custody of the Minor Children to
the Respondent (the “Interim Custody Order”). Aggrieved,
the Respondent preferred an Appeal before the High Court.
Vide an order dated 06.12.2017, the High Court initially stayed
the operation of the Interim Custody Order; thereafter vide an
order dated 19.04.2018 granted the Respondent custody of
the Minor Children on alternative weekends; and finally vide
an order dated 01.10.2019, dismissed the appeal and vacated
the interim order(s) observing inter alia that the appeal was not
maintainable.
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3.5. Aggrieved, the Appellant preferred a writ petition under

Article 227 of the Constitution of India before the High Court
challenging the correctness of the Interim Custody Order (the
“Writ Petition”). Vide an order dated 29.04.2020, the High Court
formulated an interim custody arrangement between the parties
after interacting with the Minor Children. Pertinently, although
an SLP was preferred against the aforesaid order, this Court
did not interfere with the order passed by the High Court; and
only directed the Family Court to decide the custody petition
within a period of 1 (one) month.
3.6. In the aforesaid context, the custody petition came to be
disposed of by the Family Court vide the Underlying Order
as under:
“16.1 In view of the aforesaid discussion, it is directed
that the permanent custody of minor children SSU
and SSH shall remain with the respondent. However,
the petitioner shall be entitled to have interaction
with the minor children daily through audio-video
call for half an hour, between 7:00 PM to 8:00 PM.
The respondent shall facilitate the said call. She
shall also be entitled to visit the minor children
and take them out with her from 10:00 AM to
5:00 PM, on every second and fourth Sunday, at
the station, where the minor children are staying,
subject to their school/educational commitments.
She can pick up the children from their residence
at 10:00 AM and drop them back at 5:00 PM. If it
is not possible to have visitation on any such day,
it shall be compensated on the next Sunday i.e.
third or fifth/first Sunday. Further, during the summer
vacations and the winter vacations in the school(s)
of the minor children, the petitioner shall be entitled
to have the custody of the minor children for ten
days and five days respectively. Such days can be
mutually decided by the parties. Accordingly, the
petition filed by the petitioner for seeking custody
of the minor children SSU and SSH is dismissed,
subject to contact/visitation/custody rights of the
petitioner as aforesaid.”
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Col. Ramneesh Pal Singh v. Sugandhi Aggarwal

3.7. Aggrieved by the Underlying Order, the Respondent preferred

an appeal under Section 19 of Family Courts Act, 1984
before the High Court. During the pendency of the appeal,
certain interim order(s) came to be passed from time to
time, subsequently, vide the Impugned Order, the High Court
granted the parties shared custody of the Minor Children as
under:
“34. In view of the aforesaid discussion, the impugned
order dated 22.08.2020 is set aside. We, accordingly,
partly allow the appeal and direct that the appellant
and the respondent will share custody of the minor
children ‘SSU’ and ‘SSH’ in the following manner:
(i) Till the start of the next academic session the
appellant would be entitled to have overnight
custody of the minor children on the second
and fourth weekend of every month. For the
said purpose, the appellant shall travel to the
respondent’s station of posting, on her own
expenses on the second Friday of every month.
She shall either make her own arrangements
for accommodation or request the respondent
to arrange for her accommodation at a guest
house in the Cantonment Area. The respondent
will hand over the custody of the children to the
appellant on the evening of Friday, after she
has arrived. The children shall remain with the
appellant till Sunday evening and thereafter,
the respondent shall pick them up before
the appellant leaves for Delhi. On the fourth
Friday of every month, the respondent shall
either bring the children to Delhi or send them
by flight, while placing them in the care of the
airline staff. In such a situation, the appellant
will pick the children up from the airport. The
children shall be returned by flight available
on Sunday evening. The expenses for the to
and fro journey of the children on such fourth
weekend of each month shall be borne by the
respondent.
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(ii) Prior to the beginning of the next academic

session, the appellant shall ensure that
admission of the minor children is secured at
the school where she is currently teaching,
i.e., Delhi Public School, Gurugram, Haryana.
The respondent shall fully cooperate in the
admission process. Thereafter, the respondent
shall hand over the custody of the minor children
to the appellant. The children will stay with the
appellant at her residence in Delhi. In such a
situation, the respondent would be entitled to
have overnight custody of the minor children
on the second and fourth weekend of every
month. For the said purpose, the respondent
shall travel to Delhi, on his own expenses
on every second Friday. He shall make his
own arrangements for accommodation. The
appellant will hand over the custody of the
children to the respondent on the evening of
Friday, after he has arrived. The children shall
remain with the respondent till Sunday evening
and thereafter, the appellant shall pick them up
before the respondent leaves. On the fourth
Friday of every month, the appellant shall either
bring the children to the respondent’s station
of posting or send them by flight, while placing
them in the care of the airline staff. In such a
situation, the respondent will pick the children
up from the airport. The children shall be
returned by flight available on Sunday evening.
The expenses for the to and fro journey of the
children on such fourth weekend of each month
shall be borne by the appellant.
(iii) In case the respondent is posted to a station
in the NCT of Delhi, the appellant and the
respondent will have custody of the minor
children for two weeks each including the
weekends, every month. The children shall
stay with the appellant for the first two weeks
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Col. Ramneesh Pal Singh v. Sugandhi Aggarwal

of every month and with the respondent for

the next two weeks of every month. At the end
of the second week of every month, i.e., on
Sunday evening, the appellant shall drop the
children at the respondent’s accommodation. At
the end of every fourth week, i.e., on Sunday
evening, the respondent shall drop the children
back at the appellant’s residence.
(iv) During summer vacations and winter vacations,
the appellant and the respondent shall have
custody of the minor children for an equal
number of days. Such days can be mutually
agreed upon by the parties. It is clarified that
in case the children are required to travel as a
result of the said arrangement during vacations,
the expenses for their travel shall be borne by
the parent who they are visiting. Therefore, if
the children are travelling from the respondent’s
station of posting to Delhi, the expenses shall
be borne by the appellant. If the children are
travelling from Delhi to the respondent’s station
of posting, the expenses shall be borne by the
respondent.”
3.8. Aggrieved by the Impugned Order, the Appellant preferred
SLP (C) No. 28466 of 2023 (the “SLP”) before this Court i.e.,
now converted to this instant appeal. Vide an order dated
05.01.2024, this Court stayed the operation of the Impugned
Order.
3.9. It would also be relevant to clarify that, up until this stage, the
custody of the Minor Children has essentially remained with
the Appellant despite (i) various interim order(s) passed by
(a) the High Court; and (b) the Family Court in favour of the
Respondent; and (ii) the initiation of contempt proceedings
before the High Court.
Contentions of the Parties
4. Shri Vivek Chib, Learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the
Appellant, urged the following:
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4.1. That the Minor Children have been residing with him happily
since ‘15 i.e., for period extending to almost to 9 (nine) years
and it is the desire of the Minor Children to continue to reside
with the Appellant. In this regard, it was submitted that the
aforesaid preference has been communicated by the Minor
Children to various court(s) from time -to-time including inter
alia the High Court.
4.2. That the High Court proceeded on an erroneous assumption
that the prolonged period of separation between the Respondent
and the Minor Children has sub-consciously influenced the
Minor Children against the Respondent.
4.3. That the Underlying Order passed by the Family Court was a
detailed and well-reasoned order which has been passed after
a thorough analysis of the copious evidence and material(s) on
record in favour of the Appellant.
4.4. Lastly, Mr. Chib relied on the following decision(s) of this Court
to buttress the aforesaid submission(s):
(a) Jitender Arora v. Sukriti Arora, (2017) 3 SCC 726;
(b) Nil Ratan Kundu v. Abhijit Kundu, (2008) 9 SCC 413;
(c) Mausami Moitra Ganguli v. Jayant Ganguli, (2008) 7
SCC 673;
(d) Vishnu v. Jaya, (2010) 6 SCC 733; and
(e) Lahari Sakhamuri v. Sobhan Kodali, (2019) 7 SCC 311.
5. Ms. Vandana Sehgal, AOR appearing on behalf of the Respondent
brought forth the following key contentions:
5.1. That the Appellant has forcefully retained the custody of the
Minor Children for a prolonged period of 8 (eight) years in
blatant disregard of various order(s) passed by the High Court
and / or the Family Court directing interim shared custody of
the Minor Children at different points of time.
5.2. That the Underlying Order granted the Appellant custody of
the Minor Children proceeding on an erroneous and irrelevant
consideration i.e., the alleged act of adultery.
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Col. Ramneesh Pal Singh v. Sugandhi Aggarwal

5.3. That the Appellant has deliberately disenfranchised the Minor

Children from their mother i.e., the Respondent herein, and
accordingly it was vehemently contended that the present lis is
a classic case of ‘parental alienation syndrome’ (“PAS”).
5.4. That the Minor Children are at an impressionable age and
require the presence of their mother i.e., the Respondent.
5.5. That the Court whilst exercising its parens patriae jurisdiction
must not limit itself to the wish and / or desire of the Minor
Children but must ensure the welfare of the Minor Children.
5.6. That the Respondent is employed as a teacher in a reputed
school in Gurugram; and would be able to provide the Minor
Children with a stable and conducive environment as opposed
to Appellant i.e., a serving officer in the Indian Armed Forces,
who is due to be transferred to a field station as opposed to
a family station.
5.7. In regard to the aforesaid, Ms. Sehgal relied on the following:
(a) Vivek Singh v. Romani Singh, (2017) 3 SCC 231;
(b) Gaurav Nagpal v. Sumedha Nagpal (2009) 1 SCC 42;
(c) Nil Ratan Kundu (Supra); and
(d) Rosy Jacob v. Jacob A. Chakramakkal, (1973) 1 SCC
840.
Analysis and Findings
6. We have heard the learned counsels appearing on behalf of the
respective parties at length and we have carefully considered and
deliberated upon the submission(s) made on behalf of the parties.
7. In the instant appeal we have been called upon to decide the
guardianship of 2 (two) minor children i.e., (i) SSU; and (ii) SSH, till
they attain the age of majority.
8. It is well settled that the principal consideration of the Court whilst
deciding an application for guardianship under the Act in exercise
of its parens patriae jurisdiction would be the ‘welfare’ of the minor
children.1

1 V. Ravi Chandran (Dr.) (2) v. Union of India (2010) 1 SCC 174

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9. The aforesaid principle is also enshrined in Section 17 of the Act,

the same is reproduced as under:
“17. Matters to be considered by the Court in appointing
guardian. – (1) In appointing or declaring the guardian of
a minor, the Court shall, subject to the provisions of this
section, be guided by what, consistently with the law to
which the minor is subject, appears in the circumstances
to be for the welfare of the minor.
(2) In considering what will be for the welfare of the minor,
the Court shall have regard to the age, sex and religion
of the minor, the character and capacity of the proposed
guardian and his nearness of kin to the minor, the wishes,
if any, of a deceased parent, and any existing or previous
relations of the proposed guardian with the minor or his
property.
(3) If the minor is old enough to form an intelligent
preference, the Court may consider that preference.
2
* * * * *
(5) The Court shall not appoint or declare any person to
be a guardian against his will.”
10. In this context, it would be appropriate to refer to a decision of this
Court in Nil Ratan Kundu (Supra) wherein parameters of ‘welfare’
and principles to be considered by courts whilst deciding questions
involving the custody of minor children came to be enunciated. The
relevant paragraph(s) are reproduced as under:
“52. In our judgment, the law relating to custody of a child
is fairly well settled and it is this: in deciding a difficult and
complex question as to the custody of a minor, a court
of law should keep in mind the relevant statutes and the
rights flowing therefrom. But such cases cannot be decided
solely by interpreting legal provisions. It is a human problem
and is required to be solved with human touch. A court
while dealing with custody cases, is neither bound by
statutes nor by strict rules of evidence or procedure nor

2 Sub-section (4) omitted by Act 3 of 1951, s. 3 and the Schedule.

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Col. Ramneesh Pal Singh v. Sugandhi Aggarwal

by precedents. In selecting proper guardian of a minor,

the paramount consideration should be the welfare and
wellbeing of the child. In selecting a guardian, the court is
exercising parens patriae jurisdiction and is expected, nay
bound, to give due weight to a child’s ordinary comfort,
contentment, health, education, intellectual development
and favourable surroundings. But over and above physical
comforts, moral and ethical values cannot beignored.
They are equally, or we may say, even more important,
essential and indispensable considerations. If the minor is
old enough to form an intelligent preference or judgment,
the court must consider such preference as well, though
the final decision should rest with the court as to what is
conducive to the welfare of the minor.
xxx
55. We are unable to appreciate the approach of the courts
below. This Court in a catena of decisions has held that the
controlling consideration governing the custody of children
is the welfare of children and not the right of their parents.
56. In Rosy Jacob [(1973) 1 SCC 840] this Court stated:
(SCC p. 854, para 15)
“15. … The contention that if the husband [father] is
not unfit to be the guardian of his minor children, then,
the question of their welfare does not at all arise is
to state the proposition a bit too broadly and may at
times be somewhat misleading.”
It was also observed that the father’s fitness has to be
considered, determined and weighed predominantly in
terms of the welfare of his minor children in the context of
all the elevant circumstances. The father’s fitness cannot
override considerations of the welfare of the minor children.
57. In our opinion, in such cases, it is not the “negative test”
that the father is not “unfit” or disqualified to have custody
of his son/daughter that is relevant, but the “positive test”
that such custody would be in the welfare of the minor
which is material and it is on that basis that the court should
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exercise the power to grant or refuse custody of a minor

in favour of the father, the mother or any other guardian.”
11. Furthermore, this Court in Gaurav Nagpal (Supra) undertook a
comprehensive and comparative analysis of laws relating to custody
in the American, English, and Indian jurisdiction(s) and observed
that the Court must construe the term ‘welfare’ in its widest sense
i.e., the consideration by the Court would not only extend to moral
and ethical welfare but also include the physical well-being of the
minor children.
12. Accordingly, in view of the aforesaid, not only must we proceed to
decide the present lis on the basis of a holistic and all-encompassing
approach including inter alia (i) the socio-economic and educational
opportunities which may be made available to the Minor Children;
(ii) healthcare and overall-wellbeing of the children; (iii) the ability
to provide physical surroundings conducive to growing adolescents
but also take into consideration the preference of the Minor Children
as mandated under Section 17(3) of the Act.3 Furthermore, we are
equally conscious that the stability of surrounding(s) of the Minor
Children is also a consideration to be weighed appropriately.4
13. In the present factual matrix, the minor children i.e., SSU; and
SSH have interacted with the Court(s) to express their preference
of guardian on a plethora of occasions. Accordingly, we consider it
appropriate to briefly delve into the observations of the Court(s) vis-
à-vis the preference expressed by the Minor Children:
13.1. The Learned Single Judge of the High Court engaged with the
Minor Children on 24.02.2020 i.e., SSU was approximately 11.5
(eleven and a half) years old; and SHH was approximately
8 (eight) years old. The Learned Single Judge in his order
dated 29.04.2020 recorded that he found the Minor Children
to be confident and well-groomed. Furthermore, it has been
categorically stated no overt preference was indicated by the
Minor Children in respect to one parent over the other.
13.2. Thereafter, the Family Court engaged in a personal interaction
with the Minor Children on 11.08.2020 i.e., when SSU

3 Lahari Sakhamuri (Supra); and Tejaswini Gaud v. Shekhar Jagdish Prasad Tewari (2019) 7 SCC 42
4 Shazia Aman Khan and Ors. vs. The State of Orissa and Ors. 2024 INSC 163
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Col. Ramneesh Pal Singh v. Sugandhi Aggarwal

was approximately 12 (twelve) years old; and SSH was

approximately 8.5 (eight and a half) years old. Pertinently, in
Underlying Order, the Family Court observed that the Minor
Children expressed their preference to reside with the Appellant.
Additionally, it was observed that the Minor Children were doing
well in the pursuit of their education and co-curricular activities
whilst residing with the Appellant; and that the Minor Children
were well-settled and progressing fine.
13.3. Subsequently, the Division Bench of the High Court interacted
with the Minor Children on two occasions i.e., (i) 23.08.2021;
and (ii) 17.08.2022. Pertinently, the Division Bench in an order
dated 23.08.2021 observed that the children were intelligent
and reasonably grown up. On the other hand, the Division
Bench in the Impugned Order observed that the Minor Children
expressed their clear desire to reside with the Appellant.
13.4. In the Supreme Court, we considered it necessary to interact
with the Minor Children ourselves. Accordingly, vide an order
dated 19.03.2024, we directed the Appellant to produce the
Minor Children in Court so as to enable us to interact with
them. On 05.04.2024, we interacted with both SSU; and SSH
in chambers. We found the Minor Children to be intelligent,
confident, cognisant of the pros and cons of their decisions and
most importantly content / happy. During our interactions with
the Minor Children, despite probing the issue of guardianship
on more than one occasion, the Minor Children categorically
stated that they were happy and wished to reside with their
father only i.e., the Appellant.
14. The natural and consequential deduction from the aforesaid
interaction(s) between the Minor Children and various Court over a
period spanning over 4 (four) years, is the unwavering and strong
desire of the children to continue to reside with the Appellant. The
aforesaid desire / preference although in itself cannot be determinative
of custody of the children, but it must be given due consideration on
account of it being a factor of utmost importance.
15. Having settled the preference of the Minor Children, we turn towards,
the next leg of the analysis to be undertaken by this Court in questions
involving custody of children i.e., considerations of welfare of the
children.
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16. In the instant appeal, certain contentions were raised by Ms.

Sehgal in relation to the nature of employment of the Appellant
posing a challenge in the upbringing and welfare of the Minor
Children. We find ourselves unable to subscribe to the aforesaid
view, as we find that the Indian Armed Forces provides a robust
support system to the kin of its officer(s) so as to ensure minimal
disruption in the lives of the civilian member(s) of an officer’s
family. This support system includes residential accommodation,
a network of army schools, hospitals and healthcare facilities.
Moreover, various extra-curricular activities i.e., sport(s) facilities
and recreational clubs; and other social and cultural functions are
made available for the benefit of the kin of officers of the Indian
Armed Forces – the aforesaid support system undoubtedly, aids
in the mental stimulation, growth and overall development of
personality of a child.
17. At this juncture it would also be relevant to deal with the main thrust
of the argument put forth by Ms. Sehgal in relation to the preference
indicated by the Minor Children i.e., it was contended that the
present case is a classic case of PAS wherein the Minor Children
have been influenced against the Respondent; and accordingly the
preference indicated by the Minor Children ought not to be considered
representative of the true emotions of the Minor Children. In view
of the aforesaid, the decision of this Court in Vivek Singh (Supra)
was heavily relied upon to substantiate her submission. The relevant
paragraph is reproduced as under:
“18. The aforesaid observations, contained in para 31 of
the order of the High Court extracted above, apply with
greater force today, when Saesha is 8 years’ old child.
She is at a crucial phase when there is a major shift in
thinking ability which may help her to understand cause
and effect better and think about the future. She would
need regular and frequent contact with each parent as
well as shielding from parental hostility. Involvement of
both parents in her life and regular school attendance
are absolutely essential at this age for her personality
development. She would soon be able to establish her
individual interests and preferences, shaped by her own
individual personality as well as experience. Towards this
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Col. Ramneesh Pal Singh v. Sugandhi Aggarwal

end, it also becomes necessary for parents to exhibit model

good behaviour and set healthy and positive examples
as much and as often as possible. It is the age when her
emotional development may be evolving at a deeper level
than ever before. In order to ensure that she achieves
stability and maturity in her thinking and is able to deal
with complex emotions, it is necessary that she is in the
company of her mother as well, for some time. This Court
cannot turn a blind eye to the fact that there have been
strong feelings of bitterness, betrayal, anger and distress
between the appellant and the respondent, where each
party feels that they are “right” in many of their views on
issues which led to separation. The intensity of negative
feeling of the appellant towards the respondent would
have obvious effect on the psyche of Saesha, who has
remained in the company of her father, to the exclusion
of her mother. The possibility of appellant’s effort to get
the child to give up her own positive perceptions of the
other parent i.e. the mother and change her to agree
with the appellant’s viewpoint cannot be ruled out thereby
diminishing the affection of Saesha towards her mother.
Obviously, the appellant, during all this period, would
not have said anything about the positive traits of the
respondent. Even the matrimonial discord between the
two parties would have been understood by Saesha, as
perceived by the appellant. Psychologists term it as “The
Parental Alienation Syndrome” [The Parental Alienation
Syndrome was originally described by Dr Richard Gardner
in “Recent Developments in Child Custody Litigation”, The
Academy Forum, Vol. 29, No. 2: The American Academy
of Psychoanalysis, 1985]. It has at least two psychological
destructive effects:
(i) First, it puts the child squarely in the middle of a
contest of loyalty, a contest which cannot possibly
be won. The child is asked to choose who is
the preferred parent. No matter whatever is the
choice, the child is very likely to end up feeling
painfully guilty and confused. This is because in
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the overwhelming majority of cases, what the child

wants and needs is to continue a relationship with
each parent, as independent as possible from their
own conflicts.
(ii) Second, the child is required to make a shift in
assessing reality. One parent is presented as being
totally to blame for all problems, and as someone
who is devoid of any positive characteristics. Both of
these assertions represent one parent’s distortions
of reality.”
18. The aforesaid submission found favour with the High Court.
Pertinently, the High Court in the Impugned Order observed that the
possibility of the Minor Children having been influenced against the
Respondent, could not be ruled out.
19. We find ourselves unable to agree with the High Court - in our
considered opinion, the High Court has failed to appreciate the
intricacies and complexities of the relationship between the parties
and accordingly, proceeded to entertain allegations of PAS on an
unsubstantiated basis.
20. PAS is a thoroughly convoluted and intricate phenomenon that
requires serious consideration and deliberation. In our considered
opinion, recognising and appreciating the repercussions of PAS
certainly shed light on the realities of long-drawn and bitter custody
and divorce litigation(s) on a certain identified sect of families,
however, it is equally important for us to remember that there can
no straitjacket formula to invoke the principle laid down by this Court
in Vivek Singh (Supra).
21. The role of a Court vis-à-vis allegation(s) of PAS came to be
considered recently by an English Court i.e., the High Court of
Justice Family Division in Re C (‘parental alienation’; instruction
of expert), [2023] EWHC 345 (Fam). Pertinently, the Court reflected
on the changing narrative in relation to PAS - placed before the
Court therein, by an expert body i.e., the Association of Clinical
Psychologists - UK (“ACP”) and thereafter observed as under:
“103. Before leaving this part of the appeal, one particular
paragraph in the ACP skeleton argument deserves to be
widely understood and, I would strongly urge, accepted:
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Col. Ramneesh Pal Singh v. Sugandhi Aggarwal

‘Much like an allegation of domestic abuse;

the decision about whether or not a parent
has alienated a child is a question of fact for
the Court to resolve and not a diagnosis that
can or should be offered by a psychologist.
For these purposes, the ACP-UK wishes to
emphasise that “parental alienation” is not a
syndrome capable of being diagnosed, but a
process of manipulation of children perpetrated
by one parent against the other through, what
are termed as, “alienating behaviours”. It is,
fundamentally, a question of fact.’
It is not the purpose of this judgment to go further into
the topic of alienation. Most Family judges have, for some
time, regarded the label of ‘parental alienation’, and the
suggestion that there may be a diagnosable syndrome
of that name, as being unhelpful. What is important, as
with domestic abuse, is the particular behaviour that
is found to have taken place within the individual
family before the court, and the impact that that
behaviour may have had on the relationship of a child
with either or both of his/her parents. In this regard,
the identification of ‘alienating behaviour’ should be
the court’s focus, rather than any quest to determine
whether the label ‘parental alienation’ can be applied.”
22. We find ourselves in agreement with the aforesaid position. Courts
ought not to prematurely and without identification of individual
instances of ‘alienating behaviour’, label any parent as propagator
and / or potential promoter of such behaviour. The aforesaid label
has far-reaching implications which must not be imputed or attributed
to an individual parent routinely.
23. Accordingly, it is our considered opinion that Courts must endeavour
to identify individual instances of ‘alienating behaviour’ in order to
invoke the principle of parental alienation so as to overcome the
preference indicated by the minor children.5

5 Recognised by this Court in Vivek Singh (Supra).

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24. In the instant appeal, the Family Court has categorically recorded
that there was nothing on record to suggest that the interests and
welfare of the Minor Children were in any manner affected during
their stay with the Appellant. Additionally, the Learned Single Judge
of the High Court interacted with the Minor Children on 24.02.2020
i.e., a period of close to 4.5 (four and a half) years after the alleged
incident on 08.08.2015, and categorically recorded that the Minor
Children expressed no overt preference amongst their parents –
the aforesaid observation by the Learned Single Judge, is crucial
as it underscores that while the relationship between the parties
may have been strained; the Minor Children could not be said to
have exhibited any indication of ‘parental alienation’ i.e., there was
no overt preference expressed by the Minor Children between the
parents and thus, the foundation for any claim of parental alienation
was clearly absent. The aforesaid position is also supported by
materials on record to suggest that (i) the Minor Children are
cognisant and aware of the blame game being played inter se the
parties; and (ii) that the Minor Children did not foster unbridled and
prejudiced emotions towards the Respondent. Accordingly, we find
that the Appellant could not have been said to have engaged or
propagated ‘alienating behaviour’ as alleged by the Respondent.
25. Therefore, in our considered opinion, the High Court failed
to appreciate the aforesaid nuance and proceeded on an
unsubstantiated assumption i.e., that allegations of parental
alienation could not be ruled out, despite the stark absence of any
instances of ‘alienating behaviour’ having been identified by any
Court. In view of the aforesaid discussion, we find that the reliance
placed on Vivek Singh (Supra) by the Respondent is misdirected
and the High Court erred in law and in fact whilst relying on the
said decision.
26. Accordingly, on an overall consideration, we are convinced that the
High Court was neither correct nor justified in interfering with the
well-considered and reasoned order passed by the Family Court
granting custody of the Minor Children to the Appellant for the
reasons recorded above.
Directions & Conclusions
27. In view of the aforesaid discussion, we consider it just and appropriate
that the custody of the Minor Children is retained by the Appellant,
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Col. Ramneesh Pal Singh v. Sugandhi Aggarwal

subject to the visitation rights of the Respondent as granted by the

Family Court vide the Underlying Order i.e., the final order dated
22.08.2020.
28. The appeal is allowed in the aforesaid terms; the Impugned Order
is set aside. Pending applications, if any, stand disposed of. No
order as to cost(s).

Headnotes prepared by: Nidhi Jain Result of the case:

 Appeal allowed.