TOPIC: EFFECT OF INSTITUTION – PRESCRIPTION

REODICA VS. CA | G.R. NO. 125066 JULY 8, 1998

FACTS:
On 17 October 1987, Reodica was driving a van along Doña Soledad Avenue, Better Living Subdivision,
Parañaque, MM. Due to her recklessness, her van hit the car of complainant Bonsol. As a result, Bonsol
sustained physical injuries, while the damage to his car amounted to P8,542.00. Three days later, Bonsol
filed an Affidavit of Complaint against Reodica with the Fiscal's Office. Thereafter, on 13 January 1988, an
information was filed (RTC of Makati) charging Reodica with “Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Damage to
Property with Slight Physical Injury.” Upon arraignment, Reodica pleaded not guilty. Trial then ensued.

On 31 January 1991, the RTC of Makati rendered a decision convicting petitioner of the "quasi offense of
reckless imprudence resulting in damage to property with slight physical injuries," and sentencing her to
suffer imprisonment of six (6) months of arresto mayor, and to pay Bonsol the sum of P13,542.00
representing the cost of the car repairs (P8,542.00) and medical expenses (P5,000.00) without subsidiary
impairment in case of insolvency and to pay the costs.

Reodica then appealed from the decision to the CA on which the latter affirmed later. Thereafter, Reodica
filed a motion for reconsideration on which the CA denied. Hence, the present petition for review
on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.

ISSUE: WHETHER THE PRESCRIPTIVE PERIOD FOR THE QUASI-OFFENSES IN QUESTION WAS
INTERRUPTED. (YES)

RULING: YES. As to the Prescription of the Quasi Offenses in Question, Article 90 of the RPC provides that
reckless imprudence resulting in slight physical injuries, being a light felony, prescribes in two months. On
the other hand, reckless imprudence resulting in damage to property in the amount of P8,542.00, being a less
grave felony whose penalty is arresto mayor in its minimum and medium periods, prescribes in five years.

Art. 91 of the RPC provides that as to Computation of prescription of offenses. — The period of
prescription shall commence to run from the day on which the crime is discovered by the offended
party, the authorities, or their agents, and shall be interrupted by the filing of the complaint of
information, and shall commence to run again when such proceedings terminate without the
accused being convicted or acquitted, or are unjustifiably stopped by any reason not imputable to
him.

We cannot apply Section 9 of the Rule on Summary Procedure, which provides that in cases covered thereby,
such as offenses punishable by imprisonment not exceeding 6 months, as in the instant case, "the
prosecution commences by the filing of a complaint or information directly with the MeTC, RTC or MCTC
without need of a prior preliminary examination or investigation; provided that in Metropolitan Manila and
Chartered Cities, said cases may be commenced only by information." However, this Section cannot be
taken to mean that the prescriptive period is interrupted only by the filing of a complaint or information
directly with said courts.

It must be stressed that prescription in criminal cases is a matter of substantive law. Pursuant to Section
5(5), Article VIII of the Constitution, this Court, in the exercise of its rule-making power, is not allowed to
diminish, increase or modify substantive rights. Hence, in case of conflict between the Rule on Summary
Procedure promulgated by this Court and the Revised Penal Code, the latter prevails.

Here, as the offenses involved are covered by the RPC, Article 91 thereof shall apply. Thus, the prescriptive
period for the quasi offenses in question was interrupted by the filing of the complaint with the fiscal's office
three days after the vehicular mishap and remained tolled pending the termination of this case. We cannot,
therefore, uphold petitioner's defense of prescription of the offenses charged in the information in this case.
TOPIC: FINDINGS OF INVESTIGATION PROSECUTOR – DETERMINATION OF PROBABLE CAUSE
PEOPLE VS. CA | G.R. NO. 126005, JANUARY 21, 1999

FACTS:
On August 30, 1993, Rosalinda Dy was shot at pointblank range by private respondent Jonathan Cerbo in the
presence and at the office of his father, private respondent Billy Cerbo at Poblacion, Davao. The eyewitness
Elsa Gumban executed an affidavit positively identifying Jonathan Cerbo as the assailant. On the other hand,
Jonathan Cerbo executed a counter-affidavit interposing the defense that the shooting was accidental.

Consequently, the 3rd MCTC of Nabunturan-Mawab, Davao, after a preliminary investigation, found
"sufficient ground to engender a well-founded belief" that the crime of murder has been committed by
Jonathan Cerbo and resolved to forward the entire records of the case to the provincial prosecutor at Tagum,
Davao

After an information for murder was filed against Jonathan Cerbo, petitioner Alynn Dy, daughter of the victim
Rosalinda Dy, executed an affidavit-complaint charging Billy Cerbo of conspiracy in the killing supported by a
supplemental affidavit of Elsa Gumban. Then, Billy Cerbo submitted a counter-affidavit denying the
allegations of both petitioners Alynn Dy and Elsa Gumban.

Thereafter, Prosecutor Lumangtad filed a "Motion for leave of court to reinvestigate the case" which was
granted by the judge. Accordingly, the prosecution filed an amended information including Billy Cerbo in the
murder case. A warrant for his arrest was later issued.

Private respondent Billy Cerbo then filed a motion to quash warrant of arrest arguing that the same was
issued without probable cause. Later, the Judge issued the first assailed order dismissing the case against
Billy Cerbo and recalling the warrant for his arrest.

Private Prosecutor Tagra filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied by the judge.

The CA debunked petitioners' assertion that the trial judge committed a grave abuse of discretion in recalling
the warrant of arrest and subsequently dismissing the case against Billy Cerbo. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE: WHETHER THE CA ERRED IN FINDING THAT NO PROBABLE CAUSE EXISTS TO MERIT THE FILING
OF CHARGES AGAINST BILLY CERBO. (YES)

RULING: Yes. The CA erred in finding that no probable cause exists to merit the filing of the charges against
Billy Cerbo. Executive determination of PC - The determination of probable cause during a preliminary
investigation is a function that belongs to the public prosecutor. It is an executive function, the correctness
of the exercise of which is matter that the trial court itself does not and may not be compelled to pass upon.
Indeed, the public prosecutor has broad discretion to determine whether probable cause exists and to
charge those whom he or she believes to have committed the crime as defined by law.

Judicial Determination of PC - The determination of probable cause to hold a person for trial must be
distinguished from the determination of probable cause to issue a warrant of arrest, which is a judicial
function. Verily, a judge cannot be compelled to issue a warrant of arrest if he or she deems that there is no
probable cause for doing so. Corollary to this principle, the judge should not override the public prosecutor's
determination of probable cause to hold an accused for trial on the ground that the evidence presented to
substantiate the issuance of an arrest warrant was insufficient, as in the present case.
Indeed, it could be unfair to expect the prosecution to present all the evidence needed to secure the
conviction of the accused upon the filing of the information against the latter. The reason is found in the
nature and the objective of a preliminary investigation.

Here, the public prosecutors do not decide whether there is evidence beyond reasonable doubt of the guilt of
the person charged; they merely determine "whether there is sufficient ground to engender a well-founded
belief that a crime has been committed and that the respondent is probably guilty thereof, and should be
held for trial." Evidentiary matters must be presented and heard during the trial. Therefore, if the information
is valid on its face, and there is no showing of manifest error, grave abuse of discretion and prejudice on the
part of the public prosecutor, the trial court should respect such determination.

NOTE: As a general rule, if the information is valid on its face and there is no showing of manifest error, grave
abuse of discretion or prejudice on the part of the public prosecutor, courts should not dismiss it for 'want of
evidence,' because evidentiary matters should be presented and heard during the trial. The functions and
duties of both the trial court and the public prosecutor in "the proper scheme of things" in our criminal justice
system should be clearly understood.
TOPIC: INFORMATION - CAN THIS BE DELEGATED?
GOMEZ VS. PEOPLE | G.R. NO. 216824, NOVEMBER 10, 2020

FACTS:
On September 17, 2010, police operatives from the Anti-Illegal Drugs Special Operations Task Group of Makati
City arrested the petitioner. Later, a Complaint was filed against the petitioner for corruption of public officials.
The same Complaint was received for inquest by the Office of the City Prosecutor (OCP) of Makati City.
Consequently, a Resolution was issued by the OCP of Makati City finding probable cause that the petitioner
may have offered P10,000.00 to both PO2 Ronnie E. Aseboque and PO2 Renie E. Aseboque in exchange for the
release of her companion Reynaldo Morales y Cabillo @ "Anoy." Then, an Information" for corruption of public
officials was filed with the RTC against the petitioner.

The RTC issued an Order, without any motion from either Gomez or the Prosecution, perfunctorily dismissing
the criminal case because ACP Paggao had no authority to prosecute the case as the Information he filed does
not contain the signature or any indication of approval from City Prosecutor Feliciano Aspi (City Prosecutor
Aspi) himself; and ACP Paggao's lack of authority to file the Information is "a jurisdictional defect that cannot
be cured." Aggrieved, the Prosecution filed a Motion for Reconsideration which the RTC denied.

The CA rendered a Decision which pointed out that: (1) the records show that the OCP's September 21, 2010
Resolution was indeed signed by City Prosecutor Aspi himself; and (2) the RTC cannot quash an Information
and dismiss the case on its own without a corresponding motion filed by the accused, especially if the latter
had already entered a plea during a previously conducted arraignment. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE: WHETHER THE INFORMATION BE QUASHED ON THE GROUND OF ABSENCE OF JURISDICTION

RULING: No. Judgment rendered without such power and authority is void thereby creating no rights and
imposing no duties on the parties. As a consequence, a void judgment may be attacked anytime.

Relatedly, the concept of jurisdiction has several aspects, namely: (1) jurisdiction over the subject matter; (2)
jurisdiction over the parties; (3) jurisdiction over the issues of the case; and (4) in cases involving property,
jurisdiction over the res or the thing which is the subject of the litigation. Additionally, a court must also acquire
jurisdiction over the remedy in order for it to exercise its powers validly and with binding effect. As to the
acquisition of jurisdiction in criminal cases, there are three (3) important requisites which should be satisfied,
to wit: (1) the court must have jurisdiction over the subject matter; (2) the court must have jurisdiction over the
territory where the offense was committed; and, (3) the court must have jurisdiction over the person of the
accused.

In the case at hand, the relevant aspects of jurisdiction being disputed are: (1) over the subject matter or, in
criminal cases, over the nature of the offense charged; and (2) over the parties, or in criminal cases, over the
person of the accused.
As to the Nature of the Requirement of Obtaining a Prior Written Authority or Approval from the
Provincial, City or Chief State Prosecutor, it is necessary to analyze such a requisite in the context of the
rights accorded by the Constitution to the accused. At the outset, the Court deems it noteworthy to point out
that some of the more serious grounds which tread on the fine line of constitutional infirmity may even be
waived by the accused.

Notably, if some grounds for the quashal of an Information with serious constitutional implications may be
waived, it is with more reason that the ground on securing a prior written approval or authority from the
provincial, city or chief state prosecutor, which has nothing to do with the Bill of Rights or with a trial court's
jurisdiction to take cognizance of a case, can also be waived by the accused.

In a nutshell, the Court reiterates that even some constitutionally guaranteed rights may be expressly or
impliedly waived by the accused. The perceived right of the accused to question a handling prosecutor's
authority in the filing of an Information does not even have any constitutional or statutory bearing. At best, it is
only recognized by this Court, pursuant to its rule-making power, as a procedural device available for the
accused to invoke in aid of the orderly administration of justice. Accordingly, such requirement to obtain a
prior written authority or approval from the provincial, city or chief state prosecutor is considered merely a
formal, and not a jurisdictional, requisite which may be waived by the accused.

All told, the handling prosecutor's authority, particularly as it does not appear on the face of the Information,
has no connection to the trial court's power to hear and decide a case. Hence, Sec. 3(d), Rule 117, requiring a
handling prosecutor to secure a prior written authority or approval from the provincial, city or chief state
prosecutor before filing an Information with the courts, may be waived by the accused through silence,
acquiescence, or failure to raise such ground during arraignment or before entering a plea. If, at all, such
deficiency is merely formal and can be cured at any stage of the proceedings in a criminal case.

Moreover, both the State and the accused are entitled to the constitutional guarantee of due process -
especially when the most contentious of issues involve jurisdictional matters. A denial of such guarantee
against any of the parties of the case amounts to grave abuse of discretion. Consequently, a judgment of
acquittal or order of dismissal amounting to an acquittal which is tainted with grave abuse of discretion
becomes void and cannot amount to a first jeopardy.

Henceforth, all previous doctrines laid down by this Court, holding that the lack of signature and approval of
the provincial, city or chief state prosecutor on the face of the Information shall divest the court of jurisdiction
over the person of the accused and the subject matter in a criminal action, are hereby abandoned. It is
sufficient for the validity of the Information or Complaint, as the case may be, that the Resolution of the
investigating prosecutor recommending for the filing of the same in court bears the imprimatur of the
provincial, city or chief state prosecutor whose approval is required by Sec. 1 of R.A. No. 5180185 and is
adopted under Sec. 4, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court.

NOTE: No complaint or information may be filed or dismissed by an investigating prosecutor without the prior
written authority or approval of the provincial or city prosecutor or chief state prosecutor or the Ombudsman
or his deputy.
TOPIC: JURISDICTION OF THE SANDIGANBAYAN
PEOPLE VS. HENRY GO | G.R. NO. 168539, MARCH 25, 2014

FACTS: The Information filed against respondent is an offshoot of this Court's Decision in Agan, Jr. v. PIATCO.
Subsequent to the above Decision, Pesayco filed a complaint with the Office of the Ombudsman against
several individuals for alleged violation of R.A. 3019 (Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. Among those
charged was herein respondent Henry Go, who was then the Chairman and President of PIATCO, for having
supposedly conspired with then DOTC Secretary Arturo Enrile in entering into a contract which is grossly and
manifestly disadvantageous to the government.

Later, the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon found probable cause to indict them for violation of
Section 3(g) of R.A. 3019. Thus, in an Information dated January 13, 2005, respondent was charged before the
SB in conspiracy of late Arturo Enrile, Sec. of DOTC. The case was docketed as Criminal Case No. 28090.

Thereafter, the prosecution contended that the SB has already acquired jurisdiction over the person of
respondent by reason of his voluntary appearance, when he filed a motion for consolidation and when he
posted bail.

Then, the respondent filed a Motion to Quash the Information filed against him on the ground that the
operative facts adduced therein do not constitute an offense under Section 3(g) of R.A. 3019. Further,
contended that the deceased Sec. Enrile, a public officer with whom he was alleged to have conspired,
respondent, who is not a public officer nor was capacitated by any official authority as a government agent,
may not be prosecuted for violation of Section 3(g) of R.A. 3019.

Later on, the SB granted the respondent’s MTQ and it appearing that Henry Go, the lone accused is a private
person and his alleged co-conspirator-public official was already deceased long before this case was filed in
court, for lack of jurisdiction over the person of the accused, the Court grants the Motion to Quash and the
Information filed in this case is hereby ordered quashed and dismissed. Hence, the instant petition.

ISSUE: WON THE RULING OF THE SB GRANTING THE MTQ BE APPLIED IN THE PRESENT CASE. (NO)

RULING: No. In La Naval Drug vs. CA, it was held that the lack of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant
may be waived either expressly or impliedly. When a defendant voluntarily appears, he is deemed to have
submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the court. If he so wishes not to waive this defense, he must do so
seasonably by motion for the purpose of objecting to the jurisdiction of the court; otherwise, he shall be
deemed to have submitted himself to that jurisdiction. Moreover, where the appearance is by motion for the
purpose of objecting to the jurisdiction of the court over the person, it must be for the sole and separate
purpose of objecting to said jurisdiction. If the appearance is for any other purpose, the defendant is deemed
to have submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the court. Such an appearance gives the court jurisdiction
over the person.

Notably, the SB is a special criminal court which has exclusive original jurisdiction in all cases involving
violations of R.A. 3019 committed by certain public officers, as enumerated in P.D. 1606 as amended by R.A.
8249. This includes private individuals who are charged as co-principals, accomplices or accessories with
the said public officers. Here, the respondent is being charged for violation of Section 3(g) of R.A. 3019, in
conspiracy with then Sec. Enrile. Thus, both respondent and Sec. Enrile should have been charged before
and tried jointly by the Sandiganbayan. However, by reason of the death of the latter, this can no longer be
done. Nonetheless, for reasons already discussed, it does not follow that the SB is already divested of its
jurisdiction over the person of and the case involving herein respondent. To rule otherwise would mean that
the power of a court to decide a case would no longer be based on the law defining its jurisdiction but on
other factors, such as the death of one of the alleged offenders.
TOPIC: INORDINATE DELAY
TADTAD VS. SANDIGANBAYAN | G.R. NO. 72335-39, MARCH 21, 1988

FACTS:
Antonio de los Reyes, former Head Executive Assistant of the then Department of Public Information (DPI)
and Assistant Officer-in-Charge of the Bureau of Broadcasts, filed a formal report with the Legal Panel,
Presidential Security Command (PSC), charging petitioner, who was then Secretary and Head of the
Department of Public Information, with alleged violations of Republic Act No. 3019, otherwise known as the
Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. Apparently, no action was taken on said report. Five years later, it
became publicly known that petitioner had submitted his resignation as Minister of Public Information, which
was subsequently accepted by President Marcos. Antonio de los Reyes again filed a complaint with the same
charges.

An investigation took place, and a report was submitted, recommending the filing of charges for graft and
corrupt practices against the petitioner. Petitioner moved to dismiss the complaint against him, claiming
immunity, but was denied.

Five criminal information were filed with the Sandiganbayan against petitioner Tatad. A motion to quash the
information was made alleging that the prosecution deprived accused of due process of law and of the right
to a speedy disposition of the cases filed against him. It was denied hence the appeal.

ISSUE: WHETHER THE PROSECUTION'S LONG DELAY IN THE FILING OF THESE CASES WITH THE
SANDIGANBAYAN HAD DEPRIVED PETITIONER OF HIS CONSTITUTIONAL LIGHT TO DUE PROCESS AND
THE RIGHT TO A SPEEDY DISPOSITION OF THE CASES AGAINST HIM. (YES)

RULING: Yes. The long delay in the termination of the preliminary investigation by the Tanodbayan in the
instant case to be violative of the constitutional right of the accused to due process. Substantial adherence
to the requirements of the law governing the conduct of preliminary investigation, including substantial
compliance with the time limitation prescribed by the law for the resolution of the case by the prosecutor, is
part of the procedural due process constitutionally guaranteed by the fundamental law. Not only under the
broad umbrella of the due process clause, but under the constitutional guarantee of "speedy disposition" of
cases as embodied in Section 16 of the Bill of Rights (both in the 1973 and the 1987 Constitutions), the
inordinate delay is violative of the petitioner's constitutional rights. A delay of close to three (3) years cannot
be deemed reasonable or justifiable in the light of the circumstance obtaining in the case at bar.

A painstaking review of the facts cannot but leave the impression that political motivations played a vital role
in activating and propelling the prosecutorial process in this case. Firstly, the complaint came to life, as it
were, only after petitioner Tatad had a falling out with President Marcos. Secondly, departing from
established procedures prescribed by law for preliminary investigation, which require the submission of
affidavits and counter-affidavits by the complainant and the respondent and their witnesses, the Tanodbayan
referred the complaint to the Presidential Security Command for finding investigation and report.

Moreover, the long delay in resolving the case under preliminary investigation cannot be justified on the basis
of the facts on record. The law (P.D. No. 911) prescribes a ten-day period for the prosecutor to resolve a case
under preliminary investigation by him from its termination. Thus, it cannot be disregarded or ignored
completely, with absolute impunity. It certainly cannot be assumed that the law has included a provision that
is deliberately intended to become meaningless and to be treated as a dead letter.

Thus, inordinate delay in terminating the preliminary investigation and filing the information in the instant
case is violative of the constitutionally guaranteed right of the petitioner to due process and to a speedy
disposition of the cases against him.