Emigration Nations

Policies and Ideologies of Emigrant

Engagement

Edited by
Michael Collyer
Migration, Diasporas and Citizenship Series

Series Editors: Robin Cohen, Former Director of the International Migration Institute and
Professor of Development Studies, University of Oxford, UK; Zig Layton-Henry, Professor
of Politics, University of Warwick, UK
Editorial Board: Rainer Baubock, European University Institute, Italy; James F. Hollifield,
Southern Methodist University, USA; Jan Rath, University of Amsterdam, The Netherlands
The Migration, Diasporas and Citizenship series covers three important aspects of the migra-
tion progress. Firstly, the determinants, dynamics and characteristics of international migra-
tion. Secondly, the continuing attachment of many contemporary migrants to their places
of origin, signified by the word ‘diaspora’, and thirdly the attempt, by contrast, to belong
and gain acceptance in places of settlement, signified by the word ‘citizenship’. The series
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political issues that are influenced by international migration.

Also published in Migration Studies by Palgrave Macmillan

Rutvica Andrijasevic
MIGRATION, AGENCY AND CITIZENSHIP IN SEX TRAFFICKING
Claudine Attias-Donfut, Joanne Cook, Jaco Hoffman and Louise Waite (editors)
CITIZENSHIP, BELONGING AND INTERGENERATIONAL RELATIONS IN AFRICAN
MIGRATION
Grete Brochmann and Anniken Hagelund (authors) with – Karin Borevi, Heidi Vad Jønsson
and Klaus Petersen
IMMIGRATION POLICY AND THE SCANDINAVIAN WELFARE STATE 1945–2010
Gideon Calder, Phillip Cole and Jonathan Seglow
CITIZENSHIP ACQUISITION AND NATIONAL BELONGING
Migration, Membership and the Liberal Democratic State
Michael Collyer (editor)
EMIGRATION NATIONS
Policies and Ideologies of Emigrant Engagement
Enzo Colombo and Paola Rebughini (editors)
CHILDREN OF IMMIGRANTS IN A GLOBALIZED WORLD
A Generational Experience
Huub Dijstelbloem and Albert Meijer (editors)
MIGRATION AND THE NEW TECHNOLOGICAL BORDERS OF EUROPE
Thomas Faist and Andreas Ette (editors)
THE EUROPEANIZATION OF NATIONAL POLICIES AND POLITICS OF IMMIGRATION
Between Autonomy and the European Union
Thomas Faist and Peter Kivisto (editors)
DUAL CITIZENSHIP IN GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE
From Unitary to Multiple Citizenship
Katrine Fangen, Thomas Johansson and Nils Hammarén (editors)
YOUNG MIGRANTS
Exclusion and Belonging in Europe
Martin Geiger and Antoine Pécoud (editors)
THE POLITICS OF INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION MANAGEMENT
John R. Hinnells (editor)
RELIGIOUS RECONSTRUCTION IN THE SOUTH ASIAN DIASPORAS
From One Generation to Another
Ronit Lentin and Elena Moreo (editors)
MIGRANT ACTIVISM AND INTEGRATION FROM BELOW IN IRELAND
Ayhan Kaya
ISLAM, MIGRATION AND INTEGRATION
The Age of Securitization
Majella Kilkey, Diane Perrons and Ania Plomien
GENDER, MIGRATION AND DOMESTIC WORK
Masculinities, Male Labour and Fathering in the UK and USA
Marie Macy and Alan H. Carling
ETHNIC, RACIAL AND RELIGIOUS INEQUALITIES
The Perils of Subjectivity
George Menz and Alexander Caviedes (editors)
LABOUR MIGRATION IN EUROPE
Laura Morales and Marco Giugni (editors)
SOCIAL CAPITAL, POLITICAL PARTICIPATION AND MIGRATION IN EUROPE
Making Multicultural Democracy Work?
Eric Morier-Genoud
IMPERIAL MIGRATIONS
Colonial Communities and Diaspora in the Portuguese World
Aspasia Papadopoulou-Kourkoula
TRANSIT MIGRATION
The Missing Link between Emigration and Settlement
Ludger Pries and Zeynep Sezgin (editors)
CROSS BORDER MIGRANT ORGANIZATIONS IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE
Prodromos Panayiotopoulos
ETHNICITY, MIGRATION AND ENTERPRISE
Shanthi Robertson
TRANSNATIONAL STUDENT-MIGRANTS AND THE STATE
The Education–Migration Nexus
Olivia Sheringham
TRANSNATIONAL RELIGIOUS SPACES
Faith and the Brazilian Migration Experience
Vicky Squire
THE EXCLUSIONARY POLITICS OF ASYLUM
Anna Triandafyllidou and Thanos Maroukis (editors)
MIGRANT SMUGGLING
Irregular Migration from Asia and Africa to Europe
Vron Ware
MILITARY MIGRANTS
Fighting for YOUR Country
Lucy Williams
GLOBAL MARRIAGE
Cross-Border Marriage Migration in Global Context

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Emigration Nations
Policies and Ideologies of Emigrant
Engagement

Edited by

Michael Collyer
University of Sussex, UK
Selection, introduction, afterword and editorial matter
© Michael Collyer 2013
Individual chapters © their respective authors 2013
Foreword © Rainer Bauböck 2013
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Contents

List of Tables and Figures vii

Notes on Contributors ix

Foreword by Rainer Bauböck xiii

1 Introduction: Locating and Narrating Emigration Nations 1

Michael Collyer
2 ‘Albania: €1’ or the Story of ‘Big Policies, Small Outcomes’:
How Albania Constructs and Engages Its Diaspora 25
Julie Vullnetari
3 Diaspora Engagement and Policy in Ethiopia 50
Katie Kuschminder and Melissa Siegel
4 Diaspora Engagement in India: From Non-Required
Indians to Angels of Development 75
Metka Hercog and Melissa Siegel
5 Towards the Neo-Institutionalization of Irish
State–Diaspora Relations in the Twenty-First Century 100
Breda Gray
6 Italy: The Continuing History of Emigrant Relations 126
Guido Tintori
7 Regime Change in Mexico and the Transformation of
State–Diaspora Relations 153
Jean-Michel Lafleur
8 The Moroccan State and Moroccan Citizens Abroad 175
Michael Collyer
9 Creative Destruction in the New Zealand ‘Diaspora Strategy’ 196
Alan Gamlen
10 Nigeria @ 50: Policies and Practices for Diaspora
Engagement 226
Naluwembe Binaisa
11 Portuguese Emigrants and the State: An Ambivalent
Relationship 252
José Carlos Marques and Pedro Góis

v
vi Contents

12 From Economic to Political Engagement: Analysing

the Changing Role of the Turkish Diaspora 277
Özge Bilgili and Melissa Siegel
13 An Emigrant Nation without an Emigrant Policy:
The Curious Case of Britain 302
James Hampshire
Afterword: States of Emigration 327
Michael Collyer

Index 334
List of Tables and Figures

Tables

1.1 Top 20 countries by absolute and relative sizes of

emigrant population 10
1.2 Additional countries included in collection with
ranking (out of 192) 11
1.3 Stylized typology of location and belonging 13
2.1 Estimates of Albanians living abroad: 1999,
2005 and 2010 31
3.1 Ethiopia refugee flows 53
4.1 Stock of Indian migrants as a percentage of the
total population in selected countries (2010) 81
6.1 Italian expatriates and return migration flows
(1861–1990, absolute values) 128
6.2 Italian expatriates by total population 1861–1990
(absolute values) 130
6.3 Main destinations 1861–1990 (absolute values) 131
6.4 Expatriates by sex 1871–1980 (absolute values
and percentage) 132
6.5 Italian residents abroad by region of origin (twelve
most numerous), 2006–2008 133
8.1 2012 Moroccan consular data on location of
Moroccan citizens 183
9.1 Expatriates’ return inclinations by citizenship
of family members 207
9.2 Effect of overseas votes, New Zealand’s 2008
general election 215
11.1 Portuguese nationals living in selected European
countries, 1981–2006 258
11.2 Portuguese citizens living abroad (selected countries) 262
13.1 Top ten countries of residence of UK nationals in 2008 309
A.1 Overview of outreach activities in 12 case study countries 330

vii
viii List of Tables and Figures

Figures

2.1 Albania – location map 27

3.1 Legal immigrants of Ethiopian origin in OECD states 55
3.2 Ethiopian immigration to the United States, 2000–2009 56
4.1 Number of people obtaining legal permanent resident
status in the United States from India as country of last
residence, from 1960 to 2009 77
4.2 Stock of Indian immigrants around the world 78
4.3 Immigration flows of Indian-born immigrants (aged 15
and older) in the main OECD destination countries,
from 1998 to 2009 79
4.4 Migrant remittances inflows to India from 1970
to 2012 88
6.1 Long-term emigrations and returns from/to Italy
(1920–1990) 129
9.1 New Zealand’s permanent and long-term migration by
citizenship, 1971–2007 204
9.2 Geographical distribution of expatriates, census versus
snowball estimates 204
9.3 Age–sex pyramids, New Zealand residents versus
expatriates 205
9.4 Highest educational qualification, residents
versus expatriates 206
9.5 Connections 208
9.6 Self-ascribed ethnicity, residents versus expatriates 210
12.1 Remittances to Turkey 291
13.1 Migration of British nationals to and from the
United Kingdom, 2002–2011 307
13.2 Main destination countries of British emigrants,
2006–2010 308
13.3 Overseas electors for UK parliamentary elections,
1987–2011 322
Notes on Contributors

Rainer Bauböck has a chair in social and political theory at the

Department of Political and Social Sciences of the European University
Institute. His research interests include normative political theory and
comparative research on democratic citizenship, European integration,
migration, nationalism and minority rights. Together with Jo Shaw
(University of Edinburgh) and Maarten Vink (University of Maastricht),
he coordinates the European Union Democracy Observatory on
Citizenship at http://eudo-citizenship.eu.

Özge Bilgili is a research fellow at the Maastricht Graduate School of

Governance, Maastricht University, where she works for the Migration
and Development: A World in Motion Project financed by the Dutch
Ministry of Foreign Affairs (IS Academy) focusing on the situation of
immigrants in the Netherlands. She currently works in the area of
immigrant integration and transnationalism and has specific expertise
on civic, legal, political, economic, social and cultural integration of
different types of immigrants in the Netherlands, including labour
migrants, family migrants, forced migrants and students.

Naluwembe Binaisa is a migration specialist whose research interests

include African diasporas, development, integration processes and digi-
tal technologies. Following doctoral research on the Ugandan diaspora,
Naluwembe was Research Fellow at the Sussex Centre for Migration
Research, University of Sussex, where she worked on a series of projects
focusing on African migration. Naluwembe is currently based at the
International Migration Institute, University of Oxford, as the Research
Officer on the African Mobility in the Great Lakes Project and the
African Diasporas within Africa project, which seek in different ways
to understand both theoretically and empirically the intersections of
mobility, borders, gender and generation dynamics.

Michael Collyer is Senior Lecturer in Geography at the University of

Sussex. His research concerns the relationship between mobile people
and state institutions. He has held visiting positions at universities in
Morocco, Egypt, Sri Lanka and the United States. He is Associate Editor
of the Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies and sits on a number of
editorial boards, including that of Géographie et Développement au Maroc.

ix
x Notes on Contributors

Alan Gamlen is a political and population geographer with research

interests focusing on human migration. He is Senior Lecturer in the
School of Geography, Environment and Earth Sciences at Victoria
University of Wellington, Lead Researcher of the Diaspora Engagement
Policies Project within the Leverhulme-funded Oxford Diasporas
Programme, and Editor in Chief of the journal Migration Studies, pub-
lished by Oxford University Press.

Pedro Góis is Assistant Professor in Sociology and Research Methodology

at the University of Porto and permanent researcher at the Centre for
Social Studies of the University of Coimbra, Portugal. He is a specialist
in the Sociology of Migration, Sociology of Ethnicity and the Sociology
of Arts. His main research focus is Lusophone migrants with a particu-
lar interest in the Cape Verde Islands. He has published, among other
subjects, on Cape Verdian, Chinese, Brazilian and Eastern European
migrants; on the dynamics of the economic and social insertion of immi-
grants in Portugal; ethnicity and ethnic identity; and transnationalism.

Breda Gray is Senior Lecturer in the Department of Sociology and

Director of programmes in Gender, Culture & Society at the University
of Limerick (UL), Ireland. She is also co-convenor of the National
University of Ireland, Galway and UL research consortium Gender ARC.
She has published widely on gender, diaspora, transnationalism and
mobility. Her publications include Women and the Irish Diaspora (2004),
and she is co-editor of Mobilities, 6(2) 2011, and editor of special issue
of Irish Journal of Sociology, 19(2) 2011, on transnationalism. Current
research projects include ‘The Irish Catholic Church and the Politics
of Migration’ (www.ul.ie/icctmp) and ‘Nomadic Work/Life and the
Knowledge Economy’ (http:/nwl.ul.ie).

James Hampshire is Senior Lecturer in Politics at the University of

Sussex. His main research interests are the politics of migration and
migration policy in Europe. He is the author of Citizenship and Belonging:
Immigration and the Politics of Demographic Governance in Post-war Britain
(2005) and The Politics of Immigration: Contradictions of the Liberal
State (Polity 2013). He has also published refereed journal articles and
book chapters on immigration, citizenship and race. In 2012, he was
the Specialist Adviser to the UK House of Lords EU Select Committee
inquiry into the EU’s Global Approach to Migration and Mobility.

Metka Hercog is a political scientist who specializes in migration and

international development processes. She is a scientific researcher at
the Cooperation and Development Centre at the Ecole Polytechnique
 Notes on Contributors xi

Fédérale de Lausanne (EPFL), Switzerland. She is completing her Ph.D.

in Public Policy from Maastricht University, the Netherlands. Ms.
Hercog obtained an M.Sc. degree in International Development Studies
from Utrecht University and a university degree in Political Science
from the University of Ljubljana.

Katie Kuschminder is Research Fellow/Ph.D. candidate at Maastricth

Graduate School of Governance, Maastricht University/UNU MERIT
(United Nations University – Maastricht Economic and Social Research
Institute on Innovation and Technology). Katie’s research focuses on
return migration, labour migration, domestic workers, diaspora and
refugee issues, and her dissertation examines return migration and
social change in Ethiopia. She has worked in Afghanistan, Burundi,
Canada, Ethiopia and the United Kingdom on migration and develop-
ment projects.

José Carlos Marques is Adjunct Professor in Sociology at the Poly-

thechnic Institute of Leiria and a researcher at the Research Centre for
Identity(ies) and Diversity(ies) (CIID), and at the Centre for Social Studies
of the University of Coimbra. His research focused on Portuguese migra-
tion flows, immigrants’ integration, migrants’ transnational practices,
migration policies and highly skilled migration, domains on which he
has published several articles and books.

Jean-Michel Lafleur is Research Associate at the Belgian National Fund

for Scientific Research (FRS-FNRS) and Associate Director of the Center
for Ethnic and Migration Studies of the University of Liège (CEDEM).
His work focuses on transnational politics, the external voting rights of
diasporas and contemporary European emigration.

Melissa Siegel currently works as Assistant Professor and Migration

Studies Program Manager at the Maastricht Graduate School of
Governance, Maastricht University, where she heads the Migration
research group, manages several migration research projects and coor-
dinates the Migration Studies Specialization that is part of the Master’s
Program in Public Policy and Human Development.

Guido Tintori holds a Ph.D. in History of European Society and

Institutions from the University of Milan (in co-tutorship with the
J.F. Kennedy Institut fur Nordamerikastudien, Freie Universität,
Berlin). He was awarded the Fulbright-Schuman Research Scholarship
2009–2010 on EU Affairs and EU–US relations at the Department of
Politics of New York University and was Visiting Research Fellow at the
xii Notes on Contributors

Department of European Studies of the University of Bath (2008–2011).

Until fall 2011, he was researcher at the European Union Democracy
Observatory on Citizenship of the European University Institute of
Florence. Currently, he is Marie Curie Fellow (Experienced Researcher)
2011–2013 at the Institute for History of the University of Leiden,
where he studies the comparative history of nationality laws and how
they evolve under the influence of immigration and emigration flows.
Guido Tintori is also Senior Research Associate of Italian Studies at the
University of Oxford, where he coordinates with two colleagues the
Arts and Humanities Research Council (AHRC)-funded project Human
Mobility and Cultural History: The Italian Case as an Explanatory
Model.

Julie Vullnetari is Research Fellow at the Sussex Centre for Migration

Research, University of Sussex. She holds a D.Phil. in Migration Studies
from the University of Sussex, and has published widely in peer-
reviewed international journals such as Journal of Ethnic and Migration
Studies and Global Networks. Her latest book published by Amsterdam
University Press examined the links between internal and international
migration from a development perspective, taking Albania as a case
study. With a slight departure from migration, her current research aims
to document and analyse everyday life in communist Albania.
Foreword

The title of this book may suggest to some readers that there is a pecu-
liar type of countries that we can call ‘emigrant nations’. This concept
seems to be the mirror image of “immigrant nations”, a description
which is frequently used for the United States, Canada, Australia and
New Zealand, and occasionally also for Latin American states or Israel.
The common denominator for these nations is that they were created
by colonial settlers or diasporic populations who established their dis-
tinct nation-building projects against both metropolitan powers and
indigenous populations.
This observation suggests that the two concepts can hardly be sym-
metrical. Nation-states need territorial populations; therefore there is
no ‘emigrant nation’ in the sense of a nation-state being constituted
by emigration from a territory rather than by immigration into it. Of
course, the immigrants that established ‘immigrant nations’ were at
the same time emigrants. However, the distinctive characteristics of the
immigrant nations listed above is that they have, sometimes over long
historical periods, overcome the association between nationhood and
immigrant origins, through establishing themselves as sovereign states
as well through increasing diversity of the origins of their immigrant
citizens. They have come to define themselves as immigrant destina-
tions, rather than through immigrant origin.
The distinction between immigrant and emigrant nation-states is still
a heuristically useful one, if we focus on how continuous and large-scale
immigration and emigration have become historically important for the
self-perception of nation-states rather than on how nations have been
founded. In this broader sense, we can certainly think of nineteenth-
century France as an immigrant nation and Italy as an emigrant one.
While such a dichotomy makes sense when analysing historical
narratives and imaginaries of nationhood, it quickly breaks down
once we examine migration flows and state responses to them over
a longer period. As the editor of this volume points out in his con-
clusions: ‘[T]he institutional challenges of engaging with emigrants
[have] to be [considered] common to all nation-states, irrespective
of location, size, wealth, political system, emigration history or post-
colonial context.’

xiii
xiv Foreword

Indeed, if we imagine counterfactually what it would mean for a state

to be a non-emigrant nation in the broadest sense of the term, then
we will not find a single exemplar of this species. Every state claims
to represent and protect its nationals abroad vis-à-vis their country of
residence. And no state fully disconnects from its emigrants by depriv-
ing them automatically of their citizenship. To be sure, authoritarian
regimes often denationalize dissidents whom they force into exile. And
a number of democratic ones withdraw their citizenship from emigrants
who have settled for many years abroad and have acquired another
state’s citizenship. However, as these exceptions illustrate, emigration
itself is never a sufficient condition for losing citizenship.
Even more telling is the fact that all states allow emigrants who have
retained their citizenship of origin to pass this status on to second gen-
erations born abroad. There are major differences between states with
regard to the conditions under which those born abroad can retain
a parental citizenship of origin and bequeath it in turn to third and
later generations. However, even prototypical immigrant nations with
unconditional jus soli, such as the United States and Canada, turn the
children of their emigrants into citizens, although they impose condi-
tions for retaining this status beyond the age of majority.
Finally, the right of emigrant citizens to return to the state whose
nationals they are is enshrined in international law and all states recog-
nize a duty to readmit their own citizens. There is no equivalent right
to non-citizens to immigration or naturalization. We can thus conclude
that all states are constructed as emigrant nations, whereas not all are
immigrant nations in the broad sense of keeping the state open at least
to some extent for the admission of non-citizens to their territory and
citizenship. The legal link between states and emigrant citizens is part
of the basic architecture of the international state system. And the insti-
tution of birthright citizenship provides the crucial mechanism that
sustains this link over time and across borders.
This is the second core argument running through the book that
Michael Collyer emphasizes in his conclusions. ‘[E]migration … high-
lights the limits and the evolution of the spatiality of the nation-state
system much more effectively than immigration.’ The nation in the
legal sense comprises all nationals and thus stretches beyond the state
territory through including emigrants. The relations of rights and duties
between states, their external citizens and the states where they reside
have evolved over time and the general trend seems to be a strength-
ening rather than weakening of this extra-territoriality dimension of
statehood.
 Foreword xv

We should be cautious not to confuse extra-territoriality with deter-

ritorialization. Emigrant nations are not about a general weakening of
state powers through processes of economic globalization. They are also
not about enhanced global mobility of persons that escapes the capac-
ity of states to control their borders. Emigrant nationhood is a relation
between states and extra-territorial populations that tends to expand
rather than shrink the powers of states.
If no state is an emigrant nation in the foundational sense and all
states are emigrant nations in the persistent link sense, then all that is
interesting to study empirically must fall somewhere in between these
two ends of the spectrum of conceptual interpretation. This is precisely
what the present book is about. It examines the means states employ for
engaging with their emigrants, the extent to which they are committed
to doing so and the ways in which emigration enters official narratives
about the nation.
The third argument highlighted by Michael Collyer as a common find-
ing in the contributions to this book goes some way towards explaining
the variety of state engagements with emigrants: ‘[A] narrative inclu-
sion of emigrants in stories of “the people” is a necessary pre-condition
for institutional developments associated with emigrant engagement.’
This does not suggest that we need to fall back on explaining state poli-
cies towards emigrants or immigrants through types of civic or ethnic
nationhood or other national models of citizenship. Such explanations
have been rightly criticized for ignoring the inevitable mix of ethnic
and civic principles in all constructions of nationhood, the sometimes
radical policy changes that upset expectations about path-dependent
national models and the multiple purposes that states pursue in their
engagements with both emigrants and immigrants. Instead of con-
sidering narratives of nationhood as a stable “independent variable”
that explains policy output, we need to understand them as discourses
through which states gain legitimacy for policies that may be driven
by quite different motives. Such motives include expected economic
benefits from remittances, foreign policy relations with emigrants’ host
states as well as political support among domestic constituencies that
are ideologically committed to ethnic nationhood or socially linked to
emigrant communities. A public narrative about the contribution of
emigrants in building or sustaining the nation is therefore a necessary
condition rather than an independent cause for policies of emigrant
inclusion.
Conceptual clarification of emigrant nationhood and interpretive
understanding of the empirical variety of public policies of emigrant
xvi Foreword

engagement are also necessary for addressing the democratic challenges.

The present book does not aim at evaluating what states do or prescrib-
ing what they ought to do from a democratic or liberal perspective.
There is a vast literature in political theory on how liberal democracies
ought to engage with immigrants, but states’ relations with emigrants
have until recently been ignored by normative theorists. This is surpris-
ing, since the few contributions that have been written on the topic
over the last decade indicate pervasive disagreement among scholars
who otherwise seem to defend quite similar positions on immigration
control or immigrant integration.
Normative questions about emigration can be roughly divided into
three groups. The first one is about the balance between individual
liberty and collective benefits and burdens in the relation between
states and emigrant citizens. Should states have a right to restrict their
citizens’ freedom of exit when mass emigration threatens the welfare of
the resident population, for example, when health services break down
because a majority of medical doctors and nurses seek employment
abroad? Do emigration states that have invested into developing the
human capital of their citizens through public education have a claim
to tax the income of emigrants?
A second set of questions concerns democratic principles for citizen-
ship inclusion. Should only those be included in the demos who are
subjected to the laws as residents in the territory? Should emigrants
have a right to retain their citizenship of origin even when they natural-
ize abroad? Should citizenship be transmitted by descent to those born
abroad? And should citizens born abroad or residing permanently there
have voting rights and be thus represented in legislative decisions in
their countries of origin?
A third set of questions concerns relations between migrant source
and destination states. What kind of personal jurisdiction can states
exercise over their emigrant citizens living in the territory of other
states? Should income earned abroad be taxed by states or residence or
citizenship? Should dual citizens have cumulative rights and duties in
two independent states?
The point of raising these questions here is to show that they do not
have obvious answers which could be derived from generally recognized
principles of liberal democracy. The reason for this normative uncer-
tainty is that answers depend on prior questions about the boundaries
of political community. Through their engagements with citizens who
have left the territory, emigrant nations have significantly expanded
these boundaries. But nationalism is an ideology that promotes the
 Foreword xvii

interests and moral priority of a particular political community. It is

notoriously incapable of providing generalizable principles that could
be acceptable to members and non-members alike. What political
theorists should then learn from the historical and comparative studies
of emigrant nations assembled in this book is that democracies need
boundaries but that these boundaries must not be accepted as given
by either the territorial borders of sovereign states or by their self-
defined claims to extra-territorial nationhood. The politics and policies
of emigrant nations need to be critically scrutinized. For this, political
theorists need books like the present one that help them understand the
general evolution and persistent variety of emigrant nations. And then
they still need to do their own job and propose coherent conceptions
of democratic boundaries.

Rainer Bauböck
European University Institute
Italy
1
Introduction: Locating and
Narrating Emigration Nations
Michael Collyer

But do you know what a nation means? Says John

Wyse.
Yes, says Bloom.
What is it? Says John Wyse.
A nation? says Bloom. A nation is the same people
living in the same place.
By God, then, says Ned, laughing, if that’s so I’m a
nation for I’m living in the same place for the past
five years.
So of course everyone had a laugh at Bloom and says
he, trying to muck out of it: Or also living in different
places.
( James Joyce, Ulysses: 331)

It is almost 40 years since Abdelmalek Sayad first emphasized that every

immigrant is always initially an emigrant (Sayad, 1977), yet when migra-
tion is discussed it is still typically in the context of immigration rather
than emigration. Sayad’s insistence on the enduring connection between
the two, exemplified by his continued use of the label émigré–immigré
(Sayad, 1991), marks one of the first detailed examinations of the distinct
context of emigration, yet it has only gradually filtered into anglophone
approaches to migration. Writing in appreciation of his career, Bourdieu
and Wacquant argued that highlighting the emigration–immigration
connection was one of his central contributions, ‘the implications of
which remain to be fully drawn out by scholars and policy makers alike’
(2000: 174). This is beginning to change and the importance and par-
ticularities of emigration have become much more widely appreciated in
recent years (Bauböck, 2003; Ragazzi, 2009).
1
2 Emigration Nations

The most obvious link between Sayad’s work and contemporary

research is the now vast literature on the transnational activities of
migrants (Vertovec, 2009). The transnational approach developed largely
independently of Sayad’s related analysis of emigration–immigration,
initially from empirical observation of the enduring connections that
migrants maintained with places of origin. One of the key theoreti-
cal contributions of transnationalism in the early 1990s was to focus
attention away from the state as the principal international actor in the
regulation of international migration. The state was becoming ‘deterri-
torialized’ in the words of one of the most influential books of the time
(Basch et al., 1994). In contrast, transnationalism was ‘the social space
of post-modernism’ (Rouse, 1991). Resulting transnational research has
emphasized the significance of non-state actors and particularly the role
of migrants themselves in the reproduction of international migration.
Yet transnationalism was only one manifestation of the rejection of
the state in the early 1990s social sciences. Another approach, which has
also influenced a substantial current of contemporary critical enquiry,
arose from concerns at the theoretical inadequacy of the state paradigm.
Troubled by the reification of the state as a virtually autonomous actor,
which emerged particularly from mainstream international relations
at the time, an image of the state was advanced as simply an ‘effect’ of
certain policy alignments (Mitchell, 1991). The geographer John Agnew
cautioned international relations practitioners to avoid the ‘territorial
trap’ of assuming that state borders effectively framed discrete catego-
ries of enquiry (Agnew, 1994) and sought to recognize non-territorial
forms of state sovereignty (Agnew, 2005).
This constructivist approach focused on the state as a territorial insti-
tution, though it has much in common with analysis of the nation as a
constructed entity (Anderson, 1986). More recent analysis has focused
explicitly on the ‘hyphenation’ of the nation-state, investigating the
ways in which groups of people have come to be associated with
particular territories and how through continual practice such claims
have come to be seen as perfectly natural and go largely unquestioned
(Sparke, 2005). The emigration context presents a further challenge
to the hyphenation of the nation-state; state institutions must work
harder to maintain a claim to represent a nation ‘living in different
places’, in the words of the Ulysses quote cited above. The variety of
ways in which state institutions do this and the range of motivations
for doing so are the subject of this book.
The chapters which follow are situated in this theoretical context.
They focus explicitly on the nation-state, exploring one state each.
 Introduction 3

Although this is in contrast to the typical transnational concerns with

non-state actors, it builds on transnational approaches by viewing the
institutions of the state as transnational actors competing and cajoling
international migrants in the same ways as any non-state organization;
the state is not seen as a privileged international actor. This in turn
contributes to the critical analysis of the territorial state as a constructed
institution. The concerns of this book are with emigrants: citizens
defined by their absence from state territory. The increasing enthusi-
asm with which the institutions of the state engage with these absent
individuals further underlines the limitations of territorial definitions
of the state in a way that is not true of the more common focus on
immigration.
The territorial state is clearly not a homogenous political category, but
it at least retains some theoretical purchase. As an analytical category,
the nation is genuinely all over the place as the Ulysses quote suggests.
What is clear is that nations are eminently constructed, resulting from
conscious processes of nationalism (Hobsbawm, 1983) or efforts at state
building (Anderson, 1986). The relation between nations and states is
also inevitably more complex than we can explore fully here: there are
multinational states, multi-state nations and nations with no widely
recognized state (Kymlicka, 1995). Sub-state entities such as Scotland,
the Navajo nation or Zacatecas as well as supra-state institutions like the
European Union, the Catholic Church or the Amazigh World Congress
all have elements in common with the central concerns of this volume.
Yet our inevitably more limited focus here is exclusively on nation-
states; the nations of our ‘emigration nations’ should be understood
in the sense of the United Nations, of internationally recognized, sov-
ereign, territorial polities. It is in the context of emigration that the
stability of the hyphen linking the ‘same people’ to the ‘same place’ is
most obviously destabilized.
There is of course a danger that in using the nation-state as our fun-
damental unit of analysis we fall into Agnew’s ‘territorial trap’, that we
‘naturalize’ the state in a way migration research often finds hard to avoid
(Gill, 2010; Bauder, 2012). Our intention here is exactly the opposite.
Although international migration is often cited as one of the features of
globalization that has come to undermine the state, this typically means
immigration. In the case of immigration, it is only the state’s ability to
control territory which is questioned, not the territorial nature of the
state itself. Continued engagement with emigrants, on the other hand,
re-emphasizes not only the necessary link between state and nation,
highlighting the ways in which sovereign power is exercised beyond
4 Emigration Nations

the territorial but also the fragility of that link. This is not a repeat of
the deterritorialization debates common in the 1990s but an attempt
to chart the recent evolution of the spatalization of state authority.
Sayad argued that migration was one of the ways in which the state
‘thought of itself’ (Sayad, 1999). The central argument of this book is
that, although state engagement with emigrants has a long history, the
recent expansion and development of these activities marks a change in
the way at least some states think of themselves. It is increasingly com-
mon for the narratives that bind our ‘imagined communities’ together
to incorporate emigrants in more positive ways. This is a significant
development, a way of coming to terms with the reality of nations liv-
ing in different places.
This introduction sets the theoretical framework for the book. It
begins with a review of recent explanations of emigrant engagement,
followed by a review of the choice of case studies in the book. The third
section turns to a more geographical analysis, emphasizing the signifi-
cance of location and the durability of the inside/outside dichotomy
that structures nation-states and defines emigration. The final section
explores narrations of statehood, or ‘stories of peoplehood’ in Rogers
M. Smith’s (2003) term, with a particular attention to how emigrants
and emigration are incorporated into narratives that justify some col-
lective sense of belonging. Each of the following chapters takes a com-
mon approach. Each chapter falls into three sections examining, first,
the history and geography of emigration from the country in question;
second, the development of policies designed to engage with emigrants;
and third, discussions and debates which reveal how emigration has
been incorporated into the ideology of the nation.

Explaining engagement with emigrants

The literature on state engagement with emigrants falls into three partially
overlapping approaches: migration and development, transnationalism
and the state, and extra-territorial citizenship. These three approaches
reflect different conceptual understandings, substantially different ter-
minology and different geographies of research. Very recent research has
drawn on all three approaches with an interest in combining elements of
each. This is a trend to which this book aims to contribute with a broad
selection of countries that is explained in the following section.
The first and oldest approach dates back to concerns about the impact
of emigration on countries of origin, particularly research into the
‘brain drain’ in the 1960s and 1970s (Bhagwati and Hamada, 1973). This
 Introduction 5

approach broadened to include general impacts of international migra-

tion on the development of migrants’ countries of origin and encour-
aged some to question the dominance of immigration in the migration
literature (Schmitter Heisler, 1985).
Since the late 1990s a much more positive view of the impact of migra-
tion on development has become institutionalized (de Haas, 2006).
Emigrant groups have attracted considerable attention from state insti-
tutions for their work in poverty alleviation or development projects,
and certain sending states have sought to ‘mobilize’ emigrants in order
to support or encourage such activities (IOM, 2012). This approach is
largely an applied one. Governments and NGOs have done much to
popularize the notion of ‘diaspora’ for its broadly inclusive appeal,
often without much concern for precise or consistent usage. Over the
past decade international events such as the Global Forum on Migration
and Development have given tremendous publicity to successful mod-
els of ‘diaspora engagement’, and large development NGOs and donor
states have begun to advocate for the incorporation of emigrant groups
into mainstream development policy (Migration DRC, 2009). The
concern of this literature has typically been with poorer, marginalized
states. At its simplest, this approach views emigrants as a resource that
can be mobilized in support of the political or economic interests of the
sending state.
Transnationalism has given rise to a second, distinct set of concerns.
Although the transnational approach focused attention on migrants
themselves as international actors, the impact of this development on
states was always a related issue, and one strand of the literature has
explored this in more detail (Østergaard-Nielsen, 2003a; Martiniello
and Lafleur, 2008; Tintori, 2011). There is some overlap with migration
and development in investigations of state attempts to incite or support
productive investments from migrants though the focus is much less
applied. Iskander (2010) entirely rejects the notion of ‘best practice’ that
is prominent in the migration and development approach, arguing from
a detailed study of Morocco and Mexico that success has been the prod-
uct of creative response to circumstance. Equally, research has drawn
attention to state efforts to coerce, control or isolate external criticism
where emigrants have engaged in direct political campaigns against their
own governments (Østergaard-Nielsen, 2003b; Collyer, 2006).
The innovation of this approach is to explore how state responses
to the transnational activities of migrants contribute to the ‘redefini-
tion of the state’ (Levitt and Dehesa, 2003). Levitt and Dehesa identify
five areas in which legislative or administrative reform has specifically
6 Emigration Nations

targeted emigrants: ministerial-level representation, investment policies,

expansion of political rights, protections beyond traditional consular
activities and symbolic approaches, such as the characterization of new
extra-territorial regions. Through such developments state institutions
become transnational actors like any others, abandoning the privileged
role granted to states in the international sphere in classic international
relations theory. ‘Transnationalism’ is a more common term than
‘diaspora’ in this literature, though the focus is still typically on more
peripheral states.
Finally, a largely separate literature has considered emigration in terms
of citizenship. This perspective moves further from the pragmatic policy
concerns of the migration and development approach to a much more
theoretical set of concerns. Conceptually, the focus on state interests
that explains emigrant engagement in development terms is replaced
with a more normative perspective. Rainer Bauböck has shaped this
approach through a concern with the normative principles of liberal
democracy that he argues are not fully aligned with the practice of citi-
zenship (1994). Bauböck links the rights of non-resident citizens and
the rights of non-citizen residents into a broadly inclusive ‘expansive’
or ‘stakeholder’ view of citizenship (2007).
In contrast with empirical work in more marginalized parts of the
world, this approach is characterized by a focus on wealthy liberal
democracies. Green (2005) traces state responses to emigration through
19th-century Western Europe as the right to emigrate became accepted as
an essential liberal democratic norm. Barry argues that the development
of this emigration norm is central in explaining the ongoing engagement
with emigrants; ‘the citizenship discourse will remain incomplete until
it analyzes emigrant citizenship as a tool of nation-building and identity
construction in emigration states’ (2006: 19). The particular citizenship
rights retained by emigrants are increasingly considered to form a dis-
tinct status, that of extra-territorial citizenship (Fitzgerald, 2000; M.P.
Smith, 2003) incorporating certain economic and political rights (land
ownership, investments, voting) but also obligations (taxes, voting).
These three distinct approaches have highlighted different concerns,
used different language and considered very different geographies of
emigration. Conceptually there is a distinction between interests as an
explanation for the engagement of particular states and more universal
norms, by which all states may eventually be held to account. Although
state interests clearly explain certain policy orientations (e.g. Itzigsohn,
2000), research into emigrant voting shows that there is no clear relation-
ship between obvious state interests, such as dependence on migrants’
 Introduction 7

remittances, and engagement, such as the extension of the right to vote

to emigrant electors (Collyer and Vathi, 2007). Nor does it seem realistic
to expect emigrants to form a homogenous lobbying group in the inter-
ests of the home state (Délano, 2011). In this volume we follow others
who have argued that norms are a more effective explanation of state
action than interests (Brand, 2006; Gamlen, 2008).
Migration and development approaches commonly use a language of
‘diaspora’, rather than transnationalism, citizenship or emigration, though
it is by no means restricted to that approach (Délano, 2011; Dufoix,
2005; Laguerre, 2006). Definitions of ‘diaspora’ are tremendously varied;
Brubaker’s (2005) restriction of the term to a ‘category of practice’ provides
a useful focus: ‘we should think of diaspora not in substantialist terms as
a bounded entity, but rather as an idiom, a stance, a claim’ (2005: 12).
Although many of the contributors to this volume refer to diaspora,
reflecting the common usage across certain state institutions, I have
avoided it in the volume’s title and use it only sparingly in this introduc-
tion as it is not a widely used term in all the countries explored here.
In some senses ‘diaspora’ is a broader category than the potentially
more statistically verifiable ensemble of non-resident citizens, since it
requires only a sense of common purpose, rather than a particular citi-
zenship or migration history. State institutions may include the descend-
ants or spouses of emigrants in their engagement policies, but the focus
is more typically on the more easily defined category of non-resident
citizens. Under Brubaker’s definition, ‘diaspora’ is also narrower than
the total population of emigrants since it includes only those who have
already made a commitment of some kind – a ‘stance’ or a ‘claim’. This
understanding reflects the sense of ‘building’ diaspora, which implies
that it is constructed from some broader potential pool of engagement –
that of the total emigrant community or broader still those who feel
some common purpose or solidarity with the specific country of origin.
While the broader notion of ‘diaspora’ as a potential community beyond
those who retain citizenship is often important in symbolic or narrative
terms, most practical policy measures are more restricted.
A final distinction between the three approaches is different geogra-
phies of research. Migration and development approaches have focused
on poorer, marginalized countries and research into transnationalism
and the state has tended to follow. In contrast, literature concerned
with citizenship norms has turned more towards wealthy liberal democ-
racies, such as Green’s (2005) focus on Western Europe. Recent research
in this area has begun to draw both strands of work together. Gamlen
(2006; 2008) has set an ambitious research agenda in this direction.
8 Emigration Nations

Responding to the consistent absence of emigration from examinations

of the ‘migration state’ (Hollifield, 2004), Gamlen has suggested that
emigration has been a concern of all states and labelled those state insti-
tutions devoted to the task as the ‘emigration state’. In one of the first
edited collections to follow this broad approach, Dufoix and colleagues
develop Gamlen’s agenda, considering the long history of emigrant
engagement in certain states, the particular cases of states with signifi-
cant groups of national origin outside the country who lack citizenship
and finally situations where emigrants are opposed to the governments
of their state of citizenship (Dufoix et al., 2010). This collection aims to
contribute to this literature drawing on this variety of concerns around
emigrant engagement.

The approach of this volume

A central hypothesis of this volume is that the convergence of these

three conceptual approaches reflects an empirical change in state prac-
tice towards emigrants as well as a greater recognition of the distinct sig-
nificance of emigration. This is fundamentally a product of alternative
incorporations of emigrants into narratives of popular sovereignty. The
increasing toleration of dual nationality has been widely commented
upon (Blatter et al., 2009) and is one aspect of this change. In certain
cases state institutions have shifted policy from expressly forbidding
dual nationality to actively encouraging emigrants to obtain multiple
nationalities in the space of a few decades (Østergaard-Nielsen, 2003b).
An associated development has seen the institutionalization of public
events honouring emigrant groups. Festivals such as the Gathering in
Ireland, Operation Retour in Morocco or the Pravasi Bharatiya Divas
in India suggest that the symbolic incorporation of emigration into
national public life is increasingly commonplace and not restricted to
poor or marginal parts of the world. In some cases this symbolic close-
ness to non-resident citizens is expressed in territorial terms. Aristide’s
declaration that all Haitian emigrants formed the 10th department
of Haiti, on his inauguration in 1991, is still the most famous exam-
ple (Glick-Schiller and Fouron, 1999). Since then other countries and
regions have adopted a similar formula (Dufoix, 2010), suggesting that
territorial contiguity provides a powerful symbol for common belong-
ing. These trends point to a more general pattern that is further inves-
tigated in the chapters that follow.
The selection of country case studies for this volume was based on a
number of considerations. First, the starting point was countries with
 Introduction 9

substantial emigrant populations, either in absolute or relative terms

(Table 1.1), though there are two exceptions to this (Table 1.2). Second,
there was a clear choice to include as diverse selection of countries as
possible. Third involves the practical consideration that relevant experts
had to be willing and able to present recent research concerning the
selected country.
Contributors responded to individual invitations. Most papers were
initially presented at the IMISCOE (International Migration, Integration
and Social Cohesion in Europe) annual conference in Liege in
September 2010 where a common framework was discussed. Papers
were revised according to this common framework and a new selection
was presented at the 2011 IMISCOE conference. The final selection of
papers were revised for September 2012. Despite obvious absences of
key countries listed in Table 1.1, the studies of 12 countries presented
here represent the broadest comparative study of emigration policies
currently available at this level of detail.
The kind of statistical information presented in Table 1.1 is notoriously
unreliable and fluid. In some cases there are very substantial discrepan-
cies between these figures and those quoted in individual chapters. Some
estimates rely on data collected from countries of emigration whereas
other estimates draw on country of origin statistics, arising from regis-
trations in consulates or other official sources. Statistical methods vary
substantially between countries: in the widely cited example of Morocco,
the government considers it impossible to lose Moroccan nationality and
so considers that all children born abroad to Moroccan citizens are also
Moroccan. Moroccan government estimates of emigration are therefore
at least a million people higher than those based exclusively on data from
countries of residence. Data presented here are from the UN Population
Division and are not necessarily more accurate than individual country
sources; it seems probable that they omit important south–south migra-
tions whose significance is increasingly widely recognized (Bakewell,
2009), and the inclusion of Ethiopia and Nigeria is intended to correct
any potential imbalance in this picture. Nevertheless, these data at least
present a relatively authoritative common approach.
The high degree of uncertainty surrounding statistics as fundamen-
tal as the location of citizens of any particular country is important.
Governments cannot have the same degree of statistical confidence
about emigrant populations as they can at least potentially have with
immigrant populations. This is characteristic of the uncertainty sur-
rounding governments’ relationship with emigrants. The fact that
global institutions such as United Nations Development Programme
10 Emigration Nations

Table 1.1 Top 20 countries by absolute and relative sizes of emigrant population

Absolute emigrant Emigrant population relative to total

population: Top 20 population: Top 20 (countries with total
population of <1 million excluded)

State/ Emigrant State/ Emigrant Total %

territory population territory population population
(thousands)

Mexico 12,441,703 Occupied 5,542,925 4,039 137.23

Palestinian
territory
India 11,398,091 Albania 1,429,465 3,204 44.61
Russian 10,725,449 Bosnia and 1,521,466 3,760 40.46
Federation Herzegovina
China 8,432,427 Puerto Rico 1,491,504 3,749 39.78
Bangladesh 6,476,821 Trinidad and 356,286 1,341 26.56
Tobago
Ukraine 6,356,532 Armenia 734,909 3,092 23.77
Occupied 5,542,925 Portugal 2,291,695 10,676 21.47
Palestinian
territory
Pakistan 5,023,695 Moldova 722,616 3,573 20.23
Afghanistan 4,845,806 Kazakhstan 3,284,069 16,558 19.83
Philippines 4,730,358 Croatia 867,641 4,659 18.62
United 4,691,823 Belarus 1,765,403 9,595 18.40
Kingdom
Turkey 4,284,137 Lithuania 556,269 3,202 17.37
Germany 4,279,003 Somalia 1,534,204 9,331 16.44
Italy 3,622,715 Bulgaria 1,217,298 7,494 16.24
Kazakhstan 3,284,069 Ireland 710,717 4,487 15.84
Poland 3,066,592 Azerbaijan 1,372,578 9,188 14.94
Egypt 2,912,938 Lebanon 610,478 4,259 14.33
Indonesia 2,872,165 Ukraine 6,356,532 45,448 13.99
Romania 2,862,794 Afghanistan 4,845,806 35,320 13.72
Morocco 2,815,219 New Zealand 587,348 4,368 13.45

Note: Countries included in this collection are in italics.

Source: Emigrant population: UN Population Division (2012); total population: World Bank
(2012).

(UNDP) prefer to use data on immigration to calculate numbers of emi-

grants is indicative of the assumed poor reliability of data held by all
governments on the location of their citizens overseas. The production
of statistics is one more element which acts to reinforce the inside/out-
side dichotomy on which the nature of the modern state is founded and
contemporary approaches to emigration are beginning to undermine.
 Introduction 11

Table 1.2 Additional countries included in collection with ranking (out of 192)

State/ Absolute Emigrant Total Emigrant population

territory emigrant population population relative to total
population population %

Nigeria 1,101,634 (49) 1,101,634 162,470 0.68 (162)

Ethiopia 536,055 (90) 536,055 87,734 0.63 (163)

Locating emigration

Emigration both reinforces and undermines common territorial under-

standings of state sovereignty. On the one hand, its very definition – a
movement beyond the border of the state of one’s nationality – reinforces
a polarized territorial distinction between ‘inside’ and ‘outside’, a notion
that is rooted in classical international relations theory (Walker, 1993).
This movement across the defined international border changes the rela-
tionship between the individual citizen and the state of citizenship. Yet
the constructed nature of this process is highlighted by the fact that the
same outcome may arise from the movement of the international border
rather than the movement of the individual; a significant proportion
of individuals living in a state in which they were not born are not in
fact migrants. The inside/outside dichotomy is further undermined by
the efforts of state institutions to reach out to emigrants – those citizens
‘outside’ the territory of the state. The location of emigrants is therefore
important not in absolute terms but in relation to their state of citizen-
ship. Locating emigrants is fundamental to developing understandings
of citizenship but also of developments in state sovereignty.
The notion that globalization undermines state sovereignty through
a deterritorializing ‘flattening’ effect on the nation-state system remains
popular (Friedman, 2005), though predictions of a rise of a borderless
world or the end of the entire system of territorial states that were
popular a decade or two ago have now faded. The deterritorialization
thesis of radical transformation has been undermined by the obvious
resilience of nation-states. It is also more common to see territoriality,
sovereignty and citizenship not as fixed unchanging principles but as
concepts that are in continual flux. Rather than an absolute principle
of governance, sovereignty is increasingly seen as socially constructed,
even as ‘organized hypocrisy’ (Krasner, 1999). The spatial authority of
states is not rigid; it is not something that can be broken or deterrito-
rialized and never repaired but a fluid notion, continually evolving,
responding to various social, political and technological developments.
12 Emigration Nations

International migration is often cited as one of the developments

provoking those changes. Migration is an area where the spatial distinc-
tiveness of the state remains most pronounced – reflected in the distinc-
tion between international and internal migration which mirrors the
constructed ‘inside/outside’ dichotomy and remains central to the most
basic systems of classifying migration. Migration has attracted atten-
tion as part of the challenge posed by globalization, but it is also a key
area where the state system retains a degree of resilience (Sassen, 1996),
where the sovereign prerogative to control entry onto state territory is
fiercely guarded. This is sovereignty expressed in a firmly territorial form,
reflected in the spread of border walls and fences over the past decade,
the archetypal form of territorial defence ( Jones, 2012). As the contrast
between the easy international movement of capital and the increas-
ingly constrained movement of people illustrates, control of immigra-
tion is an element of territorial sovereignty on which state institutions
have only reluctantly loosened their grip in very limited areas, such as
free movement within the European Union.
Although the ‘challenge’ posed by migration is typically considered
more or less exclusively in terms of immigration (Cornelius et al.,
2004), the state system generally functions just as rigidly when state
institutions set out to control the movement of an individual beyond
state territory, as in the cases of extradition or deportation. With few
exceptions state institutions that attempt to deal directly with individu-
als on the territory of another state are sanctioned. Formal extradition
procedures require the request to pass through the institutions of the
other state. Bypassing such procedures, as in extraordinary rendition
or extra-judicial execution, is the preserve of powerful or pariah states.
Migrant deportation is a similar example where agreement between
states must be reached before individuals can be moved from one coun-
try to another against their will.
The regular absence of emigration from these discussions is important
since a more detailed consideration of emigration changes this picture.
Consular activities have long been a normative element of state practice
that involves direct contact between state institutions and individual
citizens on the territory of another state, though there is very little
comparative information on the exact content of consular activities and
clearly very substantial variation from state to state (Gamlen, 2008). In
the introduction to a special issue of Political Geography on ‘spaces of cit-
izenship’, Joe Painter and Chris Philo illustrate the spatial context of the
necessarily exclusionary basis for citizenship opposing ‘us, here’ against
‘them, there’ (1995). They incorporate the blurring of this distinction
 Introduction 13

produced by immigration in the third category of ‘them, here’, and the

pattern can be completed with a consideration of emigrants, the final
‘us, there’ category (Table 1.3).
This highly stylized representation of the categorizations produced
by this intersection of location and belonging suggests the problematic
position in which emigrants have often found themselves in respect to
the population of their state of origin. From the perspective of ‘us, here’,
the position of ‘them, here’ is potentially unsettling since it under-
mines the sharp dividing lines with ‘them, there’ against whom their
own position is defined. The political imaginary of the ‘body politic’,
the nation imagined as a corporate entity, is significant here. Anti-
immigrant sentiment has been compared to concerns about the costs
to the health of the national ‘body’ posed by immigration (e.g. Inda,
2000). Without the security of distance, the barrier between ‘us, here’
and ‘them, here’ is obviously permeable, raising nativist concerns that
immigration will result in the transformation of the ‘body politic’.
The gendering of the corporeal body politic has generated substan-
tial critical comment (Ong and Peletz, 1995; Nair, 2012). Although the
famous frontispiece of Hobbes’ Leviathan showing the subjects of the
sovereign coalescing into a physical body suggests a male form, it is
common for countries to be referred to by the female pronoun, or rep-
resented by a female figure. This may be reinforced by gender-specific
responses to emigration. Gender-specific controls on the emigration of
women are relatively common, certainly across South Asia (Oishi, 2005),
sometimes forbidding the emigration of women entirely, sometimes set-
ting criteria, such as banning the emigration of unmarried women or
women with young children. There are no examples of gender-specific
emigration controls applying to men. Such restrictions of women to the
‘domestic’ sphere suggest that the health of the body politic will be nega-
tively affected by female emigration in ways that do not apply to males.
Emigrants trouble this corporeal imaginary. They form the absent
‘self’, the ‘us, there’ category, belonging to the nation but not present
on the territory of the nation and so detached from the body politic.

Table 1.3 Stylized typology of location and belonging

Belonging

‘Us’ ‘Them’

Location ‘Here’ ‘Us/Here’ ‘Them/Here’

‘There’ ‘Us/There’ ‘Them/There’
14 Emigration Nations

Given this interceding distance it is easier to overlook them, to detach

them, and this explains established attitudes to emigration that are now
becoming less common. Symbolic attempts to engage emigrants, as a
‘tenth département’ or a ‘fifth region’, work by symbolically reuniting
the corporeal imaginary of the nation, ‘reincorporating’ emigrants into
the body politic.
Many countries have witnessed this shift from a position of distanc-
ing emigrants to a deliberate embrace. In fact the recent expansion in
the literature on emigration to which this volume contributes is in part
a response to this empirical development. These new relationships may
be justified by obvious interests but, as others have argued, they are
more frequently a normative expression of a sense of responsibility on
the part of the state institutional partner. This sense of responsibility
cannot be adequately explained by a purely territorial conception of
sovereignty.
The argument that emigrant engagement reflects a normative concep-
tion of statehood, rather than interest-based calculations, depends on a
conception of popular sovereignty. In terms of popular sovereignty, state
authority is derived from the consent of the population. Such consent
can never be gained entirely through coercion but depends to a very
significant degree on convincing ‘the people’ that the present system
of government, and the individuals currently in power, deserves that
consent. What is new about the current efforts to reach out to emigrants
is an indication that the consent of emigrants matters too, in ways that
were not necessarily the case before. This also means including emigrants
in understandings of ‘the people’. Such inclusivity requires new stories,
new approaches to narrating a particular history of emigration. One of
the central arguments of this book is that emigrants cannot be included
in the institutional arrangements of the state, without corresponding
developments that embrace them as fully part of the nation, the people.

Narrating emigration

The notion that the sense of belonging that is central to forming any
human community is not biologically determined or naturally occur-
ring but a construction of the social or political environment has
become well established over the past few decades. While not entirely
unchallenged it has certainly become the dominant paradigm in social
sciences over that time. These constructions are rooted in particular nar-
ratives which meet with some common agreement across key constitu-
encies and gradually come to be taken as factual observations. These can
 Introduction 15

involve interpretations of historical events, generalizations of common

characteristics of large groups of people, assumptions about correct
ways of living or political organization amongst many other things.
They may relate to any sense of common belonging but the particularly
established study in relation to nation-states is of most relevance here
(Williams, 1985; Morgan, 1989; Shumway, 1991).
In terms of popular national sovereignty success depends on employ-
ing these narratives to develop or bolster the consent of the greatest
number of people. Morgan’s (1989) classic study Inventing the People is
particularly clear on this point:

The success of government thus requires the acceptance of fictions,

requires the willing suspension of disbelief […] Government requires
make believe. Make believe that the king is divine, make believe that
he can do no wrong or make believe that the voice of the people
is the voice of God. Make believe that the people have a voice or
make believe that the representatives of the people are the people.
(Morgan, 1989: 13)

This suggests the deliberate construction of fictions for political ends,

although those profiting from such ‘fictions’ may actually be equally
constrained by them, in the sense that new political projects must be
expressed in the form of well-established narratives if they are to receive
the necessary popular support. Rogers M. Smith has provided one of the
most complete attempts to theorize what he refers to as stories of people-
hood (R.M. Smith, 2003). He identifies two important requirements of
such stories: the need to develop trust of the people in political projects
and the requirements that such projects will have a value or worth to
people in economic or other terms.

To succeed in their mission, doctrines, ideologies, visions of political

peoplehood must make a certain sort of case to current and potential
members. They must suggest to such constituents that, given their per-
sonal origins and history and the way the world is, if they do indeed
adhere steadfastly to the community thus depicted, they are likely to
experience certain sorts of good things. (R.M. Smith, 2003: 44–45)

Smith considers how narratives can develop through evolving political

and social contexts and may indeed become extremely complex, even
internally contradictory, as different constituencies are included with
the aid of particularly targeted narratives. He also considers such stories
16 Emigration Nations

to be logically prior to the creation of institutions that help police ques-

tions of membership or administer to those who are already accepted
as members.
The extent to which emigrants are incorporated into such ‘stories of
peoplehood’ obviously varies considerably from one country to another.
In some contexts emigrants are totally excluded from national narratives,
painted as traitors or cowards. This is frequently the case with refugee
movements. Regimes from which individuals flee are typically authori-
tarian, where ‘exit’ and ‘voice’ are seen as synonymous with disloyalty:
this was universally the case in the former communist countries, and
North Korea and Eritrea both criminalize emigration in virtually all cases.
Yet narratives can operate in more subtle ways. Authoritarian leaders
fighting for survival through the events of the ‘Arab spring’ never failed
to blame ‘elements outside the country’, including emigrants, for insti-
gating the disturbances which eventually unseated them. In many cases
this was perfectly accurate and emigrant groups certainly offered support
for democratic transitions in the region, yet the assumption of leaders,
from Ben Ali to Bashar al-Assad, was that emigrants’ choice to live out-
side the country was alone enough to rouse suspicions of their motives
amongst the rest of the population. To the extent that such insinuations
are effective, they build on narratives of emigrants as wealthy, privileged,
out of touch or corrupt, in comparison with the honest, hard-working
folk who choose to remain in the country of their birth.
In contrast to excessive privilege, extreme marginalization has also
provided ample basis to exclude emigrants from these stories of people-
hood. Where the majority of emigrants are from a highly marginalized
group, emigration itself becomes associated with marginalization and
typically something to be denigrated or forgotten by the rest of the
population. Given the recent transformation in attitudes to emigration,
examples of such attitudes are almost exclusively historical. More than
100,000 Sri Lankan women each year leave the country for employment
primarily as domestic workers. Most women come from poor, rural
areas and are relatively uneducated by Sri Lankan standards. During
most of the 1990s migration for domestic work accounted for the bulk
of all emigration from Sri Lanka, and a particularly negative image
formed of migrants as ignorant, sexually promiscuous women who
abandon their children to feckless husbands (Frantz, 2011). Working-
class migration has often met with the same fate. Migrants from India
to the Gulf, where most work involves unskilled labour, long suffered
from an inferior status to Non-Resident Indians living elsewhere in the
world. In the early decades of migration from Morocco emigrants were
 Introduction 17

officially labelled ‘Moroccan Workers Abroad’ (Travailleurs Marocains à

l’Etranger, TME), and the millions of Mexican emigrants were virtually
ignored for decades by the federal government (Iskander, 2010).
Recent transformations in the status of emigrants have arisen from
their more positive inclusion in the stories which generate feelings
of common solidarity. The return of refugees often marks a symbolic
moment following conflict or political transformation. The current
governments of Tunisia, Libya and Egypt include individuals who were
previously exiled or in prison. Their return marks a symbolic break
with the past and a powerful message that all returning refugees have a
place. In 2012, the Sri Lanka Bureau of Foreign Employment launched
the Rata Viru programme, meaning ‘national heroes’, in a deliberate
effort to redirect the national narrative of migrant workers and gain
public support for a more substantial migrant welfare programme. This
is a particularly bold move in the light of the dominant Rana Viru pro-
gramme, supporting ‘war heroes’ of the armed forces who are idolized
by the majority of the population for bringing an end to 25 years of civil
war in 2009. The comparison is clear and certainly deliberate. Setting
poor migrant women on the same level as war heroes in terms of their
contribution to the country represents a radical attempt to transform
emigrants’ position in these stories of peoplehood.
Yet similar transformative stories are common. The migrant musicians
of Peru provide an interesting example of emigrants transforming much
broader national narratives. Tomas Turino records how the inhabitants
of Lima used to ridicule the panpipe music of the peasant villages of the
Peruvian altiplano, but following the tremendous success of these musi-
cians in Europe and North America their music has become a broadly
accepted symbol of Peruvian national culture (Turino, 1999). Much
wealthier countries have also seen comparable changes. On 23rd July 2007
a statue to ‘The Emigrants’ was unveiled in Helmsdale in the far north of
Scotland, site of the departure of thousands of poor farmworkers forced
from their land by the Enclosure Acts of the 18th century. At the opening,
Alex Salmond (2007), the first minister of Scotland commented that

we should take heart, and pride too, from the resilience of those that
left this country and made their contribution, often a significant
one, to the communities of other countries that showed generosity
in receiving them.

It is interesting that in Scotland, a country where significant emigra-

tion took place several centuries ago, symbolic changes to national
18 Emigration Nations

iconography are taking place at about the same time as similar deliber-
ate efforts to reincorporate the much more recent history of migrant
workers into a more positive narrative in Sri Lanka. In both cases poor,
marginalized rural workers whose emigration was the result and for
many also the cause of tremendous suffering have been officially rec-
ognized. This recognition took the form of a deliberate reframing of
their position in the national narrative: from destitution, that was seen
as embarrassing to the country, to heroic struggle that ennobled both
emigrants and those they left behind. As Rogers M. Smith (2003) argues,
institutional transformation follows narrative transformation. The two
are inevitably closely associated and where changes in the institutional
structures of the ‘emigrant state’ occur, they are a product of similar re-
tellings of the foundational stories of peoplehood that allow those who
have left the country a continued role in its history.
Others have suggested that these developments are the result of
more far-reaching changes to the nation-state system. Sayad character-
ized the tragedy of emigration as one of ‘double absence’, in which
emigrants lose contacts at home but never become complete members
of the societies to which they migrate. Dufoix revisits this notion, call-
ing for a ‘post-Sayadian’ investigation into the ideal of transnational
engagement of a ‘double presence’. Although he is clear that he is not
suggesting that the isolation and exclusion that concerned Sayad has
disappeared, he points to a ‘new paradigm of the nation’ in which pre-
vious notions of the nation-state are transformed (2010).
Such a fundamental transformation is perhaps something of a stretch.
There are plenty of examples of similar efforts to engage emigrants
dating back over a century, so this is not an exclusively new develop-
ment. Yet the process has undoubtedly accelerated recently. And the
coincidence of these narrative developments in countries as different as
Scotland and Sri Lanka does point to some underlying trend. The global
growth of remittances and the associated state interest is undoubtedly
a factor, but it cannot explain the development of narratives in coun-
tries which have enjoyed substantial economic gains from migration
for decades without such recognition, such as Sri Lanka, or countries
which have highly diversified economies with little dependence on
remittances, such as Scotland.
Rather than interest driven, this is more effectively explained as a
normative development, as was argued earlier; the scale of this norma-
tive change has a number of potential causes. Global symbolic recogni-
tion, such as the United Nations’ inauguration in 2000 of December
18th as International Migrants Day, may be part of this. Informal
 Introduction 19

intergovernmental meetings such as the annual Global Forum on

Migration and Development, initiated in 2007, have provided unprec-
edented opportunities for related discussions between representatives of
the 132 governments involved. The gradual convergence of norms may
be one result of such meetings. There are a range of other less tangible
developments that are likely to play a significant role in changing norms
at an international level: the development of at least rhetorical support
for democratic principles from governments around the world, the ease
of global interconnectedness or the new assertiveness of migrant groups
now aware of their economic contribution. What is clear is that this is
not limited to any one country or region. The chapters which follow
provide further illustration of similar transformations not just in the
policies and institutions but also the ideologies of emigration.

Conclusion

While it has yet to challenge the dominance of immigration as a focus

for research and policy making, emigration has undoubtedly received
growing attention in recent years. There is a comparatively small but
growing contemporary literature focusing on the specific issues raised
by emigration, to which this collection aims to contribute. This intro-
ductory chapter has not considered the subsequent chapters in any
individual detail, though it has explained the selection of case studies
and outlined their structure. The concern here is to review existing
approaches to emigration and establish a theoretical framework to give
the book as a whole a unified argument.
A first clear point is to consider the institutional challenges of engag-
ing with emigrants to be common to all nation-states, irrespective
of location, size, wealth, political system, emigration history or post-
colonial context. All of those factors are obviously important in shaping
particular forms of engagement. Yet the core theoretical problem of how
state institutions with an internationally recognized territorial compe-
tency should communicate with, cajole or coerce citizens who are per-
manently resident on the territory of another nation-state is one which
all states must face. This collection draws on approaches focused on
marginalized states in need of development as well as those concerned
with wealthier states with long democratic traditions in the hope that
drawing these approaches together can help identify characteristics of
the evolving spatiality of the nation-state system as a whole (Gamlen,
2006; Dufoix, 2010). Chapters are therefore simply arranged in alpha-
betical order, United Nations style.
20 Emigration Nations

The second common argument of the collection is that although emi-

gration cannot be thought of without the nation-state, emigration also
highlights the limits and the evolution of the spatiality of the nation-
state system much more effectively than immigration. There is no
contradiction in the use of the nation-state as the fundamental unit of
analysis and the argument that nation-states are constructed amalgams
of ‘people’, territory and institutions, simply ‘effects’ of current policy
orientations. Emigration weakens the hyphenation of the nation-state
by displacing elements of the nation away from the state, stretching the
corporeal imagination of the body politic. The most common historical
response of state institutions was to ignore those who had left, though
there were clearly important exceptions. The more recent tendency
to develop new ways to engage with emigrants may be explained by
obvious interests, particularly economic, but normative changes offer a
more universal account.
Diverse developments attributed to globalization have not over-
whelmed the state system, though they have undermined the legitimacy
of that system in some areas. Traditionally understood monopolies of
state action are now performed by a variety of non-state actors. New
efforts to engage emigrants highlight how the state’s ultimate claim to
legitimate authority is not through the fiction of territorial sovereignty
but through the claim to represent the nation. Popular sovereignty rein-
forces the hyphen linking state with nation. Engaging with emigrants
provides probable financial resources and possible political influence.
It is also one way of (re)founding this claim to speak for ‘the people’.
This leads to the third argument of the collection, that a narrative
inclusion of emigrants in the stories of ‘the people’ is a necessary pre-
condition for institutional developments associated with emigrant
engagement. Some countries have always had a particularly expan-
sive notion of peoplehood, and so little argument is needed to gain
acceptance that citizens who left, in some cases generations ago, and
their descendants should continue to enjoy benefits associated with
membership. Yet where emigrants have been criticized or marginalized,
particularly where emigration itself was viewed as evidence of disloy-
alty, a transformative retelling of the national narrative is necessary.
Where the emigration of particular groups has been criticized or even
banned, as has often been the case with the emigration of women, sto-
ries have to develop to explain why this is no longer the case, or why
it never was. It is often the case that this simply requires a realignment
of official narratives with popular narratives in order to justify resulting
policy changes, but it may require a greater shift in public opinion. The
 Introduction 21

significance of these narrative changes explains the approach taken in

each of the following chapters to consider histories, policies and ideolo-
gies of emigration in turn.
This collection contributes to an expanding literature. This is largely
driven by the empirical developments charted in the individual contri-
butions. A collection like this, in a dynamic field of enquiry, inevitably
raises more questions than it can answer. Significant gaps highlighted
in this introduction cover the problematic nature of the statistical data
on emigration and uncertainties about how it should be measured, the
lack of comparative information on consular practices, how they are
experienced and how widely they are used and the characterization and
evolution of the ‘stories of peoplehood’ which drive and justify many of
the institutional changes allowing emigrant engagement. Filling these
gaps obviously requires a range of skills, a continued multi-disciplinary
effort, comparable to that assembled here. What should be clear from
this collection is that this is an effort worth pursuing, that policies
directed towards emigrants provide an important window onto how the
nation-state ‘thinks of itself’.

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2
‘Albania: €1’ or the Story of
‘Big Policies, Small Outcomes’:
How Albania Constructs and
Engages Its Diaspora
Julie Vullnetari

For most of the twentieth century not much was known about Albania
outside its territory. Emerging as the last new state from the crumbling
Ottoman Empire in 1912, it was also the poorest and most economically
backward country in Europe (Logoreci, 1977). Its territorial integrity was
not fully established until the end of the Second World War, which saw
the communists as the victorious political force in the country. Albania
was ruled with a tight fist for nearly half a century, during which there
were some significant improvements in health and education, but also
some of the worst human rights atrocities in the world. Emerging as the
last country from behind the ‘Iron Curtain’ in the early 1990s, Albania
was on the brink of bankruptcy, with a third of its population below 15
years of age, a high rate of unemployment and long-suppressed freedom
of movement. Its borders – tightly controlled until then even by death
penalty for those who attempted escape – suddenly fell, and the tide of
large-scale exodus became one of Europe’s key concerns. Especially in
the 1990s Albania experienced one of the most significant emigration
flows in Europe as a share of its total population. By 2010 almost half
of its resident population was estimated to have emigrated and living
abroad – primarily in neighbouring Greece and Italy, but also in the
United Kingdom and North America (World Bank, 2011, p. 54). Internal
movements were also significant, especially from the highlands of the
north and the deep south towards the coastal plains of the west. A World
Bank team estimated that nearly 20 per cent of Albania’s population
had moved internally between 1990 and 2005, and if movers since birth
were counted this figure would rise to a third of the total (World Bank,
2007, pp. 33–4). By 2005 the Tirana-Durrës conurbation in the littoral
west was home to an estimated third of the resident population. It was

25
26 Emigration Nations

as if the entire country was on the move (cf. Carletto et al., 2006). Yet
migration policies of consecutive governments have lagged behind these
rapid transformations despite an acute need for forward-looking action.
This chapter seeks to document, map and analyse some of the key
features of Albania’s international migration and diasporization, focus-
ing primarily on the post-communist movements, but without losing
sight of the historical dimension. It further seeks to extend this exercise
to Albania’s policymaking on migration and diaspora and its key institu-
tions responsible for implementing this policy. Finally, a brief section will
discuss the key debates in the country on diaspora and its mobilization.

History and geography of emigration

Development of the emigrant community

Labour migration has for centuries played a central role for Albanians, as
it has for all Mediterranean peoples (Psimmenos and Georgoulas, 2001,
p. 9). Equally, forced migrations have accompanied internal and exter-
nal wars and fighting which have tormented the Balkans for centuries.
The earliest Albanian settlements abroad concern the two neighbouring
countries of Italy and Greece (Myres et al., 1945, p. 182). Albanian set-
tlements formed during the fifteenth century, could be found in Sicily
and the south of present-day Italy (Myres et al., 1945, p. 182), peopled
by soldiers who had settled there after having fought for the House of
Aragon from around 1430 (Vickers, 1995, p. 9). These were later joined
by Albanians fleeing the Ottoman conquest, especially after resistance
was crushed in Krujë (Figure 2.1) following the death of Albania’s
national hero Skanderbeg in 1467; his family was given protection by
the King of Naples. These early migrants in Italy became known as the
Arbëresh and their descendants have been able to preserve the Albanian
language and traditions through the centuries.1 It is estimated that
around 200,000 Albanians fled their homes during 1468–1506 (Tirta,
1999, p. 97), settling in Italy, the Dalmatian coast and Greece.
Before this wave, Albanians are thought to have arrived in Greece in
the thirteenth and fourteenth century as mercenaries for the Venetians,
but may have settled in Attica as early as the ninth century (Magliveras,
2009, p. 15). Known as Arvanites, they have maintained their language
and culture through the centuries. Albanian-speaking shepherds, peas-
ants and seamen were living in Aetolia, Attica and the Morea, as well as
the adjacent islands of Euboea, Andros, Hydra and the Spetzes (Myres
et al., 1945, p. 182). In addition, Greece was an important destination
for labour migrants, especially within the Ottoman Empire; many of
 Albania 27

Figure 2.1 Albania – location map

Source: King and Vullnetari (2003, p. 13).

these movements were circular in nature. Tirta (1999, p. 139) estimates

that in the 1930s there were around 400,000 Albanians in Greece,
whereas according to Magliveras’ (2009, p. 22) analysis of historians’
texts they constituted as much as half of the Greek population prior to
the 1923 population exchange between Greece and Turkey.
While the various wars in the Balkans, as well as blood vendettas,
exploitation and feuds between local chieftains and lords forced many to
leave their lands and settle elsewhere, labour migration was particularly
important during the Ottoman Empire.2 Albanians, thus, emigrated far
and wide throughout the Ottoman territory, especially craftsmen such
28 Emigration Nations

as masons, road-builders, carpenters, ironsmiths and goldsmiths (Tirta,

1999). Others left to study in key centres of learning such as Cairo or
Constantinople, while many professional men settled in the bigger cit-
ies of the Empire intending a career in the administration, army or in
professions such as medicine and the law.3 During this time present-day
Turkey especially became an important destination, where an Albanian
presence is noted from the beginning of the fifteenth century (de
Rapper, 2000, p. 3). Conservative estimates suggest that in 1928 some
250,000–300,000 Albanians lived in Turkey, 60,000 in Istanbul alone
(Pollo and Puto, 1981, p. 108; Tirta, 1999, p. 139).4 Other countries,
such as Romania, Egypt, Bulgaria and Russia (in that descending order),
received Albanian labour migrants and refugees, although settlements
here were not as significant as in the other countries mentioned earlier.5
Emigrations intensified by the late nineteenth and early twentieth
century, influenced by the global political and socio-economic devel-
opments, the creation of nation states in the Balkans as well as the
Balkan Wars and the two world wars. With progress in transport and
technology, emigration to more distant lands became feasible for some
Albanians too. They migrated as far from their country as Russia, Africa,
China, and especially to the Americas and Australia. In the latter two
they were part of the larger intercontinental flows from Southeastern
Europe (Federal Writers’ Project, 1939; Price, 1963). Indeed, some of
the Albanians who had earlier settled in Italy migrated to the Americas
as part of the Italian migratory flows at the beginning of the twentieth
century (Hall, 1994, p. 50; Tirta, 1999, p. 141). Settlements formed in
Argentina, Brazil and Canada, but the United States became by far the
most important destination. By 1945 an estimated 60,000 Albanians
lived in that country (Myres et al., 1945, p. 131, pp. 182–3).
These migrations had a mixed impact on areas and communities of
origin, but among the positive effects were much-needed financial, as
well as technological, social and political remittances. Albanian indi-
viduals and migrant associations in Bucharest, Sofia, Istanbul, Cairo
and Boston, to name but a few, became key vehicles in the struggle for
independence. Transnational ties amongst these communities, and with
Albania itself, were maintained by a core of renowned men and a hand-
ful of prominent women who championed Albania’s cause to foreign
powers. Hometown associations contributed to the development of their
villages and cities of origin by investing in education, building schools,
roads, communal water taps, cemeteries, printing and distributing books
and helping the poor (Federal Writers’ Project, 1939, pp. 82–4; Ragaru,
2002; Tirta, 1999; UNDP-Albania, 2000, p. 35).
 Albania 29

While migratory waves resulted in the creation of Albania’s ‘global

diaspora’, the geopolitics at the heart of the Balkan Wars were key to the
formation of Albania’s ‘regional diaspora’. The country’s declaration of
independence in 1912 was recognized by the Great Powers at a confer-
ence of ambassadors in London in 1913, which also decided on Albania’s
territorial boundaries. In the final settlement areas with large Albanian
majority populations – most significantly Kosovo – were allocated to
neighbouring countries. The result was that nearly half the Albanian
population was left outside of the new Albanian state (Krasniqi, 2010,
p. 4). By the end of the Second World War Albanians in the Balkans
found themselves separated into three different nation state entities:
the People’s Socialist Republic (PSR) of Albania, the Socialist Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia (especially in today’s Kosovo, Montenegro and
Macedonia) and the Republic of Greece. Following a strict Stalinist
doctrine, the PSR of Albania became quite unique in building socialism
through self-reliance and isolation. Isolation was exemplified, among
others, in the militarization of the borders, jamming foreign television
and radio waves from reaching Albanian households and more cru-
cially through banning emigration. During the 45 years of communist
rule (1945–1990) emigration was considered as an act of high treason
against the ‘fatherland’. There was a ‘shoot to kill’ policy at the border,
and anyone caught trying to escape was punished by lengthy imprison-
ment (of up to 10 years), while their family was internally exiled. As a
result, those who managed to leave formed but a trickle. Settling mostly
in North America and some key European countries, many of these refu-
gees became prominent actors in the US-led and then backed struggle to
overthrow the communist rule in Europe (Dravis, 1992).
Meanwhile, Albanians from Kosovo, Macedonia and Montenegro were
more free – indeed were ‘encouraged’ and even coerced – to emigrate
abroad. They were part of the guest-worker flows to countries such as
Germany, Austria and Switzerland, where they later formed significant
communities (Haxhikadrija, 2009). Others were forced to leave for Turkey,
from where some of them later joined the Turkish guest-workers to these
very same destinations (Blumi, 2003). Some emigrated to the United States
and Canada, and fewer to Australia, where they joined the larger Albanian
communities which were becoming well-established in these countries.
Thus, the Albanian diaspora which was forming abroad was quite
diverse in terms of its historical and political background, a feature
that was reflected in its political stance towards the origin-country
governments. The government of Albania also recognized these differ-
ences and used them in its policy towards the diaspora. Thus, during
30 Emigration Nations

the communist years, the pre-war emigrants were considered as labour

migrants and were accorded recognition along with some benefits such
as freer communication with their families in Albania and return visits.
Some were even allowed to return to Albania upon retirement, provided
their official story about life abroad was one of suffering and exploita-
tion as manual labourers working for merciless capitalists. Such returns
benefited the country’s coffers as the returnees brought much-needed
dollars with them, or received regular pensions from abroad.
In contrast to this group, those who had fled during the communist
years – whether for fear of political and religious persecution or because
of personal vendettas and blood feuds – were regarded by the state as trai-
tors, often condemned as spies working for intelligence agencies of gov-
ernments that wanted to overthrow Albania’s communist rulers. Article
14 of the 1946 citizenship law specifically referred to these individuals
when stipulating cases in which removal of Albanian citizenship could
be enacted. These migrants, in turn, also built a strong anti-communist
resistance, which was especially politically and financially powerful in
the United States (Nazi, 2000, p. 150; Ragaru, 2002). Although no stud-
ies have focused specifically on the role of diaspora in the fall of com-
munism in Albania, some commentators suggest that this role was quite
important in the crucial years of 1989–1991. During this time diaspora
money, skills and information helped the first opposition party cam-
paign more effectively during the first multi-party elections, and then
eventually retain it in power for some years to come (Vickers, 1995).

The current situation

The rupture that 45 years of communist rule brought to the emigration
history and tradition of Albania came to an end in 1990. The movement
that subsequently took place was one of the most significant modern
global migrations, in terms of both its share of population and typologies.
As communism collapsed, Albania’s borders fell with it. Many will
remember the old ships impossibly loaded with people sailing from
Albania’s coast to southern Italy in the spring and summer of 1991;
they became the symbol of the so-called global migration crisis (see the
cover of Weiner, 1995). Many more walked in droves across the country
and over the mountains to reach Greece. Most of these migrations were
irregular and of a ‘to and fro’ nature, and thus very difficult to quantify.
Table 2.1 provides a snapshot of numbers and destination countries
compiled from data made available by the Albanian Ministry of Labour,
Social Affairs and Equal Opportunities (MOLSAEO) and the Ministry of
Interior (MoI), at three key moments of the past two decades.
 Albania 31

Table 2.1 Estimates of Albanians living abroad: 1999, 2005 and 2010

Country 1999 % 2005 % 2010 %

Greece 500,000 67.3 600,000 54.9 750,000 44.0

Italy 200,000 27.0 250,000 22.9 450,000 26.4
US 12,000 1.6 150,000 13.7 400,000 23.5
UK 5,000 0.7 50,000 4.6 50,000 2.9
Germany 12,000 1.6 15,000 1.4 15,000 0.9
Canada 5,000 0.7 11,500 1.0 15,500 0.9
Belgium 2,500 <0.3 5,000 0.5 5,000 0.3
Turkey 2,000 >0.3 5,000 0.5 5,000 0.3
France 2,000 >0.3 2,000 0.2 10,000 0.6
Austria 2,000 >0.3 2,000 0.2 2,500 0.2
Switzerland 1,000 <0.1 1,500 <0.1 1,500 <0.1
Netherlands n.a. n.a. 1,000 <0.1 1,000 <0.1
TOTAL 743,500 100 1,093,000 100 1,705,500 100

Sources: 1999: Barjaba (2000); 2005: GoA (2005b, p. 36); 2010: NID (2010, pp. 7–8).

The table speaks for itself, but I highlight a few important features here.
First, connecting this picture to the historical migration we saw earlier,
it is clear that geography matters. Both then and now, the earliest set-
tlements and the most important destinations for migrants have been
Greece and Italy in that descending order. It is interesting at this point to
consider the relations between the historical and the new diaspora, espe-
cially since a break of some centuries exists between the two. A few stud-
ies which have looked at this topic have found how the new arrivals have
been treated as ‘others’ by the settled Arbëresh and Arvanites. These two
communities have tended to emphasize their roots, but identify more
with local belonging (Italian and Greek respectively), at the same time
adopting local society’s imagery and stereotypes of the new Albanian
migrants (for Italy see Derhemi, 2003; and for Greece, Magliveras, 2009).
The second point is that although both of these countries remain
important, the United States and the United Kingdom have been gaining
ground, especially in the second post-communist decade.6 The historical
diaspora in the United States is boosted by new arrivals, while that in the
United Kingdom has developed from almost zero, so to speak, having
had practically no previous own ethnic community to rely on.
The third point concerns the total volume of migrants, which by
2005 represented a third of the country’s total resident population.
Indeed, we see a progressive increase in the numbers of emigrants
which almost doubled between 1999 and 2010, even if we consider a
more conservative total for 2010. For example, the corresponding figure
32 Emigration Nations

from the World Bank data is 1.44 million, equivalent to almost half
(45.4 per cent) of Albania’s resident population of 3.2 million (World
Bank, 2011, p. 54). Results of the 2011 census suggest a continuation of
this trend, noting an 8 per cent population decrease in the 2001–2011
inter-censal period, due primarily to emigration (INSTAT, 2012).
Besides these variations in destination places, post-1990 migrations also
display a strong regional character in terms of migrants’ areas of origin
(refer to Figure 2.1). Once again, geography is very important here. The
areas to the west of the country, especially along the Adriatic coast, have
been the primary source regions for migrations to Italy. Migrants to Greece
come from all over Albania, but there is a clear dominance of those who
lived in the south and southeast of the country, bordering Greece (King,
2005). In fact, some migratory flows have taken on a rather regional
character, re-establishing transnational ties which had existed before the
Cold War. One example is the transnational space created between the
area of Korçë, southeast Albania, and that of Greater Thessaloniki, in
Northern Greece (Hatziprokopiou, 2006; Vullnetari, 2012).
Similarly, historical ties have been important particularly in the case
of migration to the United States, most of which originated then (late
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries) and now (post-1990) in
southern Albania. Migrations spurred by historical ties have also facili-
tated recent moves from southern Albania to Australia and Canada.
An additional, but important, factor in the flows to the United States
and Canada has been these governments’ immigration policies. For
instance, between 1990 and 2011 a stock of over 80,000 Albania-born
migrants had obtained legal permanent residence in the United States.7
The majority of them had entered through the annual Diversity Visa
Lottery.8 In the case of Canada, the most important drive has been the
Federal Skilled Worker programme, which has attracted highly skilled
flows in particular. Finally, the importance of policy in acting as a
channelling force for migrant flows can also be seen in settlements of
Albanians to a few other West European countries, where no prior signif-
icant diaspora or historical links existed. Two examples are given here.
The first is the bilateral labour agreement with Germany signed in 1991,
according to which 1000 Albanians went there to work and train for a
year; none of them returned and the agreement was not renewed (GoA,
2005b). The second comes from the ‘embassy migrants’ of 1990 who
became the nuclei for further chain migration in the years to come.9
Coming back to our geography of origin, it is worth noting that the vast
majority of those who settled in the United Kingdom originate from the
north and northeast of Albania. These were also the areas that received
the first and overwhelming share of refugees from neighbouring Kosovo
 Albania 33

during the 1998–2000 war there. As Kosovars used Albania to transit to

other asylum destination countries, many Albanians from this area (and
some from other parts of the country) mixed themselves in with them
(Barjaba and King, 2005). The Albanian diaspora in the United Kingdom
is therefore quite heterogeneous, including migrants from all Albanian-
inhabited areas in the Balkans (Kostovicova and Prestreshi, 2003).

Institutions and policies

By the end of the 1990s a joke ran in the local dailies in Albania which
went like this: when the minister of labour affairs was asked how he
planned to resolve the unemployment crisis in the country, he had
replied that the motor boats in Vlorë (used to smuggle migrants across
the Adriatic to Italy) were working to full capacity (de Waal, 2005). The
joke illustrates the lack of migration policies, or at least of their effec-
tiveness, during the 1990s.
Policymaking on migration in Albania in the last decade has been
framed within the wider discourse of European Union (EU) member-
ship, thus highly influenced by EU bodies (see Dedja, 2012). In addi-
tion, host-country governments, especially those of Italy and Greece,
have played a key role in ‘managing’ Albanian migration. Some of this
influence has been channelled through their development agencies
which are an essential part of the so-called ‘donor community’ in the
country, and by funding powerful intergovernmental organizations
such as the International Organization for Migration (IOM).

Institutional framework
At the national level, the key governmental institutions related to
migration and diaspora issues are as follows:
MOLSAEO10 is the authority that develops and coordinates migration
policies and the implementation of these and other related legisla-
tion. This includes the National Strategy on Migration (NSM) and its
accompanying National Action Plan (NAP) on Migration and the NAP
on Remittances, following a Council of Ministers’ Decision.11 It imple-
ments its work mainly through the Directorate of Migration, Return
and Reintegration Policies, which has two separate departments on
Emigration and Immigration; the latter handles work visas for non-
citizens. MOLSAEO is also the authority that negotiates seasonal labour
migration agreements with host countries. Other institutions relevant
to migration and accountable to the MOLSAEO are the National
Employment Services, State Social Services and the Institute of Social
Insurance.
34 Emigration Nations

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MoFA) covers issues of consular

services for Albanian citizens abroad, as well as visas for non-citizens
through its Directorate of Consular Affairs, which itself is a sub-entity
of the General Directorate of International Law and Consular Affairs.
It is a key participant in signing treaties ratified by Albania, such as the
readmission agreements and associated protocols with the EU. In addi-
tion, the MoFA housed the National Institute of Diaspora (NID), which
I will elaborate on shortly.
The MoI handles matters of immigration and asylum through its
Citizenship and Refugees Directorate, and of border control through
its Border and Migration Department, which is part of the General
Directorate of State Police. The MoI works closely with the United
Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the Organization
for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) and IOM, especially
regarding asylum seekers and the readmission of Third Country
Nationals (TCNs). It is also the authority that implements readmission
agreements with other countries. The National Coordinator against
Trafficking in Human Beings at this ministry directs and monitors the
National Referral Mechanism for Victims of Trafficking and unaccom-
panied minors. Meanwhile, the Directorate of Local Government and
Decentralization is responsible for the registration of the population in
the civil registry, including children born abroad of emigrant parents.
These registers are in turn used to compile electoral rolls.
The MoI together with the MoFA, the Ministry of Justice, the Ministry
of Finance and the Office of the President of the Republic have joint
jurisdiction over legislation regarding the acquisition and loss of citi-
zenship (Krasniqi, 2010, pp. 13–15).
The Ministry of Integration is the authority responsible for monitor-
ing of the progress regarding the requirements Albania needs to meet
within the framework of the Stabilisation and Association Agreement
with the EU, where migration takes centre stage.
The Albanian National Institute of Statistics (INSTAT) is responsible
for collecting and analysing data on emigration through periodic (ten-
year) censuses, surveys and population registers.
A number of other ministries, such as the Ministry of Education and
Science, are involved in separate activities, for example, in the pro-
gramme on ‘Brain Gain’.

‘Brain gain’ programme unit

Run between 2006 and 2010, this programme was jointly financed by the
Albanian government and the United Nations Development Programme
 Albania 35

(UNDP) and was attached to the Prime Minister’s Office. The unit employed
three individuals (two men and a woman) operating from the offices of
the UNDP. The programme aimed to facilitate the government’s efforts to
draw back to the country the highly skilled individuals from the diaspora.
It believed that it could achieve this through fostering an enabling admin-
istrative and legislative climate, as well as offering an incentives’ package
to potential returnees. Its activities included the creation of a database of
highly skilled Albanians abroad; the provision of information and media-
tion for traineeships and work placements in various Albanian universities,
public administration offices, and private companies and the organiza-
tion of relevant conferences. The programme also aimed to facilitate the
activities of the NID, specifically related to the highly skilled section of the
diaspora. No independent evaluation or monitoring report has been made
public to date (if such one exists) in order to ascertain the effectiveness
of its million-plus dollars budget. The last annual project report available
stated that less than 80 individuals had received ‘incentive packages’ and
work placements in Albanian institutions by the end of 2009, and that 450
registered user profiles were counted on its website database (BGP, 2009).
By 2013 the website is non-responsive while a question mark hangs over
the programme’s legacy and its wider impact.

National Institute for Diaspora

The NID was established in January 1996 as an entity under the Prime
Minister’s Office, but moved to the MoFA in September of that year.
While its activity was quite obscure well until the 2000s, it received
a boost when it was specifically included in the NSM. In fact, this
proposed the creation of a Migration Agency attached to the Prime
Minister’s Office, which would be a body to coordinate action amongst
the various relevant ministries and other institutions (such as INSTAT).
It would have financial autonomy and extensive policymaking powers
in the field of migration and diaspora (GoA, 2005b, p. 88). However,
this did not materialize and the NID was reinstated in its place.
The NID was given a special place in the NSM where it was tasked
with (GoA, 2005b, pp. 36–7):

• mapping the Albanian diaspora abroad, including university students;

• compiling a geographical and demographic atlas of this diaspora;
• promoting contacts and relations between diaspora members and
Albania;
• promoting the image of Albania abroad, as well as drawing investment
in Albania from the diaspora.
36 Emigration Nations

The main activities of the institute so far have been of a rather artis-
tic and cultural character, and seem to focus overwhelmingly on the
historical diaspora. First, there are the visits around the world to meet
Albanian individuals and organizations, from Arbëresh in Italy and
Arvanites in Greece to historical communities in Croatia, Ukraine and
the United States. Second, the institute has also received visits from
representatives of Albanian migrant and diaspora organizations, as well
as Albanian celebrities living abroad. Third, it has organized, or sup-
ported the organization of, various cultural and artistic events such as
concerts, exhibitions, book promotions, television programmes about
migrant communities and the diaspora. Fourth, it has distributed sym-
bolic materials to diaspora organizations such as flags, souvenirs and
leaflets with information to promote Albania as a business and tourist
destination. Fifth, it has organized or supported efforts for the teaching
of Albanian language to migrant children abroad. This was also one of
the key tasks of the institute according to the NSM. As mentioned earlier,
the NID facilitated curricula and Albanian-language school texts, as well
as other books on Albanian culture and folklore. It also supported joint
yearly training seminars of Albanian-language teachers of the diaspora.
Meanwhile, consular staff of relevant Albanian embassies participated in
end-of-school year festivities, organized by migrant NGOs for diaspora
children who attend supplementary language and culture schools.
Sixth, the NID aimed to set up five cultural centres in Athens, Rome,
New York, London and Toronto, which would serve as mobilization
nodes of the large diaspora/migrant communities in the countries with
the largest numbers, as well as act as promoters of Albania’s image
abroad. Promoting Albania for diaspora investment has been pursued
also through the director’s visits abroad, and by encouraging visits
of diaspora members and their non-Albanian friends to the country.
The target was the historical diaspora, especially in the United States,
but also that from Kosovo, Montenegro and Macedonia residing in
European countries such as Germany and Switzerland, which are gener-
ally considered as possessing established and significant wealth.
Finally, the NID was tasked to organize a World Congress of the
Albanian diaspora. In a participative manner, this Congress would ensure
sharing of views amongst participants, which would in turn inform
the further elaboration of diaspora policies (GoA, 2005a). A group of
selected migrant organizations and individuals were invited to attend
the two-day meeting organized for the launching of the NSM in
February 2005, where a Diaspora Declaration was also adopted (IOM,
2005). However, the initiative was not followed up. Yet, parallel to this
 Albania 37

and with no involvement of the NID or any other state functionary, a

number of diaspora/migrant organizations held what they called the
‘First Congress of the Albanian Diaspora’, in Rimini, Italy, in 2005. The
event was hailed as a success by some, but seen as coloured by political
affiliations by others (especially from migrants in Greece). The second
Congress was held in Tirana in November 2007, but once again no gov-
ernment representatives participated in it.
Between 1996 and 2010 a total of 17 employees had worked for the
NID, only two of whom were women (NID, 2010). By 2010 the staff
had been reduced to three and then gradually two individuals. The NID
ceased to exist at the end of 2012, when a Council of Ministers’ Decision
announced the establishment of a brand-new National Committee on
Diaspora, details of which are yet to emerge.12 Throughout its life the
institute never had the necessary financial and human resource capac-
ity, not to speak of decision-making powers, to become a veritable voice
for the diaspora in the government and abroad. It never had a web pres-
ence, using email lists and Albanian media outlets for distributing its
information bulletins. Its presence within the website of the MoF was
also quite obscure.
The decision on the new committee signals increasing importance
for the issue of diaspora as linked to populist nationalism. Indeed,
‘nationalistic’ rhetoric characterized the political scene of 2012 as the
centenary year of Albania’s independence and has emerged as a strong
rally point in the run-up to the June 2013 parliamentary elections.

Diaspora and migrant organizations

Albania does not have any officially sponsored organizations, but there
are hundreds of diaspora and migrant organizations based in destina-
tion countries. Generally, they do not receive regular funds from the
state, but support is symbolic, for example, the presence of embassy
staff in events organized by these organizations, often to celebrate
national Flag Day, and the end of year for supplementary language
and culture schools. Amongst these various organizations, there are a
number which are large, well-organized and sometimes transnational
in character. Here are a number of examples. The first, the National
Albanian–American Council, is based in the United States and run by
Albanian–American members of the historical diaspora, with a mission
to ‘advocate for Albanians and promote peace and economic develop-
ment in the Balkans’. It is mainly funded through a three-tier mem-
bership fee, but only those who pay the highest tier of $1,000 have
voting rights. The organization is a splinter grouping of the previously
38 Emigration Nations

established Albanian–American Civic League, run by a former US con-

gressman of Albanian–Arbëresh origin. Membership fees for this organi-
zation are significantly lower and do not exceed $100.
A different example is Alb-Shkenca, which started as an Internet forum
and was later formally registered as an institute with its headquarters in
Tirana. This is a truly transnational network with a membership span-
ning countries and continents and its management residing in Europe
and North America. Its membership is based on education levels and
skills, regardless of place of residence – a candidate is required to be at
least enrolled for a master’s degree – and retained through an annual
fee. The network organizes annual scientific conferences with presenta-
tions of members’ work across all science disciplines, rotating amongst
Tirana, Pristina (Kosovo) and Tetovo (Macedonia). In September 2010
its fifth conference was held in Tirana, under the motto: ‘Integration
of the Diaspora in the Albanian Science, Economy and Culture’. The
institute publishes members’ works in its annals, which it has sym-
bolically called ‘ANASH’ (in Albanian meaning ‘aside’). Besides being
an abbreviation, the institute explains the title as signifying the neglect
of Albanian politicians towards this ‘scientific diaspora’, which, none-
theless, is making every effort to be involved in improving the lives of
Albanians wherever they might be (Alb-Shkenca, 2009).
A similar organization is AlbStudent – the International Network of
Albanian Student Associations – also transnational in character, but
with a slight reliance on its members in Italy. Not surprisingly, the
majority of undergraduate students abroad study in neighbouring Italy,
partly because of the lower cost compared to other countries and partly
because the Italian language is widely spoken amongst the young gen-
eration in Albania. In fact, a quarter of all foreign students in Italy are
Albanians (Chaloff, 2008). AlbStudent has initiated a web-based project
to map all the Albanian diaspora organizations around the world,
although it is unclear when the end product might be finalized.13
The last two organizations have received some government support
for programmes related to the ‘brain gain’ initiative I discussed earlier.
The final examples are large umbrella-like migrant organizations
operating in Greece and the United Kingdom, which consist of several
smaller – generally cultural or literary organizations – and which aim
to be ‘the voice of the Albanian community’14 in these countries. In
Greece these are The Albanian Migrants’ League and The Federation of
Albanian Associations, each of which is constituted of 25 migrant asso-
ciations; in the United Kingdom The Forum of Albanian Associations is an
umbrella for 16 smaller organizations.
 Albania 39

Policies
During the communist rule, the state theoretically guaranteed its care
and protection to all Albanian citizens abroad (article 64 of the 1976
Constitution). However, in practice it held a different stance towards
those whom it considered labour migrants and those it labelled traitors,
as explained earlier.
Migration internally and abroad was officially declared a human
right only in 1993; article 22 of Law Nr.7692 guaranteed the right of
every Albanian citizen to choose his/her own place of residence and to
move freely within the country, as well as to freely leave the country
and return (Kuvendi Popullor i RSH, 31.3.1993). These rights were fur-
ther reinstated in the current Constitution of the Republic of Albania,
which was approved by parliament and voted in a referendum in 1998
(Kuvendi i RSH, 2003). The constitution was supplemented by a string of
laws and decrees, the most important of which is the law on emigration
for employment purposes passed in 2006 (Kuvendi i RSH, 18.12.2006).
The key to all current legislation is freedom of movement within the
country’s territory and going abroad. The body of legislation is often of
a descriptive character making enforcement a difficult task. Moreover,
a number of laws and regulations are in contradiction with each other,
resulting thus not only in lack of clarity but also in difficulty in imple-
mentation (see several examples in Ikonomi, 2009). In the remainder
of this section I discuss the position of the state vis-à-vis a number of
aspects important for diaspora and emigration matters.

Citizenship
Unlike previously, the post-1990 legislation on citizenship is quite pro-
gressive and addresses a number of concerns from migrants. First, it pro-
vides for unconditional dual citizenship thus facilitating the position of
those migrants who have acquired the citizenship of their host country,
or aim to do so in the future. Second, it makes provisions for reducing
statelessness by enabling individuals who have lost Albanian citizenship
to reacquire it (although in practice the process is quite cumbersome).
This stipulation was passed to address the needs of Albanians who emi-
grated in the 1990s before proper legislation was put in place, and who
renounced their Albanian citizenship in the hope of acquiring that of
the host country, but were unsuccessful in doing so. Third, migrants’
children born abroad are able to acquire Albanian citizenship through
birth if at least one parent is an Albanian citizen. This can be done also
via consular services abroad, although in practice the process is rather
costly and bureaucratic. Finally, foreign spouses of migrants who wish to
40 Emigration Nations

gain Albanian citizenship may do so through acquisition by facilitated

naturalization, subject to meeting relevant requirements, two of which
are a marriage of at least three years and continuous legal stay in Albania
of at least one year. Overall, citizenship legislation lacks ethno-centric
formulations and is gender balanced in relation to citizenship acquisi-
tion by spouses and children (for a detailed study see Krasniqi, 2010).

Voting regime for migrants

The legislation ensures equal freedoms and rights for non-resident citi-
zens as for those who reside in the country. This includes the right to
vote and be voted in the host country, according to the electoral code
and legislation of this host country (Kuvendi i RSH, 18.12.2006). As for
the right to vote in Albania, migrants can vote in their home district
provided they are registered in time in the electoral rolls (Collyer and
Vathi, 2007). In practice, however, numerous groups of migrants are
disenfranchised as they cannot travel to Albania because of work and
family obligations, geographical distance, ill health or irregular status
in the host country. Political participation is, nonetheless, considerable
from migrants in Greece (although the degree is relative and subject
to speculation in the absence of systematic research). It is also here
that more intensive political campaigning by candidates takes place.
Indeed, branches of the three main political parties – Socialist Party
(SP), Democratic Party (DP) and the Socialist Movement for Integration
(LSI) – have been created in Greece, and are often used as vehicles for
garnering migrants’ support during electoral campaigns back home.
The issue of migrant voting has often come up in electoral campaigns
in recent years, yet the status quo has been retained. In preparation for
the 2009 parliamentary elections, a public debate ensued in Albania
the previous year in order to revise the electoral code so as to ensure
free and fair elections. Emigrant voting took a prominent place in this
debate, not least due to the active role played by G99 – initially a civil
movement which developed into a centre-left political party shortly
before the elections. G99’s staff consists of professionals in their twen-
ties and thirties, trained in top universities abroad, and who have
returned to work in Albania. The movement mobilized to garner public
support for, and pressure relevant authorities to, include external voting
in the revision of the electoral code, proposing a special system of direct
postal voting by special courier as the best option for the Albanian
context.15 Although two of the major political parties (SP and LSI) half-
promised reform during this intense period of debate, especially during
their campaigning in Greece, nothing materialized. This was all the
 Albania 41

more disappointing given that various political actors and civil society
members had previously agreed to amend the electoral code to enable
distant voting, as part of the actions stipulated in the NAP on Migration
(GoA, 2005a, p. 86, measure 58, activity 3).

Other policies for emigrants with recognized status

While Albanian migrants have been providing a lifeline for their house-
holds and the country’s economy throughout these post-communist
years, it was only recently that their key role in the country’s develop-
ment was recognized (see de Zwager et al., 2005). This acknowledg-
ment was reflected in the first and only National Migration Strategy to
date, which specifically linked migration to development. Inaugurated
in 2006 with much pomp and ceremony, the strategy was followed
by a set of Action Plans on Migration and Remittances, the Law on
Emigration for Employment Purposes, the launching of the Brain Gain
programme discussed earlier and other pieces of legislation and pro-
grammes to combat irregular migration and facilitate return. The latter
was particularly singled out for intervention in the hope of attracting
migrants’ financial capital and skills through taxation and financial
incentives. For example, according to article 9 of the 2006 law on emi-
gration for employment purposes, returning migrants are exempt from
customs duties and taxes on personal items they bring with them upon
return, as well as a limited number of work tools. However, in order
to benefit from this provision, they must have acquired the status of
‘emigrant’ and that of ‘returnee’. Both of these are obtained by regis-
tering in the relevant register held at local employment offices which
report to MOLSAEO, and amending their records at this register upon
return. Another example is the provision of tax breaks promised by
the government in its political programme in 2005. In February 2006
a draft law was proposed according to which returnees who started
businesses in Albania could claim tax exemption for the first three to
five years (Chaloff, 2008). Furthermore, the campaign included the
much-publicized ‘Albania: €1’ which offered emigrants, the diaspora
and foreigners land for only €1, in order to boost investment in poor
areas with high unemployment rates (Sulka, 2006). Both initiatives
were either watered down or followed by requirements that made
them inaccessible for most emigrants, the last of the two in particular
because of the sheer threshold of capital investment required – in the
millions of euros. As other specialists have observed, having progres-
sive legislation is not enough if adequate implementation does not
follow (Ikonomi, 2009).
42 Emigration Nations

Regional diaspora and kin-state policies

As mentioned earlier, nearly half of the Albanian population in the
Balkans was left outside of Albania’s newly drawn borders by 1913, a
territorial outline that was retained pretty much intact at the end of
the Second World War. Significant Albanian populations thus live in
present-day Kosovo, south Serbia, Montenegro and Macedonia, despite
large-scale migration from these areas to North America and Western
Europe, as noted earlier. The story of Albanian populations who lived
in territories that became part of Greece is somewhat different. A group
of them was sent to Turkey as part of the 1923 population exchange
between Greece and Turkey given that they were considered Turkish by
the Greek administration because of their Muslim religion. Others who
remained in Greece, notably the Cham population, were expelled from
their homes by the Greek National Army and forced to flee in the after-
math of the Greek civil war. Most ended up in Albania where in 1953
they were given Albanian citizenship as a group, but who would rather
return to their homes and reclaim their property and Greek citizenship
(Krasniqi, 2010, pp. 8–9). This, together with issues of the Greek minor-
ity in Albania and Albanian emigration to Greece, has strained relations
between the two countries several times in the past.
The presence of these large Albanian minorities in the near abroad
has been a challenge to various Albanian governments and certainly
an important influencing factor in the country’s foreign policy. Overall
it can be said that kin-minority policy takes the form of a ‘national
responsibility’ as reflected in the constitution of Albania.16 Thus, article
8(1) states that ‘the Republic of Albania defends the national rights
of Albanians residing outside its state borders’. Such ‘responsibility’
is expressed principally in terms of maintaining linguistic and cul-
tural ties, which is generally the most commonly accepted policy. For
example, several places are reserved at Albanian universities each year
for ethnic Albanian students of former Yugoslavia, which together with
other social and cultural rights amount to quasi-citizenship (Krasniqi,
2010, p. 21). Full citizenship is also granted since legislation makes
provision for its acquisition through descent, that is, for individuals of
Albanian origin up to the second degree. Demand for Albanian pass-
ports has been on the rise especially from Kosovo following the EU deci-
sion to grant Albanian passport-holders visa-free travel to the Schengen
area from December 2010. In other cases citizenship has been granted
in a symbolic act to recognize the contribution of politicians, artists
and sportsmen to a scientific, economic, cultural or national interest
for Albania.
 Albania 43

The complex way in which kin-state minority policies are interwoven

with emigration policies are not always without contradictions. For
example, the NID whose task has been to handle matters of the diaspora
on behalf of the Albanian state has worked closely with the Ministries
of Education both in Albania and in Kosovo in order to prepare ‘harmo-
nized’ textbooks and curricula for teaching the Albanian language and
culture in the diaspora (Greca, 2008). In the same framework joint lan-
guage and training conferences for teachers of Albanian in the diaspora
are organized each year. Indeed, the NID has used a broad definition of
‘Albanian diaspora’ in its discourse, to include historical communities
as well as the more recent migrants, emphasizing identity as Albanians
rather than of Albania (see the various information bulletins of the
NID). This is in contrast to NSM’s statement that the state’s ‘[migration]
policy on Albanian communities abroad is intended to include migrants
of Albanian nationality in host countries and not minorities in the
neighbouring countries’ (GoA, 2005b, p. 37). Interesting to note that
recent debates among Albanian state and non-state actors in the region
seem to display a similar approach to diaspora, as explained next.

Debates on the role of emigrants

Throughout the two post-communist decades the focus of the public

discourse has understandably been on contemporary migrants. The
intensity of migration has meant that most Albanians have either
emigrated themselves or been closely involved in migration networks
through their relatives and friends, thus being personally concerned
about migrants’ welfare and their struggles at home and abroad. In addi-
tion, since the mid-2000s there has been increased public awareness and
debate related to migrants’ socio-economic impact on Albania itself.
The focus has been squarely on remittances, which increased year on
year from a baseline of $150 million in 1992 reaching their peak at $1.3
billion in 2007. In the early 1990s remittances covered almost the entire
trade deficit and constituted as much as 22 per cent of the country’s GDP
(Vullnetari, 2012). Following Orozco’s (2003, p. 3) five Ts, besides remit-
tances Albanian migrants are contributors also through their large-scale
participation in Tourism, especially during the summer months, and in
particular those who reside in Greece, Italy and the United Kingdom;
Transportation, as they travel between host and origin countries during
visits and holidays; Telecommunication, as family members separated
across countries retain links through phone calls and the Internet; and
less so in terms of nostalgic Trade related to ethnic foodstuff imports.
44 Emigration Nations

Following the decline of financial remittances since 2008 it appears

that the chance to utilize their developmental potential may have been
lost. Some have turned their attention to migrants’ social and political
contribution instead. Emerging from younger political elites, themselves
returnees with high-flying professional careers, such initiatives result
from combined public good and personal agendas. Elite migrants such as
students and professionals are co-opted into existing political structures
‘at home’, giving renewed energy to tired agendas and a lease of life to
older figures, while also deflecting any overarching image of the diaspora
as a potential arena for dissent. In turn, returnees benefit from career
opportunities perhaps not available to them elsewhere. Others opt for
autonomous initiatives yet within overall existing frameworks. It is within
such interpretation that I see both the ‘external voting’ debate discussed
earlier and the ‘integrated diaspora’ that I come to next. The former was
aimed to directly engage everyday migrants in the political process by ask-
ing them to cast their vote during elections, as well as lobby for migrants’
representatives in parliament, thus effectuating their position as Albania’s
‘shareholders’ deserving to partake in power (Totozani, 2008).
The latter concept of an integrated diaspora is developed within a
discourse that seeks to integrate all Albanian-inhabited areas in the
Balkans into what is labelled as an Albanian space or ‘Albanosphere’.17
The diaspora is seen as a platform that can facilitate such integration
considering its self-identification abroad as ‘belonging to the Albanian
ethno-cultural nation, which encompasses persons with different citi-
zenships living in different states’ (Pichler, 2009: 215). A vision for joint
structures and institutions amongst the different states recognizes the
need to move the debate from the management of migratory flows to
the management of diaspora’s capitals – financial, human and sociocul-
tural. While diaspora’s developmental potential is recognized, will the
new elite succeed where the old one failed?

Conclusion

This chapter has mapped and discussed the Albanian diaspora, by focusing
on the role of the state and its political elite in promoting and instrumen-
talizing the country’s global diaspora. One of the key conclusions is that
Albanian diaspora is very diverse in terms of its historical background, its
geographical roots and not least its involvement with Albania itself. This
heterogeneity is in turn recognized and instrumentalized by Albanian
governments to serve political goals. For example, the anti-communist
layer of diaspora was demonized as anti-national by the communist
 Albania 45

rulers. Yet, it was soon considered as a platform of dissent and financial

muscle by those who ascended to power once the regime fell. Moreover,
the Albanian diaspora is also an ethno-cultural one, relating more to this
ethnicity than its origin state. This makes the concept of an integrated
diaspora, as a platform shared amongst these states, even more feasible.
Although the political programmes of various post-1990 Albanian
governments have proposed policies to defend migrants’ rights abroad,
negotiate their regularization and strengthen consular services, these
have been tainted by a less than inspiring record in practice (ACPS,
2002, p. 10). In reality, migrants have been generally treated with insti-
tutionalized contempt, although their emigration helped ease off the
pressure from unemployment, and balance the distorted trade deficit
through remittances. The debate around external voting for emigrants
has brought to light some fundamental views about the role of migrants
in the country’s development and society more generally. While some
consider them as ‘shareholders without voting power’, others contest
that decisions they influence through their vote do not affect them
personally as residents abroad. The jury on this is still out. The silent
consensus amongst the old political class in Albania is to impede
migrants’ voting as much as possible, considering their vote would seri-
ously punish the kleptocratic and inefficient system which has been
governing Albania for the last decades. Yet, in a game of power and
self-preservation the old and new elites interact and cooperate, bring-
ing about increased awareness and action in the process. The hopes are
pinned on the new elite, although the future will tell of their success.
For the slow and painful EU membership process is showing that not
many want Albania in this state, even for €1!

Notes
1. The Arbëresh live in 49 towns and villages, dispersed among seven regions
and nine provinces extending from the Abruzzi Apennines to the south of
Italy and to Sicily, situated mainly in mountainous or semi-mountainous
areas; around 200,000 Arbëresh are thought to be living in this area (Bartl,
2011; Hall, 1994, p. 50; Tirta, 1999, p. 141). For an in-depth study of one
of these ‘Albanian’ towns, Piana degli Albanesi in Sicily, see Derhemi
(2003).
2. However, the boundaries between ‘forced’ and ‘voluntary or labour’ migra-
tion become blurred when one considers the grinding poverty, famine, health
epidemics, exploitation and misery in which most Albanians, especially peas-
ants, lived in their areas of origin. Migration within the Ottoman Empire –
as nowadays within the territory of the EU – blurs another boundary, that
between internal and international migration.
46 Emigration Nations

3. At least 30 Grand Viziers (prime ministers) were of Albanian origin, ruling in

different corners of the Empire. Mehmet Ali Pasha, the founder of modern
Egypt, ruled as governor of Egypt for almost half a century. His dynasty came
to a close with the abdication of King Farouk I in 1952, who was reportedly
of Albanian ancestry (Hall, 1994, p. 49; Logoreci, 1977, p. 34).
4. These statistics include Albanian refugees from Kosovo, Macedonia,
Montenegro, as well as Florina, Kastoria, Chameria, and other Albanian-
inhabited territories which became part of Greece.
5. Tirta (1999, p. 140) estimates that Romania was home to about 20,000
Albanians in 1920, Egypt to about 10,000 towards the same time, whereas
the numbers for the other countries are only a few thousands.
6. It is not clear, however, if the figure for the United States includes all waves of
migrants, that is, historical, new and second- and third-generation Albanian
migrants, or just the post-1990 ones. The figure for the United Kingdom
is most likely an estimate as there are no specific studies that have made a
systematic collection of the existing statistical data. Furthermore, both fig-
ures most likely include Albanians from Albania, Kosovo, Montenegro and
Macedonia.
7. My calculation of data by country of birth. Data sources: US Census Bureau;
from: www.census.gov. US Department of Homeland Security, Office of
Immigration Statistics; from: www.dhs.gov/files/statistics/data; [both last
accessed: February 2013].
8. Known in Albanian parlance as the US Lottery, this programme run by the
US government gives out 55,000 green cards every year for citizens of coun-
tries with low emigration rates in America. The first selection takes place in
a lottery-like manner, whereby applicants’ names are randomly picked by a
computerized system. Qualification for an immigration visa in the second
stage, however, is only possible for individuals who possess a minimum
level of 12 years of schooling or the equivalent of work experience. The
programme enables family members of the principal applicant (spouse and
children), to emigrate together.
9. In July 1990 around 5,000 Albanians stormed the walls of Western countries’
embassies in Tirana and requested asylum there. This is considered as the
first act of mass defiance against the totalitarian isolation. The Albanian
government threatened siege, but eventually relented and the refugees were
transferred to the respective countries. Most went to Germany, France and
Italy. Albania had no diplomatic relations with the United States and the
United Kingdom at the time.
10. Its role as the principal high-level administrative entity related to emigra-
tion matters over the years is reflected to some degree also in its name.
From 1991 until 1996, the versions of the ministry’s name carried the word
‘Emigration’ in it: Ministry of Labour and Emigration in 1991; Ministry
of Labour, Emigration, Social Assistance and Former Political Prisoners in
1992–1996; Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs in 1997–2005; MOLSAEO
since 2005.
11. Decision no. 425, date 11.7.2007.
12. Personal communication with NID staff, January 2013.
13. By 2013 the web was non-responsive and there was only a Facebook pres-
ence of the network.
 Albania 47

14. A notion generally contested within the wider migrant organizations and by
individual immigrants.
15. Several policy briefs and platforms were available on G99’s website,
accessed: 25 June 2010, but non-responsive by 2013; www.g99.org/index2.
php?pg=details&id=30&nid. See especially G99 (2008) and Totozani (2008).
16. However, as Krasniqi (2010) notes, in recent years Tirana has lost somewhat
its position as the hub of the ‘Albanian space’ in the Balkans, with the emer-
gence of Pristina as a powerful player.
17. Funded by Western donors, the ‘Forum of Albanosphere’ is perhaps partly an
attempt to alley neighbours’ fears resulting from nationalisistic pre-electoral
rhetoric espoused by key senior political players in Albania, including the
premiere Berisha himself.

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3
Diaspora Engagement and
Policy in Ethiopia
Katie Kuschminder and Melissa Siegel

Introduction

Ethiopia is one of the largest and poorest countries in sub-Saharan Africa.

Although Ethiopia has a low emigration rate at 0.7 per cent (World Bank,
2011), compared to other sub-Saharan African countries, due to its
sheer population size of approximately 83 million people, it has a large
diaspora community in absolute terms. The exact size of the diaspora is
unknown, but is estimated to be 1–2 million people with large popula-
tions in the Middle East, North America and Europe. Ethiopians are the
second largest group of sub-Saharan Africans in the United States (after
Nigeria) and the fifteenth largest in Europe (AFTDC-AFTQK, 2007).
Emigration from Ethiopia is a fairly recent phenomenon that largely
began in 1974 with the Ethiopian Revolution, which led to two decades
of conflict and large refugee flows out of Ethiopia. In the 1980s the refu-
gee crises in the Horn of Africa was the largest in the world with over
1 million Ethiopian refugees residing in the nearby countries of Sudan
and Kenya (Bariagaber, 1997). The majority of refugees returned or were
repatriated to Ethiopia in the 1990s and a small percentage received
resettlement in the United States or Europe. In the 1980s Ethiopian refu-
gees were one of the largest groups resettled to the United States, which
significantly contributes to the current large Ethiopian population there
(Singer and Wilson, 2007). Emigration from Ethiopia continues with
both low- and high-skilled migrants; refugee flows are now minimal.
In 2002, the Government of Ethiopia created the Ministry of
Expatriate Affairs and the Diaspora Coordinating Office of the Ministry
of Capacity Building. In 2011, the Ministry of Capacity Building was
dissolved and the Diaspora Coordinating Office was transferred to the
Ministry of Interior. The objective of these two governmental units

50
 Ethiopia 51

remains to serve as a liaison between the Government of Ethiopia and

Ethiopians abroad and to mobilize the Ethiopian community to attract
knowledge and capacity building in Ethiopia. The mission of these two
units is largely implemented in Ethiopian consulates, 13 of which now
have diaspora units. These offices have been central in promoting privi-
leges and passing new legislation specific to the diaspora.
Ethiopia has developed a draft diaspora policy, which was presented
to the diaspora in multiple locations around the world in 2011 and
early 2012. Aside from the draft policy, the government has already
implemented several pieces of legislation aimed at the diaspora and
since 2002 has become one of the most active in sub-Saharan Africa in
engaging the diaspora. This chapter will focus on the implemented poli-
cies and not the draft diaspora policy. Implemented policies include the
Ethiopian ‘Yellow Card’ (an Ethiopian origin identity card), remittance-
sending protocols, investment incentives, a Diaspora Bond and foreign
currency bank accounts directed at the diaspora. The Government of
Ethiopia has been active in extending rights to the diaspora and in what
Allan Gamlen (2006) terms extracting obligations from the diaspora.
The Government of Ethiopia views the diaspora as a key resource to
develop the country and has actively pursued diaspora investment.
The new policies have made diaspora investment, engagement and
transnational activity in general much easier for diaspora members and
are resulting in increased diaspora business and investment in Ethiopia.
This chapter will provide a comprehensive review of the institutional
and policy arrangements developed in Ethiopia to engage the diaspora
and is based on an in-depth policy review, individual interviews with
Ethiopian government representatives and observations and insights
gained at the Dialogue on Mediterranean Transit Migration (MTM) Final
Conference in Addis Ababa. It will begin with an overview of emigration
from Ethiopia and the current geography of the Ethiopian diaspora. The
second section will discuss the new institutions created by the Ethiopian
government to engage the diaspora. The third section will describe in
more detail specific policies the Government of Ethiopia has implemented
to engage the diaspora. The final section will turn to debates in Ethiopia
regarding emigration and emerging migration issues in the country.

History and geography of emigration

A history of emigration
Ethiopia has historically had a low emigration rate. Emigration move-
ments from Ethiopia have been concentrated in the last thirty years and
52 Emigration Nations

can be characterized in four waves (Lyons, 2007). The first wave was pre-
1974 with the emigration and return of Ethiopian elite. Refugees fleeing
the Dergue regime from 1974 to1982 characterized the second wave. The
third wave was primarily emigration via family reunification schemes
from 1982 to 1991 as families joined those who had initially fled the
Dergue regime. The final wave of the Ethiopian diaspora can be charac-
terized by the post-1991 flows that continue today. This last group has
mixed motivations for emigrating. This includes people fleeing political
oppression, but also includes skilled migrants and family reunification.
Tasse (2007) argues that the westernization of Ethiopia has maintained
the emigration flows particularly as better-educated urban Ethiopians
(primarily from Addis Ababa) seek to emigrate to the West.
Prior to the 1970s there was very little emigration from Ethiopia.
The monarchy had been in power since the 1930s and people who did
migrate were primarily elites who went abroad for professional pur-
poses, such as study, and then returned (Tasse, 2007; Terrazas, 2007).
Tasse (2007) notes that since so few Ethiopians migrated abroad during
this first wave their motivation to return was strong as they were almost
guaranteed a very high social position.
Political instability began when Ethiopia occupied Eritrea in 1962,
which led to the creation of an Eritrean movement for independence
(Berhanu and White, 2000). Due to the ensuing violence, people on
both sides of the border fled. More emigration from Ethiopia followed
in the 1970s with the overthrow of the traditional monarch by the
Dergue – military junta – in 1974.
This led to the second wave of emigration beginning in 1974 as the
Ethiopian Revolution led to a communist-style totalitarian regime. In
addition to the new government, there was conflict in the Ogaden
region between Ethiopia and Somalia, and the military regime sur-
vived an invasion from Somalia in 1977 (Berhanu and White, 2000).
From 1976 to 1979 the Dergue conducted the Red Terror to suppress
all opposition to their regime, resulting in brutal killings, detentions
and torture. The target was urban-based opponents, people with some
education and the young (Berhanu and White, 2000). Bariagaber cites
these three key events of political repression, Eritrea’s independence
movement and conflict with Somalia over the Ogaden region as being
the three instigators of refugee flows from Ethiopia (Bariagaber, 1997).
All of these conflicts induced forced migration.
The third wave of emigration from Ethiopia began in 1982 and lasted
until 1991. It primarily consisted of family reunification schemes as
people joined those who had fled since 1974 (Tasse, 2007). During this
 Ethiopia 53

time, however, the number of refugees also rose. In addition, Ethiopia

experienced a catastrophic national famine in 1984–1985 which killed
1 million people (Berhanu and White, 2000). Thus reasons to flee were
compounded by political and environmental factors.
Table 3.1 shows the number of Ethiopian refugees for select years
as compared to refugee flows in the Horn of Africa from 1972 to 1992
(migration waves two and three). The Horn of Africa had the highest
refugee concentration in the world at this time due to the conflicts in
Eritrea, Ethiopia and Somalia. The majority of Ethiopian refugees did
not emigrate beyond the Horn of Africa. The United States currently
has the largest proportion of the Ethiopian diaspora, but prior to 1970,
the United States granted asylum to only 63 Ethiopians (Homeland
Security, 2010). However, this number steadily increased from 1,307
between 1971 and 1980 to 18,542 from 1981 to 1990 and then again
from 1991 to 1999 to 19,912.
In 1991, the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Party
(EPRDP), a coalition of ethnically based groups, overthrew the Dergue
regime. This led to the fourth and current wave of emigration from
Ethiopia. A transitional government was established and in 1993
Eritrea separated from Ethiopia. In 1994, Ethiopia’s constitution was
established and in 1995 the country had its first elections. From 1998
to 2000, Ethiopia and Eritrea were at war, until the signing of a peace
treaty in 2000. This conflict also caused migration flows, but to a much
lesser extent than previous ones. At present, tensions still remain along
the border between Ethiopia and Eritrea but this is not generating
further migration. The constitution of 1994 established Ethiopia as a
federalist state of nine regional states based on the predominant ethnic
groups, with the exception of two federal territories: Addis Ababa and
Dire Dawa. After the fall of the Dergue the number of Ethiopian refugees
dropped drastically and has stabilized over the past decade.

Table 3.1 Ethiopia refugee flows

Year Refugees in the Refugees from Percentage of Refugees

Horn of Africa Ethiopia from Ethiopia

1972 55,000 55,000 100.00

1977 102,000 91,000 89.22
1982 1,091,000 1,081,500 99.13
1987 1,343,300 1,122,300 83.55
1992 1,676,800 752,400 44.87

Source: Bariagaber, 1997 from US Committee for Refugees (1972, 1977, 1982, 1987, 1992).
54 Emigration Nations

The numbers of people emigrating at present are primarily emigrating

for economic purposes and as illustrated above the refugee flows have
significantly declined. It is important to note that a mix of low- and
high-skilled individuals has characterized these historical flows. In the
first and second wave it was the highly skilled who were able to migrate
and travel to the West. However, as the refugee situation progressed
many low-skilled Ethiopian refugees were resettled to North America
and Europe. Today, as emigration continues, it is still both a mixture
of the high- and low-skilled who seek opportunities abroad, primarily
for employment and economic reasons. It is generally recognized that
current emigration to the United States, Canada and Europe is charac-
terized primarily by high-skilled migration, whereas emigration to the
Middle East is characterized by lower-skilled migration.

The current geography of emigration

The Ethiopian diaspora has emerged over the past three decades as a
‘new’ diaspora. Although less well established than historical diaspora
groups, such as Israelis or Indians, it has been highly engaged in poli-
tics and developments in Ethiopia. The Ethiopian diaspora is a diverse
group characterized by multiple ethnicities and factions. This section
will describe the current size and geography of the Ethiopian diaspora.
It must be noted that data is particularly scarce in the Ethiopian case
and there is wide divergence from official statistics and estimates of
the actual figures. This section will begin by examining the available
data on the Ethiopian diaspora from a variety of sources and then look
more in depth at the Ethiopian diaspora in Organization for Economic
Cooperation and Development (OECD) countries. This will be followed
by a more detailed account of the Ethiopian diaspora in the United
States where it is heavily concentrated. Finally, the section will examine
the Ethiopian diaspora in the Middle East and Israel.

The Ethiopian diaspora: A global overview

There is no official record of the size of the Ethiopian diaspora, but
commonly cited estimates used by the Government of Ethiopia are
between 1 and 2 million Ethiopians living abroad. Ethiopia has a low
emigration rate (at 0.7 per cent of the population) when compared to
other sub-Saharan African countries, such as Nigeria at 0.8 per cent,
Kenya at 1.4 per cent or Ghana at 4.5 per cent (UNDP, 2009). Due to
the sheer size of the population, however, Ethiopia has one of the larg-
est African diasporas abroad, particularly in the United States. The total
number of African immigrants to the United States from 1946 to 1999
 Ethiopia 55

was 80,698; of these, 37, 507 (46 per cent) were Ethiopian (US Census
Bureau, 2003).
The total estimated size of the Ethiopian diaspora in all OECD coun-
tries is 146,100, as illustrated in Figure 3.2 (OECD, 2005). The population
sizes are determined primarily by country census data from 2000 to 2001.
Figure 3.1 highlights that the Ethiopian diaspora is highly concen-
trated in the United States, followed by smaller numbers in Canada,
Italy, Sweden, the United Kingdom, and the Netherlands. Due to the
large number of Ethiopians in the United States, the next section will
look at this population in depth.
The United States has been a significant host of African refugees
throughout history. The number of people of Ethiopian origin (includ-
ing first and subsequent generations) residing in the United States,
according to the OECD, is 72,245. According to the US 2000 Census the
official number of legal residents born in Ethiopia was 69,530.
Figure 3.2 illustrates the immigration of Ethiopians to the United
States from 2000 to 2009. It is evident from this graph that the number
of Ethiopians receiving legal residency in the United States has contin-
ued to increase over this period from 4,053 in 2000 to 15,462 in 2009.

80,000
Unknown
70,000 Foreign born
Native born
60,000

50,000
Population

40,000

30,000

20,000

10,000

0
Australia Denmark Greece Netherlands Spain United Kingdom
Country

Figure 3.1 Legal immigrants of Ethiopian origin in OECD states

Source: OECD, 2005.
 56

Refugee arrivals Individuals granted asylum affirmatively

Individuals granted asylum defensively Persons naturalized by country of birth
Persons obtaining legal permanent resident status

18,000

16,000

14,000

12,000

10,000

8,000

6,000

4,000

2,000

0
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009

Figure 3.2 Ethiopian immigration to the United States, 2000–2009

Source: Homeland Security, Yearbook of Immigration Statistics, 2000–2010.
 Ethiopia 57

The number of refugee arrivals has also decreased since 2004 from 2,689
to 321 in 2009.
According to the US 2000 Census, only 29.5 per cent of the Ethiopian
population in the United States had a bachelors’ degree or higher, indi-
cating that that the majority of the Ethiopian diaspora in the United
States prior to 2000 were low-skilled refugees who most likely came to
the United States through resettlement programmes. The United States
has a long history of resettlement and according to the US Office of
Refugee Resettlement, 35,144 Ethiopians were resettled in the United
States from 1983 to 2004, making them the tenth largest group to be
resettled in the United States (Singer and Wilson, 2007).
Less information is available on the Ethiopian diaspora in Asia and
the Middle East. According to the Global Migrant Origin Database the
number of foreign-born Ethiopians in the Middle East around 2000
included 21,992 in Saudi Arabia, 8,781 in Jordan, 3,363 in the United
Arab Emirates, 3,088 in Lebanon and 1,233 in Yemen (Terrazas, 2007,
from University of Sussex, 2003).These numbers are based on census
data and only capture legal migrants. Estimates of the Ethiopian dias-
pora in other countries include 90,000 in Saudi Arabia, 105,000 in
Israel and 30,000 in Lebanon (Terrazas, 2007; Baldwin-Edwards, 2005).
Research on Ethiopian female migration to the Middle East suggests that
a high percentage of migration is illegal and undocumented (Kebebe,
2002). According to data collected by the Ministry of Labour and Social
Affairs of Ethiopia for 1997 and 1998, males who were migrating legally
did so to be drivers or work in factories, as labours, guards or waiters,
and females migrated to be housemaids or nannies (Kebebe, 2002 from
MOLSA).
The Ethiopian diaspora is well represented in Europe, North America
and the Middle East. It is rooted in a refugee population from original
emigrations in the late twentieth century and continues as the well edu-
cated seek to migrate to the West and the low skilled seek employment
opportunities abroad. As the Ethiopian diaspora grows the Government
of Ethiopia is working to engage this group to bring financial gains and
capacity building to Ethiopia.

Institutions and policies

Many organizations established to better engage with and serve the

diaspora living abroad have only existed for the last five to ten years. At
the national governmental level, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the
Ministry of Capacity Building are the main ministries responsible for
58 Emigration Nations

diaspora engagement. The Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs is not

directly involved in diaspora engagement, but the Employment Service
Promotion Directorate in the Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs
is responsible for assisting Ethiopian migrant workers abroad. At the
regional level, there are branches of Diaspora Coordinating Offices that
also engage directly with the diaspora abroad. At an inter-institutional
level, the Technical Committee of Federal Government Institutions on
emigrant community provides coordination across the different levels
of government on diaspora policy. Finally, the Ethiopian Investment
Agency (EIA) and the Development Bank of Ethiopia (DBE) are financial
institutions under the Ethiopian National Bank (ENB) that are involved
in diaspora engagement.

Institutions
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs is responsible for the Ethiopian Expatriate
Affairs General Directorate (EEA) and the embassies and consulates that
serve migrants abroad. Thus, Ethiopia does not have a specific ministry
that is charged with questions relating to emigration affairs, as is the
case in Ghana and Nigeria, nor a ministry that is charged with multiple
objectives, whereof one is emigrant communities, as is the case in Mali,
Cape Verde and Niger (ICMPD and IOM, 2010a). The highest govern-
ment body in Ethiopia dealing with emigration is a sub-ministerial body
under the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. This decision was made under the
advice of an Indian adviser who suggested that it does not work to sepa-
rate emigration affairs from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, based on
the Indian experience (personal communication, 2010). For example,
members of the Ethiopian diaspora member may need a visa to come
to Ethiopia to engage in investment or development efforts if they do
not have a Yellow Card, and, thus, they need to deal directly with the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Therefore, it is more convenient to deal with
one ministry rather than both the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and an
emigration ministry. Having emigration affairs under the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs is thus viewed as a positive measure to avoid overlapping
problems between ministries.
The EEA was established in 2002 and charged with the task of foster-
ing the relationship with migrant communities abroad and encouraging
them to participate in activities in Ethiopia (ICMPD and IOM, 2010b).
According to the website of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the EEA:
(1) serves as a liaison between the different ministries and Ethiopians
abroad, (2) encourages the active involvement of Ethiopian expatriates
in socio-economic activities of Ethiopia, (3) safeguards the rights and
 Ethiopia 59

privileges of Ethiopians abroad and (4) mobilizes the Ethiopian com-

munity abroad for sustained and organized image building. At the same
time, the EEA focuses on disseminating information to the Ethiopian
community abroad and keeping them informed of relevant develop-
ment. In addition, the EEA conducts research to identify the challenges
faced by the diaspora abroad so as to improve legislation to allow them
increased participation in nation building as well as ensuring their well-
being, safety, security, rights and privileges.
Specific initiatives of the EEA relating to emigrant communities
include the publication of an Information Booklet for Ethiopians
and Foreign Nationals of Ethiopian Origin Living Abroad, publica-
tion of the Ethiopian Investment Guide, organization of the annual
‘Ethiopia Diaspora Day’, support for the 2006 launch of the broadcast
of Ethiopian television programmes and information dissemination
through embassies and consulates on investment opportunities and
financial incentives in Ethiopia to Ethiopians abroad. These initiatives
will be discussed in more detail in the policies section.
According to International Centre for Migration Policy Development
(ICMPD) and International Organisation for Migration (IOM) (2010b),
the EEA has seven channels with which it reaches out to its diaspora
abroad including: (1) the website of the EEA,1 (2) visits of delegations
and/or single representatives from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to desti-
nation countries where main emigrant communities reside, (3) Ethiopian
embassies and consulates abroad, (4) liaising with migrant associations in
destination countries, (5) emigrant communities’ knowledge networks,
(6) media and (7) Internet communication technologies (ICTs).
By 2007, 13 embassies had established service desks dedicated to reach-
ing out to the diaspora. The goal of these desks is to adapt the Ministry
of Foreign Affairs’ general plan on engagement of the diaspora to the
specific local context, to provide updated information on Ethiopia, to
organize research on the specific communities where they are working
and to inform the diaspora about their rights and privileges set up by
the government (Belai, 2007). As an example, the Ethiopian Embassy in
Ottawa achieves this mission through hosting events to share informa-
tion regarding diaspora policies such as the Millennium Bond, foreign
currency bank accounts and investment opportunities with diaspora
members (personal communication, 2010). In Ottawa, the embassy is
also working with the Ethiopian Canadian Development Council to
host a forum on investment opportunities in Ethiopia (personal com-
munication, 2010). This type of forum is held annually in Washington,
DC, as an effort to attract investment in Ethiopia. In addition, these
60 Emigration Nations

offices assist diaspora members in establishing businesses in Ethiopia

by writing a letter of support to receive investment opportunities in
Ethiopia. For instance, the embassy in Ottawa has assisted in the estab-
lishment of approximately 150–200 businesses in Ethiopia over the past
four years (personal communication, 2010). Finally, these offices have a
central role in recruiting people for the MIDEth temporary return pro-
gramme that seeks to build knowledge transfer and capacity building in
Ethiopia. These offices manage a list of available positions and seek to
recruit skilled people to do development work temporarily in Ethiopia.
The Ministry of Capacity Building established the Diaspora
Coordinating Office in 2005; in 2011 the Ministry was disbanded and
the Coordinating Office moved to the Ministry of Interior. According to
the Diaspora Coordinating Office, their vision is to fully mobilize and
utilize diaspora resources and facilitate optimal brain gain and capacity
building for poverty alleviation. At the same time, they are charged with
mobilizing and coordinating support from overseas, organizations and
individuals for transferring knowledge and technology to bring a mean-
ingful and sizable impact to the economic development of Ethiopia.
The Diaspora Coordinating Office uses the main outreach channels
of emigrant communities’ knowledge networks and the website of the
IOM MIDEth Programme as well as embassies and consulates to dis-
seminate information on their activities. Specific initiatives relating
to emigrant communities funded by the Diaspora Coordinating Office
include needs assessments within priority sectors and coordination and
financing of temporary voluntary return programmes of high-skilled
Ethiopians abroad.
Although not directly involved in diaspora engagement, the
Employment Service Protection Directorate of the Ministry of Labour
and Social Affairs plays an important role in the emigration of Ethiopian
migrant workers. This unit is responsible for helping to protect
Ethiopian migrant workers abroad, assisting in access to employment
locally and abroad, formulating policies to protect the rights of migrant
workers and facilitating legal migration (ICMPD and IOM, 2010b). The
Employment Service Directorate has been less active in implementing
policies and programmes than the EEA or Diaspora Coordinating Office,
but continues to play an important part in the protection of migrant
workers’ rights.
There is a Diaspora Coordinating Office at both the national govern-
mental and regional levels. To decentralize the implementation of the
national policies, Diaspora Coordinating Offices have been set up in
each of Ethiopia’s nine regional states and two administrative districts.
 Ethiopia 61

These offices provide services such as facilitating the provision of ser-

vices to Ethiopians abroad and providing guidelines for the provision
of land for building a house or for regional investment. The regional
offices also have the authority to open emigrant community desks in
major towns and districts in each region and establish databases regard-
ing development projects to supply Ethiopians abroad with information
of regional activities.
A Technical Committee of Federal Government Institutions on emigrant
community issues was established in 2006 under the EEA. This Technical
Committee was set up to coordinate dialogue between institutions deal-
ing with matters related to the diaspora (Belai, 2007). The technical com-
mittee is chaired by the State Minister of Foreign Affairs, and comprises
department heads of the following national institutions (Hussen, 2010):
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Trade and Industry, Ministry of
Culture and Tourism, Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs, Revenue
and Customs Authority, Department of Immigration and the National
Bank of Ethiopia (NBE). This committee meets monthly to review what
each institution is doing and how it should be followed up. The main
reason for the committee is to make sure that efficient and effective
services are being offered to Ethiopians abroad in line with each institu-
tion’s annual plan (Hussen, 2010).
The EIA handles all foreign investments, offers both pre- and post-
investment services to investors and liaises with other relevant agen-
cies. The EIA is part of the Ministry of Trade and Industry (ICMPD
and IOM, 2010b). The EIA has also created a special department for
addressing problems encountered by investors. The EIA has emerged as
an all-encompassing support system that ensures all practical aspects
of investing are taken care of, from making sure permits and licenses
are obtained to helping get access to electricity and water (Belai, 2007).
The DBE, which is overseen by the NBE, supplies financial support
for local development projects. The DBE helps to facilitate access to
credit for the diaspora. The DBE has been implementing policies to help
expedite loans for diaspora members. In an effort to attract more invest-
ment from the diaspora, a public relations office to market the DBE and
services has been recently established.

Policies
This section will examine the ways in which the newly established
institutions of the Ethiopian government, as detailed in the previous
section, have worked to engage the diaspora through the development
of specific policies. As detailed in the previous sections of this chapter,
62 Emigration Nations

the Ethiopian diaspora is ‘new’ and, accordingly, the diaspora engage-

ment policies of the Ethiopia government are still in their early stages.
The government has formally acknowledged the importance of the dias-
pora and the valuable contribution that Ethiopians abroad can make to
the country’s development. This recognition has led to the decision to
create a single diaspora policy that will span all governmental institu-
tions and levels. This policy is currently in draft form and is expected
to provide a unifying approach to diaspora engagement across the dif-
ferent ministries and governmental levels. In the formulation of this
policy, the Ethiopian government hired advisers from India to assist in
understanding the Indian case as a model. As the official diaspora policy
is still under development, this section will focus on other diaspora-
focused policies implemented in the last decade.
The policies in this section have been divided into three categories
based on Gamlen’s (2006) typology for three types of government
engagement policy. The first type is capacity building policies, which
generally have two aims: (1) to produce a state-centric ‘transnational
national society’, and (2) to develop a set of corresponding state insti-
tutions (p. 6). These policies aim to create a communal belonging
among expatriate members. Capacity building policies include pro-
grammes to teach national language and history amongst the diaspora
populations, state-held conferences and conventions and the promo-
tion of national symbols to stimulate common identity. Institutional
building policies have a further objective to ‘govern’ diaspora popu-
lations. Institutional building policies generally begin with steps to
monitor the diaspora population. Specific institutional building poli-
cies include establishing consular and consultative policies, building
transnational networks, monitoring efforts, establishing a dedicated
bureaucracy and establishing a ministerial-level agency dedicated to
the diaspora.
The second type of diaspora engagement policy in Gamlen’s typology
is extending rights to the diaspora. This includes the political incorpora-
tion of the diaspora and establishing specific civil and social rights for
the diaspora. Policies that extend political incorporation rights include
dual nationality, special membership concessions, embassy voting,
postal voting, parliamentary representation and the ability to run for
office. Policies that extend civil and social rights include welfare protec-
tion and tourism services.
The final type of diaspora engagement policy is extracting obliga-
tions from the diaspora group. This includes both investment policies
 Ethiopia 63

and lobby promotion. Specific investment policies include mandatory

payments to the government, the establishment of special economic
zones, remittances and foreign direct investment (FDI) capture and
knowledge transfer programmes. Lobby promotion occurs when the
home states ‘seek the help of expatriate “lobbyists”’ to promote involve-
ment, investment, and relationships with corporate actors’ (Gamlen,
2006, p. 18).
The Government of Ethiopia has been active in implementing legisla-
tion and policies to engage the diaspora at all three levels. Under the
category of capacity building, the government has worked on informa-
tion dissemination tools such as the Diaspora Day in Addis Ababa. In
the extending rights category, it has implemented a ‘Yellow Card’ that
provides non-residents rights in Ethiopia. The government has been
most active in implementing policies in the category of extracting
obligations. These policies include provisions for remittances, foreign
currency bank accounts, a Diaspora Bond, investment and import
incentives and knowledge transfer programmes. This section will dis-
cuss each of these policies in more detail.

Capacity building
In the category of capacity building, the Government of Ethiopia has
focused on information dissemination through government publica-
tions, embassies and consulates (as detailed in the previous section of
this chapter) and the support for satellite broadcasting of Ethiopian
television. The Government of Ethiopia also sponsors Ethiopian Day
in Addis Ababa. This section will describe these efforts in more detail.
In 2009, the Ministry of Expatriate Affairs hosted the first ‘Ethiopian
Diaspora Day’ in Addis Ababa during the holiday period in 2009 when
many members of the diaspora were returning to Ethiopia. The gov-
ernment established the day to create linkages with the diaspora and
inform them of the current initiatives for diaspora investment opportu-
nities and other policies. The objective of the Ethiopian government is
to continue Diaspora Day in Addis Ababa and expand it to other coun-
tries (personal communication, 2010). The day is not as established as
the diaspora conferences and conventions in countries such as India or
Lebanon, but provides a strong example of the Government of Ethiopia
working to create ties with transnational Ethiopians.
The government has also sought to disseminate information through
brochures and satellite television; it has produced an information book-
let for Ethiopians and Foreign Nationals of Ethiopian Origin Living
64 Emigration Nations

Abroad and an Ethiopian Investment Guide (ICMPD and IOM, 2010b).

The office of the Ethiopian Expatriate Affairs also played a role in the
launch of Ethiopian Television (ETV) to satellite in 2006 (ICMPD and
IOM, 2010b). This was the first time ETV was available around the world.

Extending rights
The Government of Ethiopia has been more active in the area of extend-
ing rights than in capacity building. Policies in this category include the
Ethiopian Origin Identity Card as an alternative to dual citizenship and
specific rights and privileges for returnees.
The Ethiopian Origin Identity Card, commonly referred to as the
‘Yellow Card’, was established as a way to provide formal rights to dias-
pora members. Ethiopia does not allow for dual citizenship; therefore, for
diaspora members to naturalize abroad they must give up their Ethiopian
citizenship. This policy is fairly common among African countries. The
government states that ‘granting dual nationality is considered prob-
lematic due to issues concerning border populations’ (Hussen, 2010),
referring to the concern that individuals in border areas may claim
Ethiopian citizenship in addition to their existing citizenship (Belai,
2007), presenting security risks as Ethiopia currently has sensitive
relationships with Eritrea and Somalia. In addition, the notion of the
Yellow Card was an easier political sell than the granting of dual citizen-
ship. This model is based on the Indian example, where the Overseas
Citizenship of India scheme gives expatriate status but not dual citizen-
ship (Vezzoli, 2010).
The Yellow Card is available to people of Ethiopian origin and
spouses and children of people of Ethiopian origin. This therefore
includes people born in Ethiopia, non-Ethiopian spouses, and second-
generation diaspora members abroad. Some exceptions apply, allow-
ing the government to maintain the right to refuse applicants in
certain situations. The Yellow Card has been described as allowing
for all the rights of citizenship, except the right to vote. The card has
two exceptions; the first is that the holder of the card does not have
the right to vote or be elected to public office. The second is that the
holder of the card does not have the right to work for the National
Defense, Security, Foreign Affairs, or other similar establishment on a
regular basis.
Initially the Yellow Card cost $500 for the first five years and $200
for a two-year renewal, and was reduced in October 2011 to $100 for
a period of five years and $40 for a two-year renewal. In 2010 the
Government of Ethiopia estimated that approximately 21,000 Yellow
 Ethiopia 65

Cards had been granted. This was below expectations; through consul-
tations with the diaspora the government concluded that the fee was a
large barrier in applying for the card. Thus the fee reduction is expected
to increase Yellow Card applications.
In 2003 the Council of Ministers passed the revised Regulation on
the importation of goods on franco-Valuta basis Council of Ministers
Regulation No. 88/2003. This regulation permitted individuals returning
to Ethiopia permanently to import their personal and household effects
100 per cent duty-free. In July 2006, the provision was lifted as the gov-
ernment suspected that vehicles were being signed over to third parties
without paying duty, which violated the law; this was then revised so
that all vehicles stranded at ports could be brought to Ethiopia until
October 2006 (Mekuria, 2006). This incentive is thus no longer in effect
(Embassy of Ethiopia Washington, 2010). As an additional encourage-
ment, in 2003 returnees were also granted a piece of land upon arrival.
This policy was highly opposed by local Ethiopians as the majority of
returnees come to Addis Ababa where land is scarce. This provision was
also quickly lifted.

Extracting obligations
The Government of Ethiopia has been most active in implementing
policies that Gamlen (2006) would categorize as extracting obliga-
tions. This is makes intuitive sense as the primary objective of the
Ethiopian government’s policy is to encourage the diaspora to assist
in the development of Ethiopia. The Ethiopian government has thus
implemented five key policies in this area. The first is to make invest-
ment and imports to Ethiopia more accessible to diaspora members
by permitting them the same investment rights as a national. The
second is to allow diaspora members to hold foreign currency bank
accounts so as to attract foreign capital flows to Ethiopia. The third
is a remittance services policy intended to make sending remittances
through official channels more attractive. The fourth is a Diaspora
Bond created to generate capital for the state electrical company. The
fifth is the Transfer of Skills and Knowledge programme that is run
in partnership with the IOM and the United Nations Development
Programme (UNDP) and focuses on knowledge transfer and capacity
building of diaspora members in Ethiopia through temporary return
programmes.
One of the first initiatives of the Ethiopian Expatriate Affairs
Department was to make investment in Ethiopia more attractive to the
diaspora. In 2002, the Investment Proclamation No. 280/2002 defined a
66 Emigration Nations

domestic investor to include foreign nationals who are Ethiopian by

birth. This allows the members of the diaspora to be treated as domestic
investors, who have significantly different rights than foreign investors
in Ethiopia. For instance, foreign investors must invest a minimum of
US$100,000 in a single project or US$60,000 if the project includes a
domestic partner. For a domestic investor there is no minimum amount
required for investing.
In 2003 the Council of Ministers passed the Investment Incentives
and Investment Areas Reserved for Domestic Investors Council of Ministers
Regulations No.84/2003, which provides further incentives to domes-
tic investors, including custom import duty exemptions and income
tax holidays. This regulation also specifies industries that are open to
investment only by domestic investors.
The Customs Duty Exemptions include the ability to import 100 per
cent duty-free
‘[c]apital goods and construction materials necessary for the estab-
lishment of a new enterprise or for the expansion or upgrading of an
existing enterprise’. A domestic investor is also permitted to import a
vehicle duty-free subject to approval. However, any domestic investor
can import ambulances or buses for tour service operations duty-free.
The amendments in investment protocol have made investing in
Ethiopia significantly more accessible for diaspora members. According
to Chacko and Gebre (2009), approximately 10 per cent of domestic
investment in the last decade has been from diaspora members and 90
per cent of this is in Addis Ababa, suggesting that this policy has been
successful.
In 2004, the Government of Ethiopia established Directive No.
FXD/31/2006 on the Establishment and Operation of Foreign Currency Bank
Account for Non-Resident Ethiopians and Non-Resident Ethiopian Origin.
The objective of this directive was to encourage investment from the
diaspora and to ‘support the international foreign exchange reserve
and ease the balance of payments problem of the country’ (Directive
FXD/31/2006).
Foreigners are allowed to open three types of accounts: a fixed deposit
account, a regular current account and a non-repatriable Birr account
which takes the form of a savings deposit that can only be used for the
purpose of local payments. The interest on this account is double that
of the minimum savings deposit rate set by the NBE. The maximum
deposit that can be made in any of the above accounts is US$50,000.
The amount is capped as there is concern that a sudden large withdrawal
of foreign currency could upset the national balance of payments (Belai,
 Ethiopia 67

2007). Further, the directive established that banks must keep foreign
accounts in three currencies: the US dollar, pound sterling and the euro,
though other currencies may be offered.
These accounts are intended as an incentive for investment from the
diaspora. The interest earned on all foreign currency bank accounts is
tax-free. The funds in a fixed account can also be used for collateral to
obtain credit from local banks for investment in Ethiopia. According to
Teshome (2009), by 2009 approximately 1,000 foreign currency bank
accounts had been opened in Ethiopia. This was considered low by the
government and was attributed to a lack of interest and the fact that
many Ethiopians are engaged in casual employment abroad and only
able to provide small remittances.
Although Ethiopia has a low emigration rate, remittances are signifi-
cant to the economy as they account for a large share of foreign capital
flows (Reinhart, 2006). According to the UNDP, remittances accounted
for 2.0 per cent of GDP in 2007, totalling US$359 million (2009). This
translates to a per capita amount of US$4 per person, which is low com-
pared to the sub-Saharan Africa average of US$26 per person (UNDP,
2009). Unofficial flows, however, are not included in this number and
could account for up to 50–60 per cent more.
In 2006, the Government of Ethiopia passed Directive No. FDX/30/2003
Provisions for International Remittance Services. According to Belai (2007)
this directive was established in response to the government’s recogni-
tion that the majority of remittances were sent through informal chan-
nels. The NBE conducted a study to assess the reasons behind Ethiopian
diaspora members’ remittance channel choice. This showed that the
main concerns with official channels were high commission charges,
delays in payments and inflexibility regarding the agents that can be
utilized (Belai, 2007).
The goals of the directive are to improve the formal remittance sys-
tem, reduce its costs and increase access to international remittance
services for Ethiopian nationals and make them reliable, fast and safe
(NBE, 2009). To this end, the directive establishes regulations around
rates and remittance service providers.
In 2008 Ethiopia was the second country in sub-Saharan Africa to issue
a Diaspora Bond (Ghana issued the Global Jubilee Savings Bond earlier
the same year). A Diaspora Bond can be defined as ‘a debt instrument
issued by a country – or potentially, a sub-sovereign entity or a private
corporation – to raise financing from its overseas Diaspora’ (Ketkar and
Ratha, 2009). This Diaspora Bond, known as the Millennium Bond, was
issued by the state-owned power utility company Ethiopian Electric
68 Emigration Nations

Power Corporation (EEPCO) (Negash, 2009) and underwritten by the

Commercial Bank of Ethiopia. The minimum amount is US$500, and
the interest rates are 4 per cent, 4.5 per cent and 5 per cent for five,
seven and ten years’ maturity, respectively (Embassy of Ethiopia in the
United Kingdom, 2009). The bonds are tax-free in Ethiopia, and interest
is paid annually. The bond can also be used as collateral for borrowing
from local banks in local currency.
The IOM, in cooperation with the Diaspora Coordinating Office
of the Ministry of Capacity Building, administers the Migration for
Development in Ethiopia (MIDEth) programme (ICMPD and IOM,
2010b). The MIDEth programme is an Ethiopia-specific programme of
the larger IOM initiative Migration for Development in Africa (MIDA).
The programme has several components including the transfer of
knowledge and technology programme. The objective of the transfer
of knowledge and technology programme is for skilled members of the
diaspora to temporarily return to Ethiopia for a period of six months or
more to provide support to ministries and public institutions (ICMPD
and IOM, 2010b). The programme was established to address current
critical skill gaps (personal communication, 2010).
The programme is coordinated by Ethiopian embassies, which recruit
members of the diaspora, by the Ministry of Capacity Building, which
assesses needs for skilled workers in Ethiopia, and the IOM in Ethiopia,
which coordinates the linkages and logistics. A key focus of this pro-
gramme is universities in Ethiopia seeking skilled professionals; lists of
positions are available on embassy websites. The Ministry of Capacity
Building partially funds the programme by paying for the flight and
housing costs of temporary returnees (ICMPD and IOM, 2010b). The
UNDP funds the other aspects of the programme including the IOM
coordination activities and pays the diaspora members a top-up of a
maximum of US $300 per month.
A key success of this programme often cited by the Government of
Ethiopia is the relationship with the Ethiopian North American Health
Professionals Association (ENAHPA). Established in 1999, ENAHPA is a
network of diaspora and non-diaspora volunteers dedicated to improv-
ing health in Ethiopia via numerous projects. Each year, via the MIDEth
programme, ENAHPA sends health professionals to Ethiopia to undergo
training and attend lectures and workshops with doctors, nurses and
other medical professionals. ENAHPA organizes the health profession-
als to participate, the IOM funds their flights and the Government of
Ethiopia approves their mission.
 Ethiopia 69

Debates on the role of emigrants

The role of emigrants in a society can be controversial, particularly

as migration increases. Emigration from Ethiopia for mixed purposes
appears to be on the rise and appears to be a matter of current rather
than historical debate. This section will describe how Ethiopian emigra-
tion has been viewed to date.
Historically it appears that there was little debate regarding emigra-
tion from Ethiopia. This is primarily due to the fact that emigration
levels were low prior to the Revolution. However, during that time the
terror that occurred was widely recognized. It is the ‘lucky ones’ that
were considered able to make it to North America and Europe; emigra-
tion was viewed as a necessity.
Current debates regarding emigration in Ethiopia are centred on
brain drain, trafficking and diaspora engagement. Brain drain con-
tinues to be a large problem as professionals can earn higher salaries
outside of Ethiopia. Medical brain drain is now occurring to Botswana,
South Africa and the Middle East. According to one estimate, a doc-
tor earns US$200 per month in Ethiopia versus US$1050 per month
in Botswana (personal communication, 2010). In addition, the
Government of Botswana recruits for doctors in Ethiopian newspa-
pers. There are now more than 100 Ethiopian doctors in Botswana,
which is quite high considering there are only about 900 doctors in
all of Ethiopia. The issue of South–South cooperation for migration
and brain drain is a major concern as individuals seek to migrate to
better-off African countries.
Trafficking has also become a key issue. Although official numbers
do not exist, trafficking of woman and children to the Middle East
is thought to be a significant emigration flow at present. The IOM in
Addis Ababa estimated that there were approximately 130,000 women
working in the Middle East as domestic workers or prostitutes. The
top destinations are Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, the Emirates and Yemen.
Women generally leave Ethiopia voluntarily, but are given misinforma-
tion regarding the positions and working conditions for which they are
migrating. Ethiopian domestic workers in the Middle East are said to be
suffering from ‘inhumane working conditions, physical and sexual mal-
treatment, and denial of basic freedoms’ (Anbesse et al., 2009, p. 560).
Women described having their passports taken away, being expected to
work 24 hours per day and not being able to have contact with other
Ethiopians.
70 Emigration Nations

The issue of female migration to the Middle East has been the subject
of increasing attention as women return with severe post-traumatic stress
disorder and abuse. The study conducted by Anbesse et al. (2009) on
returnees from the Middle East to Ethiopia arose based on the observa-
tions of the number of return migrants seeking professional psychiatric
help. Anbesse et al. (2009) described how the conditions in the Middle
East led to ‘social defeat’ of the migrant women. From 1999 to 2005 the
Quarantine Office of the Addis Ababa International Airport reported
129 female bodies returned from Jeddah, Dubai and Beirut (IOM). In all
cases the cause of death was determined to be suicide (IOM). The high
number of returnees also led to the UNDP to fund a Dutch NGO to
establish the Socio-economic Reintegration for Illegally Trafficked Ethiopian
Women and Returnees from the Middle East programme. This programme
aims to provide intensive support to 300 deportees including group
counselling and the provision of shelter and boarding for the most vul-
nerable women (Migration for Development, 2010).
The role of the diaspora and return migrants is a growing focus for
discussion. In Addis Ababa, there is increasing evidence of diaspora
investment in local businesses, such as Western-style restaurants and
shops. The influence of the West is increasing in Ethiopia and there is
debate as to whether this is positive or negative.
Return migration incentives are also an issue of debate, as return
migrants received benefits that provided them preferential treatment
over locals at one time. In particular, the provision of land to returnees
policies caused some resentment. Land is particularly scarce in Addis
Ababa, which is also the primary destination for returnees. The con-
troversy on this issue is a key reason that land is no longer provided to
returnees to Addis Ababa.
As emigration continues to increase from Ethiopia it will continue to
be a topic of debate. The issues of brain drain, remittances, trafficking,
diaspora engagement and return migration all have great consequences
for the development of Ethiopia and the potential to cause both posi-
tive and negative effects.

Conclusion

Ethiopia presents an interesting case for diaspora engagement policies

as it has a lower emigration rate than other sub-Saharan Africa countries
and a relatively small diaspora as compared to countries such as India,
China, Turkey or Morocco. Simultaneously, however, Ethiopia has
been one of the most active countries in Africa in the area of diaspora
 Ethiopia 71

engagement and has invested significant resources in developing insti-

tutions and policies to engage and attract the diaspora over the past
decade. This chapter is thus timely in that it provides the first compre-
hensive overview of these policies, which can be compared to diaspora
engagement policies of other established countries of migration.
As Ethiopian policies were developed quite recently, the government
has had the opportunity to learn from the experiences of other coun-
tries, for example, by hiring a consultant from India and modelling
their engagement strategy on India’s. This appears a natural decision,
as Ethiopia and India have developed many partnerships over the past
decade in other areas, such as education and investments. Key decisions
of the Ethiopian government, such as to not have a ministerial body
devoted to emigration, to institute the Yellow Card and to implement
the Diaspora Bond, are based on the Indian case.
The institutional and policy approach taken by the Ethiopian
Government includes capacity building, extending rights and extract-
ing obligations. The government recognizes that a partnership needs
to be built with the diaspora to benefit both parties and has granted
them significant rights and privileges. In exchange, the government has
encouraged the diaspora to invest in the country both financially and
through knowledge exchange. It appears that the policies have resulted
in increased diaspora businesses and investment in Ethiopia, although
not to the degree expected. One challenge is that the Ethiopian diaspora
primarily comprises low-skilled refugee populations that may not have
the resources to invest in the country.
Ethiopia is continuing to establish and build upon its diaspora policy.
The government is finalizing a comprehensive diaspora policy to be
implemented in the near future. It is also working to encourage further
South–South cooperation on diaspora policy. The Government of Ethiopia
hosted the Government of Uganda in Addis Ababa to share experiences
in implementing diaspora policies. In addition, the Government of
Ethiopia would like to see cooperation with countries such as Botswana
and South Africa on issues of emigration and brain drain as the profes-
sional Ethiopian diaspora population increases in these African countries.
Ethiopia seeks to establish further partnerships and relationships with the
diaspora and continues to encourage investment in Ethiopia.

Notes
1. Access available at http://www.mfa.gov.et/Ethiopians_Origin_Abroad/
Ethiopia_Origin.php.
72 Emigration Nations

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Gamlen, A. (2006) ‘Diaspora engagement policies: What are they, and what kinds
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Hussen, T. (2010) ‘Ethiopia’s experience on migration’, unpublished report,
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4
Diaspora Engagement in India:
From Non-Required Indians to
Angels of Development
Metka Hercog and Melissa Siegel

Introduction

It has been mainly only in the last decade that India started to look seri-
ously at a diaspora policy, which is quite late given the fact that it has
had a large diaspora for centuries. For a long time India’s official posi-
tion was that emigrants deserted their country and harmed the coun-
try’s interests. At the time of economic liberalization and globalization
in the 1990s ethnic networks started to be seen as value-free networks
which could serve as a resource. Concomitantly, the diaspora’s economic
and political situation greatly improved. This led to a swift change in
government’s perception of its own migrants, applauding their achieve-
ments with great pride. While in the past, overseas emigrants were often
referred to as non-required Indians (a parody of the term non-resident
Indian (NRI)), nowadays they are addressed as ‘angels of development’
(Khadria, 2008), a source of national pride, members of the Indian fam-
ily or ‘Mother India’s Children’ (Sinha-Kerkhoff and Bal, 2003).
This chapter begins by describing Indian migration from the early
colonial period to the present day. We then lay out current policies and
institutions that shape Indian diaspora engagement. Special attention is
devoted to the set-up of the Ministry of Overseas Indian Affairs (MOIA),
which serves as a single stop agency for any kind of matter relating to
overseas Indians and is meant as a focal point for overseas Indians,
immigrant organizations, as well as for trade, industry and any other
organization with a stake in overseas Indian affairs. By setting up the
MOIA in 2004 and dedicating sufficient time and resources to support
relevant institutions, the Government of India declared its long-term
commitment to reach out to their migrants. Moreover, the Indian gov-
ernment has signed a number of agreements for bilateral cooperation

75
76 Emigration Nations

with the main countries of destinations and takes an active part in

regional and global initiatives for migration management. India now
has one of the most comprehensive state-level diaspora engagement
policies, which makes India’s institutional practices particularly inter-
esting to observe. The chapter highlights the continuing renegotiation
of diaspora’s involvement in the development of India.

History and geography of emigration

With an emigrant origin population of over 25 million people in 189

countries, the Indian diaspora abroad constitutes the second largest
migrant community in the world (after China) (Castles, 2008; MOIA,
2010). India’s modern migration patterns are rooted in its colonial
history with the United Kingdom but they have developed over time.
Historically, most of India’s migration has been for economic reasons.
India was an important source country for migrant labour across the
British Empire. Indian labourers were sent to British colony plantations
in the Caribbean, the Indian Ocean, North and Southeast Asia, Africa
and the Pacific to supply labour between the sixteenth and eighteenth
century (Khadria, 2009). Particularly after slavery was abolished, there
was need for large-scale labour recruitment in the Atlantic, Pacific
and the Indian Oceans and under the kangani system1 to destinations
in Southeast Asia (MOIA, 2010). These migrants went abroad mainly
as indentured workers creating the base of the old Indian diaspora
(Khadria et al., 2008). It is estimated that between 1834 and 1947, 30
million Indians migrated (Davis, 1951).
Since independence in 1947, Indian emigration continued, with a
geographical division of skilled migration to North America, the United
Kingdom and Australia and low-skilled migration to the Gulf, West and
Southeast Asia (Vezzoli and Lacroix, 2010). The dominant South–South
pattern evolved into South–North migration. The Indian diaspora that
developed from these flows is referred to as the ‘new diaspora’ as it is no
longer linked directly to colonialism and early capitalist relationships.
In the 1950s, low-skilled migrants went to the United Kingdom, the
United States and Canada. In the 1960s and 1970s, flows increased
to the United Kingdom, the United States, Canada and Europe more
generally after Indians were expelled from newly independent African
countries (particularly Kenya and Uganda) (Khadria, 2009).2
Giri (2001) has identified four waves of immigration of Indian citizens
to Europe, with the first wave beginning in the early 1960s when Indian
migration to Europe mainly consisted of movements of indentured
 India 77

labourers from former colonies to Europe. The second wave of Indian

migration to Europe, referred to as the ‘new diaspora’, occurred mainly
during the European reconstruction boom in the late 1960s. During
this period a considerable number of labour migrants of Indian ori-
gin decided to settle in Europe. Whereas most migrants moved to the
United Kingdom, other major destination countries included Germany,
the Netherlands, France and Belgium. The third wave of Indian migra-
tion to Europe was in the 1980s, following the restrictive immigration
rules of European countries with respect to entry and residence of semi-
or unskilled third-country nationals. This changed the dynamics of
migration as significant numbers of highly skilled professionals, such as
doctors, engineers and scientists arrived from the Indian subcontinent.
A fourth wave of immigration to Europe began in the 1990s, consisting
mainly of Indian IT software specialists and has continued until today.
Immigration to the United States started picking up from the 1970s
onwards. In 1960, only 12,296 Indian-born individuals were residing
in the United States. The Indian-born population grew to 450,406 in
1990 and had reached a total population of more than 1 million people
by 2000. In 2005, the Indian-born population in the United States was
close to 1.5 million (Desai et al., 2009). Figure 4.1 shows a steep increase
in the number of people obtaining legal permanent residence in the
United States in the past five decades, that is, for persons with their last

7,00,000
5,90,464
6,00,000

5,00,000
Population

4,00,000
3,52,528
3,00,000
2,31,649
2,00,000
1,47,997
1,00,000
18,638
0
1960–69 1970–79 1980–89 1990–99 2000–2009
Fiscal years

Figure 4.1 Number of people obtaining legal permanent resident status in the
United States from India as country of last residence, from 1960 to 2009
Source: US Department of Homeland Security, 2011; Authors’ analysis.
78 Emigration Nations

place of residence in India. Between 2000 and 2009, 590,464 Indians

became legal permanent resident in the United States. This trend has
accelerated in recent years: 59,728 in 2008, 54,360 in 2009 and 66,185
in 2010, which is close to 5 per cent of all the permits issued in these
years in the United States (USDHS, 2011).
Beginning in the mid-1970s, there was also a large flow of low-skilled
immigration to the Gulf States due to the oil boom, attracting emigrants
mainly from Kerala and Southern India who returned after the comple-
tion of their contracts (Khadria, 2009).
Today, Indians abroad represent one of the largest and most estab-
lished diasporas around the world. The largest share of them stays in
Asia (Figure 4.2). The estimates of the High-Level Committee of Indian
Diaspora in 2001 found that the total size of the overseas Indian popu-
lation, including NRIs and persons of Indian origin (PIOs), is concen-
trated in the United States as the major receiving country (1,678,765),
followed closely by Malaysia (1,665,000) and Saudi Arabia (1,500,000)
(Singhvi, 2001, p. xlviii). Other major countries of destination follow in
this order: the United Kingdom, South Africa, the United Arab Emirates,
Canada, Mauritius, Trinidad and Tobago, Fiji, Kuwait and Australia.
It is important to stress that at present, the bulk of Indian migration
is low-skilled in nature with skilled workers representing approximately

Oceania,
1,21,966
1%

North America
Africa, 1,55,666, 1,377,152,
2% 15%
Europe,
9,04,343,
10% Asia,
6,495,293,
72%

Figure 4.2 Stock of Indian immigrants around the world

Source: Migration DRC 2007, aggregated figures.
 India 79

20 per cent of the total migrant flows from India (Chanda and
Sreenivasan, 2006). Given that the majority of emigration from India
is low-skilled, it is not surprising that in the annual labour outflows
for 2009, Saudi Arabia is the major receiving country (281,110 workers
per year from India), followed by the United Arab Emirates (130,302),
Oman (74,963), Qatar (46,292) and Kuwait (42,091), countries with
high demands for low-skilled workers (MOIA, 2010, p. 51).
Figure 4.3 shows an increase in immigration flows from India to
major Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
(OECD) receiving countries. While the United States and the United
Kingdom continue receiving the largest numbers of Indian migrants, a
substantial increase is also noticeable for Australia and to a lesser extent
for Canada, which peaked in 2005.
The United States is the most significant destination for highly skilled
immigrants. This geographical concentration is highest for highly edu-
cated Indian migrants; 92.3 per cent of all Indian migrants with tertiary
education reside in only three countries: the United States, the United
Kingdom and Canada. The United States by itself hosts 66.4 per cent of
all tertiary-educated Indian migrants (Database on Immigrants in OECD
Countries (DIOC), OECD.stat). Especially notable for Indians in the
United States is their skills composition; 69.1 per cent of Indian-born
immigrants in the United States have completed tertiary education.
Indians are also the most prevalent among the H-1B visa beneficiar-
ies, representing 48 per cent of reported beneficiaries for this visa,

90,000
80,000
Indian-born immigrants

70,000
60,000 Australia
50,000 Canada
40,000 Germany
30,000 United Kingdom
20,000 United States
10,000
0
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009

Figure 4.3 Immigration flows of Indian-born immigrants (aged 15 and older) in

the main OECD destination countries, from 1998 to 2009
Source: Database on Immigrants in OECD Countries (DIOC), OECD.stat, extracted on 7
January 2012.
80 Emigration Nations

specifically designed for specialty occupations (USCIS, 2010). Skills

composition in Australia and Canada also leans towards highly edu-
cated migrants, with 53.3 per cent and 40.7 per cent of Indian migrants
holding tertiary education, respectively. In comparison, the overall
skills structure of Indian migrants in Europe is dominated by migrants
with lower levels of education. In the United Kingdom and continental
European OECD member states, half of Indian-born migrants hold only
primary education or lower. Only 21.5 per cent of Indian migrants in
the European OECD countries, without counting the United Kingdom,
hold tertiary education (DIOC, OECD.stat).
According to Eurostat estimates,3 Indian nationals were the fourth larg-
est group of non-EU immigrants in the EU-27 in 2006 (behind Morocco,
the Ukraine and China). Most people of Indian origin living in Europe
are in the United Kingdom. With a diaspora of about 1.2 million, the
United Kingdom accounts for two-thirds of the Indian population in the
European Union (Singhvi, 2001). According to the SOPEMI (The Systeme
d’Observation Permanente sur les Migrations) report of 2008, the stock of
Indian migrants in the United Kingdom was 570,000 in 2008. In 2002,
20,369 migrated to the United Kingdom and by 2006 this number has
increased to 51,849 Indians migrating to the United Kingdom annually.4
The Netherlands has the second largest Indian community in Europe,
with a documented population of 16,470 in 2009. There has been a
significant increase in immigration from India to the Netherlands in
the recent years. From 1995 to 2004, annual immigration from India
accounted for around 600 to 700 people per year. The flows gained
momentum 2005, when 1,214 Indians migrated to the Netherlands,
which continued to increase in the following years, leading to a flow of
3,381 people in 2008.5
Unskilled labour migration is similarly concentrated; approximately
90 per cent of unskilled migrants travel to the Gulf countries, particu-
larly the United Arab Emirates, Qatar, Kuwait, Oman and Saudi Arabia
(Vezzoli and Lacroix, 2010). In 2001 (Singhvi, 2001), there were an
estimated 3 million NRIs based in the Middle East. Since the 1980s, the
socio-economic status of workers in the Middle East has slowly increased.
Some highly skilled migrants are now migrating to the Middle East,
attracted by competitive salaries. Nevertheless, the bulk of emigration
to the Middle East is still semi-skilled or low-skilled labour. Of the NRIs
currently residing in the Middle East, it is estimated that approximately
70 per cent are semi-skilled and unskilled, 20 per cent are white-collar
workers and 10 per cent are professionals. Migrants are mainly young
males; more than half are from Kerala with the rest originating mainly
 India 81

Table 4.1 Stock of Indian migrants as a percentage of the total population in

selected countries (2010)

Country Population No. of all No. of Indian migrants

migrants Indian as per cent of total
migrants population

Saudi Arabia 27,448,000 7,288,900 1,417,371 5.3

UAE 7,512,000 3,293,264 1,200,089 16
Oman 2,782,000 826,074 434,512 15.6
Kuwait 2,737,000 2,097,527 755,584 27.6
Qatar 1,759,000 1,305,428 470,307 26.7
Bahrain 1,262,000 315,403 113,669 9

Source: United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division
(2011) for Data on country population, United Nations, Department of Economic and Social
Affairs (2012) for Data on stocks of migrants, extracted on February 20, 2012.

from Andhra Pradesh, Goa, Karnataka and Tamil Nadu. They generally
have little education and are often unmarried. Their working and living
conditions often leave much to be desired. Workers are usually placed
on fixed-term contracts and forced to go home when the duration of
their contract has been completed. Indian migrants have fewer rights
in the Middle East than in other major destination regions, particularly
with regard to family reunification and possibilities for naturalization.
Table 4.1 illustrates the stock of Indian migrants in selected countries
for 2010. Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates host the largest
populations of Indians. This population makes up a staggering 27.6 per
cent of the total population in Kuwait. Also, in Qatar, Indian migrants
make up more than 20 per cent of the population.

Institutions

In 2000 the Government of India convened the High Level Committee

on Indian Diaspora with the mandate to map the Indian diaspora. The
Report of the High Level Committee outlined a list of policy-oriented
recommendations which served as the basis for most of the policies that
were introduced in recent years.
India has its own distinctive classification and considers the Indian
diaspora to be composed of PIOs and NRIs. The Indian government
considers anyone of Indian origin up to four generations removed and
who has acquired citizenship of another country to be a PIO. NRIs are
those who still hold Indian citizenship and now live abroad. They either
have moved to another country or were born outside India and still
82 Emigration Nations

have Indian citizenship. Indian diaspora engagement policies refer to

all of the above. The target population for the policies and activities of
the established institutions is people who have migrated from territories
that are currently within the borders of the Republic of India and their
descendants (Singhvi, 2001).
On the basis of Committee’s recommendations, the MOIA was cre-
ated in May 2004; initially as the Ministry of Non-Resident Indians’
Affairs but it was soon renamed. The MOIA is one of the smallest
ministries in the Indian government and serves as a single stop agency
for any matter relating to overseas Indians. It is meant as a focal point
for overseas Indians and immigrant organizations, as well as for trade,
industry and any other organization with stakes in overseas Indian
affairs. All of India’s more specific institutions operate through the
MOIA, which provides central coordination for all policies, develop-
ments and institutions related to the diaspora. The secretary of MOIA
described the ministry as ‘standing for converting international migra-
tion into an orderly and safe process by facilitating legal migration and
curbing irregular migration in all forms’ (Mohandas, 2009). The initia-
tives of the ministry in recent years have included ‘legislative reforms,
regulatory reforms, process reforms and international cooperation’. The
mandate of the ministry can be summarized in three major goals:

• Developing networks with and amongst overseas Indians

• Empowerment and protection of emigrants
• Promotion and facilitation of trade and investments of overseas
Indians in India

Each of the major tasks is taken care of by one of the four functional
service divisions.

• The Diaspora Services Division runs several schemes related to

overseas Indians, ranging from establishing networks to engaging
diaspora in development efforts and other types of initiatives.
• The Emigration Policy Division was established in March 2006 to deal
with legislative reforms for improving emigration management; its
overarching task is the empowerment and protection of emigrants.
• The Financial Services Division promotes and enables trade and
investments by overseas Indians in India.
• The Management Services Division of the ministry is in charge of all
matters concerning the staff of the ministry, such as wages, coordina-
tion of work and leaves.
 India 83

For implementing the mandate of the ministry, several additional insti-

tutions with more narrowly defined tasks have been established:

• The Overseas Indian Facilitation Centre (OIFC)

• The India Centre for Migration (ICM)
• The Global Advisory Council at the Prime Minister’s Office
• The India Development Foundation of Overseas Indians (IDF)
• The Global Indian Network of Knowledge (Global-INK)
• The Overseas Indian Centres (OIC)

The OIFC’s logo is ‘Intertwining Diaspora Wealth and Intellect with

the Nation’s Progress’, which highlights its main objective, serving as
a platform for economic engagements of Indian diaspora with India.
Among other activities, the OIFC organizes regular ‘Investment and
Interactive Meets’ at several locations, most recently in September 2011
in New York and Washington, DC. It has the important task of facilita-
tion of a business-focused online networking platform, where special-
ized staff addresses any kind of queries (OIFC Newsletter, 2010). It is a
public–private initiative between MOIA and the Confederation of Indian
Industry. Its mandate is to promote investments, reduce transaction
costs of business and enable knowledge exchange.6 The OIFC dissemi-
nates information through a monthly newsletter (IndiaConnect) on the
current investment trends in India, an investor’s guide, an annual India
Economic Summit as well as other events, and facilitates online groups
for diaspora to join to share knowledge on investing in India.
The ICM, formerly known as the Indian Council of Overseas
Employment (ICOE),7 was officially set up in 2008 to serve as a think
tank to devise policies and strategies for promoting overseas employ-
ment. Its task is to study engagements of other countries and monitor
trends in international migration so as to assist India in holding its posi-
tion as a labour supplying country. By conducting country- and sector-
specific market research, it works towards identifying employment
opportunities in the international labour market. With a small team of
researchers, the Council works in collaboration with other Indian and
international research institutions, as, for example, with the European
University Institute (EUI), Florence, on developing a knowledge base for
policymaking on India–EU migration.
In addition to ICM, the Prime Minister’s Office set a Global Advisory
Council of People of Indian Origin which meets twice a year to draw
upon the experience and knowledge of eminent people of Indian origin
in diverse fields from across the world. It works as a high-level body to
84 Emigration Nations

discuss means for accessing knowledge of the Indian diaspora in a way

that meets India’s development goals. At the same time, the needs of
overseas Indians are also addressed and included in policy recommen-
dations to the ministry.8
The IDF was created to assist overseas Indians to contribute to social
development causes in India. Its purpose is to channel diaspora philan-
thropy in a credible way (MOIA, 2008). The foundation forges partner-
ships between donors and non-governmental organizations working in
the social sector in India. The MOIA acknowledged that diaspora philan-
thropy has been sporadic and fragmented, which leads to less than opti-
mal outcomes. The IDF, therefore, serves as a one stop shop for building
public–private partnerships and functions as a clearing house for all
information related to philanthropy. In this way, it promotes account-
ability in diaspora philanthropy. The ministry has envisaged that such
partnerships will lead to innovative projects, such as micro credit for
rural entrepreneurs, self-help groups for economic empowerment of
women or ‘best practice’ interventions in primary education (IDF, 2008).
The Global-INK is an electronic platform created to facilitate the
transfer of knowledge. It is functioning since January 1, 2010. The key
objective of this initiative is to leverage the expertise of Indian diaspora
in a way that it links up with the institutional programmes for develop-
ment and transformation, following the broad priorities set out in the
Eleventh Five Year Plan (2007–2012). The government envisaged it as a
facilitator between the diaspora and institutions in India.9
The engagement with the diaspora is carried out though the Overseas
India Centres (OIC) located in Washington, Abu Dhabi and Kuala
Lumpur. These offices network, organize events, provide assistance and
provide consular services to the diaspora at a more sophisticated level
than the services provided in embassies. Their mandate is to provide
field information on any matters relating to overseas Indians. Indian
embassies continue to provide support to the diaspora in countries that
do not have an OIC.
Finally, there are several institutions set up to offer better protection
and welfare to Indian workers and to prevent malpractices in receiv-
ing countries. The empowerment and protection of emigrants is the
overarching task of the second division of the ministry: the Emigration
Policy Division. India has gone further to protect their emigrants abroad
by establishing ‘on-site’ welfare services for emigrants in 42 countries
(including Middle Eastern, European and North American countries).
The Overseas Workers Resource Centre (OWRC) complements this
service by providing information through a telephone help-line for any
 India 85

kind of questions or complaints from emigrants regarding employment

and recruitment agencies.
In addition to institutions set up the government, there is also a
huge network of organizations run by emigrants. The organizations
are clustered according to linguistic, regional, ethnic and professional
background. There are at least 1,000 Indian organizations in the
United Kingdom and the United States, (Khadria, 2008). Because of the
conflicting relationship between the Indian government and Indian
diaspora in the past, there used to be many political organizations.
Nowadays, business and professional organizations are growing fast.
Vezzoli and Lacroix (2010) claim that the diaspora has not had much
effect on recent diaspora policies. Interviews with Indians migrants in
continental European countries support this claim as they express a lack
of knowledge and disinterest in state policies (Tejada et al., 2013).

Diaspora engagement policies

Emigration management reforms are taking place at the national,

bilateral and multilateral levels. At the national level, the ministry is
pursuing the possibility to replace the 1983 Emigration Act with new leg-
islation, adapted to the recommendations of the High Level Committee.
In the opinion of J. C. Sharma, a member of the High Level Committee,
the biggest achievement of their work has been to make diaspora an
important component of India’s foreign policy agenda (Sahoo, 2012).
These policies aim to create communal belonging among expatriate
members and raise consciousness in India of the transnational exist-
ence of the nation. Capacity building policies include programmes to
teach national languages and history amongst the diaspora populations,
state-sponsored conferences and conventions and the promotion of
national symbols to stimulate common identity. In the case of India,
Pravasi Bharatiya Divas (PBD) is the single most important instrument in
creating consciousness about the concept of the ‘global Indian family’.
It stands for Day of Non-resident Indians, when every 9January since
its inception in 2003, Indian officials gather with diaspora representa-
tives to honour high-profile Indians for their exceptional achievements.
The prestigious Pravasi Bharatiya Samman Award is conferred by the
President of India on an individual or an institution run by an NRI or
PIO. These conventions are also useful for networking among overseas
Indians and an opportunity for migrants to express their concerns.
In addition to creating a feeling of belonging, the political incorpora-
tion of diaspora involves an extension of rights. Specific policies that
86 Emigration Nations

extend political rights may include allowing for dual nationality, special
membership concessions, embassy voting, postal voting, parliamentary
representation and the ability to run for office. Policies that extend
civil and social rights include welfare protection and tourism services
(Gamlen, 2006).
The Indian constitution does not allow dual citizenship. In response
to persistent demands for dual citizenship from the Indian diaspora the
government came up with an original solution of offering a ‘quasi’ dual
citizenship. The Overseas Citizenship of India (OCI) scheme was intro-
duced in August 2005 by amending the Citizenship Act, 1955 (MOIA,
2010). In that way a legal bond is created with people who have lost
their Indian nationality. When the PIO card scheme was created in
1999, it was mainly targeting people who have left India a long time
ago, mostly prior to independence. Descendants of Indian migrants up
to the fourth generation are eligible. On the contrary, the OCI scheme
targets PIOs who were citizens of India on or after 26 January 1950 or
were eligible to become citizens of India on that day. The OCI status
entitles its holders to a lifelong, multiple entry visa and exempts them
from registration with the Foreigners Regional Registration Office for
any length of stay in India. A registered Overseas Citizen of India is
entitled to general parity with NRIs in respect of all facilities available to
them in the economic, financial and educational fields except in mat-
ters relating to the acquisition of agricultural or plantation properties.
They enjoy some further benefits, such as access to local air fares, local
national park tariffs, and inter-country adoptions. However, the OCI
does not confer political rights. They still cannot vote or hold public
office. The scheme entered into force in January 2006 and by the end of
February 2010, a total number of 552,355 PIOs were registered as OCIs
(MOIA, 2010). In 2012 a bill was introduced to merge and streamline the
PIO and OCI schemes by amending the Citizenship Act (Singh, 2012).
The Indian government’s policies to extend rights to the diaspora go
beyond OCI status. Extending rights has two primary goals: first, the
protection of the Indian diaspora abroad and, second, to assist NRIs
and PIOs to connect with their cultural roots and heritage in India.
Under the first category, the Protector General of Emigration is charged
with protecting the rights of emigrants abroad. Thus, emigration is a
managed and monitored process for citizens hired through recruiting
companies. There is a list of requirements that must be adhered to by
the recruiting company for the contract to be approved and the citizen
to receive clearance. This is a progressive step taken by India in a man-
ner similar to the Philippines to seek to protect emigrant workers. India
 India 87

has also established overseas worker resource centres in India to provide

information to citizens seeking to emigrate.
The Indian government has also introduced cultural programmes to
provide opportunities for PIOs to learn about India, trace their roots
and study in India. Several initiatives focus on diaspora youth, such as
the Scholarship Programme for Diaspora Children (SPDC). The scheme
offers 100 scholarships to children of overseas Indians to enrol in
undergraduate courses at Indian universities. It is open to NRIs or PIOs
from 40 countries which have large Indian populations (MOIA, 2010).
A further initiative to make links with the younger generation of the
Indian diaspora is the establishment of PIO/NRI universities. The first
such university for children of overseas Indians is planned to be set up
in Manipal, Karnataka. Proposals for setting up more universities of this
kind are currently being examined. Diaspora youth can also make use
of the ‘Know India Programme’ (KIP), a three-week orientation pro-
gramme covering various aspects of contemporary Indian life, including
an appreciation of economic development and typical rural life in India.
Other schemes are run explicitly for the benefit of the Indian diaspora
such as ‘Tracing the Roots’ started in October 2008 (MOIA, 2010). These
initiatives are designed to create and maintain social bonds between the
diaspora and contemporary India.
In order to optimize the economic development impacts of diaspora
engagement, government seeks to facilitate remittance flows, invest-
ments and skills transfers. As with other diaspora engagement policies,
there were no measures to increase remittances until the 1990s. Despite
the lack of specific policy measures, remittances increased considerably
in the early 1990s due to economic reforms which instituted a liberalized
exchange rate regime and current account convertibility (see Figure 4.4)
(Kumar Varma and Sasikumar, 2005). Due to these changes, most remit-
tances were sent through formal routes. Schemes were also introduced to
make the transfer of remittances faster and easier, linking money transfer
companies abroad with agents in India, which then give funds to recipi-
ents at current exchange rates (Kumar Varma and Sasikumar, 2005).
Remittances have grown tremendously in recent years, from 15.8 billion
US dollars in 2001–2002 to 70 billion in 2011–2012 (World Bank, 2012).
Chishti (2007) ascribes such increase to the reduced use of informal
channels, greater competition among money transfer organizations, the
change in the earnings composition of Indian migrants and the general
improvement of the Indian economy.
Deposit schemes for overseas Indians were one of the first diaspora
engagement policies introduced by the Indian government. Since the
88 Emigration Nations

80,000

70,000

60,000

50,000

40,000

30,000

20,000

10,000

0
1975
1977
1979
1981
1983
1985
1987
1989
1991
1993
1995
1997
1999
2001
2003
2005
2007
2009
2011
Figure 4.4 Migrant remittances inflows to India from 1970 to 2012
Source: Annual Remittances Data from the World Bank, 2012.

1970s, a number of schemes enabled NRIs to open deposit accounts

exclusively created for NRIs. At the time, India was in great need of for-
eign currency. The incentives included high interest rates for deposits
in foreign currency and exchange rate guarantees for foreign currency
accounts. This facilitated the repatriation of deposits. In addition,
deposits were exempt from income and wealth tax and there was no
ceiling on the amounts deposited. There has since been a total change
in NRI deposit policies. Exchange guarantee schemes have been with-
drawn, the interest rates have been aligned to those of the international
rate of relevant currencies and the interest rates on rupee deposits with
domestic interest rates and also the ceiling on the amounts has been
lowered. Also, the income from interests on NRI deposits is now taxed.
Several reasons underlie this shift, but for the most part such reversal of
policies took place since the NRI deposits started to be seen as a contri-
bution to external debt (Kumar Varma and Sasikumar, 2005).
Adding to an encompassing policy framework for financial services,
India also introduced the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002,
which aims to strengthen the national financial system (Kumar Varma
and Sasikumar, 2005).
A distinctive feature for financial engagement of Indian diaspora is its
short-term perspective. Overseas Indians have made important contri-
butions to India’s development through remittances and NRI deposits.
In contrast, foreign direct investment from the Indian diaspora has
 India 89

been weak, especially considering the financial capabilities of its large

population abroad. In an effort to increase investments, the Indian
government twice issued Resurgent India Bonds guaranteed by the State
Bank of India, available only to overseas Indians. The bonds were issued
in 1998 first and then again in 2000 (Newland and Patrick, 2004). As
mentioned earlier, the Indian government has created a set of institu-
tions with the objective to facilitate investments of overseas Indians,
such as the global INK and OIFC, as lack of investments is recognized
to be one of the major bottlenecks of diaspora approaches. Moreover,
one of the MOIA’s functional divisions focuses on facilitation of invest-
ments, trade and business partnerships between overseas Indian and
Indian businesses.
In addition to extracting benefits from the diaspora, one of the gov-
ernment’s main concerns is the welfare of emigrants. Potential migrants
are informed in advance about their employment prospects and rights
and obligations. In addition, the protection of migrants is implemented
through reforms to the recruitment system which may make migrant
workers vulnerable to labour exploitation. The High Level Committee’s
report details forms of mistreatment in the Gulf region by recruiting
agents and/or employers. Employment agreements are often ignored,
salaries are not paid on time or are held back for settlement of debts
incurred by the payment of work permit fees and work hours are longer
than a recognized workday (Singhvi, 2001, p. 24). To prevent such mal-
practices, several institutions were set up to improve the protection and
welfare of Indian workers abroad, such as the Migrant Resource Centre
in Kochi, Kerala, which is the most important Indian state in terms of
emigrant population size. Greater supervision of recruitment agencies
is undertaken by the Protector General of Emigrants who is responsible
for granting registration certificates to employment agencies as well as
for cancelling and revoking them in case they do not comply with the
agreed conditions. This was originally undertaken by the Emigration
division of the Ministry of Labour and Employment and was shifted
to the MOIA in December 2004 (MOIA, 2010). The ministry is also in
the process of implementing a comprehensive e-governance project on
emigration, which would lead to a more convenient and transparent
system and more effective protection of emigrants.

Bilateral and multilateral cooperation

In pursuit of transparent and effective migration management, the
Indian government has signed a number of agreements for bilateral
cooperation with the most important countries of destination. The
90 Emigration Nations

first labour agreements were signed with Qatar and Jordan in 1985 and
1988, respectively. Since then, memoranda of understanding (MOU)
have been signed with the United Arab Emirates (2006), Kuwait (2007),
Oman (2008) and Malaysia and Bahrain (2009).
In addition, the Indian government has signed a Memorandum of
Understanding on Labour Mobility Partnership with Denmark, the
first such agreement with any European country. The MOU envisages
cooperation between the two countries in various respects, including
employment facilitation, promoting direct contact between Danish
employers and potential workers in India, organized entry and orderly
migration and exchange of information and cooperation on best prac-
tices for mutual benefit of employment for qualified workers (MOIA,
2009). It is in the interest of the Indian government to sign MOUs with
other countries of destination which are in particular attractive for
skilled migrants. As stated on the ministry’s website, MOIA is currently
pursuing the signing of MOUs with Poland and Korea, and they have
expressed an interest to sign similar labour agreements also with other
European and Southeast Asian countries in the future (MOIA, 2010)
While labour agreements by and large cover provisions on enhance-
ment of employment opportunities and on protection of workers, the
bilateral social security agreements place the protection of overseas
workers as the first priority. Such agreements improve the position of
expatriate workers by providing social security coordination between
the two countries. The first bilateral social security agreement was
concluded with Belgium in 2006, followed by agreements with the
Netherlands, Germany, France, Luxembourg, Denmark, Hungary, the
Czech Republic and Switzerland. So far, only agreements with Belgium,
Germany and France have entered into force. The agreements provide
for exemption from social security contributions for migrant workers
with a short-term contract, meaning a contract of up to 48 months
in Germany and 60 months in Belgium and France . According to the
agreements, pension entitlements are no longer restricted to the place
of residence, so Indian nationals are now entitled to receive pension
payments in whichever country they live. Similar agreements have been
initiated with other leading countries of destination, like the United
States, the United Kingdom and Canada.
The Indian government is also engaged in a number of initiatives at
the regional and global level. The Colombo Process is an example of
such regional cooperation. India was one of the ten initial participating
states which in Colombo, Sri Lanka, in 2003 called for a forum pur-
posefully created for regional consultations exclusively on migration
 India 91

issues. Currently, eleven member states of the process are Afghanistan,

Bangladesh, China, India, Indonesia, Nepal, Pakistan, the Philippines,
Sri Lanka, Thailand and Vietnam. The process also includes partici-
pants from destination countries, namely, from Bahrain, Italy, Kuwait,
Malaysia, Qatar, the Republic of Korea, Saudi Arabia and the United
Arab Emirates. The consultations evolve around development of new
employment markets, increasing remittance flows and facilitating the
development impact of remittances, trainings and skills development.
A number of policy studies, aimed primarily for decision-makers and
practitioners, have been carried out to support these efforts. Specific
initiatives in the member states are assessed, upon which examples are
drawn for best practices.
The growing importance of Indian highly skilled migration for the
European Union has been illustrated by an increasingly intensive coop-
eration in this field. An India–EU Joint Working Group on Consular
issues has been in place since the first EU–India Summit in 2000. The
Working Group meets twice a year and deals inter alia with the ques-
tion on how to facilitate the movement of persons between India and
the EU. Even though the focus is set on more practical issues, such as
the speedy delivery of consular and visa services, more general topics
of interest in the area of migration are also discussed. The importance
of the subject of migration in the context of EU–India relations was
emphasized in the Strategic Partnership Joint Action Plan adopted at
the EU–India summit in 2005. Behind the background of sizeable migra-
tory movements between the EU and India, the government representa-
tives identified the facilitation of movement of people as an important
objective. Both parties voice their intention to hold dialogues on
aspects related to migration and to encourage institutions to undertake
joint studies on problems relating to skill set shortages and the chang-
ing of demographic profiles.

Debates on the role of emigrants

All these diaspora initiatives are very recent developments. India began
engaging diaspora quite late given the existence of a large diaspora for
centuries. For a long time, the Indian government paid little attention
to its diaspora. India’s official position was that emigrants deserted their
country and were harmful to the country’s interests (Castles, 2008).
There was a prolonged period of ‘conscious de-linking’ (Sinha-Kerkhoff
and Bal, 2003), which prevailed from independence until the 1980s
(Lall, 2001).
92 Emigration Nations

There have been three main phases in diaspora policy: first, what may
be termed the ‘Gandhian approach’; second, the ‘Nehruvian approach’
and, last, the ‘Vajpayeean’ approach (Sinha-Kerkhoff and Bal, 2003). As
early as the beginning of the 1900s, we can already find a positive view on
emigrants and their link to development of the home country. In a report
of the Committee on Emigration from India to the Crown Colonies and
Protectorates in 1910, Lord Salisbury wrote:

From an Indian point of view, it is desirable to afford an outlet from

these redundant regions into the tropical and sub-tropical domin-
ions of Her Majesty, where people who hardly earn a decent subsist-
ence in their own country may obtain more lucrative employment
and better lives … From an imperial point of view it seems proper
to encourage emigration from India to the colonies well fitted for
Indian populations. It is better for India that they should return to
this country with her savings and their place in the colony should be
taken by others who are in need of employment.

However, not everyone agreed with this line of reasoning at the time.
According to Sinha-Kerkhoff and Bal (2003), the Indian government
believed ‘it was in India’s best interests that the emigrants should return
with their savings’ and they suggested that those who returned were
‘unsettled by the easier life they lead in the colonies’ and that they were
‘generally unable to settle down again to the harder conditions of life
prevailing in their native villages and to use their capital economically’.
Referring to early remittances, they criticize the fact that the money was
spent fast, after which people looked again for opportunities to leave.
These officials thought that it was therefore better for immigrants to
remain abroad. In cases of limited labour demand due to closing of
industry they even argued that the repatriation of many immigrants
was undesirable. The common outlook of the Indian government was
that migration should be encouraged.
Until India became independent, international migrants were seen as
part of the (future) Indian nation in Gandhian ideology. The independ-
ence movement in British India called on the support of the diaspora
abroad. The ‘overseas Indians’ played a key role in this movement. They
were first important in the struggle against the indentured system and
later as part of the campaigns against the mistreatment and discrimina-
tion of Indians in overseas colonies (Sinha-Kerkhoff and Bal, 2003).
After India gained its independence in 1947, attitudes towards the
diaspora changed. The new policy towards the diaspora has been
 India 93

characterized as ‘studied indifference’ (Parekh, 1993). This marked

a shift from the Gandhian ideology to that of (Pandit Jawaharlal)
Nehru. Nehru did not consider overseas Indians as part of the Indian
nation. He believed that ‘expatriate Indians had forfeited their Indian
citizenship and identity by moving abroad and did not need the sup-
port of their mother country’. As a result, overseas Indians were not
considered in India’s foreign policy (Lall, 2001). The official policy of
Nehru was:

It is the consistent policy of the government that persons of Indian

origin who have taken foreign nationality should identify them-
selves with and integrate in the mainstream of social and political
life of the country of their domicile. The government naturally
remains alive to their interests and general welfare and encourages
cultural contacts with them. As far as Indian citizens residing abroad
are concerned, they are the responsibility of the government of
India. (quoted in Lall, 2001: 169)

He believed that people should only identify with one place and that
in this case it should be the country in which you are residing. He did,
however, believe that ‘wherever in this world there goes an Indian,
there is also a bit of India with him’ (quoted in Sinha-Kerkhoff and
Bal, 2003). Such negative attitudes towards emigrants were particularly
evident during the attacks on Indians at the time of decolonization in
Africa, in particular in Uganda and Kenya, and in Fiji since the 1980s.
India refused to accept them back claiming they were no longer Indians.
His policies were the dominant view until the 1990s. However, there
were glimmers of other visions. Bahadur Singh (1979) believed that the
‘Indian diaspora was part of India’. He held the view that

It would only be natural for us to turn to the one resource on which

we have a national claim. This resource is the large funds, which are
at the command of people of Indian origin overseas. Sentimentally
they also would like to give first preference to India (quoted in Sinha-
Kerkhoff and Bal, 2003).

With the Janata government in 1977 there were some changes in

policy towards overseas Indians. This government introduced new entry
laws so that overseas Indians could return to India even with foreign
passports (Dutt, 1980). The Minister for Foreign Affairs at the time
also stated that India would ‘never disown overseas Indians, or fail to
94 Emigration Nations

appreciate their loyalty to the mother land’ (quoted in Sinha-Kerkhoff

and Bal, 2003). At the 1977 seminar held at the Indian International
Centre in New Delhi to consider the status of Indians living abroad, the
Minister of External Affairs Atal Bihari Vajpayee stated:

The subject of overseas in Indians is one which is very dear to our

hearts … everyone of Indian origin overseas is a representative of
India and retains many aspects of our cultural traditions and civi-
lization. Though our sons and daughters have gone aboard to work
or to reside there, India will never disown them or fail to appreciate
and respect their essential loyalty to the culture and heritage of the
mother country. (Singhvi et al., 2001)

A major shift in thinking about Indians abroad took place in the 1990s
when the Hindu nationalist Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) won elections
in 1998 and Vajpayee was sworn in as a Prime Minister. One of the first
steps for diaspora engagement was the introduction of the PIO card in
1999, which created a new status linking the diaspora with India for
the first time since they left. Such a swift change in attitude towards
diaspora came at the time of economic liberalization and globalization.
Ethnic networks started to be seen as value-free networks which can
serve as a resource. In the view of Ajay Dubey, with such a responsible
approach towards its diaspora India showed confidence, accepting that
one can have more than one loyalty (A. Dubey, personal communica-
tion, 10 February 2009).

Current situation
Today, the government has made a clear commitment by creating per-
manent institutions and dedicating resources for services that cater to
the needs of overseas Indians at the national and local level (Rannveig
Agunias, 2009). The growing economic and political importance of the
diaspora led to India’s cultivation of their relationship with overseas
populations. The first Pravasi Bharatiya Diwas was organized in 2003
in New Delhi. The objective of the gathering was ‘to bring the Indian
family from all over the world together and to acquaint the Indian peo-
ple with the achievements of the Indian diaspora and to use them as
a bridge to strengthen relationships between India and the host coun-
tries in this age of globalization’ (Sinha-Kerkhoff and Bal, 2003). When
Prime Minister Manmohan Singh addressed the diaspora in January
2010 at an annual gathering, he spoke of the immense pride he feels for
the achievement of Indian diaspora. Overseas Indians are applauded for
 India 95

their achievements which ‘have made a great contribution in changing

the image of India to the world at large’ (Singh, 2010).
The High Level Committee on Indian Diaspora was given a mandate
and sufficient time to come up with an exhaustive report, including
profiles for 22 areas of migration destination and recommendation per-
taining to Indian diaspora. It covered recommendations in the follow-
ing fields: consular issues, culture, economic development, education,
health, media, science and technology, philanthropy, dual citizenship
and diaspora relations and its organizational structure. In this way, a
holistic agenda has been created for the ministry, which is sensitive to the
diversity of the diaspora in terms of culture, language, skills, religion and
geographical regions. By setting up the MOIA in 2004, the Government of
India declared its long-term commitment to reach out to their migrants.
By dedicating sufficient time and resources for creating institutions, the
Indian government shows its assurance in the link between migration
and development. Nevertheless, there is a challenge of capacity building
as diaspora engagement is generally not high on government’s priority
areas. MOIA is the smallest ministry of the Indian government and recog-
nizes that it lacks manpower and logistics. In addition, MOIA has a large
coordination challenge, particularly with regard to its emigrant protec-
tion policies and managing a diverse group of stakeholders. The already
mentioned e-governance project, which MOIA started in 2010, recog-
nizes the various ministries and stakeholders involved in the emigration
process, the lack of coordination among the Indian ministries and the
need for greater capacity in this area. The e-governance project will build
internal capacity in order to have better protection of emigrants.

Conclusion

Indian emigration has a long history. It has always had an economic com-
ponent and was linked with its colonial history to Britain. Today mem-
bers of the diaspora are located all over the world, although the main
regions are currently North America (the United States and Canada),
Europe (mainly the United Kingdom) and the Middle East. Each of these
regions attract a different kind of emigrant with the very highly skilled
concentrating in North America and the low skilled mainly migrating to
the Middle East.
Government attitudes towards the Indian diaspora have shifted due
to changing interests and ideologies. It was only in the late 1990s
that the India government began to take an interest in their diaspora.
India’s previous official position towards its migrants was that they were
96 Emigration Nations

deserters and a harmful opposition to the country’s interests (Cohen,

2008; Castles, 2008). It was only in the past decade that India took a
real, active interest in their diaspora. Emigrants are now seen as agents
of development and India has taken a more active emigration policy,
promoting the training of Indians in specific sectors like IT, and are now
seen as a source of pride for the country (Vezzoli and Lacroix, 2010). The
diaspora is further negotiating its position in the development of India.
It is no longer asking only for possibilities for economic engagement
but wants to have a greater say also in India’s political developments.
For example, there are requests for the diaspora to be represented in
the parliament through the Third Chamber (A. Dubey, personal com-
munication, 10 February 2009). An even more pressing issue, until very
recently, was the inability of NRIs to vote. According to the provisions
of the Representation of the People (Amendment) Act, 2010, citizens of
India who are away from their place of ordinary residence in India can
register as voters in their respective constituencies; however, they are
not permitted to cast their votes in Indian elections from abroad. The
prime minister has recognized calls for absentee ballots as a ‘legitimate
desire’ and expressed hope that absentee ballots will be included in the
next general election. In his speech at PBD 2010, the prime minister
encouraged more overseas Indians to become as involved in politics
and public life as in the economic sector (Singh, 2010). The first legal
steps have already been enacted to enable Indians resident abroad to
participate in the election processes (Singh, 2012).
Such orientation is opening up the currently economically focused
approach to become more widespread and long term. Most of the poli-
cies are still very fresh or still in the process of enactment, but the Indian
government has already showed a strong will and managed to make
itself visible throughout the Indian community. Vezzoli and Lacroix
(2010) made a very flattering assessment of the Indian diaspora engage-
ment by naming it ‘one of the most comprehensive in the world’. The
fact that the Indian government is open to suggestions coming from
various sources sends a positive message that it is responsive to the needs
of the stakeholders in the process and that they are both aiming towards
the same goal.

Notes
1. The kangani system refers to a method of recruitment, where one of the work-
ers was sent back to India to recruit new men and women, usually from his
own region and caste (Rangaswamy, 2000).
 India 97

2. This included the movement of Indians from Surinam to the Netherlands,

from East Africa to the United Kingdom, from Madagascar, Mauritius and
Indo-China to France and from Mozambique and Angola to Portugal.
3. Available at http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat, accessed on 25 August 2009.
4. CBS Databank website, accessed 8 September 2009.
5. CBS Databank website, accessed 8 September 2009.
6. See http://www.oifc.in/About-Us, accessed on 11 August 2010.
7. See http://moia.gov.in/services.aspx?id1=75&id=m1&idp=75&mainid=73,
accessed on 11 August 2010.
8. See http://moia.gov.in/services.aspx?id1=284&idp=284&mainid=196, accessed
on 12 August 2010.
9. See http://globalink.in/home/about.asp, accessed on 11 August 2010.

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5
Towards the
Neo-Institutionalization of Irish
State–Diaspora Relations in the
Twenty-First Century
Breda Gray

Introduction

The significance of ties between ‘home’/‘sending’ states and their

diasporas has only recently begun to receive scholarly attention. In this
scholarship, sending states are not seen as ‘passive exit points, but […]
as a set of institutions whose policies and practices play a constitutive
role in emigration’ and in state–diaspora relations (Brand, 2006: 12).
Indeed, such state institutional arrangements have a long history with
‘emigration state’ systems being inherent in the nation-state form itself
(Gamlen, 2008; Brand, 2006). Yet, there is much evidence to suggest a
widespread neo-institutionalization of state–diaspora relations in recent
years. And, although this neo-institutionalization is taking place at the
level of states, it is shaped by the interventions and policy initiatives
of supranational institutions, and by the active lobbying of religious
and diaspora-based groups.1 Indeed, a UN Economic and Social Council
report on the increasing significance of diasporas noted that the recent
establishment of the Irish Abroad Unit (IAU) by the Irish government
was ‘precipitated largely by lobby groups who managed to demonstrate
the importance of the emigrant population by producing their own
data’ (2008: 7). While this points to the dynamic and relational aspects
of state–diaspora engagement, my focus in this chapter is primarily on
the role of the state.
Emigration has shaped Irish society and economy for nearly three
centuries and, following the establishment of the southern state in the
early 1920s, hopes that self-determination would bring an end to emi-
gration proved optimistic. Economic necessity, aspirations for a higher
standard of living and the closely integrated British/Irish labour market

100
 Ireland 101

contributed to the continued outflow, which also became a barometer

of state failure. Beyond normal diplomatic functions on the part of the
state, the maintenance of relations with emigrants and the diaspora was
left largely to the Catholic Church. But this was to change in the early
decades of the twenty-first century when the state began to develop an
explicit institutional structure for the maintenance of ties with the Irish
abroad.
What factors contributed to this rethinking of state arrangements
pertaining to expatriates and the diaspora? Can any (dis)continuities be
observed in state–diaspora relations over time? What issues are raised
by the neo-institutionalization of state–diaspora engagement in the last
decade? In addressing these questions, this chapter is divided into four
main sections. The first section introduces the wider modern context
of Irish emigration, its history and geography, pointing to the patterns
of migration over the twentieth century. The second section addresses
policy debates and initiatives relating to emigrants and the diaspora
over the twentieth century. The neo-institutionalization of Irish state–
diaspora relations since 2000 is addressed in the third section, while
the fourth section considers emergent debates and controversies sur-
rounding state–diaspora engagement and the question of emigrant
enfranchisement.

The modern context of Irish emigration:

Its history and geography

With over 70 million claiming Irish descent globally, the sheer size of
the Irish diaspora renders it a significant phenomenon. Of course, its
size reflects the persistence of emigration over nearly three centuries,
mainly to the English-speaking countries of Britain, the United States,
Canada, Australia and New Zealand.2 Figures for emigration in the
eighteenth century vary, but Fitzgerald and Lambkin (2008) suggest that
‘modern’ patterns of migration began between 1750 and 1800, with
most of those leaving for North America between 1720 and 1835 being
Protestants, mainly from Ulster. However, it was in the nineteenth
century that ‘mass’ emigration began and, although Irish emigration
in the eighteenth and nineteenth century can be placed in the wider
context of ‘European expansionism’ (Bielenberg, 2000: 216), ‘[n]o other
country lost so large a proportion of its people during the [nineteenth]
century, or experienced such consistently heavy emigration over so
long a period’ (Fitzpatrick, 1984: 1).
102 Emigration Nations

Emigration peaked around the time of the Great Famine with about
2.5 million emigrating between 1846 and 1855 (Fitzpatrick, 1984).
Most went to the United States, with Britain, Canada and Australasia
accounting for smaller flows (Fitzpatrick, 1984). Seasonal movement
between Scotland and England and some counties in Ireland was also
significant in the nineteenth and first half of the twentieth centuries.
However, unlike other great migrations at the time, family movement
was rare, women were equally migratory as men and return migration
was relatively low. Most emigrant streams were characterized by young
unmarried and low-skilled adults (Fitzpatrick, 1984).3 And while the
outflow after the Great Famine was mainly Catholic, the larger Irish
ethnic group in the United States was and continues to be predomi-
nantly Protestant (Akenson, 2000).
In the nineteenth century, Ireland saw the creation of an interna-
tional Catholic Church throughout the diaspora and the emergence of
a reciprocal relationship between the homeland and diaspora (Gilley,
1984). During this century contact with the homeland created an inter-
national consciousness, as the pride in religion and nationality at home
was strengthened by an awareness of a new empire of common faith
and purpose beyond the seas (1984: 197).
The Church, as a key actor in this dynamic, ‘became an international
agency for achieving assimilation in the new-found land while preserv-
ing a traditional apartness’ (1984: 203; see also Hickman, 1999).
Expatriate nationalism was another significant feature of some Irish
diaspora communities in Britain and the United States in the nineteenth
and early twentieth centuries (Newsinger, 1994; Hutchinson and O’Day,
1999). For example, Irish–American funding helped support Daniel
O’Connell’s Catholic Emancipation campaign (1811–1829), Charles
Stewart Parnell’s Home Rule campaign (1882–1891) and Michael Davitt’s
agrarian movement (1879–1890s) (O’Clery, 1996). And while Eamon
DeValera’s Irish Bond drive in the United States helped fund the estab-
lishment of the Irish Free State, it also revealed the different agendas of
nationalists in Ireland and the United States, as DeValera found himself
in conflict with Irish American organizations on a range of issues from
tactics to financial management (Harris, 2009; Lainer Vos, 2011).
Miller argues that nineteenth-century emigrants to North America
adopted a ‘traditional Irish Catholic world view [that] predisposed them
to view themselves […] as involuntary, nonresponsible “exiles”, com-
pelled to leave home by forces [… of] British and landlord oppression’
(1985: 556).4 Although this world view was not found in other emigrant
locations such as Britain (MacRaild, 1999), South Africa or Argentina
 Ireland 103

(Harris, 2009: 128), Irish nationalists tended to construct emigrants as

‘unwilling and tragic political exiles’ and imagined the ideal independ-
ent Ireland as free of emigration (2006: 7).
However, emigration continued following independence with Britain
replacing North America as the main emigrant destination due to more
restrictive US immigration policy and proximity of Britain’s expanding
labour market. By alleviating high unemployment and associated discon-
tent, emigration relieved potential social unrest particularly at the high
points of twentieth-century emigration in the 1950s and 1980s. During
the 1950s ‘approximately one in eight of the population emigrated’
(O’Hanlon, 2004: 72). However, emigration in this decade involved
return for a more significant number of emigrants than for any earlier
cohort (Ó Gráda, 1997). Net in-migration in the 1970s reflected higher
levels of economic and employment growth in Ireland and consisted of
return emigrants and their families (Gmelch, 1987; McGrath, 1991).
Entry to the European Economic Community (EEC) in 1973, the inten-
sification of the conflict in Northern Ireland and the targeting of inter-
national markets for Irish goods changed the context of state/emigrant
relations in this decade. For example, EEC membership meant that emi-
gration to Britain could be reframed in some cases within the category of
EEC worker ‘mobility’. Meanwhile, Irish groups in Britain were becoming
more vocal in response to their difficult position as the Northern Ireland
conflict intensified, giving rise to more active emigrant lobbying of the
Irish state. The 1970s also saw state agencies beginning to target emi-
grants in export, recruitment and investment drives (Daly, 2008).
When recession returned in the 1980s, emigration rose to about
40,000 per annum with that figure rising considerably in the later years
of the decade (NESC, 1991: 8). As ‘professional and non-manual groups
[tended] to be overrepresented’ amongst those leaving (NESC, 1991: 84),
an image of young, educated European mobile workers was promoted
by the Industrial Development Authority (IDA) slogan ‘The Republic of
Ireland: We’re the Young Europeans’. However, emigration in this dec-
ade also acted as a survival strategy for working-class and small-farming
families (Mac Laughlin, 1994). Throughout the twentieth century, emi-
gration flows included fairly equal numbers of men and women who
were mainly young and single and between the emigration high points
of the 1950s and the 1980s, the class composition shifted towards a
higher proportion of middle-class emigrants (Ó Gráda, 1997).
Despite the recession, the factoring of return migration into economic
growth predications suggests a confidence in the future of the national
economy in the 1980s. For example, the National Economic and Social
104 Emigration Nations

Council (NESC) report on emigration identified return as ‘an important

factor […] in the context of achieving sustained economic growth’ (1991:
257). The eventual response of the state to high national debt, unem-
ployment and emigration was to enter into partnership agreements with
labour and capital which created the conditions to take advantage of the
global upturn in the 1990s. Indeed, unprecedented demand for labour
led to Ireland becoming a country of net immigration in 1996 with the
third highest immigration rate across the 27 European Union (EU) mem-
ber states (after Spain and Cyprus) by 2007 (Ruhs and Quinn, 2009).
Return Irish migrants accounted for over half of immigrants in the
late 1990s and were targeted by government agencies attempting to fill
labour market gaps in Ireland (Hayward and Howard, 2007). However,
as immigration increased, the proportion of return Irish migrants
decreased from 27 per cent of the inflow between 2003 and 2005 to 18
per cent between 2006 and 2008 (Gouveia, 2010). Although emigration
continued throughout the ‘Celtic Tiger’ years with about 14,000 Irish
nationals leaving annually,5 net out-migration was to return when the
economy crashed in 2008 and emigration overtook immigration for the
first time in 14 years in the year to April 2009. For the first couple of
years, most to those leaving were from 12 Eastern and Central European
states, but in the years to April 2011 and 2012, Irish nationals accounted
for 53 per cent of emigrants (CSO, 2011 and 2012). Although destina-
tions are more globally dispersed than in the past, Irish emigrants
are still moving mainly to English-speaking countries, with Britain,
Australia, Canada, New Zealand and the United States being the most
popular destinations (CSO, 2011).

State–emigrant/diaspora relations in the twentieth and early

twenty-first century: A changing policy and institutional context
Although one of the central ambitions of the new state following inde-
pendence was to end emigration, as noted above, it remained a central
feature of Irish society for most decades in the twentieth century.
While the state provided the usual diplomatic services, responsibility
for the welfare (and morality) of emigrants for the most part remained
the responsibility of the Catholic Church. In the early decades after
independence, organizations such as the International Catholic Girls
Protection Society and the Catholic Young Men’s Society of Ireland
(CYMS) worked with intending and arriving emigrants to ensure that
they found suitable lodgings and were linked with local church organi-
zations. However, the work of the Church gained a more formal footing
when the Catholic Welfare Bureau, including an Emigrant’s Section,
 Ireland 105

was established by the Archbishop of Dublin in 1942. Delaney suggests

that this church-based assistance to working-class emigrants reflected
middle-class concerns in Ireland that emigrants would not ‘maintain
and uphold the morals of a “respectable” Catholic country whilst living
abroad’ (2007: 37).
In 1954, the reports of the state-appointed Commission on Emigration
and Other Population Problems noted that most emigrants improved
their living standards by leaving and that emigration also increased the
living standards of those who remained (Daly, 2006: 173). Remittances
were seen as facilitating ‘greater equality in the distribution of wealth’
(Commission reports 1954: Para 313) and, overall, emigration was seen
as neither a loss nor a gain to the community (Para 315–316). One
contemporary academic remarked that ‘[o]ne is left with the impres-
sion that the Commission may have had some difficulty in passing
judgment on the desirability of emigration’ (Ryan, 1955: 188). While
the reports gave rise to some public debate, government departments
largely ignored their recommendations, suggesting a continued ambiva-
lence about emigration on the part of the state (Delaney, 2000).
The publication of a collection of essays entitled The Vanishing Irish,
edited by Irish–American priest John O’Brien in 1953, contributed to
a panic about population decline, evident also in debates prior to the
passing of the Irish Nationality and Citizenship Act (1956). This act con-
ferred citizenship as a birthright on the children and grandchildren of
anyone born in Ireland regardless of where they lived. Dáil debates on
the bill emphasized that Ireland was:

a mother country, with large overseas populations, many of whom

were forced to emigrate and to become citizens of another country
for economic reasons, but who, nevertheless, have ties of affection
and racial pride with the home land. (Minister for Justice, James
Everett quoted in Gallagher, 1988: 133)

Although this act might have helped bolster a declining population,

it was never widely promulgated and had little impact on population
trends (Gallagher, 1988).
As evidence of migrant welfare needs in Britain mounted during the
1950s and 1960s, the Catholic bishops lobbied the state to intervene,
but to no avail. Indeed, the Irish ambassador in London reported in 1957
that emigrant services were most effectively provided by ecclesiastical
authorities, voluntary organizations and the embassy (Daly, 2006: 296).
In the same year, the bishops further institutionalized the role of the
106 Emigration Nations

Church by establishing the Irish Episcopal Commission for Emigrants

(IECE). A series of missions, Legion of Mary projects and a network of
chaplaincy services were set up across Britain with the agreement of the
British church (Delaney, 2007). Some pioneering chaplains developed
housing associations and Irish centres to meet the many social needs
of migrants (Kennedy, 2007). Meanwhile, the state continued to take
a passive role in responding to emigration with the Taoiseach Sean
Lemass noting in 1965 that to fund ‘Irish centres in England would be
unsound from the point of view of state finance and would in practice
be incapable of being kept within fixed limits’ (in Delaney, 2000: 259).
A small shift in policy was signalled in 1968 when the Minister for
Labour called on his department to provide better information about
job opportunities to ‘“boys and girls with lower standards of education”,
forced to look for work abroad’ (Meehan, 2006: 7). This ‘was the first
acknowledgement by a government minister that emigrants had rights
and that the state had a responsibility toward emigrants’ (Daly, 2006:
320). In the following year, the Chair of the Catholic Church’s Emigrant
Advisory Committee suggested to the Minister for External Affairs that
the term emigration had ‘too much of the “pathetic Irish” about it’ and
suggested the use of the terms ‘the Irish abroad’ or ‘the overseas Irish’
instead (Daly, 2006: 327). This marked the first move towards reframing
emigration ‘to fit the image of a modern progressive Ireland’ (Daly, 2006).
Modest government measures to recognize and support emigrants in
the 1970s and 1980s reflected an expansion of state welfare provision in
Ireland during these decades. The Minister for Labour established a Dublin-
based Committee on Welfare Services Abroad (COWSA) in the early 1970s
to support young people leaving for England. This was superseded in 1984
by a London-based DION6 Committee which was tasked with allocating
limited funding to address the needs of ‘vulnerable’ migrants in Britain. As
emigration figures rose, an Interdepartmental Committee on Emigration
was established in 1989 to monitor developments affecting emigrants and
develop an information base on emigration. And, as many emigrants were
arriving in the United States undocumented, the government also sup-
ported a campaign to regularize their position. As emigration was increas-
ingly recognized as a matter of concern, a report by the NESC (1991)
provided an analysis of emigration and came up with a number of rec-
ommendations, including a call for the establishment of a Transfrontier
Committee. The work of this committee, which was formed in 1991, is to
frame migration in terms of the European Commission (EC) goal of ‘pro-
moting the free movement of workers within the [European] Community’
(Minister for Labour, Dáil Debates, 1991). Building on this move, the state
 Ireland 107

training agency Irish National Training and Employment Authority (FÁS)

began operating the European Job Mobility Portal (EURES), which coordi-
nated employment opportunities across the EU in 1994.
The growing emphasis on labour mobility (rather than emigration) was
perhaps most evident in discourses of 1980s emigrants as high-flying,
mobile workers upskilling abroad. Famously, the Minister for Foreign
Affairs, Mr Brian Lenihan (1987), suggested that the 1980s migrant ‘thinks
nothing of coming to the United States and going back to Ireland and
maybe on to Germany and back to Ireland again’, honing their skills and
talents abroad for deployment on return. Irish mobility was being pro-
moted as a resource (Gray, 2004, 2006, 2012) and, as noted earlier, many of
this generation returned to a booming ‘Celtic Tiger’ Ireland in the 1990s.
Conceptions of what constituted the Irish nation were also chang-
ing and, in the 1970s and 1980s, new formulations of ‘postnationalist’
belonging emerged that located Ireland in wider global/EC contexts
and Irish identity within a global diaspora (Kearney, 1997; Böss, 2002).
The diaspora, insofar as it included both the Scots–Irish Presbyterian and
the post-Famine Irish Catholic components of the Irish in the United
States in particular, symbolically subverted the territorialized national-
isms (British and Irish) that fuelled the conflict in Northern Ireland. As
such, it offered a capacious version of Irish identity. This formulation of
diaspora was taken up by President Mary Robinson (1990–1997), who,
in an address to the Houses of the Oireachtas (Irish Parliament and
Senate), in 1995, suggested that the diaspora could ‘instruct our society
in the values of diversity, tolerance, and fair-mindedness … [offering]
the chance to have that dialogue with our own diversity’.
Although this rather abstract use of the term diaspora was seen by
many as sanitizing the politics of emigration and far removed from eve-
ryday emigrant experiences (Byrne, 1995; Lloyd, 1999; Mac Laughlin,
1994), it facilitated a flexibility of Irish identity and culture that was to
be useful politically. At the government level, the diaspora or ‘the Irish
Abroad’ began to be seen as a political constituency. For example, the
Department of Foreign Affairs White Paper on Foreign Policy in 1996
devoted a chapter to ‘the Irish Abroad’ in which it committed to assist-
ing ‘cases of particular need’ (1996: 289). The term diaspora was also
mobilized in furthering the Northern Ireland Peace Process and Belfast/
Good Friday Agreement (1998) and the subsequent passing of a consti-
tutional amendment led to the rephrasing of Article 2 of the constitu-
tion, which now includes the statement that ‘the Irish nation cherishes
its special affinity with people of Irish ancestry living abroad who share
its cultural identity and heritage’
108 Emigration Nations

Although constitutional and ‘official’ recognition of the diaspora

opened up opportunities at a political level, in the latter decades of the
twentieth century, it was evident to Catholic Church agencies on the
front line that resources were not being directed towards supporting
‘vulnerable’ emigrants. Thus, in 1998 the IECE commissioned research
into current patterns of and policies on emigration with a view to set-
ting out the main policy challenges. While reaffirming the role of the
IECE and the chaplaincy in ‘meeting the social, pastoral and other needs
of Irish emigrants through the provision of generic and specialised
frontline social services’ (1999: 67), this influential report called on the
government to establish a comprehensive policy, funding and service
infrastructure. Its publication also coincided with initiatives to embrace
the Irish abroad arising from the Good Friday/Belfast Agreement (1998)
and became a reference point for the neo-institutionalization of state–
diaspora relations in the early 2000s.

The neo-institutionalization of state–emigrant/diaspora relations

In 2001, the government established a Task Force on Policy regarding
Emigrants in response to this ‘new context in which to view the phe-
nomenon of Irish emigration’ (Task Force Report, 2002: 3). The Task
Force report in 2002 recommended a comprehensive infrastructure to
support welfare, social and cultural needs in the diaspora. After some
prevarication, and following lobbying by the Catholic Church and
other actors, the government established the IAU in the Department of
Foreign Affairs (DFA) in 2004. The Minister for Foreign Affairs described
the functions of the Unit as:

‘to co-ordinate the provision of Government support to Irish emi-

grants, those considering emigration and those who wish to return
to Ireland. This includes supporting voluntary agencies working
with Irish emigrants and, in accordance with Article Two of the
Constitution, strengthening links with the Irish and people of Irish
ancestry living abroad’ (Aherne, 2007).

Echoing President Mary Robinson’s 1995 speech to the Houses of the

Oireachtas, he justified financial support to the diaspora on the basis
that ‘[w]e can never acquit the debt of gratitude we owe to generations
of emigrants. But we can, and should, share our new resources to cher-
ish our Diaspora’ (Aherne, 2007).
A new diaspora-wide Emigrant Support Programme (ESP) was estab-
lished in the IAU7 and formed the central focus of its work until 2008.
 Ireland 109

This programme dispenses considerable funding (over €93 million

between 2004 and 2011) for welfare, cultural and sporting activities
across the diaspora. In 2011, some €11.27 million was provided to sup-
port over 200 organizations in 20 countries worldwide with the bulk
of funding going to Britain, which accounts for the largest propor-
tion of emigrants (Gilmore, 2012). While the funding of welfare helps
restore national honour by atoning for involuntary emigration in the
past, funding for culture and heritage projects abroad seeks to foster ‘a
greater sense of identity and belonging within Irish communities and
strengthen their links with Ireland’ (Department of Foreign Affairs &
Trade website).
The welfare-based aspect of state–diaspora relations has moved into the
shadows since 2008 when a new economic development-oriented strand
of diaspora engagement, promoted by economist David McWilliams,
came to the fore. This strand is encouraged on the basis that:

The future is services and the key to services is brainpower and the
key to brainpower is capacity and the key to capacity is the Diaspora.
It gives Ireland the largest, best-educated, English-speaking network
in the world. This is not a virtual community. It is the real thing
and it is waiting to be tapped. It is our lever into the 21st century.
(McWilliams, 2007: 246)

The economic downturn in 2008 became the stimulus for state action
on this front and the inaugural Global Irish Economic Forum (GIEF),
convened in 2009, brought together 112 of ‘the most influential mem-
bers of the global Irish community’ in business and culture (Martin,
2009).8 This Forum meeting had two central objectives:

To explore how the Irish at home and abroad, and those with a
strong interest in Ireland, could work together and contribute to our
overall efforts at economic recovery; and to examine ways in which
Ireland and its global community could develop a more strategic rela-
tionship with each other, particularly in the economic sector. (DFA,
2009; emphasis added)

These objectives complement other state economic policy initiatives

including the Government’s Action Plan for Jobs 2012; the Strategy for
Science, Technology and Innovation 2006–2013; Building Ireland’s Smart
Economy (2008); the Report of the Innovation Taskforce (2010) and foreign
policy as articulated in the Ireland–United States Strategic Review (2009).
110 Emigration Nations

The latter review argued that the economic downturn was ‘a timely
stimulus to … see how this valuable resource [“our overseas communi-
ties”] can be elevated to a new and even more dynamic level’ (Embassy
of Ireland, Washington 2009: 13).
The GIEF creates new lines of access to the government for those
identified as influential members of the global Irish community.
Reflecting on the success of the inaugural GIEF, the Minister for Foreign
Affairs& Trade (also Tánaiste or deputy prime minister) noted that ‘the
broad economic policies […] advocated by many participants were
reflected significantly in Budget 2010’ and that the ‘follow-up process’
had assisted in implementing ‘the Building Ireland’s Smart Economy
strategy and the recommendations of the Innovation Task Force’
(Gilmore, 2011b). It must be noted, however, that although the GIEF
recommendations carry some weight, they are ‘not formally endorsed
by Government’ (DFA, 2010: 2).
Outcomes of the first GIEF in 2009 include a Farmleigh Fellowship
programme designed to equip Irish graduates ‘with the business, cul-
tural and communication skills necessary to succeed in Asia within
15 years’; the launch of the WorldIrish.com; the appointment of
Hollywood actor Gabriel Byrne as Cultural Ambassador for Ireland until
he resigned in 2011; the launch of the Certificate of Irish Heritage;
the expansion of Irish business networks abroad and, perhaps most
significantly, the launch of the Global Irish Network (GIN) composed
of regional sub-networks around the world in 2010 (Gilmore, 2011a).
These initiatives involve a combination of state-led, private sector-led
and state–private sector partnership arrangements.
While the GIEF acts as ‘a structured engagement between the
Government and leading business figures’ from the diaspora (Gilmore,
2011a), the GIN is the driving force of Irish state–diaspora engagement
with GIN members acting ‘as partners with Government in spreading
key economic messages abroad, advising on specific initiatives and
assisting Irish business development overseas’ (DFA, 2009: 8). The 300-
plus GIN members have either ‘a record of high achievement in inter-
national business’ or prominence ‘in the cultural or sporting worlds’
(Martin, 2010). The state aims for the network are:

to harness their expertise and experiences … to deepen [state]

engagement with Irish communities worldwide and to spread the
message that Ireland is absolutely open for business, and remains an
attractive place for international investment, business people and
tourists alike. (Martin, 2010).
 Ireland 111

The Network is coordinated by a Secretariat within the Irish Abroad

Unit of the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, ambassadors liaise
with the members based within their area of responsibility and an
Advisory Group for the GIN was appointed in 2011 to review progress
on the Forum outcomes, coordinate the GIN work programme and work
with ambassadors to keep the wider Network informed of developments.
Launching the second GIEF meeting in 2011, the Taoiseach (prime
minister) welcomed the 260 in attendance, describing them as ‘[e]mis-
saries, with outstanding reputation and generosity, bringing Ireland’s
message of regeneration and resurgence to and from no fewer than 37
countries’ (Kenny, 2011). The Minister for Foreign Affairs & Trade sug-
gested ‘diaspora engagement’ was not ‘an aspirational or unquantifiable
concept’, but ‘a powerful relationship-building strategy – an arm of our
industrial, economic and diplomatic policy – that delivers innovative and
practical initiatives’ (2011a). The topics for discussion were decided by the
government in advance and reflected ‘the priorities identified in the new
Programme for Government’ and economic recovery (Gilmore, 2011a).
The outcomes of the second Forum ranged from an ‘Invest in Ireland
Roundtable’ hosted in New York in February 2012 by former US presi-
dent Clinton and the Global Irish Contacts Programme to a GIN fund-
ing scheme for small- and medium-sized enterprises in Ireland, and the
announcement of a year-long festival in 2013 entitled ‘The Gathering
Ireland’ as a means of boosting tourism (DFA&T, 2012a, 2012c). This
Forum meeting also called for a more government-wide infrastructure
to ensure the effective fostering of state–diaspora relations and led
to the establishment of a Strategic Communications Unit based in the
Department of the Taoiseach; formats for regular communications on
decisions taken and progress made from the Taoiseach and Tánaiste to
GIN members; formalization of GIN involvement in Trade Missions and
the formation of the GIN Advisory Group co-chaired by the Taoiseach
and the Tánaiste.9 The Irish Abroad Unit in the Department of Foreign
Affairs maintains a central coordinating function.
However, the sustainability of the GIN and wider diaspora engage-
ment involves more than an institutional infrastructure because highly
connected members of the diaspora do not have to support state attempts
to engage them (Fitzgerald, 2008, 4). The state is, therefore, faced with
how ‘thick’ ethnic (or other forms of) identification amongst globally
dispersed cosmopolitan members and potential members might be cul-
tivated and sustained. Addressing this question, a recent Ireland Funds
Review of diaspora engagement described this as ‘a long-term “hearts
and minds” business’ noting that ‘an emotional and cultural connection’
112 Emigration Nations

acts as the glue that sustains connection with the home country (Aikins
et al. 2009: 4/21). Yet, it is precisely this emotional connection between
Ireland and the Irish–American diaspora in particular, that is currently in
question. For example, the recent Ireland–US Relations Review suggested
that with the end of the Northern Ireland conflict, sentimental links to
Ireland were on the wane (Embassy of Ireland, Washington 2009). In
view of this, it recommended that the state actively cultivate affective
relationships to Ireland, primarily via appeals to ancestry and affinity
and suggested the launch of Certificates of Irish Heritage.
In an effort to forge and/or maintain such affinity through the gen-
erations, Certificates of Irish Heritage were approved at the inaugural
GIEF, officially announced in June 2010 and launched in summer 2011.
These certificates do not confer citizenship, legal rights or entitlements,
but give ‘official recognition to the many people worldwide who are
conscious of their Irish heritage and feel a strong affinity for Ireland’
(Gilmore, 2011c). As such, they work primarily as recognition of herit-
age and identification with Ireland and enable a global connection to be
sustained through ancestry, a mode of recognition without substantive
rights. Applicants are required to submit details and documentation of
their Irish ancestral connections with Ireland. Although a number of
certificates have been presented by the state, they can also be applied
for by any member of the diaspora who can prove an ancestral connec-
tion. The certificates are issued by a third-party agency acting under
licence from the Department of Foreign Affairs & Trade, are available in
Irish, English and Spanish and cost about €40. By the end of 2012, just
under 1,000 certificates had been issued (Hegarty, 2012).
Another form of official recognition, this time for those who have
made ‘a sustained and distinguished service to Ireland and/or Irish
communities abroad’ was proposed at the second GIEF and launched
in March 2012. Nominees for this Presidential Distinguished Service
Award for the Irish Abroad are made through Ireland’s embassy net-
work and then recommended to the government by a High Level Panel
based in Ireland. The first awards were presented by President Higgins
in November 2012 to ten members of the diaspora for their work in the
areas of philanthropy, culture, business networking/mentoring, sports
and community support.
These awards and certificates inscribe ancestry, identification and
service at the heart of diasporic belonging. However, the inaugural GIEF
also called on the Irish state to ‘[p]lace greater value on, and build new
connections with affinity Diaspora (foreign nationals who have lived in
Ireland, but now returned to their countries of origin)’ (DFA, 2009: 9;
 Ireland 113

see Boyle and Kitchin, 2008). This more inclusive approach to defining
Ireland’s global community would encompass those who ‘[…] feel a
sense of affinity with this country’ (Minister Martin, in Cullen, 2010).
A similar appeal to cultivating non-ancestry-based affinities with Ireland
was made in the US–Ireland Relations Review, which recommended
that consideration ‘be given to establishing a fast track naturalisation
regime for those […] not eligible for citizenship by virtue of descent,
[who] have demonstrated a particular affinity with Ireland’ (Embassy
of Ireland, Washington 2009: 14). Although the notion of an affinity
diaspora tends to be posed as an afterthought, it goes some way towards
creating the conditions in which Ireland and Irish culture might be cho-
sen as a focus of attachment or identification. It is difficult to determine
at this early stage the impact of these moves towards institutionalizing
state–diaspora relations, but in the following section I consider some of
the points of contention as these have arisen in public debate.

Contentious issues in state–diaspora relations

Although Irish state–diaspora engagement initiatives enable the social,

cultural and economic participation of some elements of Ireland’s
external citizenship population (approximately 3.5 million relative
to a resident population of approximately 4.5 million) and diaspora,
they exclude formal political enfranchisement. Because residency is a
central criterion for voting rights, political membership is conceived
primarily in territorial terms and the idea of emigrant enfranchisement
is treated as a radical idea that has little political or popular support.
However, lobbying by diaspora groups in Britain and the United States
in the 1990s forced this issue onto the political agenda.10 For example,
a Private Members’ Bill introduced to the Dáil in 1991 advocated emi-
grant voting rights for up to 15 years after becoming non-resident. The
Minister for the Environment countered arguments for enfranchise-
ment at the time on the basis that emigrants would not be politically
informed, that Irish citizens in Britain could vote in British elections
and that the size of the emigrant constituency would be greater than
the national electorate (Dáil Éireann, Official Report, 1991). In the end,
the bill was defeated due to a combination of the alleged administrative
and constitutional problems involved.11
Due to continued pressure from diaspora-based campaigns, the govern-
ment committed itself to the provision of three Seanad (Upper House)
seats for election by Irish emigrants in 1994. However, a divergence
of views in response to the government’s consultation paper led
114 Emigration Nations

to the matter being referred to the All-Party Committee on the

Constitution, which recommended that the right to vote in Dáil elec-
tions should remain confined to citizens ‘ordinarily resident’ in the
state. Acknowledging that the history of emigration is a cause for regret,
the Committee report (2002) noted that the fruitfulness of relations
with the Irish abroad in recent years was not an argument for direct
emigrant participation in the central institutions of the state. Emigrants,
it suggested, are a category of Irish citizens that is not fundamentally
affected by the actions of the Dáil. The one positive proposal was that
the Taoiseach, in nominating senators, should include at least one
person with an awareness of emigrant issues. These recommendations
were made first on the basis of ‘the likely scale of the emigrant vote,
and how it might be mobilised and directed’ and, second, based on a
concern that emigrant votes might be decisive in forming governments
(2002: 58). However, the effect of the report was to draw a boundary
around political entitlement and, therefore, between Irish citizens who
are ‘ordinarily resident’ in the Republic of Ireland and those who are
not, highlighting ‘the ongoing central reality of Irish territoriality [and]
the ongoing centrality of being in Ireland to being of Ireland’ (Howard,
2002, emphasis in original).
In 2006, a joint Fine Gael Party and Labour Party document on the
Irish abroad stated that both parties were committed ‘to re-examining
the possibility of some form of direct election to the Seanad and […]
consult[ing] with emigrant organisations to see if previous difficul-
ties [… could] be overcome’ (Connaughton and Stagg, 2006: 4). The
Programme for Government of the Fianna Fáil, Green and Progressive
Democrat coalition government in 2007 committed to considering the
extension of franchise for presidential elections to the Irish abroad.
However, noting the government’s reluctance to act on this, the Irish
Times columnist Paul Gillespie (2009) observed that there is still a great
numbness about any wider political or representational role for the
overseas Irish. Successive efforts to secure voting rights for the estimated
3.5 million Irish citizens abroad, or for the 1 million or so Irish-born
of them, came to nothing. Even a modest representation in the Seanad
rather than the Dáil proved unacceptable.
Offering an analysis of government inaction to date, he stated that:

The tangled history of Irish emigration as the safety valve for a

conservative society conveniently ridding itself of the most dissatis-
fied men and women of each generation explains much about how
neglectfully they were treated until the 1990s by official Ireland.
 Ireland 115

In a similar vein, Noreen Bowden (2011), former director of Emigrant

Advice and editor of GlobalIrishVote.com, pointed out that ‘Ireland’s
refusal to allow emigrants voting rights is a tremendous advantage for
the insiders of the political establishment, ensuring that a big propor-
tion of those most affected by the economic downturn won’t be around
to cast their verdict’ (in Geoghegan, 2011).
However, with the return of large-scale emigration since 2009, the
issue of enfranchisement received some attention during the 2011
general and presidential elections. For example, the Labour Party sup-
ported an extension of the franchise for local, general and presidential
polls to emigrants for up to five years after they left Ireland. During the
presidential campaign, Michael D. Higgins advocated extending this
to ten years after leaving. Moreover, a recent emigrant to Canada put
enfranchisement on the agenda by setting up ‘ballotbox.ie’, an online
poll open only to those outside the country with an Irish passport
number. During the general election 5,580 Irish emigrant votes were
recorded in 124 countries producing results that largely reflected those
of the election in Ireland (Coyle, 2013). In the presidential election, bal-
lotbox.ie also delivered a result similar to that in Ireland. Meanwhile, at
the level of government, the matter was delegated (yet again) in 2012
to a Constitutional Convention, which is to address a range of propos-
als including the right of citizens abroad to vote at Irish embassies in
presidential elections only.
Emigrant enfranchisement is without doubt the focus of the most
contentious public debate. However, questions are beginning to be
posed about state–diaspora engagement initiatives, particularly with
regard to the relationships between the Irish state and GIEF/GIN mem-
bers. Members of GIEF and GIN can be seen as having semi-autonomous
‘insider’ status to serve the state but with limited accountability because
they are participating in voluntary rather than employed or elected
capacities (Mitchell, 2003). As such, the role of globally powerful and
connected members of the diaspora in shaping domestic policy becomes
a political topic. For example, a proposal by the Silicon Valley-based
Irish Technology Leadership Group to provide a list of 100 highly quali-
fied business leaders from across the globe to serve pro bono on relevant
Irish state boards was supported by the GIEF. However, this proposal
was opposed by the Institute of Directors in Ireland on the basis that
appropriate criteria for board membership would be bypassed and the
importance of residence for this role ignored (Madden, 2012). One
GIEF member suggested that this ‘self-serving rejection’ overlooked the
contribution of ideas and capital by Silicon Valley-based entrepreneurs
116 Emigration Nations

for ‘an Irish resurgence [… by] financing an innovation centre in San

Jose for emerging Irish companies, mentoring and funding many […]
We find it tragic […] that we received this clumsy response’ (Madden,
2012). These conflicting positions were eventually reconciled in favour
of the Institute of Directors by the government’s assertion that it would
not favour volunteers from the diaspora when making appointments
to state boards. Since the second GIEF, an interdepartmental commit-
tee headed by the Secretary General to the Government, government
departments and State Agencies work in partnership with members
of the GIN and wider diaspora to advance GIEF priority outcomes, it
is the GIEF priority outcomes that are the focus of this partnership
(DFA&T, 2012c).
Another controversy arose in relation to GIEF member Denis
O’Brien, a well-known public figure within the business, sporting and
philanthropy communities and tax exile now living in Malta, yet listed
by Forbes in 2011 as Ireland’s second richest billionaire. O’Brien flew
former US president Bill Clinton to Dublin for the second GIEF in his
private jet and, amongst other contributions, sponsored the Farmleigh
Asian Fellowship programme to the tune of several hundred thousand
euros (Byrne, 2011). However, having been found to have engaged in
unacceptable business practices by a publically funded tribunal, his
presence at the GIEF and at other official state events abroad gave
rise to some debate regarding government double standards regard-
ing links between politics and business. Although the controversy
extended to rows within and between both parties in government,
an official government statement expressed confidence in Mr O’Brien
as someone who is ‘involved in many important Irish businesses and
charities and [… who has] an important contribution to make to
the forum’.
In the case of O’Brien, the concern was about ethical relationships
between government and business and the influence of financially
powerful GIEF members. However, a public debate about the sincerity
of the state’s relationship to the diaspora arose following critical com-
ments by former Cultural Ambassador and Hollywood actor Gabriel
Byrne about the GIEF tourism initiative ‘The Gathering’. Modelled on
the Scottish ‘Homecoming’ of 2009, this year-long festival is aimed at
encouraging members of the diaspora and anyone with an interest in
Ireland to visit in 2013. The project is sponsoring pre-existing events
and festivals and encouraging individuals, families and communities
to organize small-scale gatherings around the country. In a radio inter-
view, Gabriel Byrne described ‘The Gathering’ as a ‘scam’ and a ‘shake
 Ireland 117

down’ of the diaspora. Most official and media reactions in Ireland

criticized Byrne for not donning the ‘green jersey’, and the Minister
for Tourism dismissed him as an aging sex symbol. Reflecting on these
reactions, Byrne noted:

All I was saying was ‘This is what I’ve heard on the ground, this is
what I have heard in my dealings with people over there, and I can
hear anger; I can hear regret, I can hear cynicism, I can hear all of
those things’. So instead of engaging with them and saying ‘OK,
maybe your man has something to say because he’s lived over there
since 1987, maybe we should listen to this, maybe there’s something
to be got out of developing a real relationship with the Diaspora, let’s
discuss that, let’s see what’s in there that we can actually make better’
they just attack me […] it’s my truth, I was surprised that it got such
a reaction. (in Egan, 2013: 10)

The prevarication of the state in relation to the enfranchisement of

emigrants, the undemocratic political influence of diasporic business
high-flyers and the sincerity of the state in its diaspora engagement
relationship are all now matters of media and public debate nearly ten
years after the state’s first explicit steps towards an active engagement
with the diaspora.

Concluding discussion

Since its establishment, the Irish state has engaged the diaspora through
its consular functions and under international legislative require-
ments to protect its members abroad. National economic development
projects administered via state bodies such as those now known as
Tourism Ireland, Culture Ireland and the Irish IDA also mobilize sectors
of the diaspora in achieving their goals. Moreover, Irish state and Irish–
American political lobbying of the US state during the 1980s and 1990s
kept undocumented Irish immigration on the political agenda and
created favourable international conditions for the success of the peace
process in Northern Ireland. However, it fell to the Catholic Church
and associated voluntary organizations to create an infrastructure of
welfare and social support for marginalized emigrants and members of
the diaspora throughout the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.
Explicit diaspora engagement on the part of the state only emerged
in the early decades of the twenty-first century and to date has involved
the dual approach of the ESP and the GIEF and GIN. By focusing on
118 Emigration Nations

both emigrant welfare and the harnessing of the ‘soft power’ of the
diaspora, state–diaspora engagement might be seen as structured by
two conflicting rationalities: emigrant welfare via the ESP and attracting
diaspora investment and support via the GIEF and GIN. However, in
2011 the ESP included amongst its objectives ‘promoting projects and
initiatives which support the outcomes of the Global Irish Economic
Forum’ and a small amount of ESP funds went towards the coordina-
tion of the GIEF and GIN, which are for the most part funded by mem-
bers themselves (DFA&T, 2012b: 1).12 Although arising out of different
stimuli and logics, these apparently contradictory initiatives could also
be seen as components of a two-pronged approach to forging affective
and economic connections globally.
As such, the Irish state’s diaspora initiatives in the early twenty-first
century involve modes of re-managing populations in which specifically
identified members are either obliged to be the bearers of the nation’s
honour as recipients of the ESP or called to economic patriotism by
forming global networks to support Ireland’s economic recovery. These
strands of engagement both assuage the guilt of a post-independence
approach to economic development that relied on emigration (ESP)
and optimize ‘spaces and populations in relation to [contemporary]
global market opportunities’ (GIEF and GIN) (Ong, 2007: 6). Thus these
diaspora engagement initiatives can be read as techniques of ‘ethnic
governmentality’ which produce a form of ‘graduated governing that
balances the multiple interests of spaces and populations’ (Ong, 2007),
but also maximizes global/human capital through the temporalities of
generation and heritage (Gray, 2012).
The trajectory of Irish state–diaspora relations can be read in terms
of shifts from anti/post-colonial nation-state building and sovereignty
consolidating processes to neo-liberal economic forms of nationalism.
However, they might be more accurately understood in terms of assem-
blages of old and new processes that coexist and impact one another in
different contexts and formations. For example, the discursive forma-
tion of emigration as ‘exile’ and diaspora as ‘globalized mobility’ are
linked by the drawing of systematic links between an emigrant past and
diasporic present, and via constitutional and officially certificated rec-
ognition of Irish heritage. As such, shifting discourses of emigration and
diaspora discussed in this chapter, although presented chronologically,
are marked by discontinuity, confluence and contradiction.
The philosophical, religious, sociological/social policy and literary
knowledges that contributed to the naming of the diaspora in politi-
cal discourse are mobilized anew in neo-liberal economic discourses
 Ireland 119

of diaspora as a source of ‘soft power’ in the 2000s. As such, dispersed

and diverse elements of emigration and diaspora as discourse and
practice are brought into unity by rules (of national honour, a flex-
ible Irish culture and identity for a globalized world and neo-liberal
economic competitiveness). Collier and Ong’s (2005) notion of ‘global
assemblage’ enables a holding together of the ‘unstable constellation’
that is the Irish diaspora in the twenty-first century. However, while for
Ong, political entitlements and claims making increasingly take place
in zones of ‘global assemblage’ rather than in the space of the national
terrain (Ong, 2006: 499), it is clear that these remain differentiated and
coexisting spaces of entitlements and claims making in the case of Irish
state–diaspora relations.
For cosmopolitan members of the diaspora, rights and entitlements are
mediated by the global market, mobility and networks of influence, so
enfranchisement in Ireland matters little. Their practices of membership
rely instead on ‘a sense of individual patriotism and strategic entrepre-
neurialism’ (Mitchell, 2003: 399). However, for those who are forced into
mobility and displacement, ‘home’ is associated with the territorial state
of Ireland, the individual citizenship relationship and loyalty bonds of
national cohesion continue to matter and enfranchisement is the ulti-
mate recognition of belonging (Mitchell, 2003). The rationalities under-
lying the GIEF and GIN suggest a multigenerational and multi-located
category of emigrants and diaspora who ‘feel at home’ in the world and
can carry the message of Ireland into the corridors of power and influence
across the globe. The extended sense of social, cultural and economic
community imagined and promoted by state–diaspora engagement is
not complemented by an expanded political community. Instead, deci-
sions are made via technocratic and managerial frameworks and proce-
dures rather than via extended enfranchisement and public debate. So,
although the territoriality of the Irish state is reconfigured to some extent
socially, culturally and economically via state–diaspora engagement, the
territorial nation-state holds politically. However, as involuntary emigra-
tion rises in the wake of the economic crash, the contentious debates
surrounding state–emigrant/diaspora relations are set to intensify.

Notes
1. These include the World Bank (Kuznetsov, 2006), the International
Organisation for Migration (IOM), the Migration Policy Institute (MPI)
(Newland, 2010; Newland and Tanaka, 2010; IOM, 2012) and the UN
Economic and Social Council (UNESC, 2008).
120 Emigration Nations

2. Although Argentina, South Africa, continental Europe, Mexico, Brazil and

the Caribbean were also emigrant destinations, a discussion of these flows
falls outside the remit of this chapter.
3. Those emigrating to Australasia and Canada in the latter decades of the
nineteenth century were an exception as they were more likely to claim a
higher occupation and to travel as a family than those going to the United
States (Fitzpatrick, 1984).
4. Donald Harman Akenson (1993) argued that readings of Irish emigration
as ‘exile’ tended towards ‘exceptionalism’ and called for a focus on over-
looked aspects of the Irish emigrant story, such as the contribution of Irish
emigrants to Empire, the global spread of emigrant destinations and the
significance of emigration amongst Protestants as well as Catholics.
5. While many were spending a year or two abroad, others sought to address their
homelessness and addiction problems in Britain (Emigrant Advice, 2005).
6. DION is an Irish word meaning shelter.
7. The DION Committee was eventually subsumed within the ESP.
8. Countries represented included the United States (44 attendees), Britain,
Europe, Argentina, Australia, Canada, China, Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia,
New Zealand, the Philippines, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, South Africa
and the UAE.
9. The Advisory Group includes 19 members of the Network from each of
the main geographic areas represented at the 2011 Forum and will review
progress on the Forum outcomes, coordinate the work programme for the
GIN and work with Irish ambassadors to keep the wider Network informed
of developments. The first meeting of the Group was held on 11 July 2012
(Global Irish Forum website, 2012).
10. The London-based campaign Glór an Deoraí (Irish Emigrants’ Voice),
established in 1988, argued for the right to vote in Dáil, presidential and
European elections, as well as referenda in the Republic of Ireland for up
to twenty years following emigration. The Irish Emigrant Vote Campaign
(IEVC, formed in the United States in 1991) demanded enfranchisement
and a voice in the future direction of the country because many intended to
return (Irish Voice, 1 October 1991: 4, in Almeida, 1992: 206).
11. This bill called for emigrants’ right to vote for up to fifteen years after becom-
ing non-resident. However, the Minister for the Environment suggested that
emigrants would not be politically informed; there was little indication that
emigrants wanted a vote; Irish citizens in Britain can vote in British elections
and the size of the emigrant constituency provided for might be greater than
the national electorate (Dáil Éireann, 1991).
12. A sum of €254,000 from the Emigrant Support Programme funds was spent
on Global Irish Network-related activities, including hosting the Global Irish
Economic Forum in October 2011.

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Affairs, Dublin. http://foreignaffairs.gov.ie/uploads/documents/task%20force%
20on%20policy%20regarding%20emigrants.pdf (accessed 10 April 2010).
UN Economic and Social Council (2008) ‘Why Is It Important to Know about
Diasporas?’ Seminar on Measuring Population Movement and Integration in a
Globalized World, ECE/CES/2008/.
6
Italy: The Continuing History of
Emigrant Relations
Guido Tintori

Introduction

Scholars of migration studies across disciplines often refer to Italy as

an example of country of emigration confined to history. Indeed, the
Italian population contributed to the mass migrations of about 55
million persons from and within Europe largely between 1815 and 1939
(Hatton and Williamson, 1998: 753; Hoerder, 2002: 339–342). After
the Second World War, many European countries became countries
of immigration; Italy was no exception. Yet it experienced a second
wave of mass emigration between 1945 and the 1960s that is too often
neglected. According to official statistical data, it was only in 1973
that, in Italy, immigrants have started to outnumber emigrants. Once
again, though, this does not mean that emigration from Italy ended or
became irrelevant after 1973. Recent studies and data have pointed out
how significant numbers of people also left the country between the
1970s and the 2000s (Bonifazi and Heins, 2009; Fondazione Migrantes,
2012). Thus, in the Italian case, it would be more correct to speak of an
example of a ‘continuing history’ of emigration.
This chapter will examine the interaction between Italy as a send-
ing country and her expatriates covering the period between the birth
of the unified state in 1861 to date. In this way, it will be possible to
analyse the development of Italy’s diaspora politics mainly on the insti-
tutional and policy level.
Despite this time-limited perspective, there are two long-standing leg-
acies to acknowledge in the construction of an Italian emigrant commu-
nity. Studies that look at Italy not as a state but as a geographically and
culturally defined space highlight how from ancient times this space has
been at the crossroads of demographic movements, which influenced

126
 Italy 127

sociocultural transformations in the wider world (Moatti and Kaiser,

2009). This formative contribution was already recognized as ‘Italian’ in
the absence of an Italian state. Most importantly, it generated a narra-
tive about the diasporic presence of Italians in the world that stretched
back to the first millennium BC and was to ‘cast long shadows over all
subsequent migrations from Italy and over all Italian interpretations of
them’ (Gabaccia, 2000: 16).
Second, as mentioned, Italy did not achieve political unity until
1861. The patchwork of states that characterized the Italian political
landscape brought into the unified state a legacy of social and cultural
fragmentation as well. As a consequence, most of the emigrants that
left the Italian peninsula both before and after the unification identi-
fied themselves almost exclusively with the region or even the local
community where they had theretofore lived. They retained local loyal-
ties and this localism also shaped settlement patterns in the receiving
countries, as people from the same village or region clustered near each
other and defined their social lives and associational activities along
regional or provincial lines (Glazer and Moynihan, 1963: 186; Sowell,
1981: 110–111; Luconi, 2004: 16).
This chapter will look at the ways in which Italy symbolically and
materially (re)incorporated her non-resident nationals into the ‘nation’,
using a historical approach to analyse the genesis and the evolution of
these processes of re-territorialization of expatriates. The first section
analyses quantitative indicators and data on emigration and, where
available, return rates, to verify whether and when a linkage can be
established between specific waves of mobility and the implementation
of specific policies or the creation of dedicated institutions. Next is a
consideration of what state agencies and bureaucracies are in charge
of addressing the emigrant population and how citizenship policies
towards these populations are formed. I then examine the part that
emigrants have had in shaping the ‘imagined community’ of the nation
and the current debate on their role in the construction of a collective
Italian identity. The conclusion addresses the governmental rationali-
ties at stake and the connection between emigrant policies and concep-
tions of the Italian state/community.

History and geography of emigration

As mentioned, significant flows out of the geographical–cultural borders

of the Italian territory were present and registered well before the unifi-
cation of the state. Yet it was only with the constitution of the unified
128 Emigration Nations

state that an administrative apparatus of classification and surveillance

was put into action and official data on those who leave systematically
collected. According to official data, from 1861 to 1990, 28,707,156
Italian nationals left the country. Italian historians usually refer to the
years between 1861 and 1915 as the ‘Great Emigration’.
As Table 6.1 and Figure 6.1 show, there are not systematic and reliable
data on return migration rates for the same range of years. But Italian
migrants frequently moved back and forth between Italy and various
destinations, to the extent that they were labelled golondrinas or ‘birds
of passage’ (Piore, 1979; Baily, 1999). Furthermore, recent studies esti-
mate that some 50 per cent of expatriates returned to Italy for good at
some point (Cerase, 2001: 115–116). Characterized by frequent returns
and circular mobility from the very beginning, Italian emigrants thus
maintained bonds to their families back home and did not disappear
from the public sphere.
Another feature of Italian emigration is that outflows followed an
irregular pattern and peaked in specific periods, in which expatriations
assumed the semblance of an exodus. For example, between 1891 and
1920, and again between 1950 and 1970, many Italian families expe-
rienced emigration of at least one family member; Table 6.2 shows the
numbers of the expatriates against the Italian population.

Table 6.1 Italian expatriates and return migration flows (1861–1990, absolute
values)
Years Total Europe Other destinations

Expatriates Returns Expatriates Returns Expatriates Returns

1861–1870 1,210,400 N/A 992,720 N/A 217,680 N/A

1871–1880 1,175,960 818,320 905,490 N/A 270,470 N/A
1881–1890 1,879,200 N/A 929,200 N/A 950,000 N/A
1891–1900 2,834,730 N/A 1,288,000 N/A 1,546,730 N/A
1901–1910 6,026,690 N/A 2,512,010 N/A 3,514,680 1,716,270
1911–1920 3,828,070 N/A 1,696,450 N/A 2,131,620 1,209,170
1921–1930 2,550,639 1,378,143 1,362,419 752,382 1,188,220 625,761
1931–1940 702,650 589,857 414,222 301,842 288,428 288,015
1941–1950* 1,144,775 446,609 655,442 362,100 489,333 84,509
1951–1960 2,937,406 1,323,589 1,767,116 1,004,404 1,170,290 319,185
1961–1970 2,646,994 1,868,620 2,128,211 1,711,184 518,783 157,436
1971–1980 1,082,340 1,121,503 835,399 899,078 246,941 222,425
1981–1990 687,302 695,710 528,945 488,081 158,357 207,629
1861–1990 28,707,156 16,015,624 12,691,532

*Data not available for the years 1943–1945.

Source: Author’s elaboration on ISTAT data. (Also available on www.altreitalie.org.).
 Expatriation rate (per 1,000 residents) Return rates (per 1,000 residents)

Per 1,000 residents

3

0
1921 1924 1927 1930 1933 1936 1939 1942 1948 1951 1954 1957 1960 1963 1966 1969 1972 1975 1978 1981 1984 1987 1990
129

Figure 6.1 Long-term emigrations and returns from/to Italy (1920–1990)

130 Emigration Nations

Table 6.2 Italian expatriates by total population 1861–1990 (absolute values)

Years Resident Total Net

population emigration rate
Expatriates Returns

1861–1870 27,239,500 1,210,400 N/A N/A

1871–1880 28,971,000 1,175,960 818,320 357,640
1881–1890 N/A 1,879,200 N/A N/A
1891–1900 N/A 2,834,730 N/A N/A
1901–1910 35,349,500 6,026,690 N/A N/A
1911–1920 37,388,500 3,828,070 N/A N/A
1921–1930 39,474,800 2,550,639 1,378,143 1,172,496
1931–1940 42,806,700 702,650 589,857 112,793
1946–1950 46,576,200 1,127,720 380,008 747,712
1951–1960 48,911,629 2,937,406 1,323,589 1,613,817
1961–1970 52,284,551 2,646,994 1,868,620 778,374
1971–1980 55,559,900 1,082,340 1,121,503 –39,163
1981–1990 57,200,782 687,302 695,711 –8,409

Note: Data not available for the years 1943–1945.

Source: Author’s elaboration on ISTAT data. (Also available on www.altreitalie.org.)

Table 6.3 shows the main destinations Italians preferred. According

to the available data and considering the whole period, the United
States was the first country Italians migrated to, followed by France,
Switzerland, Argentina and Germany. This information is somewhat
misleading, however, as it suggests that the majority of emigrant flows
were directed to the Americas, while they were actually headed to
Europe (Rosoli and Balletta, 1978), an understandable outcome con-
sidering that the proximity of European states meant lower migration
costs. Second, these figures cannot account for the significant flows
of undocumented emigrants that crossed the Italian borders towards
neighbouring states, especially France (Rinauro, 2009). Lastly, they leave
out a considerable number of people that, already since the first half
of the nineteenth century, had moved to France, Argentina and Brazil
from the northern regions of the Italian territory, by crossing the Alps or
leaving from the port of Genoa (Trento, 2002; Devoto, 2006).
Once again, the flows followed irregular patterns, with peaks and
troughs in specific periods due both to the functioning of well-established
migratory networks and to the effects of legislation in receiving countries.
For example, the implementation of the US Quota Act of 1921 (Emergency
Quota Act) and 1924 ( Johnson–Reed Act), aimed at restricting immigrants
from Southeastern Europe, resulted in a dramatic decrease of the numbers
Table 6.3 Main destinations 1861–1990 (absolute values)

Years France Germany* Switzerland Canada United States Brazil Argentina Australia

1861–1870 288,500 44,030 38,180 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A

1871–1880 347,590 105,940 132,820 26,750 37,220 86,080 460
1881–1890 374,070 86,390 71,180 6,270 244,870 215,550 391,510 1,590
1891–1900 259,280 230,930 189,060 5,920 514,330 580,220 367,220 3,440
1901–1910 572,620 591,040 655,670 65,100 2,329,450 303,360 734,600 7,540
1911–1920 664,490 285,070 433,500 83,630 1,566,780 125,880 315,520 7,480
1921–1930 1,023,088 11,494 157,056 31,799 419,161 76,558 535,741 33,516
1931–1940 213,783 58,103 85,859 3,469 114,636 12,496 80,753 14,248
1946–1950 192,039 74 313,031 15,590 66,068 25,366 274,523 26,556
1951–1960 592,492 160,513 745,031 229,332 193,459 85,566 209,545 190,533
1961–1970 206,687 745,848 1,021,033 168,792 166,961 7,163 10,979 119,297
1971–1980 61,355 347,035 344,019 36,141 82,800 9,546 7,875 30,052
1981–1990 43,685 238,487 162,473 15,155 36,569 5,572 8,719 7,929
1861–1990 4,839,679 2,904,954 4,348,912 661,198 5,735,084 1,484,497 3,023,065 442,641

* From 1949 on, figures refer only to emigration to the Federal Republic of Germany.
Source: Author’s elaboration on ISTAT data. In italics when data were not available for every single year of the decade. (Also available on www.altreitalie.org.)
131
132 Emigration Nations

of Italians migrating to the United States after 1921. An immediate effect

was that Italian emigrants then shifted towards alternative destinations,
mainly France and Argentina, as testified by the figures for 1921–1930.
The adoption of similarly restrictive policies by Argentina and Brazil at
the beginning of the 1930s and the effects of the Great Depression fol-
lowed by the Second World War explain the general drop in mobility
from Italy. Expatriations intensified again between 1946 and the 1960s.
On the one hand, the European Recovery Programme – Marshall Plan –
sustained the reconstruction of Western Europe and created again the
conditions for labour mobility to resume. On the other hand, between
1946 and 1956 successive Italian governments signed a series of migra-
tion agreements and treaties with several countries of destination outside
Europe, such as Argentina, Australia, and Canada, to mention nations
listed in Table 6.3. However, European countries remained the favoured
destinations of Italian emigrants after the Second World War as well.
Table 6.4 shows an important feature of Italian emigration: mainly
men have left the country. This played an important role in shaping
Italy’s policies towards emigrants and the decision of maintaining ties
with expatriates: men are soldiers, breadwinners, that is, taxpayers, and
at least in the Italian case until 1983,1 were the only ones who could
transmit Italian citizenship by descent.
As anticipated in the introduction, there are strong regional patterns
in Italian emigration. Looking at the whole period covered by official
statistics, the highest number of emigrants came from a northeastern
region, Veneto, immediately followed by Sicily, Campania and Calabria

Table 6.4 Expatriates by sex 1871–1980 (absolute values and percentage)

Years Total Males % Females %

1871–1880 1,176,460 1,035,990 88.06 140,470 11.94

1881–1890 1,879,200 1,523,900 81.09 355,300 18.91
1891–1900 2,834,730 2,229,150 78.64 605,580 21.36
1901–1910 6,026,690 4,945,480 82.06 1,081,210 17.94
1911–1920 3,828,070 2,915,830 76.17 912,240 23.83
1921–1930 2,550,639 1,787,171 70.07 763,468 29.93
1931–1940 702,650 418,523 59.56 284,127 40.44
1946–1950 1,127,720 712,512 63.18 415,208 36.82
1951–1960 2,937,406 2,066,202 70.34 871,204 29.66
1961–1970 2,646,994 1,982,895 74.91 664,099 25.09
1971–1980 1,082,340 712,455 65.83 369,885 34.17

Source: Author’s elaboration on ISTAT data. In italics when data were not available for every
single year of the decade. (Also available on www.altreitalie.org.)
 Italy 133

(south), Piedmont, Lombardy (northwest), Friuli and Trentino (north-

east) (Rosoli and Balletta, 1978; Gabaccia, 2000: 2–3). This goes against
the conventional wisdom that people from the less economically
developed south of Italy contributed almost exclusively to its mass
emigration, though it is true that southerners were traditionally more
represented in North America and Australia and in emigration flows
after the Second World War.
Table 6.5 shows that emigrants from the economically developed
regions of the north are still well-represented in current data.
As for destinations, people from northeastern and northwestern
regions emigrated mainly to Argentina, Brazil, France, Germany and
Switzerland, while main destinations for southerners were Argentina,
Australia, Belgium, Canada, Germany, Switzerland and the United States.
These historical patterns of Italian emigration have played an
important role in shaping policies towards the expatriates and have
left legacies that are still visible. According to the latest data available,
there were 4.455.225 Italian nationals abroad, 51.6 per cent of whom
were male, residing mainly in Europe (52.4 percent), followed by the
Americas (42.1 percent) (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2012: 125). The
most numerous Italian communities are in Argentina (766, 795) and
Germany (674,237) (idem: 126, 128).

Table 6.5 Italian residents abroad by region of origin (twelve most numerous),
2006–2008

Region 2008 2007 2006

a.v. % a.v % a.v. %

Sicily 629,114 16.8 595,749 16.7 554,491 17.9

Campania 395,064 10.6 379,435 10.6 341,044 11.0
Calabria 328,912 8.8 312,070 8.7 279,142 9.0
Lazio 308,966 8.3 300,014 8.4 122,516 4.0
Puglia 304,687 8.2 297,536 8.3 277,176 8.9
Lombardy 275,099 7.4 263,527 7.4 238,558 7.7
Veneto 260,849 7.0 248,294 7.0 233,883 7.6
Piedmont 175,264 4.7 162,761 4.6 143,314 4.6
Abruzzo 151,607 4.1 145,051 4.1 131,117 4.2
Friuli V.G. 134,908 3.6 130,420 3.7 123,483 3.9
Emilia Romagna 119,369 3.2 113,324 3.2 101,357 3.3
Tuscany 111,314 3.0 104,709 3.0 91,103 2.9
Total 3,734,428 100.0 3,568,532 100.0 3,106,251 100.0

Source: Ministry of Foreign Affairs – National Museum of Emigration. Data available at

<http://www.museonazionaleemigrazione.it/regioni.php?id=200>. Accessed on 6 July 2012.
134 Emigration Nations

Institutions and policies2

This section will examine how Italy’s policies towards expatriates were
carried out primarily by means of external citizenship policies and
‘instituted process’, or the establishment of organizations and institu-
tions to (re-)incorporate emigrants and their offspring into the nation,
as explained by Smith building on Polanyi (Smith, 2001). The main
focus will be on state technologies of inclusion, even though the rela-
tionship between the sending country and its expatriates is a very com-
plex one that cannot be considered as a one-way process. This section
adopts the concept of expatriates as both a legal and a social construct
‘for an interactive history of the figure of the leave-taker and the state’s
legislating of citizenship’ and to assess ‘how the “imagined expatriate”
has played an important part in constructing the ways in which citizen-
ship has been conceived’ (Green, 2009: 310).
This section then reviews the evolution of Italian policies towards
emigrants and expatriates by concentrating on the ministries and gov-
ernmental institutions that historically held primary responsibility over
them, describing how each move from one agency to the other was
symbolic of the lens through which emigration was seen at the time.
Mass migration emerged immediately as a critical issue in the political
discourse of the newly born Italian state. The debate among policymak-
ers polarized into two competing positions: those opposed to the free-
dom to expatriate and those in favour of emigration (Manzotti, 1962). In
the second half of the nineteenth century, the pattern followed by the
Italian state seemed to resemble that of any other European state dealing
with large outflows of its population. At first, the response was to erect
barriers against exit, switching after some time to a position of ‘benign
neglect’; the two stances reflected a transition from mercantilism to
laissez-faire in the ruling class’ political outlooks (Zolberg, 2007: 33–34).
Initially, hostility towards mass migration was dependent on a con-
cern for the demographic and economic future of the country. This
position was in defence of an important bloc of constituents, whose
interest was to restrict outflows and keep as many unemployed peas-
ants as possible in the country so as to maintain a higher supply than
demand of manpower and thereby lower salaries. These constituents
were big landowners mainly from the southern regions, but also from
some of the northern regions.
By the late nineteenth century, it was evident that the stream of
people leaving the country could not be halted without removing the
causes behind their decision to migrate, that is, through radical social
 Italy 135

and economic reforms. Contemporary inquiries had also disproved

some of the previous arguments supporting a restriction of emigration:
the feared demographic impoverishment and economic death of the
regions from where the migrants left had not taken place, nor had the
forecast of detrimental transformations in the social order (Del Vecchio,
1892). In addition, shipping company owners, steel and mechanical
industries magnates, bankers and financiers made up another influen-
tial bloc of constituents, based mainly in northern Italy. To all these
people mass migration – especially a deregulated mass migration –
represented a very fruitful business embracing all phases of the migra-
tory process. Remittances in particular were a prolific financial source
that contributed to the development of Italian industries and economy
(De Rosa, 1980; Mittone, 1984; Massullo, 2001: 161–169), though
their actual impact in the so-called ‘big spurt’ phase that straddled the
nineteenth and twentieth centuries remains controversial (Sori, 2009).
In this phase, both the government and parliament dealt with mass
migration essentially as a matter of public order and aimed in the long
term at shielding the consulates’ or the state’s finances from the costs
of repatriations (Sori, 1979: 255–259; Ostuni, 2001: 309–311). Main
responsibility over emigration lay with the Ministry of the Interior and
executive acts (the 1868 Menabrea circular, the 1873 Lanza circular
and the 1883 Depretis circular) were privileged rather than legislative
acts. Even the first organic law on emigration (n° 5866 of 30 January
1888), which Prime Minister Francesco Crispi urged the parliament to
pass because he considered mass migration a useful safety valve for the
nation’s social tensions, did not make any substantial change to previ-
ous policies. The legal protection of migrants was kept at a minimal
level. No administrative body was created in order to implement the
law, and migrants were basically abandoned to their own destiny once
they left the country.
Samuel L. Baily explained how a ‘village outward’ approach (Baily,
1992) to study Italian emigration is necessary to understand the ‘ongo-
ing multiple links between origin and destination that many scholars
today call ‘transnationalism’” (Baily, 2005: 45–46), since membership in
the family and/or local community was the initial basis of migrant net-
works. Mutual aid societies, often religious, that is, Catholic, local and
regional in orientation, provided the services needed by emigrants at the
other end of their journey. The important role that Italian associations,
regional, labour and Catholic activists have traditionally played in shap-
ing the social and political dynamics of Italian communities abroad has
its roots both in the absence of a state, in the case of emigration from
136 Emigration Nations

Italian territories in the first half of the nineteenth century, and in the
‘absent state’, between 1861 and the approval of the Emigration Law of
1901. In this void, regional, labour and Catholic associations took upon
themselves the task of preserving traits of italianità (Italianness)among
the emigrants, a cultural and sentimental belonging, if not legal. They
were thus able to consolidate their advantageous position, to the extent
that when the Italian state decided to extend its reach towards the
expatriates, it very often relied on this extant network of associations,
mutual aid societies and labour/Catholic organizations.
The theorization of a policy that looked upon mass migration as an
ideal instrument for the implementation of trade, colonial and political
expansion made its first appearance with Leone Carpi’s essay Delle colo-
nie e dell’emigrazione d’italiani all’estero sotto l’aspetto dell’industria, com-
mercio e agricoltura (Carpi, 1874), and in some of Prime Minister Crispi’s
addresses of 1888 (Sori, 1979: 260; Duggan, 2002: 568–573). Yet it was
only after the Italian economy started to grow dramatically at the end
of the nineteenth century that a plan of transforming Italian migrants
abroad into a strategic asset for Italy’s nationalist, economic and foreign
policies was clearly shaped.
This is a phase in which Italian authorities pursued ‘diaspora nation-
alism’, as Donna Gabaccia has described it (2000), or the making of
Italians abroad, and started to depict the experience of Italian emi-
grants as a sort of spontaneous expansionistic project, both economic
and political, aimed at enabling their nation to establish so-called ‘free
colonies’ worldwide (Tintori, 2006: 62–68). According to this vision,
expatriates were considered bridgeheads for new commercial outlets
and the foundation of a new kind of ‘spontaneous’ colonies. Italian
ruling classes strived for this project of ‘emigrant colonialism’ (Choate,
2008: 2) through two pieces of legislation, the Emigration Law of 31
January 1901 (Act no. 23) and the Nationality Law of 12 June 1912 (Act
no. 555) (Tintori, 2006).
With the Emigration Law of 1901, ‘[r]esponsibility for emigrants
moved from the interior ministry to the foreign ministry, mark-
ing emigration as an international expansion instead of an internal
haemorrhage’ (Choate, 2008: 59). To maintain direct control of emi-
grants, the Commissariato generale dell’emigrazione (CGE) or General
Emigration Commission, a branch of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
was established as a central institutional body with the sole purpose
of regulating and managing emigration from Italy. The CGE gathered
competences and functions scattered among different governmen-
tal institutions within a single agency. Ideally and publicly it would
 Italy 137

rationalize the outflows and protect Italian nationals abroad, as well

as implement training programmes strategically targeted at managing
emigrants’ human capital. At the same time, the Banco di Napoli was
bestowed with the role of single official bank for collecting and receiv-
ing migrants’ remittances.
While these central agencies presided over the political and eco-
nomic inclusion of expatriates, the matter of their social and cultural
inclusion was left to other formal and informal actors, such as labour
and Catholic organizations, local associations and some government-
funded institutions, like the Dante Alighieri Society, whose main task
was – and still is – to promote Italian culture and language around the
world (Choate, 2008: 72–146; Smith, 2003: 738–740; Caparelli, 1985).
It soon became evident, though, that the CGE lacked the financial
and human resources to grant protection and assistance to the expatri-
ates. Most of all, the CGE’s structural weakness undermined its ability
to control emigrants and implement the ambitious programme of trans-
forming them into a strategic resource for Italy’s international interests
(Ostuni, 2001: 312–317).
The 1901 law was intended to exploit the favourable juncture of an
increasing presence of nationals abroad, to sanction an expansion-
ism by law, establish a transnational trade and economic space, build
long-lasting political networks with Italy at their centre, based upon
a privileged ethnic channel, to reform the state’s institutions in order
to mould emigrants from the top down and to make them Italians.
Central to this strategy was to ensure that nationals abroad kept their
Italian citizenship as long as possible, regardless of the legal and politi-
cal conflicts that might arise with destination countries’ governments.
Citizenship policies emerged immediately as the crucial field of inter-
vention in order to implement political and strategic use of national
residents abroad (Tintori, 2006: 74–97).
The Nationality Law (n°. 555) passed on 13 June 1912 reasserted
jus sanguinis as the cardinal principle of Italian nationality. It adopted
the solution of a unilateral acceptance of dual citizenship, thanks to a
high degree of ambiguity, though publicly and explicitly denied. Italy
decided not to worry about knowing whether expatriates had a second
citizenship according to other countries’ legislation. It maintained
that emigrants, as long as they resided abroad, retained a sort of latent
Italian citizenship. Socialist deputy Angiolo Cabrini condemned the law
because it founded ‘the conservation of Italianness upon ignorance’ and
compared this kind of citizenship ‘to a sort of lasso to be thrown around
the neck of people escaping’.3
138 Emigration Nations

The passing of the 1912 Nationality Law made it practically impos-

sible to lose Italian nationality, even after many generations. Only an
official and voluntary act of renunciation in front of Italian authori-
ties led to a loss of nationality. In the eyes of Italian policymakers,
this external citizenship would grant the state the right to intervene
and assert its sovereignty in the protection of expatriates, opportunely
turned into Italians abroad, when it suited collective and national inter-
ests in the international scene.
Conceived by the Liberal parliament, it was the Fascist regime that
translated the plan into action. In terms of policies, in fact, the Fascist
government undoubtedly continued along the same line established
by the Liberal governments. This continuity of policies led to the con-
flation of the terms expatriates, emigrants and Italians abroad in the
government’s eyes (Cannistraro and Rosoli, 1979; Gabaccia et al., 2007).
Fascism just drew to its extreme consequences the plan outlined during
the previous two decades. Mussolini stated clearly that emigrants were a
constitutive part of Italy’s foreign policy (Susmel and Susmel, 1966: 52).
While the seizure of power by the Fascist movement in 1922 did not
modify the rationales of emigration policies, efforts to mobilize expatri-
ates in defence of Italian interests gained further momentum. At the
institutional level, the consolidation of the dictatorship brought some
significant changes.
In Italy, the Fascist Party discarded the free constitution and gave juridi-
cal form to the dictatorial regime. The Fascist Party and public institutions
became the same thing. In parallel, outside of Italy, the regime substituted
‘Fascist agencies for private organisations’ (Cannistraro and Rosoli, 1979:
691), supported and fostered the creation of fasci, that is, branches of
the party abroad, and placed trusted men in control of the main social–
cultural organizations that dealt with ‘Italians abroad’ (Gentile, 1995;
Pretelli, 2002; Franzina and Sanfilippo, 2003). Mussolini aimed to take
direct control over any activities relating to expatriates. He therefore sus-
pended all governmental subsidies to private associations, dismantled the
CGE, whose personnel were considered too autonomous, and replaced
it with the Direzione Generale degli Italiani all’estero (DGIE or General
Bureau of Italians abroad), a branch of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
He changed the Istituto Nazionale per la Colonizzazione e le Imprese dei
Lavori all’estero (INCILE), founded in 1920, with the Istituto di Credito
per il Lavoro Italiano all’estero (ICLE or Credit Institute for Italian Labour
Abroad), both designed to provide financial support to ‘colonization
projects abroad’, the only difference was that the latter was now a con-
tinuation of the Fascist Party (Cannistrato and Rosoli, 1979: 681–692).
 Italy 139

The suppression of the CGE in 1927 has particular relevance because

it was accompanied by a change in the official attitude towards expatri-
ates, who were now explicitly called ‘citizens’ and publicly acknowl-
edged as members of the nation. Emigration of Italian citizens had to
be regulated and was only meant to be only temporary (ibid.: 686–688).
These developments clearly followed the logic of totalitarianism and
introduced a new rhetoric about emigration. But it hardly changed the
substance and rationales of emigration policies conceived two decades
before by the Liberal parliament. These policies still sought to maintain
control over expatriates, their remittances and their political lobbying
in the international context. Given his plans of military expansion,
Mussolini’s ‘demographic battle’ to increase Italy’s population also
served the purpose of cultivating a reserve of men for the draft.
The fall of the Fascist regime, the restoration of democracy and the
birth of the Italian republic in 1946 did not imply the repeal of the 1912
Nationality Law or the introduction of significant amendments in Italy’s
external citizenship policies. The end of the Second World War and the
European Recovery Program restored the conditions for new waves of
mass migration from Italy, mostly towards European destinations, but
increasingly also to transoceanic destinations such as Australia, Canada
and some Latin American countries. Italian republican governments
tried to solve the problem of unemployment by negotiating a series of
treaties with foreign countries in which Italy would provide manpower
in exchange for raw materials and energy. Even the democratic regime
seemed to apply the old recipe of using emigration as an instrument of
foreign and economic policy and launched a programme of ‘assisted
emigration’. Between 1946 and 1956, Italy signed a series of migration
agreements with almost every Western European state plus Argentina,
Australia and Canada (Colucci, 2008; De Clementi, 2010).
During this period, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs split responsibility
for emigration policies with the Ministry of Labour. Yet both ministries
managed implementation through a plethora of agencies with overlap-
ping competences and created competing structures of power. ‘Assisted
emigration’ did not mean that the Italian state provided assistance and
legal protection to its expatriates once they had left the country. Like
the Liberal state, it left the task to mutual aid societies and regional,
labour and Catholic organizations.
In parallel, Italy employed part of its Marshall Plan money to fund
ICLE, the institute founded by Mussolini, to organize programmes of
assisted colonization in Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica,
Perú and Uruguay. These programmes of assisted colonization were a
140 Emigration Nations

substantial failure, however, with lower participation than expected and

high return rates.
Italian emigrants maintained their strongest link with the region of
origin during this second wave of mass migration. From 1970, while the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Labour kept their juris-
diction over the political and economic spheres of emigration policies,
other facets of the relationship with emigrants were increasingly trans-
ferred from central to regional administration. From then on, practically
all of the twenty Italian regions established an Emigration Department
and developed their own programmes on such issues as social and
educational support, vocational training and co-development projects
in cooperation with their reference communities. These communities
were already organized or unofficially represented by some regionally
based organizations, nel mondo (‘in the world’) associations that were
typically headquartered locally in Italy with many clubs or branches
worldwide (Baldassar, 2001: 52–53). In developing translocal activities
and programmes, the Italian regions have increasingly relied on these
private associations that were essentially called on to enforce public
translocal policies, employing public money through their networks.
Many of the initiatives promoted by the regions are aimed at keeping
alive cultural and family bonds across borders and time, with ‘visits
home’ and student exchange programmes. For example, the Piedmont
region has traditionally allocated funds to support the return from
Argentina of descendants of Piedmont’s emigrants. Trentino Alto-Adige
runs similar programmes in Argentina and Brazil, as does Friuli Venezia
Giulia in North and South America. Sometimes these programmes are
intended to draw immigrants from among the descendants of expatri-
ates, considered easier to integrate than those who arrive spontaneously
in Italy from Africa, Asia and Eastern Europe. Since the end of 2001
the Veneto region has introduced a programme called ‘Project Return’,
where several million euros have been invested to assist Argentine and
Brazilian descendants of Italian emigrants from Veneto to settle in the
region and work for local industries. The programme, which is still in
force, has not been able so far to achieve any of the targets it envis-
aged, and just a few families from South America have settled in Veneto
(Tintori, 2009: 50–60).
Measures aimed at building business strategy around the presence of
Italian communities and descendants of emigrants are not exclusively
promoted by regions and local administrations. The Ministry of Foreign
Affairs has developed several plans of action in cooperation with local
administrations. Italia internazionale – Sei Regioni per cinque Continenti,
 Italy 141

active since 2000 – involves six ‘Objective 1’ regions Basilicata

Campania, Calabria, Puglia, Sardinia and Sicily to encourage interna-
tional projects of co-development in countries that have traditionally
hosted Italian emigrants. The Osservatorio sul lavoro e la formazione degli
italiani all’estero (formerly known as ITENETs) is a partnership between
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the ‘Objective 1’ regions and the Italian
Chambers of Commerce abroad to provide educational support and
vocational training for the expatriates.
In 1997 the Ministry of Labour established an agency called Italia
Lavoro SpA. Among its tasks is oversight of the project Occupazione e
sviluppo della comunità degli italiani all’estero (ITES or Employment and
Development of Italian communities abroad). Through its branches in
South America and in cooperation with the main ethnic and regionally
based associations, Italia Lavoro SpA subsidized unemployed descend-
ants of Italian emigrants and implemented a programme of paid intern-
ships. The declared goal is twofold: to contribute, together with the
Italian regions, to the development of the South American countries
involved and to integrate labour and trade markets across the Atlantic.
After the Second World War, Italy has progressively included expa-
triates into the political and institutional life of the nation. Italians
residing abroad were granted voting rights with the adoption of the
Republican Constitution of 1948, provided that they returned to Italy to
cast their ballots. This was very difficult, especially for Italian nationals
residing in the Americas or Australia. Discussions on the introduction
of a new regulation for overseas voters started immediately after the
adoption of the 1948 Constitution. A lengthy debate ensued, in which
lawmakers and jurists delayed any resolutions because of their concerns
over the normative and political implications represented by the inclu-
sion of millions of voters outside the territory, while the main political
parties swung between an attitude of caution, as these electors were not
under their direct control, and the desire not to waste such a notable
voting base (Colucci, 2002, 2012; Battiston and Mascitelli, 2008).
In the meantime, Italian nationals residing abroad were included
in national politics through non-parliamentary forms of institutional
representation. During the 1980s, the state created a whole range of
agencies, mainly conceived as new instruments for keeping ties with
expatriates and an attempt to subdue the pressures for representation
exerted by some influential lobbies and advocacy networks organized
around the nel mondo associations. The Committees of Italians Abroad
(Comites) were established in 1985 as the first institutional body rep-
resenting Italians residing abroad.4 They act as advisory boards to the
142 Emigration Nations

Italian consulates to protect the rights and interests of Italian citizens

living abroad. In addition, after a meeting of Italians abroad was held in
Rome between 28 November and 3 December 1988, the General Council
of Italians Abroad (CGIE) was established in 1989,5 to provide an
‘unmediated’ linkage with Italy and its institutions. The CGIE is directly
connected to the Comites and serves as an advisory body to the Italian
government and parliament on issues related to the interests of Italians
overseas. The majority of members of the CGIE are elected directly by
the Comites; a minority are appointed by the Italian government.
A new reform of the Nationality Law was approved on 5 February
1992 (act n°. 91). This is the law currently in force. In terms of external
citizenship it did not modify past provisions, though it did introduce
a special provision to grant privileged reacquisition of Italian national-
ity to people of Italian descent who had lost it (art 17); 163,756 people
made use of this opportunity, open only from 1992 to the end of 1997.6
Dual nationality is overtly accepted. Two acts – n°. 379 of 14 December
2000 and n°. 124 of 8 March 2006 – created reacquisition programmes
with no time limit for minorities of national origin and their descend-
ants who had been citizens of the Austro-Hungarian Empire before the
end of the First World War and then passed to the former Yugoslavia
after the Second World War.
As a consequence of its external citizenship and diaspora policies,
Italy is today one of the most generous countries in the European Union
in terms of offering citizenship by descent. In order to claim Italian ori-
gin and thereby citizenship it is sufficient to prove that an Italian male
ancestor – or also female if born after 1948 – never renounced Italian
nationality, so that Italian authorities can recognize them as nationals
by jus sanguinis (Circular k.28.1 1991). An unknown number of people
retain this Italian ‘spare nationality’ throughout the world. The Ministry
of Foreign Affairs estimates that in 1998 there were roughly 60,000,000
people of Italian ancestry living in the world. Between 1998 and 2011
more than a million people made use of the opportunity and turned it
into an Italian passport. We should better say an EU passport, as 88.1
percent of the newly recognized Italians carried out the procedure at
Italian consulates in non-EU countries. Another million applications
were already in the pipeline (Tintori, 2009, 2011).
Italy further expanded its policies of political inclusion of expatriates
and their descendants by granting absentee voting rights to nationals
residing abroad with the Constitutional Law no. 1 of 17 January 2000
and no. 1 of 23 January 2001, and Law no. 459 of 27 December 2001
(Tintori, 2012). According to this legislation Italian residents abroad
 Italy 143

can elect six senators and twelve deputies in representation of four

geographic constituencies – Europe, South America, North America and
Asia–Africa–Oceania. The legislation is ill-conceived and grants broader
rights to external voters than to electors in Italy, since the former are
allowed to express up to two preferences and can vote by mail. The
reform drove all Italian parties to institute dedicated branches to deal
with overseas voters.
Concurrently in 2001, the new Ministry for Italians in the World
was established, even though since 1927 the DGIE, affiliated with the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, has continuously served as the main bureau
dealing with the Italian expatriates. The Ministry for the Italians in
the World was led by former Fascist Mirko Tremaglia and existed until
2006, when it was transformed into a sub-department of the Ministry
of Foreign Affairs.
The elections of 9 and 10 April 2006 were the first in which expatriate
representatives were elected. Their contribution was pivotal to the nar-
row majority of the winning centre-left coalition in the Senate. For two
years, the expatriate senators and MPs enjoyed a momentous visibility,
but after the landslide victory of the centre-right in the 2008 snap elec-
tions their weight and influence inevitably shrank.
The political platform of the overseas politicians so far has revolved
around a few priorities: to make it even easier for expatriate Italians to
regain lost Italian citizenship; to restructure consular offices abroad to
offer improved services; to improve health and social care for elderly
Italians abroad and to provide more resources to teach Italian language
and culture to children of Italian descent abroad.7
The many institutional and historical layers in the relationship
between Italy and its expatriates are embodied in the current plethora of
agencies and institutions which create policy and deal with expatriates.
Political, social and economic inclusion of emigrants and their descend-
ants are the responsibilities of the Ministry of the Interior, the Ministry
of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Labour, governmental agencies, par-
ties, unions and Catholic and regional associations, many of which are
funded by public money.

Debates on the role of emigrants

Scholars of emigration studies in Italy, as well as many heads of emi-

grants’ associations, have complained for many years that the main-
stream culture has always denied the role played by emigration in the
construction of Italy’s national story. This is true only to some extent.
144 Emigration Nations

Indeed, until a decade ago, in Italian history textbooks there was little
mention, if any, of the waves of mass migration from Italy in its 150
years as a unified state. There has been scarce debate about the impact
of emigration on the development of Italian industries, economy and
society thanks to remittances and human capital upgrading (Sori, 2009).
Italy has never honoured the role of its emigrants as many emigration
countries do nowadays, in particular some Latin American countries,
with their Día del migrante. Nor has it rewarded expatriates at the
national level with public recognition of initiatives like dos por uno or
tres por uno, where emigrants, their remittances and their organizations
are directly involved in projects of co-developments at home, often pro-
moted by the local administration (Orozco and Rouse, 2007).
At the same time, it is hard to say that emigration and the role of the
expatriates have been denied in Italy’s national discourse. Literature has
been sensitive to emigrants and their experience since the nineteenth
century and well into the second half of the twentieth century as in,
for example, the extremely popular book Cuore (1886), by Edmondo De
Amicis, translated into dozens of languages, and his Sull’oceano (1889),
up to Leonardo Sciascia’s Gli zii di Sicilia (1958) and Il mare colore del
vino (1973) and Primo Levi’s La chiave a stella (1978). The novel Vita,
published in 2003 by Melania Mazzucco, a fictionalized account of the
emigrant experience of the author’s grandfather in the United States,
won the most prestigious literary award in Italy, the Strega Prize, and
became an international bestseller. Other books have celebrated the
entrepreneurial skills of Italian emigrants, as in Il principe mercante
(1900), written by the then future president of the Italian republic Luigi
Einaudi (1948–1955).
Most of all, emigration has remained present in most Italian families.
Memory is among the factors that constitute collective identities, in
the form of imagined communities whose members share a common
past and a set of key values (Dawson, 2007: 12). In the Italian case, the
common past includes emigration and emigrants, who were ‘keen to be
understood as successful representatives of Italy abroad, not the desper-
ate, castoff rejects of caricature’ (Choate, 2007: 753).
Italians abroad held congresses in Rome in 1908, 1911, 1975 (com-
memorated with a celebratory stamp), 1988, 2000 – significantly, on
the eve of the approval of the Nationality Laws of 1912 and 1992, and
of the acts granting external voting rights between 2000 and 2001.
Those initiatives attest to the long-standing existence of a lobby of
non-resident nationals in the Italian political framework, albeit influ-
ential only to a limited extent. Yet the importance of those congresses
 Italy 145

cannot be underestimated in symbolic or political terms, given the clear

implication that non-resident elites were able to exert enough pressure
on Italy’s politicians to gain a voice in homeland politics. This shows
evidence of a two-way political and institutional channel between expa-
triates and the home country.
The Liberal elites met with better-off representatives of the emigrants,
while Fascist notables visited the ‘Little Italies’ abroad and invited the
next generation to Rome to revive their heritage as members of the
Roman Empire. In the post-war republic, these activities were contin-
ued under a new rhetoric and new ones were added, such as meetings
with MPs of Italian origin from around the world. Italy has constantly
reached out to her expatriates and their descendants as a means of
foreign policy and to pursue nationalist goals. Even the ‘technocratic
government’ of Mr Monti created an online ‘platform’ called Innovitalia
in 2012, managed by the Ministry of the Interior and the Ministry of
Education, aimed to ‘maximise the impact of human capital’ of the
Italian ‘brains’ abroad and ‘promote research and business opportuni-
ties’ in partnership with Italy.8
At the same time, representatives of the state were ashamed of the bulk
of the expatriates, often ‘the most miserable, poorest, neediest class’.9
They were notably shy in providing assistance and defence to millions
of emigrant workers and citizens, as on the occasion of the lynch-
ing of Italians in New Orleans in 1891, the 1893 massacres in Aigues
Mortes, France, and the many deaths of Italian miners and workers in
Switzerland and Belgium, culminating in the tragedy of Marcinelle in
1956 due to inhuman working conditions.
A less ambivalent cultural and political climate towards Italians
abroad came to flourish in the country during the 1990s. By the turn
of the twenty-first century, the process of mainstreaming the so-called
‘Italians in the world’, both emigrant citizens and the offspring of
former expatriates, in Italy’s history, public discourse and culture went
along with their full ‘institutionalization’, political representation and
inclusion in the national narrative.
The emigration experience has definitively emerged from the private
into the public dimension. The last two decades have seen the organi-
zation of exhibitions and museums on Italian emigration in growing
numbers, often sponsored by local administrations. National TV series,
movies and books have popularized Italian emigration in the world.
Sites of memory have multiplied, in commemoration of those who left.
The list includes at least 64 study centres, 32 local and regional muse-
ums, 32 documentation centres and 138 associations, 14 of which are
146 Emigration Nations

national in orientation. The Museo nazionale dell’emigrazione italiana

(National Museum of Italian emigration) was inaugurated in October
2009. It is sponsored by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and hosted at
the ‘Vittoriano’ or Altar of the Fatherland in Rome, a building that sym-
bolizes Italian nationalistic pride at its highest. The museum also pays
tribute to all the non-governmental institutions whose main mission is
to deal with expatriates and their descendants.
The recent and current climate towards emigration and its history is
thus one of nationalistic pride (Audenino, 2008). In truth, the expatri-
ate has never been a contested figure or a suspicious character in the
Italian public context. This is due to the fact that the Italian state has
nurtured a sense of guilt towards those who were ‘compelled’ to leave
the country. This mix of nationalism and guilt now plays a crucial role
in the relationship with expatriates and has been turned into policies of
compensation and an inclination to redress.
For example, an officer of the Italian Ministry of the Interior publicly
denounced the use of the Italian passport by South American citizens of
Italian origin to move freely to other EU countries and, most of all, to the
United States within the Visa Waiver Program (Menghetti, 2002). Some
Italian politicians10 have also started to raise public doubts about why
many people of Italian origin want to regain Italian citizenship in South
America. The Italian passport is used to access free health care at private
hospitals subsidized by the Italian state, work opportunities, social pen-
sions, special assistance programmes and subsidies; it gives access to
external voting rights (Tintori, 2009, 2011). Despite this, the political
weight of descendants of citizens, the burden to the Italian welfare sys-
tem and public budget were not considered sufficient to reform norms
on the acquisition of citizenship by descent in more restrictive terms, as
Germany did under similar circumstances by tightening Aussiedler and
Spätaussiedler regulations (Dietz, 2006; Von Koppenfels, 2009).

Conclusion

Since the mass emigration of the nineteenth century, Italy has been
cultivating the idea that non-resident nationals and their descendants
are members of the nation and might form a network of lobbies, ready
to take part in Rome’s nationalistic strategies and policies in the inter-
national arena. This idea has survived and burgeoned since, despite the
fact that the features and numbers of the expatriates had changed.
In summing up the strategies that sending countries implement
towards expatriates, Bauböck pinpoints three main goals – ‘human capital
upgrading, remittances, and the political lobbying of receiving-countries’
 Italy 147

governments’ – but notes that these are partially conflicting goals which
reflect ‘broader ideological orientations towards emigration’ and differ-
ent emigration policies (Bauböck, 2003: 709). Human capital upgrading
implies a policy aimed at encouraging return migration, and a change
in the view of emigration as a mere safety valve. Sending states can pur-
sue remittances when the migratory process is still at an initial phase,
with high return rates and low family reunification. Political lobbying is
generally associated with the phase when national migrants are settled
and sending states promote their integration in the host country (Portes,
1999; Guarnizo, 2008). The Italian state seemed to pursue these strategies
through external citizenship policies at an early stage, when out-and-
return flows were still high and the outflow peak had still to come. While
the public discourse or narratives that framed Italy’s policies towards its
expatriates might have changed, together with regime change over time,
the rationales behind those policies display an impressive continuity
from the approval of the Emigration Law of 1901 to the present.
Stephane Dufoix (2008) may have provided the best description of
Italy’s diaspora politics. What marks Italy’s diaspora politics is an illusion
of community when it deals with its expatriates as a state category, and
an illusion of continuity at the symbolic narrative level. Italy’s external
citizenship policies are paradoxical: they are labelled as ethnic, in that
they are inspired by jus sanguinis, and aimed at maintaining a legal
bond with the descendants of emigrants without generational restric-
tions. Yet access to Italian citizenship by descent is granted without the
requirement or verification that co-ethnic traits and communality –
like knowledge of the Italian language and familiarity with Italian
culture, history and institutions – are present. In this respect, thus, the
‘diaspora is not a social construct but a sum’ (ibid.: 55). At the same
time, the narrative related to Italians abroad has been characterized by
an essentialism that ‘exempts it from any examination of its modali-
ties of establishment, decline, transformation, or disappearance. This
static thinking has two principal effects: politically, it allows the named
diaspora to come into existence, scientifically, it makes it impossible to
reason in terms of process’ (ibid.: 56).
The Italian state has constantly looked at expatriates as an opportu-
nity to project its power beyond the national territory and to remap the
boundaries of its sovereignty. As this historical review of Italy’s diaspora
politics reveals, the Italian case brings a distinctive contribution to the
expanding literature on sending countries’ policies towards expatriates
(Østergaard-Nielsen, 2003; Brand, 2006; Gamlen, 2008; Varadarajan,
2010). It underlines the importance of the state, with its external
citizenship policies and their rationales, in creating the conditions for
148 Emigration Nations

‘emigrant homecomings’ (Harper, 2005) and ethnic return migrations

(Tsuda, 2009), thus introducing a legal and institutional unit of analysis
in the study of the impact of return migration on processes of national
identity building, economic development, labour and welfare govern-
ance. This analysis adds a crucial historical dimension to the analysis
and theorization of external sovereignty (Adamson, 2007) and the gov-
ernmentality of the diasporas (Ragazzi, 2009), while also highlighting
the complexity of the interaction between the symbolic and institu-
tional in modalities of inclusion of expatriates and in the remapping of
the boundaries of belonging.

Appendix

List of relevant legislation with sources

Emigration and citizenship
Emigration Law Act n 23. 31 January 1901.
Nationality Law Act n. 555. 13 June 1912.
Nationality Law Act n. 91. 5 February 1992 (currently in force).
Law n. 379, 14 December 2000, and Law n. 124, 8 March 2006 (Reacquisition
of citizenship for minorities of national origins and to their descendants, which
belonged to the Austro-Hungarian Empire).

External voting
Constitutional Laws no. 1 of 17 January 2000 and no. 1 of 23 January 2001.
Law no. 459, 27 December 2001.

List of relevant government ministries, centres, government-

sponsored or official emigrant organizations, with websites
Websites
AGIM – Association of Young Italians in the World http://www.giovaninelmondo.
com/.
CCIE – The Italian Chambers of Commerce Abroad http://www.assocamerestero.it/.
CGIE – General Council for Italians Abroad http://www.cgie.it/ Comites – http://
www.comites-it.org/.
Italia internazionale: http://www.itint.gov.it/ice/cda/templates/index.jsp.
Italia Lavoro SpA http://www.italialavoro.it/.

List of NGOs (National, Regional, Local) with websites

http://www.museonazionaleemigrazione.it/elenco.php?id=2 List of study and
documentation centres with websites http://www.museonazionaleemigrazione.
it/elenco.php?id=3 List of Museums/Sites of memory with websites. http://www.
museonazionaleemigrazione.it/elenco.php?id=4 List of study centres and muse-
ums abroad with websites http://www.museonazionaleemigrazione.it/musei-
internazionali.php?cont=TUTTI.
 Italy 149

Ministry of Foreign Affairs – Department for Italians in the world http://www.

esteri.it/MAE/IT/Italiani_nel_Mondo/.
Museo Nazionale dell’emigrazione italiana http://www.museonazionalee
migrazione.it/.

Notes
1. Law No. 123, 21 April 1983.
2. This section is partially based on Tintori 2006.
3. First Session, 7 June 1912, House of Deputies, Atti del parlamento italiano.
Legislatura XXIII, Sessione I, Vol. XVII, Discussioni (dal 1 al 24 giugno 1912),
Roma, Tipografia della Camera dei deputati, 1912: 20529–20530.
4. Law no. 205/1985, amended by Law 286 of 23 October 2003.
5. Law no. 368 of 6 November 1989, amended by Law no. 198 of 18 June 1998,
and by the Presidential Decree no. 329 of 14 September 1998.
6. Source: Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
7. Laura Smith-Spark, ‘Expat politicians find their feet in Rome’, BBC News
http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-/1/hi/world/europe/4759523.stm, published:
2006/05/12, last (Accessed 28 July 2010).
8. Innovitalia: http://www.innovitalia.net/crowdforce/product/index.html
(last accessed 6 March 2013).
9. Senator Pellegrini, Session of 29 January 1901, House of Senate, Atti parla-
mentari. Legislatura XXI. I Sessione 1900–901, Discussioni, Roma, Forzani e
C. Tipografi del Senato, 1901: 1025.
10. For example, Gianfranco Fini, then Ministry of Foreign Affairs, during the
nationally broadcast talk-show ‘Porta a porta’, 25 October 2005.

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7
Regime Change in Mexico and the
Transformation of State–Diaspora
Relations
Jean-Michel Lafleur

Introduction

Mexico has attracted attention among academics, civil servant and

politicians interested in home state policies towards their emigrants.
In some instances, its policies have even been copied by other govern-
ments. Many reasons – which we will discuss in this chapter – may
explain this interest in Mexico: the size of its population abroad, its
concentration in one destination country, the economic impact of
migrants on the home country and the rapid development of most of
these policies over the last two decades. Indeed, while Mexican authori-
ties’ expertise in this field is acknowledged today, Mexico also used to
be known for its negative discourse towards emigrants and its absence
of policies.
This chapter will briefly describe the historical evolution of Mexican
migration to the United States and how it has been managed by
both governments. It will also underline the main characteristics of
contemporary emigrants, then turning to analysis of the policies and
institutions directed towards emigrants that have been implemented
by Mexican authorities on the national and sub-national level. Due to
the number of policies and institutions that have been set up in recent
years, attention will be focused on those that are most politically rel-
evant: the Paisano programme, the Program for Mexican Communities
Abroad (PCME), the 3 × 1 matching fund programme, the legislation on
dual citizenship, the consular identity card, the creation of the Institute
for Mexicans Abroad (IME) and its consultative council (CCIME) and,
lastly, the right to vote from abroad. Over the course of this analysis, it
will be shown that the transformation of Mexico’s attitude towards its
emigrants is strongly connected to the evolution of its political regime.

153
154 Emigration Nations

For this reason, the last part of the chapter will discuss the evolution
of power relations between the emigrant community and the Mexican
state through the lens of the external voting debate, which illustrates
both the influence of the community and the fear it creates among
certain domestic political actors.

History and geography of migration

A brief history of Mexican migration to the United States

Due to its proportion and its duration over time, along with the fact that
it is intertwined with the history of both the United States and Mexico,
summing up Mexico’s international migration history is an arduous
task. Even before Mexicans started to cross the border in large numbers,
people found themselves foreigners because of border changes. With
the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, which ended the Mexican–American
War in 1848, a large part of the Mexican territory moved under US
sovereignty. At the time, around 75,000 of the 100,000 Mexicans resid-
ing in the former Mexican territories opted to become US citizens (the
other option being to move south to Mexico). These people are often
considered the first generation of Mexican migrants to the United States
(Cano and Délano, 2007, 698).
International migration as we know it today did not happen during
the nineteenth century because the poorly demarcated border allowed
back and forth movement. The importance of controlling the border
became more evident for authorities on both sides with the US Civil
War and the 1910 Mexican Revolution. In addition to the progressive
tightening of border security, restrictive policies in the United States –
such as the Chinese Exclusion Act (1882) – threatened the booming
economy of the West and created a demand for Mexican workers. US
employers therefore turned to private labour contractors who, through
a system known as el enganche, recruited Mexican workers by telling
them tales about the good working conditions waiting for them up
north (Durand, 2000, 21). The situation repeated itself with the First
World War and the restrictions on Eastern European migration. Despite
the absence of a bilateral agreement between the two governments,
Mexican authorities, nonetheless, tried to make sure that the rights of
their citizens were being respected (Durand, 2006, 31–33).
While US economic and political factors pulled early Mexican
migrants to the United States, Mexico’s domestic politics have been
another decisive factor. Between 1876 and 1911, Mexico was ruled by
President Porfirio Diaz, whose effort to modernize Mexico’s economy
 Mexico 155

happened at the expense of rural areas. The campo’s crisis stimulated

internal migration to Mexican cities until 1910. During the revolution-
ary decade (1910–1920), violence encouraged around 200,000 citizens to
seek refuge in the United States (Massey, Durand and Malone, 2002, 30).
The 1920s witnessed conflicting trends towards migration in US soci-
ety. On the one hand the booming economy stimulated demand for
unskilled Mexican workers. On the other hand, the increase in nativist
sentiment and the 1929 Great Depression opened an era of massive
deportation, and migration naturally fell from an average flow of 46,000
legal immigrants a year in the 1920s to less than 2,700 in the 1930s. It is
estimated that the Mexican population in the United States decreased by
41 per cent over the course of the 1930s and that 458,000 Mexicans were
deported between 1929 and 1937 (Massey et al., 2002; Durand, 2000).
In reaction to this situation, the Mexican state tried to help repatriated
Mexicans to return home through the use of special bodies, a citizens’
committee and the consular network (Sherman, 1999, 842).
With the New Deal and the entry of the United States into the
Second World War, the conditions for economic growth and labour
shortages in the United States soon reappeared. In Mexico, the poli-
cies of President Cardenas had allowed land redistribution but migra-
tion was still perceived by many peasant workers as a way of accessing
capital to develop their farms (Massey et al., 2002). For the Partido
Revolucionario Institucional (PRI) – the party state that ruled Mexico for
71 years – allowing temporary labour migration to the United States
was a dilemma. Though doing so would be an explicit recognition of
the government’s incapacity to address the problem of unemployment
in Mexico, population pressure, the need for foreign exchange and eco-
nomic difficulties encouraged the PRI to make such migration possible
(Pfeiffer, 1979, 74–75).
In this particular context, American farmers also lobbied Congress
to pass legislation on temporary Mexican migration. The US govern-
ment, however, was conscious that its Mexican counterpart, unsatis-
fied with the treatment given to its emigrants so far, would oppose
any unilateral move by the United States in the field of temporary
migration. Indeed, Mexican officials distrusted American employers so
much that they insisted that the US government itself be the formal
employer of the braceros (Kiser and Kiser, 1979, 68). In 1942, the US and
Mexican governments signed the Farm Labor Supply Agreement, allow-
ing Mexican workers to work in the United States temporarily when
American workers were not available to fill the positions. Guarantees
included a minimum wage, round-trip transportation and the right for
156 Emigration Nations

workers to bring their families into the United States (even though no
families were eventually admitted) (Martin, 1998, 880–881).
Between 1942 and 1945, 168,000 braceros went up north to work but
that remained insufficient to face demand for labour and undocumented
migration simultaneously increased (Massey et al., 2002: 36–37). While
the United States was trying to address its labour shortages with this
programme, the Mexican government was using it for political purposes
by allocating large shares of bracero contracts to regions where political
opposition was concentrated (Alarcón, 1995).
The release of influential studies and opinions on the adverse conse-
quences of Mexican temporary migrants on the domestic farm workers’
wages and working conditions led to a decline in the number of visas
issued. As the programme lost support, Congress unilaterally decided
to terminate it in 1963 (Martin, 1998). It is estimated that over the
course of the bracero programme, 4.5 million temporary working con-
tracts were issued and another 5 million undocumented migrants were
apprehended and deported from the United States (García y Griego
and Verea, 1988). The Mexican government first sought to convince
US authorities to reconsider their decision as they feared the end of the
bracero programme would stimulate undocumented migration. They
eventually abandoned the idea of signing a new agreement due to con-
cerns regarding their own capacity to protect Mexican migrants (Garcia y
Griego, 1998; Mexican Embassy, 1979; Echeverría, 1979).
The end of the bracero programme is the starting point of what Massey
and colleagues (2002: 45–46) call the era of undocumented migration in
the United States that lasted until 1985. During this period, around 28
million Mexicans entered the United States irregularly, in contrast with
1.3 million documented Mexican migrants. Factors on both sides of the
border account for this dramatic increase in the flows of undocumented
migration. In the United States, the bracero programme had created a
structural dependency on Mexican labour. Furthermore, repeated reduc-
tions in the number of visas allocated to Mexicans encouraged undocu-
mented migration. On the Mexican side, the bracero programme created
dependency on migration income in many households. Also, the progres-
sive decline of the Mexican economy (culminating with the 1982 peso
crisis) provided would-be emigrants with more reasons to do so. These
different factors consolidated the binational labour market between the
United States and Mexico (Bustamante and Cockroft, 1983, 312).
With the economic downturn in the 1970s and Cold War security
concerns in the 1980s, migrants were increasingly perceived as threats.
As a result, the Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA) was
 Mexico 157

adopted in 19861 with the objective of reducing the number of migrants

illegally crossing the border (Escobar Latapí, Bean, and Weintraub,
1999, 121–122). The consequences of the IRCA are significant. Under
the provisions concerning undocumented migrants, around 1.2 million
Mexicans legalized their status and obtained permanent residence in
the United States. Under the provisions for special agricultural workers,
another 1 million Mexicans gained residence. Most importantly, the
IRCA transformed the traditional ‘sojourner’ Mexican migration to a
‘settler’ migration (González Gutíerrez, 1995, 268).
On the Mexican side, the government adopted what some observers
called ‘a policy of not having a policy’ from the mid-1970s onwards
(see below), motivated by the principle of non-interventionism and the
fear of supporting a US migration policy that might harm its emigrants’
rights (González Gutíerrez, 1995; García y Griego and Verea, 1988).
As elaborated below, the controversial election of President Salinas de
Gortari in 1988 strongly affected the development of policies towards
the diaspora. His election also supported the transformation of Mexico
into a neo-liberal economy. The project of joining the North American
Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) became a priority. The government’s
motto was that Mexico wanted to export goods, not people. For fear
of rejection by the US Congress, Salinas eventually decided to leave
the free circulation of workers out of the NAFTA negotiation. In the
United States, it was already clear by 1990 that the IRCA had failed
to reduce both documented and undocumented migration. As border
control increased, the US Congress passed the Immigration Act in 1990
that limited family immigration to 480,000 per year. Because of the
repeated failures of these policies to prevent undocumented migra-
tion, Congress further supported the Immigration and Naturalization
Service (INS) move towards stricter border controls by passing the Illegal
Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996.2 At the
state level, California passed Proposition 187 by referendum in 1994 to
deny access to social services to undocumented migrants.
Data of the Mexican Population Council indicates that the restrictive
US\ policies implemented during the 1990s have had a limited effect on
the growth of the Mexican population in the United States (CONAPO,
2005). This population increased from 4.4 million to 8.8 million between
1990 and 2000 and again to 10.6 million in 2005. For Mexico, the
annual average net loss of population due to migration moved from
315,000 people between 1991 and 1995, to 396,000 between 2001
and 2005. With regard to the modalities through which migrants
have crossed the border, the share of undocumented crossings in total
158 Emigration Nations

border movement rose from 48 per cent in 1993–1997 to 63 per cent in

1998–2001 and further to 77 per cent in 2001–2004. Also, as a result of
the tightening of the border, the share of migrants who have made use
of smugglers to cross the border increased during the 1990s.
In 2000, Mexico experienced a historic change with the victory of the
Liberal Party Partido Acción Nacional (PAN) and its presidential candidate
Vicente Fox. His election put an end to 71 years of uncontested PRI
rule. That same year, Mexico proposed to its NAFTA partners to discuss
the possibility of adopting an open border policy. While the Canadian
and US governments showed scepticism towards such an idea, they
agreed on a negotiation agenda that included items such as the regu-
larization of undocumented immigrants, a temporary labour migration
programme, a number of visas to be given to Mexican citizens, border
safety and cooperation in the development of migrant-sending regions.
The 11 September 2001 attacks, however, put an end to those discus-
sions and prompted instead the signing of the Smart Border Agreements
(2001 and 2002) and the setting up of the Security and Prosperity
Partnership of North America acknowledging the interdependence of
the three countries in dealing with border security (Emmerich, 2003;
Benítez Manaut and Rodríguez Ulloa, 2006). For Mexico, the conse-
quence has been not only the impossibility of negotiating a new migra-
tion agreement with the United States, but also militarization of the
border, epitomized by Congress voting for the construction of a wall
along the border in September 2006.

The changing patterns of Mexican migration to the United States

As seen above, both the context of departure and arrival of Mexican
migrants have evolved over time. This has naturally affected the profile
of Mexican emigrants to the United States, which has changed in terms
of origin, destination, socio-economic profile and gender.
In discussing migrants’ origins, I refer to the typology of emigration
regions drafted by the Mexican National Population Council which
consists of the Traditional region, the Northern region, the Central
region and the Southeast region (CONAPO, 2005).
The traditional sending states include Aguascalientes, Colima,
Durango, Guanajuato, Jalisco, Michoacán, Nayarit, San Luis Potosi and
Zacatecas. These states have a common history of labour migration to
the United States and have always been large sending states, represent-
ing 44 per cent of flows in 1926–1932, around 55 per cent of bracero
migrants, 50 per cent of pre-IRCA migrants in 1984 and 54 per cent of
those who migrated in 1992 (Durand, Massey, and Zenteno, 2001, 110).
 Mexico 159

In 2005, the emigrant population originating from this region repre-

sented 21.2 per cent of the total population.
The Northern region contains the six states sharing a border with
the United States (Baja California, Coahuila, Chihuahua, Nuevo León,
Sonora and Tamaulipas) and two other states connected with the border
states (Baja California Sur and Sinaloa). Historically, strong connections
with the US border made the Northern Region a large contributor to
migration flows, yet to a lesser extent than the Traditional region, with
emigrants representing 10.6 per cent of the region’s population in 2005.
According to the Binational Study on Migration (1997), a diversifi-
cation of flows moving from a domination of the Traditional region
(which still provides the largest share of emigrants in absolute terms)
to other areas occurred in the 1990s. Based on National Population
Council (Consejo National de Población) (CONAPO) data, these new
flows come from two main regions. The Central Region – including
states such as Hidalgo, Morelos, Puebla and Querétaro, the state of
México and the Federal district – started to contribute significantly
to migration flows in the 1990s. This is supported by data showing
that the share of migrants originating from non-urban areas moved
from 44 per cent between 1998 and 2001 to 51 per cent between 2001
and 2004 (CONAPO, 2005). The Southeast region is the newcomer in
Mexican migration, sending significant numbers of migrants only in
the 1990s and includes Guerrero, Oaxaca and Veracruz.
With respect to places of destination, Mexican migration has historically
tended to concentrate in specific areas of the United States. For instance,
the 1920 US census revealed that the majority of the Mexican population
residing in the United States was concentrated in just four states (Arizona,
California, Illinois and Texas). For Durand (2005), four elements explain
Mexican emigrants’ choice for a specific destination: transport networks,
the labour market, geographical proximity to the border and the possibil-
ity of circulation and the networks helping new migrants settle where
other members of the community are already present.
Prior to the adoption of the IRCA, the majority of Mexican migrants
moved to California, Texas and Illinois. With the adoption of the IRCA, the
militarization of the border and the legalization of 2.3 million Mexicans,
California lost some of its appeal. At the end of the 1980s the share of
migrants moving to non-traditional states had reached 25 per cent,
compared to 90 per cent of the flows absorbed in California and other
traditional states in the 1980–1986 period. With the increase of anti-
migrant sentiment in traditional receiving states such as California in
the 1990s and economic growth in the Northeast, the Midwest and
160 Emigration Nations

the Southeast, 30 per cent of new legal immigrants avoided California,

Texas and Illinois by 1998 (Massey et al., 2002: 126–28). The East
Coast and Great Plains regions, however, showed major dynamism,
moving from10 per cent of the total Mexican population in 1970 to
almost 20 per cent in the early twenty-first century (CONAPO, 2005).
The socio-economic profiles of migrants have also evolved. First,
though the level of education of Mexican migrants has increased through
the 1990s, their average level of educational achievement remains
inferior to that of other Latino migrants to the United States. Second,
migrants’ occupations have also changed. Between 1993–1997 and 2001–
2004, more migrants previously holding a job in Mexico arrived, while
the share of Mexican workers occupied in US agriculture decreased from
44 to 21 per cent. These figures illustrate the fact that a lot of Mexican
migrants leave a job in Mexico to work in the United States increasingly
in the secondary and tertiary sectors (CONAPO, 2005).
With regard to poverty, the UNDP report (2007) underlines that both
the richest and poorest households in Mexico have the lowest prob-
ability of having a member who migrates; migration is most likely to
occur at the intermediary level of income. The socio-economic situation
of Mexican migrants in the United States is particularly alarming as it
is estimated that 2.9 million (26 per cent) live in poverty, which rep-
resents 46 per cent of all poor migrants in the United States. The over-
representation of Mexican migrants among the disadvantaged in the
United States is further illustrated by the fact that 53 per cent (5.9 million)
do not have health insurance (CONAPO, 2005).
Third, gender distribution has significantly evolved over time.
Whereas women represented only 5 per cent of the workers recruited
during the bracero programme, they represented around 18 per cent
of the Mexican migrant population before the adoption of the IRCA
(Donato and Patterson, 2004). In the 1990s, when newly legalized
Mexican male migrants began to sponsor their spouses, the absolute
number of women migrating continued to increase while decreasing in
relative terms (Ávila, Fuentes, and Tuirán, 2000) (CONAPO, 2005).
Female Mexican migrants differ from their male counterparts in many
regards (Ávila, Fuentes, and Tuirán, 2000; CONAPO, 2000): they have
a higher level of education, come principally from the Northern region
of Mexico and are more frequently from urban areas. They are also
younger and usually married at the time of departure. On the profes-
sional level, women work in the service sector more frequently than
men, but they obtain on average 44 per cent less income than their
male counterparts in the same sector. The last element of importance
 Mexico 161

is that women use smugglers more frequently than men to cross the
border and are accordingly more exposed to violence in the migration
process (Donato and Patterson, 2004; Alonso Meneses, 2005).

Institutions and policies

The above summary of the history of Mexican migration to the United

States has already introduced the idea that the Mexican authorities’
attitudes towards their population abroad have changed over time.
According to Durand (2004), there are five phases in Mexico’s emigra-
tion policies. First, authorities tried to dissuade Mexicans from migrat-
ing in the early twentieth century. Second, they negotiated migration
agreements with the United States after the Second World War. Third,
they opted for a laissez-faire approach in the 1970s and 1980s (or the
‘policy of not having a policy’). Fourth, they developed new policies
to ‘control the damage’ in the 1990s after relations with the diaspora
had deteriorated. Fifth, they advocated a policy of ‘shared responsibil-
ity’ with the United States, which continues today. These phases depict
different attitudes of the Mexican government towards its population
abroad and the US government. This section of the chapter focuses on
how the changing posture of Mexico towards its emigrants since the end
of the 1980s has materialized into concrete policies and institutions.
As underscored by Alarcon (2006), at the end of the 1980s, the
Mexican government paid the price for not having a policy towards its
expatriates for the previous two decades. Indeed, the 1988 presidential
election saw the controversial victory of Salinas de Gortari, the candidate
of the state party (PRI). This moment was decisive in two respects. First,
Mexican emigrants had proved supportive of Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas,
the candidate of the left-wing Partido de la Revolución Democrática
(PRD) who had been campaigning among Mexicans abroad despite the
impossibility of voting from abroad. Suspicions of fraud outraged citi-
zens abroad, whose demonstrations embarrassed Mexican authorities.
Second, because he made NAFTA a priority of his mandate, Salinas was
hoping that Mexican Americans and their associations would pressure
the US Congress in Mexico’s favour (which eventually did not happen)
(see Leiken, 2000; de la Garza and Desipio, 1998).
These two elements made the Mexican government realize it needed
to do more to reach out to its citizens abroad. Two main programmes
started during Salinas’s presidency. The first one is the ‘Paisano’ pro-
gramme created in 1989 to make the journey safer for migrants coming
back to visit relatives. To this end, stronger controls were put in place
162 Emigration Nations

at major transit points to gradually decrease extortions and bad treat-

ment by civil servants of migrants. This was a way for the authorities
to show that they were taking concrete measure to address a pressing
need of Mexicans abroad and to improve their image. The creation of
the PCME set up within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs by presidential
decree in 1990 was even more explicit in this regard. From its inception,
the programme had three major goals: strengthening relations between
Mexican citizens on both sides of the border in areas such as business,
education or even culture; improving the image of Mexican Americans
in Mexico and improving the image of Mexico among Mexicans in the
United States (González Gutíerrez, 1993).
For González Gutíerrez (1993) – a migration scholar who later became
the director of the Institute of Mexicans Abroad (IME) – the programme
has been very successful in reaching out to the Mexican American
establishment: Latino organizations started to cooperate with the pub-
lic and Mexican private agencies and business agreements were signed.
As underscored by Alarcón (2006), the PCME also encouraged Mexican
associations in the United States to form coalitions on the state level
to facilitate communication with Mexican civil servants on the local,
regional or federal levels.
In addition to these achievements, the PCME led to the promotion
of the ‘2 for 1 program’ in 1992 which encouraged migrant associa-
tions, also known as hometown associations (HTAs), to develop projects
for the benefit of their home communities (Figueroa-Aramoni, 1999;
Goldring, 2002). The matching fund programme was originally cre-
ated to permit Zacatecan migrant associations in California to invest in
development projects (such as roads, wells and schools) in their home
communities (García Zamora, 2005). It provided that regional authori-
ties would match every migrant’s dollar invested. For scholars such as
Gonzalez Gutiérrez (2006) or Delano (2009), there is little doubt that
this programme (which was subsequently supported by the federal
government and extended to other regions) contributed to empowering
communities abroad by recognizing migrants as valid interlocutors in
their home communities.
As mentioned earlier, the legitimacy concerns of the PRI government
and the desire to join NAFTA motivated Mexican authorities to change
their posture towards emigrants. It was, however, the development of
anti-immigrant sentiment in the United States in the 1990s that played
a major role in another important reform: the permission to have dual
nationality. Indeed, the adoption in 1994 by the citizens of California
of Proposition 187,3 aimed at denying access to social services to the
 Mexico 163

undocumented population, shed light on the growing hostility towards

Mexicans in the United States. In response to this, Mexican legislators
reformed the nationality law by suppressing the rule according to which
a Mexican citizen automatically loses his/her nationality by taking that
of another state. In other words, authorities sought to make it easier for
immigrants (who were traditionally reluctant to give up their Mexican
nationality) to take US citizenship. Doing so, Mexican authorities not
only hoped that US citizenship would give migrants the full set of
rights in that country, they also believed it would discourage US politi-
cians from openly promoting anti-immigrant policies (see Alarcón and
Martínez in La Jornada, 1995). At same time, dual citizenship was a
hotly debated topic in Mexico. Political parties disagreed on the rights
that ought to be attached to this status and some feared it would pro-
mote foreign influence in Mexico (Fitzgerald, 2005; Calderón Chelius
and Martínez Cossío, 2004).
The amendments to Article 32 of the constitution4 officially recog-
nized the possibility for a Mexican national to hold another nationality.
It also stated that, like foreigners, dual nationals would be submitted to
some restrictions. For example, access to government offices and func-
tions was restricted to Mexican citizens by birth. However, the restric-
tion applied to foreigners in the purchase of land was not applicable
to dual nationals. Indeed, legislators’ motivation was also to stimulate
Mexican American investments in Mexico (Becerra Ramírez, 2000).
More than just recognizing dual nationality, the constitutional reforms
made it impossible for Mexican nationals who acquired their nationality
by birth to ever lose it (Art. 37). In other words, non-forfeiture was intro-
duced into Mexico’s dual nationality law by these reforms. Following
this principle, former Mexican nationals who had acquired a foreign
nationality before 20 March 1998 were given five years, starting in 1998,
to request it back from consular authorities. Similarly, Mexicans who
acquired a foreign nationality after that date would not be deprived of
their Mexican nationality (González Martín, 1999).
At the end of the five-year period, only 67,000 former Mexican
nationals had regained their lost nationality – a figure which contrasted
with the much larger expectations of the Foreign Affairs Ministry
(Castañeda, 2007; Marcelli and Cornelius, 2005). In the United States,
the rate of eligible Mexican citizens applying for US citizenship has
traditionally been among the lowest in comparison to other communi-
ties. In 1995, their rate of naturalization was only 20 per cent, a situa-
tion the Pew Hispanic Center (Passel, 2007) considers to be partly due
to the fact that the community fits the criteria traditionally associated
164 Emigration Nations

with low citizenship levels, such as low education levels, lower levels
of knowledge of the English language or higher poverty rates. In the
following decade, the rate of naturalization among Mexicans, while
remaining lower than the average non-Mexican eligible foreigners’ rate
(66 per cent), increased more than in any other group to reach around
35 per cent by 2005. It is, however, difficult to estimate what role the
Mexican non-forfeiture law has played in this increase, since other fac-
tors (especially factors related to the US migration policy) also have to
be taken into account.
As noted by Calderón Chelius and Martínez Cossío (2004), dual citi-
zenship was a government-controlled issue that did not address a need
that had been strongly expressed by the community beforehand. For this
reason, different migrant organizations considered that dual citizenship
was a government manoeuvre to avoid addressing the demand for exter-
nal voting (see below). For the PRI, external voting was deemed too risky
for they feared it would mostly benefit the left-wing opposition party,
the PRD. In 1990, President Salinas therefore proposed that the electoral
law be modified to explicitly prohibit it. With the Chiapas rebellion in
1994, however, the government was forced to make concessions.
To ensure the country’s stability, the PRI agreed to pass a series of elec-
toral reforms. The PRD agreed to offer to support the dialogue process
in Chiapas in exchange for the PRI and the PAN’s support for reforms
on external voting. Article 36.III of the constitution5 was subsequently
modified to suppress the obligation that the vote be cast in the electoral
district to which the voter is attached. The same proposal instead states
that Mexican citizens have the obligation to vote according to the rules
set in the law. The constitutional reform, which entered into force in
August 1996, therefore accepted the principle of external voting but
left legislators the responsibility to define the conditions to access this
right and the organization of elections abroad. Despite emigrant lobby-
ing, the idea of potentially adding several million external voters to the
Mexican voting population was unappealing to many politicians and
government agencies alike. Accordingly, the necessary legislation was
not passed before the 2000 presidential election.
With respect to emigrant-oriented policies, the next decisive step
was taken by the first PAN (right-wing) President Vicente Fox, who
was elected in 2000 after 71 years of PRI rule. According to Cano and
Délano (2007: 713), ‘[o]ne of the main pillars of his election campaign
had been to seek a new relationship with the almost 22 million people
of Mexican origin living in the US, and integrate them into the design
and implementation of policies directed towards them’.
 Mexico 165

At the beginning of his mandate, President Fox established the

Presidential Office for Mexicans Abroad (OPME) whose main focus was
to promote Mexican businesses, invest in areas of high emigration and
manage remittances. The innovative feature of this office was that the
director (directly responsible to the president) managed the relations
with the diaspora directly, not via the consular network anymore.
However, the OPME lacked both human and material resources to be
effective and for this reason it was decided in 2002 to integrate the PCME
and the OPME in one single entity called the IME. The IME’s goal was to
foster a strong relationship between the emigrant communities and the
Mexican state for the benefit of both (González Gutíerrez, 2003).
The IME has been active in promoting Mexican American leadership
by holding conferences with Latino leaders to discuss possible coop-
eration between the IME and migrant organizations. The IME has also
granted the Ohtli leadership awards that show Mexico’s recognition
of the role performed by association leaders. Other programmes have
been put in place by the IME to allow migrants to access distance-
learning programmes with the possibility of earning credits at Mexican
institutions. In addition, IME has sought to establish partnership with
US health organizations to raise awareness among the communities
(Smith, 2008).
One of the IME’s biggest achievements has been to contribute to the
recognition of Mexican consular ID cards as a valid form of identification
by the US Department of Treasury, many financial institutions and US
authorities on the local and state levels. Indeed, the security restrictions
put in place after the attacks of September 2001 greatly increased the
need for undocumented Mexican migrants in the United States to hold
some form of identification. The Mexican government soon introduced
a new card with enhanced security features and the IME, along with
other Mexican agencies and migrant associations, then started to lobby
in favour of its widest acceptance possible in the United States. Despite
the opposition of anti-immigrant politicians who suggested that the
card would facilitate terrorist access to the territory, this lobbying effort
proved fruitful. The card thus became highly desirable and almost 1.2
million cards were issued in 2002 alone (Waldinger, 2008; Smith, 2008).
The most innovative feature of the IME is the creation of the Consul-
tative Council (CCIME), integrating 105 community leaders elected
in 45 constituencies by the emigrants themselves, 10 representatives
of the most influential Latino associations in the United States, 10
special advisers and 32 representatives of Mexico’s federal entities. The
CCIME is organized around seven working groups (business, education,
166 Emigration Nations

legal affairs, political affairs, health, border issues and the media) and
its main task is to make recommendations to the state with regard to
issues concerning the communities. Altogether the CCIME embodies
the very goal set out in the creation of IME, which is to stimulate dia-
logue between the state and the emigrants but also to foster cooperation
between the associations themselves (as they often had little contact).
The CCIME has, however, attracted criticism from members of the emi-
grant community and regional politicians expressing doubts about its
leverage and legitimacy (Escobar, 2005; Santamaría Gómez, 2007).
Despite the creation of the IME and its associated policies, the presi-
dency of Vicente Fox was to many migrant associations the right time
to ask for the passage of external voting legislation once and for all. As
outlined in the last section of this chapter, the evolution of this debate
was, however, strongly determined by the opinions of domestic actors
on the economic and political roles emigrants should be allowed to play
in the home country.

Debates on the role of emigrants

Mexican ‘asociacionismo’ in the United States is not a new phenom-

enon. Indeed, associations created in the second half of the nineteenth
century already provided ‘funeral and illness benefits, collective sup-
port, group defences against exclusion from political participation
or abuse at the workplace, as well as recreational services’ (Cano and
Délano, 2007: 699). The creation of these associations in response to
the subordinate positions occupied by Mexicans in the United States
laid the foundation for the emergence of a sense of solidarity among
this community. The Mexican state insisted on the protection of this
group through its consular network. Nonetheless, the pre-revolutionary
Mexican government was also reluctant to consider Mexican emigrants
as members of the nation and feared the development of political oppo-
sition among this population.
After the revolution, new associations such as the League of United
Latin American Citizens (LULAC) appeared to address the needs of
Mexican Americans. The Mexican authorities, on the contrary, focused
on helping Mexican citizens abroad and increasingly perceived US
citizens of Mexican origin as traitors (de la Garza and Vargas, 1991).
Also, the derogatory term ‘pocho’ soon came to label those Mexican
American citizens considered as having forgotten their Mexican roots.
In the 1960s, in the context of the post-bracero era and civil right
movements, the Chicano movement developed to support Mexican
 Mexico 167

American citizens in their fight to have both their rights as US citizens

and their own identity respected (Cano and Délano, 2007: 706). The
early 1970s saw a period of reconstruction of the relationship between
Mexican authorities and the Mexican community in the United States.
For the Chicanos, the objective was to obtain the support of their
homeland in the struggle for better status in the United States. Mexico’s
reaction, initially shy under the Echevaria presidency (1970–1976),
intensified with Lopez Portillo and the creation of the Office of Chicano
Affairs within the Labour Ministry. In doing so, Mexico progressively
gave up the so-called Estrada doctrine: the refusal to intervene in other
nations’ internal affairs (de la Garza and Vargas, 1991).
The new relationship left some actors on the sidelines, however.
Mexican authorities at the time considered Mexican American and
Hispanic associations as ‘the only representatives of the Mexican immi-
grant communities’ because their focus was on the inclusion of migrants
in the US. Hometown associations, on the contrary, were traditionally
led by first-generation immigrants and had specific requests such as
external voting that the home country government was not ready to
address (Santamaría, 2007: 31–32).
As shown above, Mexico’s interest in its population abroad started
to rise during the end of the 1980s with the PRI’s legitimacy crisis, the
perspective of joining NAFTA and increasing hostility towards migrants
in the United States. During the same period, the economic importance
of migrants appeared all the more evident with a boom in remittances –
shifting from USD 698 million in 1980 to USD 1,680 million in 1989,
and again from USD 6,573 million in 2000 to 26,069 million in 2007
(Tuirán, 2002; CONAPO, 2010). Remittances represent one of Mexico’s
largest sources of income together with oil and tourism revenues. This
element is to be added to the above-mentioned factors in explaining
the development of emigration policies in Mexico. As a matter of fact,
remittances not only increased, they became more valuable for Mexico
on both the micro- and macro-economic level (Goldring, 2004). Also,
as HTAs turned from being mutual aid societies to transnational asso-
ciations supporting development in the home community, the eco-
nomic role of migrants in the home country became acknowledged by
Mexican authorities in the 1990s with programmes such as the ‘3 ⫻ 1’
matching fund programme.
On the symbolic level however, it was the election of Vicente Fox in
2000, after a campaign emphasizing the positive role of emigrants, that
put an end to the ‘pocho’ stereotype in favour of a vision of Mexicans
as the nation’s new heroes. Despite this change in rhetoric and Fox’s
168 Emigration Nations

promise to make external voting a reality before the end of his term,
the recognition of migrants as valid political actors in Mexico was still
a long way away.

The right to vote from abroad

With their economic importance being acknowledged and a new rheto-
ric on migrants being part of the nation, migrant associations were now
in a much more favourable position than in the 1980s when they first
expressed the demand to vote from abroad. Also, with the renewed con-
nections between actors on both sides of the border, some associations
were more able to impact the homeland political scene. The creation
of the Coalition for the Right to Vote of Mexicans Abroad (Coalición
por los Derechos Políticos de los Mexicanos en el Extranjero, CDPME in
Spanish) illustrated this new strength. This association linked emigrant
leaders in the United States with lobbyists living in Mexico. Through
their transnational coordination, they were able to pressure Mexican
political parties with the support of grass-roots organizations in the
United States (Santamaría Gómez, 2007; Lafleur, 2011).
Knowing that Mexican political parties would be afraid of the political
consequences of being presented as ‘anti-emigrant’, associations such as
the CDPME started to publicly accuse them of blocking the adoption of
external voting legislation. It targeted its lobbying at politicians from
large emigrant sending states such as Michoacán and Zacatecas, know-
ing that these politicians would be receptive, given that a large share
of their constituents were economically dependent on emigrants. For
similar reasons states like Zacatecas proved to be supportive of the idea
of transnational citizenship by creating the status of ‘binational citizen’,
through which emigrants cannot vote but can be appointed as mayor
or Member of the Regional Assembly (Moctezuma Longoria, 2003).
Michoacán, on the other hand, was discussing the possibility of grant-
ing emigrants the right to vote from abroad in gubernatorial elections.6
Despite these favourable elements, different domestic political actors
were reluctant to see the external voting legislation pass. First and most
importantly, political parties were uncertain of the impact of this vote
on electoral results. The PRI, for one, was convinced that migrants
would use their newly gained vote to sanction the party that some
considered had encouraged them to leave. Even within the tradition-
ally migrant-friendly left-wing PRD, some promised to block any leg-
islation except that which would include reserved seats for emigrant
MPs in Parliament. Second, the Federal Electoral Institute (IFE) and the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs also expressed concerns about the practical
 Mexico 169

consequences of potentially adding several million voters to the elec-

toral lists.
As the 2006 elections approached, President Fox found himself under
increasing emigrant pressure to comply with his promise and commis-
sioned one his ministers to consult with political parties and identify
the lowest common denominator upon which they could agree. This
consensus was subsequently formalized in the 28 June 2005 legislation
on external voting that allowed a very restrictive form of voting from
abroad. Among the restrictions passed by the legislators was the limita-
tion of voting rights to presidential elections; emigrants could not elect
their own representatives to parliament. Furthermore, political parties
would be prohibited from campaigning abroad. The most important
restriction was, however, that only those emigrants already holding
a voter identity card would be capable of registering as voters from
abroad. Despite the fact that it was estimated that a large share of the
emigrant population had never applied for such card before migrating
(or had disposed of it upon crossing the border), legislators decided that
these cards would not be delivered abroad. Migrants with no card who
wanted to vote therefore had to go back to Mexico to apply for it.
For obvious reasons, this last provision strongly impacted registra-
tion figures – as intended by political parties when they approved it.
Not knowing what the impact of that vote on electoral results would
be, they decided to limit as much as possible the number of external
voters. After a registration campaign led by the IFE, which was strongly
criticized by emigrant associations, only a limited number of emigrants
managed to register and around 32,000 of the potentially millions of
Mexicans voters residing abroad eventually cast their vote in the 2006
presidential election. Despite their limited representation, electoral
results confirmed emigrants’ anti-PRI posture while the traditional sup-
porter of external voting – the PRD – was outperformed by the Liberal
Party PAN. Altogether, and in contrast to what happened at home, the
electoral process abroad was deemed transparent, to the great satisfac-
tion of the Federal Electoral Authority.
The failure of external voting in 2006 to enfranchise massive num-
bers of citizens abroad did not discourage Mexico from repeating the
experience. Just a few months after the presidential elections, the state
of Michoacan was the first to allow its citizens abroad to take part in
the gubernatorial elections from abroad under the same administrative
requirements as the presidential election. As expected, the regional
legislation on external voting had a similar outcome in terms of emi-
grant participation – only 349 ballots were cast from abroad. Despite
170 Emigration Nations

these experiences, few attempts were made to improve the registration

figures in view of the 2012 presidential election. The lack of political
consensus rendered it impossible, for instance, for voter identity cards
to be delivered to citizens abroad as requested by several migrant asso-
ciations. Thanks to minor administrative adjustments around existing
external voting legislation, the IFE managed to almost double the num-
ber of registered voters abroad in spite of its much smaller budget to do
so (see Lafleur, 2013). The figure of 59,000 registered voters, however,
remained marginal in comparison to the millions of Mexican adults
abroad who did not register.

Conclusion

This chapter has shown how the evolution of Mexico’s emigration policy
is linked to the evolution of its migration flows, its relationship with the
United States and most importantly its own domestic political evolution.
Indeed, as the PRI was concerned with the political influence of emigrants
in the home country, most policies implemented in the twentieth cen-
tury focused on the protection of Mexican citizens abroad. After a period
of relative inactivity in the field of emigration, described as the ‘policy
of not having a policy’, the regime found itself obliged to re-establish
links with communities abroad in an attempt to increase its legitimacy.
Similarly, its desire to embrace a neo-liberal economic model forced
the government to reconsider the role of its emigrants and see them
as potential allies in reaching this goal. By the end of 1990s, Mexican
authorities had developed a number of policies in the field of protec-
tion, co-development and citizenship. Regime change in 2000, however,
marked a turn in the rhetoric used to define migrants moving from the
‘pocho’ stereotype to the ‘heroes of the nation’ image. The coming to
power of President Vicente Fox also permitted the materialization of the
long-time demand of emigrants to participate in home country elections
along with other substantial reforms such as the creation of the Institute
for Mexican Abroad. The historic desire to control the impact of citizens
abroad on Mexican politics, however, strongly restricted the use of this
right. In that sense, Mexico’s external voting legislation may be said to
play a primarily symbolic function by explicitly formalizing their citizen-
ship status, despite their absence from the national territory, while ensur-
ing at the same time that they do not affect the existing electoral balance.
Looking at the latest developments in this area, the simultaneous
concern to protect emigrants and to connect with migrant communities
seems to persist. Indeed, Mexican authorities are nowadays preoccupied
 Mexico 171

with growing resentment towards undocumented immigrants in some

parts of the United States as well as with formalizing their connections
with migrant communities outside of the United States. Evolutions in
these policy areas will undoubtedly invite to more academic research on
Mexico in the coming years.

Notes
1. Pub. L. No. 99-603, 100 Stat. 3359 (1986).
2. Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009 (1996).
3. 1994 Cal. Legis. Serv. Prop. 187.
4. Ley de nacionalidad. D.O.F. 23 de enero de 1998.
5. Decreto de Reformas y Adiciones a la Constitución Política de los Estados
Unidos Mexicanos, D.O.F. 22 de agosto de 1996.
6. The state legislature eventually passed similar legislation on external voting
to the one passed on the federal level.

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8
The Moroccan State and
Moroccan Citizens Abroad
Michael Collyer

Emigration from Morocco has exemplified every significant shift in the

broader Euro-Mediterranean migration system over the past 50 years.
Throughout that time Morocco has been the focus of academic and
policy research into the changing profiles of migrants and the nature
and impacts of their movement, much of this research influencing the
way we think about migration itself and the most appropriate policy
responses to it (Collyer et al., 2009). It is therefore no surprise that the
relationship between Moroccan emigrants and the Moroccan state typi-
fies the general trend suggested by this volume: from ‘controlling’ to
‘courting’ according to Hein de Haas (2007) or ‘from being expendable,
minimally endowed subjects, to a valuable resource that generates addi-
tional scarce resources’ according to Laurie Brand (2006: 69).
This shift can be illustrated especially clearly in the changing labels
used for Moroccan emigrants. The term ‘Moroccan Workers Abroad’
(Travailleurs Marocains a l’Etranger (TME), the commonly used French
acronym), used in the early days of labour migration, reflected the one-
dimensional view of the time of emigrants as purely labourers. This
began to change in the mid-1970s, to the broader ‘Moroccan Workers
and Business travellers’ Travailleurs et Commerçants Marocains (TCM).
As the profile of migrants diversified, to include more women and
children of migrants, ‘Moroccan Residents Abroad’ Marocains Résidents
à l’Etranger (MRE) became the approved term. MRE is still the most
widely used, notably in the title of several government institutions,
including the ministry responsible for relations with emigrants.
There are, however, plenty of alternatives, most commonly the highly
valorizing ‘Moroccans of the World’ Marocains du Monde (MDM),
reflected in the ministry’s own web address (www.marocainsdumonde.
gov.ma) and increasingly used in their project descriptions. Another
175
176 Emigration Nations

recent alternative is Marocains de l’Extérieur, the title of a 2003 gov-

ernment publication (Fondation Hassan II, 2003), or even Marocains
d’Ailleurs (Moroccans from elsewhere). Finally, some emigrant writ-
ers prefer to claim the more overtly political label ‘Moroccan Citizens
Abroad’ Citoyens Marocains à l’Etranger (CME) to reinforce a claim to
political rights (Charchira, 2008), which is the term I pick up in the title
of this chapter, and will continue to use. The term ‘Moroccan diaspora’ is
increasingly used amongst emigrants and some emigrant organizations,
but is generally absent from official government literature on the subject.
There is a general pattern of evolution in this terminology, but this
emerges from the continual flux, continual experimentation, a plethora
of competing labels that are used concurrently to grasp the meaning and
impact of each until one or two are settled on as the mainstream, but oth-
ers are also widely used and may identify future alternatives. This diver-
sity of approaches stands out in the Moroccan state’s entire approach
to citizens abroad and the experimentation is broadly indicative of the
nature of this relationship. In most periods over the last 50 years, includ-
ing the present day, it is possible to highlight a range of government
initiatives towards emigrants, typically overlapping, offering alternative
approaches, even competing. Rather than seeing this as indicative of a
chaotic or poorly managed approach, Iskander (2010) highlights such
diversity as evidence of the ‘creativity’ of the Moroccan state in this field
and the value of the relationship between state authorities and migrant
organizations. If the Moroccan experience of emigrant relationships is to
be seen as a success, and though it is not perfect I agree with those who
think it should be, the key to that success is not to be found in some kind
of ‘best practice’ approach that can be easily transferred elsewhere, but in
this continual effervescence of ideas that Iskander highlights.
This chapter sets out to contribute to this literature, setting Morocco
in the comparative context of this volume. It is based on a long asso-
ciation with the country going back to the late 1990s, covering several
different related research projects and regular prolonged research visits,
including more than two years of residence in Fez, Tétouan and Rabat.
Material presented here draws on a range of interviews and discussions
with government and academic colleagues and a detailed analysis of
the substantial literature on this topic. This includes the indefatigable
chronicler of Moroccan emigration, Abelkrim Belguendouz, whose
seminal publications on this topic have included detailed overviews of
the Moroccan institutional context (2006, 2009, 2011 to cite just a few).
The significance of the Moroccan example of state–emigrant relations
is also illustrated by the fact that two of the best studies of this topic
 Morocco 177

published in English in recent years have taken Morocco as a central

case study (Brand, 2006; Iskander, 2010). This array of publications
provides extremely detailed historical analysis of the state–emigrant
relationship in Morocco that I can only hope to improve upon in this
short space by bringing it up to date; Brand’s narrative stops in 2004
and Iskander’s in 2007, though others, such as Belguendouz, have more
recent updates. The chapter therefore follows the standard format of
this book: three sections considering history and geography of emigra-
tion, related institutions and policies and ongoing debates, based on an
overview of the entire post-independence period, but with an emphasis
on the very significant political developments since 2007.

History and geography of Moroccan emigration

The area of Morocco has been an important migration hub since well
before the modern state existed. Its position on trans-Saharan trade
routes provoked an initial orientation to the south that was to remain
significant until the colonial period; indeed, some have argued that
more recent trans-Saharan migrations reinstitutionalize these ancient
mobility patterns (Bensaâd, 2003). From the eighth century onwards,
as Arab populations moved west and became established, Morocco was
the seat of a series of empires that, at their greatest extent from the
eleventh to the thirteenth centuries, stretched from West Africa, across
the Maghreb and into Northern Spain.
The dominant role of the current Moroccan royal family, the Alawites,
dates to the mid-seventeenth century and efforts to consolidate a cen-
tralized state were well established by 1700. A state bureaucracy, referred
to as the makhzen, grew around the sultan, yet its authority was never
homogenous across the entire territory. Large areas over which the state
claimed sovereignty, particularly in the south, were almost completely
out of the control of the makhzen, leading to a geographical distinction
between bled al-makhzen (land of the makhzen, or land of governance)
and the bled es-siba (land of dissidence or anarchy). The distinction
between the two came to be seen in terms of the ability to gather
taxes, partly as a result of the interpretation of colonial anthropologists
(Mohamed, 2012).
Nevertheless, this shows that the experience of managing distant
populations who were only nominally under the jurisdiction of central
state authorities is not something that arose with modern patterns of
emigration, but is common to many pre-modern or proto-state systems.
The final amalgamation of the bled al-makhzen and bled es-siba under
178 Emigration Nations

the French protectorate in the 1920s and 1930s was achieved through
violent coercion by the colonial forces. This example was followed
by the future Hassan II in his brutal repression of the 1958 Rif revolt,
which was an additional factor that encouraged significant emigration
from this marginal, mountainous region in the north. A similar logic
informed early patterns of emigrant engagement.
Contemporary emigration systems were initiated before the pro-
tectorate, during the French occupation of Algeria. European colons
began to take over the best agricultural land in Algeria from the mid-
nineteenth century onwards. This was often in large landholdings that
required substantial labour inputs, generating demand that could not
be met locally. Early patterns of cross-border labour migration therefore
became established from marginalized agriculture areas of Morocco,
particularly the Souss in the south and the Rif in the north. Following
the establishment of the French–Spanish protectorate in Morocco in
1912 these areas continued to develop as the most significant labour
sending areas of the country. During the First and Second World Wars
there was substantial migration from Morocco to France, to replace
French workers who joined the army but also in direct fighting roles.
Rifian migrants were recruited to the Spanish army during the Spanish
civil war from 1936 (Lazaar, 1987). During the entire protectorate period
an estimated 126,000 Moroccans fought in the French army, though the
vast majority of them returned to Morocco (Bidwell, 1973).
In 1956 the government of the newly independent state gave little
attention to emigration, since, in common with the general thinking
of the time, it was assumed that it would soon disappear. Nevertheless,
it was seen as an easy way of reducing potentially troublesome popula-
tions in marginalized parts of the kingdom. Following Algerian inde-
pendence in 1962, the Moroccan–Algerian border was closed and a
significant and relatively easy emigration destination was closed off. At
the same time the demand for labour in Europe was increasing and it
was in the interests of both the Moroccan and European governments
to establish a firm, predictable basis for the supply of labour. A series of
labour migration agreements were signed between the Moroccan gov-
ernment and a range of European countries, beginning in 1963, which
marks the beginnings of the contemporary system of emigration and
established the present concentration of emigration in Europe. Accords
were signed with the Federal Republic of Germany (1963), France
(1963), Belgium (1964) and the Netherlands (1969) (Muus, 1995).
These agreements are widely cited as the origins of government
involvement in the planning and management of emigration. They
 Morocco 179

were supplemented by similar agreements with Arabic countries: Algeria

(1963), Tunisia (1964, 1991), Qatar, Iraq and the UAE (1981), and
Jordan and Libya (1983), though these were less significant destina-
tions, in terms of numbers of emigrants. Even at this relatively early
stage, the Moroccan approach to emigration was distinguished from
neighbouring Algeria and to a lesser extent Tunisia, where emigration
remained overwhelmingly directed to France. These agreements reflect
a particularly one-dimensional view of emigrants, justifying the simple
label of ‘Travailleurs Marocains a l’Etranger’ (TME) in use at the time.
The agreements covered the establishment of recruitment centres in
Morocco for the selection and training of workers, but the focus was
exclusively the capacity for work; there was no provision for considera-
tion of any aspect of social and cultural life.
This vision is reflected in the 1968–1972 five year plan, the first time
that emigration is mentioned in the government’s planning. The aim
of that plan is clear: ‘The objective to be reached is the increase in the
number of workers overseas by the end of the five year period’ (vol. 1,
p. 93). This plan paints a picture of migration as a temporary phe-
nomenon which leads to significant financial returns, a vision labelled
‘mercantile and rent-seeking’ by Benkirane (2010: 4) and ‘emigrationist’
by Belguendouz (2006: 3). Belgendouz argues that it is no coincidence
that during this period, emigration was the concern of four ministries:
the Ministry of Labour (where the emigration office was situated), the
Ministry of the Interior (responsible for issuing passports), the Ministry
of Health (part of the medical screening) and the Ministry of Finance,
with little concern for the broader welfare issues faced by emigrants.
Others have offered a more positive interpretation of emigrant engage-
ment during this period. For Iskander (2010), the outreach conducted to
Moroccan emigrants by the Banque Centrale Populaire (BCP), starting
in Paris in 1968, was tremendously innovative. Moroccan emigrants
typically had limited literacy, low education and a poor understanding
of French. During ‘Operation TME’ the multi-lingual BCP employees
helped them open BCP accounts in Morocco and accompanied them to
the French Post Office to demonstrate how to complete the forms to send
international money transfers to those accounts. Although the goal was
an instrumental one, there were broader benefits for the emigrants con-
cerned; Iskander cites interviews demonstrating the almost ethnographic
approach taken by BCP, befriending Moroccan emigrants, gaining their
confidence and assisting them in a range of unrelated administrative
tasks. The impact of this initiative was dramatic and remittances to
Morocco began to rise from the beginning of the operation (Berriane and
180 Emigration Nations

Aderghal, 2011). By the end of the 1970s the BCP controlled 98 per cent
of all remittances sent to Morocco (Charef, 1999). The Banque Populaire
group is now one of the largest financial institutions in Morocco, signifi-
cantly as a result of its early dominance of the remittance market.
In the early 1960s the number of Moroccan citizens living in Europe
was in the low tens of thousands. A decade later, by the time most
Northern European destinations had put an end of primary labour
migration in the mid-1970s this number had risen to at least 400,000
(de Haas, 2005). This period coincided with growing repression in
Morocco, known as the années de plomb. Opposition groups, such as the
Union Nationale des Forces Populaires (UNFP) and democratic activists,
faced arrest, exile and even political assassination. The growing emi-
grant community came under suspicion of involvement in opposition
activism and, beginning in the early 1970s, the Ministry of the Interior
established structures to observe and control any political activity.
These Amicales were modelled on the Algerian system which grew
out of the Fédération de France of the single party Front de Libération
Nationale (FLN). They were ostensibly to support the welfare of
Moroccan emigrants, but focused on activity that might be an interna-
tional embarrassment to the Moroccan government or any challenge to
the political status quo in Morocco (Lacroix, 2005). This included union
activism, which was feared could spill over into support for the left-wing
opposition in Morocco but could also tarnish the perceived image of
the Moroccan worker as a ‘good worker’, that is, flexible and relatively
pliant. In the first few decades of large-scale emigration, the official gov-
ernment policy was also to discourage integration since it was believed
that integration would both enhance political organization and reduce
remittance flows, on which Morocco had quickly become financially
dependent (de Haas and Plug, 2006).
In a surprise move, Hassan II announced over the summer of
1984 that emigrants would be able to participate in the elections of
September of that year. This was a particularly unusual experiment
since five constituencies were drawn up outside the country to allow
emigrants exclusive, direct representation in the national parliament
(Fadloullah et al., 2000). At the time, only Portugal operated an elec-
toral system anything like it. Two of Morocco’s new extra-territorial
constituencies were located in France, one covered most of Northern
and Eastern Europe, a third covered other Arabic countries and a final
seat, the ‘député des trois continents’, represented emigrants in the rest of
Europe, sub-Saharan Africa and North and South America from a seat
in Madrid. Bold and innovative though this system was, it is widely
 Morocco 181

considered to have been a failure (Belguendouz, 2006; Charchira, 2008).

The genuine motivations behind it are unclear, since the king himself
referred to the 1997 elections as Morocco’s first democratic elections.
In practice it offered very little genuine representation to emigrants,
mainly due to the tremendous logistical difficulties of representing such
a dispersed group of people. Emigrants’ right to vote was ended in 1992
and was not repeated in this form.
A more sustained change in the Moroccan government’s policy and
approach towards emigrants occurred in 1990, partly as a result of
the continued concern provoked by the dip in remittance receipts in
1987. Three new institutions were established, the Bank al Amal (Bank
of either Hope or Work), the Fondation Hassan II pour les Marocains
Résidents a l’Etranger and a new Minister for MRE. The first Minister for
MRE, Rafik Haddaoui, offered a significant break with the past in a series
of criticism of the amicales. The ministry slowly faded and disappeared
entirely in 1997 and the other two institutions have had mixed fates
since then, considered in more detail in the following section; it is the
symbolic changes marked by their establishment that are more signifi-
cant here. As the title of these institutions suggests this marked a change
in the official language used, from a focus on Moroccan emigrants
as workers, through a brief use of the term Ressortissant Marocainsa
l’Etranger to the now well-established MRE. This change reveals the
more significant acceptance that Moroccan emigration had become
a permanent, structural change, suggesting the majority of emigrants
would not necessarily return. This meant that rather than discouraging
integration overseas, an official policy to support integration was neces-
sary and these institutions revealed a more holistic vision of Moroccan
emigrants. New policies allowed for religious and cultural provision for
emigrants. There was also support for teaching of Arabic to the children
of emigrants born overseas, who retained Moroccan nationality.
During the 1990s, patterns of emigration continued to evolve. In 1990,
Italy introduced a visa requirement for Moroccans and Spain followed
in 1991. These reflect growing migration from Morocco into Southern
Europe during the 1980s and mark the beginning of a period when all of
Europe was off-limits to Moroccans without the correct authorization.
The gradual development of a common European approach to what
became known as the ‘external border’ was reinforced by the applica-
tion of increasingly sophisticated surveillance equipment, which also
began in the early 1990s. For many Moroccans, undocumented migra-
tion was the only way to reach Europe and undocumented emigration
increased. Moroccans were amongst the most significant beneficiaries
182 Emigration Nations

of regularization programmes from 1990 onwards in Spain (1991, 1996,

2000, 2005) and Italy (1990, 1995, 1998, 2002 and 2006) through which
most Moroccans currently legally resident in the two countries gained
legal status. In 2003 Morocco’s first post-independence migration law
was passed.1 Notably for the purposes of this review it sought to regulate
not only immigration but also emigration and established substantial
penalties for ‘all those who leave Moroccan territory in a clandestine
manner’ (Art. 50).
The Moroccan approach to emigration was to change again in 2005.
King Mohammed VI selected the symbolically significant thirtieth
anniversary of the Green March to announce the creation of a new
institution to engage emigrants and a change in policy to allow emi-
grants to vote. The previous year had seen the creation of the Instance
Equité et Réconciliation (IER), a kind of truth commission on the années
de plomb. A special hearing on emigration had considered the role of
the amicales and recommended the suspension of any that continued
to exist, amongst other recommendations (Belguendouz, 2006). Such
official recognition of the problems of the past set the context for these
changes that were greeted with a great deal of optimism. Both develop-
ments took some time to implement. The Conseil de la Communauté
Marocaine a l’Etranger (CCME) was created at the end of December
2007, for an initial period of four years. This was initially intended
to diffuse pressures to allow emigrants a direct vote, but in 2011
emigrants were once again allowed to vote, first in the constitutional
referendum in July and later in the legislative elections in November.
Neither the CCME nor the new electoral system have entirely satis-
fied all critics, but they have introduced a new relationship between
the Moroccan government and emigrants, which recognized a greater
degree of citizenship, a radically different basis for engagement than
40 years earlier.
More than 10 per cent of the Moroccan population is currently living
more or less permanently outside the country, approximately 3.3 million
people in total, according to Moroccan consular data (Table 8.1). Yet the
ties are typically very strong, illustrated by the return of an estimated
2.5 million Moroccans each summer and the tremendously high levels
of remittances sent – 58.3 billion dirhams or $6.8 billion in 2011. Such
absolute remittance levels are exceeded only by countries with far greater
emigrant populations: Mexico, India and the Philippines. In the absence
of other comparable quantitative measures of attachment such high lev-
els of remittances do indicate an unusually strong relationship between
Moroccan emigrants and their country of citizenship.
 Morocco 183

Table 8.1 2012 Moroccan consular data on location of

Moroccan citizens

Country n Per cent

France 1,146,652 33.93

Spain 671,669 19.87
Italy 486,558 14.40
Belgium 297,919 8.82
Netherlands 264,909 7.84
Germany 125,954 3.73
Libya 69,276 2.05
Canada 53,707 1.59
Algeria 45,451 1.34
Saudi Arabia 35,724 1.06
United States 33,047 0.98
Tunisia 30,635 0.91
United Kingdom 26,191 0.77
UAE 15,935 0.47
Other European countries 38,567 1.14
Other Arab countries 17,420 0.52
Sub-Saharan Africa 9,366 0.28
Asia and Oceania 9,366 0.28
South America 1,164 0.03
Total 3,379,510 100.0

Source: www.marocainsdumonde.com (accessed 10 October 2012).

The Moroccan emigrant population is currently much more diverse

than neighbouring countries. Although about a third of Moroccans
registered with consulates are currently resident in France (Table 8.1),
this compares with about 95 per cent of Algerian emigrants. There are
at least 125,000 Moroccans living in six European countries, though
there is a comparable concentration in Europe; more than 90 per cent of
registered Moroccan emigrants live in Europe. Data from Table 8.1 dates
from before the political crisis in Libya in 2011. An estimated 12,000
Moroccans returned from Libya, and were assisted by the Fondation
Mohammed V pour la Solidarité, though many more preferred to stay
(Belguendouz, 2011).
In addition to this geographic diversity, the profile of Moroccan emi-
grants has also changed dramatically from the predominantly single,
male, unskilled workers of the 1960s. Emigration is increasingly highly
skilled and women make up an increasing proportion of independ-
ent migrants (Association Marocaine d’Etudes et de Recherches sur
les Migrations (AMERM), 2002; Khachani, 2011). In 1997, Morocco
184 Emigration Nations

overtook the United States as the most significant source country for
foreign students in France; it is currently second, after China. Since
2000, an average of 7,000 Moroccan students a year study in France
(Breem, 2012) and though France is by far the most significant destina-
tion for student migration, there are other significant groups of students
in Germany, Spain and the United States. Emigrants as a group are far
more likely to speak the language of the country they are living in than
40 years ago. They have developed organizing skills directed at improv-
ing their conditions in their country of residence or, for an increasing
number, country of second citizenship. This suggests a versatile, well-
organized and highly capable group of people whose attachment to
Morocco suggests that their demands of institutional engagement from
the Moroccan government will also be substantial. This has produced a
fluctuating array of institutions, the most significant of which are con-
sidered in the next section.

Institutions and policies to engage Moroccan

citizens abroad

Over the 50 years of significant, organized emigration from Morocco

there have been a range of government-sponsored institutions designed
to engage emigrants. For the first few decades the priority was con-
trol. This continued the tradition of highly coercive engagement with
distant populations established during the colonial period and fitted
with Hassan II’s attitude to populations of most marginal parts of the
country. The amicales responded to this particularly security-focused set
of concerns that dominated emigrant engagement until the late 1980s.
The final report of the IER at the end of 2004 is widely credited with
recognizing the abuses of power carried out by these institutions and
calling for the final demise of the last few that remained.
At the same time, the more financial focus of the BCP engaged emi-
grants in innovative new ways. Although not a purely governmental
institution, the BCP was, and remains, a state bank and engaged in
Operation TME in 1968 at the direction of the king. Although all signifi-
cant Moroccan and many foreign banks have sought a foothold in the
lucrative remittance market, the BCP remains the overwhelming choice
of Moroccan emigrants, 98 per cent of whom have an account with the
BCP. If there is an emigrant bank in Morocco, it is the BCP, much more
so than the Banque al Amal, which was created specifically to serve
emigrants in 1990. The Banque al Amal had a troubled early history,
since it was not able to take deposits until 2010 (La Vie Eco 6.7.2010)
 Morocco 185

and achieved relatively little in these first few decades. It now seems to
be offering a distinct brand of investment support as part of the Groupe
Banque Populaire.
The symbolic change in attitude to Moroccan emigrants as long-term
‘residents’ overseas (rather than simply ‘workers’) that produced the
Banque al Amal also instigated a new Minister for the Affairs of the
Moroccan Community Resident Abroad, delegated to the prime minis-
ter. The creation of the post was strongly supported by the five deputés
elected by Moroccan emigrants, who were in position from 1984 to
1992. The first minister was the dynamic and popular Rafik Haddaoui
who served from July 1990 to November 1993. Haddaoui travelled
extensively and met with Moroccan migrant organizations across
Europe, though in an early indication of awareness of the problems
that were to surface officially in the 2004 IER report, he was particularly
critical of the amicales. In a cabinet reshuffle he was replaced by Ahmed
El Ouardi in November 1993 and in February 1995 the post was down-
graded to an under-secretary of state within the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs (MFA) and finally abolished in 1997.
An official government representative for emigrants was reinstituted in
2002, but in a different context. The new minister, Nouzha Chekrouni,
had no significant budget or personnel. The new minister was delegated
to the Minister of Foreign Affairs, rather than the Prime Minister, which
would have suggested a more important cross ministerial portfolio, the
post was delegated to the Minister of Foreign Affairs. Belguendouz (2006)
laments the fact that the minister responsible for the greatest source of
foreign income should have had the smallest budget. Chekrouni served
in this role during the entire Jettou government. In 2007, the position
was shifted once more to a delegate to the prime minister, officially the
Ministre Déléguéauprès du Chef du Gouvernement chargé des Marocains
Résident a l’Etranger, where it remains. This inter-ministerial position
allows the ministry to position itself as the main contact point in the
government for emigrants for all sorts of issues connected with transna-
tional living, from finance and investments to consular services and tour-
ism. The post has been held by Abdellatif Mazouz since January 2012.
The third major institution established in 1990 was the Fondation
Hassan II pour les Marocains Résidents a l’Etranger. This institution has
remained active over the previous 22 years, with a more or less continu-
ous focus on sociocultural activities. It is technically a semi-governmental
institution though its entire budget currently comes from the Ministry
of MRE and until 1997 the official president was the government
representative for MRE, initially the minister delegate and from 1995
186 Emigration Nations

under-secretary. Since 1995, the Foundation’s president has been Princess

Lalla Meryem, the current king’s sister. The Foundation has therefore
enjoyed very substantial patronage from the highest levels of the state.
The Foundation engages in four main areas of activity. First, it has its
own observatory of Moroccan migrations, which supports or publishes
studies (e.g. AMERM, 2002; Fondation Hassan II, 2003) and engages in
research. Second, the Foundation coordinates a variety of partnerships
with international organizations, such as International Organisation
for Migration (IOM) or Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit
(GIZ) and local or regional migrant organizations. These partnerships
help fund research but also practical support in areas of migration
and development. Third, the areas of education and social assistance
account for the largest share of the Foundation’s budget and employ
(in 2012) 600 Arabic teachers and social support workers across Europe.
These teachers run Arabic classes, either in conjunction with national
school systems or as discrete after school programmes targeted at the
children of emigrants. Finally, the Foundation organizes holiday camps
in Morocco and cultural exchanges for MRE’s families living in Europe.
The Foundation also follows emigrant investment projects through a
section that is associated with the Banque al Amal, but this has been the
least active in practical terms and is mainly limited to research activi-
ties, so it is difficult to distinguish from the observatory. These activities
have remained fairly consistent during the 22 years of the Foundation’s
existence. Recent criticisms of the foundation have focused on issues
of financial transparency and levels of representation of the emigrant
community (Belguendouz, 2012) rather than any direct problems with
its operational activities, which seem likely to continue.
One substantial change in the role of the Fondation Hassan II has been
Operation Transit. From its creation in 1990, the Foundation was tasked
with the management of the return of more than 2 million Moroccans
over the summer period. In 1997, responsibility for this programme
shifted to the Fondation Mohammed V Pour la Solidarité, which has
greater capacity to mobilize the relevant personnel in Morocco – most
of the Fondation Hassan II’s employees are based abroad. This is a major
annual event, lasting three months, part practical assistance operation
and part public relations exercise.
Throughout this period, agents are positioned at a few foreign ports
(Algeciras in Spain, Sète in France and Genoa in Italy) and throughout
Morocco. In 2007 the name was changed from ‘Operation Transit’ to
‘Marhaba’ (Welcome). From large concerts on the beach in Tangier
throughout the summer to banners proclaiming ‘Welcome Home!’
 Morocco 187

lining the major roads south, the aim is to encourage a feeling of

belonging and a sense of honour to returning nationals, on whom the
country continues to depend financially. Yet there is also an element of
practical assistance and the Fondation Mohammed V employs doctors
and social workers at assistance centres across the country as well as
legal advisers at ports to assist with customs difficulties and additional
police officers to address very real concerns that wealthy returning
migrants may be targeted by criminal gangs. Marhaba has become a
valuable opportunity for the government to engage with the greatest
number of emigrants.
The most recent governmental institution is the CCME, which was
created in 2007 for an initial period of four years. This institution was
an initial response to the king’s declaration on the thirtieth anniversary
of the Green March (6 November 2005) that emigrants would once
again be able to vote. The king initially announced the creation of a
High Council of the Moroccan Community Abroad. This project was
initially assigned to the Human Rights Council ‘Conseil Consultatif
des Droits de l’Homme’ (CCDH) to develop and a lengthy consultation
was held through meetings with emigrants groups around the world.
This initiative was broadly welcomed by emigrant organizations in the
hope that it would correct the democratic deficiencies observed in the
Fondation Hassan II and quickly usher in more direct forms of democ-
racy from overseas. The king followed the recommendation of the
CCDH closely and, on 6 November 2007, called for the creation of the
CCME in fulfilment of his call to create the ‘High Council’.
The CCME was to be formed of up to fifty appointed individuals from
the Moroccan community overseas, though only thirty-seven individu-
als were initially appointed and no new appointments have been made
since. Existing membership reflects the geographical diversity of emi-
grants. In addition, there were observers from all areas of government
concerned, ten ministries and seven national institutions, including
the Ministry for MRE and the Fondation Hassan II. This form raised
widespread concern, from both Moroccan political parties and emigrant
organizations, chiefly due to the lack of any democratic principles in
the selection of members of the Council and in the purely consultative
role that the council would play (Belguendouz, 2009).The CCME was
intended to give opinions on significant elements of legislation. It was
organized into six working groups for this purpose. In addition to this
political work, the CCME has taken on a significant cultural, research
and educational role, significantly overlapping the areas of expertise
of the Foundation. Attempts to engage directly with emigrants and
188 Emigration Nations

emigrant organizations also placed it in conflict with the aims of the

Ministry for MRE. Nevertheless, this multiplicity of overlapping roles
appears consistent with the history of Moroccan governmental engage-
ment with emigrants.
As the CCME reached the end of its four-year mandate in December
2011, criticisms of its position began to multiply (Soundouss, 2012). Yet its
continuing role appears to be guaranteed and even enhanced by the fact
that it is one of very few institutions specifically mentioned in the 2011
Constitution. Article 163 repeats the founding objectives of the CCME:
‘The CCME is given the task of providing opinions on the direction of
public policy, allowing MREs to maintain their close association with their
Moroccan identity, to guarantee their rights, to preserve their interests
and to contribute to the sustainable human development and progress of
their homeland, Morocco’. (Article 163, 2011 Constitution). Combined
with the direct democracy, also introduced by the 2011 Constitution, this
appears to provide the CCME with a clearer mandate.
Of all the policies designed to engage Moroccan emigrants it is proba-
bly still voting that raises the greatest intensity of discussion and where
the Moroccan historical example is most unusual. The electoral system
that operated in the avowedly pre-democratic period of 1984–1992
faced major obstacles of representation that continue to pose problems
for the relatively few electoral systems that now operate in similar ways,
including France, since 2012. Nevertheless, many emigrant organiza-
tions had hoped for a similar pattern of direct representation and this
was referenced in the king’s speech in 2005. Yet the system that was
finally implemented was rather different, lacking the direct represen-
tation of the previous system. Emigrants’ participation in the 2011
constitutional referendum was facilitated with 520 voting booths open
outside Morocco for three days, but participation was disappointing;
266,301 Moroccan emigrants participated, or less than 10 per cent of all
Moroccans registered in Moroccan consulates.
Partly as a result of this limited response direct out of country vot-
ing was not organized for the legislative elections in November 2011.
Emigrants who were not able to return to Morocco to participate in the
legislative elections were only granted a proxy vote, justified by the cost
and logistical complexity of organizing a direct vote so soon after the
constitutional referendum. Proxy votes were restricted so that electors
in Morocco were allowed to vote for a maximum of one external elec-
tor each. The electoral law was drawn up immediately before the elec-
tions and was somewhat rushed. Nevertheless, interviews at the CCME
suggested that a direct overseas vote is unlikely to be organized for the
 Morocco 189

next legislative elections due to the difficulty of ensuring equal access

to polling stations for all emigrants around the world.

Debates on the role of emigrants in national life

Morocco’s vast and varied experience of emigrant engagement com-

bined with the demonstrable attachment to Morocco felt by very large
numbers of Moroccan citizens overseas have produced continually shift-
ing debates over the last few decades about how emigrants fit in with
meanings of Moroccan-ness. In his rhetoric, Hassan II took an extremely
paternalistic view of Moroccan emigrants. For him, their relationship
with Morocco was inseparable from their relationship with him. In his
speech on the Fete du Trone in 1990, when he named Rafik Haddaoui
as the newly established Minster of the Moroccan Community Abroad,
Hassan II explained.

Since We are linked by the act of allegiance to Our subjects living

overseas in the same way as to their brothers living in Morocco We
feel a religious, moral and paternal responsibility towards them. Our
subjects living overseas deserve much greater attention than their co-
citizens living in Morocco, whose needs are examined morning and
night. We charge you with the needs of these sons, who are Ours […]
The objective of this task is to ensure the connections and the act of
allegiance. (Ministère de l’Information, 1990: 11)

Emigrants fitted the king’s national vision as his subjects, expressed in

strikingly familial terms, who deserved greater attention as he was not
able to watch over them in the same way as those still in Morocco. In
policy terms, these concerns to ‘ensure the act of allegiance’ had until
that point been expressed in highly securitized terms, mostly through
the structures of the amicales. Ironically, Haddaoui would deliberately
distance himself from this previous approach, taking the king at his
word and establishing a much closer relationship with all kinds of emi-
grant organizations.
Mohammed VI’s speech on the anniversary of the Green March in 2005,
during which he announced the creation of the CCME, amongst other
things, takes a more modern tone than his father. Rather than express-
ing a direct paternal relationship with emigrants, he refers to them as
‘sons of the nation’ and speaks of ‘the efficient role of our community
resident abroad, which we consider as a major advantage for the new
Morocco. Better still, we see it [the emigrant community] positioned at the
190 Emigration Nations

avant garde of actors, while remaining firmly attached to their authentic

Moroccan identity they have devoted themselves with total sincerity to
the development of our country’ (Ministère de l’Information, 2005: 62).
Although similar in tone, in portraying emigrants as totally devoted sub-
jects, the emphasis shifts from allegiance to the person of the king to a
recognition of their dedication to the development of the country.
This evolution can be followed more closely through the govern-
ment’s focus on planning. Brand (2006) follows the emigration dis-
course through successive five year plans. The 1968–1972 plan marks
the first mention of temporary emigration policy, although key inter-
national agreements were signed in 1963. The 1973–1977 plan then
offers the first accounting for remittances, indicating the growing eco-
nomic dependency of the country on migrants’ transfers. By the early
1980s, the international economic situation was such that ‘Morocco
had reached a point at which the MRE contribution to the domestic
economy had far surpassed solely domestic unemployment alleviation:
remittances were now clearly understood to be a key factor standing
between relative solvency and economic crisis’, Brand argues (2006: 65).
This interpretation is clear from the new significance on remittances
in the 1988–1992 plan, partly justified by the concern at the signifi-
cant fall in remittance receipts in 1987 (de Haas and Plug, 2006). The
2000–2004 plan, the first time an entire section was devoted to MREs,
marks a real innovation in the approach to MREs. A clear objective of
this planning period is the defence of emigrants’ rights. According to
Brand, ‘This document is thereby the first to treat MREs as full human
beings and fuller citizens, in the sense of the state’s manifesting a seri-
ous concern for their welfare and success’ (2006: 68).
It is interesting that this notable evolution in the discourse appar-
ent in the five year plans initially appears to follow rather than dictate
the institutional development considered in the previous section. For
example, concern around remittances is apparent in the plan following
the establishment of the BCP’s ‘Operation TME’ in 1968 and does not
fix this institutional development as part of the planning objective.
Similarly, the institution officially designed to safeguard the rights and
welfare of MREs was the Fondation Hassan II, founded in 1990, yet this
approach does not appear clearly as a planning objective until a decade
later. Yet rather than suggest a significant gap between institutional
development and discourse it seems that this indicates a difference
between the official explanation and the genuine intention behind the
creation of these institutions.
Under this interpretation, the intentions behind the institutions
created in 1990 can be read more accurately through the prevailing
 Morocco 191

discourse of the time – the objectives of the relevant plan (1988–1992),

which expressed concerns at the falling remittance receipts of 1987,
and from the paternalistic discourse of Hassan II – than in the stated
objectives of the institutions themselves. The rights-based discourse of
the 2000–2004 plan fits more closely with the re-establishment of a
cabinet post representing MREs and with the official re-examination of
the années de plomb and particularly the role of the amicales that took
place during the 2004 IER than with the still dismissive attitude evident
in the abolition of the ministerial post of the previous decade. The
innovation of the 2000–2004 plan also heralds the symbolic change of
policy announced by Mohammed VI in 2005, the reinstitutionalization
of the right of emigrants to vote (albeit a few years later) and the crea-
tion of the CCME.
Unfortunately, the 2000–2004 plan was the last such five year plan
and such clearly legible expressions of objectives and official discourse
have not been available since. The evaluation of that plan highlighted
weaknesses with the planning process, notably its inadequate use of
broader empirical evidence. Industrial planning has resulted in two
similar but much narrower five year plans (currently 2009–2015) under
the slogan ‘Emergence’. These plans focus purely on the development
of particularly advanced sectors of the industrial economy and, though
it is perhaps significant that there is no mention of MREs or emigrants
in those plans, there is similarly no basis for analysis of developing
discourse either.
At the end of 2004, the High Commission of Planning initiated a con-
sultation exercise called ‘Prospective Maroc 2030’ which aimed to draw
on expertise in a wide range of domains before engaging in a process of
scenario building and further objective setting. Demographic scenarios
formed an important element of this future planning and an extensive
report ‘Quelle Demographie?’ appeared in 2008. This report focuses on
the nature of the migration transition that Morocco will undergo, with
a firm expectation that migration patterns will follow those of Southern
Europe a few decades earlier, emphasizing that ‘net emigration will be
followed by net immigration’ (Haut Commissariat au Plan, 2008: 38).
Yet there is a degree of uncertainty relating to broader economic cur-
rents, which have changed since countries like Spain or Italy passed
related ‘migration transitions’ in the mid-1970s. Globalization is por-
trayed as a series of forces through which wealthier countries are seek-
ing to replace the movement of people with that of goods and capital:

The question for Morocco is to understand if processes of globalisa-

tion will succeed in stopping migration flows and finally eliminate
192 Emigration Nations

them or, on the other hand, if the unintended effects of the industrial
restructuration demanded by globalization on the fragile social fabric
will result in an intensification of the pressure to emigrate. In the sec-
ond case it seems likely that emigration is most likely to involve the
most highly qualified. (Haut Commissariat au Plan, 2008: 23)

The report notes that Morocco is already a country of immigration. The

five migration scenarios considered range from an overall net migration
of virtually zero by 2030, as emigration continues, though at a slower
pace, to one where net immigration will have reached a million people
as emigration reverses and immigration grows substantially. On balance
the report concludes that the lower overall estimations are more likely,
but even on that basis the current government planning indicates a
clear expectation that Morocco will become a net immigration country
within the next 20 years.
Of course, this does not mean that emigration will stop, and even
as it slows, the overall emigrant community will continue to grow
substantially, since the children of emigrants retain citizenship. At a
recent (January 2013) meeting between Minister Mazouz (the Minister
for MREs) and foreign ambassadors in Rabat, the minister cited a figure
of 5 million as the current estimate of the Moroccan emigrant com-
munity, substantially larger than any previous government estimate
(Diplomatica, 2013). The report of the meeting appeared in the gov-
ernment publication for the diplomatic community, Diplomatica, and
the English-language version referred to Mr Mazouz and the ‘Minister
in charge of Diaspora’. Nevertheless, in his discussion, although the
minister evaluated the term ‘diaspora’ he finally rejected it as indica-
tive of a certain distance, which he did not feel was appropriate for
the much closer relationship enjoyed between the Moroccan emigrant
community and the Moroccan government. The closeness of this rela-
tionship has clearly never been entirely or even substantially under
the Moroccan government’s control and yet the continual attention
to it and experimentation with a variety of institutional responses for
which the Moroccan government has gained a respected international
reputation. The ‘Maroc 2030’ reflection illustrates that this will remain
a central preoccupation well into the future.

Conclusion

Although the modern history of Morocco as an independent emigration

nation is usually traced to the series of labour migration agreements
 Morocco 193

signed in 1963, the precolonial proto-state had some experience of

managing ‘distant’ populations on the territory it claimed sover-
eignty over. The violence with which these ‘distant’ populations were
disciplined during the colonial era continued to inform the repres-
sive, highly securitized approach to emigrants of newly independent
Morocco. This continued until the early 1980s, when the new electoral
system of 1984 allowed a symbolic enfranchisement of emigrants until
the more significant institutional changes of 1990, which began to
address the social, cultural and educational concerns of emigrants. In
2005 the king made more substantial proposals to treat emigrants as
genuine citizens and the more rights-based developments of the next
few years, culminating in the 2011 Constitution did much to operation-
alize this shift in emphasis.
This chapter has argued that the significant changes in the status of
emigrants over this period are associated with a narrative incorporation
of emigrants into the national narrative. Although Moroccan emigrants
have always retained their Moroccan nationality they were initially
seen as a potential threat to the stability of the regime and the act of
allegiance, in the particular concern of Hassan II. Emigrants were also
instrumentalized during the ‘emigrationist’ (in Belguendouz’s term)
era of the 1970s as one-dimensional workers who produced cash if the
means were provided for them to do so. The more inclusive rhetoric
of King Mohammed VI accompanied a greater attention to the welfare
needs of emigrants and the ways in which the state could support their
rights. In addition to the contrasting discourse of the two kings of
independent Morocco, this development can be traced through the five
year plans, as Brand (2006) has done and into 2004’s ‘Maroc 2030’ data
gathering exercise. The 2011 Constitution is the most recent and most
significant statement of this status.
Institutional development has tended to follow these changing dis-
courses, from the amicales of the 1960s to the CCME since 2007. Most
periods over the last 50 years have seen at least two institutions exclu-
sively or mainly devoted to the support of emigrants operating at the
same time. Sometimes the division of responsibilities has been clear, but
not always. At the current time the CCME’s engagement in cultural and
artistic promotion overlaps with the work of the Fondation Hassan II
pour les Marocains Residents al’Etranger. Such duplication and overlap
may be seen as unnecessary or wasteful, but it is also the hallmark of an
approach, a ‘creativity’ (Iskander, 2010) that has allowed for and even
encouraged institutional competition of this nature, just like the multi-
plicity of labels in use at the same time. Although they are not without
194 Emigration Nations

their critics, the results of this process have not been disappointing and
they have allowed Morocco to serve as an international example in this
field for several decades.

Notes
1. La loi n° 02-03 relative à l’entréeet au séjour des étrangers au Royaume du
Maroc, à l’émigration et l’ immigrationirrégulières.

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9
Creative Destruction in the
New Zealand ‘Diaspora Strategy’
Alan Gamlen

Introduction

In recent years a range of governments and state agencies have shifted

from denouncing expatriates as deserters and traitors to celebrating
them as heroes and model citizens. One of the trailblazers was Irish
president Mary Robinson who, in the early 1990s, broke from prec-
edent by declaring her wish to ‘represent’ the ‘vast community of Irish
emigrants’ living beyond her state (Robinson, 1994), pointing out that
‘if we are honest we will acknowledge that those who leave do not
always feel cherished’ (Robinson, 1995). Several years later, Mexico’s
Vicente Fox drew much attention by overturning the traditional image
of Mexican emigrants as pochos who have abandoned their roots, and
heralding them as ‘the cultural engine, the permanent ambassadors of
Mexican culture’ (Martinez-Saldana, 2003: 34). Robinson and Fox were
by no means alone: around the turn of the millennium it suddenly
seemed almost as if states had decided in unison to cast aside habitual
suspicions of ‘their’ diasporas, and take a more upbeat approach.
One of these countries was New Zealand. In mid-2000, the powerful
Business Roundtable had financed a full-page newspaper ad warning the
recently elected Labour government that ‘unless we turn things around,
New Zealand runs the risk of permanently losing the best of our next
generation’, and naming 700 young expatriate New Zealanders who
had given support to the message. Several months later, when pressured
by the Australian government to cover the social security bill for New
Zealanders in Australia, Prime Minister Helen Clark told journalists that
New Zealanders in Australia ‘would not get a bean’, if she could help
it (Alley, 2000). ‘Why on earth’, she asked, ‘would we pay money to
people who are turning their backs and leaving the country?’ Political

196
 New Zealand 197

cartoonist Garrick Tremain encapsulated the perceived official attitude

towards expatriates at that time in a cartoon showing an airport depar-
tures lane signposted and set aside for ‘ratbag traitors who don’t deserve
a great government’.
By the middle of the next year, however, the government had done
an about face. Deputy Prime Minister Jim Anderton was declaring
that ‘New Zealanders, wherever they are in the world, are always New
Zealanders. They retain a commitment to their homeland and identify
themselves as New Zealanders … I can see New Zealand as a nation
with, at least in one sense, no frontiers’ (Anderton, 2001). Within
a few years, the prime minister was more than making up for her
seemingly derogatory previous comments: ‘It’s not so long ago that
expat Kiwis were almost considered to have let New Zealand down by
leaving … In the 21st century those attitudes had to change – and they
are changing … [T]hose who stay offshore can be a huge asset to our
country – opening up their networks and contacts to New Zealand-
based businesses, researchers, and professionals seeking to expand
their global linkages.’
What happened? Why did the same government appear derisive and
spiteful towards expatriates in one moment, then warm almost to the
point of obsequiousness in the next? This chapter argues that the New
Zealand government’s shifting orientation towards its expatriates in this
period reflects a transition between phases of the country’s ongoing
neo-liberal transformation. The initial, exclusionary approach towards
expatriates can be seen as part of the tail end of a fifteen-year process of
‘roll-back’ neo-liberal restructuring, involving economic deregulation,
deep cuts in state spending, reform of the public sector and particularly
of the welfare system, and state asset sales. In this ‘destructive’ neo-
liberal climate of cutbacks and austerity, the social security entitlements
of New Zealand citizens who no longer fell within New Zealand’s tax
net was low on the new Labour government’s list of spending priorities.
By contrast, the government’s later embracing attitude towards expa-
triates should be seen as part of a new process of ‘roll-out’ neo-liberal
reforms, driven by a ‘Third Way’ philosophy of strategic partnering
between states and markets. In this new environment, political and
business leaders sought new ways to optimize the performance of
markets through state actions to suppress ‘market failures’ and sup-
port ‘positive externalities’. Engaging expatriates was seized upon as a
creative way of amplifying emigration’s positive side effects – namely,
expatriates’ transnational contributions – and using these to counteract
the feared market failure of ‘brain drain’.
198 Emigration Nations

Neo-liberal moments

Neo-liberalism is a word on everyone’s lips. As Larner notes, it has

‘usurped globalization as the explanatory term for contemporary forms
of economic restructuring’ (Larner, 2003: 509). Indeed, the two terms
are routinely lumped together indiscriminately as virtual synonyms in
the phrase ‘neo-liberal globalization’. As John Agnew notes, ‘[this] myth
is important because it implies that globalization has at root a singular
ideological inspiration: to replace states with markets. From this view-
point, globalization is a movement rather than a process’ (Agnew, 2009:
16). This chapter will eventually take up the challenge to disaggregate
the two concepts of neo-liberalism and globalization, but, first, let us
focus on the former: what is neo-liberalism?
As the suffix ‘ism’ suggests, neo-liberalism is perhaps first and foremost
an ideology: as David Harvey puts it (Harvey, 2007: 2): ‘Neoliberalism
is in the first instance a theory of political economic practices that
proposes that human well-being can best be advanced by liberating
individual entrepreneurial freedoms and skills within an institutional
framework characterized by strong private property rights, free markets
and free trade. The role of the state is to create and preserve an insti-
tutional framework appropriate to such practices.’ Harvey traces the
lineage of this ideology to the founding in 1947 of the Mont Pelerin
Society, consisting of a group of academic economists, philosophers and
historians – including Milton Friedman and, temporarily, Karl Popper –
around Austrian political philosopher Friederich von Hayek. From the
eighteenth and nineteenth century English and European liberals took
adherence to the ideal of personal freedom, which they fused onto free-
market ideals of nineteenth-century neoclassical economics, into an ide-
ological hybrid that was inimical not only to central state planning, but
also to most existing theories of state intervention (Harvey, 2007: 20–21).
However, Harvey also notes that, as an ideology, neo-liberalism is
fraught by deep internal tensions and contradictions (see especially
pages 79–80). To begin with, different notions of personal freedom may
be incompatible; as Isaiah Berlin showed, so-called ‘negative freedom
or freedom “from” external interference (notably through protection
of private property) means something quite different from “positive”
freedom or freedom “to” equal opportunities’ (such as those provided
by universal health and education systems and various redistributional
programmes) (Berlin, 1969). Moreover, in practice the protection of
negative freedoms tends towards an authoritarianism that not only
jars against the ideology of personal autonomy, but also ignites a
 New Zealand 199

tension between the neo-liberal ideal of competition and the reality

that strong state protections of negative freedoms protect the already
powerful. Because this dynamic leads to the formation of monopolies
and oligopolies, it eventually makes regulation necessary – even though
intervention is supposedly inimical to the neo-liberal state. In a similar
vein, the antipathy towards active state intervention is at odds with
the requirement of states to actively “compete” with other states in
the international arena. Thus, as Harvey illustrates, there are profound
inconsistencies within neo-liberal thought and practice, concerning the
nature of personal freedoms and how to achieve them through particu-
lar relationships between states and markets.
Underlying Harvey’s critique is a distinction between neo-liberalism
in theory and neo-liberalism in practice – a distinction that Brenner and
Theodore (2002) capture and sharpen in their notion of ‘actually exist-
ing’ neo-liberalism. In their analysis, actually existing neo-liberalism is
characterized by ‘creative destruction’: an unfolding dialectic between
destructive and creative moments of neo-liberally inspired reform. The
term creative destruction was used by both Marx and Schumpeter to
describe the process whereby the institutions of an old economic order
are replaced by a new one. It is typically used in two senses: a narrow
sense usually attributed to Schumpeter, denoting product innovation,
and a wider sense usually attributed to Marx, involving broader trans-
formation of the economic system including its regulatory apparatus.
In fact, however, the latter more expansive usage is found in both Marx
and Schumpter (Elliott, 1980).
Destructive moments of reform involve policy programmes aimed
at dismantling inherited institutional architectures, whereas crea-
tive moments involve the establishment of new market-friendly and
market-mimicking forms of state regulation. These Janus faces of neo-
liberalism have been differently described by geographers as ‘roll-back’
and ‘roll-out,’ respectively (Peck and Tickell, 2002). In many cases –
including the New Zealand one examined below – these two dynam-
ics occur in overlapping phases. For example, the notion of ‘roll-back
neo-liberalism’ succinctly characterizes the sweeping reforms initiated
by Britain’s Margaret Thatcher and the United States’ Ronald Reagan (as
well as New Zealand’s Roger Douglas and Ruth Richardson). Conversely,
the idea of ‘roll-out neo-liberalism’ fits well with the softer ‘Third Way’
approach subsequently taken by Tony Blair and Bill Clinton (and, in
New Zealand, by Helen Clark).
Wendy Larner (2000, Larner and Walters, 2004) and colleagues add
to this distinction between ideology and actual policy by identifying a
200 Emigration Nations

third way of understanding neo-liberalism as ‘governmentality’ – a term

coined by Michel Foucault (1991 [1978]) to denote (among other things)
a peculiarly ‘liberal’ way of thinking about government, which aims to
optimize population welfare rather than to control territory, and oper-
ates through the active consent of self-governing citizens rather than
through discipline and sovereignty (see Dean, 1999: 16–20). Neo-liberal
governmentality has at its heart the glorification of the market, and the
notion that government action should be ‘market-mimicking’ (Sandel,
2009) in order to instil citizens with the correct cultural rules and values
of self-responsibility and active participation. This has involved con-
tracting out governmental functions and monitoring, evaluating and
optimizing their performance, with the aim of ‘engaging’ and ‘empow-
ering’ stakeholder networks and communities to become more active in
their own self-government (Dean, 1999: 167–68).
Several recent studies have used the theoretical lenses of neo-
liberalism and/or governmentality to look at diaspora engagement
efforts – including Varadarajan’s analysis of the Indian case, Mullings’
examination of Jamaica and its diaspora and Ragazzi’s theoretical
overview of disciplinary, liberal and neo-liberal govermentalities con-
ditioning different types of diaspora policies. However, Larner’s study
is of particular interest here both because it discusses the New Zealand
case and because it provides one of the earliest attempts to link analy-
sis of diaspora policies to recent theoretical literature on neo-liberal
governmentality.
Larner identifies the emergence of a ‘formal diaspora strategy’ under
successive Labour-led New Zealand governments between 1999 and
2008, comprising a range of elite political and economic projects to
attract back and engage expatriate experts. Larner’s study presents the
New Zealand case as an exemplar of a recent proliferation of such for-
mal strategies around the world (Larner, 2007: 331–32). This strategy,
she argues, aimed to construct emigrants and their descendants as part
of a community of knowledge-bearing subjects, as part of a neo-liberal,
globalizing project:

In the policy documents of a myriad of international organisa-

tions, national governments and economic development agencies,
diaspora strategies are now an integral part of a governmental imagi-
nary in which entrepreneurial, globally networked, subjects create
new possibilities for economic growth and in doing so contribute
to the development of a knowledge-based economy … in the case
of New Zealand, diaspora strategies aim to mobilise and connect
 New Zealand 201

expatriate experts in the name of international connectedness, eco-

nomic development, entrepreneurship, and innovation rather than
trying to convince them to return home. (Larner, 2007: 334)

Thus, Larner uses New Zealand as an exemplar in coining the concept

of a ‘diaspora strategy’, and in this sense an understanding of the New
Zealand diaspora strategy has important implications for understand-
ing a whole genre of transformations that states are undergoing as part
of the current round of globalization. In order to understand diaspora
strategies in general, therefore, it is particularly important to fully
understand the New Zealand case.
This study links the foregoing discussion of neo-liberalism to the
research questions outlined at the outset: why was there a shift in New
Zealand’s orientation towards expatriates under Labour between 1999
and 2008? In light of what has just been said, it is important to ask:
what is the relationship between New Zealand’s neo-liberal reforms and
its reorientation towards expatriates? In addressing this question, this
chapter argues that the concept of a ‘diaspora strategy’ explains part but
not all of the shift in orientation towards expatriates described at the
outset of this chapter: it explains the ‘creative’ component of the shift,
involving the roll-out of new, market-mimicking state initiatives, aimed
at constituting expatriates as members of a ‘diaspora’. Put another way,
this concept aptly explains what neo-liberalism added to New Zealand’s
interactions with expatriates. But it ignores the crucial issue of how neo-
liberalism changed what already existed in this area of activity. Focusing
on the latter opens up a broader research agenda, aimed at understand-
ing the overlooked relations between states and expatriates everywhere.

Constituting the New Zealand diaspora

Diaspora research has begun to move beyond classifying diasporas and

their characteristics, to look at how and why such groups periodically
emerge and disappear (Brubaker, 2005; Dufoix, 2008; Sökefeld, 2006;
Vertovec, 1997). Different historical and geographical circumstances
foster different forms and degrees of diasporic attachment; as Steven
Vertovec puts it, diaspora identity ‘may be lost entirely, may ebb and
flow, be hot or cold, switched on or off, remain active or dormant. The
degree of attachment – and mobilization around it – often depends
upon events affecting the purported homeland’ (Vertovec, 2005). A key
point to recognize – and one that chimes with Larner’s account of New
Zealand’s ‘diaspora strategy’ – is that governments and state agencies
202 Emigration Nations

often initiate or facilitate the activities that galvanize scattered and

disparate networks into a coherent diaspora group. In this sense, New
Zealand’s diaspora strategy was less an organized approach towards a
pre-existing group, and more a strategy to constitute such a group, for
instrumental reasons connected to neo-liberalization.
With this in mind it is useful to begin, as Larner does, by highlight-
ing an attempted ‘Global Census’ of expatriate New Zealanders, funded
by a range of corporate and bureaucratic backers and spearheaded by a
public–private partnership organization called Kea New Zealand (short
for Kiwi Expats Association). This initiative piggy-backed on the public-
ity around New Zealand’s national census held at the same time, and
took the form of an online survey sent out through a hyperlink in a viral
email. The email announced: ‘Kea New Zealand has launched the first
global census of expatriate New Zealanders – Every One Counts – aimed
at tracking down the estimated one million Kiwis living overseas …
When you fill in the survey, and when you refer friends and family …
you are automatically eligible to win a range of prizes, including All Black
test tickets.’ As a marketing campaign for its parent organization, Every
One Counts (EOC) was a huge success, attracting 18,000 respondents
in 155 different countries. As responses surged in they were counted on
a digital map on the Kea webpage, decked out in the black and white
colours of New Zealand’s national rugby team and the aqua blue of the
national airline, and indicating the number of survey responses from
New Zealanders on each continent, alongside the slogan ‘New Zealand
is bigger than it looks’. Through this initiative, then, Kea and its back-
ers hoped to encourage people – including expatriates themselves – to
think of New Zealanders abroad as part of the ‘national’ population,
with New Zealand’s economic interests at heart.
Before closely examining the context out of which this constituency-
building and monitoring initiative arose, it is useful to look at the EOC
survey results themselves – which not only provide perhaps the largest
and most detailed quantitative survey to be made of any diaspora any-
where,1 but also reveal a great deal about the kind of diaspora that New
Zealand was both discovering and constituting in the period in ques-
tion. The survey data has a number of specific strengths. First, despite
being based on a non-random ‘snowball’ sample which prevents the
results from being generalized to all New Zealand expatriates, the data
set is large enough to allow comparison between subgroups of the sam-
ple (also see Fursman, 2010). Second, it provides individual-level micro-
data not only on the demographic characteristics of a large number of
expatriates, but also on the nature and extent of their transnational
 New Zealand 203

connections to their home country. Third, although the survey sac-

rificed statistical reliability by defining the diaspora in terms of self-
identification as an expatriate, rather than using the birthplace measure
employed in national censuses, it is important to recognize that it gains
some statistical validity because self-identification is more central to
the concept of diaspora than is birthplace. Not all New Zealand-born
expatriates identify and connect to New Zealand, and some people born
outside New Zealand, such as spouses and descendants of expatriates,
may strongly identify with New Zealand – particularly those for whom
belonging is defined by ancestry, which is the case for many indig-
enous Māori people, for example (Gamlen, 2007). In what follows, the
survey results are analysed briefly in terms of what they reveal about
the dispersion, homeland orientation and collective identity of New
Zealanders abroad.
New Zealand’s diaspora has accumulated gradually through net
outflows of New Zealand citizens since Britain withdrew from the
Commonwealth in 1973, precipitating a long-term economic decline.
Prior to this, New Zealand was thought of as a ‘classical migration-
receiving country’ (Castles and Miller, 2003: 7); afterwards, it sent an
increasing number of migrants as well. Between 1979 and 2006, when
the EOC survey was conducted, there was an annual net emigration of
20,578 New Zealand citizens (see Gamlen, 2007: 12).2 As Figure 9.13
shows, a steady trickle of returning New Zealand citizens has not offset
larger, more erratic surges of New Zealand citizen emigration. Peaks
of emigration occurred during the profound and prolonged economic
shock that followed cutting economic ties to Britain in 1973; during
the shock of neo-liberal reforms in the mid-1980s, implemented as
emergency measures to unburden the sinking economy; and during the
resumption of the downward slide from the mid-1990s, when it became
clear that these measures had been insufficient (also see Cately, 2001).
The imprint of what was once intra-Imperial migration remains vis-
ible in the patterns of emigration from New Zealand: Kea’s EOC survey
results suggest a young, tertiary-educated population of ‘rite of passage’
migrants exploring ‘Anglo-world’ countries, much as middle-class and
aristocratic British youth once undertook ‘Grand Tours’ of the European
continent and British Colonies in order to find their fortunes. Although
respondents were dispersed across more than 150 countries, they were
highly concentrated in the United Kingdom and Ireland (48.9 per cent),
the United States (11.6 per cent) and Canada and Australia (26.3
per cent) (see Figure 9.2).4 The sample was heavily concentrated in the
25–39 age bracket and included almost no children (see Figure 9.3), and
204

Arrivals New Zealand citizens Arrivals non-New Zealand citizens

80,000 Departures New Zealand citizens Departures non-New Zealand citizens

60,000

40,000

20,000

0
1971

1973

1975

1977

1979

1981

1983

1985

1987

1989

1991

1993

1995

1997

1999

2001

2003

2005

2007
–20,000

–40,000

–60,000

–80,000

Figure 9.1 New Zealand’s permanent and long-term migration by citizenship,

1971–2007
Source: Statistics New Zealand, Tourism and Migration 2007, Table 9.1.

0.8

0.7

0.6

0.5

0.4

0.3

0.2

0.1

0
UK & Ireland Australia USA & Canada Rest of world

Figure 9.2 Geographical distribution of expatriates, census versus snowball

estimates
Source: (1) Global Migrant Origin Database (GMOD), Migration and Development Research
Centre, University of Sussex, based on data from the 2000 round of international censuses.
Accessed 2007; (2) Kea New Zealand, Every One Counts 2006.
 New Zealand 205

New Zealand residents

85+ yrs.
Males(%)
80–84 yrs.
75–79 yrs. Females(%)
70–74 yrs.
65–69 yrs.
60–64 yrs.
55–59 yrs.
50–54 yrs.
45–49 yrs.
40–44 yrs.
35–39 yrs.
30–34 yrs.
25–29 yrs
20–24 yrs
15–19 yrs.
10–14 yrs.
5–9 yrs.
0–4 yrs.
12 10 8 6 4 2 0 2 4 6 8 10 12

New Zealand expatriates

85+ yrs. Males(%)

80–84 yrs.
75–79 yrs. Females(%)
70–74 yrs.
65–69 yrs.
60–64 yrs.
55–59 yrs.
50–54 yrs.
45–49 yrs.
40–44 yrs.
35–39 yrs.
30–34 yrs.
25–29 yrs
20–24 yrs
15–19 yrs.
10–14 yrs.
5–9 yrs.
0–4 yrs.

14 12 10 8 6 4 2 0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18

Figure 9.3 Age–sex pyramids, New Zealand residents versus expatriates

Source: (1) New Zealand Census 2006, Statistics New Zealand; (2) Kea New Zealand, Every
One Counts 2006.

respondents were on the whole more likely to have tertiary qualifications

than residents (see Figure 9.4). In short, New Zealand’s economic woes
of recent decades have amplified an existing pattern of dispersion across
what James Belich calls the ‘Anglo World’ (Belich, 2009), and therefore
in a sense this pattern is both a symptom of the British Empire’s formal
disintegration and an indication of its enduring influence.

Homeland orientation
Emigration became an increasing concern to New Zealand’s political
and economic elites during the 1990s. Public debate took aim at suc-
cessive governments for failing to counteract or, worse still, of causing
a relentless ‘brain drain’ of New Zealand citizens. The vitriol reached a
206 Emigration Nations

60
Resident New Zealanders, Census 2006
Expatriate New Zealanders, Kea EOC 2006
50
Percentage of respondents

40

30

20

10

0
Secondary school range Undergraduate range Postgraduate range No qualification or
invalid response

Figure 9.4 Highest educational qualification, residents versus expatriates

Source: (1) Statistics New Zealand, Census 2006, Quick Stats about Education Table 1; (2) Kea
New Zealand, Every One Counts 2006.

peak in 2000, with the publication of a full-page advertisement in the

New Zealand Herald, entitled ‘A Generation Lost?’, blaming the Labour
government’s policies for the exodus of skilled young people. Although
it later emerged that the ad had been financed by the left-leaning gov-
ernment’s enemies on the powerful Business Roundtable, the ad not
only listed names of 700 expatriates who shared its concerns, but also
touched a nerve with the wider public, leading to enormous pressure on
the government to do something about emigration. Partly owing to lack
of an alternative approach and partly in reflection of the ideological cli-
mate of the time (as discussed more in the next section), governments
from the late 1990s increasingly highlighted the homeland-orientated
identities and activities of skilled expatriate New Zealanders as a silver
lining to the perceived problem of emigration.
Kea’s EOC survey provides the first detailed picture of New Zealanders’
transnational connections, and one of the most detailed available for
any country. On the whole, survey respondents remained quite socially
and civically engaged with New Zealand, but economically less con-
nected (see Figure 9.5), and ambivalent about return (see Table 9.1).
Respondents in Australia were less inclined to return and averaged
fewer links than those living everywhere else – adding further support
to the hypothesis that low response rates in Australia reflect weaker
‘diasporic’ ties to New Zealand in this region. Connections of all types,
 New Zealand 207

Table 9.1 Expatriates’ return inclinations by citizenship of family members

Plans Children’s citizenship Spouse’s citizenship All

regarding
return to New Dual Other New Dual Other
New Zealand Zealand Zealand

Will return 26% 15.1% 7% 36.2% 26.6% 11.7% 22.4%

Likely to 27.7% 21% 15.8% 29.3% 25.7% 22.8% 27.4%
return
Don’t know 29.8% 36.8% 37.2% 23.2% 29.4% 38.5% 32.2%
Likely not to 12.8% 21% 28.9% 9.1% 13.3% 21.2% 14.2%
return
Will not 3.7% 6.1% 11.2% 2.3% 5.1% 5.8% 3.8%
return
Total 2,289 2,788 1,459 4,134 1,889 6,135 17,805
observations

Note: This data have been recoded. Not all groups coded in the 2006 Census are included
here. The ‘Other’ category in EOC includes groups that have been coded into other groups
in the 2006 Census output; for example, ‘European’ in the Census output includes ‘New
Zealand European’ and ‘Other: European’, while the latter remain coded as ‘Other’ in the
analysis of EOC presented here. Also note that, for the resident population, percentages
exclude non-responses to the ethnicity question, and that multiple ethnic choices are
allowed in census responses, so totals exceed 100 per cent.
Source: (1) Statistics New Zealand 2006 Census Data – Quick Stats about Culture and Identity,
Table 1. (2) Kea New Zealand, Every One Counts 2006. Author’s analysis.

including return inclinations, dwindled with time in the country of res-

idence. Return plans were strongly influenced by the citizenship of the
respondent’s spouse (respondents with a foreign spouse or child(ren)
were much less likely to intend to return or remain connected). The
largest category on the scale of return plans was the ‘undecided’ cat-
egory (32 per cent). These responses indicate an ambivalence towards
return characteristic of diasporic experience: a ‘myth of return’ (King,
1986: 12–13) that is never relinquished but always deferred (Cohen,
1997: 146–48; Safran, 1991).

Collective identity
The strength of expatriates’ transnational social ties has provided lead-
ers with some optimism that they are not entirely lost to New Zealand
society. According to expatriate businessman Chris Liddell, who was
then Chief Financial Officer of Microsoft, and subsequently of General
Motors before becoming Director of Transition Planning for Mitt
Romney’s unsuccessful 2012 US presidential campaign), the diaspora
could be ‘a relatively free resource which could have a relatively high
impact if focused in the right fashion’.5 The question was how to focus
 208

Average level of connection (max. 10) Civic connections

Family members
Economic connections
Government sources

Civic connections Associational memberships

Regular media viewing
Social connections Irregular media viewing

0 5 10 0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100%

Economic connections Social connections

No economic connections 10+ friends in NZ

Maintaining an NZ bank account
Owning equity investments Up to 10 friends in NZ
Owning commercial property Extended family in NZ
Owning residential property
Working offshore for an NZ firm Children in NZ
Conducting business with NZ firms Siblings in NZ
Owning / managing business in NZ
Regular business travel Parents in NZ

0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100%

Figure 9.5 Connections

Note: ‘Average level of connections’ has been standardized on a scale of 1 to 10 in order to facilitate comparison across different connection types.
Source: Kea New Zealand, Every One Counts 2006. Author’s analysis.
 New Zealand 209

or mobilize this resource given the loose organization and myriad

ethnic and political divisions characterizing New Zealanders abroad.
A postcolonial society, New Zealand had only relatively recently shifted
from a bicultural pattern in which a white, British-oriented majority
dominated an indigenous Māori minority to a multicultural pattern in
which new immigrant minorities had also begun to compete for politi-
cal influence. Its national identity was relatively young and ‘fractured’
(Spoonley et al., 2003), and thus the question of ‘focusing’ New Zealand
expatriates for economic gain became bound up with the question of
achieving a shared sense of being a ‘New Zealander’ – an ethnic category
that does not officially exist, for example, in the New Zealand census,
to the chagrin of many.
Nevertheless, EOC indicates the existence of a bounded ‘New
Zealand Expatriate’ identity, albeit one with porous external bor-
ders and strong internal distinctions, and its durability is uncertain.
Respondents were all self-selected ‘Kiwi Expatriates’, but ‘friends
of New Zealand’ were also welcomed to complete the survey (and
comprised around 1 per cent of respondents). Moreover, expatriates
did not constitute a homogeneous group, but one characterized by
important internal ethnic boundaries. As in New Zealand’s resident
population, the main groups in the expatriate sample were European,
Māori, Asian, Pacific People and ‘Others’ (although EOC contained a
significantly higher proportion of Europeans and significantly lower
proportions of Māori, Asians and Pacific people) (see Figure 9.6).6
Similarly, the largest share of the ‘Other’ ethnic group came from
those who voluntarily referred to themselves as ‘New Zealander’.
These comprised around 11 per cent of the New Zealand Census (see
Callister et al., 2009; see inter alia Kukutai and Didham, 2007)7 and
7 per cent of EOC respondents, making them the third largest ethnic
group in both samples. New Zealander EOC respondents often wrote a
complaint, such as the one below:

Regarding the NZ Census Ethnicity questions, as an 8th genera-

tion New Zealander on both sides, I find it irritating that I have to
describe myself as NZ European. There is nothing European about me
at all and nor do I have any family connection with Europe. I am a
New Zealander – where is that box? (Male, aged 34, Australia)

Region and ethnicity were highly correlated: over 51 per cent of ‘New
Zealanders’ lived in the United Kingdom and Ireland, 44 per cent of
New Zealand Europeans, and only 31 per cent of Māori did (versus 43
210 Emigration Nations

Resident New Zealanders Expatriate New Zealanders

90
80
70
60
Percentage

50
40
30
20
10
0
European Maori Pacific Peoples Asian Other Ethnicity

Figure 9.6 Self-ascribed ethnicity, residents versus expatriates

Note: This data have been recoded. Not all groups coded in the 2006 Census are included
here. The ‘Other’ category in EOC includes groups that have been coded into other groups
in the 2006 Census output; for example, ‘European’ in the Census output includes ‘New
Zealand European’ and ‘Other: European’, while the latter remain coded as ‘Other’ in the
analysis of EOC presented here. Also note that, for the resident population, percentages
exclude non-responses to the ethnicity question, and that multiple ethnic choices are
allowed in census responses, so totals exceed 100 per cent.
Source: (1) Statistics New Zealand 2006 Census Data – Quick Stats about Culture and Identity,
Table 1. (2) Kea New Zealand, Every One Counts 2006. Author’s analysis.

per cent of the overall sample). Conversely, 44 per cent of Māori lived
in Australia,8 but only 26 per cent of New Zealand Europeans and 20
per cent of New Zealanders lived there (versus 26 per cent overall).
These findings interestingly complement Kukutai and Didham’s (2007)
observation that New Zealander identity in the 2006 Census of New
Zealand residents was ‘especially appealing to middle aged men residing
in the South Island’. EOC suggests that New Zealander identity also has
a younger, more cosmopolitan face, appealing particularly to young,
university-educated males in the United Kingdom and Ireland.

Institutions, policies and debates in New Zealand’s

‘diaspora strategy’

The rhetorical shift between denouncing New Zealand expatriates as

traitors and hailing them as heroes overlaid a complicated array of gov-
ernmental programmes and initiatives between 1999 and 2008. This
 New Zealand 211

rhetoric and its underlying institutional manifestations must be under-

stood in the context of the country’s prolonged neo-liberal reforms.
New Zealand’s neo-liberal adventure can be divided into two phases.
It began in 1984, as the incoming fourth Labour government responded
to a succession of postcolonial economic crises. Faced with a bank-
rupt state, Labour unleashed a wave of ‘roll-back neo-liberal’ reforms
(Peck and Tickell, 2002) that had their archetype in Thatcherism and
Reaganism, and focused on state asset sales, welfare cuts and economic
deregulation. This programme was entrenched by successive National
Party governments between 1990 and 1999. At this point, after 15 years
of destructive reform, New Zealand entered a more creative phase of
neo-liberal restructuring as the Labour Party came to power promising
to follow the more moderate ‘Third Way’ path blazed by Tony Blair
and Bill Clinton during the 1990s. Rather than abnegating any role in
economic planning, government would offer streamlined support to
markets, coaxing them into welfare-enhancing growth by nurturing
their positive spin-offs and dampening their failures.
The shift in governmental orientation towards New Zealand expa-
triates took place at the point of overlap between these ‘roll-back’
and ‘roll-out’ phases of neo-liberal reform, and thus reflects both of
them. On the one hand, an increasingly inclusive and celebratory
rhetoric concerning expatriates overlaid a creative process in which
New Zealand’s political and economic elites crafted a range of market-
oriented initiatives to ‘engage the diaspora’ for the country’s economic
betterment. Larner’s concept of a ‘diaspora strategy’ gives great insight
into this trend. However, the concept omits mention of an intertwined
‘roll-back’ process within New Zealand’s pre-existing diaspora policies.
The earlier stance of denouncing expatriates overlaid a process of aban-
doning and dismantling inherited institutional frameworks for incorpo-
rating expatriates into the state as ‘external citizens’ (Baubock, 2009). In
particular, as discussed below, the bilateral agreements through which
New Zealand had long ensured the social security coverage of New
Zealanders in Australia were eroded and eventually cut entirely.9

Rolling out diaspora engagement

Many of New Zealand’s recent diaspora initiatives emerged from the
Labour-led government’s ‘Growth and Innovation Framework’ (GIF)
(Office of the Prime Minister, 2002): its grand strategy, announced in
2002, aimed at transforming New Zealand into a ‘knowledge economy’
and thereby reversing its postcolonial economic decline. The framework
emerged from what one of its writers described as a ‘stew’ of influences,
212 Emigration Nations

including several prominent reports (Boston Consulting Group, 2001;

L.E.K Consulting, 2001; Science and Innovation Advisory Council,
2002) and a major conference entitled ‘Catching the Knowledge Wave’
in 2001. Debates about brain drain and diaspora featured prominently –
sometimes as both a symptom and a source of New Zealand’s economic
woes, other times as a potential solution to them.
In part at the prompting of a new crop of business leaders (including
Chris Liddell, quoted above), the government took a cautious interest in
the idea of recasting the brain drain as a potential gain. Deputy Prime
Minister Jim Anderton embraced the idea most heartily, asserting:

I believe New Zealanders, wherever they are in the world, are always
New Zealanders. They retain a commitment to their homeland and
identify themselves as New Zealanders. We need to network and keep
our people contributing. I can see New Zealand as a nation with, in
at least one sense, no frontiers. (Anderton, 2001)

This approach was to precipitate two main policy initiatives: the

private-sector-led Kiwi Expats Association, which was later to become
the publicly funded Kea New Zealand, and a ‘World Class New Zealand’
programme within the operational arm of Anderton’s own ministry.
Initially, the two main pillars of the World Class New Zealand
Programme were its International Business Exchanges and its Business
Growth Service. The Business Growth Service aimed to assist businesses
with significant growth prospects by offering guidance and know-how
backed up with grants of up to NZ$100,000.10 The Exchanges involved
funding and facilitating visits between expatriates (plus high-flying
‘friends of New Zealand’) and New Zealand firms, in order to provide
‘entrepreneurs and high growth New Zealand industries and businesses
the opportunity to learn from the world’s best companies and brightest
talents’.11 Initially the spotlight was on the ICT sector, but it broadened
to include innovations across a wider range of sectors.
Eventually, however, the focus of the World Class New Zealand
Programme was to shift towards an awards scheme and a network, man-
aged by Kea. A central goal of the wider programme was to celebrate the
successes of talented New Zealanders wherever they lived. Jointly con-
vened by New Zealand Trade and Enterprise and Kea, the World Class
New Zealand Awards aimed to ‘recognise an expatriate who has made
an outstanding contribution to New Zealand’s economic development,
by actively assisting New Zealand industry and building our global
connections’.12 After its establishment in 2003, the initiative gradually
 New Zealand 213

grew and shifted focus. One award in 2003 grew to seven in 2006,
each targeted at key players in strategically important sectors identified
by the government: Information and Communications Technology;
Creative Industries; Biotechnology; Manufacturing; Research, Science,
Technology and Academia; and Finance, Investment and Business
Services. A lavish ceremony developed around the awards, involving
television personalities, speeches from the prime minister, and a black-
tie dinner for the Who’s Who of New Zealand business and politics.
The winners of the World Class New Zealand Awards were consid-
ered to be the top tier of a wider pool of influential expatriate movers
and shakers who the programme identifies as being capable of making
a difference. This wider pool formed the World Class New Zealand
Network – ‘a global network of New Zealanders and “New Zealand-
friendly” industry experts committed to helping New Zealand’s devel-
opment, international competitiveness and economic growth’.13 The
invitation criteria were for individuals who had achieved global success,
had contributed to New Zealand’s development or had the potential to
contribute by engaging with the network, and had the willingness to
provide time and advice to contribute towards New Zealand’s growth.
At the time of writing, the Network was managed by a full-time staff
member in New Zealand, who fosters relationships and identifies syner-
gies between members where potential collaborations may lead to ben-
efits to New Zealand. The network revolved around regular in-person
summits; in 2008 these were held in Auckland, London and New York.
The summits entailed discussions both around the role and possible
contribution of members, and around the creation of a 20-year vision
for New Zealand. Feedback and discussions were compiled and delivered
to government ministers.14
The World Class New Zealand Awards and Network were deliv-
ered by Kea New Zealand, a public–private partnership initiated by
Berkley expatriate business academic David Teece and retail magnate
philanthropist Stephen Tindall as a closing action point to the 2001
Knowledge Wave Conference. Many people were already talking about
the idea of a global network of New Zealanders, but during a tea break
in the conference Teece and Tindall decided to turn talk into action
by fronting around $100,000 apiece of their own money. They began
by organizing affluent, influential and enthusiastic expatriates in key
regions into volunteer local ‘chapters’, alongside an online database
of around 5,000 expatriates. Branding itself as ‘New Zealand’s Global
Talent Community’, the organization soon began attracting project
contracts and seed funding from a range of government agencies
214 Emigration Nations

(including its contract to deliver the World Class New Zealand Awards),
allowing it to enhance its web presence and employ more staff.
Notwithstanding ups and downs, Kea expanded massively through
the 2000s. The organization’s membership multiplied dramatically with
its 2006 survey, EOC, which piggy-backed on the publicity surrounding
the New Zealand census and played up patriotic loyalties in order to
reach some 18,000 respondents, many of whom gave permission for
their details to be stored in the online database. Some of its subsequent
initiatives were less successful, leading to criticism of the organization
for over-reaching: an evaluation of Kea in early 2009 found that even
though Kea had reached the critical mass to make a contribution to
New Zealand, ‘services such as an employment website and a mentor-
ing program have been less than successful’ (Moore and van der Scheer,
2009: i), and that ‘there is a real risk (legally and reputationally) in Kea
independently entering into anything but a light-touch approach to
service delivery without a great deal of thought and careful planning’
(Moore and van der Scheer, 2009: iv).
However, Kea scored another success with its campaign to increase
expatriate voter enrolments in the run-up to the 2008 New Zealand
General Election. Using the name ‘Every Vote Counts’, the campaign
drew on the successful ‘Every One Counts’ brand, as well as its winning
strategy of tying into the publicity around a national event. Within four
days of the campaign launch, the number of people checking their enrol-
ment details online had quadrupled, and about a third of all hits on the
official elections website were coming from overseas.15 Although expa-
triate votes had a limited impact on the election results (see Table 9.2),
Every Vote Counts successfully conveyed one of Kea’s central messages:
that the diaspora remained a powerful part of New Zealand society.

Rolling back external citizenship

The World Class New Zealand Programme and the Kea public–private
partnership were at the heart of the new ‘diaspora strategy’ rolled out
by successive Labour-led governments between 1999 and 2008. They
represented new ways of reaching out to and incorporating particular –
that is, affluent and influential – groups of elite New Zealand expatri-
ates within official conceptions of the national population. As Wendy
Larner argues, these initiatives were driven by New Zealand’s ongoing
process of neo-liberal reform. But it is important to recognize that this
reform process has been multi-faceted: the relatively recent ‘roll-out’ of
new market-friendly policy programmes has been one aspect of neo-
liberalization in New Zealand, but an at least equally important aspect
Table 9.2 Effect of overseas votes, New Zealand’s 2008 general election

Official results Overseas votes Total without overseas votes Net effect of
overseas votes

Party Votes Effective % Seats Votes Effective% Votes Effective % Seats %

Green Party 157,613 7.19 9 4,487 14.19 153,126 7.09 8 1

Labour Party 796,880 36.37 43 8,782 27.78 788,098 36.49 44 –1
National Party 1,053,398 48.08 58 16,548 52.34 1,036,850 48.01 58 0
All other parties 336,675 – 12 2,644 5.69 334,031 8.40 12 0
Totals 2,344,566 100.00 122 32,461 100.00 2,312,105 100.00 122 0

Source: Table by Kea New Zealand. Used with permission.

215
216 Emigration Nations

has been the ‘roll-back’ of the postcolonial welfare state system through
asset sales and deregulation.
This roll-back phase of neo-liberalization began during the 1980s,
and involved constrictions in the political and geographical scope of
New Zealand’s welfare regime – constrictions which also applied to
citizenship provisions for New Zealanders abroad. The advance of geo-
graphically expansive initiatives to incorporate specific non-resident
elites from 1999 to 2008 needs to be seen against the background of a
receding relationship between New Zealand and its expatriates during
the 1980s and 1990s. Just as the initiatives rolled out in 1999–2008
were geographically targeted at core strategic centres of the global
economy, the roll-back reforms to external citizenship in 1984–1999
were geographically targeted at economically and politically periph-
eral populations – particularly at New Zealanders on welfare ben-
efits in Australia, and internationally mobile New Zealand pensioners.
Understanding this roll-back dynamic requires a wider understanding
of the colonial context from which New Zealand citizenship evolved.
During the middle years of the twentieth century, the form and
content of citizenship both fragmented and expanded for most New
Zealanders. With the British Nationality Act of 1948, the expansive
status of British Subjecthood, which had applied across the disintegrat-
ing British Empire Realm, fragmented into a range of more restrictive
national citizenships applying in particular former colonies. Meanwhile,
however, the entitlements attached to the status of British Subject and
its successor citizenships expanded rapidly in step with the growth of
welfare states across the industrialized world.
These two processes shaped migration between New Zealand and
Australia at least until the late 1970s. Traditional free trans-Tasman
migration and seamless access to growing welfare benefits at either end
were formalized first through a reciprocal social security agreement in
1948, and then through the 1973 Trans-Tasman Travel Arrangement.
Although this bilateral arrangement between New Zealand and Australia
covered but a fragment of former British territory, at its height it con-
firmed and consolidated within this limited area a level of interstate
cohesion that the wider Empire had never been able to fully achieve,
guaranteeing not only free movement but also seamless social welfare
coverage between the two countries.
However, from the 1980s, this island of intra-Commonwealth free
movement also began to erode as welfare states rolled back and post-
colonial trans-Tasman relations adjusted. In 1973 Britain broke from
the Commonwealth and joined the European Economic Community,
 New Zealand 217

closing off major markets for Antipodean exports and catalysing a

profound economic crisis that New Zealand governments of the 1980s
attempted to address through a radical neo-liberal programme of pri-
vatization, deregulation and slashes to welfare funding. Emigration to
Australia reached unprecedented levels and became a concern to both
countries: New Zealand worried that the outflows represented both a
‘brain drain’ and vote of no confidence, while Australia worried about
the welfare bill for increasing numbers of New Zealand immigrants.
Although nominally imposed by Australia, the resulting restrictions
on trans-Tasman welfare portability were to some extent the result of
mutual assent (Bedford et al., 2003; Birrell and Rapson, 2001; Bushnell
and Choy, 2001; Sanderson, 2009).16 In 1986 and 1994 stand-down
periods for Australian benefits were introduced alongside a reimburse-
ment scheme whereby New Zealand paid for some of ‘its’ beneficiaries
in Australia. Matters came to a head when the New Zealand government
refused Australia’s requests to pay a larger share. Australia responded by
withdrawing New Zealanders’ special automatic access to welfare cover-
age on arrival. Commentators noted that New Zealand saw significant
interests served by the change, even though New Zealand’s negotiators
nominally resisted it (see Bedford et al., 2003; Birrell and Rapson, 2001;
Sanderson, 2009). New Zealand’s prime minister had already remarked
that New Zealanders in Australia had ‘turned their backs’ on their coun-
try and ‘should not get a bean’ (Alley, 2000). Unrestricted movement
would continue between the two countries as part of efforts to maintain
a ‘Single Economic Market’, but migrants would no longer be protected
by a welfare safety net (Birrell and Rapson, 2001: 61; Sanderson, 2009).
In an era of public cutbacks and market deregulation, the entitle-
ments of expatriate New Zealanders were low on the list of priorities –
particularly when those expatriates were not just located in a diplo-
matically safe-bet country, but were also relatively poor and raised the
spectre of dependency on New Zealand’s slimmed-down welfare state.
It was not always the case that fiscal conservatism coincided with a
primary concern for territorial residents: sometimes the two agendas
conflicted, as in the case of pension portability, which underwent a
seven-year review between 2001 and 2008.17 On the one hand, offi-
cials urged political leaders to reform the portability system in order to
achieve greater administrative efficiency and substantial fiscal savings.
The essence of their proposals was to reform the defined-benefit state
pension scheme that had been designed without portability in mind,
and as a result had come to arbitrarily discriminate against emigrants
in a variety of ways. They proposed to replace this system with a
218 Emigration Nations

defined-contribution system allowing greater international portability

of individual entitlements. On the other hand, politicians were afraid
of throwing out the baby with the bathwater, by abandoning a pension
system that worked for most of their voting constituents, in order to
make life easier for a minority of migrants.
Reform proposals were rejected, and the final outcome of the review
left in place an internationally frowned-upon system through which
the New Zealand government confiscates overseas pension entitlements
from New Zealand superannuitants, and places restrictions on their
ability to apply for their New Zealand entitlements from abroad. In this
case, fiscal conservatism per se was not the only justification for restrict-
ing the entitlements of expatriates: geographically inflected conceptions
of identity and belonging also intervened. Politicians wanted to ensure
that the pension system favoured life-long New Zealand residents over
migrants, even if such a system ended up less administratively efficient
and more expensive than the more portable alternatives.
This perspective could hardly have contrasted more with Deputy
Prime Minister Jim Anderton’s proclamation, made in the inaugural
year of the pension portability review, that ‘New Zealanders, wherever
they are in the world, are always New Zealanders’. Here was a clear state-
ment that, irrespective of secondary questions of cost, New Zealanders
remain New Zealanders as long as they remain in New Zealand. The
later ‘diaspora strategies’ merely applied an exception to this rule for
expatriates who could effectively buy their way back into the club.

Conclusions

By the end of the twentieth century, New Zealand had been, for much
of its existence, part of a unitary empire, within which flows of people,
goods, money and ideas that are now considered international were
once thought of as essentially internal. The pathways travelled by
diasporic New Zealanders are still largely determined by these older pat-
terns, but the volumes of flows passing along them are shaped by the
fracturing of this unitary system. The same economic trauma has led
New Zealand to fundamentally rethink the terms on which it engages
with the wider world, prompting a prolonged and profound period of
neo-liberal restructuring, affecting emigration policy along with every-
thing else.
New Zealand’s neo-liberal reforms have taken place in two phases.
A roll-back phase unfolded from 1984 to 1999, and involved the
destruction and dismantling of pre-existing institutional frameworks
 New Zealand 219

through welfare cutbacks, privatization of state assets and economic

deregulation. Although elements of this trend persisted after 1999,
this point marked a shift towards roll-out ‘Third Way’ neo-liberalism,
aimed at supporting enterprise-led growth through creative new mar-
ket-friendly policy programmes. This two-phase process of neo-liberal
reform is reflected in shifts in government orientation towards New
Zealand expatriates between 1999 and 2008. The tail end of roll-back
neo-liberal restructuring is evident in the constriction of external citi-
zenship entitlements for New Zealanders in Australia and in official atti-
tudes to pension portability around the turn of the century. At the same
time, roll-out neo-liberal reforms were already beginning to appear in
the form of a what Larner identifies as a ‘diaspora strategy’ aimed at
constituting strategically located elite expatriate New Zealanders as part
of a ‘global talent community’, loyal to their homeland and dedicated
to its economic advancement.
Larner’s concept of a ‘diaspora strategy’ is a powerful tool for under-
standing the roll-out phase of this process: it helps to explain ‘new’
rhetoric and policies that emerged from 1999 to 2008. However, as
currently framed, the concept has little to say about the ‘old’ rhetoric
and policy concerning New Zealanders abroad. By highlighting how
New Zealand’s new diaspora strategies emerged from the tail end of
a roll-back phase of neo-liberal state restructuring, we can begin not
only to understand the shift between old and new governmental ori-
entations towards expatriates, but also – crucially – to understand how
neo-liberalism transformed what the state was already doing as far as
expatriates were concerned.
This reframing has two significant implications for understanding
the relationship between diasporas and transnationalism on the one
hand and neo-liberalization on the other. First, by examining the proc-
ess of institutional creation and destruction in state–diaspora relations,
this kind of analysis highlights overlooked modes of ‘actually existing
neo-liberalism’, where the revolutionary ideology of market-based state
restructuring meets the messy evolutionary process of institutional
transformation. As other authors have noted, this uneven process of
transformation can give rise to sudden and surprising shifts in govern-
ing discourses and practices; as this chapter has argued, one such shift
can be seen in New Zealand’s seemingly contradictory official stances
towards expatriates in the period 1999–2008. Again, these shifts reflect
both the incremental ‘rolling back’ of inherited institutional frame-
works around expatriate membership and the gradual ‘rolling out’ of
new programmes that recast such membership in market-friendly terms.
220 Emigration Nations

Second, and perhaps more significantly, this analysis highlights a

wider research agenda to reveal, understand and explain aspects of the
state that have long existed but have been overlooked by ‘methodologi-
cally nationalistic’ ways of thinking about the world in terms of discrete,
territorially sealed nation-state units (Martins, 1974; Wimmer and Glick
Schiller, 2002; Wimmer and Glick Schiller, 2003). In acknowledging
that there was already an institutional ecosystem pertaining to expatri-
ates in place by the time ‘diaspora strategies’ came into the picture, one
is confronted by the possibility that similar ecosystems are inherent to
the nation-state form. A number of existing studies have shown that
diaspora policies can be found in an unexpectedly broad range of states
(see inter alia Gamlen, 2008) (Gamlen, 2006; Østergaard-Nielsen, 2003)
(Agunias, 2009). Other case studies also show that diaspora policies in
many contexts have a long pre-neo-liberal history (Brand, 2006; Cano
and Délano, 2007; Fitzgerald, 2006; Sherman, 1999; Thunø, 2001).
This study of New Zealand and its diaspora accentuates the sense that
a wider understanding of state–diaspora relations involves looking
beyond neo-liberalism.
In sum, on the one hand, this study forces us to disaggregate our
understanding of the globalization of state processes, from processes of
neo-liberalism: rather than seeing the two as effectively synonymous,
we should see the latter as the most recent manifestation of the former.
On the other hand, this study of the New Zealand case adds weight to
the proposition that institutionalized state–diaspora relations should be
regarded as regular rather than contingent forms of political organiza-
tion. States everywhere have long been spilling messily beyond their
own borders in pursuit of populations. We may need to revise our
understanding of the modern nation-state in order to account for this.

Notes
This chapter draws on doctoral research funded by a Top Achiever Doctoral
Scholarship from New Zealand’s Tertiary Education Commission, and its
publication is part of an ESRC-funded project entitled ‘Emigration States
in the Global Governance of Migration’ (Grant Number PTA-026-27-2323).
Support through the Leverhulme-funded Oxford Diasporas Programme facili-
tated further revisions. A revised version of this chapter appears as Gamlen
2012 ‘Creating and Destroying Diaspora Strategies: New Zealand’s Emigration
Policies Re-examined’, Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers DOI:
10.1111/j.1475-5661.2012.00522.x.
1. See http://www.keanewzealand.com/news/eoc-summary.html.
2. The average annual departures of New Zealand citizens from 1979 to 2006
was 43,976, while the average annual arrivals of New Zealand citizens for
 New Zealand 221

the same period was 23,398. Statistics New Zealand (2006). ‘Table 9.01:
Permanent and Long-term Migration by Citizenship’. Available at http://
www.stats.govt.nz/tables/tourism-and-migration-2006.htm, accessed 26
July 2009.
3. Figure 9.1 omits short-term mobility and breaks down gross permanent and
long-term flows by citizenship for the most of the post-Second World War
period (March years).
4. Census-based estimates are distributed differently (Australia 67 per cent, the
United Kingdom and Ireland 11 per cent, and the United States 5 per cent),
suggesting either selection biases or that emigrants to Australia do not iden-
tify as strongly as ‘New Zealand Expatriates’ as emigrants to other regions,
particularly the United Kingdom and Ireland. Also see Callister, Paul. 2006.
‘Some summary findings from KEA survey: draft.’ Wellington: Institute of
Policy Studies, Victoria University of Wellington.
5. Interview with author.
6. Respondents were allowed to choose more than one ethnic designation, and
choices were not ranked.
7. Around 20,000 people identified as ‘New Zealander’ in the 1986 New
Zealand Census. By 2001 the figure had risen to around 89,000 (approxi-
mately 2 per cent of the population), and in 2006 it leapt to around
430,000 (some 11 per cent of the population), partly due to an email pro-
test campaign prior to the Census. See Callister, P., Didham, R. and Kivi, A.
(2009). ‘Who are we? The conceptualisation and expression of ethnicity’,
Official Statistics Research Series, 4. Available from http://www.statisphere.
govt.nz/official-statisticsresearch/series/default.htm, Kukutai, T. and R.
Didham. 2007. ‘Can national identity become ethnic identity? The case
of the emerging New Zealander ethnic group.’ in Social Statistics and Ethnic
Diversity: Should we count, how should we count, and why? Montreal. Also
see New Zealand Herald (2009, Apr. 29), http://blogs.nzherald.co.nz/blog/
your-views/2009/4/29/should-you-be-able-describe-yourself-new-zealander-
census-forms/?c_id=1501154&commentpage=5, accessed 25 May 2009; and
Easton, Brian, ‘On being Pākehā: Some thoughts of a New Zealander, http://
www.eastonbh.ac.nz/?p=685.
8. For a detailed discussion of Māori in Australia, see Hamer, Paul 2007. Māori
in Australia: Ngā Māori i te Ao Moemoeā. Wellington: Te Puni Kokiri.
9. The following discussion draws on analysis of interviews, media reports
and official documents obtained under New Zealand’s Official Information
Act. Interviews were conducted with some 190 policymakers, business lead-
ers and migrants in eight locations (London, Sydney, Paris, Tokyo, Osaka,
Shanghai, Wellington and Auckland) from late 2004 to mid-2009.
10. Anderton, Jim (2002, 2 May), ‘Press Release: Industry NZ gets World Class
NZers into driving seat’.
11. Anderton, Jim (2002, 2 May), ‘Press Release: Industry NZ gets World Class
NZers into driving seat’.
12. Anderton, Jim (2003, 15 April), ‘Press Release: Anderton forges ties to NZers
overseas’.
13. Kea New Zealand, ‘World Class New Zealand’, http://www.keanewzealand.
com/wcnz/about.html, accessed 4 June 2009.
14. Interview with Kea New Zealand staff member.
222 Emigration Nations

15. Kea New Zealand (2008, 1 September), ‘Press Release: Enrolment rate triples
for overseas voters’.
16. Also see New Zealand Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade: Treaties and
International Law – New Zealand-Australia Social Security Agreement,
http://www.mfat.govt.nz/Treaties-and-International-Law/03-Treaty-making-
process/National-Interest-Analyses/0-NZ-Australia-Social-Security.php,
accessed 1 May 2009; New Zealand Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade:
Treaties and International Law – New Zealand-Australia Social Security
Agreement, http://www.mfat.govt.nz/Treaties-and-International-Law/03-
Treaty-making-process/National-Interest-Analyses/0-NZ-Australia-Social-
Security.php, accessed 1 May 2009.
17. This section draws on analysis of the following government reports: Report
to Minister of Finance, Minister of Social Development and Employment,
31.05/04, ‘Review of New Zealand Superannuation Portability’, available
online at http://www.nzpensionabuse.org/); Report to Minister of Finance,
Minister of Social Development and Employment, 24/11/05, ‘Review of New
Zealand Superannuation – Treatment of Overseas Pensions and Payment
Overseas’, available online at http://www.nzpensionabuse.org/); Cabinet
Social Development Committee Paper, 12/06/08, ‘Review of Treatment
of Overseas Pensions and Payment of New Zealand Superannuation
and Veteran’s Pensions Overseas: Paper One – Overview’; Cabinet Social
Development Committee Paper, 12/06/08, Ministry for Social Development
and Employment, ‘Review of Treatment of Overseas Pensions and Payment
of New Zealand Superannuation and Veteran’s Pensions Overseas: Paper
Two – Proposals’; Summary of Impasse over Pension Portability with the
USA, Undated, ‘Portability Impasse with the USA’, New Zealand Embassy,
USA; Ministry of Social Development Report, 14/2/03, ‘ New Zealand
Superannuation Portability’. I am grateful to Peter Van Bussel for sharing
documents and analysis with me.

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10
Nigeria @ 50: Policies and Practices
for Diaspora Engagement
Naluwembe Binaisa

There are no citizens in Nigeria, but only citizens of

Nigeria
(Taiwo, 2004: 58)

Nigeria has a long history of migration internally, regionally and inter-

nationally. It is an important country to research in exploring the ori-
entation and role of nation-states towards their emigrant communities.
Nigeria is the most populous country in Africa and the sixth most popu-
lated country in the world with a population of 154 million (World Bank,
2010). It has an area of 923,000 square kilometres and has land borders
with Benin, Niger, Chad and Cameroon. Nigeria has the second largest
economy in the continent after South Africa. Nigeria is also a country
of immigration and a transit country for migrants destined for other
African countries, Europe, the Gulf States and beyond (Adepoju, 2005a;
de Haas, 2006). In comparison to its total population, Nigeria has a fairly
modest net migration rate and the stock of emigrants as a percentage of
the population stands at 0.6 per cent (UNPD, 2009). This figure is seen
as an underestimate because of the lack of reliable migration data within
Nigeria and across sub-Saharan Africa more generally, and the porosity
of Nigeria’s borders with neighbouring countries. The net migration rate
also obscures important migration dynamics such as the high rate of
skilled out-migration. These complex movements reverberate in policy
initiatives targeting emigrants whose reception sits within a wider debate
about the Nigerian state’s relationship to its citizens more generally.
Nigeria came into being as a nation-state through the British colonial
administration amalgamating the Northern and Southern protectorates
in 1914, achieving partial self-government in the early 1950s before
full independence in 1960 as a federation of three regions (North, East
226
 Nigeria 227

and West) (NPC, 2009). Since gaining independence fifty years ago the
relationship of the state to its citizens has increasingly come into ques-
tion under what has been termed the ‘one Nigeria’ debate (Adebanwi,
2005: 13). This debate questions the legitimacy and viability of the
Nigerian state with its antecedents of forced creation by the British
and the fractured, at times conflict-ridden post-independence years
where the struggle to achieve social, economic and political equality
and democracy for all its citizens continues (Adebanwi, 2005; Alubo,
2005). Nigeria is governed through a federal system (36 states and the
Federal Capital Territory, Abuja), which in principle should lead to more
equitable distribution of the substantial revenues generated from oil
reserves. However, Nigeria remains a low-income country with more than
100 million people or 60.9 per cent of the population in 2010 living in
absolute poverty compared to 54.7 per cent in 2004, whilst subjective
poverty based on respondents’ self-assessments rose from 75.5 per cent
in 2004 compared to 93.9 per cent (NBS, 2010).
The Nigerian state uses the term Nigerian diaspora along a fluid spec-
trum in many of its institutions and policies that target the diaspora.
For example, the recent Nigeria Diaspora (Establishment) Commission
Bill 2010, which I will discuss in greater detail below, does not offer
an explicit definition but instead states in Part II – Functions of the
Commission that one of its primary functions is:

To register every citizen of Nigeria who resides outside Nigeria as a

member of Nigerians in Diaspora in his respective continent and any
other continent to which he might relocate from the commence-
ment of this Bill.

This is a narrower definition than that offered by the African Union

(AU, 2005: 7), which states that:

The African Diaspora consists of peoples of African origin living outside

the continent, irrespective of their citizenship and nationality and who
are willing to contribute to the development of the continent and the
building of the African Union.

Contested understandings of what is meant by the Nigerian diaspora are

reflected in the widely divergent figures for the size of this population
that are quoted by government bodies, multilateral agencies and civil
society. For example, the recently completed International Organization
for Migration (IOM) Migration Profile for Nigeria puts the size of the
228 Emigration Nations

diaspora at 5 million; the Global Migrant Origin Database puts the total
stocks of Nigerian emigrants at 1.1 million whilst an oft-quoted figure
by politicians puts the size of the diaspora at 20 million (Afolayan
and IOM, 2010; DRC, 2007; Ezema, 2010). These discrepancies reflect
weak data capture and whether undocumented migrants, the second
and subsequent generations, some of whom may not have registered
for Nigerian citizenship, are included in the figures. Interestingly, gov-
ernment rhetoric and policies towards its emigrants, which urge the
diaspora to engage in homeland development, cut across the various
categories of generations and citizenship status.
For many Nigerian emigrants their engagement with the homeland
varies over time as they respond to a range of factors including life
course, social and economic factors as well as government policies. In the
past few decades there has been a growing body of literature that exam-
ines the motivations and complex relationships that emigrants and their
descendants maintain with their sending countries. This literature has
predominantly stemmed from the transnationalism perspective, which
analyses the complex relationships that feed into the ties that migrants
maintain periodically, simultaneously or variably with their countries
of origin (see Binaisa and Oeppen, 2011; Grillo and Mazzucato, 2008;
Guarnizo, 2003). Within this literature sending countries’ motivations
for maintaining links with their emigrant communities are summarized
as the desire ‘(a) to secure continuous inflow of economic resources,
(b) to mobilize political support and control subversive political dissi-
dence and (c) to promote the upward social mobility of overseas nation-
als’ (Østergaard-Nielsen, 2003: 4). For many people emigration is not a
single or round-trip trajectory and their engagement in transnational
practices with their country of origin can take many forms socially, cul-
turally, economically and/or politically (Østergaard-Nielsen, 2003: 13).
This is true of Nigerian emigrants particularly when one notes the long
history of emigration to regional, intra-African and intercontinental
destinations with many forms of migration and mobility across time.
In the sections that follow the chapter traces the history and geog-
raphy of emigration from Nigeria and contrasts this with the current
situation to give an overview of the different migration trajectories and
composition of the diaspora. The chapter then turns to an examina-
tion of the current institutions and policies that govern and frame the
relationship between the state and its emigrants. This is a complex
undertaking as the past decade has been characterized by a plethora
of initiatives from the Nigerian government to engage with its citizens
abroad. This reflects the at times conflicting institutional demands
 Nigeria 229

Nigeria faces at the local, national and international levels. The rela-
tionship between nationals overseas, particularly those residing outside
the borders of the African continent, has come under increasing scru-
tiny from a variety of perspectives. It is increasingly framed from an
institutional dimension that focuses on security and the integrity of
borders, or how states could harness migrants’ remittance transfers for
Africa’s development (Onwuka, 1982; Ratha et al., 2011; Styan, 2007).
The final section examines how emigrants have historically contributed
to the national story and this is contrasted with the current situation
marked by debates about brain drain, remittances and Nigeria’s external
relations within the international migration management regime. In
conclusion the chapter notes that Nigeria’s policies towards its emigrant
community have to be understood within a landscape of emigrants’
long-standing self-reliance because of the perceived retreat of the state
in meeting its citizens needs both within and outside the country.

History and geography of emigration

Development of the emigrant community

The history and geography of emigration in Nigeria roughly divides
along three axes: the precolonial era, the colonial era and the post-
independence era. All three of these time periods illustrate different
emigration patterns and dynamics that have been critical to the forma-
tion and character of the modern Nigerian state. In the precolonial era
Nigeria did not exist as a nation-state within its current international
borders. Instead, the geographical area around the river Niger was home
to powerful independent states and kingdoms including the Benin, Oyo,
Kanem-Borno and Sokoto Caliphate in the North (Falola and Heaton,
2008). Between the fourteenth and nineteenth centuries the slave trade
generated forced migration along four routes: the trans-Saharan, Indian
Ocean, Red Sea and trans-Atlantic (Lovejoy, 2000). This trade was to grow
exponentially between the sixteenth and nineteenth centuries when
the trans-Atlantic route with its key nodes of the Atlantic, America and
Europe came to represent ‘the single most important economic activity
of many states in the area in and around what is now southern Nigeria’
(Falola and Heaton, 2008: 10). Many of these slaves were dispersed in
the plantation economies of the Americas, the Caribbean and South
America. Conventional trade in goods such as salt, agricultural produce,
iron, textiles and weapons led to the growth of the trans-Saharan route
across the Sahara towards North Africa, the Middle East and Europe. This
nurtured population movements that led to the formation of trading
230 Emigration Nations

colonies, trade routes and important political, economic and religious

ties (Falola, 1988). For example, early Hausa migrations included seasonal
migration, long distance merchants and apprentice religious scholars.
By the nineteenth century the social and economic influence of these
movements led to the growth of settlements north past Lake Chad to
the Mediterranean and south to the Congo and Sudan (Adamu, 1978).
Institutional and administrative policies during the colonial period
reflect Britain’s priority to control the productive capacity of the Nigerian
population and serve the needs of its own industrial revolution. This
led to large-scale investment into the extractive industries and cash
crop exports, which fuelled the growth of such sectors as cocoa, cotton,
groundnuts and tin mining industries. The political economy of the colo-
nial era led to substantial migration throughout the West Africa region.
In Nigeria the coerced and voluntary movements of people reflected the
search for wages to pay imposed taxes. The resultant wage economy and
increased purchasing power interacted with a desire for new experiences
(Amin, 1974; Berry, 1975; Freund, 1981). For example, Nigerian emi-
grant communities in Ghana grew from the colonial period onwards as
migrants sought livelihood opportunities in the mining and commercial
sectors. Yoruba people from Nigeria were one of the more substantial
groups geographically dispersed throughout Ghana reflecting patterns of
chain migration, as migrants from specific localities in Nigeria followed
their kin and social networks to corresponding localities in Ghana. Many
worked successfully as traders for many generations until their pain-
ful expulsion in 1969 by a government decree, which led to 200,000
Nigerians leaving Ghana in the space of two weeks (Eades, 1993).
During the latter part of the colonial era a small but growing number
of students accessed migration for education beyond the African con-
tinent to Britain and to a lesser extent the United States. These early
graduates for the most part returned to Nigeria taking positions in
the civil service and the cities where the colonial administration and
European firms were based. Many were to go on to pursue careers in
the lower rungs of the civil service, as clergy, teachers or administrators,
although they found themselves in jobs not necessarily commensurate
to their skills (Falola and Heaton, 2008: 138). This early pattern of emi-
gration for education outside Africa to gain further qualifications is one
that was set to grow after independence.

The current situation

Following independence on 1 October 1960 Nigeria’s economic potential
has been hampered by a combination of weak democratic institutions
 Nigeria 231

and violent political instability, which has fuelled voluntary emigration,

internal displacement and forced migration. Nigeria’s diverse population
encapsulates 374 ethnic groups dominated by the Hausa/Fulani pre-
dominantly found in the north of the country; the Igbo predominantly
found in the southeast of the country and the Yoruba found predomi-
nantly in the southwest of the country (NPC, 2009). Currently these
three groups dominate the diaspora and their geographical settlement
patterns reflect historical networks of association, with Igbo and Yoruba
emigrants found predominantly in Britain and the United States, whilst
Hausa/Fulani tend to follow the trans-Sahara migration route building
on their Islamic connection to Sudan and the Gulf States. Most inter-
national migration occurs within the region and in common with else-
where in Africa the legacy of colonialism cemented borders yet failed to
impede important migration corridors that persist today (de Haas, 2006).
Ethnic, kin and livelihood networks cut across formal state borders that
ignore traditional and seasonal patterns of mobility. This is reflected
in the many waves of regional emigration from Nigeria particularly to
neighbouring countries such as Ghana, Niger, Togo and Benin.
As the country moved into the postcolonial era issues such as demo-
graphic growth, land pressure and uneven development across the
country continued to feed into emigration dynamics as people sought
better livelihood opportunities (Mabogunje, 1970). The discovery
of oil in 1958 should have put the economy on a solid footing but
weak democratic institutions and political struggles over power and
representation lead to increased internal conflict and the collapse of
the First Republic (see Diamond, 1988). The end of the Nigerian civil
war (1967–1970) saw a period of buoyant economic growth from the
mid-1970s onwards fuelled by the oil boom. Nigeria attracted inward
flows of skilled and unskilled migrant workers from neighbouring
countries particularly Ghana which represented 81 per cent of ECOWAS
(Economic Community of West African States) nationals legally resi-
dent in the country by 1983 (Adepoju, 1988). Approximately 1 million
Ghanaians were affected by the 1983 expulsion order issued by the
Nigerian government against ‘illegal’ migrants. Some scholars attribute
this expulsion as a retaliatory act for the harsh 1969 expulsion of
Nigerian resident in Ghana (Afolayan, 1988).
The decade from the mid-1980s to the end of the 1990s saw a suc-
cession of military regimes presiding over an increasingly weakened
economy. The introduction of structural adjustment policies under
the military rule of President Babangida (1985–1993) led to increased
poverty and hardship due to severe economic mismanagement and
232 Emigration Nations

massive corruption. The subsequent economic decline saw the migra-

tion pendulum swing in the opposite direction as living standards and
working conditions worsened, emigration increased, the public sector
shrunk and the cost of living rose (Adepoju, 2005b). The emigration
of highly skilled workers trained in Nigeria was particularly significant
and by 2000 10.7 per cent of this group had emigrated (Docquier and
Marfouk, 2006) including health professionals and university teachers.
The downward slide of the economy was compounded by the violent
suppression of political dissent. The result was a collapse of the Nigerian
middle class and civil society as an increasing number of professionals
and political opposition fled the country, or opted to stay abroad at
the end of their period of overseas training (Ajibewa and Akinrinade,
2003). Since the early 2000s there has been a diversification of migra-
tion trajectories, destinations and the sectors of the population striving
for access to emigration opportunities. Other regional groups such as
the Edo where many trafficking victims originate are increasingly repre-
sented in the diaspora population (see Carling, 2005). New destinations
have also emerged within other African destinations such as South
Africa with its strong economy, Libya, Morocco and Senegal, which
act as transit points for those migrants seeking entry into Europe and
also alternative destinations in Europe such as Ireland, Italy and Spain
(Adepoju, 2004; de Haas, 2006; Komolafe, 2008).
The Nigerian diaspora is recognized as one of the most highly
skilled entrepreneurial emigrant groups in Organization for Economic
Cooperation and Development (OECD) countries. According to the
2007 American Community Survey based on the US Census more
than 80 per cent of the foreign-born population from Nigeria are in
employment and over 60 per cent have a bachelor’s degree or higher (US
Census, 2009). In Britain recent innovative analysis drawing on a range
of demographic, education, employment and health data sets reveals
that Nigerians are the most integrated of the African groups with low
proportions living in households with no earners. They have high levels
of employment and the self-employed have high levels of education and
qualifications, with many overqualified for the jobs they hold (Mitton and
Aspinall, 2010, 2011). The latest figures for emigration of health profes-
sionals show that 10.8 per cent of physicians trained in the country emi-
grated, whilst 13.6 per cent of physicians and 11.7 per cent of nurses born
in the country emigrated (Clemens and Pettersson, 2006). The United
States has the highest population of Nigerians living outside Africa with
official statistics putting their numbers at 201,000 although unofficial esti-
mates that include the undocumented second and subsequent generations
 Nigeria 233

place the figures significantly higher (Capps et al., 2011). Britain has an
official population of approximately 90,000, whilst other major destina-
tions include Chad, Cameroon, Italy, Benin, Côte d’Ivoire, Spain, Sudan
and Niger (Hernández-Coss and Bun, 2006; World Bank, 2011).

Institutions and policies

Nigeria has a range of institutions and attendant policies that are at the
forefront of the government’s efforts to engage with its emigrant popu-
lation. Many of these are of recent provenance and they can be broadly
organized under three parts. First are those Nigerian government insti-
tutions and policies that aim to increase the migration management
capacity within the country, within the region as well as internationally.
Second are those institutions and policies that are geared towards for-
mally recognizing the diaspora as a constitutive part of the nation-state
and focus on building the capacity of the diaspora to benefit the devel-
opment of Nigeria. Third are those institutions that emerge from the
Nigerian government’s need to fulfil important migration management
agreements it has with regional bodies such as the European Union (EU)
and/or bilateral agreements with other nation-states.

Institutions
There are two key institutional bodies that impact Nigeria’s emigrant
community. The first is the government of Nigeria and the policies it
enacts towards its citizens abroad, and the second is the ECOWAS,1 the
important West African regional body. On the national level the gov-
ernment and the country’s legislature are instrumental in creating and
maintaining existing institutions that deal with the various aspects of
migration management and policies that impact the emigrant commu-
nity. The president also appoints the Special Assistant to the President
on Migration and Humanitarian Affairs and the Special Assistant,
Diaspora Affairs. On the regional level Nigeria is signatory to a range
of ECOWAS protocols that directly relate to the rights of its citizens as
emigrants within the region. Migration management within Nigeria in
common with many African countries lacks coordinated institutions
that work together at the international, national and federal levels with
integrated policy coherence. Currently the government is working to
rectify this situation with a number of policies that are listed in the next
section (Afolayan and IOM, 2010: 79–81). There are a range of govern-
ment ministries that offer services and respond to different aspects of
migration management through their policies and practices. These
234 Emigration Nations

institutions and the services they provide impact the lives of Nigeria’s
highly diverse emigrant community. Most of these institutions and
ministries are based in the Federal Capital Area of Abuja although some
have representation overseas as applicable.
The Federal Ministry of Foreign Affairs is the main body that deals with
migration matters including providing consular services to Nigerians
abroad; issuing passports, travel certificates and visas promoting Nigerian
investment opportunities, trade and tourism and repatriation services
for Nigerian citizens and pilgrimage arrangements. The ministry is also
responsible for the preparation of bilateral agreements, joint commissions
with other states and multilateral agreements (Afolayan and IOM, 2010).
The Federal Ministry of the Interior evolved from the Ministry of
Internal Affairs, which was established in 1957. It is mandated with
responsibility for internal security of the Nigerian state. It implements
and formulates policies on border management; it coordinates all issues
of the Nigeria Immigration Service (NIS), the issuance of expatriate
quota allocations, the registration of voluntary organizations and all
issues of the NIS (FMI, 2011).
The Nigeria Immigration Service (NIS) is a key department of the Federal
Ministry of the Interior and was established by an act of parliament in
1963. It deals with the issuance of visas, passports and ECOWAS Travel
Certificates. The responsibilities of NIS have evolved to include imple-
menting compliance with International Civil Aviation Organization
(ICAO) standards. An important recent policy has been the introduc-
tion of machine-readable biometric passports. NIS began this process in
2007 making e-passports compulsory after 31 December 2010 in a bid
to combat fraud and enhance security and the country’s international
standing (Nigerian Rome, 2010). Nigeria is the only African country
represented on the ICAO board. NIS has benefited from strategic devel-
opment partnerships with ECOWAS, IOM and the EU (NIS, 2011).
The Federal Ministry of Labour and Productivity is responsible for pro-
moting, monitoring and overseeing employment and labour relations.
The International Labour Migration Desk was set up in 2004 within the
Ministry of Labour and Productivity. It has the mandate ‘to formulate,
review and implement the National Policy on Labour Migration as well
as establish a database on migrants within and outside Nigeria, and to
formulate and conduct pre-departure training programmes, including
counselling’ (FMLP, 2010: 15). The International Labour Migration Desk
is also charged with facilitating state bilateral employment agreements
with other countries and to facilitate controlled legal labour migration
opportunities for future emigrants. This includes managing the entry
 Nigeria 235

quotas offered to Nigeria by Italy and Spain as a consequence of their

bilateral migration reparation agreements (FMLP, 2010: 15).
The National Agency for the Prohibition of Trafficking in Persons and other
Related Matters (NAPTIP) was established in 2003 by the Trafficking in
Persons (Prohibition) Law Enforcement and Administrative Act Number
24. The government recognizes the growth in irregular migration and
the lack of protection for its more vulnerable citizens who through
scams and insufficient information are charged exorbitant fees that
expose them to further exploitation. (FMLP, 2010: 8). The main objec-
tive of NAPTIP is to coordinate efforts to eliminate trafficking and to
improve and coordinate law enforcement with a range of other parties
including the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Office of the Attorney-General,
NIS, Nigeria Customs Service and the Nigerian Police. NAPTIP also
facilitates victims in custody who wish to bring proceedings on related
offences. In addition, NAPTIP is the coordinating agency for interna-
tional cooperation and prosecution of perpetrators and for the protec-
tion of victims (see NAPTIP, 2003). Nigeria has signed memorandums of
agreement with the United Kingdom and Italy on the repatriation and
readmission of trafficked women and children. (FMLP, 2010: 48–49).
Nigerians in the Diaspora Organization (NIDO) was established in 2000
after the return to civilian rule to act as a global diaspora network for
all Nigerian emigrants. NIDO provides a platform for the diaspora and
aims to coordinate diaspora engagement with Nigeria (Afolayan and
IOM, 2010; de Haas, 2006). Membership is open to all Nigerians in
the diaspora and all Nigerian professional and community organiza-
tions. The two prominent arms of NIDO are Nigerians in Diaspora
Organization Europe and Nigerians in Diaspora Organisation Americas.
The House Committee on Diaspora Affairs is a standing committee of
the House of Representatives. The Committee was established in 2009
by Order XVII Section 144 of the House Standing Orders under the
Honourable Speaker Dimeji Bankole in the 6th National Assembly. The
current chairman of the committee is Honourable Abike Dabiri-Erewa.
The Committee is mandated to:

promote the exchange of Ideas between the home country and

Nigerians in Diaspora;
collect and maintain data on Nigerians in Diaspora from consulates,
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Education, Justices, the Populations
registers, Censuses, Employment agencies and statistics division of
International Organizations and International Census Bureau for
domestic planning and uses;
236 Emigration Nations

initiate policies needed to recognize and harness the potentials of

Nigerians in Diaspora networks and organizations, and assist in the
realization of their agenda, and promote institutional changes to help
public servants collaborate effectively with Diaspora representatives;
participate in dialogues with Governments, regional, and local on
Diaspora matters in their home and host countries (Diaspora
Committee, 2012).

The Nigerian National Volunteer Service (NNVS) established in 2000 is

the main agency under the jurisdiction of the House Committee on
Diaspora Affairs. The NNVS has a remit to facilitate diaspora commu-
nity engagement with the Nigerian state including facilitate volunteer
opportunities and knowledge and skills exchange from Nigerian pro-
fessionals abroad and facilitate state, federal and other institutions to
partner with potential volunteer professionals in the diaspora (NNVS,
2006). In 2005 NNVS initiated a Nigerian Diaspora Day to be held each
25 July and an Annual Diaspora Conference to celebrate individual and
collective contributions of the diaspora to the development of Nigeria
(FMLP, 2010: 55).

Policies
The 1979 ECOWAS Protocol Relating to the Free Movement of Persons,
Residence and Establishment is the most important policy to impact
the lives of Nigerian emigrants in the ECOWAS region. The Protocol
codifies the rights of the citizens of member states in a reciprocal
framework of benefits for all ECOWAS citizens (Afolayan, 1988). The
Protocol guarantees the rights of Nigerian citizens to free entry to any
ECOWAS country for a period of 30 days through an approved port of
entry with a valid passport or ECOWAS Travel Certificate. The ECOWAS
Travel Certificate is a valid travel document available to citizens of any
of the sixteen ECOWAS member states. The Protocol also offers the
right to residency on procurement of a residency card valid for five
years subject to the applicant’s passport or travel certificate validity. It
also gives the right to establish a business subject to admission through
an approved port of entry, valid travel documents, that is, Nigerian
passport or ECOWAS Travel Certificate, procurement of a residence card
as above and the registration of the business with the Corporate Affairs
Commission in accordance with Companies & Allied matters Act of
1990 (NIS, 2011).
The House Committee on Diaspora Affairs outlined above is respon-
sible for two important pieces of legislation that directly relate to the
 Nigeria 237

Nigerian government’s efforts to actively engage its emigrant popula-

tion. The first is the Nigeria Diaspora (Establishment) Commission Bill
2010 and an Act to Amend the Electoral Act 2010.
The Nigeria Diaspora (Establishment) Commission Bill 2010 will estab-
lish the Nigeria Diaspora Commission which aims to engage Nigerians in
the diaspora in the country’s development through policies and projects
that enhance participation. The bill aims to utilize the diaspora’s human
and material resources towards the overall socio-economic, cultural and
political development of Nigeria. The Nigeria Diaspora Commission will
function under the Office of the Presidency with a Governing Board
consisting of a chairman; a representative not below the rank of director
from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the presidency; representatives
from Nigerians in the diaspora are geographically enumerated – that is,
North America (two); Europe (two); Canada (one); Asia/Australia (two);
China (one); Africa (two); South America (one); the Middle East (one)
(Nigeria Diaspora Commission Bill, 2010: 1–2). Part II – Functions of the
Committee lists in detail the cross-cutting items that address govern-
ment diaspora engagement intentions (see Appendix 1 for the full list).
These formalize in legislation some of the functions that came under
NIDO such as the establishment of a database of Nigerians in the dias-
pora (Nigeria Diaspora Commission Bill, 2010: 4–5).
The bill has passed the three readings in the House of Representative and
is now awaiting approval from the Senate (Diaspora Commission, 2012).
The Act to Amend the Electoral Act 2010 seeks to amend the Electoral
Act 2010 to give Nigerian citizens in the diaspora the right to vote dur-
ing general elections. However, this bill was unable to pass its first read-
ing in the House of Representatives. It will be reintroduced in the 7th
National Assembly (Diaspora Commission, 2012). Although Nigerians
do not have the right to external voting many transnational Nigerian
citizens circumvent this if they maintain a home in Nigeria and have
the resources to fly home during elections in time to register and vote.
The lack of external voting rights currently remains a major bone of
contention between the diaspora and the Nigerian state as we will see
in the final section of this chapter.
Dual citizenship for Nigerians derives from the Constitution of the
Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999 (CFRN, 1999). The constitution came
into force at the end of the years of military rule and it has been con-
tested by a range of actors within civil society for ‘lacking inclusiveness,
transparency, diversity, participation, openness, autonomy, account-
ability and legitimacy’ (Adebanwi, 2005: 21). Since the constitution
was promulgated there has been an ongoing review process funded
238 Emigration Nations

and supported by a range of stakeholders including the Nigerian gov-

ernment, non-governmental organizations and civil society organiza-
tions to ensure that the constitution is more equitable and reflective
of the people’s wishes. One of the main identified foci for constitution
reform work is citizenship and residency rights (Abah and Okwori,
2005; Igbuzor, 2005). Under the Constitution of the Federal Republic of
Nigeria 1999 (CFRN, 1999) citizenship can be gained by birth (Chapter
III, Section 25: 1); by registration (Chapter III, Section 26: 1) and by
naturalization (Chapter III, Section 27: 1).
The right to dual citizenship is not explicitly stated in the
constitution – what is stated are the conditions under which those
who attain Nigerian citizenship either by naturalization or by registra-
tion can forfeit their citizenship. There are no conditions of forfeiture
for Nigerians who attain their citizenship by birth as stipulated
in Chapter III, Section 25 of the CFRN 1999 (Adebanwi, 2005: 23;
Ihonvbere, 2000: 356). The actual wording in the Constitution Chapter
III, Section 28: 1–2, states:

Subject to the other provisions of this section, a person shall forfeit

forthwith his Nigerian citizenship if, not being a citizen of Nigeria by
birth, he acquires or retains the citizenship or nationality of a coun-
try, other than Nigeria, of which he is not a citizen by birth.
Any registration of a person as a citizen of Nigeria or the grant of a
certificate of naturalisation to a person who is a citizen of a country
other than Nigeria at the time of such registration or grant shall, if
he is not a citizen by birth of that other country, be conditional upon
effective renunciation of the citizenship or nationality of that other
country within a period of not more than five months from the date
of such registration or grant. (CFRN, 1999)

In practice this means that the right to dual citizenship is granted to

those Nigerians who gained citizenship by birth as stated in Chapter
III, Section 25: 1 (CFRN, 1999). There is ongoing debate about whether
or not this grants those persons who hold dual citizenship the right to
run for office. A recent example is the legal challenge made under these
grounds against the election of Senator Ajimobi of Oyo State in 2011
who holds dual Nigerian and American citizenship (Banjo, 2011).
Two important migration management policy initiatives that will
affect the lives of Nigerian emigrants and future emigrants are the draft
National Migration Policy and draft Labour Migration Policy. The process
of formulating a draft national migration policy begun in 2005 when
 Nigeria 239

Nigeria through the Office of the Special Assistant to the President on

Migration and Humanitarian Affairs requested IOM support to help
develop a national migration policy. This draft policy is awaiting rati-
fication by the National Assembly; however, it is considered very com-
prehensive because it addresses migration and development; migration
and cross-cutting social issues; forced displacement; human rights of
migrants; irregular movement and national security; internal migra-
tion; the national population; organized labour migration; migration
data and statistics and funding for migration management. The draft
also calls for the establishment of an agency to coordinate the different
aspects of migration management (Afolayan and IOM, 2010: 69–70,
and FMLP, 2010: 8–9). The National Commission for Refugees has been
charged with the responsibility of implementing the draft national
migration policy once it is ratified. It is expected to undertake these
duties in close collaboration with other arms of government including
the ones noted above (Afolayan and IOM, 2010: 73–79).
The Labour Migration Policy revised 2010 under the mandate of the
Ministry of Labour and Productivity with the support of the IOM grew
out of a process covering two years (2008–2010) that brought together
a range of government ministries and national Social Partners.2 Its
mission is ‘to provide an appropriate framework at national level to
regulate labour migration; to ensure benefits to Nigeria as a country of
origin, transit and destination; to ensure decent treatment of migrants
and their families, and to contribute to development and national
welfare … To build an effective, responsive and dynamic labour migra-
tion governance system in Nigeria’ (FMLP, 2010: 2). It has three inter-
related broad objectives (FMLP, 2010: 8):

to promote good governance of labour migration;

to protect migrant workers and promote their welfare and that of fami-
lies left behind;
to optimize the benefits of labour migration on development, while
mitigating its adverse impact.

FMLP 2010 outlines in Section 3 detailed measures that would optimize

the benefits of labour migration for development. The proposed policy
measures include (FMLP, 2010: 23–25):

Mainstreaming migration contributions into national development plans

Linking migration and employment
Enhancing skills development to meet national and international needs
240 Emigration Nations

Enhancing the developmental impact of remittances

Facilitating reintegration of returning migrants
Negotiation of bilateral agreements with labour-receiving and -sending
countries
Linking with the pool of expertise in Nigerian transnational communities

Nigeria is signatory to a range of Bilateral Agreements that impact emigrants

and prospective emigrants. These include agreements between the
Government of Nigeria and the Government of Italy (2000) on repa-
triation and regularization; the Government of Spain (2001); and the
Government of Switzerland (2009) (see Afolayan and IOM, 2010: 84–85,
and FMLP, 2010: 45, for a comprehensive list).
The Nigerian government has also introduced a range of initiatives
and mechanisms to attract investments from the diaspora. These
include:

Nigerian Diaspora Investment Fund: this $200 million fund was launched
by the European chapter of NIDO in 2008 and was set to be opera-
tional by 2009. The majority of the fund was to be invested in
Nigerian equities, corporate bonds and investment trusts (Okele et al.,
2008: 45)
Diaspora Wealth Fund: this was announced in 2012 by Olusegun Aganga,
Minister of Trade and Investment, targeting the over $10 billion in
remittances sent by the diaspora. Funds will be used to invest in criti-
cal sectors of the economy (Monk, 2011).
Diaspora Bond: this is due to be launched by the end of 2013 to raise
funds for infrastructure and development projects. The Diaspora
Bond is managed by the Debt Management Office under the Ministry
of Finance. The Bond is targeted at the diaspora and road shows are
planned for Europe, North America, the Middle East and South East
Asia (Reuters, 2011).

Debates on the role of emigrants

History
Nigeria in historical perspective provides an opportunity to trace the
links between internal, regional (south–south) and international migra-
tion and their role in the development of Nigeria’s national story. In this
section I want to outline three important ways in which the movements
of migrants interacted with the story of the making of the modern
Nigerian state. The first is the way that regional emigration and internal
 Nigeria 241

immigration were factors in the growth of hometown associations and

other forms of ethnic association that served the needs of emigrants
away from the homeland. The second is how the spread of migration
routes interrelated with social and economic development processes
promoting national cohesion ‘from below’ (Meagher, 2009). The third
is how the emigration and return of the early cadre of students who had
undergone further training and education outside the African continent
played a key role in the struggle for independence during colonialism.
The legacies of these patterns of emigration continue to reverberate
within Nigeria’s national story.
The growth of migration within Nigeria and beyond led to the
establishment of hometown associations as the institutional interface
between migrants and their place of origin. There are many forms that
these associations take with varying levels of activity. Principal objec-
tives include providing mutual support to sustain emigrants in new
environments and support their kinship ties and commitment to their
homeland; some have a cultural and conviviality focus, some are linked
to certain professions or alumni and still others have a political agenda
for their members and their places of origin (Agbese, 1996; Falola and
Heaton, 2008: 253–254). Hometown associations are translocal and
transnational grass-roots formations that emigrants founded for the
benefit of their members and their places of origin. They are not a top-
down imposition by the state. The development activities of hometown
associations have made an important contribution to nation building.
As Nigeria progressed through the postcolonial era not only did home-
town associations survive ‘the vicissitudes of two civilian regimes and
five military governments’ (Barkan et al., 1991: 461), they continue to
provide and fund basic services to their local and homeland communi-
ties building vital infrastructure including hospitals, schools, postal serv-
ices, utilities, roads and water. As a consequence ‘some have taken on the
form and assumed many of the tasks of local government; in effect, a
“shadow state” with a clear structure of internal governance, one that is
often specified by a written constitution’ (Barkan et al., 1991: 461–462).
Nigeria’s national story is tied to the politics of identity and unity.
This is evidenced by the paradoxical and at times troubled role that
migrants have played in building a national sensibility. The example
I draw on is that of the Igbo diaspora who in response to a range of fac-
tors including demographic dynamics, societal organization, livelihood
and ecological reasons were historically a highly mobile group. They
had the largest ‘stranger’ population within Nigeria and substantial
numbers regionally in Ghana, Cameroun and Fernando Po (Onwubu,
242 Emigration Nations

1975: 403–405). Much has been written about the Igbo as the leading
proponents of a Nigerian nationality. Scholars argue that the identity
Igbo and Nigerian converged because it was in the interests of the Igbo
to promote the unity offered by Nigerian political identity to help coun-
ter and dismantle the barriers to integration cemented in the discrimi-
natory structures of governance inherited from British colonial rule3
(Onwubu, 1975: 411). The Igbo’s long-standing mobility and settlement
patterns throughout Nigeria are cited as an integrative characteristic,
but soon after independence they were ‘caught in the cross-currents of
events that would culminate in the virtual disintegration of the politi-
cal structure’ as Nigeria descended into civil war (Onwubu, 1975: 411).
Meagher offers a complex analysis of the post-civil war Igbo diaspora
to reveal the continuities that the Igbo drew on to build and reaffirm
nationhood (2009). Although during the civil war many Igbo retreated
to their homeland in Eastern Nigeria, Meagher’s empirical research
shows that post civil war many drew on resources, including from the
diaspora that had survived the war, to reinvest in enterprises within
their ethnic homeland and throughout Nigeria. Meagher argues that
Igbo success within the informal economy was not due to ‘an ethni-
cally insular and exclusive strategy … [but] involved the development
of strong inter-ethnic linkages and cooperative relations with other
Nigerian ethnic groups’ (2009: 32). The Igbo’s continued migration
and investment into other regions of Nigeria drew on these histori-
cal linkages to facilitate successful knowledge and resource networks
of cooperation, between Igbo and Hausa traders in businesses as wide
ranging as second-hand clothing into Sahelian countries and the infor-
mal currency exchange business (Meagher, 2009: 38). This reflects the
strength of earlier precolonial and colonial networks and strategies of
cooperation across religious and communal boundaries, ethnic groups
that strengthened ‘Nigerian inter-ethnic cohesion from below, even as
political struggles weaken it from above’ (Meagher, 2009: 34).
Finally, it is also important to consider the role that the early cadre
of student migrants played in the struggle for Nigerian independence.
Many of these students went primarily to Britain and increasingly to
the United States to continue their education at universities and train-
ing colleges. Although the numbers of student migrants during colonial
times were small their aggregate contribution on return was crucial to
the development of what was to become independent Nigeria. The
experience of studying in Britain and the struggle against racial dis-
crimination led to a political alignment with fellow West African stu-
dents and the foundation of the West African Students’ Union (WASU)
 Nigeria 243

in 1925 (2008: 253). WASU was led by the Nigerian Ladipo Solanke and
over time was to become the foremost anti-colonial pressure group cam-
paigning for progress towards independence (Adi, 1998). WASU grew to
include branches in United States and other West African countries. The
United States increasingly became a popular destination for Nigerian
students, particularly as it offered more opportunities to study at the
postgraduate and doctorate level; it was also viewed as more demo-
cratic and egalitarian than the United Kingdom. Many leading Nigerian
nationalists leaders such as Nnamdi Azikiwe gained from this exposure
to new forms of political mobilization. On return to the colonial home-
land many of these graduates were at the forefront of the pan-African
movements that sensitized and mobilized the general population not
only on the value of pan-African solidarity but on their right to inde-
pendent self-rule (Falola and Heaton, 2008: 253–254).

Current situation
Current debates about the role of emigrants in the development of
Nigeria are quite complex. In this section I will highlight these debates
through the tension between government policy initiatives that valor-
ize the diaspora as key development agents and discourses within the
diaspora that encapsulate their scepticism and the obstacles to engage-
ment along the state’s agenda. The brain drain/brain gain discussion as
well as recent contestations about granting Nigerian emigrants the right
to vote highlights these tensions. These counter-debates revolve around
rights, democracy and transparency and the government’s concern
about the positive contribution that Nigerian emigrants should make to
enhance and not harm Nigeria’s image. Lastly, I turn to debates around
the economic benefit that emigrants’ capital transfers in the form of
remittances have made to Nigeria’s development. Remittances which are
often hailed as the proof of the positive contribution that the diaspora
can make towards development are scrutinized from a perspective that
questions the role they play in fundamentally weakening the social con-
tract between Nigeria and her citizens (Obadare and Adebanwi, 2009).
One of the main diaspora engagement policy goals that the Nigerian
government has set is to map and collate a skills database of all
Nigerians in the diaspora. Brain drain in Nigeria is characterized by the
significant loss of skilled professionals as well as students who went
overseas to complete their studies and failed to return due to socio-
economic decline in the country (Adepoju, 2005b: 2; Okeke, 2008
13–14). The government is aware of the high human capital value of
its emigrant community and views the database as a necessary step
244 Emigration Nations

that would enable it to match development needs and gaps to skills in

the diaspora. It is a task that was initially given to NIDO in 2000 but
is now enshrined in the Nigeria Diaspora Commission Bill 2010. The
obstacles to attracting the return of the highly skilled are substantial as
many of the factors that led to brain drain are yet to be addressed. These
include poor working conditions, low wages and prospects for profes-
sional development, lack of research facilities, discrimination in career
progression, weak governance and corruption (Okeke, 2008 14–15).
Increasingly, the discussion has turned to brain gain and brain circula-
tion. Adepoju notes that there are significant levels of brain circulation
regionally (2005b); whilst the remittances sent by these skilled profes-
sionals who live in the richer OECD countries are viewed as an impor-
tant form of capital gain for Nigeria. Some highly skilled migrants are
returning; however, these numbers cannot equal those who have left
and continue to seek emigration opportunities. Accomplished Nigerian
emigrants such as computer scientist Philip Emeagwali have argued
that Nigeria needs to diversify its reliance on oil revenues, invest in the
high technology sector and develop the intellectual capital of the next
generation (Emeagwali, 2003).
The struggle for voting rights has become a benchmark for many in
the diaspora to ascertain the veracity of the Nigerian state in pursuing
diaspora engagement. The current institutional framework to support
emigrants who wish to return or invest in the diaspora is viewed as
weak (This Day, 2011), whilst the failure to deliver external voting for
the presidential elections in 2011 despite an initially favourable legal
judgement in the Nigerian Federal High Court in 2009 increased scepti-
cism about the government’s commitment to diaspora mobilization for
development (Daily Independent, 2009). Government hesitancy and
fears for extending the vote revolve variously around the notion that
the country is not ready because it would be difficult and costly to enact
external voting. Those within the legislature who oppose the Act to
Amend the Electoral Act 2010 are seen as anxious to maintain the sta-
tus quo of regional power balances (This Day 2011). There is opposition
within some sections of the general public and legislature who question
the political motivations and priorities of external voters. There is also
a tension around the near diaspora resident within the region, many of
whom have kin and ethnic ties across highly porous borders. In Nigeria
the right to vote and stand for office guaranteed by the constitution is
in practice overthrown at the local level where candidates are viewed
first as indigenes or settlers rather than for the politics they represent
(Alubo, 2005; Kaza-Toure, 2004). The state is seen as still suffering from
 Nigeria 245

corruption and weak accountability issues that continually come up at

election time with the issue of ‘vote stealing’.
Remittances are the most cited indicator of the potentially trans-
formative role that emigrants could play in the national development
of Nigeria. International non-governmental organizations have been at
the forefront of promoting the role that African emigrants could play in
the development of their countries of origin. The Nigerian government
policies outlined in the previous section illustrate a position that broadly
reflects the ‘diaspora for development nexus’ promoted by other institu-
tional development partners such as the African Development Bank, the
African Union and the EU (European Union, 2011; Ratha et al., 2011).
Nigeria is the top remittance-receiving country in Africa; it is one of the
top ten remittance-receiving countries in the world and in 2010 remit-
tances received were recorded at $10 billion (World Bank, 2011). The
volume of remittances to Nigeria from its emigrants reflects the size of
its diaspora as well as other factors such as the resilience of sociocultural
networks, institutions such as hometown associations and a culture of
remitting – some would say in spite of – not because of the institutional
policies and practices the government has put in place to promote dias-
pora engagement and investment (Hernández-Coss and Bun, 2006).
Obadare and Adebanwi posit that transnational migration and the
growing number of Nigerian citizens who rely on outside grants ‘com-
plicates the socio-political reality in Nigeria … particularly with regard
to its implication for state–citizen relations’ (2009: 502). There is a
degree of opacity in understanding what happens to the state–citizen
relationship when the state is increasingly absent in the life of its citi-
zens and that role is taken by the diaspora, and an over-reliance on out-
side grants characterizes the growing ‘remittance class’. (Obadare and
Adebanwi, 2009: 510–513). The remittance class are the increasingly
large segment of the Nigerian society who look outside the country for
the support, resources and social protection that they need within their
daily lives. There is ambivalence about the nation-state’s reliance on
transnational citizens abroad to fulfil rights and obligations to the citi-
zen that should be the provenance of the state. This potentially weakens
the covenant that should undergird state–citizen relationships (Obadare
and Adebanwi, 2009).

Conclusion

It has been just over fifty years since Nigeria gained independence
from colonial rule. This chapter not only outlines the important role
246 Emigration Nations

emigration played in forming modern-day Nigeria, but the continuing

dynamic interplay between the emigrant community and the nation-
state. The return to civilian rule in 1999 under the premiership of
President Olusegun Obasanjo provided the catalyst for Nigeria to
embark on a proactive approach to diaspora engagement with its citi-
zens that resided overseas. For the first time the Nigerian government
formally recognized the contribution the diaspora was making to devel-
opment and how it could contribute to new democratic institutions
and promote Nigeria’s image overseas. The government’s desire to effec-
tively harness the diaspora through an institutional framework for the
development of Nigeria dovetailed with emigrants’ desire to maintain
their ties with their country of origin and channel effective investment
along a range of capitals – human, social, economic and cultural (Okele
et al., 2008: 12 and 44–45).
Policies from the top down, nevertheless, have to engage with emi-
grants’ own agency towards the homeland. Hometown associations
have historically been powerful institutions for diaspora engagement
and continue in this role. Public debate within the country and amongst
the diaspora revolves around the relevance of diaspora engagement
policy initiatives when the country still needs to strengthen its physi-
cal and governance infrastructure. The lack of access to reliable energy
power, the heavy weight of state bureaucracy and weak governance are
all reasons that hinder harnessing the diaspora for development (Monk,
2011; Okele et al., 2008). The almost stalled progress of the Diaspora
Commission Bill and the Act to Amend the Electoral Act 2010 is viewed
as a further reason to mistrust government commitment to enact these
laws and raises concern about what difference it will actually make if
and when they become law. There is also a suspicion as to what extent
the government’s motivation for embarking on its migration manage-
ment/diaspora engagement legislative agenda is linked to its desire to
improve Nigeria’s image with multilateral stakeholder and regional
bodies such as the World Bank, IOM and the EU (de Haas, 2006: 18–19).
There is a dialectic relationship between Nigerian citizens’ perception
of the possibility of attaining equal access to rights, social mobility and
their decision to migrate. The quote at the start of this chapter from one
of Nigeria’s leading scholars brings this sharply into focus. It illustrates
how unified national identity is seemingly connected to emigration; as
the externally bestowed national identity has more substance than the
mutually constitutive partnership of rights and responsibilities between
a state and its people. The entrenched social inequalities within the
country obscure the relationship of Nigeria towards its citizens and the
 Nigeria 247

rights and obligations of citizens towards Nigeria. As Kraxberger notes,

‘states within the Nigerian federation increasingly serve as “citizenship
containers”, competing with each other and vying with the national
state as a container for the negotiation of citizen obligations, and espe-
cially rights’ (2005: 10). This has led to what some scholars have termed a
progressive erosion of citizenship and the transformation of Nigeria into
a country without a state (Obadare and Adebanwi, 2009; Taiwo, 2004).
Underdevelopment, restricted access to social mobility and systemic cor-
ruption are key migration drivers and impediments to return migration
and diaspora engagement. There is a very real tension if we consider
these interrelated dimensions and ask what do Nigerian state policies
and interventions to engage its emigrant community mean, when within
Nigeria the effectiveness of the state is increasingly in question?

Notes
1. ECOWAS has fifteen member states which are Benin, Burkina Faso, Cabo
Verde, Code d’Ivoire, Gambia, Ghana, Guinee, Guinee-Bissau, Liberia, Mali,
Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone and Togolese. ECOWAS, available via:
http://www.ecowas.int/ [accessed 12/11].
2. Social Partners were officials (government, employers and workers) from
the Federal Ministry of Labour and Productivity, the Nigeria Employers’
Consultative Association, the Trade Union Congress and the Nigeria Labour
Congress. Officials of the EU delegation also provided inputs. The draft also
incorporates issues and concerns identified by the inter-ministerial Technical
Working Group. IOM provided financial assistance for organizing meetings of
the TWG and towards hiring a consultant – Professor Aderanti Adepoju – to
incorporate further comments (FMLP, 2010: 3).
3. British colonial policies of divide and rule are crystallized in the discrimina-
tory codification of rights that favoured ‘indigenes’ over migrants who were
labelled ‘strangers’. The rigid enforcement of separate areas of habitation or
‘strangers quarters’ as they came to be known is one example, the legacy of
which is reflected in the ongoing citizenship crisis that wracks the modern
Nigerian state (see Kraxberger 2005).

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11
Portuguese Emigrants and the
State: An Ambivalent Relationship
José Carlos Marques and Pedro Góis

Since the nineteenth century Portugal has been a country of emigra-

tion. As a result of this continuous outflow, estimates indicate that the
number of Portuguese citizens and their descendants living in another
country is between 2 and 4.8 million. Their main countries of residence
in the Americas are the United States, Brazil, Canada and Venezuela; in
Europe, they live mainly in France, Switzerland and Germany. Taken
together these seven countries host 80 per cent of all Portuguese living
abroad. After a brief description of Portuguese emigration history, with
a special emphasis on current emigration flows and the development
of Portuguese communities in different host countries, the chapter will
analyse the relationships that Portuguese citizens abroad maintain with
their country of origin. Special attention will be given to Portuguese
political institutions and the legal framework built to mould the con-
nections that Portuguese emigrants maintain with the Portuguese State.
As will be shown, the Portuguese State and its political elites have,
particularly in recent decades, manifested discomfort in dealing with
contemporary emigration flows and Portuguese communities abroad.
This attitude towards emigration has led to an ambivalent position held
by both the Portuguese State vis-à-vis Portuguese citizens living in other
countries and emigrants towards their homeland.

History and geography of emigration

At least since the so-called Portuguese discoveries in the fifteenth cen-

tury, Portuguese migration has been intrinsically linked to national
history. Although an ongoing phenomenon, it has seen different types
of flows dictated by international and internal developments that deter-
mine not just how many people emigrate but also their destination.
252
 Portugal 253

In this section, our aim is to present a brief overview of the history of

Portuguese emigration, with particular emphasis on the period from the
1960s onwards.

The transoceanic migratory flow

After the conquest of Ceuta in 1415, emigration came to be seen in
Portuguese society as a ‘historic structural phenomenon’ (Serrão, 1982:
117). Initially, emigration was primarily to colonize, and those leav-
ing the country headed to the lands which were being discovered in
order to populate and defend them. According to Godinho (1971: 28),
there were 100,000 to 150,000 Portuguese living outside the country
in the second half of the sixteenth century. Serrão (1982) separates
this ‘emigratory-colonizing current’ from the later emigratory current
and includes the movements to populate the islands of the Azores and
Madeira (in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries) as well as emigration
to Brazil (up to the end of the eighteenth century) and the African
colonies (mostly after the end of the nineteenth century following the
Berlin Congress (1884–1885)).
In the nineteenth century and early twentieth centuries, large-scale
emigration was seen from the Old to the New World. Though Portugal
(like Italy and Spain) joined this migratory current late (Hatton and
Williamson, 1994: 55), it contributed significantly. The French inva-
sion in the early 1800s and consequent transfer of the royal court to
Brazil, followed by Brazilian independence, resulted in a reduction in
emigration, but Portuguese emigration increased in the second half of
the nineteenth century.
During this first migratory cycle which, with some interruptions,
went on until the 1960s, Portuguese emigration was almost always
synonymous with emigration to Brazil (Serrão, 1982: 41); up to 1949,
Brazil absorbed approximately 80 per cent of Portuguese emigrants and
in the following decade, 68 per cent of those leaving Portugal intended
to go to Brazil. A further destination was the United States which, up
to the First World War, accounted for 18 per cent of those seeking a
basic standard of living which they could not find at home (Baganha,
1995). The demographic and socio-economic characteristics of those
leaving Portugal for overseas destinations can be summarized as follows:
predominantly male emigrants1 aged 20–40, mainly agricultural work-
ers (farmers and agricultural labourers), who were mostly illiterate and
largely from the provinces of Minho, Beira Alta and Trás-Os-Montes,
as well as from the Azores and Madeira (Baganha, 1994a: 961; Serrão,
1982: 123–132).
254 Emigration Nations

This first emigratory wave was interrupted by the outbreak of the First
World War, during which the number of people seeking to emigrate
from Portugal fell significantly. While in the early part of the decade
starting in 1910, legal emigration stood at an average of 66,500 per year,
during the 1914–1918 war this number decreased to 19,500 (Serrão,
1982: 31). Once the war ended, a slow recovery was seen in Portuguese
emigration which was, however, to suffer a new interruption due to the
economic recession of 1929–1930 and the subsequent anti-immigration
measures imposed by the traditional destinations of Portuguese emigra-
tion (Baganha, 1995). The outbreak of the Second World War was to
prolong this reduction.
Between 1860 and 1930 Portuguese emigration policy aimed, as noted
by Maria Baganha (1988; 1990; 1994a), to reconcile the colonial voca-
tion of the country and its contradictory socio-economic needs or,
in other words, the manpower demands of the landlords against the
foreign currency needs of the mercantile and the public sectors. This
emigration policy was characterized by the strategy of selecting the
emigrant family member that could maximize emigrants’ remittances
(typically male emigrants that left their families behind) without lead-
ing to a mass exodus of the rural population and was enforced by
legal–administrative restrictions and the social marginalization of the
emigrant (Baganha, 1988).
From 1930 to 1960, during the authoritarian Estado Novo regime,
there were two identifiable phases in Portuguese emigration policy.
During the first phase (1933–1946) the state controlled departures in a
clear expression of its authoritarian ideology to subordinate ‘individual
rights to the collective interest’ (Baganha, 2003a: 4). Thus state inter-
vention in the economy and the development of a number of public
works projects was backed up by a labour force whose rights to exit the
country were severely restricted if the destination was not the colonies
in Africa.
During the second phase, in the 1950s, the Portuguese State progres-
sively changed its attitude towards migratory outflows. Aware that the
growing population could not be meaningfully directed to the coun-
try’s colonies in Africa, ‘the government tolerated the formation and
development of a new migratory current to Europe, and the spread of
channels of information and of support, within the parameters legally
defined in the previous period’2 (Baganha, 2003a: 5). At the same time
new migratory movements towards the United States and Brazil were
reactivated, mostly due to family reunification and the use of previous
migratory networks. Once the Second World War ended Portuguese
 Portugal 255

emigration resumed and, as before, a preference was seen for Brazil

that, up to 1952, increased progressively in both absolute and relative
terms. In 1952, 87.6 per cent of all emigrants were heading to Brazil,
while European destinations accounted for only 1.8 per cent (Baganha
and Marques, 2001).

The intra-European migratory flow

Though Brazil continued to be the main destination of Portuguese emi-
grants until 1962, many were drawn to the industrialized countries of
northern Europe after 1952. This gradual fall in numbers of emigrants
to Brazil was partly due to ‘restrictive immigration measures passed
into Brazilian law in the early 1960s’ (Almeida and Barreto, 1970: 227).
A further factor was the economic development being experienced by
the industrialized countries of Europe with which Portugal had estab-
lished a series of immigration agreements.3
From the 1960s, Portugal started to play an ever-increasing role in
the process of labour transfer from southern Europe to the industrial-
ized north. This was the start of what Joel Serrão refers to as the ‘French
cycle’ (in Ferreira, 1976: 105), given the predominance of emigration
to France during this period. After the devastation of the Second World
War, Europe went through a period of economic expansion and needed
ever greater numbers of low-skilled workers to fill the needs of its manu-
facturing sectors. Despite a late arrival to intra-European emigration,
Portuguese emigration reached unprecedented levels during the 1960s
and 1970s. Between 1962 (the year in which France first appeared as the
main destination for Portuguese emigration4) and 1973, approximately
1 million people left Portugal for other European countries, an annual
average of 85,523. The main destinations were France (81.7 per cent)
and Germany (16.6 per cent) (Baganha, 1994a: 975).
When it proved to be impossible to emigrate legally, the only alter-
native was to do so illegally. It is estimated that in the 1960s, clan-
destine emigration accounted for one-third of all emigration and that
between 1969 and 1972, illegal emigrants outnumbered legal emigrants
(Baganha, 1994a: 974).
During the period of intra-European emigration, the Portuguese gov-
ernment sought to articulate the workforce needs of the country with its
African interests and with the advantages it enjoyed through the place-
ment of workers on the international labour market (Baganha, 1994b).
From the 1950s, the Portuguese government adopted an increasingly
liberal5 attitude, the aim of which was to not only export excess num-
bers of workers, but also guarantee the sending of ‘foreign capital and
256 Emigration Nations

earnings’ back to Portugal (Leeds, 1983: 1032), to promote Portuguese

industrial development. In this way, however, the Portuguese New
State lost the mechanisms to control the number of people leaving the
country, which mainly operated through the ‘provisions relating to the
concession of passports’ (Rocha-Trindade, 1981: 77) that, as mentioned,
had the effect of producing an enormous flow of illegal emigrants.
Along with this intra-European migratory current, there was also
a further movement which included Canada, the United States and
Brazil. The characteristics of this flow are quite specific, however (espe-
cially with regard to the United States and Canada), as it originated
mainly in the Azores and Madeira. Between 1965 and 1978, 61 per cent
of legal emigrants to Canada and 56 per cent of those going to the United
States were from the Azores Islands, mainly the districts of Ponta Delgada
and Angra do Heroísmo (Guerreiro, 1981: 42), which maintained their
transoceanic migration after the post-war resumption of migration.
The district of Funchal (Madeira) also saw high levels of emigration,
especially in the 1950s. However, the main destination in this case was
Venezuela; between 1965 and 1978, 70 per cent of those who emigrated
from Funchal went to Venezuela, which represented 57.1 per cent of all
Portuguese emigrants going to that country.
It is also interesting to note that during this period migration to the
overseas colonies continued.6 Between 1950 and 1969, an average of
30,000 emigrants per year went to overseas territories. However, this
emigration was offset by a high level of return (on average 20,000
per year), which ran contrary to the official policy of populating the
Portuguese colonies (Ferreira, 1976: 198). Emigration to the colonies
was mainly to Angola and Mozambique, ‘the only colonies for populat-
ing’ (Ferreira, 1976: 115).

Portuguese emigration after 1973–1974

The intra-European flow described above was to be interrupted by the
oil, economic and financial crises of the 1970s, which were accom-
panied by a reduction in the demand for labour in the industrialized
countries of Europe and by the consequent implementation of restric-
tive immigration policies which were aimed not only at decreasing the
numbers of foreigners entering those countries, but also promoting the
return of those who were already there. This unfavourable economic
and political environment was to decisively influence the number of
Portuguese emigrants which, between the end of the 1970s and the
mid-1980s, never rose above 30,000 per year (Baganha and Peixoto,
1997: 16). This is despite high migratory potential during this period,
 Portugal 257

aggravated by the return of 471,427 individuals from the former

Portuguese colonies (Pires, 2003: 200).
The decline in emigratory flow was accompanied by a perceptible
change in the type of emigrant. Between 1978 and 1985 high numbers
of family members left the country as opposed to those merely emigrat-
ing for work opportunities; there was also an increase in the number
of those returning to their countries of origin (Baganha, 1993: 825).
According to estimates made by Poinard (1983) for the 1960–1980
period and by Manuela Silva and colleagues (1984) for the 1980–1985
period, 25,000 to 30,000 and 42,000 Portuguese emigrants, respectively,
returned per year. Along with these changes in Portuguese migration,
the appearance of new destinations and the development of a new type
of temporary migrant were the main features of this migration flow.
These new destinations included several Arab countries in the Middle
East (e.g. Kuwait, Iraq or Saudi Arabia), where the recruitment of work-
ers was based on contracts for specific projects (in the construction and
public works sectors) at the end of which the workers would return to
Portugal (Medeiros, 1985: 177). This new type of migratory flow has
continued up to now.
The revival in the outflow of Portuguese nationals took place after the
mid-1980s and was characterized by three main elements: a transforma-
tion of the institutional context in which it occurs, the emergence of
new forms of migration and the development of new countries of des-
tination. At the institutional level, when Portugal become a member of
the European Economic Community (EEC) in 1986 new conditions were
created for the circulation of Portuguese workers (and, incidentally, to a
certain invisibility of the emigration movements because official statis-
tics on exits to other European countries, based on the issue of a pass-
port, ceased in 1988). In 1992 Portuguese nationals gained access to a
European space in which the free movement of people was possible. This
seemed to create adequate conditions for a recovery of the outflow of
Portuguese citizens mainly directed towards the countries that, until the
abrupt halt of the early 1970s, were the main destinations of Portuguese
emigrants. Data on the entrance of Portuguese in some countries of des-
tination provided by Baganha (1993), Peixoto (1993) and Baganha and
Peixoto (1997) show that between 1985 and 1990, Portugal registered an
increased frequency of exits (on average 33,000 individuals per year left
the country during this period) which, nevertheless, were substantially
lower than those recorded during preceding decades.
Another indicator of the growth in the external mobility of Portuguese
could be revealed through the analysis of the evolution of the stock of
258 Emigration Nations

Portuguese nationals residing in other European countries. Table 11.1

shows a continuous increase of Portuguese citizens living in seven
selected European countries, mainly after 1985. This increase is expli-
cable not only by the natural increase of the emigrants already living
there but also by new migratory movements.
The impressive increases (in absolute terms and in percentage) recorded
in countries in which the presence of Portuguese nationals was, until the
1980s, nearly insignificant indicate that from that time Portuguese emi-
gration found alternative destinations to the traditional receiving coun-
tries of national labour forces. The cases of Switzerland and Andorra are
particularly illustrative of the creation and consolidation of new migra-
tory destinations; in both, the Portuguese became the most significant
foreign community in a relatively short period of time.7
To the outflows of more permanent character mentioned above, we
have to add an important flow of temporary exits. Exact numbers are
difficult to calculate, however. For example, to Switzerland there were
around 33,000 annual temporary exits during the 1980s and 1990s
(reaching a maximum of 50,000 in 1990). Since these exits were tem-
porary, it would be inaccurate to state that the number of migrants cor-
responded to the overall number of temporary exits during this period.
In fact, many of the exits were made by the same migrant in successive
years. In the Swiss case, for example, these temporary stays outside
the country of origin were repeated, generally, until the fulfilment of

Table 11.1 Portuguese nationals living in selected European countries, 1981–2006

1981 1985 1990/1 1995 2000/1 2005 2010a

Andorrab 1.304 1.731 3.951 6.885 6.748 11.294 13.100

Germanyc, d 109.417 77.000 92.991 125.100 133.700 115.606 113.208
Belgiumc 10.482 9.500 16.538 23.900 25.600 27.373 29.802
Spainc, e 24.094 23.300 33.268 37.000 42.000 66.236 142.520
Luxembourgf 28.069 – 39.100 51.500 58.450 67.800 79.800
United – – – 30.000 58.000 73.000 102.000
Kingdomc
Switzerlandg 16.587 30.851 85.649 134.827 134.675 180.765 221.641
Total 189.953 142.382 271.497 409.212 459.199 542.074 702.071

Sources: (a) Observatório da Emigração (http://www.observatorioemigracao.secomunidades.

pt); (b) Ministeri de Justícia i Interior (Andorra) [http://estudis-estadistica.finances.ad/
indexdee.htm (accessed 18/01/2008)]; (c) SOPEMI, several years; (d) Statistische Bundesamt
Deutschland, Statistische Jahrbuch, several years; (e) Instituto Nacional de Estadística.
Series anuales Padrón Municipal de habitantes (several years); (f) Service central de la sta-
tistique et des études économiques (STATEC); (g) Bundesamt für Migration, Ausländer- und
Asylstatistik, 2009/2.
 Portugal 259

the necessary conditions to earn a more permanent residence permit

(Marques, 2008).
The relevance of temporary migrations is equally visible in the move-
ment directed towards France, a traditional destination of permanent
Portuguese migrants within Europe, rising from approximately 3,000 in
1976 to 14,719 in 1989, and to 16,568 in 1991 (data from IOM quoted
in Ruivo, 2001: 160). A substantial number of these short-term migrants
were later included in the 15,368 permanent workers registered by
the service of the Office des Migrations Internationales (ONI) and the
Institut Nationale D’Études Démographiques (INED) (Ruivo, 2001: 161).
As in the 1960s and early 1970s, in the 1980s and 1990s the Portuguese
continued to migrate mainly to European countries though other coun-
tries were also chosen (e.g. Canada, Australia, the United States or South
Africa). There has been, however, a change in the importance of differ-
ent host countries in Europe. Switzerland replaced France as the main
region of attraction. Since the end of the 1970s the Portuguese migratory
flow to Switzerland was only interrupted in 1983 and after the economic
crisis of 1991. As a result, the stock of Portuguese nationals8 increased
until 1996, followed by a phase of stagnation. In 2010 the stock of
Portuguese citizens in Switzerland was constituted by 221,641 individu-
als holding a residence permit or an annual permanence permit.
To these transformations in the Portuguese emigratory landscape it is
necessary to add the development of new migration types that resulted
directly from Portugal’s membership in the European Union (EU)
(Ramos and Diogo, 2003).
The movement of posted workers assumed a particular relevance in
this context. Since the freedom of rendering services in the countries
of the then European Community did not require the same period
of transition that applied to the free movement of Portuguese work-
ers (1 January 1992), thousands of detached workers moved initially
towards construction sites in southern France and the surroundings of
Paris (Eichhorst, 1998: 157). In a second phase this type of movement
increased and was directed above all to construction sites in Germany
and especially Berlin. This type of migratory outflow was substantially
different from traditional forms of Portuguese emigration due to the
fact that Portuguese companies acted as subcontractors of big German
construction companies and used free movement within the European
space to their advantage by promoting the mobility of Portuguese
workers. This allowed Portuguese construction companies working in
Germany to take advantage of the differential in labour costs between
Portuguese and German workers (Baganha and Cavalheiro, 2001).
260 Emigration Nations

The exact number of Portuguese involved in the movement towards

building sites in Germany is difficult to establish given their absence
from any register system based either on their participation in the
labour market or in the German social security. According to data pre-
sented by Worthmann (2003), the number of Portuguese workers posted
in Germany in 1997 was 21,919, representing 12.1 per cent of all posted
workers and 40.1 per cent of posted workers coming from an EU coun-
try. Therefore, the Portuguese were the largest group of posted workers
from an EU member country. According to some sources, these figures
only refer to posted workers in a regular situation and did not include
around 35,000 Portuguese working as irregular posted workers (Gago
and Vicente, 2002: 212).
By the end of the 1990s this temporary movement of Portuguese
workers (accomplished through national companies) seemed to enter
a decline due to German legislation, which imposed stricter labour
conditions that made the detachment of workers less profitable for
Portuguese companies, and to the reduction of the total volume of con-
struction work in Germany.

The current situation

At the beginning of the twenty-first century migratory outflows of
construction workers spread to other European countries. Portuguese
construction workers were posted to the Netherlands, Ireland, Spain
and other European countries by Portuguese construction firms because
workers employed in a foreign firm can keep contributing to their own
national social security system, thus keeping the cost of their labour
lower than that of national workers or registered immigrants. Data on
recent flows are very scanty and have sometimes only become visible
with the emergence of problems connected with contract disputes or
workers’ poor living conditions.
During the 2000s and mainly since 2005, it is possible to observe
a new upsurge in the outflow of Portuguese citizens. Though data on
this increase does not capture its entirety, the available evidence sug-
gests that in addition to the destination countries mentioned above,
the emigration flow is heading towards destinations until now only
marginally regarded as possible host countries for Portuguese migrants.
The most visible case is Angola. The number of registered Portuguese
emigrants increased from 156 in 2006 to 23,787, in 2009. There are cur-
rently around 90.000 Portuguese citizens living in Angola.9 This devel-
opment is particularly significant since Angolans are one of the main
immigrant communities in Portugal, thus confirming the existence of
 Portugal 261

a multi-centred lusophone migration system that we have elaborated

elsewhere (Góis and Marques, 2009). This lusophone migration system is
made of diverse migration flows that bind Portuguese-speaking countries
and is able to combine different levels of centres that link other migra-
tion systems. It is in this lusophone migration system that Portugal’s
semi-peripheral role becomes evident, as it can be simultaneously or suc-
cessively a core and/or a peripheral country, thus attracting immigrants
and/or sending emigrants from/to the countries participating in this and
adjacent migration systems (Góis and Marques, 2009: 43–44).
In this lusophone migration system, Brazil has also recently emerged
as a renewed emigration country for Portuguese citizens. Data on this
movement are not sufficient to describe the current state of the flow
since 2000 Portuguese citizens no longer need a visa to enter Brazil
due to the Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Consultation signed
between Portugal and Brazil. Some anecdotal information could, how-
ever, be used to illustrate the development of the Portuguese commu-
nity in Brazil. Data from the Brazilian Ministry of Justice indicate that
more than 52,000 Portuguese citizens regularized their situation during
the first semester of 2011 (data cited in Jornal de Negócios, 5 December
2011). The same source reveals that in June 2011, 328,856 Portuguese
were living legally in Brazil. The data from Portuguese consulates in
Brazil show a slightly higher number of Portuguese residents in Brasil.10
According to these data the stock of Portuguese citizens registered in
one of the Portuguese consulates increased from 493,227 in 2008 to
524,847 in 2009 and to 552,264 in 2010.11 Albeit incomplete, these
numbers suggest a clear rise in Portuguese emigration to Brazil that, like
the flow to Angola, reversed the migratory movements that took place
during the 1990s and early years of the twenty-first century.
More traditional migration destinations like Switzerland, France,
Luxembourg and the United Kingdom continue to receive significant
numbers of Portuguese citizens adding to already significant Portuguese
communities in these countries.
As a result of the migratory flows described so far Portuguese commu-
nities developed in several countries. The most numerically significant
communities can be found in the United States, Brazil, and, in Europe,
in France, Switzerland, Germany, the United Kingdom and Luxembourg
(Table 11.2). Taken together these seven countries account for more
than 70 per cent of all Portuguese living in a foreign country.
To sum up this description of Portuguese outflows it is possible to
state that the migratory movements that took place after the mid-1980s
demonstrated a new pattern. If analysed together, this contemporary
262 Emigration Nations

Table 11.2 Portuguese citizens living abroad

(selected countries)

Country Number

Germany 113,260**
Spain 140,870*
France 492,502**
Luxembourg 80,000*
United Kingdom 95,000*
Switzerland 196,168**
Brazil 337,304*
United States 176,323**
South Africa 77,139*
Angola 74,600*
Rest of the World 221,789
Total 2,004,955

Notes: *2009; **2008.

Source: http://www.observatorioemigracao.
secomunidades.pt/np4/home.html.

pattern is characterized by the coexistence of new migratory forms

and more classic migratory movements (Baganha, 1993; Baganha and
Peixoto, 1997; Peixoto, 1993). The development of different forms of
short-term migratory outflows, as well as the frequent lack of distinc-
tion between permanent and temporary movements (Peixoto, 1993:
68), appears in this context as the most distinctive feature of the trans-
formation in Portuguese external migratory movements. These are
often hybrid movements where a permanent stay is obtained through
the reiteration of temporary movements and through longer stays than
those allowed by the migrants permanence permit

Institutions and policies

The legal and institutional framework of Portuguese emigration is, in

very broad terms, marked by an evolution from the subordination of
the freedom to emigrate to the national interest (during the authori-
tarian Estado Novo Regime) to the inscription of the right to emigrate
in the national Constitution of 1976 (article 44). To summarize these
developments is a daunting task that goes well beyond the objectives of
the present chapter. Therefore we will limit our analysis to the develop-
ments that, in our view, have most impacted upon the relation of the
Portuguese State with its emigrant communities.
 Portugal 263

At the institutional level the creation in 1947 of the Junta de

Emigração (Emigration Committee) by Decree Law nº 30: 558 of 28
October aimed to implement and coordinate the emigration policies
inscribed in that law (Baganha, 2003a). This Committee was affiliated
to the Interior Minister thus indicating that emigration was seen as a
political matter to be managed centrally (Pereira, 2004). The Emigration
Committee was responsible for all questions connected with Portuguese
emigration (article 1), such as the issuing of passports to emigrate,
dealing with recruitment offers made by foreign enterprises, managing
emigration and assuring the protection of the emigrant (Pereira, 2004;
Ribeiro, 1986).
In 1970 this Committee was replaced by the National Secretariat of
Emigration (Secretariado Nacional da Emigração), which became affiliated
with the Presidency of the Council of Ministers (Decree Law nº 402/70 of
22 August). This change was accompanied by new competences, mainly
intended to promote the maintenance of the relationships between
emigrant and home country (Santos, 2004: 36). Though only created
in 1970, in 1972 the government enacted two laws that reorganized
and regulated the new organ responsible for handling with emigration
issues12 (Santos, 2004: 36). Despite its updated remit, this governmental
institution continued to focus on protecting emigrants in their host
countries and guaranteeing the flow of remittances through the first
half of the 1970s.
With the re-establishment of democracy in Portugal in 1974, the
Secretariat of Emigration became the State Department of Emigration
affiliated first to the Ministry of Labour and then, after 12 July 1975,
to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs where it remains. This move to the
Foreign Affairs Ministry was justified in order to strengthen the inter-
vention of the Department of Emigration on behalf of the emigrant
community by using the ‘facilities inherent to the diplomatic status and
the existent structures of the Foreign Affairs Ministry’13 (Decree Law nº
367/75, 12 July, cited in Santos, 2004: 42).
From 1978 on there was a perceptible change in the relationship
between the Portuguese State and its citizens living in a foreign coun-
try; the programme of the IV Constitutional Government stated the
necessity of giving ‘an especial attention to the issue of schooling, the
cultural support and information to the emigrants, without forgetting
the constant need to improve the performance of the various public
services which are intended to them’ (Program of the IV Constitutional
Government, cited in Santos, 2004: 49). Portuguese citizens living
abroad also became entitled to representation in the Portuguese
264 Emigration Nations

parliament through the election of deputies from the emigration circle

(see below).14
In 1980 the State Department of Emigration became the State Depart-
ment of Emigration and Portuguese Communities,15 thus reinforcing the
state’s effort to strengthen its relationship with citizens living in another
country and to integrate them into Portuguese society (Santos, 2004:
51). By the end of the 1980s the State Department of Emigration and
Portuguese Communities became the State Department of Portuguese
Communities and Consular Matters. This transformation indicated not
only new competencies but also an effort to consolidate the principal
institutions dealing with emigrant communities under the same author-
ity (Santos, 2004: 67).
In order to promote the links between emigrants and homeland and to
assign them a more active role in decisions on emigration and Portuguese
communities abroad, the government created the Council of Portuguese
Communities16 (Conselho das Comunidades Portuguesas) in 1980. As
noted by Aguiar, this Council ‘was, historically, the first experience of
institutional listening and dialogue between the Portuguese govern-
ment and its emigrants and diaspora’ (2009: 257). The Council has a
consultative role in advising the government in all matters related to
emigration and Portuguese communities abroad. In 1988 this Council
was deactivated but reappeared in 1996,17 with a modification in the
process of election of its members; from 1980 to 1988 its representatives
were elected by the association of emigrants but from 1996 they were
elected by those Portuguese citizens registered with the Consulate.
The return of the Council was marked by a different orientation. It
was now conceived as an institution directed towards both the country
of origin and the countries of accommodation. In the country of origin,
it was intended to act as a promoter of the anxieties and aspirations of
Portuguese emigrants on behalf of the Portuguese authorities. In the
country of destination, it was meant to promote a dialogue between
the Portuguese and the institutions and authorities of the host country.
In a speech delivered at the first meeting of this Council after its re-
emergence, the Portuguese president clearly expressed this double ori-
entation that should guide the Council by encouraging all Portuguese
living abroad to participate in the political and social sphere of the host
country without, however, forgetting their sense of origin or attenuat-
ing the ties that link them to the homeland (Aguiar, 2009).
Though the history of the Council of Portuguese Communities is
marked by diverse tensions among its own members, between its mem-
bers and the government and by judicial processes and appeals,18 it
 Portugal 265

remains an effort to extend democratic participation to Portuguese liv-

ing abroad and a means of including emigrants in the decisions regard-
ing the policies that affect them (Aguiar, 2009: 259–260).
Since the Portuguese revolution of 1974, the policy of national govern-
ments towards Portuguese citizens living abroad has included a continu-
ous organization, support and funding for the teaching of Portuguese
language and culture to emigrant children.19 From the beginning this
state support was managed by an office of the Ministry of Education;
from 1 February 2010 on the Teaching of Portuguese Abroad system was
coordinated by the Institute Camões.20 In the academic year 2009/2010
almost 84,000 students were registered on one of the 5,680 Portuguese
Language and Culture courses offered in Europe, Africa and Northern
America (data cited in Instituto Camões, 2010).
Apart from these state mechanisms to promote a link between the
Portuguese abroad and their homeland, it is also necessary to refer to
other institutions that play an active role in the maintenance of this
relationship. Among them, the most important are the Portuguese
Catholic Missions abroad. These religious institutions try to deliver the
same religious services to the Portuguese emigrants as they enjoyed at
home. In 2002, the Portuguese Catholic Mission had 178 Portuguese
priests abroad, who, together with 259 priests from the several countries
of residence, gave spiritual assistance to Portuguese abroad. Their activi-
ties, however, go beyond the celebration of masses in the place of emi-
grants’ residence. They also work as a link between migrants and their
original communities. This is particularly evident in central moments
of emigrants’ religious life (for instance, baptisms and marriages), in
which the organization of the whole religious process in the country of
residence and the accomplishment of the act in the country of origin
constitutes a quite regular practice of the migrating communities (espe-
cially for those residing in European countries).
Finally, one last remark about the social organizations that are wide-
spread among the Portuguese emigrant community. There are differ-
ent types of organizations and, generally, their main objective is the
maintenance of the migrants’ culture of origin and the development of
a collective identity among the emigrants residing in a certain region.
They also function as a double mediator: first, between the migrants
and official Portuguese institutions (such as embassies and consulates);
second, between the Portuguese abroad and the social, cultural and
political context of the host country. These associations are, however,
very fragmented and disparate, and are not always integrated into an
overarching institutional framework, like federations of associations. In
266 Emigration Nations

spite of being one of the most visible institutional forms signalling the
presence of a Portuguese community abroad, these associations have
not yet been sufficiently studied, and their role as places for the produc-
tion of transnational activities should not, in our opinion, be neglected.

Policies
Voting rights of Portuguese living abroad
As mentioned above, Portuguese citizens living abroad have had the
right to elect deputies to the Portuguese parliament since 1978. The
voting rights of Portuguese citizens living abroad are thus, apart from
some particularities, similar to the entitlements of Portuguese living in
Portugal.21 These particularities have to do mainly with the necessity
of the existence of real links to the national community if enrolled for
voting after 31 December 1996 (Costa, 2000: 190). Portuguese enrolled
in the voting census abroad22 are considered as voters for the national
parliament and are also eligible to stand for election to this parliament.
These voters are grouped in two electoral circles: the circle of Europe
and the circle outside of Europe. Each of these electoral circles elects two
members of parliament. Therefore, during electoral campaigns, candi-
dates often visit national communities abroad, mainly those residing in
European countries.
The participation of Portuguese nationals living abroad in the Portuguese
presidential elections has been a controversial issue for a long time and
was only made possible in 1997, after a negotiated revision of the
national constitution.23 In the newly written article, no. 121, the legis-
lature stated the regulation of this voting right should bear in mind that
voting citizens should have an effective link with the national commu-
nity.24 In 2000, the legal framework for the election of the President of
the Republic was changed (Organic Law no. 3/2000, from 24 August)
and the requirement of an effective link was no longer deemed neces-
sary (Costa, 2000: 191).
As far as the local and regional elections are concerned (article 239,
no. 2, of the Portuguese Constitution), the participation of Portuguese
residing abroad is not allowed because the elections for local and
regional assemblies are limited to citizens enrolled in the census of the
respective territorial area (Costa, 2000: 192).
In spite of the voting rights that Portuguese residing abroad are enti-
tled to, it is important to notice that their participation rates in the
national elections (both parliamentary and presidential) are relatively
low. In fact, considering the number of Portuguese citizens living in
other countries, not only is enrolment for voting very small (around
 Portugal 267

190,000), but also the participation rates of the enrolled population

are also reduced (around 24 per cent, between the 1995 and 2005 elec-
tions, 15 per cent in the last elections for the Portuguese parliament,
and 10 per cent in the last presidential elections25). There are some
variations among the different Portuguese communities around the
world that should be pointed out. First, Portuguese residing in other
European countries represent, on average, slightly less than 50 per cent
of the total Portuguese citizens abroad enrolled for voting, whereas the
Portuguese that live in an American country (mostly the United States
and Brazil) represent the other 50 per cent of enrolled voters. If we focus
on those that live in another European country, it is possible to note
that the traditional countries of destination of the Portuguese emigrants
(France and Germany) have the highest percentages of those enrolled
for voting in Europe (on average, between 1995 and 2009, 69.0 per cent
and 13.0 per cent, respectively), but also that more recent countries
of destination (such as Switzerland) show an important percentage of
enrolled emigrants (around 6 per cent of the total).
Looking at voting rates, Portuguese residing in Switzerland are,
together with those residing in Germany, the ones that take a more
active part in the exercise of their voting rights with respective partici-
pation rates of 30 per cent and 40 per cent of enrolled voters.

Possibility of access to dual citizenship

For centuries, Portuguese nationality law has been based on the prin-
ciple of jus soli, thus limiting the acquisition of nationality by birth to
children born in a Portuguese territory.26 Children born in a foreign
country could acquire Portuguese citizenship by will (declared person-
ally if of adult age or by their legal agent if underage) (Baganha and
Sousa, 2006: 440). The law in force when Portugal witnessed its major
emigration flows limited the possibility of dual citizenship, terminating
Portuguese nationality if an emigrant voluntarily acquired a foreign
nationality (Base XVIII, of Law 2098, from 29 July 1959) (the same was
true for a Portuguese woman marrying a foreign citizen, except if she
did not acquire the husband’s nationality or if, before the marriage, she
declared that she intended to keep her Portuguese nationality). If the
acquisition of foreign citizenship was directly or indirectly imposed by
the Portuguese citizen’s state of residence, the decision on the main-
tenance or loss of the Portuguese citizenship was determined by the
Council of Portuguese Ministers.
In 1981 the state made profound modifications to its Nationality Law
(Law 37/81 of 3 October).27 Under this law jus soli lost importance as a
268 Emigration Nations

criterion for the acquisition of nationality at birth and a greater impor-

tance was attributed to ius sanguinis. Children of Portuguese emigrants
born abroad thus acquire their father’s or mother’s citizenship even if
they reside in a foreign country, it being sufficient to register the new-
born in the Portuguese civil register (Baganha and Sousa, 2006: 445).
In terms of the possibility of access to dual citizenship this nationality
act abolished the automatic loss of Portuguese citizenship and states
that Portuguese citizens that acquire another nationality only lose
Portuguese nationality if they declare that they do not want to be
Portuguese.
As mentioned by Baganha and Sousa (2006) the introduced changes
were a result of the historical and political context that came in force
after the 1974 revolution and a new attitude towards its emigrant popu-
lation aimed at maintaining the links of Portuguese living abroad with
their home country.
It was this new perception of Portugal as a small European territory and
an emigrant population estimated at more than 4 million people that
led the main political forces, both those in power and in the opposi-
tion, to pass a law that had as a key objective to facilitate the right
to Portuguese nationality of emigrants and their descendants spread
around the world. “(...) the legislators’ concern in facilitating the acqui-
sition of Portuguese nationality by all members of the communities of
Portuguese descent across the world, went even further. It allowed for
dual nationality and reacquisition of nationality by all those who had
lost it through previous legislation, or as a result of voluntary acquisi-
tion of a foreign nationality or due to marriage.” (Baganha and Sousa,
2006: 449).

Other relations of the Portuguese nation-state with its citizens

living abroad
It is also worth mentioning the financial relations that the nation-
state directly or indirectly promotes with Portuguese nationals living
abroad. These relations are mainly linked to the remittances that emi-
grants send to Portugal every year. Since 1997 Portuguese emigrants
have sent around 3 billion euros to Portugal every year. Emigrants in
France and Switzerland are responsible for almost 60 per cent of these
remittances.
The importance of remittances in the development of the Portuguese
economy is a long-standing reality and had been recognized by several
academics analysing the relationship that the Portuguese State main-
tains with its emigrants and the development of politics to control the
 Portugal 269

emigration flow (Baganha, 1994a; Baganha, 2003a; 2003b). In order

to guarantee the flow of remittances the Portuguese State allowed the
creation of a bank account specifically for emigrants that until recently
offered better interest rates than those available to Portuguese living in
Portugal.

Debates on the role of emigrants

As mentioned at the beginning of this chapter, Portuguese emigrants

at the turn of the nineteenth century and during most of the twenti-
eth century were regarded as a source of remittances necessary for the
industrialization and development of the country through successive
policies aimed at controlling emigration. Political debates, therefore,
were mainly about the need to protect emigrants from discrimination
in the host country and on measures to conciliate the country’s colonial
strategy and the conflicting needs of different Portuguese elites (land-
lords, commercial bourgeoisie and the public sector).
More recent emigration flows (developed after the 1980s) were framed
by a political discourse that tried to undervalue the existence of
Portuguese outflows. The end of official data on the emigration of
Portuguese citizens in 198828 made it increasingly difficult to produce
a reliable account of the number of persons migrating after that date
and contributed, therefore, to making emigration almost imperceptible
to mass media, politicians and researchers. The lack or, at least, the
invisibility of migratory outflows led the Portuguese government to
officially declare the end of Portuguese emigration flows at the begin-
ning of the 1990s.29
Bedazzled by the political, economic and symbolic importance of
being part of the European Community, the persistence of migratory
outflows appeared, from the point of view of the political elite, an
‘embarrassing fact’ (Baganha and Góis, 1998/1999). The inclusion of
the country among the most developed countries of Europe should, in
their neoclassical economic analysis, lead to the development of migra-
tory patterns similar to those observed in such countries. That is, by
becoming part of a central region it was expected that Portugal should
start to receive immigrants from less developed countries and that,
if not already extinguished, emigration was at least in an accelerated
process of extinction. The outflow of Portuguese workers thus appeared
to be a theoretical anomaly, not justifiable by economic imbalances
between countries belonging to the same economic space, but for
reasons that had nothing to do with strict economic calculations30
270 Emigration Nations

(Marques, 2010). At the time the discourse on the end of Portuguese

emigration seemed to gain ground among the political elite and the
scientific community, Portugal discovered a new migratory reality
which conformed much more to the idea of a ‘developed country’. The
growth of immigration flows observed after the mid-1980s led, in the
absence of sufficient information on exits, to the continuous repetition
of the announcement of the migratory transition thesis. The assertion
that the country was no longer an emigration country and had become
a country of immigration was commonly held during this period and
was scientifically legitimized through the publication in 1991 of a book
actually entitled ‘Portugal, country of immigration’ (Esteves, 1991).
The significant evolution of the foreign resident population during
the 1980s and 1990s – increasing from 58,091 in 1980 to 190,896 in
1999 – justified the prominence given to this migratory movement by
scientific researchers, politicians and public opinion in general. At the
political level the idea of an immigration country was appropriated by
the Portuguese State and integrated into its discourse on the ‘imagina-
tion of the center’ (Santos, 1993: 49). This discourse was used particu-
larly to an internal audience to present the country as an integral part
of the centre due to its adherence to the European Community and thus
no longer in the periphery of the world economic system. However,
this ‘imagination of the centre’ was only partially confirmed by the
Portuguese migratory landscape in which a growth in the immigrant
population went together with an increase in emigration (Marques,
2010; Marques, 2008).

Conclusion

For at least the last two centuries, Portugal has witnessed a large
continuous outflow of its population. As a result of this, estimates indi-
cate that the number of Portuguese citizens and their direct descend-
ants living in another country varies between 2 and 4.8 million. The
main countries of residence are, in the Americas, the United States,
Brazil, Canada and Venezuela, and, in Europe, France, Switzerland
and Germany (together these countries host 90 per cent of all the
Portuguese living abroad). We have described the different emigration
waves in which Portuguese citizens participated. As noted by different
authors (Hatton and Williamson, 1994: 55), Portugal may have come
late to the great European migration movements (both the transatlantic
migration flow and the intra-European migration flow), but it partici-
pated in them fully. Some of these movements have taken place despite
 Portugal 271

the state’s effort to control and, at least officially, constrain the exits of
its citizens. It comes, therefore, as no surprise that the relationship of
the Portuguese State with its citizens abroad was for a long time marked
by a lack of clear and continuous politics directed towards Portuguese
communities living outside the Portuguese territory. Only after the
establishment of democracy in 1974 did the Portuguese State adopt
some policies specifically aimed at promoting national integration of
its citizens abroad. Among these measures the most significant were
the possibility offered to emigrants to elect deputies to the Portuguese
parliament, the right to vote in the presidential elections and the
creation of a specific institutional setting for emigrants to advise the
government in matters that deal with emigration and Portuguese com-
munities abroad.
This concern with Portuguese emigration flows and Portuguese resid-
ing in another country has, however, during the last decades been char-
acterized by an uncomfortable position of the Portuguese State vis-à-vis
both contemporary emigration flows and the Portuguese communities
that develop as a result of these flows. This discomfort in handling mat-
ters dealing with Portuguese emigration extended even to the emigrants
that left the country in previous decades. Thus, political officials choose
to substitute the term ‘emigrant’ for the term ‘Portuguese communities’
and to replace the distinction between Portuguese living in Portugal
and emigrants by the distinction between resident and non-resident
Portuguese (Santos, 2004: 65–69). The idea underlying this termino-
logical change was that Portugal was no longer an emigration country
(an idea that reality continuously challenged) and therefore Portuguese
communities abroad should be regarded as relics of Portuguese history
and not representative of contemporary Portugal.

Notes
1. Although the turn of the nineteenth century saw an increase in the number
of families emigrating, working-age males accounted for more than 70 per
cent of emigration up to 1921–1930 (Serrão, 1982: 123).
2. These parameters were made of, among others, Decree Law nº 16: 782 of 27
April 1929 (which prohibits persons aged between 14 and 45 years to migrate
if they cannot prove they have completed primary school); Decree Law nº 33:
918 of 5 September 1944 (which prohibits the issue of a passport to an indus-
trial or rural labourer) and an emigration coordinating system (created by
Decree Law nº 36: 558 of 28 October 1947) that had the ‘goal of implement-
ing a quota system that would define the maximum number of departures by
region and occupation after taking into account regional labour needs and
the structure of the active population’ (Baganha, 2003a: 3).
272 Emigration Nations

3. During 1964, Portugal signed emigration agreements with France (28 January),
Holland (9 April) and Germany (11 May) (Rocha-Trindade, 1981: 83–84).
4. If non-official emigration is not considered, France became the main desti-
nation a year later, in 1963.
5. Leeds (1983: 1037) even states that emigration was ‘deliberately fomented by
the state’.
6. The study of the migratory movement to the Portuguese overseas colonies
encounters some difficulties due to the fact that from 1907, official statistics
no longer considered those who went to the colonies as ‘emigrants’. After
1937, data was once again published, however, not as a record of migrants,
but rather as a record of the numbers of Portuguese citizens entering and
leaving the former Portuguese colonies (Baganha and Marques, 2001: 45).
7. In the early 1970s there were fewer than 100 Portuguese in Andorra
(Malheiros, 2002: 248) and in Switzerland they numbered around 1,000
(Marques, 2008).
8. Portuguese with annual or settlement permits.
9. http://www.observatorioemigracao.secomunidades.pt/np4/paises.html?id=9.
10. Numbers presented by this source are the outcome of voluntarily inscription
at the Portuguese consulate. Thus, there are some deficiencies that result
mainly from the lack of inscriptions and from the inability to discard the
inscriptions of the citizens that no longer live in Brazil.
11. http://www.observatorioemigracao.secomunidades.pt/np4/paises.html?id=31.
12. Decree Law nº 15/72 and Decree Law nº 16/72, both of 12 January,
assigned new forms of intervention on behalf of Portuguese communities
to the Secretariat and, therefore, established the first National Secretariat
of Emigration offices in France, Luxembourg and the Federal Republic of
Germany (Rocha-Trindade, 2001; Santos, 2004: 38–40).
13. In order to assist the Portuguese abroad, the state developed an extensive net
of consulates or consular departments in all major receiving countries. There
are now approximately 128; the system has been restructured since 2007. See
www.stcde.pt/RConsular/Reest_Consular.pdf, accessed 01/08/2010.
14. Law nº 69/78 of 3 November.
15. Decree Law nº 3/80 of 7 February.
16. Decree Law nº 373/80 of 12 September.
17. Law nº 48/96 of 4 September.
18. For an overview of the development of the Council of Portuguese
Communities see Aguiar (2009).
19. An Official Service directed towards the teaching of Portuguese language to
the descendants of Portuguese emigrants was created just one year before the
revolution. Before the existence of this service the teaching of Portuguese lan-
guage was financed by the emigrants’ associations (Instituto Camões, 2010).
20. Portuguese language courses are offered in different institutional settings
according to each host countries’ views on the integration of the teaching
of immigrants’ home language in the host school system (Instituto Camões,
2010).
21. In fact, article 14 of the Portuguese Constitution especially states that
Portuguese citizens living abroad are entitled to rights and must comply with
duties that are not incompatible with their absence from the country (Costa,
2000: 190).
 Portugal 273

22. The electoral census for Portuguese people abroad is voluntary. If they
intend to participate they must go to their local embassy or consulate.
23. Before 1997 only Portuguese citizens enrolled for election at the national ter-
ritory could vote and in order to be able to vote the voter had to be present
at the voting place (former article 124 of the National Constitution) (Costa,
2000: 190).
24. However, article 297 dismissed this duty for anyone enrolled in the poll
books for the Portuguese parliament before 1 January 1997. Subsequent
registrations depend on the law that regulates the exercise of voting rights
(Costa, 2000: 191).
25. The difference in participation rates between elections for the Portuguese
parliament and the president are due to the type of vote allowed in each
of these elections. In the first, Portuguese living abroad are allowed to
vote by post, whereas in the second the vote must be made in person (in a
Portuguese Embassy or Consulate).
26. For a child born in a foreign country, acquisition of Portuguese nationality
by birth only took place if the child’s father was abroad at the service of the
Portuguese State. The same principle also applied to the child of a foreign
citizen born in Portugal (Base 1 of Law 2098 from 29 July 1959).
27. The nationality act was modified again in 1994 and 2004, but regarding
matters that impact directly on the Portuguese abroad no substantial modi-
fications were introduced (for a thorough analysis of the development of the
Portuguese Nationality Act, see Baganha and Sousa, 2006).
28. Until the end of the necessity to have an ‘emigrant passport’ to live abroad,
official statistics were based on the number of passports issued each year.
Although the number of emigrants registered this way has been always lower
than that registered by destination countries (due to the existence of a sizeable
number of Portuguese who left the country without the obligatory emigrant
passport), it was an important instrument for estimating the actual number
of migrants and understanding the characteristics of those who left legally.
29. In October 1991, the Portuguese Foreign Minister declared in a interview to
the Swiss newspaper Le Nouveau Quotidien that Portugal had ceased to be a
country of emigration and had turned into a country of immigration (cited
in Baganha and Góis, 1998/1999: 249).
30. In the Foreign Minister’s interview cited above one reason for the outflows
was the possibility, for workers with seasonal worker status in Switzerland, to
have three months’ holiday in Portugal (Baganha and Góis, 1998/1999: 249).

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Baganha, M. I. (1990) Portuguese Emigration to the United States, 1820–1930 (New

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seu impacto na economia nacional, Análise Social, XXIX, 959–980.
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‘Migration and Development’, European Science Foundation Conference, Crete,
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Baganha, M. I. (1995) ‘Unbroken links: Portuguese emigration to the USA’, in
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Baganha, M. I. and Cavalheiro, L. (2001) Uma europeizaçãodiferenciada: o sec-
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Baganha, M. I. and Góis, P. (1998/1999) Migrações internacionais em Portugal:
o que sabemos e para onde vamos, Revista Crítica de Ciências Sociais, 229–280.
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K. Groeneddijk, and H. Waldrauch (eds), Acquisition and Loss of Nationality
(Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press), 435–476.
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nationaler Regulierung: Die Entsendung von Arbeitnehmern im Rahmen der
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dades’, Suplemento do Jornal de Letras, nº 1029, ano XXIX.
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12
From Economic to Political
Engagement: Analysing the
Changing Role of the Turkish
Diaspora
Özge Bilgili and Melissa Siegel

Introduction

In the past, Turkey was a key source country for labour migration to
Europe, supplying countries such as Germany and the Netherlands
with a wealth of low-skilled labour. The picture today has changed. The
flow of immigrants from middle-income Turkey to Europe has subsided,
and there is now a large Turkish diaspora, particularly in Germany.
Migration dynamics in and from Turkey have changed substantially
over the past 60 years, producing a vast diaspora that could be engaged
to a greater extent in Turkey’s domestic affairs. There are currently an
estimated 3 million Turkish nationals living in the European Union
(EU) (Hecker, 2006), with a majority of these (2 million) residing in
Germany. While other countries are doing their best to court their dias-
pora and see what their migrants or even second generation abroad can
contribute back home, Turkey has taken a different approach and has a
particularly different approach to emigrants. The early years of Turkish
migration policy were characterized by a focus on economic remit-
tances and return migration. Turkey now views its diaspora as citizens
of Europe, legitimizing Turkey’s claim to EU citizenship. Through the
analysis of policies and institutions made in this chapter, we are able to
demonstrate this change.
In this chapter, we first map the history of Turkish migration and
policy shifts in the fields of migration and development and diaspora
engagement. We then go on to outline the institutions and policies
related to migration issues in Turkey and explain the debates regard-
ing the role of the diaspora. To better map how these institutions were
initially developed, and are currently functioning and interacting, we

277
278 Emigration Nations

conducted in-depth interviews with policymakers, bureaucrats and aca-

demics. More specifically, we interviewed people from the Ministry of
Labour and Social Security of the Republic of Turkey; External Relations
and Services for Workers Abroad; the Ministry of State of Turkey;1 Turks
Abroad and Relative Communities Department; a former Turkish attaché
to the Netherlands; a political scientist and an expert on international
relations and migration. In addition, a literature review and online
analysis of organizational websites were made to support the report.

History and geography of emigration from Turkey

The Republic of Turkey was founded in 1923, and in the early years of
the Turkish republic migration was used as a way of nation building
(Hecker, 2006). There were many waves of forced migration, as well as
population exchanges between the Balkans and what in now Turkey,
with Muslim communities moving to Anatolia and Christian com-
munities moving to the Balkans (İçduygu et al., 2008). In the nation
building process, non-Muslim communities were seen as a threat to the
state and were driven out of Anatolia. There were official exchanges of
population between Turkey and Greece with the Treaty of Lausanne,
where an estimated 1.3 million Greeks were resettled and 400,000 to
500,000 Turks were resettled to Turkey (Hecker, 2006). These population
exchanges were made based on religion. Muslims were considered Turks
and Christians Greek, with the exception of the Greek-Orthodox com-
munity in Istanbul and the Muslim population in the Western Thrace
(Kirisci, 2000). Immigration of Muslims from the Balkans also contin-
ued. When treaties were signed with their Balkan neighbours between
1925 and 1950, there was always a provision for migration (Hecker,
2006). Until the 1950s, migration in Turkey was mainly characterized
by the nation building process and the exchange of populations. These
early years of migration, however, are not seen as part of the modern
immigration story of today.
In the post-Second World War period, migration changed. Emigration
from Turkey was seen as part of a migration strategy. The booming
economies of many European countries after recovery from the Second
World War left countries like Germany, the Netherlands and France with
labour shortages that were supplied by Turkey, Morocco and Southern
Europe, while the rapidly growing population in Turkey looked to emi-
gration as a way of reducing demographic and labour market pressure
(Paine, 1974; İçduygu, 1991; Sirkeci et al., 2012). Before any official
labour agreements were signed, the labour market of Western Europe
 Turkey 279

had already started to attract workers, largely through targeted recruit-

ment by firms and general job availability (İçduygu, 2006b; İçduygu,
2008a). The first official labour agreement was signed with Germany in
1961, and other agreements followed shortly thereafter: with Austria,
Belgium and the Netherlands in 1964, France in 1965 and Sweden and
Australia in 1967 (Hecker, 2006; İçduygu, 2006b; İçduygu, 2008a). Other
agreements were signed with the United Kingdom in 1961, Switzerland
in 1971, Denmark in 1973 and Norway in 1981 (Franz, 1994). The out-
flow of workers peaked in the 1970s, and by the end of 1973 the Turkish
Employment Services had sent more than 780,000 workers to Western
Europe (80 per cent of whom were sent to Germany) (Hecker, 2006). By
1974, labour recruitment had stopped, due mainly to the oil crisis and
subsequent economic downturn, but labour migrants already in Europe
were mostly granted permanent residence permits and the right to fam-
ily reunification (Akgündüz, 2008).
Originally ‘guest workers’ from Turkey (and other countries) were
intended as temporary labour migrants to specific countries in Europe,
and this changed with the economic downturn of the 1970s. It is impor-
tant to note here that there was circularity in this guest worker migra-
tion also, that is often under-recognized (Abadan-Unat, 1988). It was
only when immigrants did not see opportunities to return to Europe
that migration became more permanent. This ‘guest worker’ period of
migration was characterized mainly by the emigration of a low-skilled
rural population, primarily for economic development (Penninx, 1982).
Some of the ‘temporary’ migration of the 1960s and 1970s turned
into permanent migration. After the oil crisis in the 1970s, labour
recruitment in Europe was halted, prompting a new type of migration
to these countries: namely, family reunification and formation (Ünver,
2010). With recruitment to Western Europe halted and the economic
and political situation in Turkey not ideal for returning, many labour
migrants decided to stay in their new homes. This was due also to the
low chances of readmission to Western Europe. Since many migrants
had gained permanent residence and the right to family reunification
in their new European homes, many began to urge their families in
Turkey to join them, and these characterized the main wave of Turkish
migration to Europe in the 1980s and 1990s (Hecker, 2006). Women
and children joined the predominantly male workers, changing the
demographic makeup of migration from Turkey.
There was also a diversification of migrants in the period between the
1980s and 1990s in other ways. Besides the increased migration through
family reunification and family formation, there was also a flow of
280 Emigration Nations

mainly Kurdish refugees and asylum seekers from the eastern provinces
of Turkey (Sirkeci et al., 2012) as the 1980s saw military clashes between
Turkish security forces and the Partiya Kareren Kurdistan (PKK) in
Turkey’s eastern, predominantly Kurdish, regions (Hecker, 2006).
When the labour market of Western Europe was officially closed to
low-skilled Turks, other labour markets where sought in the Middle East
and North Africa (İçduygu, 2008a; İçduygu and Sirkeci, 1998). Now low-
skilled migration turned more to the Middle East, as new opportunities
for low-skilled workers emerged in the oil-rich states (mainly Saudi
Arabia, Libya and Kuwait). From the early 1990s, workers also started
to move to neighbouring former communist countries such as Russia
and Ukraine (İçduygu and Sirkeci, 1998). During this period, minority
populations of Christians (Greek Orthodox and Armenian Orthodox)
and Jews continued to leave Turkey (Hecker, 2006).
By the 1980s, Turkey had already started to develop as not only an
emigration country but also an immigration country (İçduygu, 2008a).
Besides the increased number of irregular labour migrants and transit
migrants to Turkey, there has also been a growing number of non-Euro-
pean refugee and asylum seekers, particularly from the Middle East and
Gulf regions (Hecker, 2006). There has also been increased migration of
high-skilled and student migrants, mainly to the United States, Canada
and Australia (Akçapar, 2009; İçduygu, 2008b).
Turkey currently has 4,402,914 citizens abroad, mainly in Germany,
France, the Netherlands, Austria, the United States, Saudi Arabia,
Bulgaria, Greece, Switzerland and the United Kingdom (Ratha and Xu,
2008). At the same time, the stock of immigrants is 1,328,405, com-
ing predominantly from Bulgaria, Germany, Serbia and Montenegro,
Greece, Macedonia FYR, the Netherlands, Romania, Russia, the United
Kingdom and Azerbaijan (Ratha and Xu, 2008).
Today, as a general rule lower-skilled Turks are found in Europe,
whereas the highly skilled (or elite) are found particularly in the United
States and to a lesser extent in Canada. According to Köser-Akçapar
(2006), since the 1980s, Turkish immigration to the United States has
taken many forms. This period has been characterized by increasing
student migration, migration of professionals and some unskilled and
semi-skilled labour. According to the US Immigration and Naturalization
Service (INS), approximately 465,771 Turkish immigrants came to the
United States between 1820 and 2004. According to the Organization
for Economic Cooperation and Development’s (OECD)’s estimates
(İçduygu, 2004), there were 220,000 Turks in the United States as of
2003. On the other hand, Turkish consular offices in Washington, DC,
 Turkey 281

New York City, Los Angeles, Houston and Chicago estimate that there
are 350,000 Turkish Americans (Köser-Akçapar, 2006). In short, today
we are talking about a considerably large, dispersed Turkish diaspora
displaying diversity of backgrounds.

Institutions and policies related to migration issues in

Turkey

Emigration occupies an important place in Turkey’s historical nation

building, as well as its socio-economic development. Accordingly, there
are quite a few institutions and organizations that deal with migration-
related issues in Turkey. Nevertheless, it is interesting to see that despite
emigration’s significance for the country and the considerable number
of citizens living abroad, there is no umbrella institution that deals with
migration, but rather various institutions that intervene in migration
related issues according to their field of expertise. This fragmentation of
institutions and the lack of an overarching institution regarding migra-
tion make effective coordination between different organizations dif-
ficult.2 Therefore, in recent years new initiatives have been undertaken
by politicians to overcome this problem. Accordingly, in the coming
section we will portray not only the existing, ‘historical’ institutions,
but also those newly established.

The state shall take the necessary measures to ensure family unity,
the education of the children, the cultural needs and the social secu-
rity of Turkish nationals working abroad, and shall take the necessary
measures to safeguard their ties with the home country, and to help
them in their return home. (Article 62 of the Turkish Constitution)

Ministries
As previously mentioned, in Turkey the ministerial-level agency regard-
ing migration is fragmented. The major ministries are the Ministry of
Labour and Social Security, the Office of the Prime Minister and the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs. These ministries are involved not only in
emigration processes, but also in emigrants’ settlement in destination
countries, and in their integration processes. These three ministries are
concerned with Turkish citizens living abroad at different levels.
The general approach of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs is to manage
and make recommendations concerning the integration processes of
Turkish citizens living abroad. The ministry’s current focus regarding
the Turkish diaspora is to assist in overcoming integration problems in
282 Emigration Nations

relation to political participation, education, employment and cultural

maintenance.3 The Ministry of Labour and Social Security is mainly
responsible for migrant workers living abroad and the social security
agreements that protect their rights. The ministry has consultancy and
attaché offices in 17 countries and 40 cities.4 The government office
of Foreign Relations and Abroad Worker Services General Directorate
(FRAWSGD) is linked to this ministry. The Office of the Prime Minister is
the superior institution to the Turks Abroad and Relative Communities
Department and the Consultancy Board for Citizens Living Abroad
(CBCLA). The Directorate of Religious Affairs is also linked to the Office
of the Prime Minister, and is an influential actor in the Turkish context
in engaging migrants living abroad.5
These ministries’ overall understanding of integration incorporates
adaptation to the destination country’s economic, social and politi-
cal life whilst maintaining strong linkages with the origin country, the
mother tongue and cultural heritage.6 Turkish migrants living abroad
are highly encouraged to form non-governmental organizations that
could lead to better public recognition, and communication with
the government of their country of residence. The official declara-
tions indicate that a high degree of importance is placed on dialogue
within the migrant communities themselves, as well as with destina-
tion country institutions.7 For instance, in 2003, the Turkish Grand
National Assembly created a commission, tasked with visiting immi-
grant communities in Europe and investigating their problems (Kirişci,
2008). The parliament members with a migration background were
influential in this initiative, and the report published by the commis-
sion is upheld as an important demonstration of Turkey’s interest in
its diaspora.8

Government centres and offices

Dış İlişkiler ve Yurtdışı İşçi Hizmetleri Genel Müdürlüğü – Foreign Relations

and Abroad Worker Services General Directorate (FRAWSGD). The first
governmental organization (established in 1967) to deal with Turkish
migrant workers abroad, with a special focus on those in Europe.9
FRAWSGD consists of two sections, the first being the Department
of Services for Citizens Abroad and the second the Department of
International Relations. A deputy undersecretary within the Ministry of
Labour and Social Security is the head of FRAWSGD, and responsible for
counsellors and attachés abroad. At the same time, the Social Security
Agency, which is linked to an undersecretary of the Ministry of Labour
 Turkey 283

and Social Security, has played an important role in its establishment

and has authority over the department (Kaya, 2008a).
As its structure suggests, the organization has two main responsi-
bilities. Firstly, it manages the international relations of the Ministry of
Labour and Security, and, secondly, it is responsible for protecting and
enhancing the rights and interests of Turkish citizens working abroad
(Kaya, 2008a). More specifically, at an institutional level, the organiza-
tion coordinates the social security agreements signed with foreign gov-
ernments. At an individual level, the directorate provides assistance to
Turkish workers in their country of residence and upon their return to
Turkey with problems they encounter (Article 10, Law no. 3146, Official
Gazette 09.01.1985). The directorate is also in constant contact with
those foreign counsellors and attachés responsible for the professional
and social life of Turkish citizens living abroad.
Looking at the services provided by FRAWSGD, we see that the direc-
torate accepts written and oral complaints and suggestions, assists citi-
zens with their payment and employment-related issues and informs
citizens on the policies and services of the Turkish government. More
specifically, the Homeland-Advice Bureau (Yurt-Danış Bürosu) was founded
in 2001 within the constitution of FRAWSGD for Turkish citizens living
permanently or temporarily abroad, or those who return permanently
to Turkey as well as their families.10 This bureau provides direct services
for the citizens who contact the bureau regarding their legal rights and
obligations (İçduygu, 2008a). The staff of the bureau consists of multi-
lingual employees who are also responsible of assisting citizens in filling
out forms and writing official letters in the language of their country
of residence.
In its definition of tasks, the directorate particularly emphasizes its
loyalty to Turkey’s relationship with the EU and the international judi-
ciary. Within the framework of this perspective, the directorate states
that it encourages its citizens and younger generations to pursue profes-
sional education, supports employment opportunities and assists them
with legal issues.11

Yurtdışı Türkler ve Akraba Topluluklar Başkanlığı – Turks Abroad and Relative

Communities Department. Recently, it has been recognized that the lack
of an institution with ultimate responsibility for the Turkish diaspora
may create coordination issues, causing trouble for the decision-making
processes and provision of efficient assistance for Turkish citizens living
abroad.12 In line with this, a new law was approved in March 2010, for
the formation of the organization Turks Abroad and Relative Communities
284 Emigration Nations

Department. This organization is linked to the Office of the Prime

Minister, but works in coordination with other ministries and govern-
mental organizations that are involved with Turks abroad.
According to the first section of Law No. 5978 declaring the formation
of the department, the main objective of the organization is to work
with Turkish citizens living abroad and to help overcome their prob-
lems.13 The second section of the law gives detailed information about
services and activities of the department. The organization manages new
social, cultural and economic activities with Turkish citizens and their
descendants living abroad, according to their needs and demands. The
activities of the organization are directed at not only Turkish citizens and
descendants abroad, but also migrant organizations, non-governmental
organizations abroad and professional organizations. The department
also targets foreign students coming to study in Turkey; however, its
main focus remains the Turkish diaspora. The subdepartments of the
organization are as follows: Citizens Abroad (Yurtdışı Vatandaşlar),
Cultural and Social Relations (Kültürel ve Sosyal İlişkiler), Institutional
Relations and Communication (Kurumsal İlişkiler ve İletişim), Foreign
Students (Yabancı Öğrenciler), Strategic Planning (Strateji Geliştirme),
Legal Advisory (Hukuk Müşavirliği) and Human Resources and Support
Departments (İnsan Kaynakları ve Destek Hizmetleri).
The first of these permanent subdepartments, Citizens Abroad, is
responsible for coordinating and advising activities regarding Turks
abroad. Article 8 of Law no. 5978 indicates that it is this department
that decides how to connect the Turkish diaspora with the government
and the obligations of the government towards its diaspora. This depart-
ment’s constitution affirms the importance of the Turkish Diaspora in
a globalized world. The employee of the Turks Abroad and Relative
Communities Department who was interviewed for this chapter stated
additionally that Turkey is against an assimilationist perspective, and
aims to help Turks abroad to maintain their social and cultural heritage.
To achieve this, the department works mainly with non-governmental
migrant organizations.
The Cultural and Social Relations Department is the second essential
subdepartment within the organization. According to Article 9 (Law no.
5978), this department has ultimate responsibility for relations with
Turkish descendants living in Middle Asia, China, the Balkans and the
Middle East in cooperation with the Turkish International Cooperation
and Development Agency (TIKA)14 – the government’s development
cooperation agency affiliated with the Ministry of the State.15 TIKA
was formed initially to provide development assistance in various
 Turkey 285

domains – from economics to education – to developing countries

where Turkish is spoken, and countries that border Turkey. Thus,
although TIKA does not directly target Turkish migrant workers abroad,
it takes part in the broader politics that are important for engaging
the Turkish diaspora globally. With the Cultural and Social Relations
department, a new division of tasks will be established to distinguish
between those who make the policies and those who execute the
projects for better coordination and auditing.16
The third permanent subdepartment that is essential for understand-
ing how the Turkish state engages its diaspora abroad is the Public
Relations and Communication Department (Article 10, Law No. 5978).
This department was created to address the lack of government-based
institutional organization charged with supporting the activities of
organizations founded and led by Turkish citizens and their descendants
living abroad. As reported by the Turks Abroad and Relative Communities
Department, these non-governmental organizations are acknowledged
as the forth power. Based on the same report, we can argue that from a
governmental perspective, supporting the non-governmental Turkish
organizations abroad positively impacts recognition of Turks living
abroad, as well as the resolution of their problems and demands.
Moreover, it enhances their capabilities with regard to integration, and
also creates lobbying and cooperational power for Turkey abroad. The
department, in accordance, finances, coordinates and supports projects
that are related to these objectives of diaspora engagement.
This new initiative brings together the different actors of an over-
all diaspora engagement policy in Turkey for the first time. Since the
department was only recently launched, in the spring of 2010, it is too
early to evaluate its activities and the added value of such an organiza-
tion. Nevertheless, it is of significance to watch this department into
the future, as it is the first overarching governmental organization con-
cerned with the Turkish diaspora.

Yurtdışı Vatandaşlar Danışma Kurulu – Consultancy Board for Citizens

Living Abroad (CBCLA). Since its foundation in 1998, the main objec-
tive of CBCLA has been to provide public relations-related services
to Turkish citizens living abroad.17 The Minister of the State is the
president of this consultancy board. The main members of the board
are one deputy chosen from each political party currently represented
in parliament, undersecretaries from the Ministry of the Interior, the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Education, the Ministry of
Labour and Social Security, the Ministry of Culture and Tourism and
286 Emigration Nations

commissioners from the Department of Religious Affairs. In addition,

25 Turkish citizens living abroad are chosen as representatives of the
diaspora communities of their destination countries.18 Currently the
board has 76 members from 15 different countries.19
In addition to the coordination and evaluation of measures under-
taken regarding Turkish citizens living abroad, the consultancy is
charged with several other tasks that are broadly defined as follows:20
(1) if a ministry needs to debate with citizens living abroad, the consul-
tancy board will coordinate this exchange; (2) the board discusses and
determines the concrete needs of migrants for their better economic
and social integration in destination countries, as well as related services
that should be provided by the Turkish government; (3) the board takes
a position against xenophobia, racism and discrimination, and brings
public attention to specific events to create awareness; (4) if necessary,
subcommittees are established for specific areas; (5) the board is respon-
sible for the overall information flow between relevant organizations
and citizens living abroad. With the founding of the Turks Abroad
and Relative Communities Department, this consultancy board will be
responsible for contributing to the determination of strategic engage-
ment and support for the Turkish diaspora.

Tanıtma Fonu Kurulu Başbakanlık Merkez Teşkilatı – The Promotion Fund

of the Office of the Turkish Prime Minister. This fund exists to finance
projects aimed at promoting Turkey’s history, language, culture, art
and geographical richness both in Turkey and abroad. The board of
the Promotion Fund was founded in 1985 within the Prime Minister’s
Office.21 The fund is open to migrant organizations whose activities are
of interest for the promotion of Turkey. The Turks Abroad and Relative
Communities Department states that some of the non-governmental
organizations abroad are already sponsored by this fund for their activi-
ties, and it is anticipated that this support will be increased in the future.22
Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı – The Directorate of Religious Affairs, founded
in March 1924 and attached to the Office of the Prime Minister, is the
Turkish national bureaucracy of religious affairs. Diyanet, regulated by
the Turkish government, has a monopoly over religious activities, and
is considered to be the representative of official Islam in Turkey (Avcı,
2005). In line with Turkey’s increasing engagement with its diaspora,
Diyanet’s scope of responsibility extended beyond Turkey’s borders in
the 1980s. This extension of Diyanet was initially guided by the reli-
gious affairs unit of the Turkish Embassies and the Religious Services
Attachés of the Consulates (Avcı, 2005). Diyanet built its network and
 Turkey 287

engaged with many religious migrant organizations (Ögelman, 2003).

As a result, today it is considered to be the extension of the Turkish state
abroad, and one of the most influential instruments in influencing and
monitoring the Turkish diaspora (Çitak, 2010). It is essential to mention
that Diyanet abroad works through the Turkish–Islamic Association
of Religious Affairs (Diyanet İşleri Türk İslam Birliği – DITIB)23 or the
Diyanet Foundations (Diyanet Vakıfları) (Çitak, 2010). DITIB is essen-
tially a Sunni (Muslim) religious organization that relates to the Turkish
state by agreement. Many Turkish Sunni mosques are under its control
abroad ( Jonker, 2000).
This directorate has dominated the religious lives of immigrant
communities in recent years in several ways. However, as the repre-
sentative of official Islam in Turkey, Diyanet does not have the same
connection with other religious minorities like the Alevis or other
alternative Islamic religious movements existing abroad (e.g. Milli
Görüş, Suleymancis or Kaplancis).24 Regarding its activities more specifi-
cally, Diyanet sends officials with knowledge on religion, operates the
mosques and works for the establishment of official religious education
in residence countries (Çitak, 2010). Furthermore, other religious issues
such as the construction of mosques, institutional arrangements for
religious exercises (e.g. hajj, umre, kurban, and burial funds), religious
feast celebrations and sociocultural activities (e.g. Inter-faith dialogues)
are of interest to Diyanet.
The Diyanet board has met every five years since the 1990s to deter-
mine its agenda. These meetings provide valuable information, allowing
better understanding of the state approach with regard to the religious
domain, and what kind of role Diyanet plays in the integration of
Turkish migrants and their descendants abroad. In the Board Meeting in
2004, specific decisions about religion and the EU nexus were made.25
For instance, Decision 3 states that Diyanet is the institutional repre-
sentative of Turkish citizens living in the EU. The statements thus imply
that Diyanet expands its purview beyond religion, and includes meas-
ures regarding social and cultural life more broadly. The Board Meeting
decisions explicitly affirm that Diyanet should take an active role in
developing an Education and Culture policy for Turkish citizens living
abroad. Diyanet initiated several projects in cooperation with universi-
ties to train imams to serve Turkish migrant communities abroad with
regard to local languages and culture of the residence country. In a way,
Diyanet can be seen as the governmental organization responsible for
maintaining the social and cultural sense of belonging of its citizens
living abroad (Avcı, 2005).
288 Emigration Nations

Official organizations
As the migration history of Turkey suggests, Turkish descendants are
found in many countries. Moreover, Turks living abroad have distinct
and diverse backgrounds in terms of their ethnicity and socio-economic
status, as well as their cultural, political and religious affiliation. Given the
size and diversity of the Turkish population abroad, there are hundreds of
non-governmental (migrant) organizations abroad. These organizations
vary in terms of the characteristics of their members, but also their objec-
tives, activities and viewpoints about Turkey. It is beyond the scope of this
study to map the differences between these organizations; however, the
consultancy website of the Turkish government provides a comprehen-
sive list of registered Turkish organizations abroad.26 The organizations
are categorized as federations; cultural; female; professional; student; arts
and sports organizations and organizations for parents and handicapped
Turks.

Policies
The concept of citizenship in Turkey is strongly linked to national iden-
tity. Whilst constitutionally, citizenship relies on territory ( jus soli), the
concept of national identity relies heavily on the notion of common
culture (Hecker, 2006). The 1934 Law on Settlement (Law, 2510) gives
persons of ‘Turkish decent and culture’ the right to enter the country for
the purpose of permanent settlement and the right to Turkish citizen-
ship. Being of Turkish descent and culture, however, are not the only
ways to gain citizenship. Due to nation building and the integration
of other groups, Turkish citizenship can be acquired on the basis of
marriage, residence, birth and intention to settle permanently (Hecker,
2006). Officially, the law allows for dual citizenship, as acquisition of
a foreign nationality does not automatically affect Turkish citizenship,
and Turkish law does not force citizens who were born with dual nation-
ality to choose one when they reach the age of 18 (İçduygu, 2008a).
According to Turkish citizenship law, if a Turkish national would like
to acquire the citizenship of another country, they must get a ‘permis-
sion document’ from the Ministry of the Interior and anyone who does
acquire another nationality may request to keep their Turkish national-
ity or may give up their nationality (İçduygu, 2008a).
Ordinary passports are issued to Turkish citizens who would like to
work abroad, and they are entitled to a note in their passport stating
their intention to do so, making them (and their families) exempt
from paying the ‘exit fee’ when leaving Turkey (İçduygu, 2008a). While
Turkey does allow dual citizenship, it lays a predominant claim to those
 Turkey 289

citizens who are residing in Turkey. For example, those dual citizens
residing in Turkey are subject to Turkish tax laws. Males over the age of
18 are also subject to compulsory military service. Dual nationals are also
supposed to leave and enter Turkey on a Turkish passport (Kaya, 2008b).
One of the key ways by which governments engage their diasporas is
in economic affairs in the origin country. In the early days of migration,
Turkey was no different in this respect. With time, however, Turkey’s
focus on the diaspora has changed and less and less emphasis has been
placed on the economic contributions migrants can and should make
back home.
From the beginning, with guest worker migration, Turks kept in close
contact with family and friends in Turkey by mail and phone but also
by sending remittances (İçduygu, 2006a). In the early days of labour
migration, remittances were seen as an important source of develop-
ment for the country and those households receiving them. Particularly
Turkish banks and the Central Bank have played a key role in remit-
tances to Turkey. The Central Bank offers two specific bank accounts
to migrants, making it attractive for them to send money back to
Turkey and keep savings in accounts with the Central Bank. These two
accounts are the: (1) Foreign Currency Deposit Account and (2) Super
FX Account (İçduygu, 2006a). These accounts offer higher interests
rates than other banks and were set up as a way to attract remittances
and channel them into savings and investment in Turkey. Remittance
deposits at the Central Bank reached €14 million in 2004. However, this
way of attracting remittances to Turkey has been seen as costly, and is
considered outside of the scope of the Central Bank making it an ele-
ment that will be removed in the long term (İçduygu, 2006a).
There are some new financial products being considered for mar-
keting to the diaspora. One of the ideas is to sell special offer shares
of Turkish Airlines during privatization. By and large, though, new
financial products for migrants are being largely unexplored in the
Turkish context and it is unclear what should be done with the previous
€14 million attracted (İçduygu, 2006a). According to a presentation
by the Turkish State Planning Organisation, remittances have always
helped to pay for imports to the country, but have also always remained
a small share of the GDP (İçduygu, 2006a).
Previously, in the 1970s and 1980s, more emphasis was placed on
engaging the diaspora in economic activities and economic develop-
ment in Turkey, but this mostly ended in failure due to corruption and
mismanagement. According to İçduygu (2006a), there was a clear plan
in the 1970s to channel remittances into ‘employment-generating’
290 Emigration Nations

activities to help maximize economic growth, and three specific pro-

grammes were created: (1) worker’s joint stock companies; (2) Village
Development Cooperatives; and (3) the State Industry and Workers’
Investment Bank.
Workers’ joint stock companies were created to channel money to less
developed areas. It was believed that this would help create job oppor-
tunities in these less developed areas for return migrants, as well as an
economic outlet for their savings. More than 600 workers’ companies
were created in an attempt to industrialize underdeveloped regions.
These companies ran into several problems from management to com-
munication, making their numbers dwindle to 20 or 30 functioning
companies that are themselves not well run.
The Village Development Cooperatives were seen as another way to
integrate return migrant savings into local rural economies; however,
many of them focused only on securing jobs for their members rather
than making productive investments in villages. They were mainly used
as a way to facilitate more migration, making it difficult to sustain the
original goal of the project. Similarly, the State Industry and Workers’
Investment Bank was formed to facilitate mixed enterprises through
both state and private funds (particularly remittances) but was also
unsuccessful.
İçduygu (2006a) goes on to explain that in the 50-year history of
Turkish emigration, several policy measures, objectives and practices
have been utilized to enhance the developmental impact of remittances,
including: (1) enabling transfers via formal channels through foreign
exchange accounts, premium interest rate accounts and remittance
bonds; (2) giving to migrant collectives/associations through matched
funding, public–private ventures and competitive bidding for develop-
ment projects; (3) setting up special banks; and (4) trying to secure future
remittances by promoting future migration and engaging the diaspora.
As illustrated in Figure 12.1, remittances have drastically decreased in
the past ten years. This decline has been partly attributed to the seem-
ing lack of government interest in further securing remittance flows to
Turkey (İçduygu, 2006a). At the moment, there are no governmental
attempts to promote the flows of remittances to Turkey, and the likeli-
hood of an uptake in the future appears low (İçduygu, 2006a).
The communication strategy of the Turkish General Secretary of the
EU (answerable to the Prime Minister’s Office) gives valuable informa-
tion to better evaluate the Turkish government’s perspective regarding
its diaspora. The communication strategy regarding the EU is not neces-
sarily about a governmental organization working for the diaspora, but
 Turkey 291

6,000

5,000

4,000

3,000

2,000

1,000

0
74
76
78
80
82
84
86
88
90
92
94
96
98
00
02
04
06
08
10
19
19
19
19
19
19
19
19
19
19
19
19
19
20
20
20
20
20
20
Figure 12.1 Remittances to Turkey
Source: World Bank, 2012.

rather the strategy of the prime ministry. This is, however, important for
influencing policy and future measures regarding migrants abroad.
The following topics are found in the strategy report, and demon-
strate which subjects are prioritized by the government in policymak-
ing. The report’s 15th section refers to cooperation with the Turkish
community in EU member states. Firstly, cooperation with migrant
organizations is mentioned. More specifically, the report suggests that
migrant organizations should be listed, more contact established with
European city municipalities and Turkish migrant organizations be
made aware of the importance of EU integration. Secondly, the report
emphasizes cooperation with Turkish-origin individuals in European
country parliaments. Finally, the report aims to promote better relations
with both the existing Turkish community and the new emigrants leav-
ing for job opportunities in Europe. In this respect, especially informa-
tion sharing and mutual understanding are emphasized.27

Debates: From temporary to permanent migration:

Evaluating the role of emigrants in Turkey

Looking at Turkey’s history since its foundation in the early 1920s,

one can argue that Turkey has made strategic use of immigration and
emigration to achieve different objectives. Various trends in emigra-
tion flows from Turkey reflect the changes in the perception of the
role of emigrants. A historical analysis of Turkish emigration provides
292 Emigration Nations

a good basis to develop the debate on the role of emigrants in the

eyes of the Turkish state, and how it has evolved in the past decades.
What is interesting about the Turkish case is that the expectations of
Turkish emigrants and their descendants who are born and raised in
the residence countries, the second- and third-generation migrants,
did not reduce as they became permanent residents abroad. In other
words, transition from temporary to permanent migration from
Turkey has not caused a decline in the obligations of Turkish citizens
living abroad, but a conceptual change in their role. In this section, we
aim to discuss these changes with a historical perspective and evaluate
the economic, political and sociocultural role of the Turkish diaspora
toward Turkey.

The role of diaspora in the Turkish economy

In the 1950s, Turkey introduced a Five-Year Development Plan that pro-
posed Turkey ease employment pressure on its labour market by exporting
surplus of labour power to the major European countries (İçduygu et al.,
2001; Ünver, 2010). This trend, initiated by the first bilateral agreements
signed between Turkey and Germany in 1961, led to a huge inflow of less-
skilled Turkish workers to several European countries. Until the 1973 Oil
Crisis when emigration from Turkey to Europe experienced a period of stag-
nation, Turkish migration policies regarding its citizens living abroad were
dominated by ‘homeland policies’ (Smith, 1997) defined as an approach
aimed at orienting migrants towards return by creating institutions and
taking measures facilitating migrants’ strong economic linkages with their
origin country. In other words, Turkey introduced various measures to
channel remittances in such a way that migrant earnings could positively
affect the country’s economic development (see Section on Policies).
Compared to other forms of financing (e.g. foreign aid and high inter-
est loans), remittances were seen as an efficient way to solve Turkey’s
economic problems, especially those regarding foreign debts and inter-
est payments (Martin, 1991). In a way, for a developing country going
through economic liberalization, the huge value of remittances was seen
to be an important revenue and hard currency source (Abadan-Unat,
2006). With the inflow of hard currency, Turkey could import the inputs
and the technology that are crucial for industrialization and interna-
tional trade (Penninx, 1982). Hence, Turkish citizens living abroad, espe-
cially those living within the EU, were expected to provide economic
support through financial remittances and investments back in Turkey.
Migrant remittances were $93 million in 1967, and reached $1.4 bil-
lion in 1978 (İçduygu, 2006a). Between 1979 and 1988, the level of
 Turkey 293

annual remittances transferred to Turkey was around $1.5–2.0 billion,

and by 1995 remittances had increased to $3.4 billion (İçduygu, 2006a).
By this time Turkey had witnessed economic liberalization and develop-
ment. If we are thus to discuss the extent to which diaspora finances
impacted this, it is important to recognize the difficulty in identifying a
specific causal relationship between diaspora economic engagement with
Turkey and the country’s economic development. It is argued that the
institutional (structural) and contextual circumstances in the country of
origin are important factors that influence migrant remittances (De Haas,
2005). In the case of Turkey also, Sayan (2006) states that Turkish workers
in Europe followed the economic and political actuality in Turkey, and
adapted their remittance sending behaviour according to current condi-
tions. As a result of this, although one cannot deny the economic input
of the Turkish diaspora towards the country’s economic development in
the early years of labour migration, it is important to bear in mind the
ambiguous relationship between migration and development.
Today, remittances constitute only around 2 per cent of the deficit
whereas they accounted for almost half of the trade deficit in previous
decades (İçduygu, 2009). Consequently, we can argue that the relative
size of remittances has declined over the years, and lost its significance
at least in quantitative terms (İçduygu, 2009). However, from a human
development perspective, most studies have shown that migrant house-
holds are better off than non-migrant households (e.g. Abadan-Unat,
1976; Koc and Onan, 2004). Hence, although from a state standpoint
the economic role of the Turkish diaspora might have decreased, on a
household level, its significance remains.
Currently, debate on the economic role of the Turkish diaspora has
changed considerably. İçduygu (2009) argues that the decline in the
importance of remittances is mainly due to the fact that Turkey has
become a country that is well integrated in the global economy. In paral-
lel, discourse regarding the importance of Turkish migrants living abroad
and sending remittances has lost its priority. This was well expressed by
one of our interviewees from the Ministry of Labour and Social Security:
‘Before, it was very important that the migrants would send money
back to Turkey, but now this has lost its importance. Remittances are
equal to endorsement of a mid-sized company in Turkey.’ Moreover,
another interviewee from the Turks Abroad and Relative Communities
Department concurs that ‘we do not see our migrants living abroad as
“currency exchange point”, since Turkey is one of the biggest countries
in the world. We have become the 17th biggest economy. Turkey is not
a country which is in need of remittances to survive.’
294 Emigration Nations

However, one could argue that remittances to Turkey could even

increase due to better economic conditions in Turkey. Why Turkey has
changed its discourse about the economic contribution of the diaspora
when its added value has not necessarily decreased is a poignant question.
Firstly, some of the policies and programmes aimed at mobilizing
migrant remittances in the past failed due to lack of coordination
and problems of corruption (İçduygu, 2009). These past experiences
have decreased the likelihood of Turkey depending on migrant remit-
tances and investments. The following quote from a former attaché
interviewed for this chapter illustrates this point of view well: ‘Turkey’s
record on benefiting from remittances is not very positive. Many of
the initiatives have failed in the past. It would be hard to mobilize
people for similar projects.’ Secondly, today the Turkish diaspora is
well established. After the 1980s, there was a transition from temporary
to permanent migration observed through family reunification and
formation (İçduygu, 2008). This is argued to decrease the likelihood
of return and incentives for sending remittances. Thirdly, one can
argue that the diaspora’s well-established role in Turkey has changed
in essence, and diminished in economic relevance. It is interesting to
look into these arguments in further detail, and debate whether Turkey
does not need remittances sent by the Turkish diaspora, or cannot mobi-
lize its diaspora abroad to receive more remittances. Such questions
are valuable to better understand the dynamics between the state and
the diaspora, and to develop an appropriate perception of the Turkish
diaspora in Turkey.
Permanent settlement of Turkish citizens in destination countries led
to changes in the way the Turkish state approached its citizens. While
temporary migration implied return migration, transition to perma-
nent migration meant the establishment of a strong Turkish diaspora
in Western immigration countries (İçduygu et al., 2001). In accord-
ance with this change, the country’s expectations and its obligations
towards its citizens permanently living abroad have changed. During
this transition period, Turkish migrants have begun to demand the abil-
ity to express their sociocultural identities more explicitly, and mobilize
politically through migrant organizations (Ögelman, 2003). Another
factor influencing this change is the new emigration flows of various
groups abroad after the 1980s. The Turkish diaspora became much more
heterogeneous with the generation of Turkish refugees and asylum seek-
ers from politically active ethnic or religious minority groups in Turkey
(İçduygu and Kiriğci, 2009). Finally, Turkish economic liberalization,
creating new dynamics for Turkey, became more prominent around this
 Turkey 295

time. Given all these different factors, the focus on the role of Turkish
emigrants changed drastically from economic to political.
As the history of Turkish emigration suggests, the Turkish diaspora
is not homogeneous, and the distance and attitude of the Turkish
government towards the diaspora differs among groups. There is an
ongoing debate as to which groups’ demands are taken more seriously
by the Turkish government than the others. The Turkish state has in
recent times put more emphasis on the lobbying power of the Turkish
diaspora in Turkey. For instance, political parties refer to the Turkish
diaspora for votes during election times. Although Turkish citizens
living abroad should return to Turkey to vote, which means that the
institutional barriers towards full political participation remain, in the
national discourse there is emphasis on the power that Turkish citizens
living abroad have for Turkey (Østergaard-Nielsen, 2003). Not only for
internal relations, but also for external relations, the Turkish diaspora is
an important actor and the Turkish state makes use of this. For instance,
Turkey assigns academic positions abroad according to the scholars’
views on the massacres on Armenians in the beginning of the century
(Østergaard-Nielsen, 2003). In short, the Turkish diaspora is becoming
a legitimized political actor that Turkey makes use of when necessary.
Global nation policies best define the Turkish state’s attitude towards
its diaspora after the 1980s. According to these policies, states seek to
encourage migrants to stay abroad but keep in touch (Smith, 1997). One
of the main agenda points for which it is essential that the migrants
stay abroad but maintain their contact with Turkey is Turkey’s well-
known plan to join the EU. As Østergaard-Nielsen (2003) argues, Turkey
legitimizes its presence in the European context through its diaspora
in Europe. Despite criticism of Turkish descendants regarding integra-
tion in residence countries, Turkey places emphasis on their economic
success, upward social mobility and the multicultural contribution of
Turkish citizens in Europe.28
From the state perspective, Turkish discourse implies that it is of great
importance that the Turkish population in Europe integrates, as their
successful integration is seen as proof of Turkey’s compatibility with
Europe, and suggests that Turkey should be considered an integral part
thereof. In accordance with this argument, we observe that Turkey’s
diaspora engagement policies aim to support the well-being of Turkish
migrants and their descendants. In other words, today Turkey sees the
Turkish diaspora as representative of the Turkish nation abroad, even
though a considerable part of this population has never lived in Turkey
and consists of second- or third-generation migrants. We can conclude
296 Emigration Nations

that Turkey supports the Turkish diaspora to allow them to be active

actors in demanding the enhancement of their economic, social, cul-
tural and legal rights in residence countries. The institutional develop-
ment that we have discussed in this chapter supports this view of the
Turkish state with regard to its diaspora.
In this chapter, we mentioned the highly skilled migration from Turkey
to major immigration countries such as the United States, Canada and
Australia. As already stated, the migrant profile in these countries is quite
different to that of the Turkish diaspora in the European context, and their
number is too large to ignore. However, the ‘brain drain’ debate related
to highly skilled migration has not attracted a lot of attention since the
1960s in Turkey. The main reason for this has been political and academic
agenda domination of issues such as the labour migration to Europe,
Turkey’s transition into an immigration country and integration processes
(Akçapar, 2006). One of the few initiatives to benefit from highly skilled
migration in Turkey was the temporary return migration programme
entitled TOKTEN (Transfer of Knowledge through Expatriate Nationals),29
developed by the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) in 1977.
The programme was piloted in Turkey, yet today it is no longer in place.
Especially after the economic crisis that Turkey faced at the begin-
ning of this millennium, highly skilled migration was presented as a
socio-economic problem (Akçapar, 2009). On a rhetorical level, highly
skilled migrants’ potential contribution to Turkey’s economic and social
development through transfer of knowledge and information, human
capital formation and investment is acknowledged (Akçapar, 2006).
Nevertheless, not many concrete measures are taken to create condi-
tions for this potential to be realized. The lack of investment in research
and development is a key element of this problem (Kaya, 2003).
From a developmental perspective, the efforts of highly skilled
migrants to invest and transfer knowledge back to Turkey are limited
to the individual level, and dependent on specific cases (Kaya, 2002).
With regard to this issue, Ünver (2010) observes an increasing level
of reverse brain drain in Turkey. However, he puts the emphasis not
on the convenient conditions that the Turkish state presents for its
highly skilled citizens living abroad, but the inadequate living condi-
tions abroad due to economic and social problems such as xenophobia
and discrimination (Ünver, 2010). İçduygu (2009) refers additionally
to the establishment of private universities and competitive facilities
that attract Turkish scholars, scientists and university graduates living
abroad back to the country. In conclusion, highly skilled migrants, the
so-called ‘crème de la crème’ of Turkey symbolize the part of the Turkish
 Turkey 297

diaspora that returns to Turkey only if adequate economic and social

conditions are met. Our respondent from the Ministry of Labour and
Social Security suggested that Turkey would do well to increase its focus
on this issue, and develop strategies to enhance human development
opportunities.
Debating the role of the diaspora, we cannot ignore how the Turkish
diaspora, with its ongoing strong contact with Turkey, influences social
and cultural life in the country. In the current transnational context,
Turkish citizens living abroad have a strong impact on economic, social
and political spheres in Turkey. As Levitt (1999) explains, Turkish emi-
grants transfer not only money and goods, but also social remittances
(knowledge, values, norms and ideas) to their country of origin. In par-
ticular, existing ties between Turkey and the destination countries have
led to new types of clothing and food consumption, and the emergence
of new diaspora-based art and music (Soysal, 2009). Moreover, civil
society activities bring together actors of the diaspora with non-migrant
Turkish citizens (İçduygu, 2009). Accordingly, we can argue that although
family and friends of the migrants in Turkey help migrants to maintain
their social and cultural heritage, it is clear that Turkish migrants abroad
also transfer values, ideas and knowledge to their community, and hence
have an impact on the social and cultural life in Turkey.

Conclusion

From the early years of emigration, Turkey has witnessed considerable

changes in both socio-economic and political domains. In accordance
with these changes, the country’s style of dealing with its citizens liv-
ing abroad has evolved. In this chapter, we first described in detail the
institutional-level arrangements that Turkey has made in order to bet-
ter engage its diaspora over the years. Second, we discussed how these
policies and practices led to different debates regarding the role of the
Turkish diaspora for Turkey.
We have seen that the diaspora’s role in the 1960s was mainly to
contribute to the country’s economic development and welfare. By
the time Turkey witnessed economic liberalization, as the political
scientist that we interviewed suggests, ‘the voice of Turkey began to be
stronger because today it is more powerful in economic terms and have
better international contacts. Naturally, the country’s dialogue with
its Diaspora has changed.’ Our analysis illustrated in which way this
change has been realized. Today, for Turkey, the Turkish diaspora is a
lobbying power for both internal and external relations of the country.
298 Emigration Nations

In particular, as the former attaché in the Netherlands agrees, ‘today

Turks living abroad are obviously of great importance for Turkey’s future
about the European Union’. In short, in political terms, permanent
settlement of Turks abroad is seen as an important strategic advantage.
We have also touched upon the effect of the diaspora on the social
and cultural life in Turkey, and finally ‘the brain drain’ debate was
mentioned as highly skilled migrants account for a particular subsection
of the diaspora. To conclude, with this chapter, we have demonstrated
the diversity of the Turkish diaspora’s role and agency, and how the
politics and practices of transnational citizenship influence Turkey’s
history and future.

Notes
1. The Ministry of State of Turkey was abolished in June 2011 and has been
taken over by the Office of the Prime Minister.
2. This argument is based on the common opinion of all the respondents inter-
viewed for this report.
3. See the Ministry of Foreign Affairs website: http://www.mfa.gov.tr/the-
expatriate-turkish-citizens.en.mfa.
4. See the Ministry of Labour and Social Security website: http://www.csgb.gov.
tr/csgbPortal/csgb.portal.
5. The organizations mentioned here will be discussed more in detail below.
6. See the Ministry of Foreign Affairs website: http://www.mfa.gov.tr/the-
expatriate-turkish-citizens.en.mfa.
7. Ibid.
8. For further information on the report, see http://www.tbmm.gov.tr/sirasayi/
donem22/yil01/ss335m.htm.
9. See the FRAWSGD website: http://www.csgb.gov.tr/csgbPortal/diyih.portal?
page=genelmudurluk&id=2.
10. http://www.csgb.gov.tr/csgbPortal/diyih.portal?page=yurtdanis.
11. Ibid.
12. This is stated by the interviewee from the Turks Abroad and Relative
Communities Department.
13. For the details of law number 5978, see the website: http://www.yok.gov.tr/
content/view/868/183/lang,tr/.
14. TIKA has coordination offices in 20 countries, and operates in many coun-
tries across Africa, Asia and Europe, delivering development assistance to
partner countries through its projects and activities.
15. For more information on TIKA refer to http://www.tika.gov.tr/.
16. Mentioned in the report entitled ‘What does Turks Abroad and Relative
Communities Department bring?’, given by the interviewee from the Turks
Abroad and Relative Communities Department.
17. See the website http://www.devlet.gov.tr/Forms/pYYVDK.aspx.
18. To be chosen as a representative, the person should have resided in the des-
tination country for a minimum of five years; must speak the destination
 Turkey 299

country language very well; have attained a minimum of secondary-level

education; have a work permit in the destination country; not receive any
social assistance; not have any criminal record and have good contacts with
community members in the destination country.
19. The majority of members are from the United States (10) and Germany
(35). Other members are from Australia, Canada, the Netherlands, Belgium,
France, the United Kingdom, Switzerland, Russia, Sweden, Denmark, Austria,
Norway and Finland.
20. See the website http://www.devlet.gov.tr/Forms/pYYVDK.aspx.
21. See the website http://www.basbakanlik.gov.tr/Forms/pOrganizationDetail.
aspx.
22. Mentioned in the report entitled ‘What does Turks Abroad and Relative
Communities Department bring?’, given by the interviewee from the Turks
Abroad and Relative Communities Department.
23. For more information on DITIB: http://www.ditib.de/ (in German).
24. It is beyond the scope of this chapter to further analyse these differences;
however, it is important to mention that these differences exist, and that
there exists a broad base of literature on this subject.
25. See the website http://www.diyanet.gov.tr/dinsurasi/sura/default.asp.
26. http://www.konsolosluk.gov.tr/Organisations/Organisations_Main.aspx.
27. See website for more information: http://www.abgs.gov.tr/abis/index.php?
p=20&l=1.
28. See website: http://www.mfa.gov.tr/the-expatriate-turkish-citizens.en.mfa.
29. See website for more information on the programme: http://www.ilo.org/
dyn/migpractice/migmain.showPractice?p_lang=en&p_practice_id=26.

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13
An Emigrant Nation without an
Emigrant Policy: The Curious
Case of Britain
James Hampshire

Introduction

During the 2010 UK general election campaign, David Cameron

famously made a promise to cut net migration from ‘hundreds of
thousands’ to ‘tens of thousands’ by 2015. In the context of increas-
ingly politicized debates about immigration, the electoral logic of this
commitment was not difficult to divine, but its feasibility was always in
question. Leaving aside economic or moral justifications, the problem
with a promise to reduce net migration is that it is calculated by tak-
ing inflows, over which the government has only partial control, and
subtracting outflows, over which it has none. On the one hand, the
government is unable to control the number of European Union (EU)
citizens exercising their free movement rights, who make up a signifi-
cant proportion of immigrants (though luckily for them this number
has been decreasing during the economic crisis); on the other hand,
the government is almost wholly unable to influence emigration. Short
of persecuting its citizens or running its economy into the ground, no
democratic government is able to regulate the number of people who
choose to leave.1 Thus the focus on net migration, rather than immigra-
tion, is a curious hostage to fortune.
Indeed, it can only be made sense of by recognizing how emigration
is largely absent in the British migration debate. Cameron’s apparent
failure to recognize the hurdle that he had set up is symptomatic of the
lack of consideration given to emigration in British public discourse.
For while the topics of immigration and immigrants are debated inces-
santly, barely a word is spoken about emigration or emigrants. For
example, a Nexis search for stories on ‘immigration’ in UK broadsheets
in the month up to 2 October 2012 returns 651 results, while the same

302
 United Kingdom 303

search for stories on ‘emigration’ returns just 45 results. Given the scale
of British emigration this is a curious silence.
Curious because Britain is an emigrant nation par excellence, with one
of the largest and most widely dispersed overseas populations of any
country. Among high-income Organization for Economic Cooperation
and Development (OECD) countries it is the top emigration country
(World Bank, 2011: 40). A recent study estimated that there were as
many as 5.6 million UK nationals living overseas in 2008 (Finch et al.,
2010: 28). The scale and extent of British emigration is partly a legacy
of Britain’s imperial past, such that the old imperial boast that the sun
never set on the British Empire could today be replaced with a similar
adage about UK nationals. But it is also a story of much more recent,
and increasingly diverse, emigrations including inter alia skilled workers
taking up job opportunities overseas, families relocating to new coun-
tries, second home buyers looking for a ‘place in the sun’ and natural-
ized British citizens returning or retiring to their country of birth.
Britain’s de facto status as a nation of emigrants is not, however,
reflected in British government policy. Compared to many other coun-
tries with large overseas populations, Britain is notable for its lack of
engagement with its citizens living overseas. British emigrants are rarely
viewed as a resource to be tapped for political, economic or cultural
reasons, and few people, including emigrants themselves, talk about
British emigrants as constituting a ‘diaspora’ (though there have been
recent attempts to promote the idea of a British diaspora). There is no
government minister or department with responsibility for emigrants,
and no emigration policy to speak of. The Foreign and Commonwealth
Office (FCO) does of course provide consular services to overseas nation-
als, as well as pre-departure information and support. And it has shown
some interest in increased engagement in recent years. But in com-
parative terms it does little to engage its overseas population through
either ‘diaspora building’ measures that celebrate British expatriates or
‘diaspora integration’ measures that extend rights or extract obligations
from them (the distinction is taken from Gamlen, 2008).
This chapter documents and then explains Britain’s status as an emi-
grant nation without an emigrant policy. It first sketches the history
and contemporary geography of British emigration, and argues for
the ‘super-diversity’ of British emigrants. The chapter then reviews the
limited institutions and policies through which the British govern-
ment seeks to engage with its overseas citizens. Finally, it examines
reasons for the absence of an emigrants’ policy, principally supply-side
problems associated with the difficulty of engaging an exceptionally
304 Emigration Nations

heterogeneous overseas population and demand-side problems arising

from the apparent indifference of most British emigrants towards being
engaged.

History and geography of British emigration

From empire settlement to the present

There has been substantial emigration from the British Isles for at least
400 years. Though precise numbers are difficult to establish, as early as
the seventeenth century significant numbers of English, Scots, Welsh
and Irish began to migrate to other European countries, as well as to
India, parts of West Africa, the West Indies and North America. But it
was with imperial expansion and colonial settlement from the early
nineteenth century onwards that emigration really increased. Providing
a continuous story of migration flows is difficult due to changing prac-
tices in official record-keeping. Nevertheless, the overall trend is clear.
Passenger records show that 3,466,110 persons, just over 91,000 per
year, left British ports during the period 1815–1852. Records at the time
do not distinguish between British subjects and aliens, nor passengers
and permanent migrants, but even once this is factored in it is clear that
there were substantial outflows during the first half of the nineteenth
century. Starting in 1853, a distinction between British subjects and
aliens was made, and the records show that gross outward movements
of British subjects between 1853 and 1869 totalled 2,682,001, or nearly
158,000 per year. From 1870 to 1913, a total of 6,200,072 outward pas-
senger movements, nearly 14,100 per year, were recorded (Harper and
Constantine, 2010: 3). In relative terms, some other European coun-
tries saw even larger emigrations than the United Kingdom during the
nineteenth century, notably Italy and Norway. But emigration from
the British Isles was the largest in absolute terms, accounting for over a
third of all emigrants from Europe between 1815 and 1930.
British emigration during this period was of course bound up with
imperial expansion and settlement. In his typology of diasporas, Robin
Cohen categorizes British colonial emigrants as an ‘imperial diaspora’,
defined by ‘a continuing connection with the homelands, a deference
to and imitation of its social and political institutions, and a sense of
forming part of a grand imperial design’ (Cohen, 1997: 67). In contrast,
the historian Stephen Constantine (2003) argues that British emigra-
tion during the imperial heyday (roughly the 1880s to 1940s) should
be categorized as an overseas settlement rather than a diaspora because
emigrants settled in an already established ‘British world’. As with a lot
 United Kingdom 305

of the literature on diasporas, this disagreement largely turns on com-

peting definitions of the word diaspora, something which the present
chapter does not seek to engage with. What is indisputable is that
British emigration and settlement during the period of imperial expan-
sion created or consolidated the English-speaking societies in Australia,
Canada, New Zealand and the United States, as well as contributed
to the formation and development of countries of the so-called New
Commonwealth. It was thus an emigration with the most profound
political, economic and cultural consequences, not least for the indig-
enous populations who were subjugated and sometimes exterminated.
Imperial migration – and indeed the colonial project as a whole –
was essential for the emergence of a British identity. Prior to empire,
national and regional attachments were more significant forms of
identification. The idea of Britishness barely existed; rather, people
were identified as English, Scottish, Welsh, Irish or sometimes in terms
of sub-national regional identities. These national and sub-national
identities were not effaced in the context of imperial settlement, but
they were increasingly supplemented, and sometimes supplanted, by
an emergent sense of common British identity as people from different
part of the British Isles found themselves in remote and challenging
environments (Fedorowich, 2008; Bridge and Fedorowich, 2003). Thus
British identity was forged through the encounter with difference.
Emigration to the empire was generally seen in a positive light by the
British government and public alike. Settlers were the physical and psy-
chological bonds of empire, without which the colonial project could
hardly have succeeded. Furthermore, during the nineteenth century
especially, British elites thought that emigration helped to overcome
Malthusian overpopulation and act as a safety valve to quell popular
discontent during periods of unemployment. Some voluntary groups
lobbied the government to adopt a more active role organizing and
sponsoring emigration, but for most of the nineteenth century the
British government adopted a laissez-faire approach. Emigration was
left to emigrants themselves and to the governments of white settler
societies who sought to attract them by paying some or all of their
travel costs through assisted passage schemes (Constantine, 2003: 22).
One exception to the laissez-faire approach of the British government
was the establishment in 1886 of the Emigrant’s Information Office
within the Colonial Office, which provided advice and information to
would-be emigrants (Fedorowich, 2008: 88), though it ran on a very
small budget (Thompson, 2000: 139). As a result of resurgent fears
of overpopulation and concern about ‘surplus women’ in Britain and
306 Emigration Nations

‘surplus men’ in the Dominions, the British government did become

more involved in sponsoring emigration during the early twentieth cen-
tury, offering assisted passages and other inducements under the 1922
Empire Settlement Act, as well as propaganda to encourage emigrants to
populate ‘Greater Britain’ (Constantine, 2003: 23).
From 1912 onwards, official records begin to distinguish between
passengers and migrants, finally allowing for the calculation of net
migration figures, rather than just passenger flows. During the 1920s,
net emigration was nearly 119,000 per year. This went into reverse
during the Depression years of 1930 to 1938, when net immigration
of 164,105 was recorded, but net emigration resumed after the Second
World War, totalling nearly 1,100,400 from 1946 to 1963, or more than
61,000 per year (Harper and Constantine, 2010: 3). This was of course a
period of decolonization in the New Commonwealth, but flows to the
Old Commonwealth continued throughout, often aided by the British
government after lobbying by overseas governments, notably Australia,
such that the Commonwealth Settlement Acts were renewed up until
1972. But politically speaking, attention in Britain switched during the
1950s and 1960s to immigration from the West Indies and Indian sub-
continent, a momentous shift that laid the foundations of contempo-
rary Britain’s multi-ethnic society (see Hampshire, 2005; Hansen, 2000;
Paul, 1997).
While immigration has sporadically dominated the headlines since
the 1950s, and Britain is today a net immigration country, in recent
years there has consistently been a net outflow of British citizens. As
Figure 13.1 shows the outflow of British citizens has exceeded inflows
in every year of the last decade, though the gap narrowed in the after-
math of the 2008 economic crisis and subsequent recession. The his-
torical legacies of imperial settlement reviewed above remain relevant
for understanding contemporary stocks and flows: as discussed below,
Australia remains the main destination for British emigrants. But in
recent years emigration has become increasingly diverse, as the next
section aims to show.

The ‘super-diversity’ of British emigrants

The stock of British citizens living overseas is large, widespread and
heterogeneous. In 2006, the Institute for Public Policy Research (IPPR)
estimated that there were around 5.5 million British nationals who
lived permanently overseas (Sriskandarajah and Drew, 2006). By 2008
this had increased slightly to 5.6 million, with an additional half a mil-
lion living abroad for part of the year (Finch et al., 2010: 27). Other
 United Kingdom 307

Inflows Outflows

250

200

150

100

50

0
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011

Figure 13.1 Migration of British nationals to and from the United Kingdom,
2002–2011
Source: International Passenger Survey.

estimates are slightly lower. For example, the World Bank estimates
there to be 4.7 million British citizens living overseas, but this still
makes the United Kingdom the eighth largest emigrant sending country
in the world and the only high-income country in the top ten (World
Bank, 2011: 3). If a much broader definition of ‘Brits abroad’ is adopted,
including people eligible for a British passport (mostly because their
forebears were past British emigrants) and those who can claim British
ancestry, then the size of the worldwide British community grows very
substantially. Taking this broad definition, the IPPR estimates that what
it calls the ‘British diaspora’ could number 56.9 million, nearly 1 per cent
of the world population (Finch et al., 2010: 28). Clearly, this much
larger group has a more tenuous link to Britain, but shows the extent of
an ethno-cultural conception of British diaspora.
In addition to its size, a second distinguishing feature of British emi-
grants is the wide range of countries in which they reside. For most of
the second half of the twentieth century Britons tended to emigrate to
Western Europe, the United States and Old Commonwealth countries
(particularly Australia and Canada). While these remain important des-
tinations, in the last couple of decades British emigration destinations
308 Emigration Nations

have become increasingly diverse, due to changing economic, lifestyle

and return migration patterns. Figure 13.2 shows the main destinations
of British emigrants from 2006 to 2010 based on data from the UK
Office for National Statistics (ONS). Australia is consistently the most
popular destination during this period, accounting for annual outflows
ranging from 28,000 to 49,000. Spain remains an important destination
for British emigrants, but there was a clear contraction in 2008–2009,
reflecting the impact of the recession on what is largely a lifestyle migra-
tion. Table 13.1 shows the top ten countries of residence of UK nation-
als living abroad in 2008. These are the most recent estimates available,
drawing on various data sources and compiled by the IPPR, but it
should be borne in mind that some populations may have decreased
slightly as a result of the economic crisis. As expected, the largest over-
seas population of British nationals live in countries with long histories
of British emigration – the Old Commonwealth of Australia, Canada,
New Zealand and South Africa – plus the United States and some major
European countries. The UAE is a relatively recent entry into the top ten
( joint with Switzerland).
Outside of the top ten, there are sizeable populations of British citi-
zens in a wide range of countries. In fact, communities of 1,000 or more
UK nationals can be found in most countries of the world. For example,

Canada Spain France USA Australia

140

120

100

80

60

40

20

0
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010

Figure 13.2 Main destination countries of British emigrants, 2006–2010

Source: ONS.
 United Kingdom 309

Table 13.1 Top ten countries of residence of UK nationals in 2008

UK nationals Including those who live

permanently abroad abroad for part of the year

Australia 1,062,000 1,072,000

Spain 808,000 1,050,000
The United States 829,000 838,000
Canada 608,000 614,000
France 253,000 330,000
Ireland 289,000 318,000
New Zealand 248,000 250,000
South Africa 219,000 222,000
Germany 97,000 107,000
UAE 65,000 72,000
Switzerland 66,000 72,000

Source: Finch et al., 2010: 29.

China and India, both of which had seen rapid growth in their econo-
mies since the 1980s, are now home to an estimated 47,000 and 53,000
Britons, respectively.
As well as being located in many countries, British emigrants are
incredibly diverse in terms of their socio-economic and demographic
profile, as well as their reasons for emigration and the duration of
their residence overseas. The largest age cohort of emigrants overall are
of young to mid working age (25–44), though the age distribution of
Britons living overseas varies considerably from one destination country
to another. For example, in the countries of the Old Commonwealth,
where migration from Britain has a longer history, a relatively high
proportion of British citizens are over 50. Data from the Department of
Work and Pensions (DWP) show that in 2009 there were 250,000 British
pensioners living in Australia (just under a quarter of the total British
population resident there) and 159,000 British pensioners in Canada
(just over a quarter of the British population) (DWP: awaiting FoI
request for more recent data). Conversely, Britons who have migrated to
work in some EU member states, the United States, the UAE and Saudi
Arabia tend to be younger than average. This latter group also tend to
be highly educated and skilled. Overall, the overseas British population
tends to be more highly educated and higher skilled than the popula-
tion resident in the United Kingdom. But there is again substantial
variation both within and between destination countries. The data
do suggest that the United Kingdom experiences a net loss of nation-
als in professional and managerial occupations (Finch et al., 2010: 39),
310 Emigration Nations

a supposed ‘brain drain’ that has been the cause of some consternation
among policymakers.
The reasons for emigration and duration of residence overseas
have undoubtedly diversified in recent years. Whereas most British
emigration during the nineteenth and first half of the twentieth cen-
tury was for overseas settlement – especially to the Empire and then
Commonwealth – today there is a complex mix of permanent, tem-
porary and seasonal emigration. Britons emigrate alone or with their
families to find work, to improve their standard of living, to retire to
a warmer climate (sometimes permanently, sometimes for part of the
year) or to return to their country of birth and so on. Motivations vary
by country. Many recent migrants to Australia, for example, migrate to
settle. But emigrants to other countries often leave for shorter periods,
for example, to work on a fixed-term contract in a tax-free state such as
the UAE, or as an intra-company transferee in a multinational firm with
offices in another EU member state or the United States. Retirement
migration is also an important type of emigration from Britain. There
are (still) substantial stocks of Britons in Southern European countries,
notably Spain, even if flows to these countries have decreased as a result
of the economic crisis and depreciation of sterling against the euro. But
British retirement migration also has another, newer face in the form
of naturalized British citizens returning to their country of birth. This
is an increasingly important part of flows of Britons to India, for exam-
ple, and also in smaller numbers to the Caribbean. A growing number
of British emigrants are arguably best described as ‘sojourners’ –people
who spend part of the year in the United Kingdom and part in another
country. This group of seasonal migrants includes the growing number
of British nationals who own a second home outside the United
Kingdom. The Department of Communities and Local Government’s
English Housing Survey shows that the number of English households
with a second home abroad has more than trebled in size in the last 15
years, from 115,000 in 1996–1997 to 368,000 in 2010–2011, though this
was slightly down on the 2009–2010 peak of 389,000 (DCLG, 2011).
Spain and France remain the most popular locations for second homes
(88,000 and 84,000 homes, respectively) but with regard to the wider
globalization of emigration, 100,000 second homes outside the United
Kingdom, 27.2 per cent of the total, are in non-European countries.
In summary, British emigrants are a large, widespread and het-
erogeneous group. The increasingly complex patterns of migration
and mobility that can be seen elsewhere are readily apparent in the
British emigrant nation. In an era of economic globalization, cheaper
 United Kingdom 311

international travel and new communications technologies, a wider

array of Britons are moving to more places for a wider range of reasons
than ever before. And perhaps to an unusual extent, the British overseas
population increasingly mirrors the diversity of the home population.
If recent immigration to Britain has famously been characterized by
its ‘super-diversity’ (Vertovec, 2007) – ‘a level and kind of complex-
ity surpassing anything the country has previously experienced …
distinguished by a dynamic interplay of variables among an increased
number of new, small and scattered, multiple-origin, transnationally
connected, socio-economically differentiated and legally stratified
immigrants who have arrived over the last decade’ – similar things
could be said of the geographically dispersed, socio-economically
varied, and increasingly multicultural British expatriate community.
Indeed, one can substitute the word ‘immigrant’ with ‘emigrant’ in
Vertovec’s definition without too much difficulty (even ‘multiple ori-
gin’ resonates, given the long-standing multinationality of Britain and
the more recent phenomenon of naturalized British citizens returning
‘home’). Perhaps our collective imagination has yet to catch up with
this reality? Certainly, the two dominant stereotypes of the latter part
of the twentieth century – the safari-suited colonial expat and the sun-
burnt lager lout – are decreasingly apposite even as caricatures. And just
as super-diversity among immigrants is argued to have policy implica-
tions at home, so super-diversity among emigrants has implications for
emigration policy abroad. As discussed further below, diversification
of the emigrant nation problematizes the construction of a diasporic
identity, and renders government engagement with overseas nationals
a difficult task.

Institutions and policies (or the lack thereof)

In recent years, a number of writers have sought to analyse – and

sometimes either proselytize or criticize –‘diaspora engagement’ poli-
cies (see the varied views of, for example, Basch et al., 1994; De Haas,
2006; Gamlen, 2008; Glick Schiller, 2005; Ionescu, 2006; Kuznetsov,
2006; Newland and Patrick, 2004; Van Hear et al., 2004). This literature
has often focused on how low- and middle-income countries engage
with their emigrants for development purposes, for example, by creat-
ing programmes to facilitate remittances. In an attempt to broaden the
analysis and normalize state–diaspora relations, Alan Gamlen (2008)
has argued that many states – both rich and poor – use a variety of
mechanisms to engage with their overseas populations. He usefully
312 Emigration Nations

distinguishes between what he calls ‘diaspora building’ and ‘diaspora

integration’ mechanisms: diaspora building mechanisms seek to cul-
tivate new diaspora communities and recognize existing ones, while
diaspora integration mechanisms involve the extension of rights and
obligations to emigrants. Examples of the former include the organiza-
tion of extra-territorial celebrations of national holidays, awards for
expatriates, sponsoring expatriate media, consular activities to engage
the diaspora and the establishment of dedicated diaspora agencies or
ministries; examples of the latter include the extension of rights that
benefit emigrants such as dual nationality, external voting rights or
special legislative representation, the provision of pre-departure services
and active consular support for emigrant communities, as well as the
extraction of obligations such as taxing expatriates or creating incen-
tives to encourage investment, trade or remittance sending.
On neither count is the British government especially engaged in
comparative terms, especially ‘diaspora building’. It is rare (in fact,
almost unheard of) to find British officials using the term ‘diaspora’
to describe British emigrants, let alone actively cultivate what is some-
times called ‘diasporic consciousness’ among UK nationals. In terms of
‘diaspora integration’ the government has relatively few policies that
are targeted at or designed with emigrants specifically in mind, and
no diaspora engagement strategy to speak of, though it does tolerate
dual nationality and allow external voting. The aim of this section is
to review the institutions and policies, such as they are, through which
the British government does engage with overseas nationals; while the
next section considers why British state relations with its emigrants are
so limited.
In contrast to those countries that have designated officials or even
a government department with responsibility for emigrants, the British
state lacks a dedicated institutional architecture for engaging with its
overseas population. There is neither a ministry nor minister for emi-
grants for the diaspora. The FCO is responsible for the provision of
consular services and offers extensive travel advice through its website.
In recent years, it has made some initiatives to identify and keep track
of UK nationals living overseas. The most significant is the LOCATE
database, which was launched with considerable publicity in 2007. The
stated intention of LOCATE is to encourage citizens living or travelling
overseas to register their details via a website so that the ‘embassy and
crisis staff can then give you better assistance in an emergency such
as a tsunami or terrorist attack’.2 As this mission statement reveals,
the focus of LOCATE is simultaneously broader in scope (travellers as
 United Kingdom 313

well as overseas residents) and narrower in content (focused on emer-

gency assistance) than a diaspora engagement strategy. In any case,
it appears to have become largely dormant: as of 9 October 2012 the
home page of the website still carries a message that the database will
be down for ‘essential maintenance’ on 5 July 2012, while an inquiry
from the author about the number of people currently registered on
LOCATE went unanswered. Based on the latest published estimate as of
September 2009, there were only 57,000 registered users (Finch et al.,
2010: 92). Though not insignificant, this represents barely more than
1 per cent of the overseas population. Many UK nationals do not see
the point of registering, while some are suspicious of UK government
intentions or doubtful of its competence to keep their personal data
secure. In short, LOCATE, which was one of the government’s most
prominent forays into engaging its overseas citizens, is not a hotbed of
FCO activity (at least since the 2010 budget cuts) nor is it highly valued
by many emigrants.
This is not to say that the British government entirely lacks policies
that are of relevance to emigrants and would-be emigrants. One area
in which it is arguably more advanced than some other governments
is pre-departure services. For example, in 2001, the FCO launched the
‘Know Before You Go’ campaign, which aims to provide information
about travel safety and health risks.3 More generally, the FCO website
contains extensive and up-to-date country advice, and the FCO pub-
lishes a booklet on ‘Going to Live Abroad’.4 However, with the excep-
tion of the latter booklet and webpage, most of these initiatives are as
much oriented towards travellers as emigrants. The Know Before You
Go campaign, for example, is run in collaboration with over 500 ‘travel
industry partners’, including airlines, tour operators, travel agents and
insurance companies, which reveals its tourism focus.
Overseas, British consulates have started to move away from a purely
response mode approach, in which they wait for UK nationals to con-
tact them with a request for advice or help in an emergency towards
a more active attempt to engage with the emigrant community. Some
consulates now organize outreach activities, such as disseminating
information through leaflet and poster campaigns or running radio
advertisements. However, the IPPR researchers found that compared to
other countries these kinds of outreach initiatives were both limited and
patchy. In particular, they found little evidence of face-to-face contacts
between consular staff and emigrants, and claims by some emigrants
that UK overseas officials are ‘lofty and distant’ (Finch et al., 2010: 101).
In interviews, consular officials said that they did not have the capacity
314 Emigration Nations

or resources to organize events for emigrants, and in any case it was

not appropriate to use public funds for this unless there was a specific
purpose. The main exception to this general rule is engagement with
overseas business communities. Embassies and consulates often have
close contacts with British businesses, sometimes organizing or par-
ticipating in business networks, and in the case of at least two overseas
missions (Dubai and San Francisco) actually sharing their premises with
business groups. But this stands in stark contrast to the relative lack
of engaging with emigrants as a whole. Several of the IPPR’s emigrant
interviewees explicitly and negatively compared their experience with
the British consulate or embassy to the more active approach of other
countries. The UK government certainly does very little to foster a sense
of diasporic identity either through organizing events for emigrants or
by engaging with initiatives that have been started by British emigrants.
Despite some shifts, then, UK overseas missions still tend to view their
nationals as ‘customers’ or people with needs to be met in emergencies,
rather than as assets that could be harnessed for goals including invest-
ment and foreign policy objectives.
There are, however, two respects in which the British government
adopts a more inclusive approach to its emigrants: its toleration of dual
nationality and overseas voting rights. Toleration of dual or multiple
nationality is one of the main ways in which governments try to retain
links with their overseas citizens, as it enables emigrants who wish to
naturalize in their country of residence to retain their home country
citizenship (and its attendant rights) and also pass that citizenship
down to their children. In this regard, Britain is, and long has been,
remarkably liberal. Whereas countries such as the United States and
Germany have been suspicious if not hostile towards the principle of
dual nationality, in Britain it has never been a matter of elite or popu-
lar concern. The British government’s stance is best described as one
of indifference. Indeed, referring to a Sherlock Holmes detective story,
Randall Hansen (2002) labels dual nationality in the United Kingdom as
‘the dog that didn’t bark’, its significance being that it has never caused
any fuss. The legal situation is relatively straightforward: under the
British Nationality Act, individuals acquiring another citizenship only
lose their British citizenship if they formally renounce it to the Home
Secretary and moreover if the Home Secretary accepts the renunciation.
While this is a policy that potentially benefits emigrants, and might be
counted as an element of ‘diaspora engagement’, it actually has little
to do with emigration. Rather, the United Kingdom’s liberal approach
reflects a pragmatic attitude to the issue among political elites, the
 United Kingdom 315

imperial legacy of a plural British citizenship that embraced millions of

colonial subjects (since overhauled), and more recently, an official view
that dual nationality is conducive to immigrant integration (Hansen,
2002: 185–187).
The second area in which Britain extends significant rights to emi-
grants is overseas voting. Unlike the historically liberal citizenship
regime, overseas voting rights are a more recent phenomenon. Up
until 1985, British expatriates could not vote at all. But following pres-
sure during the 1970s and early 1980s, the Conservative government
brought forward legislative proposals to introduce overseas voting
in 1985. The 1985 Representation of the People Act granted overseas
citizens the right to vote in general elections for up to five years, subse-
quently extended to 20 years by the 1989 Representation of the People
Act. Overseas voting was not universally supported by MPs, however,
and in 1998 a Home Affairs Select Committee recommended that the
grace period should be reduced once again to five years (The Economist,
2000). In 1999, the new Labour government introduced legislation that
proposed a reduction to 10 years, amended upwards to 15 years as the
Bill went through the House of Lords (White and McGuiness, 2012).
The 2000 Political Parties, Elections and Referendums Act remains the
basis for overseas voting rights today. Overseas voters have to register
every year in the same way as voters living in the United Kingdom.
Once registered, overseas electors can vote by post or by proxy (i.e. by
nominating a person to vote on their behalf in the United Kingdom)
in general and European elections. Overseas electors vote in their most
recent constituency of residence. Unlike some other countries, notably
France, Italy and Portugal in Europe, the United Kingdom has not cre-
ated special representation for overseas electors (i.e. they do not form a
separate constituency voting for their own representatives). In general
terms, the UK policy on overseas voting is broadly in line with most
other democracies: nearly 100 countries, more than half of all members
of the United Nations and a large majority of democracies, allow over-
seas citizens to vote in national elections, but only a small minority have
created special representation for expatriates (Baubock, 2007: 2393).
It is worth mentioning that overseas voting has a partisan aspect in
British politics. The original grant of the right to vote and the exten-
sion of the grace period from 5 to 20 years were both passed under
Conservative governments, whereas the restriction to 15 years in 2000
was passed under a Labour government. And when the Home Affairs
Select Committee proposed a reduction in 1998, it was Labour and
Liberal Democrat members who suggested that 20 years was too long
316 Emigration Nations

(White and McGuiness, 2012: 4). This speaks volumes about the pre-
sumed voting of British emigrants. While there are no data on how
overseas electors vote, the presumption shared by the main parties is
that they tend to vote Conservative. This is likely to be true to the
extent that groups which tend to vote Conservative, for example, pen-
sioners and businesspersons (not to mention tax exiles), are over-repre-
sented amongst expatriates. Yet this situation may change (or already
have changed) as British expatriates become increasingly diverse. The
subject of overseas voting rights remains live, with one Conservative
MP recently proposing an amendment to the 2012–2013 Electoral
Registration and Administration Bill to remove the 15-year restriction.5
The partisan dimension of overseas voting may help to explain why
the British state does relatively little to encourage the political participa-
tion of its emigrants as compared to some other countries. Certainly, UK
consulates do not do much to encourage registration beyond providing
some basic information in the form of leaflets, and unlike some coun-
tries there are no provisions for voting in embassies or consulates. The
Electoral Commission does run registration campaigns, most recently in
the spring of 2010, but despite this the number of overseas voters is very
low (see discussion below). Links with overseas voters are mostly left
to the political parties, all of which now have international divisions.
Conservatives Abroad is the most established and active overseas party
organization, probably reflecting the presumption that there are more
Tory votes to be captured overseas.6 It has branches in 30 countries,
which organize events as well as an annual conference and website.
Labour International is the equivalent organization for Labour Party
members and supporters who live or work overseas.7 It has branches
or groups in five countries, as well as individual correspondents in
approximately 30 countries. The most recent overseas party organiza-
tion is Liberal Democrats Abroad, which was only set up in 2010, and
currently has branches in Brussels, Spain, Hong Kong and the Channel
Islands.8 Despite the existence of these organizations it is worth noting
that given the small number of overseas citizens who register to vote,
the parties have limited incentives to engage with emigrants.
Finally, it is important to note that while the British government
does comparatively little to engage with its emigrants, the devolved
Scottish government under the Scottish National Party (SNP) has
developed an extensive and active approach. Major initiatives include
Global Scot, a business network founded in 2001;9 Global Friends of
Scotland, a social and community network; ‘Tartan Days’ in countries
such as the United States to celebrate Scottish culture and emigrants;
 United Kingdom 317

the Talent Scotland Relocation Advisory Service, which provides advice

to potential migrants to Scotland, including the return migration of
skilled Scottish emigrants10 and Homecoming 2009 and 2014, tourism
campaigns to encourage both recent emigrants and those with Scottish
ancestry to visit Scotland.11 These various initiatives are part of an
overall diaspora strategy geared towards encouraging investment, trade,
tourism and migration by reaching out to Scotland’s ‘international fam-
ily’ (see Ancien et al., 2009; Rutherford, 2009; Scottish Government,
2010). The Scottish diaspora policy can also be viewed as transnational-
ism in the service of political nationalism, since initiatives that promote
Scotland overseas form part of the SNP’s wider project of advocating
for an independent Scotland. By comparison, the Welsh government
has pursued a much more limited approach, its main initiative being a
project to map the ‘Welsh diaspora’ through an analysis of the geogra-
phy of Welsh names.12

Debates on the role of emigrants: Explaining the lack

of an emigrant policy

To consider why the British state engages less with it overseas popula-
tion than some other countries, it is first necessary to consider why
states in general engage with emigrants. There is an academic debate
about whether states should engage their diasporas, often based on less
than explicit normative assumptions (compare the broadly positive
views of, for example, De Haas, 2006; Ionescu, 2006; Van Hear et al.,
2004, with the more sceptical views of, for example, Basch et al., 1994;
Glick Schiller and Fouron, 1999; Fitzgerald, 2006). However, explaining
diaspora engagement requires a different approach. We can start with
the simple premise that states will seek to engage with their overseas
population if they have an interest in doing so, and if it is feasible for
them to do so, that is, if viable engagement mechanisms can be identi-
fied which promise benefits that outweigh the costs. ‘Having an inter-
est’ can be decomposed into supply-side and demand-side explanations,
which may interact in practice: on the supply side, states will engage
with emigrants if they see economic, political or, more nebulously,
cultural advantages or opportunities in doing so. For many countries,
especially those in the developing world, the principal aim of diaspora
engagement is to encourage emigrants to support development in their
home country. Indeed, the growing interest in diaspora engagement
owes a lot to the migration and development debate. The most com-
mon and direct route by which states harness their overseas populations
318 Emigration Nations

for development is by encouraging and enabling remittances, but some

states also encourage their emigrants to trade, invest and share skills
and knowledge with the home population. Emigrants are also some-
times seen as potential actors or channels for the foreign policy aims
of home country governments; as Kuznetsov and Sabel (2006) put it,
emigrants can be ‘bridges and antennae’ for their home country states.
Lastly, emigrants may be seen as cultural ambassadors, promoting the
national image or ‘brand’ overseas.
On the demand side, states may be impelled to engage by emigrants
themselves, in the case of democratic regimes most directly through
the ballot box. Elected governments respond to the demands of voters
partly to the extent that the latter exercise their right to vote. As dis-
cussed above, most democratic countries allow their overseas citizens to
vote; thus if emigrants mobilize in significant numbers, and especially if
they are able to influence election outcomes, then politicians are likely
to respond to their demands. On the other hand, a lack of voter engage-
ment will likely result in disinterest on the part of elected politicians
(assuming no supply-side factors are at play). While voting is the most
direct form of political engagement, it is not the only way in which emi-
grants may be able to influence homeland politics, and in the case of
non-democratic regimes it is not feasible at all. Other forms of political
participation, including inter alia lobbying, funding of political parties,
media campaigns and support for opposition groups, may be used. But
it is important to note that the attitude of overseas populations range
from demands for engagement through indifference to active resist-
ance. At the latter end of this spectrum are political refugees who may
well mobilize to support one side in a civil conflict (the Tamil diaspora
is an obvious example) or seek regime change (e.g. the Iraqi diaspora
prior to the fall of Saddam Hussein in 2003). But in these cases, the
idea of state-initiated ‘diaspora engagement’ takes on a more coercive,
sinister dimension.
Finally, assuming states identify an interest in engaging with
emigrants – whether for supply- or demand-side reasons or some com-
bination of the two – for engagement to follow governments must be
able to identify mechanisms through which they can meaningfully
interact with their overseas citizens. This will be easier in some cases
than others. Simplifying somewhat, it is probably easier to design coher-
ent policies when the overseas population is relatively homogenous in
terms of its socio-economic and demographic profile, spatially concen-
trated in a region or few countries or has similar migration profiles (i.e.
reasons for migrating, type of migration, duration). Conversely, it is
 United Kingdom 319

more difficult to define coherent policies when an overseas population

is heterogeneous and spatially dispersed, and includes many different
kinds of emigrants.
Using this framework, how might we explain the limited emigrant
policy in the British case? First, there are prima facie reasons why the
British government might be expected to take a more active approach.
The sheer size of the British overseas population and the number of
countries in which British emigrants live suggests significant potential
for the British state. Furthermore, British emigrants boast a high level of
skills, above average income and a range of experiences that make them
potentially influential ‘ambassadors’ in a wide range of countries. This,
in essence, is the case made by the IPPR for a diaspora engagement strat-
egy. They argue that the British diaspora represents a considerable soft
power resource and recommend that the government should seek to
mobilize emigrants ‘in pursuit of long-term progressive and sustainable
global goals’ (Finch et al., 2010: 111). Another reason that on first glance
appears to support engagement is the large amount of remittances sent
by Britons living overseas. As noted above, a major supply-side reason
why governments engage their emigrants is to encourage and facilitate
remittance sending. The United Kingdom received $7.4 billion in remit-
tances in 2010, making it the 15th highest remittance-receiving country
in the world (World Bank, 2011: 13). Though it might be claimed that
this suggests there is a significant financial incentive for harnessing
the diaspora, it is equally possible to argue that given such large flows
without any significant state intervention, government involvement is
unnecessary and possibly even counterproductive.
But the main reasons why Britain lacks an emigrant policy have more
to do with the nature of the overseas population, in particular its lack
of a diasporic identity, and its apparent indifference to being engaged
by the government. In other words, there are supply-side problems in
developing a policy that could coherently engage with a diverse popula-
tion, and there is a lack of demand-side imperatives to engage.
It was argued above that the British emigrant population was highly
heterogeneous, in terms of class, age and reasons for migrating. This is
hardly unique to British emigrants, and other countries with divided
constituencies have succeeded in creating a more or less cohesive diaspora
(Cohen, 1997). But one thing that is particularly distinctive about the
British overseas population (though again not strictly unique) is its mul-
tinational character. The United Kingdom is, of course, a multinational
state and Britishness is a multinational identity. In recent years there
has been substantial debate about Britishness, driven by immigration
320 Emigration Nations

and cultural diversity as well as devolution, and just about the only
thing that everyone agrees upon is that Britishness is far from straight-
forward. Compared to Scottish, Welsh, Northern Irish and English
national identities, British identity is elusive. Furthermore, Scots and
Welsh are more likely to self-identify as such than as British; the English
are more likely to identify as British but they will often specify by add-
ing that they are also English (Sriskandarajah and Drew, 2006: 55).
Once this multinational character is overlaid on an already heteroge-
neous population, spread across many different countries, it becomes
easier to understand why so few British emigrants conceive of them-
selves as belonging to a global community of Britons. For if the ques-
tion of British identity cannot be settled among the resident population
that share the same territory and jurisdiction, then the possibility of
fostering a sense of Britishness among the 5.6 million persons living
across the globe seems ambitious to say the least. This is not to say
that there is no sense of Britishness, but contrasted with the relatively
robust nature of Scottish identity, for example, British national identity
is somewhat anaemic. In many ways this is a strength as Britishness
has proven more capacious and inclusive than the national identi-
ties, certainly than Englishness, as shown by the greater likelihood of
ethnic minorities to identify as British than English. But it also helps
to explain why the Scottish government has been more successful in
cultivating a Scottish diaspora. In contrast, the phrase ‘British diaspora’
is almost never uttered in British political discourse, being largely con-
fined to academic circles and a few policy advocates. While many emi-
grants maintain strong links with Britain, watch the BBC, read British
newspapers and so on, they also do not conceive of themselves as part
of a diaspora. Most conceive of ‘home’ as being where they currently
live (Finch et al., 2010). Of course states can seek to cultivate diasporic
consciousness, but there has to be something to work with in the first
place.
The plurality of identities and affiliations that sit under the umbrella
of Britishness, combined with the socio-economic and migration differ-
ences among overseas Britons, makes it difficult to conceive of how the
government could engage through a single diaspora policy. Certainly a
one-size-fits-all approach is unlikely to work. The needs and interests of
an ex-soldier living on the Costa del Sol are likely very different from
those of a property executive in Dubai, who is in turn different from a
research scientist at an Ivy League University, who is different from a
naturalized Briton retiring to her birthplace in India, who is different
from a family that decamps to Australia and so on almost ad infinitum.
 United Kingdom 321

While all these persons are British, it is hard to see what else they share.
This does not mean that it is impossible to engage with such a diverse
group, but it does suggest that it will be difficult. In short, the very size
and diversity of British emigrants is an obstacle to an emigrant policy.
This goes some way towards explaining why it would be difficult to
construct an emigrant policy, but more fundamental to explaining why
there has been no attempt to do so in the first place are demand-side
factors: British emigrants do not show high levels of interest in being
engaged, and, related to this, they do not make much use of such
channels as do exist to impel politicians to represent their interests. If
there were substantial interest in engaging on the part of emigrants one
would expect those rights and opportunities that are afforded them to
be enthusiastically seized. In fact, the evidence suggests the opposite. As
already mentioned, and despite a high-profile launch campaign, regis-
tration for the FCO’s LOCATE database is extremely limited: little more
than 1 per cent of overseas British citizens. As even the IPPR admits in
its otherwise upbeat assessment, many emigrants simply do not see the
benefit of registering and some are even wary of what will be done with
their data (Finch et al., 2010: 92–94).
This is further reinforced by the fact that most British emigrants do
not exercise their voting rights to make British politicians sit up and
pay attention. As outlined earlier in the chapter, overseas British citizens
who have resided in the United Kingdom and registered to vote within
the last 15 years are eligible to vote in UK general and European elec-
tions. Some 5.6 million persons are eligible to register and vote as over-
seas electors, something in the region of 10 per cent of potential voters.
But a tiny fraction actually do so. Figure 13.3 shows the numbers of
registered overseas electors for the period 1987–2011. Like resident vot-
ers, overseas citizens must re-register each year, so these data keep track
of the total number of electors on a yearly basis. The number of regis-
trations is clearly cyclical: the peaks in 1991–1992, 1997, 2001 (though
to a much smaller extent), 2005 and 2010 map on to election years.
As one would expect, more people register to vote in years when there
are general elections. The more important point, however, is that the
total number who register to vote is exceptionally low. Even in 2010,
when registrations reached a ten-year peak of 32,739, overseas electors
represented only 0.58 per cent of those eligible to register. While exter-
nal voter participation is nearly always lower than among the domestic
electorate (Lafleur, 2010; IDEA, 2007), this is an especially low level.
Furthermore, at these levels the chance of overseas votes making a dif-
ference are almost nil. Under the United Kingdom’s First-Past-the-Post
322 Emigration Nations

system, overseas electors vote for candidates in their nominated home

constituency, rather than for dedicated overseas representatives or as
part of proportional electoral college, which further dilutes their poten-
tial impact on electoral outcomes. With 650 parliamentary constituen-
cies in the 2010 election, there were approximately 50 overseas electors
per constituency. The electoral data do not allow for constituency by
constituency assessments, as records for overseas electors are kept only
by borough or district rather than constituency; nevertheless, given that
in only one constituency (Hampstead and Kilburn) was the result closer
than 50 votes, and only three more was the winning margin under 100,
it is unlikely that overseas voters made a difference to the outcome in
more than a handful, or indeed any, constituencies.
In short, while most British citizens living overseas are able to vote,
hardly any of them choose to do so. This may partly reflect a lack of aware-
ness on voting entitlements, and a failure to communicate these rights
by authorities. It may also reflect the hassle of registering. There is some
evidence to suggest that campaigns targeted at expatriates have an effect
on levels of registration. For example, in September 2009, the Electoral
Commission launched a media campaign to encourage British citizens
living overseas to register to vote, which was followed by an increase in
registration. But as this occurred in the run-up to the 2010 election it is
impossible to unpick the relative effect of the campaign, even if the par-
ticularly large spike indicates that it had an independent effect.

40,000

35,000

30,000

25,000

20,000

15,000

10,000

5,000

0
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011

Figure 13.3 Overseas electors for UK parliamentary elections, 1987–2011

Source: White and McGuiness (2012).
 United Kingdom 323

But lack of awareness or costs of registering cannot do all of the

explaining here. Rather, when coupled with the low numbers of emi-
grants who register on LOCATE it is difficult not to conclude that many
overseas Britons are simply not especially interested in engaging with
what in other contexts is sometimes referred to as ‘homeland politics’.
This is fundamental to explaining the lack of an emigrant policy. With
little apparent demand or electoral dividend, little wonder that British
politicians are unengaged. Since emigrants do not mobilize and use
their votes, British politicians have little incentive to represent their
interests. In short, there is little evidence that British emigrants as a
whole are especially keen to be engaged by the British government,
which coupled with the supply-side problems caused by a heteroge-
neous overseas population, helps explain why Britain is an emigrant
nation, without much of an emigrant policy.

Conclusion

Britain hardly shuns its emigrants, but nor does it go out of its way to
court them. Emigrants are viewed as neither traitors nor heroes, simply
persons who for myriad reasons have chosen to live elsewhere. As this
chapter has shown, the British government does provide services and
extend some rights to its overseas citizens, but compared to several
other governments it pursues a fairly laissez-faire approach. Given the
size, heterogeneity and lack of a clear diasporic British identity among
emigrants, and the limited interest in registering on the government’s
LOCATE database or exercising voting rights, this is not surprising. The
British government, whose immigration and immigrant policies have
recently been at the vanguard of European developments, is thus not a
pace-setter on emigrant policies.
And it seems unlikely that a more engaged approach will emerge in
the foreseeable future. Although the Conservative-led coalition govern-
ment might have been expected to be responsive to engaging emigrants
due to the partisan presumptions discussed earlier, the timing of the
IPPR’s 2010 report advocating for diaspora engagement could hardly
have been less auspicious. As part of the government’s deficit reduction
plan, in October 2010 the Chancellor of the Exchequer announced the
results of the government’s spending review, with severe cuts across
Whitehall including a 17.4 per cent cut to the FCO budget. Like many
other departments, the FCO has had to close programmes and focus on
its core activities. These are not promising times for complex policies of
uncertain benefit, which arguably includes diaspora engagement. Even
324 Emigration Nations

when Britain finally emerges from its economic malaise, the difficulties
of developing a coherent strategy for engaging with an increasingly
diverse and apparently indifferent overseas population will persist.

Notes
I gratefully acknowledge the research assistance of Katie Wright Higgins.
1. Net migration fell by a small amount from 252,000 in 2010 to 216,000 in
2011. The new ‘tough’ immigration policies may partly account for the fall
in immigration (from 591,000 to 566,000), but government can claim no
credit – if credit is due – for slightly increased emigration (from 339,000 to
350,000).
2. See http://www.fco.gov.uk/en/travel-and-living-abroad/staying-safe/Locate/.
3. http://www.fco.gov.uk/en/travel-and-living-abroad/about-kbyg-campaign/.
4. http://www.fco.gov.uk/en/travel-and-living-abroad/living-overseas/.
5. See HC Deb 27 June 2012 c346. The amendment was withdrawn following
the government’s reply that it would give ‘serious consideration’ to the idea.
6. http://www.conservativesabroad.org/.
7. http://www.labourinternational.net/.
8. http://www.libdems.org.uk/abroad.aspx.
9. https://www.sdi.co.uk/globalscot.aspx.
10. http://www.talentscotland.com/workers/moving-to-scotland/before-you-
move/visas-and-immigration/contact-our-relocation-advisory-service.aspx.
11. http://www.homecomingscotland.com/.
12. See http://wales.gov.uk/about/aboutresearch/econoresearch/completed/
welshnames/?lang=en.

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Afterword: States of Emigration
Michael Collyer

This book has been structured by four key arguments, which are
intended as a contribution to the growing literature on emigrant engage-
ment. First, emigration policy is practiced to a degree by all states –
it is not the preserve of poorer, or wealthier, states, or of a particular
type of ‘emigrant nation’ that, as Bauböck argues in the foreword, cannot
exist. Second, there is a degree to which clear similarities are apparent
in policy approaches of very different states with diverse histories of
emigration. This is partly to do with new opportunities for international
exchange on these issues but also supports the argument that emigrant
engagement is driven by a normative change in state practice. Third,
the developments in institutional design and policy traced in the 12
empirical case studies reflect an underlying change in understandings
of ‘the people’ to include those absent from state territory in ways that
have not usually been the case. Finally, these developments mark a fur-
ther change in the spatiality of state authority, in the way states ‘think
of themselves’ in Sayad’s term, as territorially bound entities.
The first of these arguments, reflected in the deliberate diversity
of the 12 country case studies, is that the institutional challenges of
emigration are faced by all states. The only factor common to the 12
countries considered here is the significant relative or absolute size of
their emigrant populations. Gamlen has made this point elsewhere (e.g.
Gamlen 2006), and, as he argues in his chapter in the present volume,
‘institutionalized state–diaspora relations should be regarded as regular
rather than contingent forms of political organisation’. Along with the
recent French language collection by Dufoix and colleagues (2010), this
book offers the first comparative support for this argument.
States are not privileged actors in this international field. The estab-
lished system of relations between states grants a notional sovereign
327
328 Emigration Nations

equality to all internationally recognized politico-territorial entities.

This does not apply to relations between states and individuals in the
international arena. On state territory, state institutions can coerce
and control individuals in ways that are not possible beyond that ter-
ritory. Other states will usually grant limited access to citizens overseas
in terms of consular provision but this is highly variable. Beyond this
states have the same difficulties as any non-state actor in engaging,
persuading or encouraging their citizens to adopt certain behaviours or
beliefs. States will of course be known to citizens in ways that are not
always true of non-state actors, but this can be as much a disadvantage
as an advantage. Emigrant engagement also undermines the necessary
fiction that states are unitary actors. Different ministries will have diver-
gent motivations for making contact with emigrants and emigrants’
responses may have as much to do with the government in power as
their feelings towards ‘the state’ in general.
Despite this diversity, this comparison highlights elements of shared
practice, such as the influence of the Indian ‘diaspora strategy’ over
the development of similar approaches in Ethiopia. Ethiopia’s ‘yellow
card’ was explicitly modelled on the Indian ‘Person of Indian Origin’
status and offers a specific example of explicit policy exchange. There
are other examples where similar policy solutions appear to have arisen
independently, such as the representative ‘consultative councils’ estab-
lished in Mexico in 2002 and in Morocco five years later. In both cases,
these councils were established to head off demands for emigrant vot-
ing. The two councils are constituted differently and although there is
no evidence that the Moroccan policy was influenced directly by the
Mexican approach, it would be surprising if there were not a degree of
inspiration, given opportunities such as the Global Forum on Migration
and Development where these ideas are widely discussed.
Historically, the experience of these 12 countries is obviously highly
varied and yet there is a substantial degree of convergence that is appar-
ent in recent years. The Italian experience of supporting emigrants is one
of the most established; indeed, as Tintori illustrates in his chapter, emi-
grant engagement substantially predates the Italian state. Outreach to
Italian emigrants initially took place through the Catholic Church, a pat-
tern that Gray also describes in relation to early pastoral support for Irish
emigrants, where the Church was the dominant actor until the 1950s.
The early history of government regulation of emigration from both
Portugal and the United Kingdom involved relatively limited and mostly
highly instrumental controls of the number and characteristics of set-
tlers moving to each country’s overseas colonies. Early management of
 Afterword: States of Emigration 329

emigration from India by the colonial government also related more to

labour needs elsewhere in the British Empire than to the economic or
labour market situation in India, and the welfare of Indian emigrants
themselves was usually entirely irrelevant. The remaining seven countries
have no significant history of government involvement in emigration
before the 1950s and even then it became established only very slowly.
Yet, with the exception of the United Kingdom where, as Hampshire
argues, emigration remains an almost irrelevant political issue, the extent
and nature of government attempts to engage emigrants have expanded
substantially over the last decade. Several chapters in this book follow
Gamlen’s (2008) distinction between ‘diaspora building’ activities, those
policies designed to encourage emigrants to feel some shared form of
belonging, and ‘diaspora integration’ measures, which extend rights. An
obvious illustration of ‘diaspora building’ activities is the relatively recent
trend in festivals that celebrate or publicly recognize contributions made
by emigrants. Policies to extend voting rights to diaspora members are a
similarly common example of a ‘diaspora integration’ measure.
Seven of the 12 countries considered here now have some form
of regular emigrant focused celebration (Table A.1). If we consider
Morocco’s current festival ‘Marhaba’, which dates from 2007, rather
than its origins in ‘Operation Transit’ of the 1990s, all of these festivals
have been initiated in the last decade. In the 12 countries considered
here, the most established festival is India’s Pravasi Bharatiya Divas.
This is a two- to three-day event of conferences held annually in India
since 2003 that is typically addressed by both the Prime Minister and
President and, amongst other things, bestows annual awards on particu-
lar diasporic figures. Other countries have followed this formula, nota-
bly Nigeria’s Diaspora Day, held annually since 2006, and the annual
Ethiopian Diaspora Day, introduced in 2009. Other countries have held
more irregular events, such as the World Congress of Albanian Diaspora,
held in 2005 and not yet repeated, and the General Assembly of Turks
living abroad, which was first held in 2010. Finally, ‘The Gathering’ in
Ireland in 2013 is organized primarily by the tourism authority and taps
into the substantial diaspora tourism market, offering an umbrella to a
series of locally organized events.
External voting is a second area of emigrant engagement policy where
a degree of convergence is becoming apparent. This marks an exten-
sion of rights to overseas citizens and would therefore be a ‘diaspora
integration’ measure, in Gamlen’s terms. As Jean-Michel Lafleur high-
lights elsewhere, external voting describes an array of approaches to
political incorporation (Lafleur 2013). At the most general level, 9 of the
Table A.1 Overview of outreach activities in 12 case study countries
330

Albania
Ethiopia
India
Ireland
Italy
Mexico
Morocco
New Zealand
Nigeria
Portugal
Turkey
United Kingdom

Dedicated No No Yes No No No Yes No No No No No

minister
Sub-ministerial NIDNCD EEA IAU GIE IME CCME Kea NZ NIDO Dept. TARC No
body dedicated PCCM
outreach
institution

Institutions
Ministry Foreign Foreign MOIA Foreign Foreign President MRE Deputy PM Foreign Foreign Foreign FCO
responsible Affairs Affairs Affairs Affairs Affairs, Affairs Affairs,
Labour, Office
President of PM
Overseas Yes No Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes
voting
Year of 1996 N/A 2012 N/A 2006 2006 2011 1972 N/A 1978 2013 1985
introduction
Multiple Yes No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
nationality

Policies
Non-citizen No Yes Yes No No No No No No No No No
recognition
Regular festival Yes Yes Yes Yes No No Yes No Yes No Yes No
Year of first 2005 2009 2003 2013 N/A N/A 1997/’07 N/A 2006 N/A 2010 N/A
festival

Source: Individual chapters of this book.

 Afterword: States of Emigration 331

12 countries considered here allow emigrants to vote in national elec-

tions. In six of those nine countries the provision has been introduced
in the last decade (Table A.1). The approaches vary, from Albania and
India, where emigrants must return to vote, to Portugal and Italy where
emigrants elect their own representatives. The significance of external
voting is highlighted not just by the recent changes, but also by the fact
that in the three countries considered here which do not currently have
provisions for emigrants to vote (Ethiopia, Ireland and Nigeria), it is one
of the most contentious topics of current political debate.
This recent growth in both ‘diaspora building’ policies, such as
festivals, and ‘diaspora integration’ policies, such as external voting,
highlights the second argument of the book. The fact that these poli-
cies have become widespread across this diverse selection of countries
provides clear empirical support for the thesis of normative change that
others, such as Bauböck, Gamlen and Brand, have argued is driving emi-
grant engagement more widely. Further support for this thesis can be
found in the ministries responsible for relations with overseas citizens
in these 12 countries (Table A.1). Currently, only India and Morocco
have dedicated ministers devoted to relations with diaspora groups.
Most of the remaining ten countries currently locate emigrant-focused
activities within Ministries of Foreign Affairs, with a lesser role to cross-
portfolio sections of government, such as the offices of the President,
the Prime Minister or the Deputy Prime Minister.
This picture has changed substantially over time. The general his-
torical trend has seen responsibility for emigrants shift from Interior
Ministries to Foreign Ministries, often with some intermediary efforts
at dedicated ministries or cross-ministerial cooperation coordinated out
of the offices of the President or Prime Minister. This transition often
occurred at key moments in a country’s history. As Tintori notes, the
symbolic shift from Interior to Foreign Ministries occurred in Italy with
new legislation in 1901. There was a corresponding shift in the narra-
tive on emigration from one of internal concern at lost labour power, to
international opportunities. In Portugal, the Emigration Committee was
affiliated to the Interior Ministry on its creation in 1947, marking it as
a matter of political concern, shifting to the Presidency in 1970. It was
only with the reestablishment of democracy in Portugal in 1974 that
responsibility for emigration moved to the Ministry of Labour and in
1975 to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, where it remains. A similar pat-
tern is apparent in Morocco, where the shift in responsibility away from
the Interior Ministry slightly predated the movement towards greater
democracy at the end of the reign of Hassan II. The more dramatic
332 Emigration Nations

transition to democracy in Albania was also associated with a new, more

positive justification.
The centrality of this shift in narrative in emigrant engagement is
the third key argument of this collection. This builds on analysis of
the necessity of certain fictions in the establishment of political society
(Morgan 1989) and the significance of foundational ‘stories of peo-
plehood’ in which the legitimacy of future political projects must be
anchored (Smith 2003). Institutional change in emigrant engagement
policy must be justified by similar stories about emigrants’ incorpora-
tion into common ideas of ‘the people’. Where this has never been
in any doubt that raises few issues. Yet where emigrants have been
presented as embarrassing or dangerous their (re)inclusion in national
public life must be explained or justified. The focus of responsibilities
for emigrants in dedicated ministries, or the more normalized inclusion
in ministries of foreign affairs, is an indicator of this shift, as is the crea-
tion of other specialized institutions and policies. But this shift can only
follow a corresponding narrative development.
The final argument of the collection concerns the shifting spatiality of
state authority that is implied in the previous three arguments. Drawing
on evidence presented in the previous 12 chapters, I have argued that the
inclusion of emigrants is most obvious in states with large emigrant com-
munities but is common to all states. This comparative empirical material
supports arguments that changes in state practice reflect a normative
development. Further, it highlights the relationship between institutional
development and changes in the underlying narrative of ‘peoplehood’.
New forms of emigrant engagement suggest a substantial and widespread
shift in the ways that states ‘think of themselves’ as territorially bounded
entities. This argument draws on a well-established critical literature in
political geography, discussed in the introduction, on the territoriality of
the nation-state system. The focus on emigration provides a new empiri-
cal angle with which to examine the evolution of this system.
Overall, this collection contributes to and justifies the developing
interest in emigration, rather than immigration. While immigration cre-
ates a centralizing, centripetal force that can even come to characterize
certain territories, such as the classic countries of immigration, the cen-
trifugal force of emigration dissolves territorial classifications. Bloom’s
confused final definition of a nation (the same people living in different
places) with which I began the introduction highlights the difficulties of
considering emigration in territorial terms. Yet emigration can only be
defined in relation to territorial states. Emigration therefore highlights a
tension in the hyphenated nation-state that immigration does not.
 Afterword: States of Emigration 333

The growing incidence of state attempts to both ‘build’ and ‘inte-

grate’ diaspora provides a particularly clear illustration of this tension.
Developing policies highlight the gradual recognition of extra-territorial
belonging in formal and informal institutions that are central to ter-
ritorially bounded polities. Yet emigrant engagement also provides a
form of resolution to this tension and illustrates the adaptability of the
nation-state. As Brand (2006) has argued, states are particularly resilient
institutions. We have limited our analysis to nation-states even though
comparison with forms of emigration within other spatially defined
authorities, such as regions or cities, may be instructive.
An eventual goal must be to follow Sayad’s prescient insistence of the
indivisibility of emigration and immigration and incorporate this kind
of analysis of emigration into more established approaches to immi-
gration. But we seem some way from that at present. For the moment
empirical material on emigrant engagement is still lacking; details of
consular practices, for example, are very patchy at any kind of compara-
tive level. And patterns of emigrant engagement are currently changing
so fast that policies referred to in this book may be replaced or updated
soon after publication. Several chapters have highlighted significant
legislation which is in the process of being examined at the time of writ-
ing, such as Nigeria’s Overseas Voting Bill. Nevertheless, this volume
has set out a framework for continuing analysis. In addition to further
establishing theoretical arguments for the significance of emigrant
engagement, this volume has highlighted elements of policy develop-
ment and institution building that are worthy of sustained attention as
they continue to evolve.

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Gamlen, A. (2008) ‘The emigration state and the modern geopolitical imagina-
tion’ Political Geography 27, 840–856.
Lafleur, J.M. (2013) Transnational Politics and the State: The External Voting Rights
of Diasporas (London: Routledge).
Morgan, E.S. (1989) Inventing the people: the rise of popular sovereignty in England
and America (New York: Norton).
Smith, R.M. (2003) Stories of Peoplehood: the politics and morals of political member-
ship (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).
Index

A ANASH, 38
Action Plans on Migration and Anderton, Jim, 197, 212, 218
Remittances, 41 Andorra, Portuguese emigrants, 258
Act to Amend the Electoral Act 2010, Angola, Portuguese emigrants, 260
237, 244 Angolans communities in Portugal,
African Union, 227 260–1
Aganga, Olusegun, 240 années de plomb, 180
Agnew, John, 2 Arbëresh, 26
Albania, internal movement, 25 Archbishop of Dublin, 105
Albanian–American Civic League, 38 Argentina
Albanian emigration, 30 Albanians in, 28
brain gain programme, 34–5 Italian emigration to, 130, 132
current situation, 30–3 Arvanites, 26
diaspora and migrant organizations, Australia
37–8 British emigrants, 308, 309
dual citizenship, 39 Indian immigration to, 80
emigrant community development, New Zealand’s migrants, 216–17
26–30 Azikiwe, Nnamdi, 243
emigrants’ role, 43–4 Azores Islands, 256
institutions, 33
kin-state policies, 42–3 B
NID, 35–7 Babangida, 231–2
overview, 25–6 Baganha, Maria, 254
policies, 39 Baily, Samuel L., 135
recognized status, 41 Balkan Wars, 28
regional diaspora, 42–3 Banco di Napoli, 137
remittances, 43–4 Bank al Amal, 181, 184–5
voting rights, 40–1 bankruptcy, Albania, 25
Albanian Ministry of Labour, Social Banque Centrale Populaire (BCP),
Affairs and Equal Opportunities 179–80, 184
(MOLSAEO), 30 BCP, see Banque Centrale Populaire
Albanian minorities, 42–3 (BCP)
Albanian National Institute of Belfast/Good Friday Agreement, 107
Statistics (INSTAT), 34 Belich, James, 205
Albanosphere, 44 Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), 94
Alb-Shkenca, 38 Bilateral Agreements, Nigeria, 240
AlbStudent, see International Network bilateral cooperation, Indian
of Albanian Student Associations government’s, 89–91
Algeria, 178 Binational Study on Migration (1997),
All-Party Committee on the 159
Constitution, 114 BJP, see Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP)
American Community Survey, 232 Blair, Tony, 199, 211
Amicales, 180 bled al-makhzen, 177

334
 Index 335

bled es-siba, 177 CBCLA, see Consultancy Board for

Bowden, Noreen, 115 Citizens Living Abroad (CBCLA)
brain drain CCME, see Conseil de la
Britain, 309–10 Communauté Marocaine a
Ethiopia, 69–70 l’Etranger (CCME)
New Zealand, 212 Central Bank, Turkey, 289
Nigeria, 243–4 Certificates of Irish Heritage, 112
Turkey, 296–7 CGE, see Commissariato generale
brain gain programme, Albania, 34–5 dell’emigrazione (CGE)
Brazil Chekrouni, Nouzha, 185
Albanians in, 28 Chelius, Calderón, 164
Portuguese emigration to, 253, 261 Chinese Exclusion Act (1882), 154
Brazilian Ministry of Justice, 261 Citizens Abroad, Turkey, 284
Britain Citizenship Act (1955), India, 86
Irish emigration to, 102, 103 civil war (1967–70), Nigeria, 231
Nigerian emigration, 230, 233 Clark, Helen, 196
British emigrants Clinton, Bill, 116, 199, 211
age cohort, 309 Coalition for the Right to Vote of
countries of residence, 307–9 Mexicans Abroad, 168
dual nationality, 314–15 Cohen, Robin, 304
overseas voting rights, 315–16 Colombo Process, 90–1
population overseas, 306–7 colonial era, Nigerian emigration,
as sojourners, 310 229–30
super-diversity, 306–11 Commercial Bank of Ethiopia, 68
British emigration Commissariato generale
brain drain, 309–10 dell’emigrazione (CGE), 136–7,
reasons, 310–11 139
seasonal, 310 Commission on Emigration and
British Nationality Act, 216, 314 Other Population Problems, 105
Bulgaria, Albanians in, 28 Committee on Welfare Services
Business Growth Service, 212 Abroad (COWSA), 106
Byrne, Gabriel, 116–17 communist rule (1945–90)
emigration, 29
C Conseil de la Communauté
Cabrini, Angiolo, 137 Marocaine a l’Etranger (CCME),
California, Mexican emigration to, 182, 187–8
159–60, 162–3 Conservatives Abroad, 316
Cameron, David, 302 Constantine, Stephen, 304
Canada constitution of 1994, Ethiopia, 53
Albanians in, 28 construction workers, Portuguese,
British emigrants, 309 260
Indian immigration to, 80 Consultancy Board for Citizens Living
Carpi, Leone, 136 Abroad (CBCLA), 285–6
Catholic Church, 102 Consultative Council (CCIME), 153,
Catholic Church’s Emigrant Advisory 165–6
Committee, 106 Cossío, Martínez, 164
Catholic Welfare Bureau, 104–5 Council of Portuguese Communities,
Catholic Young Men’s Society of 264–5
Ireland, 104 Council of Portuguese Ministers, 267
336 Index

Crispi, Francesco, 135 Diyanet Isleri Turk-Islam Birligi

Cultural and Social Relations (DITIB), 287
Department, Turkey, 284–5 Douglas, Roger, 199
Cuore (De Amicis), 144 dual citizenship
Albanian emigrants, 39
D British emigrants, 314–15
Dabiri-Erewa, Abike, 235 Indian diaspora, 86
Dante Alighieri Society, 137 Italian emigrants, 137, 142
Davitt, Michael, 102 Mexican emigrants, 163–4
De Amicis, Edmondo, 144 New Zealand’s emigrants, 214–18
De Gortari, Salinas, 157 Nigerian emigrants, 237–8
Denmark, Indian MOU with, 90 Portuguese emigrants, 267–8
Department of Foreign Affairs Turkish emigrants, 288–9
White Paper on Foreign Policy,
Ireland, 107 E
Department of Work and Pensions Economic Community of West
(DWP), 309 African States (ECOWAS), 231,
deposit schemes, Indian diaspora, 233, 236
87–8 ECOWAS Protocol Relating to the Free
Dergue regime, 52 Movement of Persons, Residence
DeValera, Eamon, 102 and Establishment, 236
Development Bank of Ethiopia (DBE), EEA, see Ethiopian Expatriate Affairs
58, 61 General Directorate (EEA)
diaspora, terminological usage, 7 EEC, see European Economic
Diaspora Bond Community (EEC)
Ethiopia, 68 EEPCO, see Ethiopian Electric Power
Nigeria, 240 Corporation (EEPCO)
Diaspora Coordinating Office. Egypt, Albanians in, 28
Ethiopia, 60 Einaudi, Luigi, 144
Diaspora Day, Ethiopia, 63 Electoral Commission, 316
Diaspora Wealth Fund, Nigeria, 240 El Ouardi, Ahmed, 185
Diaz, Porfirio, 154–5 Emergency Quota Act, 130
DION Committee, 106 Emigrant Support Programme (ESP),
Directive No. FDX/30/2003 Provisions 108–9
for International Remittance Emigration Act (1983), India, 85
Services, 67–8 Emigration Committee, Portugal,
Directive No. FXD/31/2006 on the 263
Establishment and Operation Emigration Law of 1901, Italy, 136
of Foreign Currency Bank Empire Settlement Act (1922), 306
Account for Non-Resident ENAHPA, see Ethiopian North
Ethiopians and Non-Resident American Health Professionals
Ethiopian Origin, 66 Association (ENAHPA)
Direzione Generale degli Italiani enfranchisement, see voting rights
all’estero, 138 EPRDP, see Ethiopian People’s
DITIB, see Diyanet Isleri Turk-Islam Revolutionary Democratic Party
Birligi (DITIB) (EPRDP)
Diyanet Isleri Baskanligi - The Eritrea, 52, 53, 64
Directorate of Religious Affairs, Ethiopian Canadian Development
286–7 Council, 59
 Index 337

Ethiopian diaspora European Recovery Program, 132, 139

capacity building, 63–4 Every Vote Counts campaign, 214
emigrants’ role, 69–70
extending rights, 64–5 F
extracting obligations, 65–8 Farm Labor Supply Agreement, 155–6
female migration to the Middle Farmleigh Asian Fellowship
East, 70 programme, 116
institutions, 58–61 Fascist Party, Italy, 138
investment, 65–7 Federal Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
overview, 54–7 Nigeria, 234
policies, 61–3 Federal Ministry of Labour and
remittances, 67 Productivity, 234–5
return migration incentives, 71 Federal Ministry of the Interior,
Yellow Card, 64–5 Nigeria, 234
Ethiopian Diaspora Day, 63 Flag Day, Albania, 37
Ethiopian Electric Power Corporation Fondation Hassan II pour les
(EEPCO), 67–8 Marocains Résidents a l’Etranger,
Ethiopian Embassy in Ottawa, 59 185–7
Ethiopian emigration Fondation Mohammed V Pour la
first wave, 52 Solidarité, 186–7
geography, 54 Foreign Affairs Ministry, Portugal,
political instability, 52 263
refugee flows, 53 Foreign and Commonwealth Office
second wave, 52 (FCO), 303
third wave, 52–3 Going to Live Abroad, 313
Ethiopian Expatriate Affairs Know Before You Go campaign,
Department, 65 313
Ethiopian Expatriate Affairs General Foreign Relations and Abroad Worker
Directorate (EEA), 58–9 Services General Directorate
Ethiopian Investment Agency (EIA), (FRAWSGD), 282–3
58, 61 Foucault, Michel, 200
Ethiopian National Bank (ENB), 58 Fox, Vicente, 158, 164–5, 167–8, 169,
Ethiopian North American Health 196
Professionals Association France
(ENAHPA), 68 Italian emigration to, 130, 132
Ethiopian Origin Identity Card, Moroccan emigration, 178, 183,
see Yellow Card, Ethiopia 184
Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Portuguese emigrants, 259, 268
Democratic Party (EPRDP), 53 FRAWSGD, see Foreign Relations and
Ethiopian Revolution, 52 Abroad Worker Services General
Ethiopian Television (ETV), 64 Directorate (FRAWSGD)
ethnic groups of Nigeria, 231 French Post Office, 179
EU-India Summit, 91 French–Spanish protectorate in
European Commission (EC), 106 Morocco, 178
European Economic Community
(EEC), 103, 257 G
Irish membership, 103 Gabaccia, Donna, 136
European expansionism, and Irish Gandhian ideology, 92–3
emigration, 101 The Gathering, 116–17
338 Index

General Council of Italians Abroad High Council of the Moroccan

(CGIE), 142 Community Abroad, 187
‘A Generation Lost?’, 206 High-Level Committee of Indian
Germany Diaspora, 78, 95
Italian emigration to, 130 Home Affairs Select Committee
Portuguese emigrants, 259–60, 261 (Britain), 315
Turkey’s bilateral agreements, 292 Homeland-Advice Bureau
Ghana, Nigerian resident in, 231 (Yurt-Danis Burosu), 283
GIEF, see Global Irish Economic hometown associations (HTA), 162
Forum (GIEF) Horn of Africa, Ethiopian refugees
Gillespie, Paul, 114 in, 53
GIN, see Global Irish Network (GIN) House Committee on Diaspora
Gli zii di Sicilia (Sciascia), 144 Affairs, Nigeria, 235–7
Global Advisory Council at the Prime HTA, see hometown associations
Minister’s Office, 83–4 (HTA)
Global Friends of Scotland, 316 Human Rights Council (CCDH), 187
Global Indian Network of Knowledge
(Global-INK), 84 I
Global-INK, see Global Indian IAU, see Irish Abroad Unit (IAU)
Network of Knowledge ICM, see India Centre for Migration
(Global-INK) (ICM)
Global Irish Economic Forum (GIEF), IDF, see India Development
109–10, 111, 112, 115–17 Foundation of Overseas Indians
Global Irish Network (GIN), 110–11, (IDF)
115, 116 IECE, see Irish Episcopal Commission
Global Migrant Origin Database, 228 for Emigrants (IECE)
Global Scot, 316 IER, see Instance Equité et
Great Emigration, 128 Réconciliation (IER)
Great Famine, and Irish emigration, Igbo (ethnic group of Nigeria), 231,
102 242
Greece, Albanians in, 26–7, 42 Illegal Immigration Reform and
Greek National Army, 42 Immigrant Responsibility
Green March, 182, 189 Act of 1996, 157
Growth and Innovation Framework Il mare colore del vino (Sciascia),
(GIF), 211–12 144
guest worker migration, 279 Il principe mercante (Einaudi), 144
Gutíerrez, González, 162 Immigration Reform and Control
Act (IRCA), 156–7
H Incentives and Investment Areas
H-1B visa, 79 Reserved for Domestic
Haddaoui, Rafik, 181, 185 Investors Council of
Hansen, Randall, 314 Ministers Regulations
Harvey, David, 198–9 No.84/2003, 66
Hassan II, 180 India Centre for Migration (ICM),
Hausa/Fulani (ethnic group of 83
Nigeria), 231 India Development Foundation of
Higgins, Michael D., 115 Overseas Indians (IDF), 84
High Commission of Planning, India–EU Joint Working Group on
Morocco, 191 Consular issues, 91
 Index 339

Indian diaspora, see also Indian International Network of Albanian

emigration Student Associations, 38
capacity building policies, 85 IOM Migration Profile Nigeria,
cultural programmes, 87 227–8
deposit schemes, 87–8 IPPR, see Institute for Public Policy
dual citizenship, 86 Research (IPPR)
emigrants’ role, 91–5 IRCA, see Immigration Reform and
engagement policies, 85–91 Control Act (IRCA)
extension of rights, 85–7 Irish Abroad Unit (IAU), 100
institutions, 81–5 Irish American organizations, 102
KIP, 87 Irish emigration, see also Irish state-
OCI, 86 emigrant/diaspora relations
remittances, 87 `Celtic Tiger’ years, 104
size, 78–9 expatriate nationalism, 102
SPDC, 87 Great Famine, 102
welfare of emigrants, 89 modern context, 101–4
Indian emigration nineteenth century, 101, 102
first wave, 76–7 overview, 100–1
fourth wave, 77 recession, 103
highly skilled emigration, 79–80 twentieth century, 103
overview, 75–6 Irish Episcopal Commission for
second wave, 77 Emigrants (IECE), 106
third wave, 77 Irish Free State, 102
unskilled migration, 80–1 Irish identity, 107
Indian International Centre, 94 Irish Nationality and Citizenship Act,
Industrial Development Authority 105
(IDA), 103 Irish state-emigrant/diaspora
Innovitalia, 145 relations, 104–17
Instance Equité et Réconciliation church bishops, 105–6
(IER), 182 contentious issues, 113–17
INSTAT, see Albanian National GIEF, 109–10, 111, 112, 115–17
Institute of Statistics (INSTAT) GIN, 110–11, 115, 116
Institute Camoes, 265 neo-institutionalization, 108–13
Institute for Public Policy Research politics and business, 116
(IPPR), 306 remittances, 105
Institute of Directors in Ireland, 115 tourism initiative, 116–17
Institute of Mexicans Abroad (IME), voting rights, 113–15
162, 165 Irish Technology Leadership Group,
Interdepartmental Committee on 115
Emigration, 106 isolation, 29
International Business Exchanges, Istanbul, Turkey, Albanians in, 28
212 Istituto di Credito per il Lavoro
International Catholic Girls Italiano all’estero, 138
Protection Society, 104 Istituto Nazionale per la
International Civil Aviation Colonizzazione e le Imprese
Organization (ICAO), 234 dei Lavori all’estero (INCILE),
International Labour Migration Desk, 138
234–5 Italia internazionale - Sei Regioni
international migration, 2 per cinque Continenti, 140–1
340 Index

Italia Lavoro SpA, 141 Labour Party

Italian emigrants, see also Italian Britain, 316
emigration New Zealand, 211
congresses, 144–5 La chiave a stella (Levi), 144
dual nationality, 137, 142 Larner, Wendy, 199–201, 214
literature, 144 Laughlin, Mac, 107
political inclusion, 141–3 Law on Emigration for Employment
role, 143–6 Purposes, Albania, 41
voting rights, 141 Law on Settlement, Turkey, 288
Italian emigration League of United Latin American
destinations, 130–2 Citizens (LULAC), 166
expatriates by sex, 132 Lemass, Sean, 106
Great Depression, 132 Lenihan, Brian, 107
history, 127–33 Levi, Primo, 144
overview, 126–7 Liberal Democrats Abroad, 316
regional patterns, 132–3 Liddell, Chris, 207, 212
village outward approach, 135–6 LOCATE database, 312–13
Italy, visa for Moroccan emigrants, LULAC, see League of United Latin
181, 182 American Citizens (LULAC)
lusophone migration system, 261
J Luxembourg, Portuguese emigrants,
Johnson-Reed Act, 130 261
Junta de Emigraçao (Emigration
Committee), see Emigration M
Committee, Portugal makhzen, 177
Maori, 209–10
K Marshall Plan, 132, 139
kangani system, 76 Mazouz, Abdellatif, 185
Kea New Zealand, 212, 213–14 Mazzucco, Melania, 144
King of Naples, 26 McWilliams, David, 109
kin-state policies, Albanian memoranda of understanding (MOU),
emigration, 42–3 Indian government’s
KIP, see Know India Programme with Denmark, 90
(KIP) with Korea, 90
Kiwi Expats Association, 212 with Poland, 90
Know Before You Go campaign, Mexican-American War in 1848,
313 154
Know India Programme (KIP), 87 Mexican migrants
Knowledge Wave Conference of 2001, destinations, 159–60
213 education, 160
Korea and India, 90 females, 160–1
Kosovo, 29 gender distribution, 160
IME, 165–6
L OPME, 165
labour agreements, of Indian Paisano programme, 161–2
government, 90 role, discourse on, 166–8
Labour International, 316 socio-economic condition, 160
Labour Migration Policy, Nigeria, US citizenship, 163–4
239–40 voting rights, 168–70
 Index 341

Mexican migration to the United Ministry of Integration, Albania, 34

States, 153–70 Ministry of Interior (MoI), 30
braceros, 155–6 Ministry of Labour
changing patterns, 158–61 Italy, 141
Great Depression (1929), 155 Morocco, 179
IRCA, 156–7 Portugal, 263
NAFTA, 157 Ministry of Labour, Social Affairs and
overview, 153–4 Equal Opportunities (MOLSAEO),
undocumented migration, 156 30, 33
Mexican National Population Ministry of Overseas Indian Affairs
Council, 157, 158 (MOIA), 75, 82–3
Mexican Revolution (1910), 154 challenge, 95
MIDA, see Migration for Development mandate, 82–3
in Africa (MIDA) Ministry of the Interior
Middle East Italy, 135
Ethiopian female migration to, 70 Morocco, 179
Indian immigration to, 80–1 Minorities, Albania, 42–3
Turkish migration to, 280 Mohammed VI, King of Morocco,
MIDEth, see Migration for 182, 189
Development in Ethiopia MOIA, see Ministry of Overseas Indian
(MIDEth) programme Affairs (MOIA)
Migrant Resource Centre in Kochi, MOLSAEO, see Ministry of Labour,
Kerala, 89 Social Affairs and Equal
Migration for Development in Africa Opportunities (MOLSAEO)
(MIDA), 68 Moroccan emigrants
Migration for Development in BCP, 179–80, 184
Ethiopia (MIDEth) programme, industrial planning, 191
68 institutions, 184–9
Millennium Bond, see Diaspora Bond, political inclusion, 180–1
Ethiopia population, 182–3
Minister for External Affairs (Ireland), proxy votes, 188–9
106 regularization programmes, 181–2
Minister for Foreign Affairs, India, remittance receipts, 181, 190
93–4 role in national life, 189–92
Minister for Labour (Ireland), 106 voting rights, 182, 188–9
Minister for the Affairs of the Moroccan emigration
Moroccan Community Resident CCME, 182, 187–8
Abroad, 185 contemporary system, 178
Ministry for Italians in the World, five year plan (1968–72), 179, 190
143 five year plan (1973–7), 190
Ministry of Capacity Building, five year plan (1988–92), 190
Ethiopia, 60, 68 five year plan (2000–4), 191
Ministry of Education, Portugal, 265 geographic diversity, 182–4
Ministry of Finance, Morocco, 179 IER, 182
Ministry of Foreign Affairs overview, 175–7
Albania, 34 student migration, 184
Italy, 138, 140–1 undocumented migration, 181
Turkey, 281–2 multilateral cooperation, of Indian
Ministry of Health, Morocco, 179 government, 89–91
342 Index

Museo nazionale dell’emigrazione identity, 207–10

italiana, 146 institutions, 210–11
Mussolini, 138 neo-liberalism, 198–201
mutual aid societies, 135 overview, 196–7
pension portability system,
N 217–18
NAFTA, see North American Free welfare policies, 216–17
Trade Agreement (NAFTA) New Zealand’s Global Talent
NAPTIP, see National Agency for the Community, 213–14
Prohibition of Trafficking in NID, see National Institute for
Persons and other Related Diaspora (NID)
Matters (NAPTIP) NIDO, see Nigerians in the Diaspora
National Action Plan (NAP), 33 Organization (NIDO)
National Agency for the Prohibition Nigeria Diaspora Commission, 237
of Trafficking in Persons and Nigeria Diaspora (Establishment)
other Related Matters Commission Bill 2010, 227, 237
(NAPTIP), 235 Nigeria Immigration Service (NIS),
National Albanian–American Council, 234
37 Nigerian diaspora engagement
National Committee on Diaspora, emigrants’ role, 240–5
37 institutions, 233–6
National Coordinator against overview, 226–9
Trafficking in Human Beings, 34 policies, 236–40
National Economic and Social remittances, 245
Council (NESC), 103–4 student migrants, 242–3
National Institute for Diaspora (NID), voting rights, 244–5
35–7 Nigerian Diaspora Investment Fund,
Nationality Law, Portugal, 267–8 240
Nationality Law (n°. 555), Italy, Nigerian emigration
137–8, 142 civil war (1967–70), 231
National Migration Policy, Nigeria, colonial era, 229–30
238–9 contemporary condition, 232–3
National Migration Strategy, emigrant community, development,
Albania, 41 229–30
National Secretariat of Emigration, ethnic groups, 231
263 postcolonial era issues, 231
National Strategy on Migration slave trade, 229–30
(NSM), 33 violent political instability, 231
nation-state, 2 Nigerian National Volunteer Service
Nehru, Jawaharlal, 93 (NNVS), 236
neo-liberalism, 198–201 Nigerians in Diaspora Organisation
Netherlands, Indian immigration to, Americas, 235
80 Nigerians in Diaspora Organization
New Zealand Herald, 206 Europe, 235
New Zealand’s diaspora strategy Nigerians in the Diaspora
brain drain, recasting, 212 Organization (NIDO), 235
external citizenship, 214–18 NNVS, see Nigerian National
global census, 202–5 Volunteer Service (NNVS)
homeland orientation, 205–7 non-resident Indian (NRI), 75, 81–2
 Index 343

North America, Irish emigration to, Parnell, Charles Stewart, 102

101, 102 Partido Acción Nacional (PAN), 158
North American Free Trade Agreement Partido de la Revolución Democrática
(NAFTA), 157 (PRD), 161
Northern Ireland Peace Process, 107 Partido Revolucionario Institucional
Novo, Estado, 254 (PRI), 155
NRI, see non-resident Indian (NRI) Partiya Kareren Kurdistan (PKK), 280
NSM, see National Strategy on PBD, see Pravasi Bharatiya Divas (PBD)
Migration (NSM) PCME, see Program for Mexican
Communities Abroad (PCME)
O People’s Socialist Republic (PSR) of
O’Brien, Denis, 116 Albania, 29
O’Brien, John, 105 persons of Indian origin (PIOs), 81
Occupazione e sviluppo della comunità Pew Hispanic Center, 163
degli italiani all’estero, 141 Piedmont region, Italy, 140
OCI, see Overseas Citizenship of India PIOs, see Persons of Indian origin
(OCI) (PIOs)
O’Connell, Daniel, 102 Poland and India, 90
OECD countries, 303 Political Parties, Elections and
Indian immigration to, 79 Referendums Act (2000), 315
Nigerian emigrants, 232 Portuguese Catholic Missions, 265
OIC, see Overseas India Centres (OIC) Portuguese emigrants
OIFC, see Overseas Indian Facilitation children, 268
Centre (OIFC) dual citizenship, 267–8
Oil boom, Nigeria, 231 institutions, 262–6
Operation TME, 179 remittances, 268–9
Operation Transit, 186–7 role of, discourse on, 269–70
OPME, see Presidential Office for social organizations, 265–6
Mexicans Abroad (OPME) voting rights, 266–7
Organization for Economic Portuguese emigration
Cooperation and Development after 1973–4, 256–60
(OECD), see OECD countries countries, 261, 262
Osservatorio sul lavoro e la First World War, 253, 254
formazione degli italiani intra-European flow, 255–6
all’estero, 141 lusophone migration system, 261
Ottoman Empire, 25 overview, 252
Overseas Citizenship of India (OCI), transoceanic flow, 253–5
86 Pravasi Bharatiya Divas (PBD), 85, 94
Overseas India Centres (OIC), 84 Pravasi Bharatiya Samman Award, 85
Overseas Indian Facilitation Centre Presidency of the Council of
(OIFC), 83 Ministers, 263
Overseas voting rights, British Presidential Distinguished Service
emigrants, 315–16 Award for the Irish Abroad, 112
Overseas Workers Resource Centre Presidential Office for Mexicans
(OWRC), 84–5 Abroad (OPME), 165
Prevention of Money Laundering Act,
P India, 88
Paisano programme, 161–2 PRI, see Partido Revolucionario
PAN, see Partido Acción Nacional (PAN) Institucional (PRI)
344 Index

Program for Mexican Communities Security and Prosperity Partnership of

Abroad (PCME), 162 North America, 158
Program of the IV Constitutional September 11, 2001 attacks, 158
Government, 263 Sharma, J. C., 85
The Promotion Fund of the Office of shoot to kill policy, Albania, 29
the Turkish Prime Minister, 286 Singh, Bahadur, 93
Proposition 187, California, 157, 162–3 Singh, Manmohan, 94
Prospective Maroc 2030, 191 Skanderbeg, 26
Protector General of Emigrants, India, slave trade, Nigerian emigration,
86, 89 229–30
Protestants, 101 Smart Border Agreements, 158
socialism, 29
Q Socialist Federal Republic of
Quelle Demographie?, 191 Yugoslavia, 29
sojourners, 310
R Somalia, 52
Reagan, Ronald, 199 Spain
regional diaspora, Albanian British emigrants, 308
emigration, 42–3 visa for Moroccan emigrants, 181,
remittances, Portuguese emigrants, 182
268–9 SPDC, see Scholarship Programme for
Representation of the People Act Diaspora Children (SPDC)
(1989), 315 state, as virtually autonomous
Republican Constitution of 1948, 141 actor, 2
Ressortissant Marocainsa l’Etranger, State Department of Emigration,
181 Portugal, 263
Resurgent India Bonds, 89 State Department of Emigration and
retirement migration, British Portuguese Communities, 264
emigration, 310 State Department of Portuguese
Revised Regulation on the Communities and Consular
importation of goods on franco- Matters, 264
Valuta basis Council of Ministers Strategic Partnership Joint Action
Regulation No. 88/2003, 65 Plan, EU-India Summit, 91
Richardson, Ruth, 199 Sull’oceano (De Amicis), 144
Robinson, Mary, 107, 108, 196 Switzerland
Romania, Albanians in, 28 Italian emigration to, 130
Russia, Albanians in, 28 Portuguese emigrants, 258–9, 261,
268
S
Salisbury, Lord, 92 T
Sayad, Abdelmalek, 1 Talent Scotland Relocation Advisory
Scholarship Programme for Diaspora Service, 317
Children (SPDC), 87 Tanitma Fonu Kurulu Basbakanlik
Sciascia, Leonardo, 144 Merkez Teskilati, see The
Scottish National Party (SNP), 316 Promotion Fund of the Office of
Second World War the Turkish Prime Minister
Albanian emigration and, 29 Tartan Days, 316
Italian emigration, 132, 141 Teaching of Portuguese Abroad
Moroccan emigration, 178 system, 265
 Index 345

Technical Committee of Federal overview, 277–8

Government Institutions, 61 post-Second World War period, 278–9
Teece, David, 213 Turkish Employment Services, 279
territorial state, 3 Turkish International Cooperation
Thatcher, Margaret, 199 and Development Agency (TIKA),
Third Country Nationals (TCNs), 34 284–5
TIKA, see Turkish International Turkish-Islamic Association of
Cooperation and Development Religious Affairs, 287
Agency (TIKA) Turkish State Planning Organisation,
Tindall, Stephen, 213 289
TOKEN, see Transfer of Knowledge Turks Abroad and Relative
through Expatriate Nationals Communities Department, 283–4,
(TOKTEN) 285
‘Tracing the Roots’, 87
trafficking, Ethiopian migration, 69 U
Trafficking in Persons (Prohibition) UK Office for National Statistics
Law Enforcement and (ONS), 308
Administrative Act Number 24, United Kingdom
235 Indian immigration to, 80
Transfer of Knowledge through Portuguese emigrants, 261
Expatriate Nationals (TOKTEN), United Nations Development
296 Programme (UNDP), 34–5
Transfrontier Committee, 106 United States
transnationalism, 2 Albanians in, 28
Trans-Tasman Travel Arrangement, Ethiopian diaspora, 53
216 Indian immigration to, 77–8, 79–80
Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, 154 Irish emigration to, 102, 106, 107
Tremain, Garrick, 197 Italian emigration to, 130, 132
Turkey, Albanians in, 28 Moroccan emigration, 184
Turkish diaspora Nigerian emigrants, 232–3
citizenship, 288 Turkish immigration to, 280–1
communication strategy, 290–1 US Civil War, 154
dual citizenship, 288–9 US Department of Treasury, 165
emigrants’ role, 291–7 US Immigration and Naturalization
financial products, 289 Service (INS), 280
government centres and offices, US Quota Act of 1921, 130
282–7
job opportunities, 289–90 V
ministries, 281–2 The Vanishing Irish (O’Brien), 105
official organizations, 288 Vertovec, Steven, 201
passports, 288 Village Development Cooperatives,
remittances, 289–90, 292–4 Turkey, 290
role in economy, 292–7 Visa Waiver Program, 146
Turkish emigration Vita (Mazzucco), 144
geography, 280–1 voting rights
guest workers, 279 Albanian emigrants, 40–1
highly skilled migration, 296–7 British emigrants, 315–16
history, 278–81 Indian emigrants, 85–7
labour market, 279, 280 Irish emirants, 113–15
346 Index

voting rights – continued World Class New Zealand Network,

Irish state emigrants, 113–15 213
Italian emigrants, 141 World Class New Zealand Programme,
Mexican emigrants, 168–70 212–13
Moroccan emigrants, 182, 188–9 World Congress of the Albanian
Nigerian emigrants, 244–5 diaspora, 36
Portuguese emigrants, 266–7
Y
W Yellow Card, Ethiopia, 64–5
West African Students’ Union Yoruba (ethnic group of Nigeria),
(WASU), 242–3 231
Western Europe, Turkish migration to, Yurtdisinda Yasayan Vatandaslar
278–80 Danisma Kurulu, see Consultancy
World Class New Zealand Awards, Board for Citizens Living Abroad
212–13 (CBCLA)