2NC Round 3

Off time road map: Theory Shell, Topicality, Case

T

Topicality
Analytical: Judge, the affirmative has fundamentally misunderstood what argument is for the topicality.
Looking at the evi it does not answer our t at all.

Anwhalt 23, Moseff 19

The entire argument is based on the fact that they are providing support. Our specific warrant is that IPR
must be protected FROM theft! That was the warrant in our card. Perfer our ev! Field 15 profesor of law.

Arg on csmp, not predictiable

Case
Group Hurst 23, Maginer 23. Cross apply Hadley. Our warrant are specific that we will lead, even if we
fall behind we catch up.

AND

Antage

The US inevitably out competes China

Kroenig 20 – Matthew Kroenig is the author of The Return of Great Power Rivalry: Democracy Versus
Autocracy From the Ancient World to the U.S. and China, a professor of government and foreign service
at Georgetown University, and the deputy director of the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security at
the Atlantic Council. Kroenig, Matthew. “Why the U.S. Will Outcompete China. The faith in autocratic
ascendance and democratic decline is contrary to historical fact. The Atlantic. April 3rd, 2020.
https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2020/04/why-china-ill-equipped-great-power-rivalry/
609364/ WMK

National-security analysts see China as one of the greatest threats facing the United States and its allies. According
to an emerging conventional wisdom, China has the leg up on the U.S. in part because its authoritarian
government can strategically plan for the long term, unencumbered by competing branches of government,
regular elections, and public opinion. Yet this faith in autocratic ascendance and democratic decline is contrary to
historical fact. China may be able to put forth big, bold plans—the kinds of projects that analysts think of as long term—
but the visionary projects of autocrats don’t usually pan out. Yes, democratic governments are obligated to
answer to their citizens on regular intervals and are sensitive to public opinion—that’s actually democracies’ greatest
source of strength. Democratic leaders have a harder time advancing big, bold agendas, but the upside of that
difficulty is that the plans that do make it through the system have been carefully considered and enjoy domestic
support. Historically speaking, once a democracy comes up with a successful strategy, it sticks with the plan,
even through a succession of leadership. Washington has arguably followed the same basic, three-step
geopolitical plan since 1945. First, the United States built the current, rules-based international system by
providing security in important geopolitical regions, constructing international institutions, and promoting free markets and
democratic politics within its sphere of influence. Second, it welcomed into the club any country that played by the
rules, even former adversaries, like Germany and Japan. And, third, the U.S. worked with its allies to defend the
system from those countries or groups that would challenge it, including competitors such as Russia and China, rogue
states such as Iran and North Korea, and terrorist networks. America can pursue long-term strategy in part because it
enjoys domestic political stability. While new politicians seek to improve on their predecessor’s policies,
the United States is unlikely to see the drastic shifts in strategy that come from the fall of one political
system and the rise of another. Democratic elections may be messy, but they’re not as messy as coups
or civil wars. Open societies have many other advantages as well. They facilitate innovation, trust in
financial markets, and economic growth. Because democracies tend to be more reliable partners, they are
typically skillful alliance builders, and they can accumulate resources without frightening their neighbors.
They tend to make thoughtful, informed decisions on matters of war and peace, and to focus their security
forces on external enemies, not their own populations. Autocratic systems simply cannot match this
impressive array of economic, diplomatic, and military attributes. David Leonhardt recently wrote in The New York Times, “ Chinese leaders
stretching back to Deng Xiaoping have often thought in terms of decades.” Commonly cited examples of that long-
term thinking include the Belt and Road Initiative, a program that invests in infrastructure overseas; Made in China 2025, an
effort to subsidize China’s giant tech companies to become world leaders in 21st-century technologies, such as artificial intelligence; and
Beijing’s promise to be a global superpower by 2049. Since putting in place sound economic reforms in the 1970s, China
has seen its economy expand at eye-popping rates, to become the world’s second largest. Many economists predict that
China could even surpass the United States within the decade, and some have suggested that China’s model of state-led
capitalism will prove more successful, in terms of economic growth, than the U.S. template of free
markets and open politics. I doubt these predictions. Because autocratic leaders are unconstrained and do
not have to contend with a legislature or courts, they have an easier time taking their countries in new and radically
different directions. Then, when the dictator changes his mind, he can do it again. Mao’s autocratic China
ricocheted from one failed policy to another: the Great Leap Forward, then the Hundred Flowers
Campaign, then the Cultural Revolution. Mao aligned with the Soviet Union in 1950 only to nearly fight a
nuclear war with Moscow in the next decade. Beginning in the time of Deng Xiaoping, China pursued a fairly
constant strategy of liberalizing its economy at home and “hiding its capabilities and biding its time” abroad. But President Xi
Jinping abandoned these dictums when he took over. As the most powerful leader since Mao—he has changed China’s constitution to
set himself up as dictator for life—he could once again jerk China in several new directions, according to his
whims, and back again. According to the Asia Society, he has stalled or reversed course on eight of 10 categories
of economic reform promised by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) itself. Moreover, Xi is baring China’s teeth militarily,
taking contested territory from neighbors in the South China Sea and conducting military exercises with
Russia in Europe. The problem for Beijing is that stalled reforms will stymie its economic potential and its
confrontational policies are provoking an international coalition to contain them. The 2017 U.S. National Security
Strategy declared great-power competition with China the foremost security threat to the U.S.; the European Union
labeled China a “systemic rival”; and Japan, Australia, India, and the United States have formed a new
“quad” of powers to balance China in the Pacific. Furthermore, the plans often cited as evidence of China’s farsighted
vision, the Belt and Road Initiative and Made in China 2025, were announced by Xi only in 2013 and 2015, respectively. Both
are way too recent to be celebrated as brilliant examples of successful, long-term strategic planning. A
certain level of domestic political stability is a prerequisite for charting a steady strategic course in foreign
and domestic affairs. But autocratic regimes are notoriously brittle. While institutionalized political successions in democracies
typically lead to changes of policy, political successions in autocracies are likely to result in regime collapse and
war. China’s “5,000 years of history” were pockmarked by rebellion, revolution, and new dynasties. Fearing
internal threats to domestic political stability—consider the protests this year in Hong Kong and Xinjiang—the CCP spends more on
domestic security than on its national defense. If you follow the money, the CCP is demonstrating that the
government is more afraid of its own people than of the Pentagon. This domestic fragility will frustrate
China’s efforts to design and execute farsighted plans. If threats to Chinese domestic
stability were to materialize and the CCP were to collapse tomorrow,
for example, Chinese grand strategy could undergo another seismic
shift, including possibly opting out of competition with the United
States altogether. Autocracies have other vulnerabilities as well. State-led planning has never produced high rates of
economic growth over the long term. Autocrats
are poor alliance builders who fight with their supposed allies more
than with their enemies. And the highest priority of autocratic security forces is repressing their own people, not defending the
country. The world has undergone drastic changes in just the past few years, but these enduring patterns of international affairs have not. Some
fear that Trump’s nationalist tendencies will erode the U.S. position, but
the momentum of America’s successful grand
strategy has kept the country on a fairly steady course. Despite Trump’s criticism of NATO, for example, two new countries
have joined the alliance on his watch, including North Macedonia this week. The coronavirus has upended a sense of security in the U.S., leading
many people into the familiar trap of lauding autocratic China’s firm response in contrast to the halting and patchwork measures in the United
States. But there is good reason to believe that this assessment will be updated in America’s favor with the benefit of hindsight. Already we are
seeing evidence that conditions are much worse in China than CCP officials are letting on and that China’s
attempts at international
“disaster diplomacy” are backfiring. It has been revealed that the CCP has continually misrepresented the numbers of COVID-19
infections and deaths in China, and European nations have rejected and returned faulty Chinese coronavirus testing kits. The great political
theorist Niccolò Machiavelli considered a similar line of thinking in the 16th century, about whether republics or dictators charted a more stable
course. He wrote, “I, therefore, disagree with the common opinion that a populace in power is unstable [and] changeable … The prince …
unchecked by laws, will be more … unstable, and imprudent than a populace.” The U.S. political system certainly has
problems. But democracy is the best machine ever invented for generating enormous power, wealth, and
prestige on the international stage.

FOR the Taiwan, for their case

No Taiwan invasion
Klare 23 — Michael T. Klare is a Five Colleges professor of Peace and World Security Studies, whose
department is located at Hampshire College, defense correspondent of The Nation magazine and author
of Resource Wars and Blood and Oil: The Dangers and Consequences of America's Growing Petroleum
Dependency. Michael Klare, "Is a Chinese Invasion of Taiwan Imminent?," RealClearWorld, 3-15-2023,
https://www.realclearworld.com/2023/03/15/is_a_chinese_invasion_of_taiwan_imminent_887373.htm
l, accessed 3-20-2023 WMK
Exercises like these certainly indicate that Chinese leaders are building the capacity to undertake an invasion, should they deem it necessary. But
issuing threats and acquiring military capabilities do not necessarily signify intent to take action. The
CCP’s top leaders are survivors of ruthless intraparty struggles and know how to calculate risks and
benefits. However strongly they may feel about Taiwan, they are not inclined to order an invasion that
could result in China’s defeat and their own disgrace, imprisonment, or death.
Weighing the Risks

Even under the best of circumstances, an amphibious assault on Taiwan would prove exceedingly
difficult and dangerous. Transporting tens of thousands of PLA troops across 100 miles of water while
under constant attack by Taiwanese and (probably) U.S. forces and depositing them on heavily defended
beachheads could easily result in disaster. As Russia discovered in Ukraine, conducting a large-scale assault
against spirited resistance can prove extremely difficult — even when invading by land. And keep in mind that
the PLA hasn’t engaged in significant armed combat since 1979, when it lost a war with Vietnam (though it has had
some border skirmishes with India in recent years). Even if it managed to secure a beachhead in Taiwan, its forces would undoubtedly
lose dozens of ships, hundreds of planes, and many thousands of troops — with no assurance of securing
control over Taipei or other major cities.

Just such an outcome emerged in multiple war games conducted in 2022 by the Center for Strategic and International
Studies (CSIS), a Washington-based think tank. Those simulations, performed by figures with “a variety of senior governmental, think tank, and
military backgrounds,” always began with a PLA amphibious assault on Taiwan accompanied by air and missile attacks on critical government
infrastructure. But “the Chinese invasion quickly founders,” a CSIS summary suggests. “Despite massive Chinese bombardment, Taiwanese
ground forces stream to the beachhead, where the invaders struggle to build up supplies and move inland. Meanwhile, U.S. submarines,
bombers, and fighter/attack aircraft, often reinforced by Japan Self-Defense Forces, rapidly cripple the Chinese amphibious fleet. China’s
strikes on Japanese bases and U.S. surface ships cannot change the result: Taiwan remains autonomous.”

Those like General Minihan who predict an imminent Chinese invasion usually neglect to mention such
hardcore assessments, but other military analysts have been less reticent. Buried deep in the Pentagon’s 2022 report on Chinese
military power, for example, is the following: “An attempt to invade Taiwan would likely strain PRC’s armed forces
and invite international intervention. Combined with inevitable force attrition… these factors make an amphibious
invasion of Taiwan a significant political and military risk for Xi Jinping and the Chinese Communist Party.”

Surely Xi’s
generals and admirals have conducted similar war games and reached comparable conclusions.
Chinese leaders are also painfully aware of the sanctions imposed by the U.S. and its allies on Russia in
response to its invasion of Ukraine and recognize that an invasion of Taiwan would automatically result
in similar penalties. Add in the potential damage to Chinese infrastructure from U.S. bombers and the country’s economic
prospects could be crushed for years to come — a likely death sentence for the Chinese Communist Party. Why, then, even
think about an invasion?

Inter harm
Never respon alt cause, American don’t, All args on it dropped

Extend alt cause

US-China trade war, COZVD, and Ukraine are all alt causes that spill over and
destroys the international financial system---kills global trade and growth
Butts 23 — Dylan Butts is a general assignment associate reporter for CNBC based out of Singapore.
Citing IMF Deputy Managing Director Gita Gopinath. Dylan Butts. “U.S. and China trade divisions
threaten a ‘reversal’ for global economy, IMF official warns,” CNBC. 11-15-2023.
https://www.cnbc.com/2024/05/08/us-and-china-trade-bloc-divisions-threaten-a-reversal-for-global-
economy.html, accessed 6-19-2024 //WMK

Differences between U.S.-led Western and China-aligned economic blocs threaten global trade cooperation
and economic growth, a top official with the International Monetary Fund warned on Tuesday. IMF Deputy Managing Director Gita
Gopinath said in a speech at Stanford University that events such as the global pandemic and Russia’s invasion of Ukraine have
disrupted global trade relations in ways not seen since the Cold War. “Increasingly, countries around the world are
guided by economic security and national security concerns in determining who they trade with and invest in,” she said, adding that this has
resulted in countries increasingly
picking sides between China and the U.S. While strengthening economic resilience is “not
necessarily bad,” the
trend of fragmentation threatens a move away from a “rules-based global trading
system” and a “significant reversal of the gains from economic integration,” Gopinath said. Tensions between
Washington and Beijing have been rising as the U.S. ramps up trade restrictions and sanctions on China, citing national
security concerns, while worries over Beijing’s advances in the South China Sea and the rhetoric around Taiwan have also soured sentiment.
The increasing tension between the world’s two largest economies has been reflected globally, with over
3,000 trade restrictions imposed by countries worldwide in 2022 and 2023, more than triple compared with
2019, according to data compiled by the IMF. Trade between the China and U.S. blocs has declined compared with
trade among countries within the groupings, Gopinath said. The U.S. bloc mainly includes Europe, Canada, Australia and New
Zealand, while China-leaning countries include Russia, Eritrea, Mali, Nicaragua and Syria. Since the invasion of Ukraine, trade
between the blocs has dropped by about 12% and foreign direct investments are down by 20% compared
with those within the bloc’s constituents. China, in particular, has struggled to maintain foreign investment amid increased tensions with the
West. Foreign direct investment flows into the country reportedly fell 26% in the first three months of 2024 compared with the same period a
year earlier. Future impact While economic fragmentation has yet to reach the same levels as the Cold War, its
potential impact is much
greater due to the global economy’s higher dependence on trade, according to Gopinath. If divisions are not bridged,
the IMF estimates the economic costs to the world’s GDP could be as high as 7% in the extreme fragmentation
scenario. GDP will be hit by about 0.2% in case of mild divisions.

Extend Solv
Statutory amendments are irrelevant---the courts add back confusion
Lindhorst 19 — J.D. Candidate, 2019, Case Western Reserve University School of Law. Rebecca
Lindhorst, "Two-Stepping through Alice's Wasteland of Patent-Eligible Subject Matter: Why the Supreme
Court Should Replace the Mayo/Alice Test," Case Western Reserve Law Review 69, no. 3 (Spring 2019):
731-770 //WMK

Resorting to legislative amendment in an attempt to fix patent eligibility will provide, at best, a temporary
solution to the chaos of the Mayo/Alice two-step. In its implementation of the current patent- eligibility framework, the Court
has largely ignored the text of section 101, as well as the role of the other sections of the Patent Act.
The Mayo/Alice two-step, however, is grounded, not in a solid interpretation of section 101, but in the Supreme Court's patent
policy agenda of preventing preemption. 257 The Court appears to believe that the current approach to
patent eligibility is the only way to eliminate overly broad patents that preempt the building blocks of
technology. 258 Consequently, amending section 101 to overrule Mayo and Alice will not prevent the Supreme
Court from interpreting the new statute in a manner that fits its policy agenda. This is of particular concern if the
amendment incorporates language, as currently proposed, stating that generic technical or functional language will not salvage an otherwise ineligible claim.259
The Supreme Court has already embraced the idea that newly drafted patent statutes should be
interpreted in a manner consistent with precedent; in Flook, the Supreme Court embraced the patent-eligibility standard developed in
Funk Brothers in spite of the

intervening passage of the 1952 Patent Act. 26 0 The Court reasoned, "[i]t is our duty to construe the patent statutes as they now read, in light of our prior
precedents." 62 1 Similarly, a
statutory amendment to section 101 is likely to be read in light of the Court's prior
precedent in Mayo and Alice. Consequently, any reference in an amendment which is suggestive of the Court's
current eligibility test is likely to be read hito the new statute, even if that was not the hitent of the drafters. This is even
more likely, despite its insistence that Congress should determine patent policy, since the Court seems more than willing to set its
own policy agenda in regards to patent eligibility.

Even a complete legislative override is subject to judicial interpretation---the

SCOTUS reverts back to Mayo
Nguyen 21 — Elaine Nguyen is an associate in the Washington, DC office, where she is a member of
the Patent Litigation Practice Group. Prior to joining Covington, Elaine served as a law clerk to the
Honorable Todd M. Hughes of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit. J.D. Duke Law. Elaine H.
Nguyen, "Scalpels over Sledgehammers: Saving Diagnostic Patents through Judicial Intervention Rather
than Legislative Override," Duke Law Journal 70, no. 7 (April 2021): 1631-1662 //WMK
C. A Legislative Override Is Still Subject to Judicial Interpretation As the situation at the Federal Circuit has grown more dire, an increasing number of parties have
called for either the Supreme Court or Congress to step in and address the mess that is § 101.153 Legislators have begun to take action, claiming that "[i]t's time to
restore America's patent system" because current patent laws are "hostile to innovation."1 5 Senators Coons and Tillis have released a draft bill15 5 that seeks to
overhaul the patent eligibility standards in § 101 and have held hearings before the Senate Judiciary Subcommittee on Intellectual Property soliciting feedback on
the drafted language.1 56 Representatives from industry, academia, trade groups, bar associations, former Federal Circuit judges, PTO officers, and other
stakeholders testified.15 7 The proposed bill is an example of what a legislative override of patent eligibility might look like. It adds a new definition of "useful" to §
100, the definition section of the patent statute, and overhauls § 101: Section 100: (k) The term "useful" means any invention or discovery that provides specific and
practical utility in any field of technology through human intervention. Section 101: (a) Whoever invents or discovers any useful process, machine, manufacture, or
composition of matter, or any useful improvement thereof, may obtain a patent therefor, subject to the conditions and requirements of this title.1 58 The bill
completely abrogates the judicially created exceptions and two centuries of case law 59 in order to create a "clear legal framework for what types of innovations are
patent eligible."1 60 However, like
any legislative override, the language of the new draft bill would still be left to
courts to interpret. The "framework" may not be so clear to the judges who must interpret it, especially
when it comes to applying it to new inventions in a variety of fields. And while the language of this specific
bill may succeed in securing patents for diagnostics, eliminating the exceptions wholesale threatens to
create a new, clear path to evergreening for pharmaceutical companies.161 Instead of over-filtering, the new §
101 could under-filter, allowing for an influx of questionable patents that may also threaten
downstream innovation. 162 For example, under the language of the proposed new bill, an invention must
provide utility in any field of technology. What counts as a field of technology? An artful patent prosecutor
could easily search for ways to use the term "technology" to obtain patents on concepts not currently
considered patentable. For example, it is well recognized that Einstein's equation for mass-energy equivalence, E=mc2, is not patentable.1 63 Under the
Tillis-Coons standard, could a method of using a calculator (a field of technology) that is programmed to take inputs from a human (human intervention) and apply
them to the equation be patented? And would that then prevent others from using a calculator to compute applications of the equation in the future? Of course,
this would almost certainly not pass other patent requirements, but it is not immediately clear that it would fail at the Tillis-Coons § 101 stage. This goes to show
how any legislative solution will necessitate judicial interpretation and elaboration-what counts as a field
of technology, and how rigorously should that distinction be applied? By abrogating the current § 101 wholesale, the courts
will have to start from an entirely blank slate in attempting to corral a chaotic technological landscape.
Broad language like that of the TillisCoons bill would offer minimal guidance. Furthermore, in a phenomenon that Professor Deborah
Widiss has termed "shadow precedent," "the Supreme Court and lower courts often narrowly constr ue the significance

of congressional overrides and instead rely on the prior judicial interpretation of statutes as expressed
in overridden precedents."1 64 Though Widiss focuses on the phenomenon as it applied to interpretations of Title VII and discrimination law,1 65
this phenomenon has occurred in patent law as well, following the enactment of the Leahy-Smith America Invents
Act ("AIA")-major legislation that overhauled the U.S. patent system in 2011.166 Despite the amendment and

addition of new language to the patent statute, the Supreme Court held that a common law rule about
secret sales that predated the AIA survived its enactment.1 67 In doing so, they dismissed a plain text reading that indicated that
the new language should change the rule.1 68 Here, future courts may rely on the "shadow precedent" of Mayo to

construe newly enacted § 101 language in a similar manner to the previous iteration of § 101. Absent any new guidance on
how to interpret the new § 101 statute, courts may fall back on using the old common law judicial
exceptions, recreating them anew and bringing the inquiry back to square one: How should these judicially created
exceptions be interpreted and applied

The plan is unconstitutional

Sarnoff 19 — Law professor at DePaul University. Joshua D. Sarnoff. “Testimony of Joshua D. Sarnoff
Senate Committee on the Judiciary, Subcommittee on Intellectual Property.” Hearing: The State of Patent
Eligibility in America: Part I, June 4, 2019.
https://www.judiciary.senate.gov/committee-activity/hearings/the-state-of-patent-eligibility-in-america-
part-i //WMK
The pending proposals
will result in an overextension of the patent system that will lead to serious
constitutional challenges. In Bilski, Justice Stevens and three other Justices concurred separately in finding the claims ineligible, so as
to avoid interpreting Section 101 as treating practical claims for business methods as eligible inventions. In doing so, they clearly stated that
such abroad extension of the patent system would be unconstitutional (but without clearly specifying whether that
was because such claims (a) fail to promote "Progress," (b) exceed the scope of the "useful Arts," or (c) are not
"Discoveries" of "Inventors"65). I would restore patent law to its historical and constitutional moorings.... But the Court is quite wrong, in
my view, to suggest that any series of steps that is not itself an abstract idea or law of nature may constitute a “process” within the meaning of §
101. The language in the Court’s opinion to this effect can only cause mischief. The wiser course would have been to hold that petitioners’
method is not a “process” because it describes only a general method of engaging in business transactions—and business methods are not
patentable. More precisely, although a process is not patent ineligible simply because it is useful for conducting business, a claim that merely
describes a method of doing business does not qualify as a “process” under § 101. ... It is not evident from the face of the statutes or the
Constitution whether the objects of the patent system were “arts” that are also useful, or rather a more specific category, the class of arts
known as “useful arts.” ... The Constitution allows Congress to issue patents “[t]o promote the Progress of ... useful Arts,” Art. I, § 8, cl. 8. This
clause “is both a grant of power and a limitation.”... This is the standard expressed in the Constitution and it may not be ignored. And it is in this
light that patent validity ‘requires reference to [the] standard written into the Constitution.’” ... The Court has kept this “constitutional standard”
in mind when deciding what is patentable subject matter under § 101. For example, we have held that no one can patent “laws of nature,
natural phenomena, and abstract ideas.”66 Additional constitutional challenges are likely should Congress expressly
legislate broadening of patent eligibility, particularly if utility patents become subject only to a
requirement of practical, technological utility. The pending proposals appear expressly intended to overturn the "constitutional
standard" referred to by Justice Stevens established in prior cases that prevents patents on science, nature, and ideas. These proposals,
moreover, would authorize such utility patents without clearly specifying how such patents must be
"specific," "practical" and "technological," thereby authorizing aesthetic (or aesthetically functional) creativity,
without limitation to designs for articles of manufacture.67 This will raising even more starkly than for design patents the
constitutional grounds for such patent rights.68 The utility patent system thus will extend to music, scents, and all of the other expressive
creativity currently covered by the copyright system and the design patent system. But it will do so by creating such exclusive rights on steroids,
without the copyright system's doctrinal limitations (including the requirement for copying as the predicate of infringing conduct).69 Even
if
such patents were limited to claimed, practical applications making a "technological" contribution in their
novel and creative advance sufficient to survive Article I, Section 8, Clause 8 scrutiny, such extensions of the patent system may
violate the First Amendment by creating patents on physically embodied information70 or by restricting
(directly or through secondary liability) various forms of thought or communication (such as the medical correlation patents
that were at issue in the LabCorp. case that the Supreme Court ultimately dismissed as improvidently granted).71 Patent law lacks the
idea/expression, merger, and fair use doctrines that act as speech- protecting safeguards within copyright law's "traditional contours."72 To
address these constitutional problems, Congress would then have to make dramatic changes to counteract the effects of unjustifiably expanding
eligible subject matter.