Burst Detection Fingerprinting Sensitivity
Burst Detection Fingerprinting Sensitivity
Abstract—There has been a recent shift toward improving uniqueness exists and is attributable to various manufacturing,
wireless access security within the OSI PHY layer by exploiting RF aging, and environmental factors [3]. While several process-
features that are inherently device specific and difficult to replicate ing steps are required to effectively exploit RF fingerprints,
by an unintended party. This work addresses the extraction and
exploitation of RF “fingerprints” to classify emissions and provide transient detection is perhaps the most important [6], [8]. In
device-specific identification. Burst transient detection precedes this context, transient detection includes both the transient
RF fingerprint extraction and is generally the most critical start time and signal duration over which fingerprints are ex-
step in the overall process. This work provides a much needed tracted. Both of these factors are important given that improper
sensitivity analysis of burst detection capability. The analysis is selection of either can bias the processing to favor channel
conducted using instantaneous amplitude responses with both
Fractal-Bayesian Step Change Detection (Fractal-BSCD) and Vari- noise effects or steady-state signal effects [3]. Burst transients
ance Trajectory (VT) processes. The performance of each method can be estimated using various emission features. However,
is evaluated under varying SNR conditions using experimentally instantaneous amplitude and instantaneous phase features are
collected 802.11a OFDM signals. The impact of transient detection perhaps the most extensively investigated [3], [6]–[8]. With the
error on signal classification performance is then demonstrated exception of more recent work in [12] and [13], these previous
using RF fingerprints and Multiple Discriminant Analysis (MDA)
with Maximum Likelihood (ML) classification. The VT technique efforts lack a detailed sensitivity analysis of burst detection and
emerges as the better alternative for all SNRs considered and fingerprint classification performance under varying channel
yields MDA-ML classification accuracy that is consistent with noise conditions.
“perfect” transient estimation performance.
This type of analysis is imperative for determining the
I. I NTRODUCTION minimum acceptable collected SNR that will provide consistent
and accurate results. Establishing the minimum acceptable SNR
Considerable research has been conducted on detecting also allows determination of the maximum transmitter-receiver
and/or mitigating spoofing within the Medium Access Con- separation distance which would aide in laying out the physical
trol (MAC) layer of the Open Systems Interconnection (OSI) hardware for network security. Noise sensitivity performance
stack [1], [2]. There has been a recent shift toward providing can also provide a good discriminator for comparing various
added security at the OSI Physical (PHY) layer by exploiting detection and classification techniques. For the work presented
RF features that are inherently unique to a specific device and here, noise sensitivity analysis for transient detection perfor-
that are difficult to replicate by an unintended party. For ex- mance is conducted for three noise-signal conditions, including:
ample, some efforts have investigated Received Signal Strength 1) noise only effects using a single collected 802.11a burst and
(RSS) (a power-based metric) for detecting and/or locating a multiple noise realizations, 2) signal only effects incorporating
spoofing node [1], [2]. Both of these efforts demonstrated some burst-to-burst signal variability with a single noise realization,
success at detecting spoofing using experiments conducted with and 3) combined noise-signal effects using multiple burst and
different hardware and in different physical environments. noise realizations. The impact of transient detection error on
RF fingerprinting work provides an alternative PHY layer signal classification performance is then demonstrated using
approach but is dismissed in [2] for “scale” reasons. For Multiple Discriminant Analysis with Maximum Likelihood
applications where size constraints may not be a dominant classification (MDA-ML).
factor, RF fingerprinting remains a viable alternative and is
considered in this work. Collectively, related works in RF fin- II. BACKGROUND
gerprinting, electromagnetic signatures, intrapulse modulation,
and unintentional modulation [3]–[11], form a solid basis for A. Fractal-Bayesian Step Change Detector
developing techniques that may be applicable to commercial It has been demonstrated that transient detection can be
communication devices. accomplished using the fractal dimension measure followed by
If the inherent RF fingerprints are repeatedly extractable and a Bayesian Step Change Detector [7]. This process is denoted
unique, they may be used to identify the specific make, model, here as Fractal-BSCD. The fractal derivation can be found in
or serial number of a device. Previous work suggests that this [14] and can be calculated using the following Higuchi method.
Given data time series {X(1), X(2), ..., X(NX )}, the curve 0.01
Amplitude
length is defined as: 0.005
X̄(NX − 1)
Lm (k) = , (1) 0
0 500 1000 1500 2000 2500 3000
k 2 NL Sample Number
NL
1
Fractal
X̄ = |X (m + ik) − X (m + (i − 1) k)| ,
i=1 0.5
where NL = (NX − m)/k, • is the floor operator, k is the 500 1000 1500 2000 2500
Sample Number
interval index number, and m ∈ [1, k] is the start time index 0.4
number. For this work, the signal of interest was divided into
PDF
windowed regions containing NX = 20 samples. 0.2
5
Amplitude
4
3
2 200
1
Bin Count
100
1
VT
0.5
50
0
0 500 1000 1500 2000 2500 3000
Sample Number 0
2 2
1.5 1 30
24 27
VT
1 0
15 18 21
−1 9 12
0.5 6
3
−2 −3 0
Error (secs * 10−5) SNR (dB)
500 1000 1500 2000 2500
Sample Number
Fig. 3. Impact of Channel Noise variation: Fractal-BSCD transient estimation
Fig. 2. Instantaneous signal amplitude (Top) and corresponding V Ta for: using 200 noise realizations and a given 802.11a RF Burst.
(Middle) SN R = 30 dB (Middle) and (Bottom) SN R = 3 dB.
100
1
50
0
2
0
2
1 27 30
0 18 21 24
30
1
24 27 −1 9 12 15
0
15 18 21 3 6
−1 9 12 −5 −2 −3 0
6 Error (secs * 10 ) SNR (dB)
3
−2 −3 0
Error (secs * 10−5) SNR (dB)
Fig. 7. Impact of Combined variation:Fractal-BSCD transient estimation using
Fig. 5. Impact of RF Burst variation: Fractal-BSCD transient estimation using 200 noise realizations per 200 802.11a bursts.
200 802.11a bursts and fixed noise realization.
3
Bin Count * 104
150
Bin Count
2
100
1
50
0 0
2 2
1 30 1 27 30
24 27 0 21 24
0 18 21 18
12 15
−1 9 12 15
−1 6 9 6
3 3
−5 −2 −3 0 −5 −2 −3 0
Error (secs * 10 ) SNR (dB) Error (secs * 10 ) SNR (dB)
Fig. 6. Impact of RF Burst variation: VT transient estimation using 200 Fig. 8. Impact of Combined variation:VT transient estimation using 200 noise
802.11a bursts and fixed noise realization. realizations per 200 802.11a bursts.
This full text paper was peer reviewed at the direction of IEEE Communications Society subject matter experts for publication in the IEEE ICC 2009 proceedings
0.8
[15] J. O Ruanaidh and W. Fitzgerald, Numerical bayesian methods applied to
signal processing. Statistics and Computing Series, New York: Springer,
1996.
0.7
[16] R.A. Fisher, “The use of multiple measurements in taxonomic problems,”
Annals of Eugenics, vol. 7, pp. 179 – 188, 1936.
Fractal−BSCD
[17] R. Duda, P. Hart, and D. Stork, Pattern Classification, 2nd ed. New
0.6
Perfect w/Random error
York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 2001.
Perfect
[18] 802.11a, WLAN MAC and PHY layer specs: high speed PHY extension
VT in the 5 GHz band, IEEE, Piscataway, NJ 08855-1331, USA, Sep 16,
0.5
1999, revised 2003.
0.4
−5 0 5 10 15 20 25 30
SNR (dB)