#!

/bin/sh
#
# Generated iptables firewall script for the Linux 2.4 kernel and later.
# Script generated by Easy Firewall Generator for IPTables 1.15
# copyright 2002 Timothy Scott Morizot
# Modified for Slackware Linux by Eric Hameleers <[email protected]>
#
# This generator is adapted from the original to work on Slackware Linux.
# Basically, I corrected the path name to the iptables* commands
# and re-wrote this comment.
#
# It can be executed with the typical start and stop arguments.
# If used with stop, it will stop after flushing the firewall.
# The save and restore arguments will save or restore the rules
# from the /etc/sysconfig/iptables file. The save and restore
# arguments are included to preserve compatibility with
# Redhat's or Fedora's init.d script if you prefer to use it.

# You may want to save this script as /etc/rc.d/rc.firewall

# and make it executable, like this:
# chmod +x /etc/rc.d/rc.firewall
# Slackware Linux will then automatically run this script
# with the "start" parameter.

###############################################################################
#
# Local Settings
#

# sysctl location. If set, it will use sysctl to adjust the kernel parameters.
# If this is set to the empty string (or is unset), the use of sysctl
# is disabled.

SYSCTL="/sbin/sysctl -w"

# To echo the value directly to the /proc file instead

# SYSCTL=""

# IPTables Location - adjust if needed

IPT="/usr/sbin/iptables"
IPTS="/usr/sbin/iptables-save"
IPTR="/usr/sbin/iptables-restore"

# Internet Interface
INET_IFACE="eth0"

# Local Interface Information

LOCAL_IFACE="eth1"
LOCAL_IP="192.168.255.1"
LOCAL_NET="192.168.255.0/24"
LOCAL_BCAST="192.168.255.255"

# Localhost Interface

LO_IFACE="lo"
LO_IP="127.0.0.1"

# Save and Restore arguments handled here

if [ "$1" = "save" ]
then
echo -n "Saving firewall to /etc/sysconfig/iptables ... "
$IPTS > /etc/sysconfig/iptables
echo "done"
exit 0
elif [ "$1" = "restore" ]
then
echo -n "Restoring firewall from /etc/sysconfig/iptables ... "
$IPTR < /etc/sysconfig/iptables
echo "done"
exit 0
fi

###############################################################################
#
# Load Modules
#

echo "Loading kernel modules ..."

# You should uncomment the line below and run it the first time just to
# ensure all kernel module dependencies are OK. There is no need to run
# every time, however.

# /sbin/depmod -a

# Unless you have kernel module auto-loading disabled, you should not
# need to manually load each of these modules. Other than ip_tables,
# ip_conntrack, and some of the optional modules, I've left these
# commented by default. Uncomment if you have any problems or if
# you have disabled module autoload. Note that some modules must
# be loaded by another kernel module.

# core netfilter module

/sbin/modprobe ip_tables

# the stateful connection tracking module

/sbin/modprobe ip_conntrack

# filter table module

# /sbin/modprobe iptable_filter

# mangle table module

# /sbin/modprobe iptable_mangle

# nat table module

# /sbin/modprobe iptable_nat

# LOG target module

# /sbin/modprobe ipt_LOG

# This is used to limit the number of packets per sec/min/hr

# /sbin/modprobe ipt_limit

# masquerade target module

# /sbin/modprobe ipt_MASQUERADE

# filter using owner as part of the match

# /sbin/modprobe ipt_owner

# REJECT target drops the packet and returns an ICMP response.

# The response is configurable. By default, connection refused.
# /sbin/modprobe ipt_REJECT

# This target allows packets to be marked in the mangle table

# /sbin/modprobe ipt_mark

# This target affects the TCP MSS

# /sbin/modprobe ipt_tcpmss

# This match allows multiple ports instead of a single port or range

# /sbin/modprobe ipt_multiport

# This match checks against the TCP flags

# /sbin/modprobe ipt_state

# This match catches packets with invalid flags

# /sbin/modprobe ipt_unclean

# The ftp nat module is required for non-PASV ftp support

/sbin/modprobe ip_nat_ftp

# the module for full ftp connection tracking

/sbin/modprobe ip_conntrack_ftp

# the module for full irc connection tracking

/sbin/modprobe ip_conntrack_irc

###############################################################################
#
# Kernel Parameter Configuration
#
# See http://ipsysctl-tutorial.frozentux.net/chunkyhtml/index.html
# for a detailed tutorial on sysctl and the various settings
# available.

# Required to enable IPv4 forwarding.

# Redhat users can try setting FORWARD_IPV4 in /etc/sysconfig/network to true
# Alternatively, it can be set in /etc/sysctl.conf
if [ "$SYSCTL" = "" ]
then
echo "1" > /proc/sys/net/ipv4/ip_forward
else
$SYSCTL net.ipv4.ip_forward="1"
fi

# This enables dynamic address hacking.

# This may help if you have a dynamic IP address \(e.g. slip, ppp, dhcp\).
#if [ "$SYSCTL" = "" ]
#then
# echo "1" > /proc/sys/net/ipv4/ip_dynaddr
#else
# $SYSCTL net.ipv4.ip_dynaddr="1"
#fi

# This enables SYN flood protection.

# The SYN cookies activation allows your system to accept an unlimited
# number of TCP connections while still trying to give reasonable
# service during a denial of service attack.
if [ "$SYSCTL" = "" ]
then
echo "1" > /proc/sys/net/ipv4/tcp_syncookies
else
$SYSCTL net.ipv4.tcp_syncookies="1"
fi

# This enables source validation by reversed path according to RFC1812.

# In other words, did the response packet originate from the same interface
# through which the source packet was sent? It's recommended for single-homed
# systems and routers on stub networks. Since those are the configurations
# this firewall is designed to support, I turn it on by default.
# Turn it off if you use multiple NICs connected to the same network.
if [ "$SYSCTL" = "" ]
then
echo "1" > /proc/sys/net/ipv4/conf/all/rp_filter
else
$SYSCTL net.ipv4.conf.all.rp_filter="1"
fi

# This option allows a subnet to be firewalled with a single IP address.

# It's used to build a DMZ. Since that's not a focus of this firewall
# script, it's not enabled by default, but is included for reference.
# See: http://www.sjdjweis.com/linux/proxyarp/
#if [ "$SYSCTL" = "" ]
#then
# echo "1" > /proc/sys/net/ipv4/conf/all/proxy_arp
#else
# $SYSCTL net.ipv4.conf.all.proxy_arp="1"
#fi

# The following kernel settings were suggested by Alex Weeks. Thanks!

# This kernel parameter instructs the kernel to ignore all ICMP

# echo requests sent to the broadcast address. This prevents
# a number of smurfs and similar DoS nasty attacks.
if [ "$SYSCTL" = "" ]
then
echo "1" > /proc/sys/net/ipv4/icmp_echo_ignore_broadcasts
else
$SYSCTL net.ipv4.icmp_echo_ignore_broadcasts="1"
fi

# This option can be used to accept or refuse source routed

# packets. It is usually on by default, but is generally
# considered a security risk. This option turns it off.
if [ "$SYSCTL" = "" ]
then
echo "0" > /proc/sys/net/ipv4/conf/all/accept_source_route
else
$SYSCTL net.ipv4.conf.all.accept_source_route="0"
fi

# This option can disable ICMP redirects. ICMP redirects

# are generally considered a security risk and shouldn't be
# needed by most systems using this generator.
#if [ "$SYSCTL" = "" ]
#then
# echo "0" > /proc/sys/net/ipv4/conf/all/accept_redirects
#else
# $SYSCTL net.ipv4.conf.all.accept_redirects="0"
#fi

# However, we'll ensure the secure_redirects option is on instead.

# This option accepts only from gateways in the default gateways list.
if [ "$SYSCTL" = "" ]
then
echo "1" > /proc/sys/net/ipv4/conf/all/secure_redirects
else
$SYSCTL net.ipv4.conf.all.secure_redirects="1"
fi

# This option logs packets from impossible addresses.

if [ "$SYSCTL" = "" ]
then
echo "1" > /proc/sys/net/ipv4/conf/all/log_martians
else
$SYSCTL net.ipv4.conf.all.log_martians="1"
fi

###############################################################################
#
# Flush Any Existing Rules or Chains
#

echo "Flushing Tables ..."

# Reset Default Policies

$IPT -P INPUT ACCEPT
$IPT -P FORWARD ACCEPT
$IPT -P OUTPUT ACCEPT
$IPT -t nat -P PREROUTING ACCEPT
$IPT -t nat -P POSTROUTING ACCEPT
$IPT -t nat -P OUTPUT ACCEPT
$IPT -t mangle -P PREROUTING ACCEPT
$IPT -t mangle -P OUTPUT ACCEPT

# Flush all rules

$IPT -F
$IPT -t nat -F
$IPT -t mangle -F

# Erase all non-default chains

$IPT -X
$IPT -t nat -X
$IPT -t mangle -X

if [ "$1" = "stop" ]
then
echo "Firewall completely flushed! Now running with no firewall."
exit 0
fi

###############################################################################
#
# Rules Configuration
#

###############################################################################
#
# Filter Table
#
###############################################################################

# Set Policies

$IPT -P INPUT DROP

$IPT -P OUTPUT DROP
$IPT -P FORWARD DROP

###############################################################################
#
# User-Specified Chains
#
# Create user chains to reduce the number of rules each packet
# must traverse.

echo "Create and populate custom rule chains ..."

# Create a chain to filter INVALID packets

$IPT -N bad_packets

# Create another chain to filter bad tcp packets

$IPT -N bad_tcp_packets

# Create separate chains for icmp, tcp (incoming and outgoing),

# and incoming udp packets.

$IPT -N icmp_packets

# Used for UDP packets inbound from the Internet

$IPT -N udp_inbound

# Used to block outbound UDP services from internal network

# Default to allow all
$IPT -N udp_outbound

# Used to allow inbound services if desired

# Default fail except for established sessions
$IPT -N tcp_inbound

# Used to block outbound services from internal network

# Default to allow all
$IPT -N tcp_outbound

###############################################################################
#
# Populate User Chains
#

# bad_packets chain
#

# Drop packets received on the external interface

# claiming a source of the local network
$IPT -A bad_packets -p ALL -i $INET_IFACE -s $LOCAL_NET -j LOG \
--log-prefix "fp=bad_packets:2 a=DROP "
$IPT -A bad_packets -p ALL -i $INET_IFACE -s $LOCAL_NET -j DROP

# Drop INVALID packets immediately

$IPT -A bad_packets -p ALL -m conntrack --ctstate INVALID -j LOG \
--log-prefix "fp=bad_packets:1 a=DROP "

$IPT -A bad_packets -p ALL -m conntrack --ctstate INVALID -j DROP

# Then check the tcp packets for additional problems

$IPT -A bad_packets -p tcp -j bad_tcp_packets

# All good, so return

$IPT -A bad_packets -p ALL -j RETURN

# bad_tcp_packets chain
#
# All tcp packets will traverse this chain.
# Every new connection attempt should begin with
# a syn packet. If it doesn't, it is likely a
# port scan. This drops packets in state
# NEW that are not flagged as syn packets.

# Return to the calling chain if the bad packets originate

# from the local interface. This maintains the approach
# throughout this firewall of a largely trusted internal
# network.
$IPT -A bad_tcp_packets -p tcp -i $LOCAL_IFACE -j RETURN

# However, I originally did apply this filter to the forward chain

# for packets originating from the internal network. While I have
# not conclusively determined its effect, it appears to have the
# interesting side effect of blocking some of the ad systems.
# Apparently some ad systems have the browser initiate a NEW
# connection that is not flagged as a syn packet to retrieve
# the ad image. If you wish to experiment further comment the
# rule above. If you try it, you may also wish to uncomment the
# rule below. It will keep those packets from being logged.
# There are a lot of them.
# $IPT -A bad_tcp_packets -p tcp -i $LOCAL_IFACE ! --syn \
# -m conntrack --ctstate NEW -j DROP

$IPT -A bad_tcp_packets -p tcp ! --syn -m conntrack --ctstate NEW -j LOG \

--log-prefix "fp=bad_tcp_packets:1 a=DROP "
$IPT -A bad_tcp_packets -p tcp ! --syn -m conntrack --ctstate NEW -j DROP

$IPT -A bad_tcp_packets -p tcp --tcp-flags ALL NONE -j LOG \

--log-prefix "fp=bad_tcp_packets:2 a=DROP "
$IPT -A bad_tcp_packets -p tcp --tcp-flags ALL NONE -j DROP

$IPT -A bad_tcp_packets -p tcp --tcp-flags ALL ALL -j LOG \

--log-prefix "fp=bad_tcp_packets:3 a=DROP "
$IPT -A bad_tcp_packets -p tcp --tcp-flags ALL ALL -j DROP
$IPT -A bad_tcp_packets -p tcp --tcp-flags ALL FIN,URG,PSH -j LOG \
--log-prefix "fp=bad_tcp_packets:4 a=DROP "
$IPT -A bad_tcp_packets -p tcp --tcp-flags ALL FIN,URG,PSH -j DROP

$IPT -A bad_tcp_packets -p tcp --tcp-flags ALL SYN,RST,ACK,FIN,URG -j LOG \

--log-prefix "fp=bad_tcp_packets:5 a=DROP "
$IPT -A bad_tcp_packets -p tcp --tcp-flags ALL SYN,RST,ACK,FIN,URG -j DROP

$IPT -A bad_tcp_packets -p tcp --tcp-flags SYN,RST SYN,RST -j LOG \

--log-prefix "fp=bad_tcp_packets:6 a=DROP "
$IPT -A bad_tcp_packets -p tcp --tcp-flags SYN,RST SYN,RST -j DROP

$IPT -A bad_tcp_packets -p tcp --tcp-flags SYN,FIN SYN,FIN -j LOG \

--log-prefix "fp=bad_tcp_packets:7 a=DROP "
$IPT -A bad_tcp_packets -p tcp --tcp-flags SYN,FIN SYN,FIN -j DROP

# All good, so return

$IPT -A bad_tcp_packets -p tcp -j RETURN

# icmp_packets chain
#
# This chain is for inbound (from the Internet) icmp packets only.
# Type 8 (Echo Request) is not accepted by default
# Enable it if you want remote hosts to be able to reach you.
# 11 (Time Exceeded) is the only one accepted
# that would not already be covered by the established
# connection rule. Applied to INPUT on the external interface.
#
# See: http://www.ee.siue.edu/~rwalden/networking/icmp.html
# for more info on ICMP types.
#
# Note that the stateful settings allow replies to ICMP packets.
# These rules allow new packets of the specified types.

# ICMP packets should fit in a Layer 2 frame, thus they should

# never be fragmented. Fragmented ICMP packets are a typical sign
# of a denial of service attack.
$IPT -A icmp_packets --fragment -p ICMP -j LOG \
--log-prefix "fp=icmp_packets:1 a=DROP "
$IPT -A icmp_packets --fragment -p ICMP -j DROP

# Echo - uncomment to allow your system to be pinged.

# Uncomment the LOG command if you also want to log PING attempts
#
# $IPT -A icmp_packets -p ICMP -s 0/0 --icmp-type 8 -j LOG \
# --log-prefix "fp=icmp_packets:2 a=ACCEPT "
# $IPT -A icmp_packets -p ICMP -s 0/0 --icmp-type 8 -j ACCEPT

# By default, however, drop pings without logging. Blaster

# and other worms have infected systems blasting pings.
# Comment the line below if you want pings logged, but it
# will likely fill your logs.
$IPT -A icmp_packets -p ICMP -s 0/0 --icmp-type 8 -j DROP

# Time Exceeded
$IPT -A icmp_packets -p ICMP -s 0/0 --icmp-type 11 -j ACCEPT

# Not matched, so return so it will be logged

$IPT -A icmp_packets -p ICMP -j RETURN
# TCP & UDP
# Identify ports at:
# http://www.chebucto.ns.ca/~rakerman/port-table.html
# http://www.iana.org/assignments/port-numbers

# udp_inbound chain
#
# This chain describes the inbound UDP packets it will accept.
# It's applied to INPUT on the external or Internet interface.
# Note that the stateful settings allow replies.
# These rules are for new requests.
# It drops netbios packets (windows) immediately without logging.

# Drop netbios calls

# Please note that these rules do not really change the way the firewall
# treats netbios connections. Connections from the localhost and
# internal interface (if one exists) are accepted by default.
# Responses from the Internet to requests initiated by or through
# the firewall are also accepted by default. To get here, the
# packets would have to be part of a new request received by the
# Internet interface. You would have to manually add rules to
# accept these. I added these rules because some network connections,
# such as those via cable modems, tend to be filled with noise from
# unprotected Windows machines. These rules drop those packets
# quickly and without logging them. This prevents them from traversing
# the whole chain and keeps the log from getting cluttered with
# chatter from Windows systems.
$IPT -A udp_inbound -p UDP -s 0/0 --destination-port 137 -j DROP
$IPT -A udp_inbound -p UDP -s 0/0 --destination-port 138 -j DROP

# Ident requests (Port 113) must have a REJECT rule rather than the
# default DROP rule. This is the minimum requirement to avoid
# long delays while connecting. Also see the tcp_inbound rule.
$IPT -A udp_inbound -p UDP -s 0/0 --destination-port 113 -j REJECT

# A more sophisticated configuration could accept the ident requests.

# $IPT -A udp_inbound -p UDP -s 0/0 --destination-port 113 -j ACCEPT

# However, if this is a gateway system that masquerades/nats for internal systems

# and the internal systems wish to chat, a simple changing these rules to
# ACCEPT won't work. The ident daemon on the gateway will need to know how
# to handle the requests. The stock daemon in most linux distributions
# can't do that. oidentd is one package that can.
# See: http://dev.ojnk.net/

# Network Time Protocol (NTP) Server

$IPT -A udp_inbound -p UDP -s 0/0 --destination-port 123 -j ACCEPT

# DNS Server
# Configure the server to use port 53 as the source port for requests
# Note, if you run a caching-only name server that only accepts queries
# from the private network or localhost, you can comment out this line.
$IPT -A udp_inbound -p UDP -s 0/0 --destination-port 53 -j ACCEPT

# If you don't query-source the server to port 53 and you have problems,
# uncomment this rule. It specifically allows responses to queries
# initiated to another server from a high UDP port. The stateful
# connection rules should handle this situation, though.
# $IPT -A udp_inbound -p UDP -s 0/0 --source-port 53 -j ACCEPT

# mDNSResponder
$IPT -A udp_inbound -p UDP -s 0/0 --destination-port 5353 -j ACCEPT

# External DHCP Server

# Allow DHCP client request packets inbound from external network
$IPT -A udp_inbound -p UDP -s 0/0 --source-port 68 --destination-port 67 \
-j ACCEPT

# Dynamic Address
# If DHCP, the initial request is a broadcast. The response
# doesn't exactly match the outbound packet. This explicitly
# allow the DHCP ports to alleviate this problem.
# If you receive your dynamic address by a different means, you
# can probably comment this line.
$IPT -A udp_inbound -p UDP -s 0/0 --source-port 67 --destination-port 68 \
-j ACCEPT

# Network File System (NFS) Server

# Please note that additional services must
# be configured in order to support an NFS Server through
# the firewall. Read the help in the generator or this site:
# http://www.lowth.com/LinWiz/nfs_help.html

# NFS Server - portmapper

$IPT -A udp_inbound -p UDP -s 0/0 --destination-port 111 -j ACCEPT

# NFS Server - statd

$IPT -A udp_inbound -p UDP -s 0/0 --destination-port 9400 -j ACCEPT

# NFS Server - NFS daemon

$IPT -A udp_inbound -p UDP -s 0/0 --destination-port 2049 -j ACCEPT

# NFS Server - lockd

$IPT -A udp_inbound -p UDP -s 0/0 --destination-port 9401 -j ACCEPT

# NFS Server - mountd

$IPT -A udp_inbound -p UDP -s 0/0 --destination-port 9402 -j ACCEPT

# NFS Server - quotad

$IPT -A udp_inbound -p UDP -s 0/0 --destination-port 9403 -j ACCEPT

# Not matched, so return for logging

$IPT -A udp_inbound -p UDP -j RETURN

# udp_outbound chain
#
# This chain is used with a private network to prevent forwarding for
# UDP requests on specific protocols. Applied to the FORWARD rule from
# the internal network. Ends with an ACCEPT

# No match, so ACCEPT
$IPT -A udp_outbound -p UDP -s 0/0 -j ACCEPT

# tcp_inbound chain
#
# This chain is used to allow inbound connections to the
# system/gateway. Use with care. It defaults to none.
# It's applied on INPUT from the external or Internet interface.

# Ident requests (Port 113) must have a REJECT rule rather than the
# default DROP rule. This is the minimum requirement to avoid
# long delays while connecting. Also see the tcp_inbound rule.
$IPT -A tcp_inbound -p TCP -s 0/0 --destination-port 113 -j REJECT

# A more sophisticated configuration could accept the ident requests.

# $IPT -A tcp_inbound -p TCP -s 0/0 --destination-port 113 -j ACCEPT

# However, if this is a gateway system that masquerades/nats for internal systems

# and the internal systems wish to chat, a simple changing these rules to
# ACCEPT won't work. The ident daemon on the gateway will need to know how
# to handle the requests. The stock daemon in most linux distributions
# can't do that. oidentd is one package that can.
# See: http://dev.ojnk.net/

# DNS Server - Allow TCP connections (zone transfers and large requests)
# This is disabled by default. DNS Zone transfers occur via TCP.
# If you need to allow transfers over the net you need to uncomment this line.
# If you allow queries from the 'net, you also need to be aware that although
# DNS queries use UDP by default, a truncated UDP query can legally be
# submitted via TCP instead. You probably will never need it, but should
# be aware of the fact.
# $IPT -A tcp_inbound -p TCP -s 0/0 --destination-port 53 -j ACCEPT

# mDNSResponder
$IPT -A tcp_inbound -p TCP -s 0/0 --destination-port 5353 -j ACCEPT

# Web Server

# HTTP
$IPT -A tcp_inbound -p TCP -s 0/0 --destination-port 80 -j ACCEPT

# HTTPS (Secure Web Server)

$IPT -A tcp_inbound -p TCP -s 0/0 --destination-port 443 -j ACCEPT

# FTP Server (Control)

$IPT -A tcp_inbound -p TCP -s 0/0 --destination-port 21 -j ACCEPT

# FTP Client (Data Port for non-PASV transfers)

$IPT -A tcp_inbound -p TCP -s 0/0 --source-port 20 -j ACCEPT

# Passive FTP
#
# With passive FTP, the server provides a port to the client
# and allows the client to initiate the connection rather
# than initiating the connection with the client from the data port.
# Web browsers and clients operating behind a firewall generally
# use passive ftp transfers. A general purpose FTP server
# will need to support them.
#
# However, by default an FTP server will select a port from the entire
# range of high ports. It is not particularly safe to open all
# high ports. Fortunately, that range can be restricted. This
# firewall presumes that the range has been restricted to a specific
# selected range. That range must also be configured in the ftp server.
#
# Instructions for specifying the port range for the wu-ftpd server
# can be found here:
# http://www.wu-ftpd.org/man/ftpaccess.html
# (See the passive ports option.)
#
# Instructions for the ProFTPD server can be found here:
# http://proftpd.linux.co.uk/localsite/Userguide/linked/x861.html

$IPT -A tcp_inbound -p TCP -s 0/0 --destination-port 62000:64000 -j ACCEPT

# Email Server (SMTP)

$IPT -A tcp_inbound -p TCP -s 0/0 --destination-port 25 -j ACCEPT

# Email Server (POP3)

$IPT -A tcp_inbound -p TCP -s 0/0 --destination-port 110 -j ACCEPT

# Email Server (IMAP4)

$IPT -A tcp_inbound -p TCP -s 0/0 --destination-port 143 -j ACCEPT

# SSL Email Server (POP3)

$IPT -A tcp_inbound -p TCP -s 0/0 --destination-port 995 -j ACCEPT

# SSL Email Server (IMAP4)

$IPT -A tcp_inbound -p TCP -s 0/0 --destination-port 993 -j ACCEPT

# sshd
$IPT -A tcp_inbound -p TCP -s 0/0 --destination-port 22 -j ACCEPT

# Network File System (NFS) Server

# Please note that additional services must
# be configured in order to support an NFS Server through
# the firewall. Read the help in the generator or this site:
# http://www.lowth.com/LinWiz/nfs_help.html

# NFS Server - portmapper

$IPT -A tcp_inbound -p TCP -s 0/0 --destination-port 111 -j ACCEPT

# NFS Server - statd

$IPT -A tcp_inbound -p TCP -s 0/0 --destination-port 9400 -j ACCEPT

# NFS Server - NFS daemon

$IPT -A tcp_inbound -p TCP -s 0/0 --destination-port 2049 -j ACCEPT

# NFS Server - lockd

$IPT -A tcp_inbound -p TCP -s 0/0 --destination-port 9401 -j ACCEPT

# NFS Server - mountd

$IPT -A tcp_inbound -p TCP -s 0/0 --destination-port 9402 -j ACCEPT

# NFS Server - quotad

$IPT -A tcp_inbound -p TCP -s 0/0 --destination-port 9403 -j ACCEPT

# Not matched, so return so it will be logged

$IPT -A tcp_inbound -p TCP -j RETURN

# tcp_outbound chain
#
# This chain is used with a private network to prevent forwarding for
# requests on specific protocols. Applied to the FORWARD rule from
# the internal network. Ends with an ACCEPT

# No match, so ACCEPT
$IPT -A tcp_outbound -p TCP -s 0/0 -j ACCEPT

###############################################################################
#
# INPUT Chain
#

echo "Process INPUT chain ..."

# Allow all on localhost interface

$IPT -A INPUT -p ALL -i $LO_IFACE -j ACCEPT

# Drop bad packets

$IPT -A INPUT -p ALL -j bad_packets

# DOCSIS compliant cable modems

# Some DOCSIS compliant cable modems send IGMP multicasts to find
# connected PCs. The multicast packets have the destination address
# 224.0.0.1. You can accept them. If you choose to do so,
# Uncomment the rule to ACCEPT them and comment the rule to DROP
# them The firewall will drop them here by default to avoid
# cluttering the log. The firewall will drop all multicasts
# to the entire subnet (224.0.0.1) by default. To only affect
# IGMP multicasts, change '-p ALL' to '-p 2'. Of course,
# if they aren't accepted elsewhere, it will only ensure that
# multicasts on other protocols are logged.
# Drop them without logging.
$IPT -A INPUT -p ALL -d 224.0.0.1 -j DROP
# The rule to accept the packets.
# $IPT -A INPUT -p ALL -d 224.0.0.1 -j ACCEPT

# Rules for the private network (accessing gateway system itself)

$IPT -A INPUT -p ALL -i $LOCAL_IFACE -s $LOCAL_NET -j ACCEPT
$IPT -A INPUT -p ALL -i $LOCAL_IFACE -d $LOCAL_BCAST -j ACCEPT

# Allow DHCP client request packets inbound from internal network

$IPT -A INPUT -p UDP -i $LOCAL_IFACE --source-port 68 --destination-port 67 \
-j ACCEPT

# Inbound Internet Packet Rules

# Accept Established Connections

$IPT -A INPUT -p ALL -i $INET_IFACE -m conntrack --ctstate ESTABLISHED,RELATED \
-j ACCEPT

# Route the rest to the appropriate user chain

$IPT -A INPUT -p TCP -i $INET_IFACE -j tcp_inbound
$IPT -A INPUT -p UDP -i $INET_IFACE -j udp_inbound
$IPT -A INPUT -p ICMP -i $INET_IFACE -j icmp_packets

# Drop without logging broadcasts that get this far.

# Cuts down on log clutter.
# Comment this line if testing new rules that impact
# broadcast protocols.
$IPT -A INPUT -m pkttype --pkt-type broadcast -j DROP

# Log packets that still don't match

$IPT -A INPUT -j LOG --log-prefix "fp=INPUT:99 a=DROP "

###############################################################################
#
# FORWARD Chain
#

echo "Process FORWARD chain ..."

# Used if forwarding for a private network

# Drop bad packets

$IPT -A FORWARD -p ALL -j bad_packets

# Accept TCP packets we want to forward from internal sources

$IPT -A FORWARD -p tcp -i $LOCAL_IFACE -j tcp_outbound

# Accept UDP packets we want to forward from internal sources

$IPT -A FORWARD -p udp -i $LOCAL_IFACE -j udp_outbound

# If not blocked, accept any other packets from the internal interface
$IPT -A FORWARD -p ALL -i $LOCAL_IFACE -j ACCEPT

# Deal with responses from the internet

$IPT -A FORWARD -i $INET_IFACE -m conntrack --ctstate ESTABLISHED,RELATED \
-j ACCEPT

# Port Forwarding is enabled, so accept forwarded traffic

$IPT -A FORWARD -p udp -i $INET_IFACE --destination-port 8080 \
--destination 192.168.255.101 -j ACCEPT

$IPT -A FORWARD -p tcp -i $INET_IFACE --destination-port 8080 \

--destination 192.168.255.101 -j ACCEPT

# Log packets that still don't match

$IPT -A FORWARD -j LOG --log-prefix "fp=FORWARD:99 a=DROP "

###############################################################################
#
# OUTPUT Chain
#

echo "Process OUTPUT chain ..."

# Generally trust the firewall on output

# However, invalid icmp packets need to be dropped

# to prevent a possible exploit.
$IPT -A OUTPUT -p icmp -m conntrack --ctstate INVALID -j DROP

# Localhost
$IPT -A OUTPUT -p ALL -s $LO_IP -j ACCEPT
$IPT -A OUTPUT -p ALL -o $LO_IFACE -j ACCEPT
# To internal network
$IPT -A OUTPUT -p ALL -s $LOCAL_IP -j ACCEPT
$IPT -A OUTPUT -p ALL -o $LOCAL_IFACE -j ACCEPT

# To internet
$IPT -A OUTPUT -p ALL -o $INET_IFACE -j ACCEPT

# Log packets that still don't match

$IPT -A OUTPUT -j LOG --log-prefix "fp=OUTPUT:99 a=DROP "

###############################################################################
#
# nat table
#
###############################################################################

# The nat table is where network address translation occurs if there

# is a private network. If the gateway is connected to the Internet
# with a static IP, snat is used. If the gateway has a dynamic address,
# masquerade must be used instead. There is more overhead associated
# with masquerade, so snat is better when it can be used.
# The nat table has a builtin chain, PREROUTING, for dnat and redirects.
# Another, POSTROUTING, handles snat and masquerade.

echo "Load rules for nat table ..."

###############################################################################
#
# PREROUTING chain
#

# Port Forwarding
#
# Port forwarding forwards all traffic on a port or ports from
# the firewall to a computer on the internal LAN. This can
# be required to support special situations. For instance,
# this is the only way to support file transfers with an ICQ
# client on an internal computer. It's also required if an internal
# system hosts a service such as a web server. However, it's also
# a dangerous option. It allows Internet computers access to
# your internal network. Use it carefully and only if you're
# certain you know what you're doing.

$IPT -t nat -A PREROUTING -p udp -i $INET_IFACE --destination-port 80:8080 \

-j DNAT --to-destination 192.168.255.101:8080

$IPT -t nat -A PREROUTING -p tcp -i $INET_IFACE --destination-port 80:8080 \

-j DNAT --to-destination 192.168.255.101:8080

# This is a sample that will exempt a specific host from the transparent proxy
#$IPT -t nat -A PREROUTING -p tcp -s 192.168.1.50 --destination-port 80 \
# -j RETURN
#$IPT -t nat -A PREROUTING -p tcp -s 192.168.1.50 --destination-port 443 \
# -j RETURN

# Redirect HTTP for a transparent proxy

$IPT -t nat -A PREROUTING -p tcp --destination-port 80 \
-j REDIRECT --to-ports 8081
# Redirect HTTPS for a transparent proxy - commented by default
# $IPT -t nat -A PREROUTING -p tcp --destination-port 443 \
# -j REDIRECT --to-ports 8081

###############################################################################
#
# POSTROUTING chain
#

$IPT -t nat -A POSTROUTING -o $INET_IFACE -j MASQUERADE

###############################################################################
#
# mangle table
#
###############################################################################

# The mangle table is used to alter packets. It can alter or mangle them in
# several ways. For the purposes of this generator, we only use its ability
# to alter the TTL in packets. However, it can be used to set netfilter
# mark values on specific packets. Those marks could then be used in another
# table like filter, to limit activities associated with a specific host, for
# instance. The TOS target can be used to set the Type of Service field in
# the IP header. Note that the TTL target might not be included in the
# distribution on your system. If it is not and you require it, you will
# have to add it. That may require that you build from source.

echo "Load rules for mangle table ..."

# Set the TTL in outbound packets to the same consistent value.

# A value around 128 is a good value. Do not set this too high as
# it will adversely affect your network. It is also considered bad
# form on the Internet.
$IPT -t mangle -A OUTPUT -o $INET_IFACE -j TTL --ttl-set 128