AFTER

THE
COUP
MYANMAR’S POLITICAL AND
HUMANITARIAN CRISES
 AFTER
THE
COUP
MYANMAR’S POLITICAL AND
HUMANITARIAN CRISES

EDITED BY ANTHONY WARE

AND MONIQUE SKIDMORE
Published by ANU Press
The Australian National University
Canberra ACT 2600, Australia
Email: [email protected]
Available to download for free at press.anu.edu.au
ISBN (print): 9781760466138
ISBN (online): 9781760466145
WorldCat (print): 1403852647
WorldCat (online): 1403846591
DOI: 10.22459/AC.2023
This title is published under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-
NoDerivatives 4.0 International (CC BY-NC-ND 4.0) licence.

The full licence terms are available at

creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/legalcode
Cover design and layout by ANU Press
Cover photograph: The scene on a bridge after protesters clash with security forces in
Yangon, Myanmar, on March 16, 2021. Photograph by The New York Times. Used with
permission.
This book is published under the aegis of the Social Sciences editorial committee
of ANU Press.
This edition © 2023 ANU Press
 Contents

Acronyms vii
Contributors xi
1. Post-Coup Myanmar’s Political and Humanitarian Crises 1
Anthony Ware and Monique Skidmore
2. Scenarios for Understanding Myanmar’s Political
and Humanitarian Crises 25
Nicholas Farrelly
3. The Role of Social Media and Disruptive Technologies
in Post-Coup Democracy Activism 47
Jaydn (pseudonym), Monique Skidmore and Cecile Medail
4. Multinational Enterprise Behaviour in Post-Coup Myanmar 71
Nicholas Coppel
5. Politics, Justice and Accountability: Myanmar and
International Courts 95
Adam Simpson and Juliette McIntyre
6. China–Myanmar Relations after the 1 February
Military Coup 119
Kristina Kironska and Diya Jiang
7. Myanmar in ASEAN: Dilemmas, Determinants and Capacity 137
Moe Thuzar
8. The Federal Democracy Charter: A Path to Inter-Ethnic
Peace in Post-Coup Myanmar 163
Costas Laoutides
9. Rakhine State Post-Coup: Arakan Army State-Building
and Its Implications for Rohingya and Aid 185
Anthony Ware and Costas Laoutides
10. Evolution of Communal Tensions in Rakhine State after
the Coup 209
Ye Min Zaw and Tay Zar Myo Win
11. Pandemic Weaponisation and Non-State Welfare
in Pre- and Post-Coup Myanmar 231
Gerard McCarthy and Saw Moo (pseudonym)
12. Localisation, Good Humanitarianism and Solidarity-Based
Approaches to Aid in Myanmar 253
Anne Décobert
13. Relief as Resistance: (Re)Emergent Humanitarianism
in Post-Coup Myanmar 277
Aung Naing and Tamas Wells
14. Myanmar’s Higher Education Sector Post-Coup:
Fracturing a Fragile System 297
Charlotte Galloway
15. The Aftermath: Policy Responses to Myanmar’s Political
and Humanitarian Crises 319
Monique Skidmore and Anthony Ware
 Acronyms

AA Arakan Army
AAPP Assistance Association for Political Prisoners
ANU The Australian National University
APA Arakan People’s Authority
ARI Asia Research Institute
ARSA Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army
ASEAN Association of Southeast Asian Nations
ASEANSAI ASEAN Supreme Audit Institutions
BRI Belt and Road Initiative
CBO community-based organisations
CCP Chinese Communist Party
CDM Civil Disobedience Movement
CRPH Committee Representing Pyidaungsu Hluttaw
CSO civil society organisation
DDoS distributed denial-of-service
EAO ethnic armed organisations
EC European Commission
FDC Federal Democracy Charter
FFM Fact-Finding Mission on Myanmar
GAD General Administration Department
GNLM Global New Light of Myanmar
HE higher education
HEI higher education institutions
IASC Inter-Agency Standing Committee

vii
 AFTER THE COUP

ICC International Criminal Court

ICJ International Court of Justice
IDP internally displaced persons
IFRC International Federation of the Red Cross
IIE Institute of International Education
IIMM Independent Investigative Mechanism for Myanmar
INGO international NGO
ISEAS Institute of Southeast Asian Studies
ISP Institute for Strategy and Policy – Myanmar
MCRB Myanmar Centre for Responsible Business
MEC Myanmar Economic Corporation
MEHL Myanma Economic Holdings Limited
MLHN Myanmar Local Humanitarian Network
MoE Ministry of Education
MOGE Myanmar Oil and Gas Enterprise
MoU memorandum of understanding
NGO non-government organisations
NLD National League for Democracy
NUCC National Unity Consultative Council
NUG National Unity Government
OECD Organisation for Economic Co-Operation
and Development
PDF People’s Defence Force
SAC State Administration Council
SEZ Special Economic Zone
SUM Spring University Myanmar
TCG Tripartite Core Group
UEC Union Election Commission
ULA United League of Arakan
UN United Nations
UNESCO United Nations Educational, Scientific and
Cultural Organization

viii
 ACRONYMS

UNHCR United Nations High Commission for Refugees

UNHRC United Nations Human Rights Council
UNTFHS United Nations Trust Fund for Human Security
USAID US Aid
USDP Union Solidarity and Development Party
VFU Virtual Federal University
VPN virtual private network

ix
 Contributors

Dr Adam Simpson is a senior lecturer in international studies within

Justice & Society, University of South Australia. He has held a six-month
visiting research fellowship at the Centre for Southeast Asian Studies,
Kyoto University, and visiting scholar positions at School of Oriental
and African Studies, University of London, Queen Mary, University of
London and Keele University. His articles have appeared in journals such
as Environmental Politics, Third World Quarterly, Society & Natural Resources
and Pacific Review. He is the author of Energy, Governance and Security in
Thailand and Myanmar (Burma): A Critical Approach to Environmental
Politics in the South (Routledge, 2014; NIAS Press, 2017) and is lead editor
of the Routledge Handbook of Contemporary Myanmar (2018) and Myanmar:
Politics, Economy and Society (Routledge, 2021).
Dr Anne Décobert is a development studies scholar, anthropologist of
development and development practitioner who has worked since 2009
on questions related to conflict and peace-building, humanitarianism,
development and the struggles for rights and justice of minority groups
in Myanmar. Strongly committed to ethically engaged research, she is
particularly interested in approaches to addressing inequities and injustices
faced by marginalised communities whose lives are shaped by structural
violence and conflict. Her work to date has notably explored how those
who are often wrongly labelled as passive ‘victims’ of violence and
injustices themselves challenge, and potentially redefine, humanitarian and
development systems and approaches as part of wider attempts to achieve
recognition and social justice. Anne is the author of The Politics of Aid to
Burma: A Humanitarian Struggle on the Thai-Burmese Border (Routledge,
2016), as well as academic articles, reports and media pieces focusing on
humanitarianism, development and peace-building in conflict situations.
In addition to her academic work, Anne also continues to act as a consultant
with aid agencies in Myanmar.

xi
 AFTER THE COUP

Associate Professor Anthony Ware is an associate professor of International

& Community Development at Deakin University, and convenor of
the Development-Humanitarian Research Group. He was director of the
Australia Myanmar Institute (2013–17), secretary of the Development
Studies Association of Australia (2019–22) and is a thematic editor of
Development in Practice. He has published over 50 academic papers/chapters
and four books (two monographs, two edited collections), including, as lead
author, the highly regarded Myanmar’s ‘Rohingya’ Conflict (Hurst/Oxford
University Press, 2018, with Costas Laoutides). His research focuses on
humanitarian/international development approaches in conflict-affected
situations, with a particular interest in conflict sensitivity, do no harm,
everyday peace, peace-building and countering violent/hateful extremism
via community-led programming. His major field of research has been
Myanmar.
Dr Aung Naing (pseudonym) is an independent researcher who has spent
much of the past two decades studying social protection, poverty reduction
and inequalities in Myanmar, as well as training successive generations
of new scholars in social research.
Dr Cecile Medail holds a PhD in international political studies from
the University of New South Wales. Her main research interests include
democratisation, state-building and ethnic identity in Myanmar. Prior to
her doctoral studies, she worked with Burmese grassroots organisations in
Thailand and in Myanmar for eight years. She provided capacity building
support to young community activists from various ethnic backgrounds,
advocating for genuine democracy in Myanmar and campaigning for
an economic development respectful of the rights of local indigenous
communities. She is now a visiting fellow at the Department of Political
and Social Change, Coral Bell School of Asia Pacific Affairs, The Australian
National University (ANU).
Dr Charlotte Galloway has been researching in Myanmar for over 20 years.
An art historian, Charlotte has been actively involved with capacity building
in the museum and heritage sector. She has participated in collaborative
projects within the Ministry of Religious Affairs and Culture, and was
a United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
(UNESCO) expert for the preparation of Bagan’s world heritage
nomination dossier. An experienced educator, she has been visiting faculty
at the University of Yangon and has extensive involvement in capacity
building and research activities for Myanmar’s higher education sector,

xii
 CONTRIBUTORS

including working with international donors. Immediately prior to the

coup, Charlotte was involved in drafting the higher education components
for the National Education Strategic Plan 2 (NESP2) (2021–30) for the
Myanmar Ministry of Education. She is currently engaged in a project to
investigate and develop alternative modes of education delivery for students
in conflict areas.
Associate Professor Costas Laoutides is an associate professor of
international relations at Deakin University, Australia. His area of expertise
is ethno-political and separatist conflict, and its resolution. He is the
co‑author of Myanmar’s ‘Rohingya’ Conflict (Hurst/Oxford University Press,
2018, with Anthony Ware) and the sole author of Self-Determination and
Collective Responsibility in Secessionist Struggle (Routledge).
Diya Jiang is a researcher specialising in the fields of international relations
and political economy. Her research interests include non-state actors in
international relations, foreign influence and democratisation. Following
her experience conducting quantitative research for the Center for Policing
Equity (policingequity.org/) in New York, she further developed expertise in
comparative democratisation and international soft power dynamics during
her postgraduate degree in international political economy at the London
School of Economics and Political Science. She now pursues her research
endeavours at the Central European Institute of Asian Studies (www.ceias.
eu), where she has assisted on multiple projects including the Myanmar
Coup Tracker (myanmarcouptracker.eu). She is an incoming PhD student
in political science at McGill University.
Dr Gerard McCarthy is a research fellow at National University of
Singapore’s Asia Research Institute (ARI) where he works on the politics of
welfare and development in Southeast Asia, especially Myanmar. He also
co-leads ARI’s archival project ‘Living with COVID-19 in Southeast
Asia: Personal and visual experiences of crisis, control & Community’.
His writing and commentary on welfare politics, non-state social actors,
military capitalism and conflict has been published in outlets including
Conflict, Security & Development and Journal of Contemporary Asia along
with The New York Times, the Economist and the Washington Post. His book
Outsourcing the Polity: Non-State Welfare, Inequality and Resistance in
Myanmar will be published in 2023 by Cornell University Press. He earned
his DPhil from the Department of Political and Social Change at ANU
where he was associate director of the ANU Myanmar Research Centre
from 2017 to 2019.

xiii
 AFTER THE COUP

Jadyn (pseudonym) is a former computer engineer with diverse experiences

including political analysis and monitoring, political campaigning, civic
education and media. As a computer engineer during the 2007 Saffron
Revolution, he witnessed how the power of the internet carried voices from
within Myanmar throughout the entire world. When the country was still
closed, Jadyn researched and presented internationally about the internet
and the political situation in Myanmar. When the country opened up,
he researched and presented locally on civic engagement with the media,
politics in cyberspace and political trends in Myanmar.
Juliette McIntyre is a lecturer in law at the University of South Australia,
and a PhD candidate at the University of Melbourne. Her PhD thesis
examines the rules of procedure of the International Court of Justice.
She holds a first-class LLM in international law from the University of
Cambridge and is a recipient of the Law Foundation of South Australia
Fellowship. She also has significant litigation experience, including before
the International Court of Justice. She has published in several leading
international journals such as the Michigan Journal of International Law,
the Leiden Journal of International Law and AJIL Unbound.
Dr Kristina Kironska is a socially engaged interdisciplinary academic
with experience in Myanmar affairs, Taiwan affairs, Central and Eastern
Europe – China relations, campaigns and activism. In 2015–16, she lived
in Myanmar, where she worked for a local non-governmental organisation
(NGO) and conducted research on the 2015 elections, the political
transition of the country and the issue of the Rohingya. In 2017–18,
she worked for Amnesty International as a campaigner. In 2019–20, she
lived in Taipei where she conducted research under the Taiwan Fellowship
program, lectured at the University of Taipei and organised monthly human
rights talks. Currently, she is the advocacy director at the Central European
Institute of Asian Studies (www.ceias.eu) and a senior researcher at the
Palacky University in Olomouc, Czech Republic.
Moe Thuzar is senior fellow at the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies
(ISEAS)-Yusof Ishak Institute, Singapore, and coordinator of the Myanmar
studies program. Moe joined ISEAS in 2008, serving as a lead researcher
in the ASEAN Studies Centre up to August 2019. Prior to joining ISEAS,
Moe spent 10 years at the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)
Secretariat, where she headed the Human Development Unit from 2004
to 2007. A former diplomat, she is researching Burma’s foreign policy
implementation from 1948 to 1988 for her PhD studies at the National

xiv
 CONTRIBUTORS

University of Singapore. Moe has contributed to several compendia on

ASEAN and on Myanmar, including Myanmar: Life After Nargis (ISEAS,
2009), a co-authored report with Pavin Chachavalpongpun on ASEAN’s
response to the 2008 Cyclone Nargis in Myanmar, and a coedited volume
with Yap Kioe Sheng on Urbanisation in Southeast Asia: Issues and Implications
(ISEAS, 2012).
Professor Monique Skidmore is an honorary professor with Deakin
University’s Alfred Deakin Institute. She is an award- and grant-winning
Burmese political and medical anthropologist, and international expert
media commentator. She has published seven books on Myanmar,
including the very highly regarded Karaoke Fascism: Burma and the Politics
of Fear (University of Pennsylvania Press, 2004). She convened the Burma
Studies Update at ANU for eight years, and has held senior positions at the
University of Tasmania, University of Queensland and ANU, among other
institutions. She is the current director of the Australia Myanmar Institute.
Associate Professor Nicholas Coppel is an adjunct associate professor
(practice) at Monash University and a former career diplomat and
ambassador. He was Australia’s ambassador to Myanmar for four years
from 2015 to 2018. Previous postings were as special coordinator of the
Regional Assistance Mission to Solomon Islands, deputy high commissioner
to Papua New Guinea, deputy ambassador to the Philippines and first
secretary in the Australian Embassy, Washington DC. The Solomon Islands
government awarded him with the Cross of Solomon Islands for his work
towards restoring peace and governance. Among various roles in Canberra,
he headed the Economic Analytical Unit in the Department of Foreign
Affairs and Trade where he oversaw and contributed to the research, writing
and publication of 10 reports covering major trade and economic issues.
He holds a Bachelor of Economics degree from ANU and a Master of
Business Administration degree from London Business School. From 2004
to 2010 he was on the Editorial Advisory Board of Asia-Pacific Economic
Literature.
Professor Nicholas Farrelly studied at ANU and the University of Oxford.
Over the past 20 years he has researched political conflict and social change
across the borderlands where Myanmar meets Thailand, India, Bangladesh
and China. In 2006, he founded New Mandala, a website that has become a
prominent public forum in Southeast Asian studies. He then held a range of
academic positions in the College of Asia and the Pacific at ANU, including
as deputy director of the Coral Bell School of Asia Pacific Affairs and as

xv
 AFTER THE COUP

director of the Myanmar Research Centre. From 2017 to 2019, Nicholas

was an associate dean in the College of Asia and the Pacific, ANU. In 2020,
he was appointed to the Board of the Australia-ASEAN Council. As head of
the School of Social Sciences at the University of Tasmania, Nicholas leads
a vibrant multidisciplinary academic team.
Saw Moo (pseudonym) is a social researcher and project manager currently
working with an international organisation in Myanmar. He holds a master’s
degree in development studies from the University of Melbourne.
Dr Tamas Wells is an academic at the University of Melbourne where
he is also coordinator of the university’s Myanmar Research Network.
His research focuses on contested meanings of democracy, human rights and
accountability in Southeast Asia, and the impact of these on development
policy. His book Narrating Democracy in Myanmar (Cambridge University
Press, 2021) examines the Burmese opposition movement in the lead up
to the historic 2015 elections in Myanmar and diverging narratives of
democracy within the movement and among its international supporters.
Before entering academia, he worked as an aid and development adviser
and consultant with various NGOs including Save the Children, with seven
years living and working in Myanmar. He has been active in developing
stronger connections between academics and practitioners in the field of aid
and development and is the editor of the PK Forum, an online discussion
forum on aid and development in Myanmar.
Tay Zar Myo Win is a lecturer at the Faculty of Political Science, Ubon
Ratchathani University. His main research interests include analysing
electoral systems, decentralisation, democratisation, federalism, social
conflict and human rights, both in Myanmar and in the wider Southeast
Asian context. His current research projects are the communal conflict in
Rakhine State, Myanmar, and the rights of the Rohingya people and the
Civil Disobedience Movement in Myanmar’s democratisation process. Apart
from his research work, Tay Zar has longstanding experience working in
development practice, focusing on civic education, democracy and electoral
support. Collaborating with civil society organisations and international
NGOs in Myanmar, he was involved in developing a series of civic education
curricula for young students and adult learners and managed training and
workshops. He also closely worked with the Union Election Commission
in Myanmar as a member of a technical support team to assist national and
local elections in Myanmar.

xvi
 CONTRIBUTORS

Dr Ye Min Zaw is an independent researcher and writer in contemporary

politics and conflict in Myanmar. His research is focused on sub-national
conflict, peace-building and social cohesion in Myanmar, and humanitarian
assistance in protracted and fragile conflicts. He has been working in the
humanitarian and development sectors for 10 years, with a wide range of
international non-profit organisations and the United Nations.

xvii
 1
Post-Coup Myanmar’s Political
and Humanitarian Crises
Anthony Ware
Associate Professor, School of Humanities and Social Sciences,
Deakin University, Australia

Monique Skidmore
Professor, Alfred Deakin Institute, Deakin University, Australia

Abstract
Myanmar’s coup on 1 February 2021 abruptly ended a decade of (limited)
economic and political liberalisations and plunged the country into civil war
and a deep humanitarian crisis. This introductory chapter to the volume
tracks the key events of the coup, and subsequently, to lay a foundation of
facts and details for the analysis offered in the following chapters. It highlights
the brutality of the military as they have tried to consolidate power, as well
as documenting the emergence of the Committee Representing Pyidaungsu
Hluttaw, National Unity Government, Civil Disobedience Movement
and People’s Defence Force. It documents the current situation regarding
numbers of civilian deaths, arbitrary arrests, death sentences, houses
destroyed, and people displaced internally and across borders. The chapter
concludes that the strength and organisation of resistance clearly took the
military leadership by surprise, but this has only increased their brutality.
The military face a high rate of defections and are increasingly spread very
thinly, but the resistance does not look like it can take control of the country
either, leading us to conclude that the conflict is almost certainly destined

1
 AFTER THE COUP

for a prolonged, bloody stalemate. The chapter then provides a summary of

the key contributions of each of the other chapters in the volume, as an
outline of the book.

***
The Myanmar military1 executed a coup d’état in the early hours of Monday
morning, 1 February 2021, abruptly ending a decade-long flirtation with
(limited) economic and political liberalisation. In a series of pre-dawn
raids, the military arrested State Counsellor Aung San Suu Kyi, President
Win Myint and other senior members of the elected National League
for Democracy (NLD) government (Pietromarchi & Gadzo 2021), and
declared a one-year state of emergency, later extended to 18 months, then
two years, with further extensions likely. They imposed a national curfew
and moved to take control of the key institutions of state. Phone and internet
connections were disrupted in Naypyidaw and Yangon (expanding to other
centres as resistance spread), state television was taken off air, and financial
and banking services were interrupted. In Naypyidaw, military trucks
blockaded the parliamentary residential quarter, effectively quarantining
hundreds of other elected members of parliament from communications,
the media and their constituents. The moves on that first day were swift,
decisive, well planned and tightly executed. They were effective in cutting
elected representatives and the NLD off from control over any part of the
state apparatus.
The coup came just hours before the new parliament had been due to sit
for the first time after the 8 November 2020 election. The NLD had won
that election with a landslide. It had been widely viewed as a referendum
on Aung San Suu Kyi’s first five years in office, and the voice of the people
was decisive. The NLD won 396 elected seats (83 per cent) in the Union
Parliament, an increase from the 370 seats they won in the 2015 election,
and well over the 67 per cent super-majority needed to outvote the
combined pro-military bloc (once the military-appointed 25 per cent of
seats [160 seats] is factored in). The military-backed Union Solidarity and

1 The Myanmar military calls itself the ‘Tatmadaw’, a name that was long adopted by the academic
community. However, many in the resistance to the coup refuse to use the name, which literally translates
as ‘royal armed forces’. As Myanmar is no longer a kingdom, the contemporary use of the name implies
‘glorious’ more than ‘belonging to the king’. In solidarity with the Myanmar people, this chapter, indeed
this whole volume, refuses to use the name and usually simply uses the term ‘Myanmar military’, to avoid
implying it is in any way a glorious or meritorious institution. Desmond (2022) makes this case, arguing
for use of the term sit-tat instead, although Aung Kaung Myat (2022) critiques this as problematic.

2
 1. POST-COUP MYANMAR’S POLITICAL AND HUMANITARIAN CRISES

Development Party (USDP) won just 33 out of the possible 476 seats in
the election, down from 42 seats in 2015, a serious snub by voters that
served to further reduce the military’s influence in the national parliament
to under 200 seats across the two houses. Addressing that, together with
NLD campaigning for changes to the 2008 Constitution of the Republic
of the Union of Myanmar, were critical motivations behind the coup,
because the military would have definitely seen a challenge to its military
bloc voting rights in the constitution occur during the next parliamentary
term. (That said, it is worth noting that, even then, constitutional change
would have required a super-majority of over 75 per cent of parliament
voting in favour, and with the military appointing 25 per cent of seats
under their 2008 Constitution, so long as the military appointees voted as
a bloc, they already had effective power of veto).
The military justified the coup by alleging widespread election fraud, and
immediately pledged to clean up politics and run free and fair elections one
year after their intervention. These elections have now been deferred until
August 2023, and, if they proceed at all, it is clear they will do so without
Aung San Suu Kyi or the NLD, in defiance of the will of the people. At best,
if they do occur, it seems clear they will be stage-managed and engineered to
elect only military-backed parties and candidates to a puppet government.
Regardless, to consolidate control, the day after the coup the generals set
up the junta-controlled State Administration Council (SAC) to replace the
elected government. Chaired by Commander-in-Chief Senior General Min
Aung Hlaing and comprising, initially, 11 loyal military personnel, it was
expanded to include military-aligned civilian party leaders. In August 2021,
it was named as the provisional government, with Senior General Min Aung
Hlaing serving as both head of the armed forces and prime minister.
Meanwhile, President Win Myint and Aung San Suu Kyi were permanently
sidelined by being charged with a series of trumped-up offences. Win
Myint was charged with breaching campaign guidelines and COVID-19
pandemic restrictions, while Aung San Suu Kyi was charged with importing
walkie-talkies for her security team (which are restricted in Myanmar and
need clearance from military) as well as breaching emergency COVID-19
laws (Myat Thura & Min Wathan 2021). Further charges have been added,
with Aung San Suu Kyi facing at least 18 charges including corruption,
violating the Official Secrets Act and intent to incite public unrest (Frontier
Myanmar 2021a). Combined, these charges carry a maximum jail terms
of nearly 190 years! By mid-October 2022, the 77-year-old Suu Kyi has
already been sentenced to 26 years in jail, some sentences including hard
3
 AFTER THE COUP

labour, with most charges still to come to court (Mogul & Kwon 2022).
The arrogant display of raw power, in the marginalisation of the people’s
clearly expressed will, is obscene.
While most commentators did not believe the military would institute
a coup after the 2020 election, there were many warnings from the military
and indications they were considering doing so. On 14 August 2020, three
months before the election, 34 pro-military parties including the USDP met
with Min Aung Hlaing, seeking to have the military intervene in the event
of ‘electoral integrity issues’ (San Yasmin Aung 2021). Critics were alarmed
that the commander-in-chief came out of that meeting bragging, ‘I am brave
enough to do anything’ (San Yasmin Aung 2021), fearing it was a clear
threat to institute a coup if they did not win at the ballot box. Then, six days
prior to the election, the military issued a statement asserting that the Union
Election Commission (UEC) was mishandling preparations for the election
(Irrawaddy 2021a). Clearly, they were setting up a narrative to support
a potential coup. Nonetheless, on election day, 8 November 2020, Min
Aung Hlaing did make the comment that, ‘I’ll have to accept the people’s
wish and the results that come with it’ (Sithu Aung Myint 2021). Observers
relaxed, hoping he was committed to respecting the electoral outcome.
Immediately after the election, however, he announced the military would
review the electoral process—a power it does not constitutionally have—
then went on a campaign to discredit the election results, repeatedly alleging
irregularities throughout December 2020 and January 2021 (San Yasmin
Aung 2021). The coup was thus a surprise, yet not really a surprise.
A week after the coup, 70 UEC officials were taken into custody (ANFREL
2021), replaced by junta appointees who quickly called for the NLD to be
disbanded and party leaders to be prosecuted as ‘traitors’, echoing the senior
general’s pretext for the coup. That has not (yet) formally occurred, but de
facto, through military power and arrests, the NLD has been sidelined from
power. If the junta does eventually run new elections, it seems clear that
the NLD and other democratic parties will be prevented from contesting.
In July 2022, three of the senior UEC officials who administrated the 2020
election were sentenced to prison terms, including the UEC chair Hla
Thein (Ko Cho 2022).

4
 1. POST-COUP MYANMAR’S POLITICAL AND HUMANITARIAN CRISES

Coercive force and civilian resistance

Opposition to the coup was rapidly mobilised. The NLD published a
statement on the party’s official Facebook account shortly after the coup
began unfolding on 1 February, purportedly written by Aung San Suu
Kyi before she was detained, urging people to resist the coup (BBC News
2021). Whether this came from her, or the NLD media team, elected
politicians countered quickly and strategically. Four days after the coup,
on 5 February, elected representatives who were not in detention held an
emergency parliamentary session, releasing a public claim to be the only
legitimate government of Myanmar and appointing a Cabinet. They
formed the Committee Representing Pyidaungsu Hluttaw (CRPH) to serve
as the legitimate parliament, a body that quickly included over 300 elected
representatives from a spectrum of political parties spanning the two houses
of parliament (Pyidaungsu Hluttaw 2021; CRPH 2021; Irrawaddy 2021b).
On 31 March, the CRPH declared the country’s 2008 Constitution void
and put forward an interim replacement, the Federal Democracy Charter,
hoping to woo an alliance with the armed organisations2 of the country’s
many borderland minority groups (AP News 2021). On 16 April, the CRPH
appointed a National Unity Government (NUG), with representatives
from parties beyond the NLD, to form government under the CRPH. The
NUG appointed a full Cabinet with ministers and departments (see www.
nugmyanmar.org/en/), as well as representatives in several countries
including the United States, United Kingdom, France, Czech Republic,
Australia and South Korea as they quickly sought international recognition.
The broader public initially resisted the coup by banging pots and pans
at 8pm, as the curfew came into effect, which has been a traditional way
to ward off evil spirits for centuries (Vossion 1891, 109; Lovett 2021).
While minimal, it did signal to the military on the streets how little popular
support they had. Two days after the coup, healthcare workers went on
strike, quickly followed by civil servants in other sectors across Myanmar
(ANFREL 2021). This was the beginning of the Civil Disobedience
Movement (CDM), in which civil servants, workers in government health
and education sectors, and others connected to government (and beyond),

2 These armies, from the country’s many minority groups in the borderlands, are often referred
to as ethnic armed organisations. Given the damage the ethnicisation of identities has done in
Myanmar, particularly the hegemonic adoption of ‘ethnicity’ in political identities, we prefer avoiding
the term completely. ‘Ethnicity’ is an intellectually lazy conception of minority groups, to be avoided
wherever possible.

5
 AFTER THE COUP

simply refused to work for the regime, striking until the junta reversed the
coup and freed their elected leaders. At its peak, the CDM boasted more
than 360,000 members, most of whom chose to walk away from state jobs,
and was nominated for the 2022 Nobel Peace Prize (Lipes 2022a). The
CDM also became a force online, widely sharing creative forms of resistance
and photos of groups supporting the CDM to promote solidarity. By the
end of the first week after the coup, tens of thousands of civilians were
flooding the streets daily in peaceful protests (Al Jazeera 2021a), with up to
90 per cent of the staff in some government ministries on strike (Frontier
Myanmar 2021b). Initially, the security forces showed some restraint, for
example by sending the police rather than the military to control protests.
As the police stood in formation, not advancing, protesters attempted to use
moral shame to win them over; however, this only resulted in the military
being deployed in many locations. Within weeks, demonstrators were
widely beaten, arrested and fired upon. Police and soldiers responded in
Mandalay, Bago and Naypyidaw with water cannons, tear gas and both live
and rubber bullets (ANFREL 2021). Fortify Rights and Yale Law School’s
Schell Center claim the junta created a special command a day after the
coup, responsible for the operation of troops in urban areas, and authorised
lethal attacks on unarmed civilians (Fortify Rights 2022). They claim the
junta primarily deployed snipers to kill protesters to instil fear, while soldiers
were instructed to arbitrarily arrest protesters and activists.
For weeks, the military crackdown only spurred on the peaceful protest
movement. Demonstrations grew to hundreds of thousands of people on
the streets across the country (Al Jazeera 2021b; Guardian 2021)—this
despite expanded curfews, internet cuts, Facebook/WhatsApp/Twitter
being completely blocked for days, the deployment of armoured vehicles
in city streets (Safi 2021) and security forces firing on protesters (Hallam
2021; Paddock 2021). However, the mass demonstrations finally dissipated
as the weeks of mass arrests and the overwhelming use of military force
against the civilians took its toll. Eventually, soldiers took to mowing down
demonstrators with machine guns and destroying barricades with rocket
propelled grenades—for example, in Bago on 9 April 2021 where at least
82 were killed and corpses piled high in the grounds of a local Buddhist
temple (Gerin 2021; Strangio 2021).
As this coercive force against the civilians mounted, and numbers protesting
peacefully on the streets dwindled, the resistance movement split into
those that continued to pursue non-violent civil disobedience and those
who wished to use violent means to resist the coup (Lovett & Safi 2021).
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 1. POST-COUP MYANMAR’S POLITICAL AND HUMANITARIAN CRISES

Armed resistance groups self-organised, attempting to ambush junta forces

and fight back with homemade weapons (Strangio 2021). By early April,
for example, activists in Sagaing Region, in northern Myanmar, had armed
themselves with rudimentary rifles and adopted the name ‘Kalay Civil
Army’. With the multiplication of such militias increasing, the NUG
announced the formation of a nationwide ‘People’s Defence Force’ (PDF)
on 5 May 2021, declaring it a forerunner of a truly federal armed forces
institution that would include soldiers from all anti-regime armed groups
(Irrawaddy 2021c). Their aim was to militarily depose those who took power
by force, in cooperation with minority group armies who would work with
them. The NUG suggested that ‘preparations for this army were made a
long time ago’ and announced both military training for new recruits and
a weapons acquisition department under the NUG’s Ministry of Defence
(Whong 2021). Unsurprisingly, the military immediately labelled the PDFs
as ‘terrorist’ organisations. But they grew. By 7 September 2021, the NUG’s
Ministry of Defence announced the launch of a ‘defensive war’ and called
for a ‘nationwide revolution’ against the military. By October 2021, it had
formed a central military command to coordinate resistance operations
across the country (Al Jazeera 2021c; Reuters 2021).
Fast forward to the situation as this book is being compiled in late 2022,
a year and three-quarters after the coup, and the situation remains highly
contested. What started as civil disobedience has now turned into a civil war,
taking a horrific toll on the people as the junta rolls out a military campaign
across the country to eliminate all opposition to its rule. The financial and
human toll, on both sides, means both sides now appear to be losing steam,
and the situation risks becoming a grinding stalemate in which neither side
can be completely victorious.
The PDF, for their part, claim to be stronger than ever (Lipes 2022b), with
new recruits drawn from all walks of life: deposed members of parliament,
artists, celebrities, students, farmers and defected soldiers. In May 2022, the
NUG Ministry of Defence claimed the PDF had 257 units based in 250
townships across Myanmar, with strong links with more than 400 other
local resistance militias. By November 2022, the Irrawaddy (Banyar Aung
2022) assessed their operational capacity at over 300 PDF battalions of 200–
500 members each, right across the country, 221 of them under the direct
command of the NUG, with a further 63 battalions waiting for recognition
by the NUG. Combined PDF membership, according to this report, is now
over 65,000, excluding the 400 or more Local Defence Force militias not
formally affiliated with either the NUG or the established armies of minority
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 AFTER THE COUP

groups. Certainly, reports suggest the regime now controls barely half of the
country (Min Min 2022a). Over 12,900 soldiers and police have defected
to the PDF (MPM 2022; Min Min 2022a). The NUG has raised and spent
over USD55 million on military equipment, arms and training for the PDF,
and commenced payments to PDF soldiers (Banyar Aung 2022)—in part
through innovative fundraising for a government-in-exile, such as selling
shares in coup leader Min Aung Hlaing’s mansion in Yangon (Irrawaddy
2022c) and selling NUG ‘treasury bonds’—that latter of which had raised
USD38 million by June 2022 (PTV 2022). They also claim to have set
up production of single-shot firearms, automatic submachine guns, land
mines and bombs to be dropped by drones, outside of factory settings across
Myanmar (Lipes 2022c).
However, the NUG/PDF are struggling. Another USD100 million would
be required to properly arm the PDF (Irrawaddy 2022d), with only
25 per cent of PDF forces fully armed, and another 40 per cent carrying
homemade weapons (Banyar Aung 2022). This prompts the uncomfortable
question of whether external powers should be more active in arming and
training the opposition movement. At present, PDF forces can only employ
guerrilla tactics and are unable to face the military head-on (Lipes 2022b).
In addition, the CDM is losing steam amid junta crackdowns that have
made peaceful opposition too dangerous. The NUG President’s Office has
conceded that more than a third of people who walked away from state jobs
to take part in peaceful anti-junta CDM action have since returned to those
jobs, buckling under personal and financial insecurity (Lipes 2022a).
At the same time, though, the Myanmar military are also struggling.
In March 2022, Min Aung Hlaing said the military would ‘annihilate
[its opponents] until the end’ (Al Jazeera 2022). They have made extensive
new weapons purchases, including jet fighters, armoured vehicles, surface-
to-air missiles and mobile defence systems from Russia (Ohmar 2022), as
well as other weapons from China (Lipes 2022c). However, weapons alone
cannot win against the people, and morale is low and defections high. Prior
to the coup, the military was estimated to have around 400,000 troops;
it is likely now that they are down to only half that (Min Min 2022a).
One contributing factor is the failure of the military company Myanma
Economic Holdings Limited (MEHL) to distribute dividends. MEHL is
a massive conglomerate, with 56 subsidiary companies operating across
14 industries. Its revenue is a primary means by which the military has
self-financed and remained in power for decades. It has been mandatory
for more than 20 years for all ranks to buy MEHL shares, and the share
8
 1. POST-COUP MYANMAR’S POLITICAL AND HUMANITARIAN CRISES

dividends are effectively seen as a salary component, becoming a pension

after retirement. However, while MEHL’s financial losses are not public,
as recently as mid-2022 it was clear that the dividend payment due in
September 2021 remained unpaid (Min Min 2022b; Zaw Ye Thwe 2022),
meaning the regime had not been able to pay current and former soldiers
their full salary since the coup. It is not clear in late 2022 whether they have
yet been paid, but while MEHL and other military companies are struggling
financially, the military will continue to be cash-starved and morale is likely
to decline.
The outcome is a terrible, ongoing conflict that has devastated the country
and, in our estimation, seems destined for stalemate. The NUG and military
would disagree, but we do not see the tide turning any time soon. The result
is an acute political and humanitarian crisis affecting the entire population,
destroying lives and livelihoods. As of 23 November 2022, according to
data from the Assistance Association for Political Prisoners (AAPP 2022a),
2,533 civilians have been verified as killed by the junta, including well over
400 children, with 16,403 arrests for participating in anti-coup activities
including the CDM. At that time, some 12,976 remained detained by the
military, despite just 1,608 having been charged and sentenced. This figure
may be less now, after the junta released 5,774 prisoners in an amnesty on
17 November 2022 for National Day, but the AAPP had only been able to
verify that 402 of the political prisoners on their list had been released by
23 November (AAPP 2022b, 2022c). Meanwhile, a total of 128 civilians
have now been sentenced to death, the first four of whom were executed on
25 July amid global outcry.
The Institute for Strategy and Policy – Myanmar record at least 2,299
civilians shot by the military while protesting and another 701 who died in
the process of being arrested by the SAC (ISP 2022a). They confirm that at
least 36,000 houses and buildings were destroyed in military raids since the
coup (ISP 2022b), resulting in more than 1.6 million people now internally
displaced (ISP 2022c)—taking the combined total of internally displaced
people plus refugees from Myanmar to almost 3 million people (ISP 2022d;
Al Jazeera 2022). The NUG allege around 2,800 separate war crimes have
been committed by the military, including arbitrary killings, extrajudicial
executions, rape, the use of torture, using civilians as human shields, air and
artillery strikes on civilian targets, and the looting and burning of houses
(Irrawaddy 2022e). On the other side, however, the SAC allege over 3,542
civilians have been killed by resistance forces in targeted assassinations as
alleged military informants (ISP 2022a). This has not been independently
9
 AFTER THE COUP

verified, but, if true, it would take the total civilians killed in violence
since the coup to over 7,000 people. Evidence of atrocities on both sides is
mounting (Pedroletti 2022).
What is clear is that the strength and organisation of resistance clearly took
the military leadership by surprise, and its effectiveness and longevity has
surprised most international commentators. The CDM, NUG and PDF
have prevented the military from consolidating control. By any analysis,
the coup has been only partially successful, at best, in delivering control
of the country to the generals, who still have only limited control over
the bureaucracy, health and education systems, international relations
and, indeed, territory across Myanmar. Their ongoing campaign has
not only highlighted their brutality and bloody-mindedness, but also
the incompetence of the military. Its need to resort to brutal tactics and
overwhelming force, and still be unable to succeed, underscores its total
ineptitude. The high rate of defections of soldiers and police to the PDFs
have become an increasing concern for the military and have helped to sustain
and grow the PDF resistance (Esther J & Min Min 2022). The military are
increasingly spread very thin, fighting insurgents on a multitude of fronts,
to the point that they have needed to draft police to serve on the frontlines
against PDF forces (Irrawaddy 2022b) and form armed pro‑military civilian
militias (Irrawaddy 2022a). Reports suggest they have had to resort to
airstrikes because ground troops are reluctant to fight (BNI 2022).
There are a range of deeply concerning factors in the events since the coup.
These include the military’s use of battlefield tactics against civilians in
urban areas, particularly the coercive violent repression of unarmed, peaceful
civilians in the first months after the coup; renewed warfare between the
military and several of the minority group armies, including the use of
aerial bombardment for the first time in two decades; increasing strategic
engagement of Russia and China; decline, outlawing or suborning of the
institutions that previously supported civil society and democratisation,
specifically the Buddhist monkhood (Sangha), the NLD and the media;
and the rapid breakdown of institutional capacity and increase in state
fragility, with a decimation of the economy and rapid impoverishment of
the country. The interlinked political, economic and humanitarian crises
are severe and deeply intertwined.

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 1. POST-COUP MYANMAR’S POLITICAL AND HUMANITARIAN CRISES

Origins and outline of the book

This brief overview of events since the coup sets the stage for the chapters that
follow. The contributions in the volume further analyse key aspects of the
political and humanitarian crises precipitated by the coup. They explore
the implications of various aspects of the coup and its potential responses.
This volume emerged from a two-day research roundtable symposium
hosted online and in person by Deakin University on 1–2 February 2022, to
mark the one-year anniversary of the coup. A call for chapters was circulated
internationally in August 2021, but, with closed borders for COVID-19,
most interest came from within Australia and similar time zones. The
chapter submissions were selected for relevance and coherence. From there,
contributors were required to submit a first draft of their paper prior to the
roundtable, and to attend the full two days. Papers were then presented
and discussed in-depth by participants on 1–2 February 2022 at the
roundtable symposium, which was also open to other selected academics,
policymakers and aid sector representatives. Based on the discussions during
the roundtable about each paper and the debates about some of the key
challenges and issues, authors revised their contributions through several
rounds of editorial review—and then the manuscript underwent double
peer review by the publisher. All papers are up to date with events as of
November 2022, but their focus is not so much on current events as much
as on the implications of key aspects of the coup, and the sorts of policy
and practical responses international actors have, could and perhaps should
make. This analysis is likely to be relevant for years to come.
The remainder of the volume consists of 13 chapter contributions from
various scholars, experts and practitioners on topics ranging from the
role of social media and disruptive technologies, multinational enterprise
behaviour, justice and accountability mechanisms being pursued in
international courts, relations with China and ASEAN, whether the Federal
Democracy Charter offers a potential path to peace in a post-coup Myanmar,
the changing situation in Rakhine State, weaponisation of the pandemic
response, appropriate aid approaches and the political resistance dimensions
being embraced by local actors, and Myanmar’s higher education sector.
There are, of course, many more aspects of the political and humanitarian
crises precipitated by the coup that need analysis. It is clear that the bloody
reintroduction of absolute military rule means that all previous policy
settings towards Myanmar are no longer valid—whether in retrospect they

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 AFTER THE COUP

ever really were. There is now an urgent need for new policy settings, and
for practical engagement based on revised understandings, new goals, new
modes and different sorts of partnerships with local actors and/or recipient
groups. This volume has a very practical policy focus, exploring the issues
presented here in detail, to arrive at policy implications and responses.
These are presented by each contributor, within their chapters, but are also
then summarised in our final chapter, ‘The Aftermath: Policy Responses to
Myanmar’s Political and Humanitarian Crises’.
There is, of course, a deep tension between our conclusion that the most
likely scenario is a drawn-out stalemate in the civil war, most likely until
something changes within military itself, and the very idea of policy
recommendations premised on the notion that outsiders can have some
influence. Nonetheless, we do believe there are ways international actors
can show solidarity with and aid the Myanmar people, even if the extent
of impact is limited. Perhaps, even, this support may even contribute,
in some tiny way, to precipitating internal changes and ending this
horrendous predicament.
Looking at the contributions of each of the chapters in turn, Chapter 2,
by Professor Nicholas Farrelly, lays out four possible future scenarios for
post-coup Myanmar, and thus various potential political and humanitarian
conditions in the country over the years ahead. Each of Farrelly’s four
possible scenarios—coup success, coup failure, centrifugal unravelling and
implosion—has long-term implications about the sorts of crises, plausible
humanitarian conditions and, thus, international policy and aid responses
that may be necessary to support the Myanmar people. The analysis draws
on the erratic imbalance of forces, ideas, politics and strategies that have
energised Myanmar’s turbulence since the recent coup and that, in many
respects, influence the range of potential responses. The scenarios are
examined separately, and yet, in practice, aspects of each of the potential
futures are part of a complex set of trajectories. The analysis highlights the
intense challenges any future Myanmar government will face, and those
faced by international partners seeking to influence developments in
a more positive direction in the meantime. The advantage of looking at
the scenarios as distinct future possibilities is that they imply medium-
term outcomes that have significant, perhaps permanent, implications for
Myanmar, for its immediate neighbours and indeed for the wider Asian
region. These scenarios should be kept in mind as each of the subsequent
chapters are read.

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 1. POST-COUP MYANMAR’S POLITICAL AND HUMANITARIAN CRISES

Chapter 3, by Jadyn (pseudonym), Professor Monique Skidmore and

Dr Cecile Medail, explores the role of social media and disruptive technologies
in the post-coup conflict. Since the coup, the junta has attempted to expand
its authoritarian control over cyberspace, deploying the latest encryption
and cybersecurity surveillance technologies to extend its existing physical
and psychological warfare battlefields online. In response, anti-coup
forces have adapted and innovatively used digital technologies to support
the revolution, making the digital space a new, key frontline in the battle
between the military and the people of Myanmar. In this chapter, Jayden,
Skidmore and Medail analyse the deployment and implications of these
new technologies by a military state with techno-totalitarian ambitions,
and the ways the resistance movement, civil and armed, has countered
with the adoption of disruptive technologies to organise, share real-time
information, finance revolution and counter the regime’s fearmongering
through propaganda.
Multinational enterprises have come under sustained pressure since the
coup to review their operations in Myanmar and exit any relationships
they have with military-controlled entities. In Chapter 4, former Australian
ambassador to Myanmar Associate Professor Nicholas Coppel examines
this pressure, the extent and significance of corporate relationships with
the military, their responses to the coup and the impact this has had on the
junta. Coppel finds that very few foreign firms were in joint venture or had
other commercial relations with military-owned or controlled entities, and
that companies that left Myanmar mostly did so for security, commercial
or reputational reasons. Moreover, leaving was not always easy or helpful
to Myanmar’s citizens and, in some instances, even benefited the military.
Overestimation of the extent and significance of such relationships has
distracted policymakers and activists from considering policies focused on
the role the business community could play to strengthen human rights
in Myanmar. Taken together, targeted sanctions and activist pressure run
the risk of stigmatising all business with Myanmar, including legitimate,
non‑sanctioned activity.
Three separate international justice processes commenced prior to the 2020
coup to hold the Myanmar military accountable for the atrocities committed
against the Rohingya. Chapter 5, by Dr Adam Simpson and Juliette
McIntyre, considers the implications of Myanmar’s 2021 coup for these
mechanisms of international justice, and whether the military (or any other
groups in Myanmar) could be prosecuted for crimes committed during and
since the February 2021 coup using any of these mechanisms. Simpson and
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 AFTER THE COUP

McIntyre find that while the influence and authority of international courts
are important, their ability to respond to Myanmar’s many crises is limited.
At best, the chapter argues, one can anticipate that the joint pressures of the
ICC investigation, the ICJ proceedings and work of fact-finding missions
and other human rights agencies will lead to an international consensus to
refuse the junta recognition.
Chapters 6 and 7 explore China–Myanmar relations and ASEAN’s response
to the coup. Chapter 6, by Dr Kristina Kironska and Diya Jiang, examines
China’s shifting response to the coup. China has significant interests in
Myanmar and is perhaps the most powerful external actor in relationship
with Myanmar; it is thus interesting that Beijing has remained more
cautious than other countries in its response to the coup. Kironska and
Jiang examine the detailed exchanges between China and Myanmar since
the coup, and analyse the two countries’ strategic interaction, offering
an explanation for why China has gradually changed from a (seemingly)
neutral stance immediately after the coup to one more in favour of the
military regime. The chapter argues that, initially, ambiguity was logical
and beneficial, but, as time went by, appearing neutral became costly to
China’s strategic interests. China’s initial hesitation stemmed largely from
the perceived risk of a negative impact on its global economic and political
interests, and the risk of security issues surrounding its interests within
Myanmar. However, as international attention on Myanmar has lessened,
China has once again been motivated primarily by its geostrategic interests
in Myanmar, and priority to advance its Belt and Road Initiative projects
and further its long-term, two-ocean strategy.
Moe Thuzar, a former head of the Human Development Unit at the
ASEAN Secretariat, examines ASEAN’s response to the coup in Chapter 7.
Myanmar has posed a dilemma for ASEAN ever since its admission into the
grouping in 1997, even during its decade of democratisation (2011–21).
The February 2021 coup presents the most serious crisis for ASEAN since
Myanmar joined the association. Thuzar reviews two historical crises to
illustrate ASEAN’s Myanmar dilemma: the response to Cyclone Nargis in
2007 dealing with an earlier military regime, and the Rohingya refugee crisis
in 2017, which erupted during the democratically elected NLD government’s
tenure. Using these to frame analysis of ASEAN’s responses to date towards
the 2021 Myanmar coup, Thuzar argues that new precedents may be
emerging that offer some insights into the opportunities and limitations of
ASEAN’s engagement with recalcitrant members. Myanmar’s value to and
in ASEAN, and Myanmar’s capacity to meet its commitments/obligations
14
 1. POST-COUP MYANMAR’S POLITICAL AND HUMANITARIAN CRISES

as an ASEAN member, present a dilemma for the regional bloc. The chapter
concludes with a number of clear policy recommendations for ASEAN
based on this analysis.
As noted in the summary of events above, less than two months after the
coup, the CRPH (i.e. the representatives elected in the November 2020
election but denied power by the coup) declared the country’s 2008
Constitution void and put forward an interim replacement, the Federal
Democracy Charter. A key aim of the charter was to woo an alliance
with the armed organisations of the country’s many borderland minority
groups. Chapter 8, by Associate Professor Costas Laoutides, explores this
charter, and, in particular, whether it holds the potential to end decades
of intergroup conflict and unify the minorities in a common effort to
oust the brutal military regime. Laoutides examines the charter in light of
international experiences in power sharing agreements designed to mediate
the potential harm of majoritarian democracy, and finds that its continued
framing around ethnicity as the basis for political identity problematic.
In particular, issues emerge around the right to self-determination granted
to federal states, and collective rights granted to ethnic groups who may
be more geographically dispersed. Laoutides concludes that the charter has
not offered a compelling vision to unite minorities, and, despite appearing
progressive, its semi-consociational approach around ideas of ethnic
identity remains locked in the problematic past rather than paving the way
for a future that unites the people.
In Chapter 9, Associate Professor Anthony Ware and Associate Professor
Costas Laoutides explore the surprisingly rapid expansion of control over
large parts of Rakhine State by the Arakan Army as they take advantage of
an informal ceasefire. Ware and Laoutides document the expansion of de
facto state institutional functionings by the Arakan Army since the coup,
having implemented new judicial, taxation, conflict resolution and security
functions, taken a leading role in the COVID-19 response and overturned
major aspects of Rohingya policy at the local level. The chapter argues that
this is a significant power shift, likely to reshape Rakhine State and (perhaps)
politics for decades to come. This chapter explore the likely trajectory
of these changes, and the implications for both domestic politics and
international aid/peace-building. These developments will have significant
implications for the Rohingya, but the nature of these implications is not
yet clear or resolved, given that the underlying issues for the Rohingya
remain unaltered.

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 AFTER THE COUP

Chapters 9 and 10 consider the impact of the coup on Rakhine State;

on intercommunal relations with the Rohingya; and on the emergence
of parallel, de facto, state-like institutions under the Arakan Army.
Chapter 10, by Ye Min Zaw and Tay Zar Myo Win, examines how the
national crisis impacted communal tensions between Arakanese and
Rohingya communities in Rakhine State, and the changes in social tension
given both the expansion of territorial control by the Arakan Army and
the resurgence of Rohingya identity. It explores how the political crisis has
impacted communal tensions in Rakhine State and how the communities
have responded. Noting significantly improved intercommunal relations,
Ye Min Zaw and Tay Zar Myo Win argue that, under the surface of the
seemingly stable situation, an atmosphere of fear remains—principally,
the fear that violence may resume at any time, as the underlying issues
remain unresolved.
Chapter 11 considers the COVID-19 pandemic response and non-state
welfare before and after the coup, and how this has impacted Myanmar’s
vibrant non-state charitable sector. Dr Gerard McCarthy and Saw Moo
(pseudonym) draw on a national survey conducted in January 2021, with
follow-up work since the coup, to trace the ways in which both the elected
government of Aung San Suu Kyi and then then military regime since
February 2021 have exploited the COVID-19 response to benefit their
political allies and entrench their social dominance. They find that despite
issues with the NLD government response, they did encourage and support
non-state social responses during 2020. However, after seizing power in
February 2021, the SAC weaponised the COVID-19 response to brutally
suppress political opposition in ways that have disrupted the non-state
pandemic response: suppressing perceived dissenters, empowering loyalists
and disciplining charitable actors. As a result, the nascent state–societal
cooperation of the NLD-era came to a dramatic end in the wake of the
coup, deepening the reliance of ordinary people on private and non-state
providers who receive no government or official support. In this sense, the
weaponisation of COVID-19 by the junta has compounded the process of
social outsourcing that has been ongoing for decades, entrenching societal
reliance on non-state social actors both to survive and resist dictatorship.
McCarthy and Saw Moo thus urge greater international support to non-
state welfare provision in the short term.
Chapters 12 and 13 explore humanitarian aid and responses to the crises in
Myanmar: what is possible, what it would look like and how it would be
delivered. Chapter 12, by Dr Anne Décobert, reassesses ongoing debates
16
 1. POST-COUP MYANMAR’S POLITICAL AND HUMANITARIAN CRISES

about international humanitarian engagement in Myanmar in light of

the coup, arguing that responses to the humanitarian crises precipitated
by the coup demonstrate the effectiveness of localised aid. Arguing that
neutrality of aid is not possible or desirable in such a context, she focuses
attention on humanitarian autonomy, rights and justice. Décobert sees
not just ongoing resistance against the military regime in the response by
local aid agencies, but also growing resistance towards unequal and unjust
international aid systems. In this, Décobert calls for significantly more
localisation of aid to Myanmar, supporting local organisations in planning
and response, noting that the activist agenda of most localised humanitarian
response demands a solidarity-based approach rather than insistence on aid
neutrality. While recognising that there are no simple answers to difficult
issues, Décobert argues that, in a context where normative neutrality can
do harm, reframing ‘good humanitarianism’ as promoting local agency and
autonomy provides a moral compass for international actors to navigate
complex political and ethical dilemmas.
Dr Aung Naing (pseudonym) and Dr Tamas Wells follow this up in
Chapter 13, examining the impacts of the February 2021 coup on local
organisations delivering humanitarian aid in Myanmar. Exploring findings
from a recent survey of civil society organisations (CSOs) in Myanmar, they
explore ways in which CSOs use local relief to resist military rule—not
through overt opposition, but, instead, through localised fulfilment of what
should be state functions by non-state CSOs. In this sense, Aung Naing
and Wells argue that, through welfare, CSOs demonstrate a particular form
of resistance, embodying a viable, legitimate and internally sustainable
alternative to the current military government’s claims and approach. This
chapter urges a reorientation of humanitarian policy towards Myanmar
that embraces the complexity, ambiguity and latent potential of emergent,
volunteer welfare groups as not only a means of delivering aid in ways that
avoid entanglement and dependency on coup-controlled processes, but
also enable and promote active citizenship in local communities, which is
itself a critical step towards re-establishing community life and institutional
integrity in Myanmar.
The final contribution to the volume, Chapter 14 by Professor Charlotte
Galloway, examines the impact of the coup on Myanmar’s higher education
system and the likely implications for future foreign engagement. Galloway
identifies how the coup has completely disrupted the progress made within
the sector over the last decade, and this almost certainly applies to all levels
of the education sector in Myanmar. But, unique to the tertiary sector, the
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 AFTER THE COUP

military leaders’ lack of trust in engagement with foreign researchers and

entities, and their inability to accept even the mildest criticism of their own
policy positions, is crippling the higher education sector. The consequences
of another lost generation on Myanmar’s future prosperity are dire. Without
homegrown expertise there will, by necessity, be reliance on external actors
to achieve any economic and social development, as the military brutality
deters even international students from returning to Myanmar, further
eroding Myanmar’s knowledge-based capacities. It is difficult to see how the
higher education system can recover, and there is no expectation that higher
education reform will be a military regime priority.
Thus, on most fronts, the situation in Myanmar is dire. The local response
and resistance to the regime is impressive and has defied most predictions.
There is an enormous amount for the international community to learn from
the local civil disobedience, organising, active citizenship and humanitarian
response. However, it is hard to move away from the conclusion that
a grinding stalemate is becoming entrenched that only further impoverishes
the country and destroys its people and institutions. Chapter 15 returns to
the question of future trajectory and international policy and aid responses
to the political and humanitarian crises in Myanmar. This final chapter
summarises the major findings and implications from the previous chapters.
There are no good options. There is no easy solution, no way to force the
military to retreat from this brutal and destructive path. Nor is there any
good way to change the circumstances of tens of millions of ordinary people
who are suffering. Resolution of the complex crises in Myanmar can only
come from within the country, and, most likely, from within the Myanmar
military hierarchy. However unlikely, we implore them to change, to step
back and hand over power to the people. Meanwhile, the research and
solid analysis in this volume points to some of the possibilities that exist
to improve our response, in coordination with and support of the locals at
the frontlines of resistance, to perhaps make a small difference. That is our
hope, as we complete this volume.
One final note: conducting any research in Myanmar at this time is very
challenging. It is almost impossible, and probably very unwise, for Westerners
(at least) to travel to the country for research. And the environment is not
a lot easier for local researchers. Travel can be dangerous, asking questions
can be potentially problematic, and carrying research data and notes is
potentially risky. All contributors to this volume have worked closely with
local informants and researchers, whether explicitly recognised in the
authorship or subsumed to protect anonymity, and their analysis is based
18
 1. POST-COUP MYANMAR’S POLITICAL AND HUMANITARIAN CRISES

on years of collaboration and engagement. We truly thank these mostly

unnamed colleagues for their partnership and seek to amplify their voices
through this volume, even if we cannot name most of them at this time. For
their sake, we hope this analysis resonates, and impacts policy and practice
in ways that lead to change, to the extent any foreign engagement may be
able to influence the dire situation in Myanmar.

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Frontier Myanmar. 2021b. ‘Striking Government Workers Say They Are “Ready to
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Gerin, Roseanne. 2021. ‘Myanmar Junta Kills Scores of Protesters in Bago, Decrees
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20
 1. POST-COUP MYANMAR’S POLITICAL AND HUMANITARIAN CRISES

Guardian. 2021. ‘Myanmar: More Than 100,000 Protest in Streets against Coup’.
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Hallam, Jonny. 2021. ‘Myanmar Police Open Fire on Protesters in Mandalay

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Irrawaddy. 2021b. ‘Amid Coup, Myanmar’s NLD Lawmakers Form Committee

to Serve as Legitimate Parliament’. 8 February. www.irrawaddy.com/news/​
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Irrawaddy. 2021c. ‘Myanmar’s Shadow Government Forms People’s Defense Force’.

5 May. www.irrawaddy.com/news/burma/myanmars-shadow-government-forms-
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Irrawaddy. 2022a. ‘Myanmar Junta Arming, Training Civilians as Losses, Defections

Mount’. 18 January. www.irrawaddy.com/news/burma/myanmar-junta-arming-
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Irrawaddy. 2022b. ‘Myanmar Junta Enacts Law Allowing It to Deploy Police to Front
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allowing-it-to-deploy-police-to-front-lines.html

Irrawaddy. 2022c. ‘Sale of Myanmar Coup Leader’s Mansion Raises US$2 Million in
Three Days’. 9 May. www.irrawaddy.com/news/burma/sale-of-myanmar-coup-
leaders-mansion-raises-us2-million-in-three-days.html

Irrawaddy. 2022d. ‘NUG Plans More Weapons and Funds for Revolution Against
Myanmar Junta’. 26 May. www.irrawaddy.com/news/burma/nug-plans-more-
weapons-and-funds-for-revolution-against-myanmar-junta.html

Irrawaddy. 2022e. ‘Myanmar Regime Committed Almost 2,800 War Crimes in

Last Six Months: NUG’. 13 June. www.irrawaddy.com/news/burma/myanmar-
regime-committed-almost-2800-war-crimes-in-last-six-months-nug.html

ISP (Institute for Strategy and Policy – Myanmar). 2022a. ‘Over 7,000 Civilian
Deaths since the Military Coup’. Data Matters, no. 32, 18 October. www.isp​
myanmar.com/over-7000-civilian-deaths-since-the-military-coup/

21
 AFTER THE COUP

ISP (Institute for Strategy and Policy – Myanmar). 2022b. ‘Over 36,000 Houses
And Buildings Burned and Destroyed since the Coup’. Data Matters 30: www.isp​
myanmar.com/more-than-36000-homes-and-buildings-torched-after-the-coup

ISP (Institute for Strategy and Policy – Myanmar). 2022c. ‘IDPs Spread Across 96
Townships’. Data Matters, no. 34, 2 November. www.ispmyanmar.com/idps-
spread-across-in-96-townships/

ISP (Institute for Strategy and Policy – Myanmar). 2022d. ‘Almost 3 Million
Internally Displaced and Exiled Refugees in Myanmar’. Data Matters, no. 28, 2
September. www.ispmyanmar.com/almost-3-million-internally-displaced-and-
exiled-refugees-in-myanmar-2/

Ko Cho. 2022. ‘Myanmar Junta Sentences Three UEC Heads to Prison’. Myanmar
Now, 11 July. myanmar-now.org/en/news/myanmar-junta-sentences-three-uec-
heads-to-prison/

Lipes, Joshua. 2022a. ‘Myanmar Civil Disobedience Movement “Losing Steam”

amid Junta Crackdowns’. Radio Free Asia, 26 April. www.rfa.org/english/news/
myanmar/cdm-04262022211343.html

Lipes, Joshua. 2022b. ‘Conflict Seen Escalating in Myanmar on Anniversary

of PDF’. Radio Free Asia, 11 May. www.rfa.org/english/news/myanmar/
anniversary-05112022202816.html

Lipes, Joshua. 2022c. ‘Defector Group Says 4 Combat Weapons in Production for
Fight against Myanmar Junta’. Radio Free Asia, 6 June. www.rfa.org/english/
news/myanmar/weapons-06102022164120.html

Lovett, Lorcan. 2021. ‘The Nights of Pots and Pans are Back, on Myanmar’s Fearful
Streets’. Guardian, 2 February. www.theguardian.com/global-development/​
2021/​feb/02/the-nights-of-pots-and-pans-are-back-on-myanmar-fearful-streets

Lovett, Lorcan and Michael Safi. 2021. ‘Myanmar’s Besieged Resistance Dreams of
“People’s Army” to Counter Junta’. Guardian, 21 March. www.theguardian.com/​
world/2021/mar/20/myanmars-besieged-resistance-dreams-of-peoples-army-to-
counter-junta

Min Min. 2022a. ‘Is Myanmar’s Military Becoming a Spent Force?’ Myanmar Now,
8 May. myanmar-now.org/en/news/is-myanmars-military-becoming-a-spent-
force

Min Min. 2022b. ‘It’s Certain That the Military Is Losing Ground’. Myanmar
Now, 6 May. myanmar-now.org/en/news/its-certain-that-the-military-is-losing-
ground

22
 1. POST-COUP MYANMAR’S POLITICAL AND HUMANITARIAN CRISES

Mogul, Rhea and Jake Kwon. 2022. ‘Myanmar Court Extends Aung San Suu Kyi’s
Prison Sentence to 26 Years’. CNN, 12 October. edition.cnn.com/2022/10/12/
asia/aung-san-suu-kyi-myanmar-court-corruption-intl-hnk/index.html

MPM (Myanmar Peace Monitor). 2022. ‘Coup Dashboard: October 2022’.

6 November. www.mmpeacemonitor.org/314605/coup-dashboard-october​-​
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Ohmar, Khin. 2022. ‘To Stop Russian Aggression, US Must Act on Myanmar’.
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Paddock, Richard C. 2021. ‘Myanmar Security Forces Open Fire on Protesters,

Killing 2’. The New York Times, 20 February. www.nytimes.com/2021/02/20/
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Pedroletti, Brice. 2022. ‘Myanmar: Army Atrocities Are on the Rise in the Central
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Pietromarchi, Virginia and Mersiha Gadzo. 2021. ‘Myanmar’s Military Stages Coup
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PTV (Public Voice Television). 2022. ‘Public Voice Television’. Facebook, 22 June. www.
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 AFTER THE COUP

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24
 2
Scenarios for Understanding
Myanmar’s Political and
Humanitarian Crises
Nicholas Farrelly
Head of School, School of Social Sciences,
University of Tasmania

Abstract
This chapter explores four interlinked scenarios about Myanmar’s
trajectory since the February 2021 military coup, with specific attention to
plausible humanitarian conditions in the years ahead. The analysis draws
on the erratic imbalance of forces, ideas, politics and strategies that have
energised Myanmar’s turbulence since the most recent coup and that, in
many respects, influence the range of potential responses to the multiple,
ongoing humanitarian crises. The examination of hypotheticals, such as
these scenarios, requires attention to history, to current conditions and to
foreseeable future outcomes. The scenarios are explored in the hope that,
by better understanding recent events, we may be able to better appreciate
future trajectories. The analysis highlights the intense challenges for
any future Myanmar government and for international partners seeking to
influence developments in a more positive direction.

25
 AFTER THE COUP

Thinking about the future of

Myanmar’s coup
Part of the dark calculation in Naypyidaw for Myanmar’s 2021 coup was that
powerful international players, divided by intense geostrategic rivalries and
diminished by the response to the first year of the COVID-19 pandemic,
would struggle to mount any substantial response. Exhausted by almost two
decades of active military and humanitarian intervention across the Middle
East and Central Asia, the United States and key allies have signalled,
for years, increasing reluctance to directly support teetering, or toppled,
democratic regimes. Enthusiasm for the process of contested institution-
building, especially in places where there are only modest strategic interests
at stake, has waned dramatically.
In the Myanmar situation, the generals and their enablers in the civilian
bureaucracy have many years of direct experience manipulating Association of
Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) diplomacy towards outcomes favourable
to the entrenchment of military power. Under these circumstances, the
generals would have judged, with some confidence, that the room for
external powers to make dramatic pronouncements and then actively
build momentum against the re-entrenchment of military power was very
limited. Yet, well after the coup, the new military regime has struggled to
consolidate its control of territory and remains deeply unpopular across the
breadth of Myanmar society. Brazen anti-coup tactics, like silent strikes,
reinforce the overwhelming perception that the 2021 coup could still fail,
although the trigger for a calamitous breakdown in the military regime has
proved elusive. In the past, Myanmar’s military decision-makers have also
usually succeeded in avoiding real scrutiny or consequences when called to
account for human rights abuses (Shukri 2021, 258). Since the coup, there
have been admirably thorough efforts to document the range of distressing
allegations that have emerged (A. A. & Gaborit 2021, 56).
In this strategic and historical context, this analysis draws on the erratic
imbalance of forces, ideas, politics and strategies that have energised
Myanmar’s turbulence since the most recent coup and that, in many
respects, influence the range of potential responses to the multiple, ongoing
humanitarian crises. With the Myanmar military now fighting a much
wider range of opponents, including the People’s Defence Force militias
that formed in 2021, the entire Myanmar state system is being tested by
those prepared to mount ‘revolutionary responses’ (Prasse‐Freeman & Ko

26
 2. SCENARIOS FOR UNDERSTANDING MYANMAR’S POLITICAL AND HUMANITARIAN CRISES

Kabya 2021). Where the previous compact for power sharing in Myanmar,
which grew from 2011 onwards, between democratic, militarist, ethnic
and chauvinist groups was always uneasy (Renshaw & Lidauer 2021),
most parts of the country avoided large-scale humanitarian issues. The key
exception—the Rakhine State—saw almost a million people flee across the
border to Bangladesh in 2017, generating a substantial international and
Bangladeshi humanitarian response (Halim et al. 2021, 199; also Ahmed &
Das 2022). That crisis led to the Myanmar government facing accusations
of genocide in the International Court of Justice in The Hague. Aung San
Suu Kyi led the government’s defence of its actions in what was, at the
time, a striking signal of the popularity of anti-Rohingya violence and the
uneasy working coalition between the military and elected officials from the
National League for Democracy (NLD).1 Aung San Suu Kyi is now, again,
detained by the military and faces years of imprisonment on charges laid
after the coup.
There remains deep concern internationally about the direction of events in
Myanmar and the humanitarian crises that have evolved since the 2021 coup
have not been completely ignored. Obviously, any major breakdown of state
institutions will further galvanise local, national and regional responses,
including more robust attention to the structure of Myanmar’s future
political system (for an early contribution, see Kipgen 2021), but it would
be bold to predict that Myanmar is ever more than a peripheral concern
among great powers, except, of course, for China’s regional ambitions.
What is also apparent is that the carefully curated and heavily controlled
institutions that allowed for increased popular participation in politics from
2011 to 2021 are gone, with no clear indications of how alternative models
of governance will be created (Thant Myint-U 2020). After the coup, the
State Administration Council apparently expected that its repudiation of the
NLD’s 2020 electoral triumph would only lead to modest and short-lived
opposition. That judgement was plainly wrong and, once again, brings into
question the strategic acumen of Naypyidaw’s powerbrokers (for helpful
and wideranging analysis, see Selth 2020).

1 In the wake of the coup there has been some commentary on these issues. For example:
The case of Myanmar unfolding before our eyes shows us that calling for accountability is
something that the private sector operating and investing in Myanmar should do: in this
case, they should insist that a reinstalled democratic leadership embrace the jurisdiction of
the International Criminal Court. To finally and firmly entrench democracy in Myanmar,
there will be a need for accountability for both the military and the political actors involved in
perpetrating the genocide. (Triponel & Williams 2021)

27
 AFTER THE COUP

With this history and the challenging contexts in mind, this chapter explores
how the Myanmar people confront four volatile and heavily contested
scenarios. Each scenario has long-term implications for the resolution of the
country’s multiple crises across the full spectrum of humanitarian domains.
The discussion is, by its nature, somewhat speculative, but I have also
sought, where possible, to draw on a wide reading of the strategic, political,
cultural and historical conditions that led to the 2021 coup, and that will
shape Myanmar’s further development over the next five to 10 years.

State institutions and state fragility

This chapter explores these four interlinked scenarios pertaining to Myanmar’s
post-coup trajectory, with specific attention to plausible humanitarian
conditions in the years ahead. The examination of hypotheticals, such
as these scenarios, requires attention to history, current conditions and
foreseeable future outcomes. The scenarios are presented here in the hope
that, by better understanding recent events, we may be able to better
appreciate future trajectories. The analysis highlights the intense challenges
for any future Myanmar government and for international partners seeking
to influence developments in a more positive direction.

Coup is consolidated
First, there is a scenario in which the post-coup military regime consolidates
its power. This is the baseline scenario, partly due to the country’s history
of coup consolidation. Myanmar’s previous military coups, in 1962 and
in 1988, both faced resistance, which, in both cases, was only ever partly
eliminated. Nonetheless, the most serious opposition, at least in terms
of armed response, was eventually pushed to the margins, usually to the
mountains along Myanmar’s borders. After 1962, it was the Communist
Party of Burma, and various Shan, Karen, Mon and Kachin armed groups,
that fought, often over decades, against central government control. From
1988, Myanmar’s battlegrounds were even more fractious, with ceasefires,
stalemates and open warfare all coexisting. The conflict situation since
February 2021 has challenged the new junta in different ways. The military
government has fought hard to maintain its control of state institutions,
a posture that has generated sustained opposition both in the Bamar-
majority regions and across the ethnic minority–dominated peripheries.

28
 2. SCENARIOS FOR UNDERSTANDING MYANMAR’S POLITICAL AND HUMANITARIAN CRISES

In a consolidation scenario, there will still be resistance to the army, other

security agencies and the wide range of other representatives of government
authority, with continued armed opposition.
In this scenario, the blurred threats of ongoing violence, continued
displacement, appalling human rights abuses and economic paralysis would
likely create increased pressure on all of Myanmar’s neighbours, with acute
outcomes for Thailand, and potentially for Bangladesh and India. Many
Myanmar people do not want to live under military rule ever again. Since
the coup, over 440,000 people have been displaced by fighting, and some
have left the country, most heading to Thailand and Malaysia, with smaller
numbers offered rare pandemic-era permission to travel to countries across
the democratic West. In this scenario, with the new junta able to consolidate
its rule, the Rohingya and other marginalised groups would continue to
suffer greatly while the Myanmar Army limits their access to meaningful
civil and economic rights.
Where the NLD and Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP)
governments may have been receptive to some types of advocacy around
human rights issues, the coup also gives senior decision-makers the chance
to reverse even some of the modest improvements that had occurred. For
instance, the National Human Rights Commission, established in 2011,
cannot continue with its work, and there is no prospect of its modest
functions and influence being transferred to any other body. In late 2021,
Senior General Min Aung Hlaing announced that an election would
be held in mid-2023, extending an earlier schedule that had implied an
election in 2022. The military will seek to manipulate this timetable to its
own advantage and, obviously, has much experience using the rules and
procedures available through formal mechanisms to develop ‘compromises’
that further its institutional agenda. The USDP, which won an undemocratic
election in 2010, and then ruled from 2011 to 2016, is now a greatly
diminished vehicle for the presentation of a civilianised group of post-coup
military leaders.
There will never again be any confidence that the USDP, or a similar
political configuration, could surrender power to genuinely elected
representatives, as they did after the 2015 general election victory by the
NLD. As such, a scenario in which the coup is consolidated likely draws
on many of the organisational, cultural and personal resources built up
during the last period of sustained military dominance, which only ended in
2011. Obviously many aspects of military rule were used to define political,

29
 AFTER THE COUP

economic and strategic direction after the USDP took power. Almost all its
senior figures were previously key players in the State Peace and Development
Council military regime and those who helped to make up the legislative
numbers, at the local and national levels, also tended to have enjoyed long
careers within, or adjacent to, the military regime’s bureaucracy. Their
subsequent failure in open electoral competition—at the 2012 by-election,
the 2015 general election and then again at the 2020 general election—
ultimately created the conditions for the coup. For the USDP, and for its
sponsors still in army uniforms, the dominance of the NLD as an electoral
force undermined their ability to secure the outcomes, in terms of political
balance, on which they always insisted.
For this scenario, the ASEAN region offers a number of models, historically
and today, for guided, managed and, indeed, authoritarian electoral
systems. Some analysts have speculated that the Myanmar generals take
inspiration from General Prayuth Chano-ocha in Thailand, whose 2014
coup finally ended the electoral dominance of the Shinawatra family,
under prime ministers Thaksin and Yingluck Shinawatra. While Thailand
held an election in 2019, its outcome was predetermined by the limits
on competition set by the military-drafted constitution. The result kept
General Prayuth in charge, his situation improved by the extra legitimacy
even a flawed electoral process often eventually delivers. Long-serving
regimes in Singapore and Cambodia have similarly utilised multifaceted
restrictions on political opponents, alongside regular elections, to ensure the
continuity in power of dominant individuals and political parties. In each
case, they benefit from a nexus of bureaucratic, cultural and military power,
in which, over decades, the national elite has regenerated its capacity to
exert control to the exclusion of alternative forces. The problem, in the final
judgement, is that Myanmar’s generals will struggle to ever regain the type
of support and interest that was generated after the USDP government took
power in 2011.
With the consolidated coup scenario, the role of the NLD and other
electorally successful forces would be managed closely by military leaders
who would remain wary, perhaps on a permanent basis, of those who
so strongly and effectively opposed the coup. The prospect of Aung San
Suu Kyi’s ongoing incarceration would obviously weigh heavily on any
chance of the NLD re-emerging as a political force; she may face decades
in gaol. The NLD has been obliterated and would struggle for space for
even a compromised role in any new political structure. Indeed, in the
consolidation scenario, many anti-coup activists are likely to remain
30
 2. SCENARIOS FOR UNDERSTANDING MYANMAR’S POLITICAL AND HUMANITARIAN CRISES

imprisoned, or in exile, or struggling to survive under constant surveillance,

marginalised by the military’s ongoing entrenchment of its power.
Restrictions on the free flow of information would be a key part of the
military regime’s ongoing strategy. We understand Chinese technicians have
worked with their Myanmar counterparts since the coup to better monitor,
and perhaps in the future fully control, the digital realm (see Lintner 2021).
Such issues obviously highlight some of the differences between
circumstances this decade and those during previous periods of military
rule. The fact is, after 2011, Myanmar society changed rapidly, with
information, education, technology, international travel and exchange,
political experimentation and open electoral competition all working to
further expand the horizons and possibilities for millions of Myanmar
people. The backlash against the coup, which apparently surprised key
leaders in Naypyidaw, is a consequence, partly, of the enormous shifts
experienced by the Myanmar people. They have enjoyed the benefits of
a more liberal, transparent, lively and unpredictable political and economic
environment. The nationwide and almost universal opposition to the coup
is a strong signal of just how highly the average Myanmar person has valued
the changes that occurred from 2011 to 2021. It is on the basis of these
changes that the resistance to the coup has organised itself to battle against
the dominance of military figures in the country’s political future.

Coup fails
Second, it is important to fully consider the implications of a scenario
in which the Myanmar military is forced to surrender its claimed status
ruling from Naypyidaw. Since the coup, ASEAN foreign ministers have
raised concerns about the legitimacy of the post-coup regime, indicating
that, even within orthodox foreign policy circles, there are grave misgivings
about the legitimacy of the military’s authoritarian rule. The State Peace and
Development Council government that ruled from 1996 to 2011 became
skilled, after its inclusion in ASEAN from 1997, at using regional forums,
and the legitimacy it could draw from its welcome to the ASEAN family,
to manage its engagement with the global system.
In this coup failure scenario, Myanmar’s pre-coup political arrangements
may provide some inspiration for the management of the country’s diverse
geographies and cultures, and yet there would be a strong incentive for
a revolutionary government to dispense with the foundational expectations
of previous regimes. In such a scenario there would still be increased state
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fragility, with the prospect that some conflicts would continue between
a new central government and other armed forces. Even in a best case
scenario, it is unlikely there would be a sustained consensus about Myanmar’s
future political direction (for context, see Sadan 2016). Would the NLD,
for instance, remain the key player in a future revolutionary system?
The answer likely depends on the ability of senior NLD figures to position
themselves as the legitimate guardians of the revolutionary spirit. During
2021 it became apparent that the elected democratic forces, both Bamar
and from ethnic minorities, were only part of the story of resistance
to the coup. Some groups and individuals have sought to redefine their
struggles beyond the scope of earlier democratic movements. Part of this
shift is generational, with young activists often still only in their teens and
twenties taking enormous risks. They may be reluctant to empower senior
figures who they may judge made the wrong concessions to the military
or, perhaps most tellingly, compromised Myanmar’s democratic values
on policies of exclusion—even genocide. Working through these types of
foundational and existential questions would be a major test for any new,
revolutionary regime.
As such, a revolutionary regime would also need to determine, quickly,
what it stood for, balancing the interests of the National Unity Government
(NUG), NLD and other stakeholders. Even within the NLD, which has
over 30 years of political experience and maturity, the space for alternative
perspectives has often been limited greatly by the policy authority of a small
number of senior decision-makers, led by Aung San Suu Kyi (Farrelly
2016). For instance, members of the 88-Generation, which has a similarly
long history of democratic activism and opposition to military rule, found
themselves excluded from the NLD’s political vehicle after 2011. Other
major political groups, such as the Kachin Independence Organisation,
the Arakan National Party, the New Mon State Party and the Kachin State
Democracy Party, are wholly defined by the interests of small elites, many
of whom have worked together closely for decades. Bringing in new voices,
embracing youth-inspired debate and finding mechanisms to generate
genuine popular engagement have proved difficult.
Looking closely at a scenario in which the coup fails, it is important to
consider, as Su Mon Thant (2021, 10–12) has done, the variety of
anti-coup forces that exist. She calls them ‘democrats’, ‘federalists’ and
‘intersectionalists’. From her perspective:

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 2. SCENARIOS FOR UNDERSTANDING MYANMAR’S POLITICAL AND HUMANITARIAN CRISES

The causes of the democrats are direct and narrow, focusing on the
immediate actions they see as needed to put the nation back on
track. This group has the advantage of wide public participation, but
its limited goals do not satisfy the other two groups, who are actively
engaging and leading the resistance movement. While the aim of
federalists is to best guarantee a federal state for ethnic minorities,
agreeing on federal terms in parallel to the anti-coup movement
costs time. While intersectionalists have strong and equitable ideals
for a post-revolution society, this requires long-term commitment
and devotion. (Su Mon Thant 2021, 11–12)

Her useful summary of the situation is a strong reminder of the significant

challenges ahead for this new generation of political actors in a scenario in
which they are, for the first time, given the opportunity to more directly
influence political outcomes. Their ideals will be tested both by the realities
of entrenched conflict and disadvantage, and also by the ongoing battles for
influence among senior figures unwilling to surrender their status to more
youthful voices.
For the coup to fail, in a comprehensive sense, requires some other type of
significant change likely at both the local and global levels. For now, the
Myanmar military regime draws on support from Russia and China, which
dramatically improves its battlefield options. The fuller mobilisation of
external military support, including the proliferation of heavier weaponry
among different anti-regime forces, would likely be part of any such coup
failure scenario. Where foreign support for Myanmar’s resistance forces
exists, it would be fair to assume it is kept as quiet (and deniable) as
possible. The style of foreign support made available to Ukraine as it resisted
Russian invasion in 2022 is not possible due to the double bind of ASEAN
hesitation and Chinese opposition to any hint of military escalation near
its border. The stalemate that may appear to exist between the Myanmar
Army and its many opponents is, however, made less stable by the prospect
of fresh injections of trained and well-equipped fighters on either side, and
by the unpredictable use of both new and old technology, both military and
civilian, in shaping the rapidly changing battlefield. In this context, openly
arming anti-regime forces would introduce other unpredictable dynamics,
especially in terms of the response from both China and Russia.

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Centrifugal unravelling
Then there is the third scenario, in which Myanmar unravels. Indeed, the
further diminution of state control, in either of the first two scenarios, could
add weight to the centrifugal forces that pull, on an almost permanent basis,
at the unifying agenda emphasised by leaders in Naypyidaw over the past
15 years (Farrelly 2018). Avoiding the fragmentation of Myanmar has been
a stated objective of all its post-independence governments, but the current
crisis is a new test for the decades-long project of Myanmar nation-building
(Walton 2015; also Meehan 2015). The Myanmar Army’s capacity to coopt
powerful ethnic minority groups, especially those with their own large
fighting forces and economic engines, will remain in question (Brenner
2015; McCarthy & Farrelly 2020).
While any hypothetical declarations of independence from a ‘Kachinland’
or a ‘Kawthoolei’ or, perhaps, a ‘Wa Union’ would need to draw on foreign
powers for credibility, in this scenario there could simply be alternative
quasi-state institutions that, over time and perhaps incrementally, create
alternative identities at the margins of a crumbling Myanmar state. Some
are already reasonably well placed to make the transition into more formally
constituted state-like entities. In parts of Shan State, for instance, the United
Wa State Army controls significant territory, and has, for the past three
decades, maintained its strength through a narcotics and weapons-based
economy. It is active along both the Chinese and Thai borders, and has
been able, through the large army that it fields, to carve out an independent
sphere of influence. Analysts speculate that much of its capability is the
outcome of support received from Chinese actors. They would be essential,
it seems, to any further development of Wa political institutions.
The political economy of these ‘illiberal’ sub-national governance
arrangements have been explored in detail elsewhere (including McCarthy
& Farrelly 2020). What is still unclear is how any future micro-states would
sustain themselves economically. There would be only limited international
interest in providing subsidies to the weakest of these new statelets, meaning,
in practice, that illicit economies would continue to offer alternative
streams of personal and institutional revenue. Some parts of Myanmar,
perhaps most notably the Kachin State, are rich in resource wealth, and they
could, in theory, build reasonably strong economies on local jade, gold, tin,
timber and energy industries. Yet almost all of these resources would still
be exported in a relatively unprocessed form. Industrialisation of Kachin

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 2. SCENARIOS FOR UNDERSTANDING MYANMAR’S POLITICAL AND HUMANITARIAN CRISES

State seems implausible. And it would be many years before tourism or

other service industries could offer much to the people of even Myanmar’s
richest area.
In the unravelling scenario, the poor corners of the country, such as the
Chin and Rakhine states, would be in a very difficult position if Myanmar’s
central government was to collapse. Local conflicts, such as those along
the Muslim–Buddhist faultline, or between different Chin language
groups, could quickly overwhelm the modest capabilities of any fragile new
micro-state. In a scenario in which centrifugal unravelling occurs, there
would be uneven outcomes and different responses from neighbouring
governments. In the Rakhine and Chin examples, both Bangladesh and
India have sufficient concerns about instability spilling over their borders
that there would be the possibility, at least, for some level of foreign
military intervention.

Implosion, war, chaos

Fourth, it is possible that the Myanmar system implodes more dramatically,
with no clear mandate for a post-coup government, and with sparring
between the other significant military factions and other political players
in the cities and elsewhere. For this scenario, what could lead to such
a dramatic deterioration? There are many possibilities, all of which imply
the comprehensive breakdown of faith in the emergence of a stable political
situation. Open conflict between military regime forces is the likeliest trigger
for such a breakdown, with violent military factionalisation encouraging
new coalitions, including the opportunistically multi-ethnic, to strike hard
against their opponents. Such an implosion, followed by vendettas, war and
chaos, would also be the culmination of other things going wrong. If we
seek historical examples for potential triggers, then it is killing of specific
types, especially assassinations or mass atrocities, that can lead to such
a tragic unravelling. Whatever the trigger, such breakdowns can also often
draw their strength from deeper structural and historical conditions.
Such a scenario would likely be predicated on, and then would further
encourage, the involvement of neighbouring powers particularly Thailand,
China and India, and potentially even Bangladesh. In terms of the
hypotheticals considered in this analysis, this is the scenario that would, in
the medium term, likely cause the greatest damage to Myanmar’s people,
to the economies on which they rely and to the future sovereignty of the
political system(s) they have sought to build. The scenario, which is still low
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likelihood, could have significant and permanent consequences for the entire
Asian region. It would imply that other efforts to avoid calamity have failed,
and that the cultural, political and strategic restraints on expected action
have completely fallen away. The prospect of remnant forces—drawing
their fighting strength from the former Myanmar Army, from the People’s
Defence Forces and from various ethnic armies—that could reconvene
and then regroup in different formations, would make it very difficult to
understand the ideological or other basis on which groups were working.
The outcomes would be unpredictable; however, if core strategic interests
were believed to be at stake, including the security of China’s pipelines
across central Myanmar, then the scenario would be primed for regional
armed forces to (perhaps very reluctantly) become more involved (Ahamed,
Rahman & Hossain 2020). A push by the People’s Liberation Army into
Myanmar territory would make the country, perhaps only temporarily,
a global flashpoint, requiring attention at the United Nations and elsewhere.
How other countries would respond to a Chinese expeditionary force deep
in Myanmar territory is difficult to judge. The United States and its allies
like Japan and Australia would also probably have some level of active
involvement. Thailand would be the obvious launch-pad for their support,
but the Thai government, under former coup commander General Prayuth
Chano-ocha would be reluctant to become too heavily involved in a conflict
that, ordinarily, it would judge is the responsibility of Myanmar authorities
to resolve. But what if Myanmar’s authorities have dissolved?

Factors to consider in all scenarios

Compared to any of Myanmar’s previous crises there are some new factors
that make the conditions in 2023 and beyond different. These factors
require serious attention because we are all inclined to dwell on historical
examples, analogies and interpretative speculation, as it allows us to seek
to find a good fit for any judgements about Myanmar’s current and future
trajectory. One of the most important issues that differentiates Myanmar’s
political situation since the 2021 coup is the proliferation of the internet
and internet-enabled devices in Myanmar. Technology for taking photos,
video-recording, editing, broadcasting and then engaging is almost
universal. The early protests against the coup were remarkable for the speed
and clarity with which information about events could circulate within the
country and, to a lesser extent, the outside world. On Facebook, Twitter

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 2. SCENARIOS FOR UNDERSTANDING MYANMAR’S POLITICAL AND HUMANITARIAN CRISES

and elsewhere, the implication of current footage and information was

significant, drawing many people to the Myanmar situation during the
early, somewhat upbeat, coverage of popular defiance. The deterioration
of conditions since the coup has put extra pressure on internet access, with
the military government keen to ensure it can monitor subversive materials
and crackdown on resistance activities. Like in so many other parts of life,
the effort to put the genie back in the bottle struggles against years of rapid
rollout of high-quality and cost-effective technologies supporting economic,
cultural and political activity across Myanmar.
The related change is to the expectations of the Myanmar people at
large, many of whom have enjoyed greater opportunities for education,
enrichment, travel and interaction than ever before. While many parts
of the country remain poor, the country’s economic growth has been
significant over the past decade. In 2012, gross domestic product per capita,
a reasonable proxy in this context for economic activity and also for key
aspects of social wellbeing, was USD936—the lowest in Southeast Asia,
and one of the world’s lowest outside sub-Saharan Africa. By 2015, this
had grown to USD1,144. By 2019, Myanmar had risen even further, to
USD1,362. Yet, since the coup, the economy has contracted dramatically,
with the World Bank estimating that it is almost 20 per cent smaller than
at the start of 2021, after already suffering through the initial pandemic
upheavals of 2020 (Robinson 2022). Such a calamitous decline in domestic
product is accompanied by deep pockets of poverty and disadvantage. Some
parts of the country have seen waves of displacement and depopulation
since the coup, with estimates that very large numbers of people, in, for
instance, the Kayah State capital, Loikaw, have now left for what they hope
is relative safety in the mountains or near the Thai border. Relentless attacks
by the military regime make it impossible for ordinary life to continue, and
even basic necessities are now hard to come by in many parts of Myanmar.
Further, it now seems very unlikely that Myanmar’s democrats will ever
again tolerate the types of concessions that were accepted, and indeed were
acceptable, during the decade from 2011 to 2021. Many now look at this
period as a strategic blunder, one in which the NLD and other anti-military
forces gave up too much of their credibility to legitimise the military’s
continued role in politics. While it campaigned hard on the need to change
the constitutional arrangements that kept Aung San Suu Kyi out of the
presidential palace, and the military’s constitutionally mandated 25 per
cent of allocated seats as a handbrake on further changes, the NLD never
managed to make the strategic or tactical changes that it sought. And yet,
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even the small chance that a new NLD government would push harder for
the military to surrender its residual vetoes and dominance was enough for
the coup to be launched, and for so much further suffering and violence to
occur. It is for this reason that the calls for change are nowadays much more
forceful: there is a mood for revolution, for the destruction of the Myanmar
Army as a political force and, perhaps, even for its final disbanding.
For these reasons, planning around political and humanitarian scenarios
requires attention to Myanmar’s specifics, and also a broader imagining of
what might be possible under these conditions. What are the meaningful
comparisons? The Balkanisation that followed the end of unified Yugoslavia?
The end of the Khmer Rouge regime in Cambodia and the civil war that
followed? The Rwandan genocide? The toppling of the Suharto regime in
Indonesia? While there may be some common elements and analytically
useful threads, the situation in Myanmar is not so readily comparable in ways
that make for the creation of easy models or straightforward comparisons.

How to avoid disaster?

Considering these four scenarios as interlinked versions of Myanmar’s
future development after the coup is designed to encourage reflection
on the humanitarian, economic and political consequences of the forces
unleashed over the past year. Opportunities to build effective political
institutions will require careful attention to the range of calculations
being made by the Myanmar military itself, within well-established ethnic
armed organisations, and across the spectrum of new militia and political
organisations. Policymaking and advocacy interests, within ASEAN and
beyond, will need to confront the possibility that further deterioration will
lead to hard decisions about the resources required to avoid an even more
complex humanitarian catastrophe (with examples from recent experience
of peace-building still relevant to the discussion, see Roy, Ware & Laoutides
2021; Mathieson 2021).
In any of these scenarios, Myanmar will lag far behind its neighbours for
years to come due to the upheavals generated by the coup, and through the
parallel health and economic degradation that has occurred (Myo Nyein
Aung, Shiu & Chen 2021; also Wunna Tun 2021, 50). With a shrinking
economy, even more widespread poverty, the persistent threat of violence,
stark limitations on foreign involvement and new political disagreements
adding fuel to old enmities, the overall outcome is likely to be bleak for
38
 2. SCENARIOS FOR UNDERSTANDING MYANMAR’S POLITICAL AND HUMANITARIAN CRISES

tens of millions of people (for recent analysis of livelihood issues across

Myanmar, see Thawnghmung 2019; also Moos, Roberts & Mo Aye 2021).
Avoiding the worst hardships and the most damaging violence would mean
Myanmar needs to receive much more attention from regional and global
players than was available in the first two years after the coup.
In Naypyidaw the expectation remains that exhaustion with Myanmar’s
tragic situation, and the related inability of ASEAN governments to build
a more proactive policy position, will give the post-coup government
sufficient time to eventually consolidate its rule. Yet this perspective is
based on a general assessment, with judgements predicated on patterns
that existed before the coup, about the effectiveness of resistance forces.
Those forces look very different in 2022, and have improved their fighting
capabilities in every domain. For instance, urban guerrillas prepared to target
junta forces in their moments of vulnerability make the job of securing
Myanmar’s vast cities and sprawling hinterlands an almost impossible one.
With the economy in such a parlous condition, it is difficult to see how
Senior General Min Aung Hlaing and his key strategists can firm up their
positions without further alienating the vast majority of Myanmar people,
already dissatisfied with the coup and the violence of 2021.
Where Myanmar goes next is, as ever, a question for the Myanmar people,
the NUG, the People’s Defence Forces, and the strongest of the ethnic
armed groups who are working towards toppling the powers in Naypyidaw
once and for all. It is worth reflecting, finally, on what such an outcome
might mean in both political and humanitarian terms. To leave behind the
rule of the Myanmar Army and its top generals would not imply a future
without conflicts or, indeed, violence. Of course, one of the key ideas
justifying military rule in Myanmar is that the country would spiral into
the abyss without firm management from a central, Bamar-dominated
political institution. There is no escaping the same difficulties faced by
Aung San Suu Kyi and the NLD as they sought to broker the nationwide
ceasefire through the Union Peace Conference under the auspices of the
21st Century Panglong framework. Any future government, elected through
a free vote after the collapse of the post-coup regime, would need to navigate
perilous political terrain, with no guarantee that the country’s many large
armed groups would be prepared to accept the range of concessions and
compromises required for a genuinely united front.

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Final thoughts on the future of the

four scenarios
The four scenarios examined in this chapter have been explored side-by-
side, and yet, in practice, there are likely to be times when aspects of each of
the potential futures are part of a complex set of trajectories. The advantage
of looking at the scenarios as distinct future possibilities is that they imply
medium-term outcomes that could have significant, perhaps permanent,
implications for Myanmar, for its immediate neighbours and, indeed, for
the wider Asian region.
In the first scenario—with the coup consolidated, and with a new military
regime able to impose its will on Myanmar society and continue to largely
define the scope of political action—the country’s democratic activists are
likely to face years, even decades, of dismay and punishment. Foreign investors
and institutions from the Western democracies, such as the universities that
committed resources to Myanmar’s earlier liberalisation, will be unlikely to
ever return with substantial investments. The country’s international links
will, once again, be defined by ties with ASEAN, and also with countries
that pay little or no heed to human rights expectations. Countries with
their own antagonistic relations with the West—such as China, Russia
and North Korea—have historically proved the most consistent supporters
of Myanmar’s military. Yet it is doubtful there will ever be much, if any,
enthusiasm for their active involvement in society among the vast mass of
Myanmar people. China, as the largest, most powerful and most proximate
of these countries, is also the international player that faces the greatest risk
of pushback from the Myanmar people. Russia is also preoccupied with
other conflicts, most acutely in Ukraine.
In the second scenario, in which the coup fails and a democratic revolution
prevails, the efforts to unravel generations of military dominance and to
create a viable institutional basis for alternative political cultures would
require substantial external support. In this scenario, a wide range of
countries, such as the United States, the United Kingdom, Thailand,
Japan, Germany, Singapore and Australia, are likely to commit significant
resources across humanitarian, commercial, educational and political
domains. Efforts to influence the next generation of decision-makers,
and to help shape the model of national governance, would need to be
carefully managed, especially as the debates between Myanmar stakeholders
would, like before the coup, rarely lead to consensus. A peace process,

40
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truth and justice mechanisms, and the ultimate path towards some type
of national reckoning, or hypothetical reconciliation, would take time and
test the patience of those seeking immediate and decisive change. Any
new government, even one that can draw on all of the country’s policy
and political talent, would still need to manage Myanmar’s long history of
trauma, poverty, exclusion and distrust. One core requirement would be the
creation, training and resourcing of military forces that could help to unite
the entire country.
Yet the risks for those who might encourage the coup to fail outright should
be contemplated too. There appears to be a sense, among policymakers
around the world, that effectively managing the failure of the coup
would require an enormous investment of resources and ideas, perhaps
well beyond apparent appetites. Recognising the political and military
forces opposed to the coup will always need both symbolic and practical
components, and the practicalties are expensive, fraught with danger and,
perhaps, only justified where other strategic interests are at stake. These
assessments point back towards the initial calculations in Naypyidaw
about the willingness of democratic powers to actively oppose the coup.
The implication is that the United States and its key allies now lack the
will, and perhaps the imagination, for the vast nation-building projects that
accompanied the early twenty-first-century interventions in the Middle East
and Central Asia. Myanmar, treated the wrong way, is a strategic nightmare
from which there would be no meaningful retreat.
There is no avoiding the problem. The political conundrum in both the first
and second scenarios is the need to find a sustainable set of understandings
between Myanmar’s largest ethnic group, the Bamar, and the country’s many
ethnic minorities. In the scenarios in which the coup is consolidated or fails,
the longer-term prospects of any future government would be determined,
to a large extent, by the ability of key decision-makers to effectively manage
the political grievances they would face, almost inevitably, along ethnic lines.
It is in scenario three that those grievances could prove most destabilising,
with centrifugal forces ultimately unravelling Myanmar claims to a single
union. A process of unravelling would be uneven, in the sense that some
areas and leaders would be better prepared to take advantage of the failure
of central authorities to maintain the unified order.
What would happen to the Bamar-majority areas of central Myanmar in
such a scenario would be a further test. The possibility of ongoing discontent
and conflict would be real, especially given the very mixed population

41
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patterns across most areas of Myanmar. There are almost no parts of the
country where the Bamar do not currently live, and many other ethnic
groups, perhaps most notably the Karen, Mon, Kachin and Shan, all have
large populations outside their ethnic states. Any process of partition on
ethnic lines would create messy and probably violent upheavals. A process
of new nation-state-building would probably create a number of failures
along the way.
The fourth scenario implies a much wider failure of Myanmar governance,
and one that would, therefore, almost certainly motivate foreign diplomatic,
and then military, intervention. Avoiding this scenario, should, on
humanitarian grounds alone, be a high priority for national, regional and
global leaders. Does that imply accepting the restoration of some political
and economic stability under the new military dictatorship if it means
avoiding greater calamity and, if only marginally, improving the lives of
millions of destitute Myanmar people at the same time? This question
matters regionally too, because Myanmar’s implosion would be especially
difficult for the near neighbours with the most to lose: Thailand and China.
For them, a failed state, whatever form that took, would be a problem with
deep strategic and economic implications, especially if millions of Myanmar
people sought refuge in their borderlands. Deploying military forces into
Myanmar would also not be a smooth process, and would almost inevitably
draw in all of the world’s most militarily significant players, especially in
the context of the hypothetical leadership of the United Nations. China’s
role would obviously be crucial and it would be a profound test of the
Communist Party’s willingness to use Chinese power beyond their own
borders to secure economic and strategic linkages, and also to avoid further
deterioration in the regional security landscape.

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45
 3
The Role of Social Media
and Disruptive Technologies
in Post-Coup Democracy
Activism
Jaydn (pseudonym)
Consulting firm director, conducting political and business analysis
for international companies in Myanmar

Monique Skidmore
Professor, Alfred Deakin Institute, Deakin University, Australia

Cecile Medail
Visiting Fellow, Department of Social and Political Change,
The Australian National University

Abstract
This chapter reflects upon the effectiveness of censorship and surveillance
technologies in asserting totalitarian control versus the power of disruptive
cyber technologies to overthrow dictatorships. From hacktivism, to doxing,
to cryptocurrency donations, to financial bond sales and ‘click-to-donate’
websites, a new generation of IT-savvy democracy activists in Myanmar
are fighting for their right to live in a democratic state by harnessing their
skills to disrupt authoritarian control. In a context in which the country’s
economy has become dependent upon the internet, app-based payment

47
 AFTER THE COUP

and communication technologies, we argue that the junta is struggling to

maintain and extend its control of this new sphere of conflict. By contrast,
a creative and diverse use of digital technologies enables the anti-coup
movement to disrupt the military’s repressive attempts to conquer the
virtual battlefield.

Fighting in cyberspace
The nature of civil war is fundamentally changing due to repressed
populations having widespread access to cyberspace and state deployment
of online encryption and surveillance technologies (e.g. Ethiopia; ICG
2021). Myanmar is the first East Asian conflict zone in which social media
and encryption technologies may be deciding factors. This chapter analyses
the deployment and implications of new technologies by a military state
with techno-totalitarian ambitions, and the resistance movement’s adoption
of disruptive technologies.
The 1 February 2021 military coup in Myanmar has been fiercely resisted in
urban and village battlefields across the country. Meanwhile, a third territory
has opened up in this fight for democracy: cyberspace. The Myanmar
military has demonstrated totalitarian ambition for decades, waging physical
and psychological warfare to establish authoritarian structures of control
over its people. Totalitarianism is at the heart of the Myanmar military
mindset (Selth 2021; Skidmore 2003). The logic of totalitarianism is one of
fighting a continual war of attrition of the spirit—of placing physical and
psychological boundaries around a population so that, over time, resistance
is reduced to easily extinguished spot fires by an ever more experienced
apparatus of repression (Skidmore 2004, 2007).
After the reprise of liberalisations in the Burman heartlands (but not
borderlands) over the past decade, the military have sought to rapidly
extend their control over cyberspace. They have doubled down on these
efforts since the coup and the unexpected resistance they have received from
their captive population. The coup marks a shift in the military’s online
strategy. No longer able to use social media to promote its authoritarian
agenda, Myanmar’s military, led by the State Administration Council
(SAC), is now rapidly deploying the internet as an extension of the existing
battlefields in which physical and psychological warfare are waged. Since the
coup, a contest between the latest encryption and cybersecurity surveillance
technologies has become one of several new frontiers.
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 3. SOCIAL MEDIA AND DISRUPTIVE TECHNOLOGIES IN ACTIVISM

The widespread availability and use of the internet and social media apps
constitutes a main difference between the post-coup mass resistance and
the 2007 Saffron Revolution, which was the last time the population
sought to overthrow the military junta (Skidmore & Wilson 2008).
The internet has played an increasingly crucial role in facilitating Burmese
pro‑democracy diaspora activism since the 1990s (Danitz & Strobel 1999),
and in disseminating vital information securely via nascent online platforms
during the Saffron Revolution (Chowdhury 2008; Brough & Li 2013).
The phenomenon of democracy communication and mobilisation against
authoritarian rulers has been documented in Africa and the Middle East,
and it is not surprising that a new generation of Burmese have turned
to apps and the internet to organise resistance. Since the coup, cyberspace
has become a critical workplace for many of the key actors at the forefront
of the current resistance, notably the National Unity Government (NUG),
the People’s Defence Forces (PDFs) and the Civil Disobedience Movement
(CDM). This chapter examines the use of new technologies employed by
civil and armed resistance groups against the junta for their utility in allowing
more effective organisation and communication. We see the strategic use of
disruptive technologies to finance revolution and to counter the regime’s
fearmongering through propaganda as being both novel and potentially the
most effective form of resistance to date.

The use of Facebook as a new terrain

of authoritarian control
Facebook provides a good illustration of the junta’s use of cyberspace to
expand its authoritarian control. Its role has changed from an unregulated
channel for military propaganda to a temporary platform of resistance
against the coup. Facebook’s efforts to stop hate speech and deplatform the
military after the coup eventually blunted the junta’s online strategy, which
rapidly shifted to restriction and repression.
Myanmar is the East Asian nation that was most quickly dominated
by Facebook. The rapid uptake occurred in a similar fashion to the
extraordinarily fast adoption of mobile phone telephony from 2013. Akin
only to North Korea, until 2011, mobile phone subscriptions in Myanmar
were between one and two per 100 persons (ITU 2013) with a cost of
over USD3,000 for a single subscription (Petulla 2013). When Ooredoo

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 AFTER THE COUP

then Telenor were given network licences in 2013, subscriptions fell to

USD1.50—and Ooredoo sold 1 million subscriptions in three weeks, while
Telenor sold 500,000 (Economist 2015; Ling et al. 2015).
Similarly, the Facebook platform rapidly became very powerful in Myanmar:
by 2021, Facebook users represented 51.5 per cent of the population
with 28.7 million users, 12.4 million being between 25 and 34 years of
age (NapoleonCat 2021). Considering the levels of poverty, internet
connectivity and remoteness of parts of the country, this is an extraordinary
statistic. Accounting for over 93 per cent of all internet traffic in April 2022,
Facebook enjoys a unique level of popularity and a quasi-monopoly on
social media use and information sharing (Statcounter 2022). In 2016, the
global body representing mobile operators found that in Myanmar many
people considered Facebook as their entry point for online information and
perceived postings as news (Hogan & Safi 2018). For the average Myanmar
phone user, Facebook is synonymous with the internet and most people do
not use internet browsers to search for information. Such success is largely
due to Facebook’s quick development of a Burmese language version and
the fact that Facebook was typically pre-installed on phones, and that some
phone plans did not charge for time spent on Facebook.
The changing role of the platform during Myanmar’s quasi-democratic
period has been discussed elsewhere (Tønnesson, Min Zaw Oo & Ne Lynn
Aung 2022). In this section, we look at Facebook as a case study of the
military’s expansion of its authoritarian control over cyberspace. Facebook
is now at the centre of the junta’s repression, censorship and surveillance
efforts deployed to impose its authoritarian control over cyberspace and
attempts to defeat the resistance movement’s free access to information and
its potential for digital disruption.

The centrality of Facebook throughout

Myanmar society
During Myanmar’s quasi-democratic period, widespread access to
smartphones and the rapid growth of internet use enabled a broad range of
actors to use Facebook as their primary channel of communication. Media
outlets, the general public, Buddhist figures, and military and government
officials, as well as minority ethnic armed organisations, all began posting
on Facebook. As a central forum of discussion that has also become a main

50
 3. SOCIAL MEDIA AND DISRUPTIVE TECHNOLOGIES IN ACTIVISM

outlet for traditional media, Facebook has allowed a broad spectrum of

people to engage with social and political issues, offering them a new way to
access information, express their opinions and connect with others.
However, the platform has also contributed to the polarisation and
reinforcement of pre-existing opinions among communities sharing the
same interests (McCarthy 2018). Facebook facilitated the spread of ultra-
nationalist sentiment reflected in leading monk U Wirathu’s sermons,
supported the propagation of negative prejudice towards Muslim men
(McCarthy & Menager 2017) and enabled the production of narratives
of fear and Buddhist–Muslim antagonisms (Schissler 2015). The platform
eventually played a major role in the spread of hate speech, enabling users
to participate in the co-production of nationalism and the construction of
a potential Muslim threat (Prasse-Freeman 2021).
The pace of social media’s spread in the 2010s is also reflected in the way
government authorities communicated with the public. The use of official
social media channels by high-level military and civilian government offices
to promote their narratives became the norm. Facebook, in particular,
became the main platform for partisan political communication used by
the government and its supporters (Aung Khant 2017; Dowling 2019;
Nyi Nyi Kyaw 2019). Finally, ethnic armed groups also use Facebook as
a tool of communication with their constituents to mobilise support and
legitimise their role. For some armed groups, such as the Arakan Army, their
intelligence gathering and successful military operations against Myanmar’s
armed forces relied heavily on social media until the army pushed the civilian
government to impose the world’s longest internet shutdown between June
2019 and February 2021, in Rakhine and Chin states (Tønnesson, Min
Zaw Oo & Ne Lynn Aung 2022; Kyaw Hsan Hlaing & Fishbein 2021).

Military Facebook: Promoting the

authoritarian agenda
The army’s psychological warfare department is believed to have trained
hundreds of officers to run multiple Facebook accounts, attracting followers
and spreading fake news to foment religious and racial crises. Officials of
the Thein Sein government used posts from the minister of information—
known as ‘the Minister of Facebook’—refuting allegations of human rights
abuses in order to spread hate speech (Irrawaddy 2018). In 2014, U Wirathu,

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the notoriously anti-Muslim monk leader of the Mabatha movement, shared

a Facebook post with fabricated accusations of rape that went viral, resulting
in another incident of intercommunal violence.
The fact that the NLD government relied on Facebook for their own partisan
political communication represented a great challenge to the regulation and
sanction of fake news in Myanmar (Nyi Nyi Kyaw 2019). Senior officials,
including the military leadership and civilian wing of the government, did
not persuasively condemn the Buddhist-nationalist narrative in their official
media outlets or on their Facebook accounts; neither did they use the 2013
Telecommunication Law to charge individuals involved in promoting
religious hate speech, such as the extremist monk U Wirathu (Fink 2018).
By contrast, authorities used this law just before the 2020 election to
prosecute hundreds of Facebook users for mocking Senior General Min
Aung Hlaing (Yan Naung Oak & Brooten 2019).
During the peak of military and civilian violence against Muslims in 2016
and 2017, hate speech on Facebook multiplied and socially licensed the
brutal military operations that led to the displacement of 700,000 Rohingya
to Bangladesh. The crackdown on the Rohingya was supported by top
Myanmar officials, including the leader of the military, Senior General
Min Aung Hlaing, and the leader of the National League for Democracy,
Aung San Suu Kyi, who asserted that testimonies from refugee camps
and the international depiction of the crisis were biased. This claim was
reinforced by viral posts on social media (Kinseth 2019). Since state media
and Buddhist-nationalist Facebook pages only relayed the displacement of
Buddhists and Hindus, many citizens expressed support on Facebook for
the counterinsurgency operations against Rohingya militants (Fink 2018).

The end of impunity and the blunting of the junta’s

online strategy
In early 2018, Facebook was in the spotlight for spreading hate speech
against the Rohingya minority, as investigators from the UN Human Rights
Council’s Fact-Finding Mission on Myanmar indicated that social media,
which in Myanmar is Facebook, played a ‘determining role’ in the level of
conflict within the public (Miles 2018). The Fact-Finding Mission report,
released later in the year, described Facebook as ‘slow and ineffective’ at
stopping hate speech (HRC 2018).

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 3. SOCIAL MEDIA AND DISRUPTIVE TECHNOLOGIES IN ACTIVISM

Soon after Facebook’s role was first officially criticised, and as a result of
pressure from digital rights activists, the platform took some steps to actively
remove hate speech and ban military officials.1 By August 2018, 18 Facebook
accounts, and 52 Facebook pages representing almost 12 million followers,
were removed. This ban included the account of Min Aung Hlaing, the
leader of the coup, and the armed forces’ Myawaddy television channel.
By the end of the year, another 438 pages, 145 accounts and 17 groups
were removed for being linked to the military (Meta 2018).2 According to
Frontier Myanmar (2018), taking the unprecedentedly popular Facebook
platform away from top army officials and outlets represented the strongest
punishment the international community could hope to inflict.
However, such measures had a limited impact, as the armed forces remained
in control of other pages, such as the Ministry of Defence page, and could
possibly use other pages managed by the civilian government to spread its
propaganda (Frontier Myanmar 2018).
In the weeks following the coup, Facebook banned the remaining military
state and media pages, groups and accounts, including the Ministry of
Defence page, as well as ads from commercial entities linked to the armed
forces, which were eventually removed at the end of 2021. The banning
of these military-linked businesses from the platform occurred just after
a group of Rohingya refugees filed a lawsuit against Facebook for allowing
the spread of hate speech, which led to large-scale violence against the ethnic
minority group (Milmo 2021). Despite these moves, a report released in
March 2022 revealed that Facebook was still approving ads with hate speech
content inciting violence against the Rohingya (GW 2022).

1 Facebook has certainly restricted its Myanmar users for not following its ‘community standards’
before its role in the propagation of hate speech was officially exposed. However, restrictions had been
applied unevenly (Fink 2018). While Rohingya users have complained that Facebook was silencing
them by quickly suspending or closing their accounts for documenting human rights abuses committed
by the military (Osborne 2017), U Wirathu’s account was only permanently shut down in January
2018, after being able to propagate hate speech for years, despite reports that his page was spreading
inflammatory content. Even after his account was shut down, his videos remained in circulation (Barron
2018). In addition, despite the hiring of dozens of Burmese speakers to review hate speech content,
announced in April 2018, a Reuters report exposed in August 2018 that more than a thousand posts,
images or comments attacking Rohingya had been up for up to five years (Reuters 2018).
2 Additionally, in February 2019, Facebook deplatformed four armed groups who were members of the
Northern Alliance, which the National League for Democracy government had previously characterised as
terrorist organisations. Although this label is no longer held by the NUG, Facebook’s censorship of these
armed groups remains, which the anti-coup movement perceives as very detrimental because it restricts the
flow of information and, hence, their ability to organise (Kyaw Hsan Hlaing 2021).

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 AFTER THE COUP

Nevertheless, ending years of military use of the platform with impunity,

Facebook’s deplatforming of Myanmar’s armed forces blunted the junta’s
online strategy by limiting its outreach capacity while bolstering the
anti‑coup movement. As the chapter will develop further, activists have
used Facebook extensively to mobilise people, organise protests, urge civil
servants to join the CDM, fundraise, document military abuses, share
information and encouragements or give advice on protest tactics and safety.
Countless users have changed their profile pictures to express their support
for the NUG. The coup thus marked a huge change in the military’s online
strategy: instead of using Facebook to spread its propaganda, the junta
started restricting and punishing its use.

Post-coup military crackdown on social media

and internet access
The junta’s subsequent attempts to control the virtual battlefield
through internet shutdowns, the establishment of its own intranet with
limited services, and its increased surveillance and repression of groups
and individuals significantly impacted social media use and Facebook use
in particular.
After seizing power, the SAC enacted amendments to the Electronic
Transactions Law to allow them to access user data and then sue prominent
opponents (HRW 2021). It also sought to win the communications battle
by temporarily shutting down access to the internet. During the first few
hours of the coup, the SAC completely shut down the internet in Myanmar.
This effectively cut the flow of information via social media to prevent the
organisation of a resistance. However, this quickly resulted in chaos as
the banking system shut down, halting the functioning of sectors of the
economy. The junta then instituted a nightly ban on internet services and
shut down mobile internet services, which is the main source of web access.
These measures lasted only three months. The internet is a major
development factor of Myanmar’s economy (OBG 2019). In a context in
which pandemic restrictions have increased the dependency of Myanmar’s
economy on internet banking and ecommerce, many businesses require
reliable internet access for their transactions. In 2020 alone, 38 per cent
of Myanmar firms moved to online platforms, resulting in a 73 per cent
increase in e-transactions (Chen 2021). The SAC also remains dependent
on the internet for its surveillance efforts, which rely on platforms like

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 3. SOCIAL MEDIA AND DISRUPTIVE TECHNOLOGIES IN ACTIVISM

Facebook. The dalan (pro-military civilian informants) have been deployed

across the platform to monitor posts and activity, including in private
groups (Duncan & Mendelson 2021).
Employing a strategy used by the government in 2020 to silence critical
voices (Nyan Hlaing Lin 2020), the junta pressured mobile operators and
internet service providers to restrict access to certain websites and also
virtual private networks (VPNs) that can bypass internet filtering. In an
attempt to develop a national intranet, the junta whitelisted more than
1,200 web services used for business purposes, such as internet banking
and some social media apps like WhatsApp, Zoom and Instagram (Strangio
2021). In some conflict areas, the SAC ordered a total internet shutdown
and sporadic mobile communications cuts.
The fact that the SAC has been applying the same measures previously
used against the Arakan Army suggests it has yet to develop alternative
strategies to limit digital disruption without incurring a socioeconomic toll
(ICG 2021). The SAC also attempted to restrict internet access by raising
the price of sim cards from USD1.50 to USD11 and internet services by
50 per cent. It also drafted a Cybersecurity Law to punish the use of VPNs,
which has already been enforced, although it has yet to be passed as a law
(Irrawaddy 2022a; Haffner 2022; Dobberstein 2022).
Since Facebook is banned and the use of VPNs is risky and does not get
around dalan surveillance, the number of Facebook users has decreased
as people move to safer encrypted apps. In early 2022, the number of
active social media users dropped to about 38 per cent of the Myanmar
population, against 53 per cent the previous year (Statistica 2022). Similarly,
the number of Facebook users decreased to 21 million people one year
after the coup as opposed to almost 28 million people—more than half
of Myanmar’s 54 million population—just before the coup (NapoleonCat
2021, 2022). As of June 2022, the predominance of Facebook in social
media traffic has dropped from 93 per cent to 77 per cent (Statcounter
2022). While direct comparison with figures from previous years should be
made with caution, this general trend seems to reflect the realities of internet
shutdowns, restrictions on certain social media platforms such as Facebook
and the increased prices of mobile data connection. Some people fear being
arrested with their smartphones and charged under the Cybersecurity Bill,
so they delete Facebook and their VPN when taking their phone outside
their home. The junta’s use of the Counter-Terrorism Law to seize the
property of democracy supporters has led to the confiscation of more than

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 AFTER THE COUP

547 properties since the NUG’s declaration of war in September 2021

(Irrawaddy 2022b). As a result, fewer people express support for the NUG
on Facebook. In addition, the junta continues to expand its control over
cyberspace with the development of a national identity database and the
adoption of a new sim card regulation, which requires users to register their
sim cards with their national ID card number. This, combined with the fact
that telecom providers are either controlled by the junta or believed to be
controlled by military-aligned entities, enables the junta to control users’
personal data and arrest people more easily (RFA 2022).
As an illustration of military rule in cyberspace, the case of Facebook’s
rise and decline in Myanmar shows how the junta has used a central
part of cyberspace as a new terrain of authoritarian control, and how it
has changed its tactics since the coup. After initially simply moving their
crude propaganda and psychological warfare strategies into cyberspace and
throttling internet connectivity to disrupt opposition communications, the
junta have now imported new cyber-surveillance technologies from China,
Russia, the United States, Israel and Sweden (Beech 2021). Nonetheless, the
use of Facebook and social media and the internet in general has not been
uncontested. The civil resistance and armed movements in Myanmar have
adopted new technologies to push back military control of the Myanmar
cyber-sphere.

The resistance fights back: Disruptive

technologies v. authoritarian control
Despite the SAC’s fierce attempts to control cyberspace, democracy activists
have so far been one step ahead in their use of new technologies. According
to Ryan and Tran (2022), this has been possible because pro-democracy
activists were able to sharpen their ‘digitalized capacity’ prior to the coup,
through the development of training programs and advocacy campaigns
directed towards social media platforms, government authorities and
internet users. Building on these skills, the anti-coup movements harnessed
the cyber-sphere for disruptive purposes: they have been successful in
digitally organising protests, fundraising and sharing information about
events inside the country, with each other and the world. While Facebook
continues to be instrumental to the anti-coup movement, Myanmar’s
digital activism has predominantly relied on other tools that require little
knowledge or skill, such as free VPNs and encrypted messaging services.

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 3. SOCIAL MEDIA AND DISRUPTIVE TECHNOLOGIES IN ACTIVISM

In a review of the literature on digital activism, George and Leidner

(2019) divide digital activism into three broad categories: digital
spectatorship, digital transition activities and digital gladiatorial activities.
They describe digital spectator activities as clicktivism, mentioning and
assertion; digital transitional activities as e-funding, political consumerism,
digital petitions and botivism; and digital gladiatorial activities as data
activism, exposure and hacktivism. Hacktivism has been taken up by
Myanmar democracy activists. Jordan (2002) has described hacktivism as the
attempt to achieve social and political objectives through hacking. George
and Leidner (2019) further differentiate hacktivists into cyberterrorists,
civic hackers and patriotic hackers. Myanmar’s nascent hacktivist political
activism is a little of each of these subcategories, with the aim being to
disable the regime’s ability to govern and to spread propaganda. This section
discusses, in particular, the use of social media for counterpropaganda
and real-time communication, and the effectiveness of digital gladiatorial
activities such as hacktivism and doxing, and digital transitional methods
of e-financing, in preventing the SAC from consolidating its control on
the ground.

Counterpropaganda and real-time communication

The use of social media makes the regime’s censorship of media outlets and
restrictions of social media platforms less effective by publishing evidence
that is contrary to the regime’s statements and accounts. For example, images
of deserted cities posted on Facebook counter the regime’s illustrations
in media outlets showing congested streets during the nationwide ‘silent
strikes’. Armed resistance groups routinely use Facebook pages to report
battles and attacks in real time through photo and video uploads of fighting
and human rights abuses. One group may have several pages. One of the
reasons for the SAC’s attempted shutdown of the internet has been to try
and stop information reaching rank and file soldiers so as to preserve morale
and limit further defections (ICG 2021).
Social media apps have allowed widespread publishing of real-time military
movements, numbers and weaponry. Different tools have been used in
Yangon and Mandalay, mainly during the peak of the attacks. Some websites
such as Myanmarmap.live3 have provided real-time map information.
Facebook messenger groups have been used to get security information in

3 Site no longer accessible.

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 AFTER THE COUP

various neighbourhoods and townships and to relay it to people directly

in the line of advancing SAC columns.4 After the banning of Facebook,
resistance groups have massively moved to encrypted apps such as Telegram
and Signal to share sensitive information. The Fifth Column Telegram
channel gathers and shares military intelligence information with resistance
groups. The walkie talkie app Zello has also been used as a channel to
communicate between trusted parties (as joining a Zello channel requires
a recommendation from a group member). These tools provided grassroots-
level information for resistance groups to organise protests, avoid arrests
and attack military supporters—for example, when five police officers were
killed on a train in Yangon (Myanmar Now 2021). In addition, people have
been using them in their daily lives to plan safe travel routes.

Hacktivism and doxing

Hacktivism in Myanmar is used to block military propaganda by preventing
public access to government websites and, in some cases, display a protest
message. For instance, the government-owned news websites Global
New Light of Myanmar and Myanmar Digital News have been targeted,
with messages such as ‘Stop arresting people illegally at midnight; Save
Myanmar’. Although hacktivism is a ‘gladiatorial’ activity with the ability
to have the most significant effects upon the regime’s ability to govern and
propagandise, as yet the Myanmar resistance forces lack the capacity to
create mass DDoS (distributed denial-of-service) attacks and so hacktivism
has been largely symbolic.
Doxing has proven a more successful, albeit small-scale, resistance tactic.
Doxing is a social punishment strategy used in cyberspace, which consists
of naming and shaming individuals affiliated with the junta or related to
military officers. This social punishment campaign, which started soon after
the coup, works as a kind of retribution for the junta’s past social exclusion
of democracy activists that goes far beyond cyberbullying.
Anonymous activists have set up a database listing targets in the armed forces,
their locations, photographs and the type of offence they have committed.
Individuals have also created Facebook groups and viral posts that publish
the personal details of family members of military officers and pro-regime
celebrities. In addition to the widespread incitement to bully senior officers’

4 See, for example, the closed South Okkalapa township Facebook group, www.facebook.com/grou
ps/419886232433483/?ref=share

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 3. SOCIAL MEDIA AND DISRUPTIVE TECHNOLOGIES IN ACTIVISM

children,5 the tactic allowed the boycott of military-linked businesses and

had the effect of decreasing the legitimacy of the junta by shrinking the
number of influential and well-known Burmese (such as entertainers or
social media influencers) willing to be associated with them (Sithu Aung
Myint 2021). The deportation and freezing of assets of military family
members and associates living abroad has been a key motivation for the
diaspora movement engaging in doxing (McMichael 2021). For instance,
the Australian Government launched an investigation into junta relatives
living in Australia following calls from human rights advocates and Burmese
Australians who prepared a list naming 15 relatives of senior junta members
(Galloway & McKenzie 2021).
Doxing has also had concrete effects on the ground, including the murder
of at least four military supporters and informants as the direct result of
revealing their identity and personal details on Facebook. In November
2021, local armed groups killed two military informants and a ward
administrator as well as a teacher who did not join the CDM (Irrawaddy
2021a; Maung Maung Thein 2021). In addition to exposing the teacher’s
identity, resistance supporters specifically asked her to stop collaborating
with the military (Maung Maung Thein 2021).
Reliable sources indicate that, in some cases, people have been wrongly
identified as pro-military, with real-life consequences. For instance, the
supposed addresses of Myanmar Air Force Officers were published in
a public Facebook group. This wrongly led to the bombing of a residence
that was later identified as that of a local singer (Ko Korozan 2022).
In addition, this climate of social punishment has trickled down to civilians,
with increased tensions and polarisation, which the youth feel strongly
(Chiu 2022). The fear of being publicly shamed and labelled as pro-military
causes social anxiety and results in self-censorship: people can be ostracised
simply for using Facebook to share their intention to study abroad or go
back to university (Chiu 2022).
Doxing has been a small-scale but effective strategy deployed by activists
inside and outside the country, and has also been a deadly tactic used
by the SAC’s intelligence apparatus to hunt pro-democracy supporters.

5 For example, in March 2021, the personal information of the son of a general was published on
Facebook. The post incited people to use it for cyberbullying, phone bullying and even offline bullying.
Later, the post was removed from Facebook.

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 AFTER THE COUP

The identity and details of active resistance supporters have been exposed
on social media, leading to their arrests, and there are credible reports of
extrajudicial killings.6
One of the biggest recent changes is the use of Telegram channels by both
pro‑democracy and pro-military groups. A Telegram channel allows its
owner to broadcast messages to an unlimited number of subscribers who
cannot send their own messages—unless the channel owner links it to
a discussion group and enables comments. While the pro-resistance channel
‘Digging SAC’ is mainly used to share information, the pro-military
channels ‘Han Nyein Oo’ and ‘Ko Lu Ngwe’ are used to crowdsource
information about pro-democracy activists through their subscribers, the
online dalans, who can safely denounce members of the resistance through
a private account created for this purpose. Members of the resistance have
been arrested or killed through these channels. For instance, two National
League for Democracy supporters were killed in Mandalay in response to
a pro-military militia’s launch of a counterinsurgency operation circulated
on the Han Nyein Oo channel (Irrawaddy 2022d).
While doxing has had a concrete impact and sometimes led to deaths, its
effectiveness in undermining the junta’s consolidation is limited because of
its infrequent and small-scale uses and also because this tactic is used against
the resistance itself. Digital financing represents the real game changer
in the short term as it offers a new frontier.

Digital financing
Digital financing is used to fund the resistance against the coup, both non-
violent and violent, through three main avenues: the parallel government,
grassroots actors and, more recently, through click-to-donate websites
and apps.
The NUG is able to finance the resistance movement through its innovative
use of crowdfunding. In late 2021, the NUG announced a target budget of
about USD800 million (MMK1.4 trillion) to cover social and humanitarian
support, including health care, education, welfare and funding for striking
civil servants as well as defecting military personnel and police officers
(Nachemson 2021; Irrawaddy 2021b). This budget did not officially

6 See, for instance, the arrest of a bank employee, www.facebook.com/ngerdopnaingmarpar/posts/​

191226889878748

60
 3. SOCIAL MEDIA AND DISRUPTIVE TECHNOLOGIES IN ACTIVISM

include defence spending, but, in June 2022, the NUG declared that it had
already spent over 45 million—about 95 per cent of its available funds—
on arming PDFs. More money is desperately needed, however, as funding
the armed resistance would require at least USD10 million monthly
(Irrawaddy 2022f ).
The alternative government was able to raise this money through innovative
initiatives, such as the purchase of lottery ticket sales, bonds, participating
in a ‘voluntary tax’ regime, and through sales of military property shares and
cryptocurrency. The online lottery sale pilot scheme launched in August
2021 raised USD8 million. The bond sale began in November 2021, with
USD2 million worth of bonds sold within the first two hours (Nachemson
2021). The voluntary tax, which can be paid online through a voluntary
self-assessment process, raised about USD150,000 in a month (Mizzima
2021; Nyan Hlaing Lin 2021). The Ministry of Finance also launched an
unexpected scheme at the end of April 2022 whereby properties owned
by military leaders would be reclaimed and sold in shares to support
the revolution. In the first three days that Min Aung Hlaing’s residence
was put on sale for USD10 million (a third of its value), USD2 million was
raised in the sale of shares (Irrawaddy 2022e). Such a fundraising move is
revolutionary in that it is simultaneously delegitimising the junta, bestowing
legitimacy on the NUG and potentially supporting violent action. Finally,
the NUG encourages the use of cryptocurrency, which is hard to trace. The
Ministry of Finance announced in December 2021 the use of the stable
coin Tether as its official currency, to ensure the safety of donations made to
the NUG (Al Jazeera 2021). Then, in June 2022, the NUG launched NUG
Pay, a digital platform using a new blockchain digital currency, the Digital
Myanmar Kyat. With this technology, the NUG is able to circumvent the
formal banking sector without SAC interference (Abuza 2022).
In addition to NUG funding, the resistance movement is widely using
grassroots fundraising techniques to support striking civil servants as well
as local PDFs. Such grassroots fundraising is organised by individuals,
celebrities and armed groups and includes platforms such as We Pledge
CDM Myanmar, which receives donations supporting CDM participants
and humanitarian aid. Digital wallet platforms, such as KBZ Pay, are widely
used to support armed resistance. Any group can post its digital wallet ID
or QR code on Facebook for donors to transfer money. It is not easy for
the junta to trace such fund movements. However, in some cases, the use
of transfer names like ‘Revolution’ or ‘PDF’ enabled the junta to identify
several accounts and freeze them. To further crack down on people funding
61
 AFTER THE COUP

the anti-junta movement, the Central Bank announced a new restrictive

regulation in September 2022 whereby mobile payments would be cancelled
unless transfers were registered with the user’s correct identification details
(GNLM 2022).
Donating money via digital wallet platforms has thus become increasingly
risky. The junta has been charging NUG or PDF supporters with funding
terrorism under the 2014 Counter-Terrorism Law. Almost 200 people have
been prosecuted since the coup, and face up to 10 years imprisonment, no
matter how small the donation (Irrawaddy 2022c). In one instance, two
university students received a seven-year sentence for donating MMK5,000
or USD3 (Irrawaddy 2022c). Where funding for pro-democracy and
armed resistance groups has been stopped by the SAC, some have turned
to cryptocurrency. When Myanmar celebrity Htar Htet Htet’s digital wallet
code was revealed by regime supporters in August 2021, she encouraged
her followers to make donations to the NUG through different countries
and platforms, which include Binance, Bitcoin and PayPal. While the use
of NUG Pay is increasing among NUG supporters, KBZ Pay remains the
main payment method. Responding to increasing challenges in accessing,
transferring and raising funds in Myanmar, the PDFs have instituted other
innovative fundraising systems that rely on internet advertising revenue rather
than on individual donations. Revenue is generated through the YouTube
channels views and likes as well as through click-to-donate websites. Users
typically generate a donation to the website owner by clicking on ads without
spending their own money. While each donation only generates a few cents,
the objective is to accrue enough clicks to produce significant amounts.
Donations are encouraged on Facebook’s Click2donate page, which also
shares daily reports of funds raised by a total of 10 sites. Facebook is still
used for the promotion of this innovative crowdfunding system, which
offers a much safer way to donate to the resistance and generates a significant
amount daily. For example, on 5 May 2022 alone, almost USD10,000 was
generated. Tech savvy resistance youth have also developed several click-to-
donate apps—for instance, the news app ‘Tha Din’ and the gaming app
‘The PDF Game’—whereby the user generates a donation each time an ad
shows up as the app is loading. These new fundraising strategies represent
a much safer option than posting a QR code on a Facebook account, which
could easily be traced if the post became viral. It is also a simple act, which
does not cost anything to the user but can make a significant difference
when used collectively. Tapping into the global advertising networks moves
resistance funding into the mainstream and provides an ongoing and passive
source of income.
62
 3. SOCIAL MEDIA AND DISRUPTIVE TECHNOLOGIES IN ACTIVISM

Despite continuous attempts to repress the use of cyberspace, the junta has
not been able to stop digital financing because they do not have the capacity
to shut down the internet, which continues to be used by a highly creative
pro-democracy resistance. Yet, the impact of digital financing is beyond
cyberspace as it provides the resistance with more capacity to buy weapons
and, therefore, has the potential to directly influence the result of the war
on the ground.

Conclusion
Counterinsurgency strategies have proved too costly for the junta to
implement digitally as for the moment, it inhibits their economy and
banking system. By employing innovative digital techniques that go beyond
Facebook’s quasi-monopoly to maintain its access to information and
sustain the resistance movement, pro-democracy groups have been able to
blunt the pro-totalitarianism military’s fear-making apparatus that includes
its own propaganda, surveillance and censorship methods. At this early stage
of disruptive technology use in the developing cyber-world of Myanmar,
connectivity to the internet is critical for the resistance movement to access
funds through digital financing and to communicate through social media.
In the short and medium term, digital financing of the resistance has the
potential to affect the outcome on the physical battleground: the PDFs are
better armed this year and the junta is unable to consolidate its coup.
But all authoritarian regimes have been confronted with these new
opportunities for democracy activism. The 2011 Arab Spring movement
is considered the first social media–enabled resistance movement, but
theorists have written on the formation of such virtual communities in
terms of ‘Slacktivism’, an ultimately ineffective form of protest or adjunct
to physical resistance. We only need to look to Myanmar’s northern
border to see how authoritarian governments over time are mastering these
tools to building their own cyberworlds. In the Chinese Splinternet, for
example, an authoritarian metaverse is being created that is as tightly bound
and defended as their physical territories (Griffiths 2019).
The junta has studied longstanding autocracies such as China and Russia to
understand how they have been able to neutralise the power of the internet
and social media to resist their rule and to turn it into an extension of their
social control. As a result, the regime is working hard on making the everyday
use of the internet and social media too expensive and risky. The junta can
63
 AFTER THE COUP

buy spyware and other tools and start creating its own internet. The purchase
of new cyber-surveillance technologies is ongoing, as illustrated by the visit
in early April of a private open-source intelligence expert from Russia selling
a public opinion monitoring system on social media, Telegram channels
and the darknet (IO 2022). This might explain the internet shutdown that
affected the whole country mid-March. We should expect more measures
designed to deny Burmese citizens access to the cyber-world as the junta
learns to navigate and create their own cyber-sphere. Techno-totalitarianism
may eventually win in Myanmar, as it is winning in its more cyber-developed
neighbour China. But, until a time comes when the junta is able to control
access to cyberspace, Myanmar activists will continue to use social media and
the internet not just to organise and publicise alternate politics and visions
of the future, but also to dull the resonance of the regime’s propaganda.
Last but not least, with the ability to digitally fund armed resistance in the
physical battlefield, cyberspace offers ways, if only in the short term, to even
up the stakes on the ground.

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 4
Multinational Enterprise
Behaviour in Post-Coup
Myanmar
Nicholas Coppel
Adjunct Associate Professor (practice), Monash University,
and former Australian ambassador to Myanmar

Abstract
Since the coup, multinational enterprises have come under pressure to review
their operations in Myanmar and exit any relationship they have with military-
controlled entities. Targeted sanctions imposed by the United States, United
Kingdom, Canada and European countries made it a legal requirement in
their jurisdictions. However, very few foreign firms were in joint venture or
had other commercial relations with military-owned or controlled entities,
and the overestimation of the extent and significance of such relationships
has distracted policymakers and activists from considering policies focused
on the role the business community could play to strengthen human rights
in Myanmar. The companies that left Myanmar mostly did so for security,
commercial or reputational reasons. Leaving was not always easy or helpful to
Myanmar’s citizens and, in some instances, even benefited the military. This
chapter explores these pressures and responses and argues that policies need
to recognise that change will only come from within Myanmar; thus, the
focus should be less on external actors and more on what the international
community can do to support responsible business practices in the country
that will strengthen human rights and the wellbeing of the people.

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***
Following the 1 February 2021 coup d’état, the United Kingdom, United
States, Canada, the European Union and other European countries imposed
targeted sanctions on the two military-owned and controlled conglomerates,
Myanma Economic Holdings Ltd (MEHL) and Myanmar Economic
Corporation (MEC), as well as state-owned enterprises and the business
interests of named military personnel and their family members. Most of
the rest of the world did not follow with their own sanctions, although
a number of countries restricted exports of arms and military equipment.
The economy-wide sanctions applied by some countries from the 1990s
to the 2010s are regarded as having concentrated wealth and power in the
hands of regime-linked forces (Jones 2015) and this time were not applied
by any country. Notably, none of the sanctioning countries was a significant
trading partner of Myanmar (China, Thailand and Japan account for 58 per
cent of Myanmar’s exports and 50 per cent of imports; World Bank 2021),
and none of Myanmar’s bordering countries imposed sanctions. But, more
significantly, as discussed below, very few foreign firms were actually in joint
venture or in other commercial relationships with the Myanmar military or
its entities. In this context, sanctions have not had much bite or functioned
well as a coercive lever. Foremost, they have been statements of concern and
displeasure at the coup and a signal of solidarity with those opposed to it.
The ways in which multinational enterprises responded to the coup were,
thus, influenced not so much by the legal requirements of sanctions as by
Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and Development (OECD) and
United Nations (UN) guidelines, and principles setting voluntary standards
of corporate behaviour. Various non-governmental organisations have
developed advice specific to the Myanmar context to help guide businesses.
Activist organisations, in particular, have targeted companies that lease
land from military entities or pay fees to state-owned enterprises, arguing
that these companies are complicit in the atrocities and human rights
abuses committed by the military. Taken together, targeted sanctions and
activist pressure run the risk of stigmatising all business with Myanmar,
including legitimate, non-sanctioned activity. Corporate boards and
fund managers concerned about their organisation’s reputation can be
influenced by perceptions. If this sentiment is pervasive, targeted sanctions
combined with activist pressure could become similar in effect to damaging
economy‑wide sanctions.

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This chapter explores the extent and significance of corporate relationships

with the military, and their responses to the coup, and concludes that
withdrawing from the country is not always helpful, and that policies need
to recognise that change will only come from within Myanmar. Thus, the
focus should be on supporting responsible business practices in-country
that can strengthen human rights and the wellbeing of the people.

Multinational enterprises and human rights

The OECD’s Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises (2011) set out non-
binding principles and standards for responsible business conduct. These
voluntary, not legally enforceable, guidelines advise that the first obligation
of enterprises is to obey domestic laws, and that where domestic law conflicts
with the guidelines, enterprises should seek to honour the guidelines in
ways that do not place them in direct violation of domestic law. They also
suggest that enterprises abstain from improper involvement in local political
activities. Most publicly listed companies subscribe to these principles but,
as we shall see, they are not comforting principles when the authority issuing
the laws and regulations has come to power through the barrel of a gun.
The UN’s Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights (UN 2011) state
that in conflict-affected areas, the host state of multinational enterprises has
a role to play in assisting corporations to ensure that they are not involved
with human rights abuses. Business enterprises should seek to prevent or
mitigate adverse human rights impacts directly linked to their operations,
products or services, even if they have not contributed to those impacts.
Where a business has not directly contributed to an adverse human rights
impact, and it does not have the leverage to prevent or mitigate the adverse
impact, ‘the enterprise should consider ending the relationship, taking into
account credible assessments of potential adverse human rights impacts
of doing so’ (UN 2011). Here there is a recognition that, in some cases,
enterprises will need to weigh the impact of leaving against the impact
of staying.
In Myanmar, the Myanmar Centre for Responsible Business (MCRB)
initially responded to the coup with a cautiously worded statement saying
that it was watching the developments with growing and deep concern, but
was abstaining from politics (MCRB 2021). Reinforcing this, the statement
avoided the word ‘coup’ or condemnation of what had happened. While
noting that everyone benefited from respect for human rights, democracy,
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fundamental freedoms and the rule of law, it said its primary concern was
the safety of employees and the continued provision of essential services. The
emphasis was on the contribution multinational enterprises could make to
human rights and essential services (MCRB 2021). This focus featured also
in a statement by several chambers of commerce, which said their members
had provided Myanmar people with access to greater opportunities and
prosperity (CCI France 2021).
As military atrocities against civilians increased, more was expected of
foreign firms than watching with concern. The UK-based Institute for
Human Rights and Business, an international think tank that founded
the local MCRB, advised businesses to ‘ensure they do everything in their
power to abide by international standards and avoid complicity in human
rights violations being committed by security forces’ (Tripathi & Morrison
2021). In response to claims that payments legitimised the regime, funded
the military and could be complicit in acts of atrocity, they cautioned
businesses ‘to avoid and end commercial relationships—direct or indirect—
with the military and its economic interests’. But, on the fraught question
of whether to pay taxes, they pointed out that tax revenues contributed to
preventing a failed state. They suggested that companies should publish
what they paid and advocate for taxes to be spent on welfare not warfare.
In further collective advice to businesses, the Institute for Human Rights
and Business suggested that foreign enterprises leave Myanmar if they
were ‘contributing to, or directly linked to, harm and cannot exercise any
leverage—collectively or individually—to prevent or mitigate that harm’.
Conversely, there was an argument for some enterprises to stay, especially
those that:
have the leverage to ensure at least their own operations, and usually
those of their business partners, respect human rights on issues such
as worker safety, fair wages, and respecting the rights to freedom
of association and expression, and not to be discriminated against,
including as a union member. (Tripathi, Morrison & Bowman 2021)

The argument was that, by staying, they would offer a different, more
hopeful, vision of the future and be well placed to contribute to the country’s
eventual revival. That is, the essential step was for enterprises to review
their operations and consider whether they were in any way connected to
harm. This approach was contested by activist groups who argued that any
payment to the Myanmar military regime would support and legitimise the
military and make the payer complicit in atrocity crimes and human rights
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abuses. The respective merits of these competing approaches are considered

later in this chapter in light of the impact of companies that did withdraw
from the country.

Calls to end commercial relationships with

military-owned or controlled entities
Drawing attention to multinational enterprises with commercial
relationships with Myanmar’s military predates the coup. For example,
following the attacks on Myanmar’s Rohingya community in Rakhine
State in 2017, an Independent International Fact-Finding Mission was
mandated by the UN Human Rights Council to investigate. It reported on
the military’s economic interests, concluding that:
Foreign companies with joint ventures and other commercial
relationships with the Tatmadaw … are in some cases legally
implicated in the conduct of the Tatmadaw, and in all cases complicit
through their tacit acceptance and approval of the Tatmadaw’s
actions. (UNHRC 2019, 62)

The Fact-Finding Mission advocated economic isolation of, and

disengagement from, the military conglomerates and associated companies.
In view of the scale and diversity of the military’s business interests, it is
surprising that only 14 foreign company joint ventures with military-owned
or controlled businesses were identified, and only 44 foreign companies
were identified as having other contractual or other commercial ties, such as
leasing land (UNHRC 2019).
Continuing this approach, the self-styled Special Advisory Council for
Myanmar, a trio of former UN rapporteurs or advisers on Myanmar, advocated
a ‘cut the cash’ strategy involving ending commercial relationships with not
only military-owned companies, but also the six state-owned economic
enterprises (SAC-M 2021). This approach was supported by other advocacy
groups who argued that Myanmar state-owned enterprises—especially
the Myanmar Oil and Gas Enterprise—financially benefited the military.
Burma Campaign UK maintained a list of multinational enterprises doing
business with the Myanmar military and this so-called Dirty List included
101 companies (Burma Campaign UK 2021).

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Returning to the UNHRC Fact-Finding Mission report, the 14 joint

ventures identified represent just 11 foreign companies, as three foreign
companies each had two joint ventures (see Table 4.1). Nine of the joint
ventures have partners domiciled in either Korea or Japan, and all bar one
are domiciled in Asia.

Table 4.1: Foreign joint venture partnerships with MEHL and MEC

Myanmar company MEHL Foreign company Domicile Sector

or MEC
Coal Mine and MEC Saraburi Coal Co. Ltd Hong Mining
Power Plant Kong
Gold Cement Co. MEHL 26.4% GC Holdings Seychelles Manufacturing
Hanthawaddy Golf MEHL 37% Inno Co. Ltd Korea Recreation
& Country Club
JPMD Ltd MEC 49% Japan Myanmar Japan Construction
Development
Institution
Mandalay Brewery MEHL 51% Kirin Holdings Japan Manufacturing
Ltd
Moe Gyo Sulphuric MEHL Unknown % China Manufacturing
Acid NORINCO
Myanmar Brewery MEHL 51% Kirin Holdings Japan Manufacturing
Ltd
Myanmar Inno MEHL 44% Inno Co. Ltd Korea Real estate
International Ltd
Myanmar Inno Line MEHL 18% Inno Co. Ltd Korea Real estate
Co. Ltd
Myanmar POSCO MEHL 70% POSCO Coated Korea Manufacturing
C&C Co. Ltd & Color Steel Co. Ltd
Myanmar POSCO MEHL 70% POSCO Steel Korea Manufacturing
Steel Co. Ltd Co. Ltd
Myanmar Wise- MEHL 55% Pan-Pacific Korea Manufacturing
Pacific Apparel Co. Ltd
Yangon Co. Ltd
Telecom Int’l MEC 49% Viettel Viet Nam Communications
Myanmar Co. Ltd
Virginia Tobacco MEHL 60% Distinction Singapore Tobacco
Co. Ltd Investment
Holdings Pte

Source: UNHRC (2019, 96–7).

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Of the 11 foreign joint venture partners two, Kirin Holdings Co. Ltd
(a Japanese beverage maker) and POSCO Steel, have announced their
intention to end their joint ventures. Kirin and MEHL jointly own
Myanmar Brewery and Mandalay Brewery. Kirin had pre-existing concerns
about their association with MEHL and, in 2020, decided to suspend
dividend payments from the two breweries (Goto 2021). After the coup,
Kirin initially wanted to retain their Myanmar investment, but without
the stigma attached to being in partnership with MEHL and sought to
terminate the joint venture. However, in February 2022, it concluded that
this would not be possible and decided to sell its stake in the breweries
and withdraw completely from Myanmar. Unable to find an outside
buyer, Kirin sold its stake to its military joint venture partner (Taguchi &
Henmi 2022). Similarly, immediately after the coup, POSCO Coated &
Color Steel Co. Ltd announced in February 2021 that it had suspended all
dividend payments to joint venture partner MEHL and, two months later,
said it would rearrange the joint venture but continue to make steel roofing
to improve the housing market, create employment and industrialise and
revitalise the economy (POSCO 2021).
Three years after publication of the Fact-Finding Mission’s report and
21 months after the coup, only one foreign joint venture had divested
and one other hoped to rearrange its joint venture. The limited impact
of the Fact-Finding Mission report stems from the misapprehension
that the military’s large and diversified business interests were integrated
into the global economy. However, decades of isolationism, economic
mismanagement and the stigma attached to going into a joint venture with
a military conglomerate meant there actually were few linkages created
over the preceding decades and, hence, limited leverage. Further, those few
companies with linkages were from countries not imposing sanctions. This
casts doubt on the utility of a response to the coup that targets foreign firms
but has no discernible effect on the military’s funding or attitude.

Multinational enterprises in other

relationships with military entities
Unlike most other companies in some sort of relationship with the military,
Facebook received funds from them—it did not make payments to them.
Shortly after the coup, Facebook banned the Myanmar military and
military‑controlled state and media entities from Facebook and Instagram

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as well as ads from military-linked entities. In December 2021, Meta

Platforms Inc. (formerly known as Facebook) expanded its ban and removed
pages, groups and accounts representing military-controlled entities such
as Myanmar Beer and telecommunications operator Mytel. Meta used the
International Fact-Finding Mission report on the economic interests of
the military to identify companies to be removed (Frankel 2021).
All bar three of the 44 foreign companies with contractual or commercial
ties to the military-owned business conglomerates were domiciled in Asia
and one other was domiciled in both Singapore and Lebanon. That is, the
foreign enterprises with a direct association with the sanctioned entities
were not domiciled in the jurisdictions imposing sanctions. Consequently,
the imposition of sanctions did not have much success.
Nevertheless, one company, Adani, felt the impact of sanctions and
sustained advocacy and decided to exit. Adani Ports and Special Economic
Zone Ltd, an India-based subsidiary of the Adani Group, was subjected
to considerable international attention because it leased land from MEC
(a sanctioned entity) to develop a port project in Yangon. It did not matter
that in 2019 it was the National League for Democracy government that
had granted Adani permission to develop, operate and maintain a port on
the land. In an example of shareholder activism, Norwegian pension fund
KLP said it would divest from Adani Ports and Special Economic Zone
Ltd on the grounds that the company’s military link breached the fund’s
responsible investment policy (Fouche 2021). Initially, Adani denied their
linkage was inappropriate, but in October 2021 said it would nevertheless
work on a plan to exit the company’s investment by June 2022 (Sethuraman
N.R. & Sudarshan Varadan 2021). This was cautiously welcomed by activist
groups who, in an afterthought about the consequences, said:
Adani Ports must now find a way to exit responsibly by mitigating
the impact on their Myanmar workers and recovering what they can
of their $90 million payment to MEC so they do not leave a windfall
for the terrorist Myanmar military. (ACIJ 2021)

Campaigns to attract public support need also to have regard to the

complexity of situations and the range of implications. Ironically, Adani’s
heralded departure may further enrich the military, while national income
and employment will likely be less than what they would be if they stayed.
Australia’s sovereign wealth fund, the Future Fund, was criticised for having
equity stakes collectively valued at AUD157.9 million across 14 publicly
traded companies that maintain business links to the Myanmar military.
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Somewhat tenuously, an activist group argued that the Future Fund was
‘profiting from the Myanmar military’s brutal oppression and campaign of
terror’ (Justice for Myanmar 2021b). Even more tenuously, it argued that
the Australian Government had not directed the fund to divest and was,
therefore, ‘directly connected to the Myanmar military’s grave violations
of human rights’ (Justice for Myanmar 2021b). The equity stakes were in
companies including Adani Ports, Kirin and POSCO. New Zealand’s Super
Fund was also criticised for investing in Adani (BHRRC 2021). The goal of
these campaigns was to create a perception that all commercial connections
with Myanmar carry reputational risk and to get the attention of the
Australian and New Zealand governments, which had not joined European
and North American governments in imposing sanctions. Selling down
their relatively small shareholdings in companies listed on international
bourses could not seriously be expected to be of any consequence to the
situation in Myanmar.

Multinational enterprises in relationships

with state-owned enterprises
Myanmar’s six state-owned enterprises play a large role in the economy, and
the National Unity Government (NUG) called for sanctions to be imposed
on them, especially the Myanmar Oil and Gas Enterprise (MOGE)
(NUG 2021). The NUG also called on all offshore gas operators to suspend
payments to the government until democracy was restored. The US, UK,
Canada and European countries have heeded the call and sanctioned some
of the state-owned enterprises, but only the EU has sanctioned MOGE.
Publish What You Pay Australia, a civil society coalition, claimed that:
any international oil and gas company making or facilitating the
payment of funds to MOGE is likely to be assisting the Myanmar
military in committing extensive human rights abuses and financing
and legitimising its claim to be the government of Myanmar.
(Moore 2021b, 7)

They also said that asset managers and pension funds were ‘exposed to
the risk of funding the military through the military’s misappropriation
of MOGE’s cash, supporting its efforts to crush Myanmar’s transition to
democracy and its human rights abuses’ (Moore 2021b, 7). They did not
call for production to be halted (two-fifths of Myanmar’s power comes from

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gas) but called on oil and gas companies to place gas sale proceeds into
escrow accounts until there is an elected, civilian government. Withholding
taxes, however, would place them in violation of domestic law and would
not be consistent with OECD guidelines or the approach favoured by the
Institute for Human Rights and Business.
MOGE is in four offshore gas joint ventures with multinational
enterprises: the Yadana, Shwe, Zawtika and Yetagun projects. Each joint
venture comprises a gas production component and a gas transportation
component. The main joint venture companies are the French energy group
Total; Korea’s POSCO International; PTTEP, a subsidiary of the Thai state-
owned oil and gas company PTE; and Petronas, Malaysia’s state-owned oil
and gas company.
Total is the operator of the Yadana Project, which supplies 50 per cent of
total gas supply to Myanmar and 11 per cent of Thailand’s natural gas. In
May 2021, the joint venture suspended cash distributions to shareholders
from the project’s gas pipeline joint venture, but continued to pay taxes.
However, in January 2022, Total and another joint venture partner,
Chevron, decided to exit Myanmar, leaving PTTEP, a subsidiary of the
Thai state-owned oil and gas company PTE, as the project’s operator. Total
and Chevron’s withdrawal increased the equity share (and future dividend
payments) of the remaining partners including MOGE (PTTEP 2022).
Given that their withdrawal has only increased the equity of MOGE, it was
incorrect for Justice for Myanmar to herald Total’s decision to exit Myanmar
as ‘a major step in cutting off funds to the illegal military junta’ (Justice
for Myanmar 2022a). Total’s exit was a windfall gain for MOGE and is
illustrative of the unintended consequences that can come from pressuring
foreign firms to exit.
POSCO, the operator of the Shwe Project supplying gas to China,
maintained operations, defending its relationship with MOGE on the
basis that it predated the coup and that withdrawal might see it replaced
by China or other players, which would only benefit the junta and inflict
damage to Korea (Korea Times 2021). POSCO International is continuing
its exploration activities. In July 2021, it extended its contract with
Swiss-based driller Transocean (Energy Voice 2021). The Zawtika Project
is operated and mostly owned by PTTEP and most of the project’s gas is
piped to Thailand. PTT is also in a joint venture with MEC to construct
a fuel terminal that has attracted criticism (HRW 2021).

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In April 2021, Petronas, operator of the Yetagun Project, declared force

majeure due to depletion of gas production and said it would temporarily
cease production until remedial measures were undertaken to enable its
resumption (Petronas 2021). A year later, Petronas and their foreign joint
venture partners all withdrew from the project and the military appointed
a Thailand-based private oil and gas company as operator, thereby ensuring
the continued flow of funds to the military (Justice for Myanmar 2022c).
Certainly, MOGE’s revenue is the greatest of all the state-owned enterprises
and, consequently, has been the major target in efforts to cut funding to
the military. Several foreign joint venture partners have divested, leaving
other foreign partners to assume the role of operator. Their divestments
have served only to increase MOGE’s share in the joint ventures. Despite
the attention on international operators, no gas production has halted
(other than from the depleted Yetagun Project), and the military’s revenue
has only increased.

To stay or to leave?
Many multinational enterprises operating in Myanmar are not in a
relationship with the military or their owned or controlled entities.
Nevertheless, several have, of their own accord, chosen to divest while others
have been pressured to do so.
Shortly after the coup, Woodside, an Australian natural gas producer with
large offshore petroleum exploration holdings in Myanmar, reduced its
presence in Myanmar and demobilised its offshore exploration drilling
team. The company subsequently went one step further and withdrew
from Myanmar, relinquishing its exploration permits. The company said
its conduct was ‘guided by the UN Guiding Principles on Business and
Human Rights and other relevant international standards’ (Woodside
2022). While the company did not have any producing assets or generate
any revenue, it had, as required, a production sharing agreement with
MOGE that would have become operational if the gas fields were to be
developed. The relinquished exploration permits are now open to being
offered by MOGE to less principled gas producers from China and Russia.
The future possibility of a gas-for-weapons deal cannot be ruled out.

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Claims were made that if Myanmar Metals, an Australian explorer and

mine developer, did not divest from its Bawdwin joint venture it ‘would
essentially be in support of the illegal, unconstitutional seizure of power and
legitimize the Myanmar military’s authority’ (Moore 2021a). The company
decided to dispose its entire interest to one of its local joint venture partners,
but stated other reasons for doing so:
the lack of stability, clarity, and confidence in Myanmar at this time
makes it impossible for us to bring international finance to bear on
the project, impossible for us to gain access to it, and impossible for
us to meet our obligations in the meantime. (Myanmar Metals 2021)

Civil society groups remained unhappy and lodged a complaint with the
Australian national contact point for the OECD guidelines, arguing that
the sale could lead to millions of dollars ‘lining the pockets of Myanmar’s
murderous generals once the mine becomes operational’ (Barrett 2021).
Telenor Myanmar, a Norwegian-owned mobile telephony provider, is
another example of a company that activists criticised for withdrawing
from Myanmar. Telenor was criticised not for paying its licence fees but
for divesting its Myanmar operations through a sales agreement with the
Lebanon-based M1 Group (Justice for Myanmar 2022b). As a condition
precedent for regulatory approval, M1 entered into a local partnership
to ensure it had a local majority owner (Telenor 2022b). Telenor’s decision to
write-off its investment was informed by the deteriorating situation and
by security, regulatory and compliance issues. Ensuring continuation of
operations that provide affordable mobile services to support Myanmar’s
development and growth was also a consideration (Rostrup 2021). Activist
groups were concerned that the business’s new owners might be less vigilant
in resisting censorship and protecting customer data and claimed Telenor’s
sale would further embolden the military, ‘putting the lives of activists,
journalists and anyone opposed to the military junta at greater risk’ (Justice
for Myanmar 2021a). Telenor explained the dilemma they faced:
There are no solutions without negative consequences … a key
reason for selling Telenor Myanmar is that we do not want to activate
intercept equipment, which all operators are required to do … It is
precisely this conflict—between the requirement to comply with
local law on the one hand and the concern about human rights and
the risk of violations of Norwegian and European sanctions on the
other—that leaves Telenor with no choice but to sell … selling the
business is the least detrimental solution for customers, employees
and the broader society. (Telenor 2022a)
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These examples from Total, Woodside, Myanmar Metals and Telenor all
highlight the risk of unintended consequences from pressuring companies
to leave. The Total and Myanmar Metals exits could lead to more revenue
for the military and Telenor’s exit is not good news for its 18 million
subscribers.
Other companies to exit for operational reasons include:
• The German wholesaler Metro, suppliers of food to restaurants and
hotels, ceased operations due to ‘the volatile investment and business
environment’ (Metro 2021).
• In October 2021, British American Tobacco said it would cease all
operations after evaluating their long-term operational and commercial
viability (Petty 2021).
• EDF, a French power group, suspended development of the Shweli 3
hydropower project citing human rights concerns (Reuters 2021).
• Amata Asia (Myanmar), a Thai industrial estate developer, indefinitely
suspended the Yangon Amata Smart & Eco City Project (Chan Mya
Htwe & Aung Loon 2021).
• Hongkong and Shanghai Hotels Ltd suspended for one year construction
of its planned Peninsula Yangon Hotel ‘due to the unfortunate situation
in Myanmar’ (Kawai 2021).
• Sembcorp Industries, a Singapore-based engineering company operating
a gas-fired power plant, is ‘actively monitoring the situation’ and has
not made a decision on whether to proceed with its proposed industrial
park development (Sembcorp 2021). Its president said: ‘we are invested
in this country. We are operating this very important infrastructure
asset; our immediate priority is to continue to serve the community’
(Connors 2021).
• The Swiss-owned Kempinski Hotel in Nay Pyi Taw ceased operating
in October 2021, eight months after the coup, suggesting business
conditions including the impact of COVID-19 contributed to the
decision (Myanmar Now 2021).
This chapter has identified over 30 multinational enterprises (Table 4.2)
as having made public statements about their Myanmar operations. Those
exiting range from franchise operators selling pretzels (Auntie Anne’s) or
bubble tea (KOI Bubble Tea Shop) to major multinational corporations
developing industrial zones (Amata Corporation) or manufacturing
cigarettes (British American Tobacco). While there may be more companies
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that have ceased or been sold since the coup that have not attracted
media attention, many of the 1,914 existing foreign investment projects
in Myanmar (DICA 2022) are keeping a low profile and continuing.
Examples of such companies include Carlsberg, Sumitomo, Marubeni,
Mitsubishi (in the Thilawa Special Economic Zone and the Landmark
Project) and Accor. Media reports of an exodus of multinational companies
abandoning Myanmar (Nikkei Asia 2021; Economist 2021) are, thus, clearly
exaggerated. However, the more significant story is the almost complete
end of new foreign investment. According to the Myanmar Investment
Commission, the cumulative value of permitted projects increased by less
than USD100 million between May 2021 and April 2022, with most of the
new investment coming from China and Hong Kong (DICA 2022).

Table 4.2: Multinational enterprise announcements about

Myanmar operations

Company Domicile Activity Decision

Adani Ports & SEZ India Container terminal Divest by June 2022
AEON Japan Shopping mall Project shelved
developer
Amata Corporation Thailand Industrial zone Indefinite suspension
development
Ant Financial China Mobile payment Not proceeding with
services purchase of stake in
Wave Money
Auntie Anne’s USA Pretzel retailer Exited
Bridgestone Japan Tyre manufacture Operations suspended
British American UK Cigarette sale and Ceased operations and
Tobacco production will withdraw
Chevron US Yadana gas project Equity transferred to
subsidiary
EDF France Hydropower Development
development suspended
ENEOS Holdings Japan Yetagun gas project Divested
Hongkong & Hong Kong Peninsula Hotel Construction
Shanghai Hotels suspended for a year
Kempinski Hotel Switzerland Kempinski Nay Pyi Operations ceased
Taw
Kirin Holdings Japan Beer production Divested
and sale
KOI Bubble Tea Shop Taiwan Bubble tea retail Exited
Meta US Social media Military-linked entities
(Facebook) banned from platform

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Company Domicile Activity Decision

Metro Germany Grocery wholesaler Operations ceased
MGTC France, US Gas pipeline Cash distributions
suspended but taxes
paid
Mitsubishi Japan Yetagun gas project Divested
Myanmar Metals Australia Mining Divested
Petronas Malaysia Yetagun gas project Divested
Portia Group UK Port management Contract not extended
beyond 2021
Ooredoo Qatar Mobile telephony Divested
POSCO International Korea Offshore gas Continuing
POSCO Coated & Korea Steel roofing Continuing but seeking
Color Steel new JV partner
PTTEP Thailand Yadana gas project Assuming project
operator status
Puma Energy Switzerland Aviation fuel Divested
RMH Singapore Singapore Cigarette sale and Withdrew from joint
manufacture venture
Sembcorp Singapore Industrial park No decision
development
Sembcorp Singapore Gas-fired Continuing
powerplant operator
Telenor Norway Mobile telephony Divested
Telenor Norway Mobile payment Sold 51% stake in
services Wave Money
Tokyo Tatemono Co Japan Commercial complex Suspended operations
Ltd development
Total SA France Yadana gas project Divested
Toyota Japan Hi-lux assembly Opening postponed
Woodside Australia Offshore gas Exited
exploration

Source: Company websites and media reporting.

Twenty-one months after the coup, the main observation is not an exodus
of existing foreign investment, but the drying up of new investment, which
is in stark contrast to the previous 10 years, which saw an opening of the
economy and an influx of foreign investment. To be sure, some prominent
firms have left but many others have remained. And almost all of those
that have announced their departure or suspension of operations are not

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those identified as in joint ventures or other commercial relationships with

military conglomerates or state-owned enterprises. They were businesses
without any military association.

Conclusions and policy recommendations

Multinational enterprises have responded to the coup in ways that largely
reflect their equities in the Myanmar economy. Small investors in franchise
operations such as Auntie Anne’s pretzels and KOI Bubble Tea Shop had no
military association but decided to exit the market for commercial reasons.
The investments were relatively small and catered to consumers with
disposable income. Some multinational enterprises still in the development
phase of their investments, such as industrial zone development and
hotel development, have suspended operations. In such decisions we see
recognition that it was no longer possible, for a combination of commercial
and strategic reasons, to continue; yet, the value of the original investment
was significant. Suspension leaves open the possibility of returning to
extract value from the sunk cost in the event that the political situation
improves. Multinational enterprises with fully operational investments, such
as mobile telephony services and beer and gas production, faced difficult
decisions. Even when the enterprise wished to divest there was a need
to do so responsibly. Human rights considerations included the impact on
employees, the potential loss of a service benefiting the community and
the possibility that a new owner might be more willing to comply with
military edicts and be less sensitive to responsible business practices. Telenor
Myanmar, for example, was faced with requirements to shut down the
internet, block websites, provide data and switch on intercept equipment,
and, consequently, decided to divest. However, it was criticised for leaving
the business in the hands of others perceived as unlikely to have qualms
about complying with military directives. Total’s exit will increase MOGE’s
share of the revenue from the Yadana offshore gas field and increase the
resources available to the military. The unintended consequences of these
withdrawals need to be considered by all stakeholders concerned about
the coup.
For many multinational enterprises, it will not be feasible to operate
without having some relationship with a military-controlled regulatory
body, such as payment of rent, lease fees, taxes or licence fees. Some argue
that such payments fund the military, but this assumes a linear relationship,

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 4. MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISE BEHAVIOUR IN POST-COUP MYANMAR

whereas, given the fungibility of revenue, there is none. We also know that
when revenue is constrained, the military prioritises themselves and their
operations, reducing funds for health and education. Nevertheless, corporate
boards dislike adverse publicity and when accused of being complicit in
atrocity crimes will seriously consider divesting. In this sense, stigmatisation
of ongoing operations in Myanmar can have the same effect as economy-
wide sanctions. Myanmar’s earlier period of sanctions did little to change
the will or capacity of the military to maintain their power and repressive
policies, while adding to the suffering of the population (ICG 2004, 15–18;
Jones 2015). The current stigmatisation of continued business operations in
Myanmar risks having the same outcomes.
Policy options are limited. UN-mandated targeted sanctions or an arms
embargo, howsoever desired, will not be achieved while China and Russia
continue to protect Myanmar from UN Security Council resolutions.
Unilateral sanctions are possible but will not harm or sway the generals, as
they have little regard for international opinion and their business interests
are domestically focused. Nevertheless, sanctions can serve as a signal of
displeasure at the coup and of solidarity with those opposed to the coup.
Activist pressure ostensibly focused on businesses with connections to
military entities has not achieved much, in large part because the prevalence
and significance of such ties have been greatly overestimated. The loudness
of the calls to cut military ties, despite their insignificance, raises questions
about whether the calls are a Trojan horse for those who would countenance
collapsing the economy in an attempt to force change. To date, however,
military violence and economic mismanagement have done more to cut
funds available to the military than the actions of external players.
Foreign government and multinational enterprise policies need to have
regard to their impact on the country, the workforce and the businesses
themselves, both now and into the future. The policy objective should not
be the economic collapse of Myanmar and immiseration of the people. From
a broad and long-term human rights perspective, staying can be a responsible
option. An isolated and impoverished Myanmar, when eventually restored
to democracy, would face heightened challenges of governing with
a debilitated commercial sector, small tax base and low-skilled workforce.
The departures of Telenor and producers of gas for electricity generation
will make life harder, not better, for the people of Myanmar, without adding
to the financial pressure the regime faces.

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 AFTER THE COUP

Policymakers need to think more creatively about how foreign businesses

in Myanmar can be leveraged to promote human rights. They may not
be able to resolve conflict, but they can model good corporate behaviour
by respecting human rights on issues such as worker safety, fair wages and
freedom of association, as well as by developing employee and managerial
skills. As we saw with mobile telephony, circumstances may deny the
possibility of operating responsibly and the decision then becomes whether
it is more responsible to stay and uphold other elements of corporate
responsibility or to divest and leave the business in the hands of cronies or
other less principled players. The arrest and sentencing of MCRB’s director,
Vicky Bowman, shows that responsible business practices are perceived by
the military as being in opposition to their regime, placing them at risk and
in need of protection. The focus of policymakers needs to be on encouraging
and supporting responsible business practices that can make a difference
to the lives of Myanmar’s citizens. Foreign activist organisations also need
to think beyond the standard action playbook focused on large Western
corporations and devise Myanmar-focused strategies—that is, strategies
that directly assist agents and conditions for change in Myanmar. It is the
businesses, organisations and people who remain, not those that have left,
that will ultimately bring about change in Myanmar.

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 5
Politics, Justice and
Accountability: Myanmar
and International Courts
Adam Simpson
Senior Lecturer in International Studies, Justice & Society,
University of South Australia

Juliette McIntyre
Lecturer in Law, Justice & Society, University of South Australia
and PhD candidate, University of Melbourne

Abstract
The military coup in February 2021 has added yet another brutal chapter
to the multiple crises facing Myanmar. Prior to the coup, Myanmar and its
military already faced various charges, including crimes against humanity and
genocide of the Muslim Rohingya minority, in the International Criminal
Court and the International Court of Justice. There are now questions over
whether there have been crimes committed during and since the February
2021 coup, by the military or any other groups in Myanmar, that could be
prosecuted under international law. While the United Nations Independent
Investigative Mechanism for Myanmar gathers evidence of such crimes, it
cannot prosecute, and it is not a court. This chapter investigates the potential
international justice mechanisms available to hold Myanmar to account,
and the issues with these. It finds that various factors, such as restrictions
on jurisdiction, the need for state consent and the significant burden of

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establishing criminal acts reaching the threshold of crimes against humanity

or genocide, mean that the influence and authority of international courts,
while important, remains limited.

***
The military coup in February 2021 has added yet another brutal chapter
to the multiple crises facing Myanmar (Simpson 2021a). It has provided
a further case study of the Myanmar military’s ruthless modus operandi.
Prior to the coup, Myanmar and its military already faced various
international court proceedings, notably at the International Criminal
Court (ICC) and the International Court of Justice (ICJ). The crimes being
investigated included crimes against humanity and genocide of the Muslim
Rohingya minority.
In 2017, the Myanmar military conducted clearance operations in Rakhine
State that resulted in the exodus of 740,000 mostly Rohingya refugees to
Bangladesh (Simpson & Farrelly 2021b). These operations involved the
commission of serious human rights violations including mass killings,
torture, rape and sexual assault, and the destruction of homes and mosques
(UNHRC 2018a, 256–60). Myanmar refused to allow independent
investigators into the country and vigorously defended its actions in the
proceedings, as seen in Aung San Suu Kyi’s vigorous defence of the military
at the ICJ in November 2019 (Simpson 2020; Simpson & Farrelly 2020).
Since 2019, three separate international justice processes have commenced
with the goal of accountability for the atrocities committed against the
Rohingya. First, the Independent Investigative Mechanism for Myanmar
(IIMM) was established by the United Nations Human Rights Council
(UNHRC 2018b) in September 2018. Its mandate was to collect evidence
regarding serious international crimes and violations of international
law committed in Myanmar since 2011. Second, on 11 November
2019, The Gambia filed suit in the ICJ against Myanmar alleging that
Myanmar was responsible for committing genocide against the Rohingya
(The Gambia 2019). The Gambia has emphasised that the prohibition
of genocide has the character of a peremptory norm and the obligations
under the Genocide Convention are owed erga omnes (to all states) and erga
omnes partes (to all other states party to a treaty) (The Gambia 2019, 14).
The UK, the Maldives, Canada, and the Netherlands have stated their
intention to act as intervenors in the case (Pillai 2020; Simpson 2022b).
Third, on 14 November 2019, a Pre-Trial Chamber of the ICC authorised

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the opening of a full investigation by the Office of the Prosecutor into

crimes against humanity committed against the Rohingya that took place,
at least in part, on the territory of Bangladesh, which is a state party to the
Rome Statute (ICC 2019). These alleged crimes have only been investigated
outside of Myanmar since Myanmar is not a state party to the Rome
Statute. The former National League for Democracy government, deposed
in the 2021 coup, blocked investigations by the relevant agencies within
Myanmar’s territory.
Other cases in national courts, such as those of Argentina and Germany,
have also sought to address the accountability gaps in Myanmar for atrocities
against the Rohingya and the rest of the population. In November 2021,
the Federal Criminal Court of Argentina confirmed that it would pursue
an action against senior Myanmar military officials under the principle
of universal jurisdiction, which allows particularly horrific crimes to be
prosecuted anywhere in the world, regardless of where the crimes were
committed. This allows the court in Argentina to investigate all crimes
committed against the Rohingya in Myanmar, giving it a wider remit
than the ICC prosecution (Reed 2021). Similarly, in January 2023, the
NGO Fortify Rights announced in Bangkok that it had filed a criminal
complaint with the federal public prosecutor general of Germany under
the principle of universal jurisdiction against senior Myanmar military
generals and others for genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity
covering atrocities related to both the Rohingya pogroms and the military
coup (Fortify Rights 2023). In this chapter, however, we focus on the
international court proceedings since they reflect most clearly a developing
international political and legal consensus.
By November 2022, there were reports that more than 2,400 opponents of
the military regime had been killed since the February 2021 coup, including
almost 250 children, with over 13,000 political prisoners under arrest
(AAPP (Burma) 2022). The military regime also tortured detainees to death
(Simpson & Farrelly 2021a). Almost a million people remained displaced
(Andrews 2022b). These activities may well result in further charges against
the military of crimes against humanity, which could be brought before the
ICC or other courts. It may, therefore, one day be significant that the exiled
National Unity Government (NUG) has declared that it will accept the
ICC’s jurisdiction with respect to all international crimes committed in
Myanmar since 2002 (Simpson 2021b).

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This chapter will consider the implications of Myanmar’s 2021 coup for
these mechanisms of international justice and consider the avenues for
increasing accountability under international law through engagement
with the NUG. The first section examines the existing international justice
processes, including the IIMM investigation and the proceedings before
the ICJ and the ICC. The second section addresses the procedural issue
of who represents Myanmar in international legal proceedings, whether it
be a representative from the junta, the NUG or a civil servant. The third
section investigates the actions of the military—and the opposition—since
the coup and considers the substantive issue of whether prosecutions under
international law are possible or likely. The fourth section addresses the
policy implications of international legal considerations for the international
community, including the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)
and Australia. The chapter concludes by finding that while the influence and
authority of international courts are important, their ability to respond to
Myanmar’s many crises is limited.

Existing international justice processes

There are three active international justice processes investigating war
crimes, crimes against humanity in Myanmar and genocide of the Muslim
Rohingya ethnic minority. The scope of each of these processes, which are
at times intersecting, is outlined below.

Independent investigative mechanism for Myanmar

In response to reports of human rights abuses, the UNHRC has established
various independent fact-finding investigations into the situation
in Myanmar. The Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on
Myanmar (FFM) (with which Myanmar refused to cooperate) was
established in April 2017 (UNHRC 2017). It concluded that the actions of
Myanmar’s military forces in Kachin, Rakhine and Shan states since 2011
constituted consistent patterns of serious human rights violations, crimes
against humanity and war crimes (UNHRC 2018a). The FFM proposed
that the United Nations (UN) Security Council should refer the situation
to the ICC or create an ad hoc international criminal tribunal (UNHRC
2018, 426), neither of which has occurred due to obstruction by Russia
and China.

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 5. POLITICS, JUSTICE AND ACCOUNTABILITY

Following the release of the FFM final report, the IIMM was established
(UNHRC 2018b). The FFM transferred almost all the material it gathered
to the IIMM, and, as such, the two processes may be seen as connected.
The role of the IIMM is to collect and preserve evidence of the most serious
international crimes and violations of international law committed in
Myanmar since 2011. As explained by the head of the body, the necessity of
this work derives from the fact that, over time, ‘crime scenes get disturbed,
bodies decompose, wounds can heal, people’s memories can fade, witnesses
with information can pass away’ (UN News 2021). The IIMM works to
ensure that evidence is gathered in a way that meets the required technical and
procedural standards to be admissible in criminal proceedings. The IIMM
may also prepare case files for use by prosecutors where it considers that
the information meets the standard required to hold individuals criminally
responsible. However, the body itself cannot prosecute or adjudicate cases;
it is not a court.
Unlike the FFM, the IIMM is not limited in geographical scope, nor
to any particular group of victims or perpetrators. It may investigate
any international crime occurring in the territory of Myanmar. It is also
mandated to investigate both past and future situations. As such, it has
continued to closely monitor events in Myanmar since the coup (IIMM
2021). Indeed, the IIMM reports that it has experienced an ‘exponential
increase in communications’ (IIMM 2021) since the military seized power
on 1 February 2021. By July 2022, its repository consisted of nearly 3 million
information items, including ‘interview statements, documentation, videos,
photographs, geospatial imagery and social media material’ (IIMM 2022).
The IIMM prioritised the post-coup events for investigation:
on the basis of a preliminary assessment of the gravity of the crimes
concerned, including their scale, nature, manner of commission
and impact on victims; the degree of responsibility of alleged
perpetrators; the strength of the available evidence; the importance
the Mechanism’s thematic priorities concerning sexual and gender-
based crimes and crimes against children; and the likelihood of a
court or tribunal taking jurisdiction over the crime(s) in question.
(IIMM 2022)

Thanks to the work of the IIMM, evidence of the atrocities committed by

the junta is being collected and collated. But this record-keeping function
is insufficient in and of itself as an instrument of justice. The IIMM cannot
directly hold perpetrators to account. Indeed, as observed by Mahnad, the

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model was ‘an innovation borne out of desperation’ in a situation in which

there was no realistic prospect of domestic prosecutions in the near future,
a lack jurisdiction on the part of the ICC and ‘no path toward it due to a
blocked Security Council’ (Mahnad 2018).

The International Court of Justice

However, the importance of the FFM and IIMM’s evidence-gathering
function is demonstrated by the reliance placed on the reports of the FFM
by the ICJ in the proceedings brought by The Gambia. The Gambia alleges
that Myanmar is responsible for committing genocide against the Rohingya
by undertaking operations that were intended to destroy the Rohingya as
a group, in whole or in part (The Gambia 2019, 6).
The jurisdiction of the ICJ requires the consent of both parties to the
dispute, which can be manifested by ‘matters specially provided for … in
treaties and conventions in force’ (ICJ Statute 1945, Art. 36(1)). In this case,
The Gambia and Myanmar are both parties to the Genocide Convention
(adopted by the UN in 1950), Article XIII of which provides that disputes
relating to the ‘interpretation, application or fulfilment’ of the treaty shall
be submitted to the ICJ. While The Gambia is not directly implicated
or impacted by Myanmar’s conduct, the ICJ held in accordance with its
previous jurisprudence (Longobardo 2021) that:
any State party to the Genocide Convention, and not only a specially
affected State, may invoke the responsibility of another State party
with a view to ascertaining the alleged failure to comply with its
obligations erga omnes partes, and to bring that failure to an end.
(ICJ 2020, 17)

In December 2019, the ICJ heard arguments on whether to grant an

interim order for provisional measures pursuant to Article 41 of the
court’s statute; a hearing notorious for the appearance of Nobel Peace
Prize laureate and former state counsellor Aung San Suu Kyi as agent for
Myanmar, attempting ‘to defend her government against allegations that
many considered indefensible’ (Becker 2020, 428). The court’s unanimous
order, issued in January 2021, held that Myanmar was required to ‘to take
all measures within its power to prevent the commission of all acts’ of
genocide (as defined in Article 2 of the Genocide Convention) in relation
to the members of the Rohingya group in its territory, and to report back
to the court ‘on all measures taken to give effect’ to this order within four
months, and thereafter every six months, until a final decision on the
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case was reached by the court (ICJ 2020, 30). Although the reports are
confidential, Myanmar appears to have continued to comply with this order
even following the coup (Myanmar Now 2021, 2; ICJ 2022a, 15).
Prior to making this order, the ICJ needed to establish that the requisite
elements of Article 41 were made out (Miles 2017). The court had to be
satisfied that the rights asserted by The Gambia were ‘at least plausible’
(ICJ 2020, 18). In this case, it was
the right of the Rohingya group in Myanmar and of its members to
be protected from acts of genocide and related prohibited acts …
and the right of The Gambia to seek compliance by Myanmar with
its obligations not to commit, and to prevent and punish genocide
in accordance with the Convention. (ICJ 2020, 23)

This is where we return to the reports of the FFM, because, in finding

that these rights were plausibly established, the court relied heavily on
the conclusions of the FFM investigation (ICJ 2020, 22) to find that the
Rohingya were a protected group under the Genocide Convention and that
the Rohingya in Myanmar ‘remain extremely vulnerable’ (ICJ 2020, 26).
Vice-President Xue observed that the evidentiary ‘weight’ of the FFM
reports ‘cannot be ignored’ (ICJ 2020, 35). While there are questions
remaining as to the reliance that the court will place on such third-party
fact-finding at the merits stage of the case, where the standard of proof is
higher (Becker 2019b; Becker 2019a; Devaney 2016), the IIMM has been
requested by both parties to share evidence with the court (UN News 2021).
As such, while the IIMM cannot itself prosecute international crimes, it has
an important role to play in providing evidence to decision-makers.
Oral hearings in relation to Myanmar’s objections to the ICJ’s jurisdiction to
hear the case were held on 21–28 February 2022, a year after the coup. This
raised issues relating to the legal and legitimate representation of Myanmar
at these proceedings, which are explored in the third section.

The International Criminal Court

Finally, in relation to the conduct of the Myanmar authorities prior to the
coup, there is the question of the role to be played by the ICC. There are
separate questions to be asked regarding the role of the ICC for conduct
occurring as part of, or subsequent to, the coup, which will be addressed in
the last section.

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In November 2019, an investigation into crimes against humanity

committed against the Rohingya was authorised by the ICC (ICC 2019).
This followed an earlier ruling that the ICC had jurisdiction ‘over the
alleged deportation of members of the Rohingya people from Myanmar to
Bangladesh, provided that such allegations are established to the required
threshold’ (ICC 2018, 42). The reason for the geographical limitation is
that Myanmar is not a party to the Rome Statute, and, as such, the ICC does
not have jurisdiction to investigate crimes occurring within the territory
of Myanmar without its consent, unless it has a Security Council mandate.
Bangladesh, however, is a party to the Rome Statute, and the ICC may
assert jurisdiction pursuant to Article 12(2)(a) of the statute if at least one
element of a crime within the jurisdiction of the court or part of such crime
is committed on the territory of a state party to the statute. The prosecutor
successfully argued that the crime of deportation (Rome Statute 1998, Art.
7(1)(d)) was completed when the victims fled to Bangladesh as a result
of coercive acts and a coercive environment (ICC 2019, 24).
However, deportation that falls within the jurisdiction of the ICC must
reach the threshold of a crime against humanity (Rome Statute 1998, Art.
7(1)). This requires that the act takes place in a context of ‘a widespread or
systematic attack directed against any civilian population’. Article 7(2)(a)
of the Rome Statute further defines an ‘attack directed against any civilian
population’ as ‘a course of conduct involving the multiple commission
of acts … against any civilian population, pursuant to or in furtherance of a
State or organizational policy to commit such attack’. The underlying crime
of deportation must have been committed as part of the attack.
The Pre-Trial Chamber accepted that ‘there exists a reasonable basis to
believe’ that ‘widespread and/or systematic acts of violence may have been
committed against the Rohingya civilian population’ that could qualify as
the crime against humanity of deportation across the Myanmar–Bangladesh
border (ICC 2019, 42). The chamber did not assess whether other crimes
may have been committed, although this line of inquiry could form part of
the prosecutor’s ongoing investigation.
The Office of the Prosecutor is now undertaking an investigation in relation
to any crime, including any future crime, that meets the criteria set down
by the Pre-Trial Chamber. That is, in addition to meeting the temporal
limitations demanded by the entry into force of the Rome Statute, the
alleged crime must be: 1) within the jurisdiction of the ICC, 2) allegedly

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committed at least in part on the territory of Bangladesh, or on the territory

of another state that accepts ICC jurisdiction (i.e. not Myanmar) and
3) sufficiently linked to the situation of the deportation of the Rohingya
minority. Therefore, while the prosecutor’s investigation is to be welcomed,
it is, in fact, extremely limited in its scope.

Who represents Myanmar?

The procedural issue of who represents Myanmar in international law is
one that is heavily dependent on international politics. The main practical
contest in the international sphere is whether Myanmar is represented by
the junta and its representatives, or the NUG and the opposition. This
has played out in a variety of fora but most recently in relation to the ICJ
case. For the purposes of the court, it is the state of Myanmar and not the
government that has standing to appear (ICJ Statute 1945, Art. 34). This was
emphasised by the president of the court at the opening to the oral hearings
in February 2022, where she stated that ‘the parties to a contentious case
before the Court are States, not particular governments’ (ICJ 2022a, 11).
Ko Ko Hlaing, minister for international cooperation under the junta,
appeared as agent for Myanmar at these hearings, along with its attorney-
general, Thida Oo. Both are subject to US sanctions due to the coup and the
violent suppression of resultant peaceful protests. The hearings proceeded as
normal, and the ICJ is, at the time of writing, deliberating on its judgement.
But matters could have proceeded very differently. The NUG on 1 February
2022—the one-year anniversary of the coup—issued a statement that
withdrew the preliminary objections and asserted that UN Ambassador
Kyaw Moe Tun is ‘the only person authorised to engage with the Court on
behalf of Myanmar’ (NUG 2022, n.p.). Had the ICJ accepted this, it could
have proceeded immediately to hearing the merits of the case.
The ICJ’s choice to permit the junta to appear on behalf of Myanmar
creates political difficulties, as other organs of the UN continue to resist
acknowledging the junta. For example, in September 2021, the US and China
brokered a deal that prevented Myanmar’s military rulers from addressing
the General Assembly at its 76th session (Lynch, Gramer & Detsch 2021).
And while the military junta stated that it had appointed Aung Thurein,
a former military commander, as Myanmar’s ambassador to the UN, the
incumbent representative Kyaw Moe Tun remained the ambassador, as a

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decision must be taken by the General Assembly credentialing committee

and approved according to General Assembly rules before he can be replaced
(Simpson 2021c).
The NUG has endeavoured to be seen, both by Myanmar’s population
and the international community, as the legitimate government and
representative of Myanmar. It announced a ‘defensive war’ that would work
with newly formed volunteer People’s Defence Force (PDF) units to attack
the junta and its interests (Regan & Olarn 2021). To prosecute the war, it
developed a ‘chain of command’ to assist in coordination between disparate
groups (Myanmar Now 2021). But the junta’s appearance at the ICJ has
conferred a perception of legitimacy upon the military government that
works against the NUG’s claims (Simpson & McIntyre 2022; Weller 2022).
This was a valuable diplomatic win for the military junta, one that a more
powerful nation, such as Russia, may not have been so desperate to achieve
(McIntyre & Simpson 2022a).
Within ASEAN, the response has also been mixed. Traditionally, ASEAN
has been far more accommodating to military juntas and human rights
abuses, partially because of the limited history and culture of democracy
across Southeast Asia (Simpson & Smits 2018). With the organisation’s
mostly timid and laggardly response in the first few months following the
Myanmar coup, history seemed to be repeating itself. That changed at
the emergency meeting of ASEAN foreign ministers held on 15 October
2021 (Simpson 2021d). The statement released afterwards began with a
discussion of the Five-Point Consensus reached with coup leader Min Aung
Hlaing in April and the role of the special envoy, who had just cancelled
his visit to Myanmar after being refused access to Aung San Suu Kyi and
other junta opponents. It went on to hint at Myanmar’s intransigence by
‘emphasising the need to exercise flexibility’, while noting that the situation
in Myanmar was having an impact on regional security and the credibility
of ASEAN itself.
The statement noted requests by the NUG to represent Myanmar at the
meeting and then employed ASEAN’s tradition of consensus decision-
making to deny representation to both the NUG and the junta, instead
deciding to invite a non-political representative from Myanmar, probably
a civil servant. This response, pushed by the more progressive quartet of
ASEAN—Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore and the Philippines—and
supported by the then ASEAN chair, Brunei, effectively disinvited Min
Aung Hlaing to a series of ASEAN-related summits in October 2021,
including one with US President Joe Biden.
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In November 2021, ASEAN continued its surprising stance when the virtual
ASEAN–China Special Summit, a major event to commemorate 30 years
of ASEAN–China relations, began with Myanmar’s seat embarrassingly
empty, a further major snub to the military (Simpson 2021e). The same
five governments of Indonesia, Brunei, Malaysia, the Philippines and
Singapore joined Myanmar’s Civil Disobedience Movement in successfully
opposing the junta’s attendance at the summit, despite diplomatic lobbying
by China. The following day, the Myanmar representative attending an
ASEAN climate and disaster conference was a minister of the NUG not the
military junta. While this event was relatively independent of the ASEAN
Secretariat and did not have the prominence of the leaders’ summits, it was
still significant: an NUG minister was invited to an ASEAN conference
for the first time. It was a sign of growing frustration with the military’s
brutality and intransigence. Further snubs soon followed, with the junta’s
foreign minister barred from attending an ASEAN retreat in February
2022 and Myanmar represented by an empty chair at a special US–ASEAN
Summit at the White House in May (AFP 2022).
While it might seem somewhat bizarre to contemplate two rival groups
fighting to be prosecuted for genocide at the ICJ, this competition should
be seen in the context of the politics of international legitimacy and
representation. Both groups want to be seen as the legitimate government
of Myanmar, although Suu Kyi’s previous robust defence of the military at
the ICJ would likely evaporate if the NUG was to take the stand.
The ICC will likely follow the UN in its recognition protocols, which
is currently in the NUG’s favour due to the incumbency of Kyaw Moe
Tun. Due to ongoing support from the US and others in the credentialing
committee, Kyaw Moe Tun remained in place for the 77th Session of the
UN General Assembly in September 2022 and will likely remain so for
the foreseeable future (Simpson 2022b).

International proceedings in the future:

Prosecuting the coup?
Clearly, the existing ICC and ICJ proceedings demonstrate that there
is a case to be answered in international courts in relation to the Rohingya
(Becker 2020). A more substantive issue than who represents Myanmar is
whether there have been crimes committed during and since the February
2021 coup, by the military or any other groups in Myanmar, that could be
prosecuted under international law.
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As noted above, the IIMM is mandated to investigate both past and future
situations. As such, it has continued to closely monitor events in Myanmar
since the coup to gather evidence of potential crimes. However, despite the
reliance placed on similar materials by the ICJ in its provisional measures
order, there is no capacity for the ICJ to expand the scope of its judgement
beyond the question of genocide of the Rohingya. The ICJ is limited by the
jurisdictional mandate granted under the Genocide Convention, and by
the non ultra petita (not beyond the request) principle, by which it cannot
independently investigate issues outside of those raised by the parties to
the case.
We are, therefore, left with the possibility of criminal prosecution against
individuals at the ICC. The Rome Statute grants the ICC jurisdiction in
respect of genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity and the crime of
aggression (Rome Statute 1998, Arts 6–8bis). In respect of the situation in
Myanmar, only the crime of deportation is presently within the scope of the
investigation opened by the Office of the Prosecutor.
Putting to one side the question of jurisdiction, as noted above, to reach
the threshold of a crime against humanity, the criminal act—murder, rape,
torture or other acts as listed in Article 7(1)—must take place in a context of
‘a widespread or systematic attack directed against any civilian population’.
Given that the military is an organ of the state of Myanmar (ICL 2001,
Art. 4) or at the least that the junta is exercising elements of governmental
authority in Myanmar (ICL 2001, Art. 5), it is likely that its acts would be
considered to be in furtherance of state or organisational policy.
Regarding the requirement of multiple attacks against civilian populations,
as evidence mounts it is becoming clear that the junta’s attacks on the
opposition may reach the threshold of crimes against humanity with a range
of interrelated actions including:
• shooting or otherwise killing or maiming unarmed protesters in multiple
peaceful demonstrations over many months, including:
– a massacre in Yangon on 14 March 2021 when at least 65 unarmed
protesters and bystanders were killed
– on 5 December 2021, security forces driving purposefully into the
rear of a protest, followed up by beating and shooting protesters,
leaving five dead and many others injured.

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• the killing of unarmed civilians or captured members of the opposition

(including the PDF) in a variety of villages across the country, including:
– an attack in Kayah (Karen) State on 24 December 2021 that left
more than 30 people dead and burned, including women, children
and two staff members from the international non-governmental
organisation Save the Children
– a series of mass killings in Sagaing in July 2021 that resulted in at
least 40 men, beaten or tortured to death
– the burning of 11 unarmed captives, including teenagers, in Sagaing
Region in December 2021
– taking 40 villagers from Magway Region’s Myaing Township hostage
in May 2022 and using them as human shields, while killing six
of them
– the torture and killing of at least six civilians in Kani Township,
Sagaing, in June 2022.
• systematic torture, with at least 110 prisoners dying in police custody,
many from torture in the first 24 hours of detention while others died
due to being denied medical care.
• execution of four political prisoners in July 2022 (Simpson 2022a).
• indiscriminate attacks on villages that kill civilians including air strikes,
shelling and the burning of buildings and entire villages, including:
– an attack on Thantlang in Chin State in September 2021, which
was analysed by the Washington Post through videos, photos, satellite
imagery, eyewitness accounts and military planning documents, and
demonstrated that it was the result of a premeditated campaign that
targeted civilians
– an air raid by military jets in October 2022 that bombed a music
festival in Kachin State celebrating the anniversary of the founding
of the Kachin Independence Organisation, killing at least 80 people,
including musicians and other civilians, and injuring at least 100
(Al Jazeera 2022).
• blocking the transport of humanitarian aid to civilian communities.
• the displacement, arbitrary detention and torture of children (Andrews
2022a).

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The mandate of the IIMM does not extend to the overthrow of the
constitutional authority via the coup, but, in November 2021, Nicholas
Koumjian, the head of the IIMM, suggested that preliminary evidence
collected since the coup demonstrated a widespread and systematic attack
on civilians ‘amounting to crimes against humanity’ (Associated Press 2021).
Another issue to consider is whether ethnic armed groups, the PDF and
other oppositional actors have committed crimes that might also be
prosecuted under international law. There is little doubt that PDFs have
been undertaking targeted assassinations of civilians who have assisted
with the junta’s administration, and clashes have resulted in the death of
thousands of military personnel. Any crimes committed against civilians
by the opposition should also be investigated, but the opposition does
not presently exercise governmental authority, nor are these entities to be
equated with organs of the state of Myanmar. As such, even criminal acts
on their part would not reach the threshold of crimes against humanity
necessary to implicate prosecution at the ICC.
In this regard, the efforts of the NUG to establish itself as Myanmar’s
legitimate government, with a clear chain of command between itself and the
PDFs, may be a double-edged sword, since, although it may be advantageous
politically and diplomatically, it may also open it to prosecution under the
ICC. While this is a potential outcome in the future, it is likely that for the
moment, for the purposes of international state and individual criminal
liability, the main perpetrator of international crimes is the instigator of the
crisis itself, the Myanmar military led by Min Aung Hlaing.
However, at present the ICC cannot consider any of these acts, whomever
commits them, since Myanmar is not a state party to the Rome Statute.
The ICC does not have jurisdiction. It is worth noting that there is one
way in which the ICC could widen its mandate, and that is through the
operation of Article 13(b) of the Rome Statute, which allows the ICC to
receive referrals of situations by the Security Council. This has occurred,
for example, in respect of the situation in Darfur, notwithstanding that
Sudan is not a state party to the Rome Statute (de Wet 2018). With such
a referral, the ICC could assume jurisdiction over all crimes listed in the
Rome Statute that may have been committed in the territory of Myanmar.
To date, however, the non-cooperation of China and Russia has ensured the
Security Council has not taken any steps in this direction.

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Policy implications for the international

community
The international community has a range of levers at its disposal to
influence events in Myanmar, many of which can be considered part of
the contentious policy known as Responsibility to Protect (R2P) (Simpson
2021a), where the international community intervenes in a country when
its government is unable, or unwilling, to protect communities at risk.
Human Rights Watch and other international non-governmental
organisations have called for a comprehensive global arms embargo
against Myanmar (HRW 2021). Fortify Rights, an organisation focused
on Myanmar and its region, called for UN member states to form an
emergency coalition to respond to the coup and Myanmar’s devastating
COVID-19 outbreaks (Fortify Rights 2021). These organisations have
some influence in the Western halls of power, but they are still dependent
on action from states. States themselves have a range of competing interests
and are constrained by the limits of their authority within the international
system. Even a UN Security Council resolution banning arms sales to the
junta was a bridge too far for China and Russia.
In terms of the ICJ proceedings, the most effective direct action for the
international community would be to formally intervene in the genocide
case under Article 63 of the ICJ Statute. Such intervention brings moral and
legal reinforcement to one side of the case (Fitzmaurice 1958, 127). While
many states, such as the UK, Canada, the Netherlands and the Maldives
have made statements that they intend to intervene, by November 2022
none had filed a formal declaration of intervention (ICJ 2022b). This is
in stark contrast to the other genocide case underway at the ICJ, in which
at least 23 countries have formally intervened to support Ukraine against
Russia (ICJ 2022c; McIntyre & Simpson 2022b; Simpson 2022c). However,
regardless of who joins the Myanmar genocide case, it is highly unlikely that
the ICJ will make any reference to the coup.
The ICC cannot act in relation to activities within Myanmar unless there
is a Security Council resolution or Myanmar itself becomes a party to the
Rome Statute. Since the NUG has committed to joining the Rome Statute
if it takes power, it is in the international community’s interest for this to
happen. The main avenue for international pressure at present is, therefore,
to recognise the NUG as Myanmar’s legitimate government and accredit

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Myanmar’s various rebellious ambassadors, including the current UN

representative, Kyaw Moe Tun, who have denounced the military coup and
been sacked by the military as a result. This would send a potent message to
the junta and allow the NUG to fill Myanmar’s currently empty seat on the
UN Human Rights Council (Simpson 2022b).
Likewise, ASEAN should continue to isolate the military and recognise the
NUG. Unfortunately, the visit to Myanmar in January 2022 of Hun Sen,
Cambodia’s prime minister and the chair of ASEAN for 2022, undermined
ASEAN’s fragile position by meeting with Min Aung Hlaing, resulting in
criticism from Malaysia’s foreign minister. Hun Sen was confident that, as a
fellow authoritarian, he could make progress in the peace process. However,
he came away from the discussions empty handed and, in February, virtually
gave up on making any headway (Nachemson 2022).
Another important strategy for the international community is to provide
material support to the NUG and the opposition movement. Many
participants in the Civil Disobedience Movement have not received any
income since February 2021. Since the coup, the real value of Myanmar’s
currency has collapsed, losing up to 60 per cent of its value, with rampant
inflation only exacerbating Myanmar’s humanitarian crisis. The NUG
has very limited funding with essentially no-one being paid. A substantial
international measure, that would assist both the NUG and the rest of the
opposition movement, would be for the US to release the USD1 billion
frozen in the Federal Reserve to the NUG. Countries such as Australia
should also consider applying sanctions against Myanmar’s military officials.
Australia has recently enacted Magnitsky-style legislation that could be
deployed for this purpose.
A more contentious, although still justifiable, policy would be to support
the anti-junta PDFs that have emerged, often in conjunction with existing
ethnic minority militias, to militarily challenge the Tatmadaw. While many
governments are hesitant to arm or support non-state militias, arguing
that non-violent methods should be employed, Myanmar’s military has
shown throughout history that it has no qualms in ruthlessly and brutally
crushing non-violent opposition movements. While the conflicts and crises
in Myanmar are only likely to be resolved by groups within the country,
aid and diplomatic support may well provide the opposition movement
with the resources, resolve and recognition that they need to force
a negotiated settlement.

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Conclusion
The evolving crises facing the people of Myanmar are not limited to violence
and political repression. They include the heavy burdens of poverty, food
shortages and unemployment, along with the collapse of the healthcare and
education systems and the pressure of COVID-19 (Simpson 2021a; Thant
Myint-U 2021). A report by the World Bank estimated that Myanmar’s
economy contracted by 18 per cent in 2021 because of the joint effects of the
pandemic and the coup (World Bank Group 2021). It suggested the share of
people living in poverty would more than double by the beginning of 2022
compared to 2019. Another crisis waiting in the wings is climate change,
which is already disrupting the monsoon, causing droughts and reducing
agricultural returns (Simpson & South 2022; Thant Myint-U 2020).
Applying external pressure to the military junta is unlikely to have any
significant impact while China, Russia and some ASEAN countries continue
to work with the regime. The international community can provide aid and
diplomatic support to the opposition, but the conflicts in Myanmar are
only likely to be resolved by the groups within the country.
The power of the international judiciary to respond to these intersecting
crises in general, and the violence and repression of the coup in particular, are
limited. International courts can only act within the legal mandate granted
to them by states. Various factors, such as restrictions on jurisdiction, the
need for state consent and the significant burden of establishing criminal
acts reaching the threshold of crimes against humanity or genocide, mean
that their influence and authority, while important, remains limited.
The acts committed by the military junta are abhorrent and, thanks to
the work of the IIMM, have been documented for the eyes of the world
to see. It is difficult to be optimistic in the face of the military’s brutality
and incompetence. However, a bleak outlook is no reason not to act on
Myanmar, whether at a diplomatic level or via international courts. There is
always the possibility of political change, particularly when the vast majority
of a country’s population is so implacably opposed to its leaders. While
some sections of Myanmar’s population reluctantly accepted military rule
for the half-century prior to 2011, there can be no doubt this time about
the level of visceral domestic fury directed towards the military for having,
once again, driven the country into the ground and snuffed out the dreams
of its long-suffering people. The joint activities of the ICC investigation,
the ICJ proceedings related to the Rohingya genocide, and the work of
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fact-finding missions and other human rights agencies will continue to

document crimes and prosecute the military in courts where possible. The
wheels of international justice turn slowly but it is hoped that, one day,
justice can be done.

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 6
China–Myanmar Relations
after the 1 February
Military Coup
Kristina Kironska
Senior Researcher, Department of Asian Studies,
Palacky University Olomouc, Czech Republic

Diya Jiang
PhD candidate, Department of Political Science,
McGill University, Canada

Abstract
Following Myanmar’s 1 February military coup, Beijing remained more
cautious than other countries in its response. Protesters accused China
of supporting the Myanmar generals and torched Chinese factories and
boycotted Chinese products. However, did China actually back the Myanmar
military? It would be too simplistic to assume that China favoured a return
to military rule in Myanmar. Myanmar, with its many Belt and Road
Initiative projects, is important for China to achieve its strategic presence in
the Indian Ocean; therefore, choosing the appropriate strategy was crucial
for a continued relationship. Beijing’s initially ambiguous attitude towards
the coup did not favour the military; yet, despite having a reasonable
relationship with Aung San Suu Kyi, it did not favour the protest movement
either. However, as time has passed, China has edged increasingly closer
to recognising the military regime, approving funds for infrastructure
projects and donating COVID-19 vaccines. Why has this shift occurred?
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This chapter argues that, although initially logical and beneficial, appearing
neutral ultimately became costly to China’s strategic interests as time passed
and that, as a consequence, China began moving to closer cooperation with
the military.

***
China’s reactions to the coup in Myanmar have been very interesting. While
Burma was the first non-Communist country to recognise the People’s
Republic of China in 1949, the relationship between Burma/Myanmar
and China over the following decades remained nervously friendly, at best,
and at times even hostile. The relationship warmed in 1988, and China
became the junta’s closest ally after the coup, supporting it economically
and diplomatically. With Myanmar’s top-down political transition to quasi-
civilian rule from 2010 onwards, relations with China soured due to the
cancellation of various Chinese-funded projects and Myanmar’s expansion
of its diplomatic profile following reforms and the country’s so-called
opening up. Cooperation with China was subsequently revived under the
umbrella of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) during the Aung San Suu
Kyi administration. Then, when the Rohingya crisis broke out and the West
criticised the military’s actions, China refused to condemn Myanmar and
even supported the Myanmar government. So, given the twists and turns
in China’s relationship with Myanmar’s military and democratic forces, the
question of how China would react to the 1 February 2021 coup was far
from clear-cut.
Myanmar is geopolitically important for China to achieve its strategic
presence in the Indian Ocean, to reduce transport time for some of China’s
trade and to achieve its long-term two-ocean objective. Choosing the right
strategy after the coup was crucial to ensure a continued relationship.
Beijing’s initially ambiguous attitude towards the coup did not favour the
Myanmar military but, despite having a reasonable relationship with Aung
San Suu Kyi, neither did it favour the protest movement. Yet, remaining
neutral was not an option in the long term due to political and other costs.
This chapter examines how the Chinese government has gradually shifted
its response towards the military, assuming that it would play some role
in Myanmar’s future. The authors examine exchanges between China and
Myanmar in 2021 and early 2022 through process-tracing, analyse the
strategic interactions and offer an explanation as to why China changed
from a (seemingly) neutral stance immediately after the coup to gradually
leaning towards the military in the later months.
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The chapter is organised as follows. After the introduction, China’s diplomatic

interactions immediately after the coup (including the Chinese media’s take
on the coup) and in the later months (including the advancement of each
BRI project summed up in an easily comprehensible table) are described.
This is followed by an analysis of China’s shifting attitude. Finally, the
conclusion sums up the findings of the research.

China’s ambiguous stance towards

Myanmar following the coup
The relationship between China and Myanmar was relatively warm during
the Aung San Suu Kyi administration, which, among other things, suggests
that China had relatively few border security concerns (although the
authors acknowledge that many specifics are at play along the Myanmar–
China border). The interactions between state officials during this period
focused mainly on economics. Just a few weeks before the coup, Chinese
Foreign Minister Wang Yi visited Myanmar, discussing cooperation with
Aung San Suu Kyi and President Win Myint and promising COVID-19
assistance (CMoFA 2021). Wang was the first foreign minister invited to
visit Myanmar after its general elections in November 2020, confirming the
importance attached to Myanmar’s neighbour on the one hand, and China’s
support for the National League for Democracy (NLD) government (which
won a landslide in the elections) on the other.
Immediately following the coup, Beijing was extremely cautious in its
comments as to what had happened in Myanmar. While other countries
expressed serious concern and denounced the military’s actions, China
merely took note of the situation and turned a blind eye to the military coup
(Tiezzi 2021a). Indeed, to avoid ‘picking a side’, China opposed the UN
Human Rights Council’s calls for the release of Aung San Suu Kyi, insisting
that Myanmar’s ‘internal affair’ should not be interfered with (Cook 2021).
When thousands of Myanmar people took to the streets to join peaceful
protests and were shot at by the military, various countries and groupings,
such as the European Union and G7, issued statements demanding that
the military refrain from violence against demonstrators. On 11 February,
the United States announced sanctions on the junta leaders and several
companies and other countries followed suit, such as Britain and Canada
on 18 February and the European Union on 22 March (ANFREL 2021;
Reuters 2021c). Countries such as Japan, India and Australia called for the
return of democracy in Myanmar. China remained silent (Reuters 2021a).
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China’s initial reservations towards the situation in Myanmar are reflected in

Chinese media reports. For example, Xinhua, the official Chinese state-run
media, referred to the coup as a ‘cabinet reshuffle’ (Xinhua 2021a) in the
newspaper’s English-language version. Similar language was adopted by the
People’s Daily, the largest state-controlled newspaper in China. On 2 February,
the day after the military deposed the NLD government, Xinhua released an
article entitled ‘Major Cabinet Reshuffle Announced in Myanmar’ (Xinhua
2021a). The same article was published in Chinese, with a direct translation
of ‘cabinet reshuffle’ (政治改组) (Xinhua 2021b). The official website
of the People’s Daily contained a similar report, also avoiding the word ‘coup’
(政变). The content and reporting style was consistent in both English and
Chinese. As the official state media is directly controlled and monitored
by the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), the
tone and reporting directly reflected the government’s attitude, signalling
its reluctance to condemn the military takeover. However, while official
state media reports downplayed any mention of the violence that occurred
in the wake of the coup, Chinese local media outlets, targeting Chinese
audiences, were less hesitant. Large newspapers not directly owned by the
CCP, such as the Southern Weekly and Beijing News, described the military
takeover as a coup. Likewise, a page on Baidu Baike, the Chinese version of
Wikipedia, was created under the name ‘2.1 Myanmar Coup’ (Baidu 2021).
The difference in tone between the official state media (representing the
government’s stance and targeting foreign audiences) and those directed at
Chinese citizens reflected China’s dual agenda. Domestically, the long-term
objective was to maintain China’s own power; in a sense, reporting on the
‘undemocratic’ misery of foreign nations could be seen as strengthening
the government’s legitimacy by increasing the relative satisfaction felt by
its citizens towards their own national environment. Internationally,
however, the government chose to be more reserved in order to optimise its
international leverage.
In Myanmar, the image of China has been severely damaged for a long period
of time. During the years of military rule in Burma/Myanmar (1962–2011),
China provided economic assistance, cheap loans, trade, investment, and
military and diplomatic support in return for access to Myanmar’s natural
resources. Myanmar people remember this support as having neglected the
voice of the people under suppression. Mistrust of China also runs deep
among the armed forces, and reducing dependency on China was one of the
key motivations for the Myanmar military to initiate political reforms to the
quasi-democratic system in 2011 (Kironska 2020). Although Myanmar’s

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civilian NLD government cooperated more broadly with the Chinese than
its military had done, Chinese projects were still attacked for not creating
enough jobs for locals, not treating Myanmar workers the same as Chinese
workers and not adhering to environmental standards.
Given this strong anti-Chinese sentiment in Myanmar and Beijing’s lack of
a firm stance on the Myanmar coup in the initial weeks, it is not surprising
that China was accused of involvement in the coup. Many rumours
circulated on the internet—for example, that Chinese airplanes had been
seen transporting technical staff to Myanmar to help build a firewall and
that Chinese soldiers were present in the streets of Myanmar. Chinese
officials denied such rumours, calling them ‘complete nonsense and totally
ridiculous’ (Chinanews 2021). The Chinese Ambassador to Myanmar Chen
Hai stated that China was ‘not informed in advance of the political change
in Myanmar’ and that the situation was not something China wanted to
see (EoPRC 2021a). However, Facebook was flooded with posts blaming
the Chinese; people in Myanmar began boycotting Chinese products and
posting images of what not to buy—for example, big white onions were
deemed to have originated in China, and people were encouraged to buy
the smaller (local) ones instead. During a protest against China in April,
a Chinese flag was burned in Yangon, and pictures were circulated on
the internet.
In March 2021, dozens of Chinese-financed factories in Yangon were
attacked and some were destroyed by arson. It was not clear how the attacks
began, but the Chinese Embassy released a statement saying they were
‘completely nasty’ (EoPRC 2021b). Taiwan’s de facto embassy in Myanmar
advised Taiwanese companies operating in the country to fly the island’s
flag and hang signs stating they were from Taiwan to avoid being confused
with Chinese companies (Reuters 2021d). Chinese officials condemned the
perpetrators and urged Myanmar officials to prevent any further violence
to ensure the safety of Chinese citizens and Chinese-owned businesses in
Myanmar. The coup leader reassured Beijing that his regime would protect
foreign-funded enterprises and, a few weeks later, the military tribunal
sentenced 28 people to 20 years in prison for the attacks, signalling to
China the seriousness of this promise (Reuters 2021b). China’s reaction
to the arson—blaming the protesters and only mentioning financial
damage without considering the people killed by the junta—and, later, its
presence at a military parade to celebrate the annual Armed Forces Day
in Naypyidaw on 27 March (along with representatives from seven other
countries), angered Myanmar’s pro-democracy movement.
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China’s assets in Myanmar were again attacked in the following months.

In May 2021, guards at the Mandalay off-take station of the oil and gas
pipelines were killed (Irrawaddy 2021b). In June, a bomb exploded at
a Chinese clothing factory in Ayeyarwady Region (Irrawaddy 2021a).
In January 2022, electricity pylons supplying a China-backed nickel-
processing plant in Sagaing Region were blown up by the local People’s
Defence Forces, forcing production to halt (Irrawaddy 2022a). China was
concerned with its projects from the onset of the coup and requested as
early as February 2021 that the military regime tighten security measures,
to which the coup leader gave his reassurances.

China’s shift towards an increasingly

positive attitude towards the junta
From its initial ambiguity, China moved to officially supporting the
efforts of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) to assist
Myanmar to address the situation, basically using the association as a proxy.
China emphasised the principle of noninterference in other countries’
internal affairs and promoted restoring stability ‘the ASEAN way’. Beijing
emphasised the ‘three avoidances’: prevent violence (on all sides), prevent
foreign influence and prevent intervention by the Security Council (China
Daily 2021). This would lessen pressure on the Myanmar military and
prevent it from collapsing, which China did not want to see because it
expected the military to continue to play a role in Myanmar’s future.
Although it took some time, China also made contact with Myanmar’s
shadow government. China is known for its multilayered approach,
utilising its government-to-government, party-to-party and people-to-
people policies to widen contacts (and leverage). In the past, following
this approach, it managed to play the ethnic armed groups in the border
region against the central government, securing for itself an official role in
Myanmar’s (failed) peace process (Lintner 2021). After a phone call between
the Chinese Embassy and a member of the Committee Representing the
Pyidaungsu Hluttaw (legislative body in exile, created after the coup) was
made public, the NLD was invited to attend an online meeting (as one of
four parties from Myanmar and others from South and Southeast Asia) on
‘Political Parties’ Cooperation in Joint Pursuit of Economic Development’
organised by the CCP, a party-to-party platform, in September 2021. At the
same time in the international arena, China helped broker an agreement

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to block the Myanmar junta from addressing the United Nations General
Assembly, thereby delaying efforts by the junta to push the United Nations
to recognise it as Myanmar’s legitimate representative.
With all this balancing, China still edged increasingly closer to recognising
Myanmar’s military regime, having previously avoided explicitly picking
a side. As time passed and the likelihood of the NLD government returning
to power diminished, it became more geopolitically beneficial for China to
embrace friendly relations with the newly established military regime. After
the junta leader and his foreign minister met the Chinese ambassador, the
embassy’s Facebook statement identified the senior general as the ‘Leader
of Myanmar’ (CEM 2021). Chinese state-run media followed suit. China’s
lean towards the military junta was confirmed in June 2021 when the junta
was invited to the third BRI meeting (held online), the special ASEAN–
China Foreign Ministers meeting in Chongqing (where the junta’s foreign
minister, Wunna Maung Lwin, had a one-on-one informal session with the
Chinese foreign minister) and the Mekong-Lancang Cooperation meeting
with other foreign ministers from the Mekong region (Tiezzi 2021b). At the
last-mentioned meeting, the bloc approved 22 projects to be implemented
in Myanmar, for which more than USD6 million was to be transferred from
the Chinese government to the Myanmar military (Strangio 2021). China’s
special envoy for Asia, Sun Guoxiang, also travelled to Myanmar twice (in
August and November 2021) to meet with top military leaders and lobby
support for the junta’s attendance at the China–ASEAN leaders’ summit in
November; however, ASEAN decided to exclude the military regime from
the leaders’ summit (Frontier Myanmar 2021). China also assisted the junta
with the delivery of COVID-19 vaccines, including donating some of them.
In 2022, this trend in the development of China–Myanmar relations
persisted; although Myanmar’s military continued facing domestic resistance
and struggled to consolidate its power, Beijing grew closer to the military
regime. In April, China’s ambassador to Myanmar, Chen Hai, held meetings
with the Union Election Commission to discuss the planned elections, as
did India’s ambassador (Irrawaddy 2022b). That month, Chinese Foreign
Minister Wang Yi met with his junta counterpart, Wunna Maung Lwin, in
Anhui province, China, where he promised to continue China’s COVID-19
support and encouraged the development of deeper relations by pushing
forward the China–Myanmar Economic Corridor and other landmark
projects (CMoFA 2022). Wang reiterated China’s support of ‘the ASEAN
way’ in resolving the conflict in Myanmar and ‘working with Myanmar
constructively’.
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Myanmar civil society reacted to the strengthening of relations between the

two states with an open letter to Xi Jinping warning that Chinese projects in
Myanmar could be targeted if China continued to cooperate with the junta.
The authors of the letter, written on behalf of 558 Myanmar organisations,
claimed that China’s engagement with the junta was legitimising the military
regime in the country (Progressive Voice 2022).
China’s strategy in terms of its engagement with Myanmar is driven by its
geopolitical and strategic interests in Myanmar. As Myanmar represents
a close neighbour, involving a number of important BRI projects and
providing important geopolitical access in the Asia-Pacific, China has a
strong interest in remaining relatively friendly with the country. The junta,
for its part, is eager to advance the previously agreed and commenced
projects in the country, as it is again becoming internationally isolated.
The junta ousted all civilian government members of the China–Myanmar
Economic Corridor Joint Committee and replaced them with their own
appointees as it pushed ahead with plans to implement Chinese projects
that were part of the BRI. Table 6.1 presents a comprehensive list of, and
updates on, the BRI projects in Myanmar following the coup.

Table 6.1: Projects under the BRI’s 1,700-kilometre-long China–Myanmar

Economic Corridor

She Gas and Oil Pipelines

The 771-kilometre-long gas and oil pipelines, implemented by the China National
Petroleum Corporation and Myanmar Oil and Gas Enterprise, have run from
Myanmar’s Rakhine State to China’s Yunnan Province since 2013 (gas) and 2014 (oil).
With an annual transport capacity of 22 million tons of oil and 12 billion cubic metres
of gas, the pipelines currently run at a quarter gas capacity and half oil capacity.
They constitute less than 10 per cent of all piped gas imports to China and about
2 per cent of all oil imports to China.
Development after the coup
Officials from both countries held an emergency meeting in February 2022, at which
Chinese officials urged the military regime to tighten security measures for the
pipelines, a request first made in September the previous year. In February 2022,
a take-off station of the pipelines was damaged as a result of attacks from a local
resistance group.
Shwe Natural Gas
This project consists of several offshore gas fields in the Bay of Bengal (discovered
in 2004) and is being developed by a consortium of six companies from Myanmar
(Myanmar Oil and Gas Enterprise), China, Korea and India. Production began in 2013
after the completion of the first of three phases.
Development after the coup
POSCO DAEWOO Corporation, the project operator, is currently undertaking the
second and third phases of development. The first gas from phase two is expected
in the second quarter of 2022.

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Kyaukphyu Special Economic Zone (SEZ)

The project gives China direct access to the Indian Ocean. A framework agreement
for its development by China’s state-run CITIC Group was signed in 2018. During
Xi Jinping’s official visit to Myanmar in 2020, China and Myanmar agreed to push
forward with the project.
Development after the coup
Preparations have been made to seize 250 acres of land in the proposed area,
and the SEZ management committee has been reorganised. In August 2021, the
military regime invited bids to provide legal services to the SEZ and Deep Sea Port
projects. In September 2021, CITIC announced that a consortium had signed with
another Chinese company to conduct consultancy services and a preliminary field
investigation. In October 2022, a gas-fired power plant was opened by the Chinese
ambassador to Myanmar, Chen Hai.
Kyaukphyu Deep Sea Port
This project, approved to continue in 2020, is being built by CITIC Group in Myanmar’s
Rakhine State. It is part of the Kyaukphyu SEZ, 105 kilometres from the Sittwe Port in
Rakhine State, a deepwater port constructed by India in 2016. It provides China with
direct access to the Indian Ocean and the Bay of Bengal, where India is developing
a new naval base for nuclear submarines and ships (Project Varsha).
Development after the coup
In August 2021, the military regime invited bids to provide legal services to the Deep
Sea Port and SEZ projects. In September, an agreement to conduct preliminary field
investigation work for the project was signed.
Myitsone Dam
The dam project (a cascade of seven dams) in the state of Kachin was being
implemented by the state-owned China Power Investment Corporation and the
Myanmar conglomerate Asia World and was allegedly designed to supply 90 per cent
of its electricity to China. President Thein Sein suspended the project in September
2011, after widespread opposition.
Development after the coup
In February 2021, the junta announced the resumption of an unnamed hydropower
project, but the Myitsone Dam project remains suspended.
Letpadaung Copper Mine
The mine is located in the Sagaing Region and, since 2011, has been operated by
Wanbao Mining (a subsidiary of NORINCO, a Chinese state-owned conglomerate
with interests in arms manufacturing and mining) in partnership with the Union of
Myanmar Economic Holdings. The Myanmar government receives 51 per cent of
shares from royalties and income tax. It began shipping copper in 2016. Since 2012,
locals have been protesting against the project.
Development after the coup
In February 2021, the mine stopped operations after thousands of employees joined
the Civil Disobedience Movement (some operations continued to run staffed by
Chinese labourers); however, it has since resumed operation. In April 2022, the
military promised to deploy troops to protect the mine after several attacks.

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Three border economic cooperation zones

The three border economic cooperation zones are located in Muse (Shan State), Chin
Shwe Haw (Shan State, part of the Kokang Self-Administered Zone; this gateway
provides the shortest route from Kunming to Kyaukphyu) and Kanpiketi (Kachin State).
Development after the coup
The junta reorganised the three working committees of the cross-border economic
cooperation zones:
1. Muse: No update since the second meeting of the bilateral local working group
on the China–Myanmar Ruili-Muse Border Economic Cooperation Zone was held
in 2020. The border has also been closed due to COVID-19.
2. Chin Shwe Haw: In May 2021, the military regime and officials from the Kokang
Administration Department discussed reviving the 125 border zone (destroyed in
2017 during attacks by an ethnic armed group).
3. Kanpiketi: In May 2021, the regime-controlled investment commission gave the
green light to begin the construction of this project.
Kunming–Muse–Mandalay–Kyaukphyu/Yangon railway and road
The project aims to run from Kunming to Mandalay and from there to Kyaukphyu and
Yangon. Construction began in 2011 but has been delayed due to fighting between
the Myanmar military and ethnic armed groups. The Kunming–Kyaukpyu railway and
pipeline constitute one of the most critical veins of the BRI, as it provides China with
access to the Indian Ocean.
Development after the coup
On the Chinese side, a new rail line was opened in August 2021 stretching from
Chengdu to Lincang (opposite Chin Shwe Haw). On the Myanmar side, there was
no development other than a feasibility study. The first trial of the China–Myanmar
corridor took place with a cargo of 60 containers being sent by road from Yangon to
Chin Shwe Haw, then by train from Lincang to Chengdu.
New Yangon city
This project, on the west bank of the Yangon River and occupying a proposed
20,000-acre area, is led by the Yangon Region Government and the China
Communication Construction Company. In January 2021, Xi Jinping referred to
the project as one of the three pillars of the China–Myanmar Economic Corridor.
The project is controversial because of its flood-prone location and because of
corruption allegations against the China Communication Construction Company.
Development after the coup
In March 2021, the military regime held a meeting with officials playing vital roles in
the implementation of the project. Officials have been instructed to finalise the land
acquisition process to move construction of the project forward.

Source: Compiled by the authors from various sources.

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Explaining China’s shifting attitude

To analyse and understand this shifting attitude towards Myanmar’s military
since the coup, we take the lens of China as a strategic player and examine
its economic and political interests both domestically and internationally
when engaging with the junta. It is important to note that, as Chinese
diplomatic exchanges have traditionally been with those holding power, the
coup has placed the Myanmar military in the ruling position and, thus, as
the main player. Although China’s relations with other actors—the shadow
government, the NLD and ethnic armed groups—have also been important
in the wake of the coup, analysing Beijing’s move towards Myanmar’s
military may provide some insight into the possible future direction of
China–Myanmar relations.
Following its rapid economic expansion at the turn of the century, China
now presents itself as an important global player, capable of influencing,
and seeking to influence, the global norm (Chhabra et al. 2020). Especially
since Xi took power in 2012, economic and political influence has been
prominent in the Chinese agenda, with the BRI arguably the first step
in China’s grand strategy (Clarke 2017, 71–9). The BRI constitutes an
important part of China’s interests, both economically and politically. The
expansion and successful completion of BRI projects will help China to
become a global norm shaper, attracting more countries to engage with it.
The success of the BRI is likely to have an even more important symbolic
meaning, especially in light of rising competition from the West, such as the
Partnership for Global Infrastructure and Investment (PGII), a G7 initiative
aiming to provide investment to developing countries. China’s BRI projects
also provide effective economic leverage and can be used as coercive tools in
socialising countries to behave in ways that favour Chinese interests.
The BRI projects also provide certain leverages to Myanmar. As shown in
the previous section, Myanmar is a host to many infrastructure and energy
projects. Due to its geographic proximity to China, Myanmar is home to an
important section of the belt and road, connecting directly to inner China.
In other words, significant parts of the belt and road could not be completed
without Myanmar. In this case, a strategic decision that accelerates ongoing
projects or one that leads to additional economic engagements could
establish further economic and political ties and build a good reputation for
the BRI and further Chinese engagement globally. However, a decision that

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leads to the cancellation of projects or even more stagnation could incur

a reputational cost and could potentially have a spillover effect on other
recipients, leading them to reject BRI projects in their countries.
The BRI is certainly not the only factor influencing China. Maintaining
a certain international reputation is important for China—although this
has been variable in recent years. As a member of numerous international
bodies, China needs to consider the reaction of the international community
when making decisions. It is in China’s interest to maintain a favourable
image among countries in which it holds a strategic interest, even though
some may not align with it ideologically, especially in the Asia-Pacific region.
A good and well-maintained reputation can bring additional economic
exchanges and help to avoid economic sanctions or trade wars caused by
disagreements or hostile public opinions in democratic countries. In the
case of Myanmar, ASEAN’s opinion is particularly relevant to China. Given
the negative attitude of most ASEAN countries towards the coup, China
needed to consider the potential downturn of some established relations
should it show support for the coup.
Military interests, or security concerns, are arguably the most important
of China’s strategic interests, as they directly affect the regime’s survival.
Military interests include both short-term border security as well as long-
term geopolitical risks. The Chinese government has historically used
nationalism (often arising from territorial concerns and disputes) to enforce
its legitimacy and minimising security risks remains a priority for internal
stability (Downs & Saunders 1998). Such concerns are especially salient
in interactions with neighbouring states (e.g. Myanmar), as geographical
proximity can pose immediate threats to border security, including a possible
refugee crisis. China, with its strict refugee policy, is neither well equipped
nor particularly willing to handle a large inflow of refugees. Further, it has
its own security problems (e.g. separatist movements troubling the CCP),
making the additional cost of a neighbouring refugee crisis too high.
Comparing the perceived outcomes of the above interests for each possible
position China could take helps to explain its shifting attitude towards
the Myanmar military. There are three possible stances or attitudes China
could adopt: positive, neutral or negative. In the early period immediately
following the coup, the attitude of the military, its willingness to work with
Beijing and the likelihood of its survival were relatively unknown. Officially
endorsing the Myanmar military could have resulted in BRI projects
moving (faster) forward if the military was willing to work with Beijing.

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However, the coup attracted considerable international attention, and

openly supporting the military could have damaged China’s international
reputation, thus increasing the risk of its relations with the West, and possibly
also ASEAN countries, turning negative. Therefore, in the immediate wake
of the coup, China’s open support of the military could have brought more
cost than benefit.
Public condemnation of the regime would also have yielded a negative
result, as it would have alienated the military, causing China to lose one of
its important allies in the region. A damaged relationship with the Myanmar
military may have resulted in less effort being expended to maintain the
China–Myanmar border, leading to possible conflicts and unwanted refugees.
Moreover, such action could have resulted in the cancellation of many
ongoing BRI projects, incurring both economic and reputational costs to
China. Consequently, given the level of uncertainty immediately following
the coup, taking a definite position of either support for, or condemnation
of, the military posed a high risk of negative effects on Chinese interests.
Thus, China chose to appear neutral, as this approach was less likely to induce
a negative downturn in its relations with Myanmar. This helps to explain
the Chinese government’s initially ambiguous attitude towards the Myanmar
military, including its reluctance to call what occurred a ‘coup’ while also
avoiding statements that would declare the junta a ‘government’.
As the months went by, however, the situation changed. International
attention diminished and with it the risk to China’s reputation, as well
as the risk of international sanctions being imposed on China. In fact,
holding a seemingly neutral position posed its own risks, including loss
of reputation, as it made China appear indecisive. When it became clear
that China’s apparent neutrality could not be maintained long term, the
government was forced to take a position. By then it had become clear that
the junta was willing to cooperate with Beijing. As the Myanmar military
gradually took decisive control over economic and infrastructure projects
across the country (thus increasing its leverage over China), it became clear
that holding a positive attitude towards the military could lead to potential
economic gains through moving BRI projects forward and deepening
political ties with the military. As the alternative—adopting a negative
attitude towards the military and/or continuing to appear neutral—would
most likely have had negative effects on Chinese interests and incurred
other costs, it made sense for China to adopt a more positive and friendly
stance towards the military. This helps to explain China’s shifting attitude in
the later months of the crisis.
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Conclusion
Beijing’s initially ambiguous attitude towards the coup neither favoured
the Myanmar military nor the protest movement headed by the shadow
government. As time passed, China edged increasingly closer towards
recognising Myanmar’s military regime. This chapter has outlined the major
exchanges between China and Myanmar following the February 2021 coup
and documented Beijing’s shifting attitude, in which it first attempted to
appear neutral and gradually became more friendly towards the military.
Analysing China’s strategic interests in relation to Myanmar, the authors
found that China’s initial hesitation stemmed largely from the possibility
of a decline in economic and political power and security issues. In the
beginning, when criticism of the military was widely circulating, open
support for the military would have damaged China’s reputation, increased
the risk of possible international sanctions and prompted a decline in
China’s global political power. Conversely, China’s open condemnation of
the regime could also have negatively impacted its balance of power and
incurred a security risk. Thus, appearing neutral was the option most likely
to best serve China’s strategic interests.
In the months following the coup, the situation changed. As international
attention on the Myanmar crisis lessened, the risk to China’s reputation
and threat of possible sanctions decreased. At the risk of being seen as an
indecisive international actor, China decided to take a more affirmative
and supportive stance. The following statement from the 13th National
People’s Congress of China illustrates China’s position: ‘No matter how the
situation evolves, China will not waver in its commitment to advancing
China–Myanmar relations and will not change the course of promoting
friendship and cooperation’ (Xinhua 2021c). One should not forget that
Myanmar is geopolitically important to China in terms of its commitment
to advancing its BRI projects and two-ocean strategy.
Although China has traditionally been cautious and avoided direct conflict
when dealing with Western countries, the time of cautious diplomatic
exchange seems to be over. China’s soft power and reputational power is
now limited in the West. Consequently, in the future, China is likely to be
more direct—even bold—in its condemnation of other countries. Its recent
open alignment with bodies such as the Taliban indicates that Beijing is
less and less concerned about its reputation in the West. As a result, when
dealing with China, Western countries will need to understand that China
is likely to be more assertive and, to a certain extent, more extreme.
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When dealing with Myanmar, countries such as Australia need to be aware

that, as time goes by, China is likely to be a stronger ally to the Myanmar
military. Further, China is unlikely to contribute to, and will probably
oppose, any moves by international actors to engage with the Myanmar
shadow government.

Funding
This work was supported by the European Regional Development Fund,
‘Sinophone Borderlands—Interaction at the Edges’, CZ.02.1.01/0.0/0.0/
16_019/0000791.

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 7
Myanmar in ASEAN:
Dilemmas, Determinants
and Capacity
Moe Thuzar
Fellow, ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute, Singapore

Abstract
Myanmar marked a quarter-century as an ASEAN member in 2022.
Accepted into the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) fold
under a previous military regime amid international criticism, Myanmar’s
ASEAN membership since 1997 has presented both ASEAN and successive
administrations in Myanmar with more hard experiences than teachable
moments. The collaborative response to humanitarian needs after Cyclone
Nargis in 2008 and the decade of Myanmar’s opening and democratic
transition (2011–20) offered some optimism that ASEAN’s constructive
engagement might prove a workable approach for Myanmar. However, the
tendency of Myanmar authorities to manipulate the ASEAN space, including
in the aftermath of the 2017 Rohingya exodus following military operations,
provides another example of how authorities in Myanmar may resort to
precedents in managing regional interventions. ASEAN’s role in dealing
with crises in Myanmar gained more salience after the 1 February 2021
coup. While past precedent still provides a reference, new precedents may
be emerging, offering some insight into the opportunities and limitations

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of ASEAN’s engagement with recalcitrant members, and how authorities

in Myanmar view their country’s membership in, and interactions with,
ASEAN and, by extension, with ASEAN’s external interlocutors.

***
The year 2022 marks a quarter-century of Myanmar’s membership of
the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). Myanmar’s bid
to join ASEAN was initiated by the State Law and Order Restoration
Council military regime, which took power in 1988, quelling a nationwide
democracy uprising that saw the crumbling of close to three decades of
(military-dominant) socialist authoritarian rule. It has become a truism that
developments in Myanmar have posed a dilemma for ASEAN, ever since
Myanmar’s admission into the grouping in 1997, even during the decade
of democratisation from 2011 to 2021.
The military’s grip on political power and its reluctance to relinquish control
of the state presents the most salient aspect of this dilemma. ASEAN’s
responses to various crisis situations over the two and half decades also
indicate the grouping’s perceptions of the determinants of the dilemma and
the attendant capacities in Myanmar to respond to ASEAN’s interventions.
The coup on 1 February 2021 presents the most serious crisis for the
country, and for ASEAN’s response.
This chapter reviews two past crises to illustrate ASEAN’s Myanmar
dilemmas, and the grouping’s responses to each. The analysis seeks to
identify the determinants and capacities for ASEAN’s response to the current
crisis in Myanmar. Specifically, the chapter examines ASEAN’s response to
Cyclone Nargis in 2008 and its dealings with an earlier military regime, and
its response to the Rohingya refugee crisis in 2017, which erupted during
the tenure of the democratically elected National League for Democracy
(NLD), using these to frame analysis of ASEAN’s responses to date towards
the 2021 Myanmar coup. The chapter concludes with a number of policy
recommendations, including engagement with Myanmar’s National Unity
Government (NUG)1 and ethnic armed organisations (EAOs), not just the
Tatmadaw, and strengthening work with ASEAN’s dialogue partners.

1 The NUG emerged in April 2021 as appointees of the Committee Representing Pyidaungsu
Hluttaw (CRPH), which was formed primarily with NLD lawmakers who had been initially detained
in their dormitories then released in the early days of the coup. The NUG’s claim to legitimacy stems
from the CRPH’s status as elected members of parliament. However, the SAC annulled the results of the
2020 elections, and the NUG itself is an interim entity in the political roadmap towards an envisioned
federal democracy.
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ASEAN responses to past crises in Myanmar

ASEAN was founded in 1967, originally with five member states.2 Although
criticised for its slow progress, ASEAN has nevertheless developed a unique
geopolitical role. Over the last 20 years, it has mitigated a wide range of
underlying tensions in East Asia, largely by dint of its central convening
role in bringing contesting parties to the table, and a pragmatic balancing
of global power pressures.
Mahbubani’s (2017) observation that ASEAN’s strategic diplomacy has
resulted in peaceful relations in Southeast Asia, despite a high degree of
ethnic, religious, political and economic diversity, uses ASEAN’s experience
with Myanmar as one of several examples. However, there are few precedents
for ASEAN’s success in overcoming internal conflicts among its members.
Most ASEAN members have at least one ethnic or communal conflict
within their borders that has resisted resolution for decades. Myanmar
stands out as a test case, precedent and example for ASEAN’s interventions.
Two instances provide a benchmark of sorts for ASEAN’s response to the
political crisis that erupted in Myanmar after the military seized power on
1 February 2021.

Cyclone Nargis
A precedent to justify ASEAN intervening in Myanmar occurred in the
aftermath of Cyclone Nargis in 2008. The cyclone devastated Myanmar’s
Irrawaddy delta region on 2 May 2008, causing over 130,000 fatalities.
International focus on the cyclone’s aftermath arose when offers of
humanitarian assistance were met with reticence from the military regime
then in power in Myanmar. On 19 May 2008, the ASEAN foreign ministers
held a special meeting to consider assisting Myanmar with humanitarian
relief. This meeting—convened by Singapore, ASEAN chair for that year—
overcame the ASEAN principle of noninterference in the domestic affairs
of its members, leading directly to an ASEAN-coordinated international
emergency relief program. Barely six months earlier, in November 2007,
Prime Minister of Myanmar Thein Sein had rejected ASEAN’s suggestion to
have the special envoy of the secretary-general of the United Nations (UN),
Ibrahim Gambari, brief the 13th ASEAN Summit in Singapore on the

2 The original five were Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore and Thailand. Brunei joined in
1984. Vietnam was admitted in 1995, followed by Laos and Myanmar in 1997, and Cambodia in 1999.

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situation in Myanmar following the September 2007 Saffron Revolution.

Singapore, as ASEAN chair in 2007, issued the grouping’s strongest-worded
statement on Myanmar, expressing ‘revulsion’ at the crackdown on peaceful
protests (Singapore Government 2007).3
ASEAN’s response in May 2008 evolved in the context of a tense standoff
between the international community and Myanmar’s military regime,
caused by the disconnect between the international community’s eagerness
to send aid and the military’s suspicion of their motives. An ASEAN
Secretariat report documenting aspects of ASEAN’s response mentioned
that Singapore’s foreign minister, George Yeo, recalled that ‘some countries
had dispatched warships carrying supplies to the region and even talked
openly about invoking the Responsibility to Protect’ principle (Marr 2010).
Yeo was referring to US Navy vessels off Myanmar’s coast (the US Navy
was participating in the annual ‘Cobra Gold’ US–Thailand joint military
exercises at the time). He was also referring to the French foreign minister’s
proposal to invoke the UN’s ‘Responsibility to Protect’ (R2P) clause and
deliver aid directly to the Myanmar people without waiting for approval from
the military government. Myanmar’s military junta saw the R2P invocation
as blatantly disrespectful of the ASEAN principle of noninterference in a
member country’s domestic affairs. But, in May 2008, ASEAN itself played
the R2P card as one of three options open to Myanmar:
1. a UN-led mechanism for managing the post-Nargis relief and
reconstruction effort
2. an ASEAN-led mechanism, in which ASEAN would be at the
forefront of a coalition of neighbouring countries and other competent
organisations; specifically, ASEAN would work together with the
Myanmar government to manage access by the coalition partners in
implementing relief and reconstruction programs in the affected area
3. the delivery of aid by force, if necessary, on the basis of the R2P principle.
The State Peace and Development Council regime acceded to the second
option. Four days after the special ASEAN Foreign Ministers’ Meeting,
it allowed relief workers into the country irrespective of nationality.
Subsequently, the international humanitarian community has had the
opportunity to openly maintain a presence in Myanmar.

3 The statement was issued by Singapore, in its ASEAN chair capacity, on the sidelines of the United
Nations General Assembly in New York. It was done with Myanmar’s full knowledge and acquiescence.

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At the 19 May 2008 meeting, ASEAN foreign ministers also took the first
step towards creating an ASEAN-led tripartite coordination mechanism.
They established the ASEAN Humanitarian Task Force to work closely with
the UN and the Myanmar Government. ASEAN also led the ASEAN–
UN Pledging Conference in Yangon on 25 May 2008. Representatives of
countries that had been treating Myanmar as a pariah state for its human
rights abuses set aside politics and attended the conference along with
representatives from ASEAN member countries and other Asian countries.
The Humanitarian Task Force established a formal implementation
mechanism involving ASEAN, the UN and Myanmar, called the Tripartite
Core Group (TCG), to organise immediate assistance and undertake a post-
Nargis joint assessment.
Although not an instrument to bring about political change in Myanmar,
the TCG mechanism showed Myanmar government officials over the next
two years new ways of working with a wide range of interest groups, both
domestic and foreign, without upsetting the established political order.
Frank discussions in the TCG led to the streamlining of several rigid and
lengthy bureaucratic processes, and also exposed Myanmar’s military to
humanitarian operations.
ASEAN’s initiative to broker and lead the coordination of international
humanitarian response to Myanmar, and its calling attention to issues
requiring special engagement with Myanmar, set a precedent for future
ASEAN responses to crises in Myanmar. Since 2008, ASEAN’s cross-border
coordination role has evolved and expanded, despite the institutional
hurdles of the noninterference and consensus principles.4

ASEAN and Rohingya repatriation

Another defining moment occurred at a special ASEAN Foreign Ministers’
Meeting in Myanmar on 19 November 2016. It was the first time ASEAN
foreign ministers had been invited by a member country to discuss
a domestic conflict, namely the escalating pattern of attacks in Rakhine
State on the Muslim community self-identified as Rohingya. Myanmar’s
stance up to that point, under both military (pre-2011) and Union
Solidarity and Development Party (USDP) (2011–16) regimes, had been
to insist on the domestic nature of the issue and refuse to have the topic

4 The ‘consensus principle’ requires that all formal decisions by ASEAN be adopted with the
agreement of all ASEAN members.

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tabled for ASEAN’s discussion agenda. An important factor enabling this

meeting was the recognition of the potential trans-boundary impacts of this
internal conflict on other ASEAN members (e.g. human trafficking and
migration), necessitating discussion of humanitarian and other responses
from a regionally coordinated viewpoint. Another factor was that Aung
San Suu Kyi, head of the country’s new civilian-led government, showed
a willingness to brief ASEAN counterparts. This suggests that ASEAN’s quiet
diplomacy approach, led by Indonesian Foreign Minister Retno Masurdi in
this instance, was still preferred for managing sensitive and difficult topics,
regardless of whether the Myanmar leadership was civilian or military.
Nonetheless, the careful language used in the Indonesian Ministry of
Foreign Affairs’ statement on the matter (CabSecRI 2017), and Minister
Retno’s factual recounting of ASEAN’s role and Indonesia’s initiative
(Asia Society 2017), indicate that the NLD government’s willingness
to cooperate with ASEAN was still limited to, or framed within, the
humanitarian assistance sphere. This attitude constrained any potentially
constructive interventions that ASEAN could have initiated or instituted
for an ongoing process for addressing the Rohingya issue, even within the
bounds of the recommendations presented by the Advisory Commission
on Rakhine led by former UN secretary-general Kofi Annan. The NLD
government had just announced its commitment to implementing that
commission’s 88 recommendations when the military crackdown on
Rohingya communities commenced on 25 August 2017 (Callahan 2018).
To address the consequences of the 2017 exodus, ASEAN’s proposal to assist
Myanmar with the Rohingya repatriation followed the Nargis precedent,
although the communities in question and attitudes in Myanmar towards
the problem could not have been more different. The NLD government
started its Rohingya response by emphasising peace and development in
Rakhine State, and prioritising a civilian-led coordination of responses to
humanitarian needs in Rakhine. It established the Union Enterprise on
Humanitarian Assistance, Resettlement and Development in Rakhine
on 17 October 2017, with direct oversight by the State Counsellor’s
Office. The NLD government’s emphasis on this initiative as the vehicle
for humanitarian and other assistance in Rakhine, and its preference for
bilateral initiatives over a regional response, indicate Myanmar’s unease with
having the Rohingya issue discussed in a regional or multilateral setting,
despite the recognition among policymakers dealing with this issue that
a do-nothing approach or insistence that this was a domestic matter was

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no longer an option. If Myanmar had to accept external intervention on

this issue, the ASEAN platform presented a more favourable space for the
authorities in Myanmar.
The 2019 State of Southeast Asia survey conducted by the ASEAN Studies
Centre at the ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute reveals Myanmar’s preferences.
Close to 60 per cent of respondents in Myanmar preferred that ASEAN
mediate between the Myanmar government and other stakeholders.
A relatively large minority (41.4 per cent) of respondents viewed the issue as
Myanmar’s domestic affair, and only a few (7.1 per cent) wanted diplomatic
pressure on Myanmar. Regionally, the most preferred option was mediation
(66.5 per cent), with humanitarian assistance (50.9 per cent) and diplomatic
pressure (38 per cent) as second and third preferences, respectively.
The 2017 Rohingya crisis response revealed Myanmar’s ability to manoeuvre
within the ASEAN space. The deployment of an ASEAN-coordinated
needs assessment team for the repatriation process was delayed as a result of
the repatriation process itself being delayed. The ASEAN secretary-general
visited Myanmar in December 2018 and May 2019 to discuss ASEAN’s
role in helping Myanmar address repatriation and other related concerns.
A preliminary needs assessment report in 2019 identified three potential
areas of cooperation: enhancing capacity of reception and transit centres,
strengthening information dissemination and supporting the provision
of basic services (AHA Centre 2019).
It should be noted that the Rohingya and other sectors of the international
community have subsequently been critical of ASEAN’s response to the
Rohingya crisis. In particular, concerns have been expressed that Myanmar
authorities may have used ASEAN’s preliminary needs assessment report to
downplay the impact of the 2017 violence against Rohingya communities.
Since 2017, ASEAN’s key statements have included a paragraph on the
current status of the regional response in Myanmar. Hopes for a safe and
voluntary return of the Rohingya have been hampered by the security
situation in Rakhine State and, more recently, by the COVID-19 pandemic.
However, the underlying and main concern behind the Rohingyas’
reluctance to be repatriated on a voluntary basis remains the history of
persecution and systematic discrimination they have faced, mainly at the
hands of Myanmar’s security apparatus. The February 2021 coup has
further complicated matters. The State Administration Council (SAC)
junta initially indicated some interest in restarting repatriation talks with

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Bangladesh, but, in an interview with Chinese-language Phoenix Television

in May 2021, Senior General Min Aung Hlaing denied the possibility of
accepting a return of Rohingya refugees to Myanmar (Reuters 2022a).5

ASEAN and Myanmar after the

1 February 2021 coup
When the military seized power in February 2021, deposing the NLD
government, ASEAN initially turned to its past experience with military
regimes in Myanmar as a way forward. However, there were some nuances
in its approach that signalled a different attitude. For example, although
occasional references were made to its (only) successful intervention
in Myanmar (i.e. the Nargis response), other developments showed
that ASEAN was breaking, somewhat, with its past practices regarding
Myanmar. It should be noted, however, that these developments only
started in October 2021, eight months after the coup began. Prior to that,
ASEAN faced a credibility challenge, both in Myanmar and internationally,
due to its response to the coup. Further, despite these nuances, some doubts
remain as to whether ASEAN can maintain its credibility and centrality
in responding to what may constitute its most serious internal challenge
to date.
Although ASEAN issued a statement a day after the coup, it was not until
March 2021 that ASEAN foreign ministers convened to prepare for a leaders’
meeting on Myanmar, which finally took place on 24 April 2021. At the
meeting, ASEAN heads of state and government met with Senior General
Min Aung Hlaing and agreed upon a Five-Point Consensus6 that called for
a cessation of violence and a mediated dialogue among key stakeholders to
find a peaceful solution. The SAC’s subsequent conflation of the Five-Point
Consensus with its own political roadmap affected internal perceptions

5 The Myanmar military channel, Myawady, has published the full transcript (in English) of Min Aung
Hlaing’s interview, see www.myawady.net.mm/content/phoenix-tv-people%E2%80%99s-republic-china-
interviews-chairman-state-administration-council (page discontinued).
6 Appended to the Chairman’s Statement on the ASEAN Leaders Meeting of 24 April 2021, the
Five-Point Consensus calls for: 1) immediate cessation of violence in Myanmar, 2) constructive dialogue
among all parties concerned towards a peaceful solution, 3) a special envoy of the ASEAN chair to
facilitate mediation, assisted by the ASEAN secretary-general, 4) humanitarian assistance through the
AHA Centre and 5) the special envoy to visit Myanmar to meet with all parties concerned (ASEAN
2021). The full text of the Chairman’s Statement and Five-Point Consensus is available at asean.org/wp-
content/​uploads/​Chairmans-Statement-on-ALM-Five-Point-Consensus-24-April-2021-FINAL-a-1.pdf

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of ASEAN’s response to Myanmar. Meanwhile, the surge of COVID-19

infections and deaths in mid-2021 compounded the effects of the coup.
The inability of regional governments (facing pandemic challenges of their
own) to urgently respond to the plight of the Myanmar people caused a shift
in how people in Myanmar viewed international interventions. Initial calls
for R2P-type interventions gave way to calls for self-determination and a
growing climate of cynicism towards regional and international diplomacy.
Nevertheless, ASEAN’s decision on 15 October 2021 (BMoFA 2021) that
the 38th and 39th ASEAN Summits, and related summit meetings for
2021, would invite a ‘non-political representative’ (i.e. a senior civil servant)
from Myanmar raised some hope, as the decision effectively barred the
SAC chief and his ministerial-level nominees. Even though accepting any
representative associated with the SAC constituted a pragmatic acceptance
of the SAC’s presence at the regional table, ASEAN persisted with this
approach, holding many of its sectoral meetings with SAC representatives in
the Myanmar seat, at ministerial, senior official and working group levels.7
Currently, Myanmar is the 2022–23 rotational executive director and
secretariat for ASEANAPOL, the regional mechanism for cooperation
among police forces in the 10 member states. In November 2021, Myanmar
assumed the rotational two-year chairmanship of ASEAN’s Supreme
Audit Institutions (ASEANSAI 2021). In June 2022, the SAC’s defence
minister attended the Defence Ministers Meeting chaired by Cambodia
(MMoI 2022).
The chairman’s statement at the emergency ASEAN Foreign Ministers’
Meeting on 15 October 2021 (BMoFA 2021) mentioned the NUG by
name. Prior to this, ASEAN had remained largely silent on the NUG,
although several ASEAN member states had unilaterally made informal
contact with NUG representatives. Malaysia’s foreign minister, Saifuddin
Abdullah, publicised his informal meeting with his NUG counterpart Zin
Mar Aung on the sidelines of the ASEAN–US Summit in Washington DC
in May 2022 (Reuters 2022b). Prior to this, Saifuddin had publicly called
for ASEAN to collectively meet with the NUG, drawing an angry response
from the SAC’s foreign ministry (Irrawaddy 2022b).

7 ASEAN insiders have shared that, in the weeks and months following the February 2021 coup,
the SAC insisted (in writing) that ASEAN meetings and activities accept its representatives in the
Myanmar seat.

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It is worth monitoring whether ASEAN’s think tank community will

engage more fully with NUG representatives. On 27 January 2022, the
Center for Strategic and International Studies in Indonesia convened an
online panel discussion on Myanmar, inviting the NUG’s ambassador to
ASEAN to discuss ASEAN’s role in dealing with the Myanmar crisis (CSIS-
Indonesia 2022). This, and another panel on 17 November featuring the
NUG’s deputy foreign minister discussing Indonesia’s role as ASEAN chair
and the Myanmar crisis, have been the only publicised instances to date.8
In response to ASEAN’s October 2021 decision, the SAC retaliated
by refusing to attend the summits under Brunei’s chairmanship, and
challenged ASEAN on its charter provisions regarding participation at
ASEAN meetings, citing the principle of equality. ASEAN, however, upheld
its decision and convened the 2021 summits, with Myanmar’s Zoom
screen blank.9 ASEAN held to this default position for the ASEAN–China
Special Summit in November 2021, setting a precedent for the ASEAN–
US Special Summit in May 2022 and the ASEAN–India Special Foreign
Ministers’ Meeting in June 2022. In each instance, the SAC refused to send
a non-political representative, citing the aforementioned equality principle.
These instances indicate a gradual change in ASEAN’s approach to
recalcitrant members—though views may differ internally regarding the
available options to overcome the current Myanmar impasse. Myanmar
has been ASEAN’s main recalcitrant member since it joined the association
in 1979, with issues such as the generals’ reluctance to cede power prior

8 In November 2021, a project-level activity coordinated by the ASEAN Foundation with

international partners included the NUG minister for the environment in the advertised list of plenary
speakers for an international conference on a climate and disaster resilient ASEAN, scheduled for 22–
23 November 2021. However, the actual conference took place without any NUG participation at either
plenary or technical level.
In November 2022, the Foreign Policy Community Initiative (FPCI), an Indonesian think tank, invited
NUG foreign minister Zin Mar Aung to give opening remarks at the Global Town Hall 2022 virtual
forum, which the FPCI organised in partnership with international education and advocacy organisation
Global Citizen. Zin Mar Aung’s deputy, Moe Zaw Oo, was invited to participate in a panel discussion
at the same event. However, FPCI had to cancel both NUG representatives participation (and apologise
to them separately) due to the UN’s discomfort that featuring participants from the NUG might be
interpreted as taking sides in the Myanmar crisis. Global Town Hall 2022 featured several high-level
participants, including former UN secretary-general Ban Ki Moon, former Australian prime minister
Kevin Rudd and US Assistant Secretary of State Daniel Kritenbrink.
9 Hun Sen, the incoming ASEAN chair, was especially vocal in stating that the SAC had brought
about Myanmar’s absence itself.

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to 2010, the Thein Sein administration’s refusal to consider the Rohingya

issue, and the NLD administration’s scoping of the ASEAN space and
available institutional mechanisms to respond to the 2017 Rohingya crisis.
For the current political crisis in Myanmar, ASEAN still adheres to the
broad rubric of the Five-Point Consensus despite the SAC’s glaring lack
of adherence to it. On the same day that ASEAN agreed on the Five-Point
Consensus (24 April 2021), the military used lethal force against protesters.
The military’s violence resulted in increased levels of armed resistance
against the SAC across the entire length and breadth of the country by
several EAOs and localised militias known as People’s Defence Forces
(PDFs). Some of the PDFs and young people fleeing arrest sought EAO
support for urban warfare training. The Myanmar public justifies and even
applauds this armed resistance to the SAC as self-defence in the face of
international inaction (or inability to take action) to intervene in Myanmar.
Since 7 September 2021, this armed resistance has taken the form of a
‘people’s defensive war’. The SAC has labelled the EAOs and PDFs, and
even the NUG, as terrorists in an attempt to justify its refusal to engage in
any form of dialogue. In June 2022, however, the SAC seemed to backtrack
on its rhetoric with an invitation—largely ignored—for PDFs to surrender
and return to civilian life (Irrawaddy 2022c).
ASEAN’s default position regarding the SAC’s representation at key, high-
level political meetings highlights its awareness of: 1) the SAC’s attempts to
influence ASEAN’s processes towards its own interests, 2) the reputational
damage caused by the SAC’s disregard of ASEAN’s processes and 3) the
regional security implications arising from the continuing violence in
Myanmar. ASEAN is clear about its ability to intervene in a situation that
affects regional stability. In the past, such interventions have taken the form
of statements of concern, at times accompanied by quiet diplomacy.
Before taking up her appointment as the UN secretary-general’s special
envoy on Myanmar, Dr Noeleen Heyzer observed in March 2021 (then
in her capacity as a member of the UN Secretary-General’s High-Level
Advisory Board on Mediation) that ‘we have to accept the fact that the age
of quiet diplomacy is over in the age of social media’, and that ‘ASEAN’s
diplomacy needs to reflect this new reality’ (Tan Hui Yee 2021). Heyzer was
herself affected by this new reality in 2022 when a remark she made in an
interview about ‘power sharing’ with the military drew a fierce reaction from
Myanmar activists and civil society organisations supporting the anti-junta
movement (Vaphual & Ratcliffe 2022). Her August 2022 visit to Naypyidaw

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as UN special envoy also provoked criticism for seeming to accord the SAC
some legitimacy. Her statements to the media post-visit (UN 2022) did not
endear her to the SAC, which asserted that she had not fully reflected the
SAC’s perspective. The SAC published a ‘full description’ of the meeting in
the state-run newspaper Global New Light of Myanmar (2022).
ASEAN has also grappled with increasing criticism of its Myanmar response
since the coup. ASEAN’s earlier attempts, up to the point of the April 2021
ASEAN Leaders Meeting on Myanmar, were mainly efforts to keep up with
the reality of what was happening on the ground in Myanmar, and the on-
ground sentiments towards the SAC’s promise of elections and restoration
of stability. The intensity of these on-ground sentiments, reflected in the
many protests across Myanmar—including burnings of the ASEAN flag in
June 2021 signalling disagreement with the ASEAN chair’s move to consult
the SAC on the appointment of the special envoy on Myanmar—and the
online activism on social media, constituted a wake-up call, jolting ASEAN
to the new reality in Myanmar.
In this context, it is important to note the forces within ASEAN driving
change in practice and policy towards Myanmar. Indonesia, Singapore,
Malaysia, Brunei (which was the ASEAN chair in 2021) and (sporadically)
the Philippines have treated the Myanmar crisis and ASEAN’s response to
it as a matter of principle. For these countries, adherence to the ASEAN
Charter and upholding the centrality of regional decisions are paramount
considerations. However, the SAC has challenged ASEAN with a narrow,
one-dimensional interpretation of the charter’s principles. These challenges
have mainly taken the form of statements issued by the SAC’s Ministry
of Foreign Affairs in response to decisions made by ASEAN leaders and
foreign ministers regarding Myanmar’s representation at leaders’ or foreign
ministers’ meetings. For its part, ASEAN’s decisions have mainly been
informed by the SAC’s lack of commitment to address the Five-Point
Consensus. In response, the SAC has resorted to making unilateral statements
invoking ASEAN’s noninterference principle and threatening ‘negative
impacts’ on ASEAN’s community-building efforts (MMoFA 2022a). It has
also attempted to influence ASEAN’s internal deliberations on Myanmar
via its bilateral links with some countries in the region. This looks likely
to continue unless either external or internal forces (or a combination of
both) somehow compel the SAC to change its attitude towards mediation
and reconciliation.

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Myanmar and ASEAN in 2022

Focus on humanitarian assistance

Kicking off Cambodia’s 2022 rotational chairmanship year, Prime Minister
Hun Sen made much of his bilateral visit to Myanmar in January 2022—
as did his military hosts in Naypyidaw (Tan Hui Yee 2022). The negative
publicity from that visit gave Hun Sen pause to consider the import and
broader implications of ASEAN’s collective response to the Myanmar crisis,
not least the credibility challenge that would redound to ASEAN if the
situation continued to deteriorate (RFA 2022a).
Following Hun Sen’s Myanmar visit, ASEAN expanded its October 2021
decision to the foreign ministers’ level. The ASEAN Foreign Ministers’
Annual Retreat, which usually kicks off ASEAN’s key political discussions
and agenda-setting for the year, followed the October 2021 precedent
of inviting a non-political representative, drawing another retort from
the SAC in a statement issued by Myanmar’s foreign affairs ministry on
14 February 2022 (MMoFA 2022b).
After his Myanmar visit, Hun Sen’s follow-up conversations with
counterparts from other ASEAN member states, such as Indonesia and
Singapore, revealed the seriousness with which these founding members
viewed ASEAN’s collective decision to send a clear message to the SAC about
its adherence and commitment to the Five-Point Consensus priorities, not
least those to cease violence and allow unfettered humanitarian assistance.
In fact, in the first of his video calls with junta chief Min Aung Hlaing,
Hun Sen made a four-point appeal, including to allow a visit by the
ASEAN special envoy for 2022 and to provide ‘full cooperation in support
of ASEAN efforts’ in order to provide humanitarian relief for people in
Myanmar (CMoFAIC 2022a).
In 2022, ASEAN’s focus on humanitarian assistance for Myanmar became
more pronounced. ASEAN’s secretary-general had led an appeal and a
pledging conference in August 2021, but ASEAN was unable to coordinate
aid delivery on the ground in Myanmar. The SAC instead designated the
Myanmar Red Cross Society as the in-country coordinator for humanitarian
assistance from ASEAN. In a statement issued at the one-year mark of the
coup, the ASEAN chair voiced ASEAN member states’ collective concern
at the ongoing crisis in Myanmar, referring specifically to the ‘continued

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violence and deteriorating humanitarian situation’ (CMoFAIC 2022b).

The statement, released by Cambodia’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs
and International Cooperation on 2 February 2022, also referred to the
importance of the ASEAN special envoy’s missions to Myanmar.
Hun Sen’s January 2022 video call paved the way for ASEAN Special Envoy
Prak Sokhonn’s visit to Myanmar in March 2022. The Myanmar junta
heavily circumscribed his visit, including determining who he could and
could not meet. Unable to meet with senior NLD leaders, and finding no
traction in his efforts to seek the cessation of violence and the ‘engendering
of an inclusive political dialogue that is Myanmar-owned and Myanmar-
led’, Prak Sokhonn prioritised facilitating ASEAN humanitarian assistance
as his next deliverable (CMoFAIC 2022c). This has become his main
deliverable to date.
The SAC agreed to Prak Sokhonn’s proposal to convene a consultative
meeting on humanitarian assistance, but then framed that proposal to its
meet its own interests. The ASEAN consultative meeting was held on 6 May
2022, at the foreign minister level. It did not include UN Special Envoy
to Myanmar Noeleen Heyzer, whose mandate included the facilitation of
humanitarian assistance provision to Myanmar. Instead, Joyce Msuya, the
assistant secretary-general for humanitarian affairs, and UN specialised
agencies were present. The Special Advisory Council for Myanmar, which
comprises former UN experts on Myanmar, shared that Heyzer was
‘invited then disinvited’ (Irrawaddy 2022a) to the meeting, which included
representatives from all ASEAN member states, and some non-ASEAN
countries such as the US, the UK and Japan. Heyzer’s absence raised
speculation that the junta may have blocked her participation in reaction
to her earlier meetings with the NUG (Irrawaddy 2022a). Prior to the
meeting, on 2 May, the junta had termed Saifuddin’s proposal for ‘informal
engagement’ with the NUG on humanitarian aid delivery as ‘irresponsible
and reckless’ (Irrawaddy 2022b).
The ASEAN consultative meeting on 6 May identified certain states and
regions in Myanmar, notably Kayah, Kayin, Magway, Sagaing and Bago,
that were disproportionately in need of assistance due to fighting and
civilian displacement. However, details on how those areas would receive
priority assistance and how it would be delivered remained unclear. At a press
conference following the meeting, Prak Sokhonn presented the meeting’s
outcomes as progress, though he noted that humanitarian assistance to
Myanmar still faced numerous obstacles, including the junta’s fear that aid

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would end up in the hands of resistance groups and the junta’s desire to tax
humanitarian assistance. While the latter issue was ‘negotiated successfully’,
removing the requirement to tax humanitarian assistance, a lack of clarity on
aid delivery remained (CMoFAIC 2022c). The outcome of the meeting also
gave rise to the criticism that ASEAN seemed to be giving the junta control
of aid delivery. At the meeting, the SAC’s taskforce on humanitarian aid
undertook to ensure that aid reached affected communities, especially those
in areas under EAO control (PPP 2022). The NUG flagged its concern
that the junta would ‘continue to hamper urgent and effective delivery
of humanitarian aid’, and called for ‘crucial stakeholders’ such as ‘Ethnic
Resistance Groups’ and local aid organisations to be involved in discussions
on aid distribution (NUG 2022).

ASEAN–US Summit expectations

Prior to the ASEAN–US Special Summit in Washington on 12–13 May
2022, expectations ran high on how the Myanmar crisis would be
approached. The Myanmar crisis was one of several pressing issues of
geopolitical and regional importance competing for attention. The Joint
Vision Statement of the ASEAN–US Special Summit (ASEAN 2022a)
devoted an entire paragraph to Myanmar under the heading ‘Preserving
Peace, Building Trust’. Paragraph 26 covered all the broad priority points:
‘timely and complete implementation’ of the Five-Point Consensus;
US support for ASEAN’s response to the Myanmar crisis, including the
work of the ASEAN special envoy in carrying out his mandate; and calls
for humanitarian assistance to be ‘without discrimination’ and for the ‘release
of all political detainees including foreigners’. The call for close coordination
between the ASEAN and UN special envoys suggested an awareness of the
undercurrents of the 6 May ASEAN consultative meeting on humanitarian
assistance for Myanmar. Meanwhile, increased publicity of the United
States’ informal engagement with the NUG10 served as an indication of

10 Deputy Secretary of State Wendy Sherman met with NUG Foreign Minister Zin Mar Aung on
12 May 2022 for a second time (the first meeting was in August 2021). Zin Mar Aung also reportedly
met with State Department Counsellor Derek Chollet (her third public meeting with Chollet, the first
two being virtual sessions in September 2021 and January 2022) and the ‘president’s adviser for human
rights’, according to an interview with RFA (2022b). In that same RFA interview, Zin Mar Aung said
that she had met ‘a few ASEAN foreign ministers’, but noted that the only publicised meeting was with
the Malaysian foreign minister.

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the Biden administration’s attitude towards, and position on, the Myanmar
crisis, despite its continued practice of not mentioning the NUG in official
documents or statements.
Beyond these publicised instances of engaging with the NUG, the ASEAN–
US Special Summit itself did not issue specific recommendations on the
way forward for the Myanmar crisis. In June 2022, US State Department
Counsellor Derek Chollet affirmed at the 19th Shangri-La Dialogue’s special
session on Myanmar that Myanmar remained a ‘top priority’ for the US but,
echoing observations made at the same session by Heyzer and Saifuddin
on the need to strengthen ASEAN’s role and seek more inclusive dialogue,
acknowledged that ‘the road ahead is going to be very difficult’ (Ng 2022).
All this seems to indicate that quiet diplomacy via a few key ASEAN
members and informal consultations with experts and stakeholders on
possible policy options may still be the United States’ preferred approach.
The Myanmar crisis may also rank lower in terms of priority and attendant
policy attention in view of the United States’ domestic policy concerns
as well as the foreign policy and security implications of Russia’s invasion
of Ukraine.
In November 2022, at the 40th and 41st ASEAN Summits under Cambodia’s
chairmanship, the nine ASEAN heads of state/government issued a statement
on their review of the Five-Point Consensus, reiterating that it remained
a ‘valid reference’ to be ‘implemented in its entirety’ (ASEAN 2022b).
At the time, four of the five points of the consensus agreement remained
either unmet or only partially met. ASEAN leaders called for specific and
time-bound indicators that measured the implementation, or lack thereof,
of the consensus—an approach that failed to meet any of the expected
ideals for stringent measures towards the SAC. The question of expanding
non-political representation to other sectoral meetings was delegated to the
foreign ministers to decide ‘as the situation requires’, leaving this open for
interpretation (Moe Thuzar & Seah 2022).

What are the options?

Notwithstanding its own internal differences on how best to deal with
the Myanmar crisis, ASEAN’s default position at the summit and foreign
minister levels looks likely to hold, with SAC leaders’ attendance at key
regional meetings being restricted to non-political representatives. The focus

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on humanitarian assistance seems to be ASEAN’s other default priority,

specifically, to identify and pursue a common objective in consultation
with different stakeholder groups. If the October 2021 decision is ASEAN’s
‘stick’ regarding the Myanmar crisis, then humanitarian assistance might
be considered the ‘carrot’. However, the 6 May 2022 consultative meeting
outcome shows that ASEAN (and successive special envoys of the ASEAN
chair) continue to face the dilemma of balancing diplomatic pragmatism
with addressing the pressing needs of a populace whose resilience is
crumbling daily. The emphasis on a ‘Myanmar-led, Myanmar-owned’
process (CMoFAIC 2022b) that external interlocutors, including ASEAN,
could support is open to different interpretations by different stakeholder
groups in Myanmar.11 Determining who the key stakeholders are and how
best to mediate between them presents ASEAN with another dilemma.
In theory, there are numerous options for ASEAN to promote peace and
development in Myanmar. Few may be politically feasible. The option
of expanding the decision to disinvite the SAC to other sectoral
ASEAN meetings is not considered here due to its political infeasibility.
A fundamental difference between pragmatic and principled approaches
adds to, or underpins, the current complexities of ASEAN’s Myanmar
response. Nevertheless, three distinct options within the present reality can
be readily described. These options are not mutually exclusive and may be
considered in combination or parts thereof.

Humanitarian resistance?
As ineffective as it has been, most ASEAN member states would agree it
would be worse to not have the Five-Point Consensus. As the points listed
in the document are not in any order of priority, the current conflicts across
Myanmar necessitate ASEAN’s responsibility to coordinate and provide
humanitarian assistance to communities in need. However, the main vehicle
by which such assistance would be coordinated, the ASEAN Coordinating
Centre for Humanitarian Assistance (AHA Centre), requires both a request
by and the consent of the member state concerned, as well as access to all areas
and communities. This means working within ASEAN’s intergovernmental
bounds and engaging with the SAC. Additionally, the AHA Centre does
not have the technical expertise to deliver aid in a conflict situation. Even

11 This phrase was first mentioned in the ASEAN chair’s statement on Myanmar issued on 2 February
2022, but the SAC foreign minister used it to impress upon the ASEAN special envoy that Myanmar
(under the SAC) must lead the implementation of the Five-Point Consensus.

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if ASEAN were able to boost, and contribute to, the AHA Centre’s team
on the ground in Myanmar, the Nargis experience indicates that the SAC
would be the main interlocutor on aid delivery and coordination.
The immediate past executive director of the AHA Centre, Adelina Kamal,
classified ASEAN’s current response as a ‘classic band-aid’ approach,
which, as it was taking place under the scrutiny of the SAC, could
only provide limited results. By contrast, she described the ‘pragmatic’
approach by Myanmar’s neighbour China as a proactive buffering of
potential humanitarian spillovers that offered an alternative out-of-the-
box ‘humanitarian resistance’ model that placed people at the centre of aid
coordination and delivery (Kamal 2022). Malaysia’s recent appeal to ASEAN
to consider informally engaging with the NUG in relation to humanitarian
assistance provision suggests that there is at least some consideration of
alternative options (Irrawaddy 2022a).
The current high-level of cynicism in Myanmar towards ASEAN and the
ASEAN-led response coupled with ASEAN’s hesitancy thus far to engage
with the NUG collectively may affect the ASEAN special envoy’s mandated
task to meet with, and consult, all stakeholders. Among those stakeholders,
the EAOs have emerged as important in state- and peace-building in
Myanmar, and are now asserting their voice more than in the past.

Engage with the NUG and EAOs?

The military’s narrative of being the only organised institution in the
country protecting national security is being challenged as never before.
Anti-coup protests have continued despite brutal repression and violence,
and the NUG has continued to engage in dialogue with various EAOs,
political parties, civil society organisations and Civil Disobedience
Movement representatives via the National Unity Consultative Council
(NUCC) platform. The lack of headway in engaging with the SAC seems
to have created more interest in engaging with the NUG, albeit informally.
Even Thai Special Envoy Pornpimol Kanchalanak’s caution in June 2022
on the ‘diminishing returns’ of isolating the SAC carried an underlying
acknowledgement of the junta’s recalcitrance (Ng 2022).
Foreign Minister of Malaysia Saifuddin’s call for ASEAN to consider more
engagement with the NUG and the NUCC may serve to awaken more
interest in these bodies, which, in turn, will need to prepare for such
engagement. Part of that preparedness requires a greater awareness and

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understanding of how an intergovernmental organisation such as ASEAN

operates. The EAOs and other NUCC members may, thus, require more
assistance in this journey of engagement with ASEAN than the NUG.
Even the NUG still faces the challenge of asserting its status as an essential
counterpart for dialogue, not least because of the SAC’s domination of the
foreign policy space in ASEAN and the grey areas governing the recognition
of states over governments.
Further, many external interlocutors may be less aware of the NUCC’s role
in discussions on Myanmar’s political future and of its intersection with the
NUG. The NUG’s challenge will be to show, and to prove, that its current
set-up and dialogue with the NUCC is different from past parallels.12 The
NUG’s Rohingya policy provides a good illustration of this difference, but
the NUG also faces the challenge of capacity and necessary human resources
to pursue its state-building and peace-building moves (Htet Myet Min Tun
& Moe Thuzar 2022).
ASEAN member states should consider ways and means to engage with
the NUG and the EAOs to identify where bilateral or third-party capacity
support can assist efforts to address and undo decades of structural violence
inflicted by the military. This is where ASEAN may consider opportunities
and complementarities of working with the UN and other dialogue partners,
including Myanmar’s neighbours, in a broader ‘ASEAN Plus’ configuration.

Work with ASEAN’s dialogue partners

in a loose coalition?
Across ASEAN’s various external partners—dialogue, sectoral and
development—there is a broad spectrum of goodwill and expertise for
ASEAN to leverage and coordinate in providing assistance and support to the
Myanmar people. The UN and ASEAN are dialogue partners, and ASEAN
has a separate seat at the UN. Annual ASEAN–UN ministerial meetings
take place in October. However, current geopolitical tensions surrounding
Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, and the tendency to assign competency to

12 After the State Law and Order Restoration Council annulled the results of the 1990 elections, the
elected NLD members formed a government in exile, the National Coalition Government of the Union
of Burma. That exile government was also part of the National Council of the Union of Burma, which
served as a platform for dialogue and discussion among armed groups and other pro-democracy forces.

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ASEAN for dealing with the Myanmar crisis, seem to indicate that UN
attention on Myanmar will largely fall on Special Envoy Heyzer and the
UN agencies in Myanmar.
However, in light of the current sentiments towards ASEAN in Myanmar,
it may be more beneficial if the grouping is part of a larger international
effort. Given that both the SAC and the resistance movement are opposed
to considering any form of pragmatic mediated dialogue, the challenge will
be to come up with creative ways of assisting the Myanmar people. Still,
such a coalition, with ASEAN as a convenor, could galvanise action and
commitment from other countries, including ASEAN Dialogue Partners,
with economic and strategic interests in Myanmar.

Concluding thoughts
Ultimately, ASEAN’s responsibility to protect the Myanmar people from
further distress and disaster must transcend the discomfort of taking up an
issue that pushes ASEAN out of its self-imposed constraints and forces it
to discuss and respond to the Myanmar crisis—beyond merely at leaders’
or foreign ministers’ meetings. The Myanmar question must become an
agenda item for every sectoral ASEAN meeting or discussion; projects and
programs must be formulated bearing in mind the need to assist Myanmar
in overcoming its multifaceted challenges. Inputs from ASEAN’s research
community and from ASEAN parliamentarians and civil society for track
two diplomacy must also be sought and considered in formulating policy
responses bilaterally and regionally. In Myanmar, too, the role and capacity
of civil society must be considered and boosted. Efforts by civil society
to build bridges that ease the tensions have borne results in the past. But
the antagonisms between communities that have existed for decades will
require an equally long period of constructive engagement, nationally and
regionally (Tin Maung Maung Than & Moe Thuzar 2012).
At present, ASEAN’s ability to find solutions to the Myanmar dilemma is
limited by what veteran ASEAN hands may deem as ASEAN’s ‘structural
flaws’ (Desker 2021) as well as its capacity (or not) to persuade the
Myanmar military. The Myanmar crisis presents yet another reminder that
ASEAN and its member states need to determine the value and import
of ASEAN membership and the internal dimension (i.e. implementation) of
ASEAN centrality. This is not the first time that Myanmar has created issues

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for ASEAN, and, sadly, it may not be the last, but ASEAN’s response to the
present crisis in Myanmar could still be the first time that clearer precedents
and procedures are established for violations of membership obligations.
The Myanmar people, with their limited awareness of what ASEAN as
an intergovernmental organisation can or cannot do, welcomed ASEAN’s
October 2021 decision. Yet, few are sanguine enough to believe that ASEAN,
as a collective grouping, can effectively be relied upon to deal with the crisis
in their country. To many protesters and participants in Myanmar’s Spring
Revolution, the international community’s readiness to take the cue from
ASEAN and its Five-Point Consensus came as a surprise. At the same time,
the expectation that individual ASEAN members and international donors
could do more to engage with the NUG seems to be quite common. This
hope centres on supporting the NUG’s humanitarian assistance effort via
local community networks and channels, including in ethnic-controlled
areas. The ASEAN leaders’ decision in November 2022 to give more leeway
to the AHA Centre and the ASEAN secretary-general may result in new and
creative forms of humanitarian assistance.
Russia’s invasion of Ukraine highlighted the question of appropriate responses
by regional and international organisations and individual member states
to acts of aggression or war. While the Myanmar and Ukraine crises are
not directly comparable, from the perspective of the Myanmar people, the
Myanmar military is behaving like a foreign occupier, robbing the country
of its institutional development and its political future.
Even before the Ukraine crisis, Myanmar’s prolonged troubles imparted
some awareness of the limitations of international/regional diplomacy.
In the 2022 State of Southeast Asia survey on ASEAN’s response to the
Myanmar crisis, the attitudes of the Myanmar people were markedly more
negative than the regional average. Myanmar respondents (78.8 per cent)
were largely dissatisfied with ASEAN’s response, compared to a 33.1 per
cent disapproval rating regionally. Compared to their ASEAN peers, more
Myanmar respondents (39.9 per cent) wanted ASEAN to employ ‘harder
methods’, such as targeted sanctions and suspension to ‘curtail the SAC’
(Moe Thuzar 2022). In 2023, Myanmar respondents to the survey question
on ASEAN’s response still mostly viewed the Five-Point Consensus as
‘fundamentally flawed’ (35.7 per cent compared to 19.6 per cent regionally).
However, more Myanmar respondents (36.5 per cent) preferred the option

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of engaging in dialogue with all stakeholders, including the NUG, ‘to build
trust’ rather than resort to harder measures (15.7 per cent) than in 2022
(Seah et al. 2023).
The people’s defensive war since September 2021 is an illustration—albeit
an extreme one—of supreme dissatisfaction and people taking matters into
their own hands. However, it is possible to discern a change in the political
sphere. Discussions about overcoming the trust deficit now extend to not
only how different political actors and institutions interact with each other,
but also to addressing the dynamics between individuals and groups of
individuals. Fragile in its nascence, the capacity and desire to move beyond
such discussion and take action perhaps adds to the dilemma of determining
Myanmar’s value to, and in, ASEAN.

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2022c. ‘Briefing Note by H.E. Deputy Prime Minister Prak Sokhonn, Minister
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Desker, Barry. 2021. ‘ASEAN’s Myanmar Dilemma’. East Asia Forum, 23 May.
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Global New Light of Myanmar. 2022. ‘Full Description of Discussions between SAC
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Irrawaddy. 2022a. ‘Myanmar Junta Slams Malaysia’s Call for ASEAN to Engage
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Irrawaddy. 2022b. ‘Junta Bars UN Special Envoy on Myanmar from ASEAN

Meeting’. 9 May. www.irrawaddy.com/news/burma/junta-bars-un-special-envoy-
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Irrawaddy. 2022c. ‘Myanmar Resistance Rejects Junta Calls to Surrender’. 13 June.

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Kamal, Adelina. 2022. ‘Myanmar Crisis: A Humanitarian Stalemate or

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Mahbubani, Kishore. 2017. ‘ASEAN’s Strategic Diplomacy Underpins Regional

Stability’. East Asia Forum, 18 June. www.eastasiaforum.org/2017/06/18/aseans-
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11 November. www.mofa.gov.mm/press-release11-11-2022/

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Moe Thuzar. 2022. ‘The State of Southeast Asia Survey: An Outlet for Myanmar
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an-outlet-for-myanmar-aspirations/

Moe Thuzar and Sharon Seah. 2022. ‘Reviewing the Review: ASEAN’s Five-Point
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Moe Thuzar and Htet Myet Min Tun. 2022. ‘Myanmar’s National Unity Government:
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Ng, Eileen. 2022. ‘Asean Needs More Detailed Plan for Myanmar Crisis: Malaysia’.
Straits Times, 11 June. www.straitstimes.com/asia/se-asia/malaysia-suggests-asean-
returns-to-drawing-board-to-tackle-myanmar-crisis

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Consultative Meeting on ASEAN Humanitarian Assistance to Myanmar’.
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PPP (Phnom Penh Post). 2022. ‘Prak Sokhonn Announces Progress on Myanmar
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Reuters. 2022b. ‘Myanmar Junta Leader Casts Doubt on Return of Rohingya’.

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RFA (Radio Free Asia). 2022a. ‘Cambodia’s Hun Sen Gives up on Myanmar’.
16 February. www.rfa.org/english/news/myanmar/towel-02162022174658.html

RFA (Radio Free Asia). 2022b. ‘Interview: “It’s Time for ASEAN to Move Forward”,
Urges NUG Foreign Minister’. 12 May. www.rfa.org/english/news/myanmar/
myanmar-nug-interview-05122022184741.html

Seah, Sharopn, Joanne Lin, Melinda Martinus, Sithanonxay Suvannaphakdy and

Pham Thi Phuong Thao. 2023. The State of Southeast Asia: 2023 Survey Report.
Singapore: ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute. www.iseas.edu.sg/wp-content/uploads/​
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Singapore Government. 2007. ‘Statement by ASEAN Chair, Singapore’s Minister

for Foreign Affairs George Yeo’. 27 September. www.nas.gov.sg/archivesonline/
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Tan Hui Yee. 2021. ‘Diplomacy Will Be a High-Wire Act as Resistance to Military
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Tan Hui Yee. 2022. ‘Cambodian PM Hun Sen Meets Junta Chief on Two-Day
Visit to Myanmar’. Straits Times, 8 January. www.straitstimes.com/asia/se-asia/
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Tin Maung Maung Than and Moe Thuzar. 2012. ‘Myanmar’s Rohingya Dilemma’.
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UN (United Nations). 2022. ‘Note to Correspondents: Statement by the Secretary-

General’s Special Envoy on Myanmar, Noeleen Heyzer’. 17 August. www.
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heyzer

Vaphual and Rebecca Ratcliffe. 2022. ‘Myanmar’s UN Envoy under Fire for
Proposing “Power Share” with Military’. Guardian, 3 February. www.theguardian.
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proposing-power-share-with-military

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 8
The Federal Democracy
Charter: A Path to Inter-Ethnic
Peace in Post-Coup Myanmar
Costas Laoutides
Associate Professor, School of Humanities and Social Sciences,
Deakin University, Australia

Abstract
This chapter analyses the Federal Democracy Charter in light of the
question of ethnic minorities in Myanmar. Drawing on consociational
and integrative patterns of power sharing, two issues are explored. First,
I discuss the extent to which cultural differences can create problems for
the federation, especially if the federal units aspire to cultivate further such
differences. This is particularly important for the emerging minorities in
a federal redrawing of the map. Crucial in this respect is how the charter
creates mechanisms to counterbalance such developments. The second
issue under examination is the way that federal units and ethnic minorities
are treated in the charter. There is a tension between the right to self-
determination granted to federal states and the collective rights granted to
ethnic groups who may be more geographically dispersed. Accordingly, the
ramifications towards the realisation of self-determination are discussed.

***

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A few weeks after the February 2021 coup, the National Unity Consultative
Council (NUCC), a decision-making body that brings together the pro-
democracy forces and ethnic armed organisations (EAOs) shaping the
parallel governance system of Myanmar spearheaded by the National Unity
Government (NUG), was formed. Soon afterwards, the NUCC issued the
Federal Democracy Charter (FDC), claiming it would pave the way for
a peaceful federal Myanmar in their hoped-for, post-coup future (Su Mon
Thazin Aung 2022).
Globally, power sharing arrangements are based on the understanding
that the unequal distribution of resources between communities leads to
internal conflict. The denial of equal access to power and resources leads
to frustration and mobilisation by oppressed minorities. Thus, power
sharing offers an alternative approach to the design of the state to mediate
the potential harm of majoritarian democracy. The models of power sharing
oscillate between integration and consociationalism—that is, the formation
of proportional representation and grand coalitions that ascertain the equal
participation of ethnic minorities into the political process. However, the
underlying assumption of power sharing is that persons are primordially
separated into identity groups that cannot find sufficient common ground
and are, therefore, eternally bound to antagonistic relations.
Some of the clauses in the FDC have been seen as progressive, especially
viz. offering ethnic minorities the right to self-determination—although,
at the same time, criticism of the lack of equal recognition of certain other
minorities, especially the Rohingya, has mounted. Taking stock of the
international experience in power sharing agreements, this chapter assesses
the FDC to determine whether it has the potential to end decades of ethnic
conflict in Myanmar, and, if so, whether it could, perhaps, unify the ethnic
minorities behind a campaign to oust the brutal military regime.
The chapter examines two issues. First, it analyses the extent to which
cultural differences can create problems for the federation, especially
if the federal units aspire to cultivate further such differences. This is
particularly important for the emerging minorities in a federal redrawing
of the map. Crucial in this respect is how the FDC creates mechanisms to
counterbalance such developments. The second issue under examination is
the way that federal units and ethnic minorities are treated in the charter.
There is a tension between the right to self-determination granted to federal
states and the collective rights granted to ethnic groups who may be more
geographically dispersed. This friction raises two questions. First, to what

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extent does the right to self-determination include the right to secession,

especially in light of Article 4 of the FDC which recognises that the federal
units and their people are ‘the original owners of sovereignty’? Second, how
could the right to self-determination not be a collective right, given that it
counts as the more fundamental right within the third generation of human
rights in international practice (Laoutides 2019)? These issues and questions
will be explored throughout the chapter.

Building consensus? The Federal Democracy

Charter and the ethnic identity question
Broadly interpreted, power sharing political systems are those that foster
governing coalitions inclusive of most, if not all, major mobilised ethnic
groups in society. In most deeply divided societies, power sharing political
systems are inclusive of generally legitimate representatives of all groups.
Democratic rule has been seen as the solution to ethnic conflict if power
sharing institutions are introduced to overcome politically motivated ethnic
divisions and to ensure access to political power for all members of the society.
In this context, decision-making is based on a consensus of coalitions that
are widely inclusive, thus transcending strict ethnic boundaries. The central
issue is the search for those institutions and practices that create an incentive
structure for ethnic groups to negotiate their differences via the legitimate
institutions of a common democratic state (Sisk 1996). Put differently, we
might ask: what form should an inclusive and moderate democracy take in
a deeply divided society like Myanmar?
The FDC constitutes the first step towards constitutional reform proposed
by the NUG for a post-coup Myanmar. Similar to earlier historical phases,
the international audience is more occupied with the struggle between the
democratic forces led by the NUG and the dictatorship led by the military.
Yet, the ethnic identity dimension has been a core element of the conflict
and, therefore, a key constitutional debate since independence in 1948. The
question of ethnic communities and their representation in the Union has
been the cause of multiple prolonged civil wars, leading to the conclusion
by some that Myanmar will have neither democracy nor peace unless the
ethnic question is recognised in a power sharing constitutional agreement
(Williams 2009).

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Chapter I of the FDC frames the twofold root cause of conflict in the
country as a lack of democracy and ethnic representation, and sets out
the goal of the NUG to:
ensure all ethnic nationalities–population can participate and
collaborate and to build a prosperous Federal Democracy Union
where all citizens can live peacefully, share the common destiny and
live harmoniously together. (FDC 2021, Chapter I)

Accordingly, Chapter I outlines as key objectives: the eradication

of dictatorship, the abolition of the 2008 Constitution, the building of
a Federal Union and the emergence of Public Government. The FDC
attempts to set the ethnic question on a new base that would be in
tune with the wider vision of an open and democratic country through
abolition of the 2008 Constitution (Raynaud 2021). The concurrent use
of the term ‘ethnic nationalities–population’ can be seen as an attempt to
bridge ethnic and civic notions of peoplehood towards a common political
community, a common demos, of the post-coup, future democracy. This
intention is also attested in Chapter II, in which members of the FDC
(i.e. those responsible for implementing the charter) are the elected MPs;
political parties; the Civil Disobedience Movement; forces of the General
Strike Committee; members of civil society organisations, including women
and youth organisations; and EAOs. However, as will become clear, this
effort remains undeveloped without a clear terminological pathway that can
break from past views entrenched in identity politics towards an inclusive,
democratic and tolerant Myanmar. The Conclusion of Part I of the FDC sets
the context within which the charter would operate, referring to the need
for members of the FDC to implement ‘the Panglong Agreement, Panglong
Commitment and Panglong Principle … in order to build peaceful and
prosperous Federal Union’.
In Chapter IV, Part I, the FDC outlines the core values of the NUG’s union,
which include self-determination, social harmony, diversity, protection
of minorities and commitment to human rights. In the second part of
Chapter IV, the FDC identifies the locus of sovereignty as belonging to
the member states of the Union and their people. This is also repeated in
Part III of the same chapter under the heading ‘Power of the Union’. What
is noteworthy is that the FDC does not mention which states constitute
the Union. Despite the lack of clarity around territories and borders, the
FDC ascribes to member states ‘the right to develop and enact State
Constitutions’ (FDC 2021, Chapter IV, Art. 12). In addition, there is no

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provision for further devolution to self-administered zones and divisions as

in the 2008 Constitution. The criterion for creating special administrative
zones in the 2008 Constitution was based on an ethnic minority who did
not have an ethnic state constituting the majority population in two or more
adjacent townships. In the FDC, there is little reference to the people that
inhabit those areas. The lack of reference to territories and peoples in the
NUG’s charter appears as an attempt to overcome the challenge of identity
politics that is so deeply embedded in Myanmar politics. At the same time,
however, there is no clear positive step to replace the language of ethnicity/
nationality, and this reluctance indicates a deferral of the thorny issue to
a future constitution drafting debate. This is also supported by a reference
to the protection of minorities in state constitutions, again without a clear
description of who those minorities are and how they may be recognised as
minorities (FDC 2021, Chapter IV, Part. III, Art. 14).
The reluctance (or inability) of the NUG to transcend identity politics is
also evidenced in relation to the protection of fundamental rights and the
rights of ethnic minorities (FDC 2021, Chapter IV, Part. III, Art. 23, 24).
The FDC insists on another division that generates potentially two types
of members in the political community of the Union. Article 23 provides
individual and collective rights to ‘all ethnic nationalities … entitled
as ethnic groups’, but this progressive and inclusive, yet loosely defined,
approach is cut short in Article 24, in which the FDC provides that:
Every citizen who has adopted the citizenship of the Union although
they are not ethnic nationalities born in the Union, shall have the
full rights to fundamental rights of the citizens (citizen rights).
(emphasis added)

This wording is particularly interesting as it indicates the future existence of

two types of citizens in Myanmar: those with both individual and collective
rights on the basis of ethnicity, and those who will bear only individual civil
rights. Despite the willingness of the NUG to be inclusive, the insistence on
ethnicity as a political marker that can generate two types of citizens is highly
problematic, as it reproduces the precondition for ethnic discrimination.
Another interesting omission that has been a point of heated debate between
EAOs and the central government for decades is the absence of a clause on
the right to secession. If ultimate sovereignty lies with the states and their
peoples, however ill-defined, and if ‘ethnic leaders who built the Union
have given up their right to build their own separate nationals and signed
1947 Panglong Agreement to build this Union as a federation’ (FDC 2021,
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Part I, Conclusion), it follows that the right to secession, as an expression of

the right to self-determination, should be provided in the charter and any
future constitution. The lack of such reference highlights the vulnerability
of Myanmar as a divided society.

Myanmar as a divided society

Although there are a range of scholarly accounts seeking to describe the role
of ethnicity in the political organisation of societies, it is possible to discern
a set of common patterns that can assist with identifying how deeply divided
societies are. In any particular case, three issues determine the presence
and degree of division: the structure of social cleavages, the level of access
to political power by different ethnic groups, and the phases of conflict
escalation and de-escalation. The salience of ethnicity as a marker of political
distinction and the intensity of ethnic ties are critical elements in the shaping
of a divided society. Salience and intensity are closely interconnected to the
perceived stakes of ethnic relations (Esman 1994). According to Esman, the
stakes are higher when group identity is threatened, especially symbols of
ethnic identity that are held as sacred and thus are seen as non-negotiable.
Consequently, ethnic group claims on issues such as language or customary
practices have been referred to as ‘incommensurate goods’ that are not
amenable to change (Horowitz 2000, 219–24).
There is a broad consensus in the literature that when social cleavages are
reinforced by vertical divisions based on religion, ethnicity or class, the
possibility for violent conflict is higher. This is particularly so when one
distinct group dominates others (Huntington 1981). Donald Horowitz
offers a vantage point by depicting a very clear, ideal scenario that describes
a divided society:
Suppose a society contains two ascriptive (birth-derived) groups: the
As with 60 percent of the population, and the Bs, with 40 percent.
The groups have the same age structures and rates of natural increase;
their proportions are not vulnerable to change through immigration;
they vote at the same rates; and they vote for ascriptively defined
political parties, the A party and the B party. Under virtually every
form of fair majoritarian political arrangement and every electoral
system, the As will dominate government and Bs will be in opposition
for perpetuity. (Horowitz 2008, 1214)

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Similarly, Arend Lijphart (2004) defines a divided society as one with strong
ethnocultural divisions that have the potential to be politically salient and
mobilising, threatening the stability of the state and the coexistence of
the different groups that live within it. What needs to be underscored is
that ethnocultural diversity is not itself problematic from a political point
of view. What makes a divided society is when those differences become
markers of political identity and mobilisation (Coakley 2009). In divided
societies, core assumptions that underlie the competitive paradigm of
democratic politics (the Westminster model) do not apply. The most
important of these assumptions is the belief that cross-cutting cleavages of
interests and outlooks among individuals prevent any permanent exclusion
of segments of society from political power. It follows that there is always
a possibility for opposition parties to win a share of power. However, the
ethnic segmentation of divided societies based on politicised identity poses
an impediment to the development of cross-cutting cleavages based on
membership in multiple social groups, multiple outlooks and overlapping
interests that can moderate the political process (Choudhry 2009).
Myanmar has been a deeply divided society since independence in 1948 in
several key ways. First, the dominant cleavage between the state-controlling,
ethnic Bamar majority and the ethnic minorities has been a permanent
political marker, determining the level of access to political power based
on ethnic identity. The takeover of the country by the military in 1962
created a second cleavage between the supporters of the military regime and
those who envisioned a democratic polity for Myanmar. Being a friend or
a foe of the regime would determine the interaction of individuals with the
decision-making centre. A final line of division, which often but not always
overlaps with ethnic divisions, runs along religious lines, with Buddhism as
the predominant religion against a number of other religious groups in the
country, including Muslims, Christians and Hindus (Walton 2016). These
divisions have created multiple levels of segregation, raising challenging
questions about the body politic in Myanmar and how the demos (i.e. the
political community) should be defined to allow for a functional and
inclusive democracy (Laoutides & Ware 2016).
Such conversations were underway after 2011, being fundamental to
the peace process discussions attempted as the country entered into its
democratic transition, but have now been interrupted by the military coup.
The rise to power of the National League for Democracy (NLD) in the 2015
elections, and their Panglong II peace process created hope for a final peace
agreement that would create a new Federal Union. The February 2021 coup
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brutally destroyed the (limited) progress made. The NUG’s FDC, issued
a few months after the coup, aims to revive the conversation about federal
democracy and instil an even greater sense of hope and unity for the future.
The FDC proposes creating a set of power sharing arrangements among the
communities to bridge the dividing cleavages and create a coherent demos.
In the following section, I outline the two basic models of power sharing in
divided societies; in the subsequent section, I provide an assessment of the
power sharing elements of the FDC that address the ethnic sociopolitical
cleavages of Myanmar society and examine the chances of it ending decades
of ethnic conflict in a post-coup Myanmar and, thus, unifying the ethnic
minorities in a united campaign to oust the military.

Models of power sharing in ethnic conflicts

During the Cold War period, ethno-political conflict was the cause of
many cases of intense armed violence resulting in minority oppression.
Based on the principle of self-determination, many ethnic groups sought
to address their grievance through the creation of ethnically homogenous
nation-states. In that period there was a bias against political divorce that
would lead to secession, evidenced by the fact that only Bangladesh was
successful in obtaining international recognition as an independent state
(Laoutides 2019). However, since the early 1990s the breakup of former
Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union, the bifurcation of Czechoslovakia, the
successful Eritrean struggle and the creation of South Sudan have given
an impetus to secessionist movements. There is a growing perception, by
aspiring ethnic groups, that the creation of new sovereign states as a means
of fulfilling self-determination is an achievable goal. The almost absolute
logic of denial to secession by the international community, however, has
led to ongoing oppression, war, humanitarian crises and genocide. Thus,
international decision-makers face a fundamental choice: allow partition
and political divorce or create new and more viable structures for living
together in a common polity. The latter option is informed by the promotion
of democracy as the form of government that can accommodate ethnic
tension and create a political environment of coexistence and harmony.
Many policymakers and scholars believe that broadly inclusive government
is essential to successful conflict management in deeply divided societies.
There are two classical models for building conflict-preventing democratic
institutions in ethnically divided societies: the consociational and
centripetal/integrative approaches. The former, mainly represented in
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the work of Arend Lijphart (1968, 1969, 1977, 1995, 2004), defends
inclusion through representation and assurances for minority protection.
It introduces a series of proportional representation mechanisms, a grand
coalition of communal leaders, group autonomy and mutual vetoes to
protect vital interests. The centripetal/integrative approach is mainly
associated with Donald Horowitz (1990, 1991, 1993, 2008) and aims to
alter the identity of the body politic, away from ethnic affiliations, towards
an integrative common demos. To this end, it encourages moderation by
advocating institutions that provide incentives for the electoral success
of cross- and multi-ethnic parties and candidates. Both approaches share
a belief in coalescent democracy as an alternative to the adverse effects of
majoritarian politics. Crucially, both approaches transcend standard notions
of procedural democracy, since an impeccable procedure does not prevent
minorities from complete exclusion (Horowitz 1993).

Consociational democracy
Consociationalism relies on elite cooperation as the principal characteristic
of successful conflict management in deeply divided societies. Even if
there are deeply communal differences, overarching elite cooperation is a
necessary and sufficient condition to resolve conflict (Nordlinger 1972).
In this context, group leaders are seen to legitimately represent various
ethnic segments and their actions aim at forging political ties at the centre.
The central tenet of consociationalism is to share, divide, decentralise, limit
and separate power; the nature of this model is that of a fragmented political
representation that ‘allows for legislative representation of territorially
dispersed minorities who may be outvoted under First-Past-the-Post in
single member districts’ (Choudhry 2009, 19).
There are two key elements for establishing a successful consociational
democracy. The first element is power sharing in the executive through
a grand coalition that ensures the minority is not permanently excluded
from the political power. In grand coalitions, political elites negotiate their
differences in an effort to reach consensus, but public contestation among
them is limited (Lijphart 2004). The most important feature is that decision-
making takes place consensually at the top among elites representing
underlying segments of the society (Lijphart 1977). The possibility of sharing
power transforms all participant elites into stakeholders who will defend the
viability of the constitutional system. Power sharing at the executive level
is also supported by the minority veto through which each segment of the

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society is given a guarantee that it cannot be outvoted by the majority on

crucial issues affecting vital interests of the minority. The minority veto
is at the heart of the concrete assurances of consociationalism, but, most
importantly, it offers each ethnic group the power to protect themselves.
Similarly, the principle of proportionality facilitates consociational systems,
as it is introduced at every level of decision-making to give minority groups
access to power and influence that reflects their size within the society.
Proportionality is manifested through the commensurate representation of
the ethnic group in parliament, and through the allocation of material and
human resources by the state to the ethnic communities.
The second element is autonomy of communal groups on the basis of
territorial or non-territorial federalism that devolves decision-making
authority to the segments and, thus, promotes the internal autonomy of all
groups. There is a distinction between issues that concern the whole of the
society and those that mainly concern the ethnic segments: for the former,
decision-making occurs via consensus, whereas for the latter, decision-
making is delegated to the autonomous ethnic groups. Group autonomy
means that communal groups ‘have authority to run their own internal
affairs, especially in the areas of education and culture’ (Lijphart 2004, 97).
An important element of the call for entrenched minority group rights is
the question of whether power sharing should be made on an ethnic basis or
with ethnically neutral criteria. Accordingly, the different segments of society
should have the option of voluntary affiliation, away from strict, predefined
ethnic markers, through a proportional electoral system (Lijphart 1995).
There are three areas of criticism of the consociational model. The first
is the inherent assertion that elites can regulate ethnic conflict in divided
societies. This is part of a wider argument about ethnic conflict as an elite-
driven process (Brass 1991; Gurr & Harff 1994). Although political elites
may agree on a formula for accommodation, peace cannot endure without
grassroots backing. In the context of Myanmar, this has been captured
in the fallout of ‘ceasefire capitalism’—when ethnic communities in the
borderland areas became disillusioned with their elites, who were coopted
by the Burmese regime, and resumed violence to defend their lands from
exploitation (Woods 2011). This experience reinforces the argument that
consociationalism overestimates the deference communal groups pay to their
elites and downplays the power of popular dissatisfaction with intergroup
compromise. Elites will not necessarily use their leadership to promote peace
(Horowitz 1991, 141). The second drawback is the entrenching of ethnic
identity in the political system by consociationalism, as it maintains and
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legitimises ethnic claims against the state. By hardening ethnic boundaries—

for example, through the statutory reservation of offices for specific group
representatives—consociationalism normalises ethnicity as a paramount
part of the political process and the body politic (Andeweg 2000). This
leads to a form of systemic sectarianism that denies citizens in divided
societies peace and justice (Taylor 2009). A third point of criticism concerns
the arguably anti-democratic character of consociational institutions. The
model of grand ethnic elite coalitions minimises the possibility of vigorous
opposition politics. In turn, the potential lack of a strong opposition party
may detract from the accountability of the government (Borman 2017).
Consociational democracies are rare, with prime examples to be found mostly
in Western Europe. Austria, Belgium, Switzerland and the Netherlands are
all classic consociations that elect their parliaments with the help of list
proportional representation (Lijphart 1991). Although there is no universal
agreement, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Burundi, Lebanon and Northern
Ireland are frequently mentioned as consociational democracies.

The centripetal/integrative approach

The integrative approach promotes a politics of moderation and
compromise as a way for effective democratic governance in deeply divided
societies. Democracy can be best managed by depoliticising ethnicity
through institutional incentives for cross-ethnic voting that increase
accommodation among competing ethnic segments (Reilly 2012). Whereas
consociationalism seeks to guarantee that all groups are represented in the
government and the state apparatus, the centripetal/integrative approach
seeks to foster initiatives that capture the middle/moderate ground. To
achieve the integrative spin, there is a need for electoral incentives for
broad-based moderation by political leaders and disincentives for hardliners
(Horowitz 2000, 597–600). The incentives will be provided to politicians
who can appeal beyond their communal segment for support. The
assumption behind this rationale is that politicians, as rational actors, will
do whatever they need to do to get elected (Horowitz 1991, 291). If they are
rewarded electorally for moderation, politicians will control their rhetoric
and action. This line of argument opts for incentives, as these provide
reasons for behaving moderately; by contract, consociational constraints
provide obstacles to prevent politicians from becoming entrenched in their
ethnic segments. In addition, rather than (over)relying on ethnic leaders, the
integrative approach puts the constituency at the centre of the moderation

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process. The electoral system must be designed so that the leaders have to
appeal to the moderate sentiments of the electorate, thereby cutting across
ethnic rival groups. Moving the basis of moderation from the elites to the
constituency allows politicians to make compromises at the centre to
achieve democratic stability for the divided society. Constituency-based
consent via moderation can function only if minority votes in the electoral
system are designed to be influential, rather than merely representative,
thereby safeguarding the interests of the minority. There are, arguably, three
institutional practices that can have this effect: vote pooling, devolution
of power and a presidential system of politics.
Vote pooling occurs when politicians are dependent on cross-communal
support to get elected and voters exchange votes across group boundaries.
Vote pooling is based on the assumption that divided societies need
electoral systems that fragment support of one or more ethnic groups and
induce inter-ethnic bargaining that encourage electoral candidates to adopt
a moderate stance. To win, politicians must seek to obtain the second
or third preference votes of those who, in all probability, would not vote
for them because they do not represent the voter’s community (Horowitz
1993). The key difference of the integrative approach is the formation of
electoral conditions by constituents, as they specify their second and third
preferences that will lie outside the boundaries of the ethnic brethren.
However, it is easier for vote pooling to occur in heterogeneous electoral
districts (Bogaards 2003).
Devolution of power can facilitate ethnic coexistence in deeply divided
societies (Horowitz 2000, 601). It can combine with the electoral system
to promote moderate political parties that pursue inter-ethnic coalitions.
Regional and local levels of politics provide the ideal space for the fostering
of intergroup ties at the centre that can be projected in higher-stakes issues
at the level of central government. Similarly, a devolved structure can absorb
and resolve conflict at lower levels of government while promoting cleavages
within ethnically homogenous groups. In addition, federalism can block
any party from attempting a hegemonic grip of the entire country.
The integrative approach has attracted considerable criticism. The scarcity
of empirical examples of the system at work is an important point of
critique. Elements of the integrative model have been identified and
assessed in 11 cases (Reilly 2001; McCulloch 2013; Coakley & Fraenkel

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2017).1 In addition, there is an inherent assumption that politicians will

respond to the incentive system for moderation and, in a similar vein, that
voters be willing to vote for parties not based in their own ethnic group
(Lijphart 2004). Most importantly, centripetalist electoral systems have
been criticised as majoritarian, since the logic of the model advocates the
benefits of aggregation in terms of votes, parties and issues. As such, the
integrative model is underpinned by a ‘majoritarian vision’ of democracy
in which aggregation matters at the expense of an equitable reflection of all
points of view into the legislature (Powell 2000).
At the heart of the difference between consociational and integrative
approaches to power sharing are the nature and formation of multi-ethnic
coalitions. Consociationalism advocates the formation of coalitions by elites
after an election, whereas centripetalism advocates the forming of coalitions
before the election. To paraphrase Horowitz (2000, 365ff ), it is a dilemma
between coalitions of convenience versus coalitions of commitment.

Ethnic minorities and the Federal

Democracy Charter
A deeply divided society, Myanmar has been marred by long periods of
armed conflict between the military government and ethnic groups,
resulting in rounds of displacement, persecution and ethnic cleansing.
According to Horowitz (2004, 252), ‘most divided societies have crafted
no institutions at all to attend to their ethnic problems’, and this certainly
applies to Myanmar. Although the conflict in Myanmar has been depicted
as a clash between militarism and democracy, it is foundationally a conflict
about ethnic identity. Even if Myanmar returns to democracy after the 2021
coup, stability will not be secured unless the ethnic identity question is
addressed. Although ethnicity is socially constructed, the ethnic minorities
in Myanmar perceive their different identities as real in their consequence.
Their experience since the country’s independence in 1948 is one of
oppression and war perpetrated by Bamar-dominated military governments.
The response to the aggression from the centre has been the creation of strong
ethnic communities and inter-ethnic cooperation, with solid structures that
look after their own in a nexus of dynamically evolving forms of ethnic

1 Australia, Estonia, Fiji, Indonesia, Kenya, Nigeria, Northern Ireland, Papua New Guinea, Republika
Srpska, Southern Rhodesia and Sri Lanka.

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identity (Sadan 2013). The gradual increase in political importance placed

on ethnicity by successive Myanmar governments since 1962 has influenced
minorities’ political perceptions and agendas. Thus, the expression of ethnic
difference is something that needs to be clearly reflected in any future power
sharing constitutional arrangement as an acknowledgement of the existence
of different ethnic communities in the political space of the union.
There are three main issues behind the call for power sharing measures.
The first is the cultural denialism of the Bamar majority and the cultural
domination of the political system on the basis of majoritarian politics
unsuited for culturally diverse societies. The ethnic minorities in Myanmar
have a different sense of belonging—they speak different languages, they
practise different religions and they have different political structures (Smith
1999; Sadan 2013). The military governments have systematically oppressed
the ethnic communities through a series of measures—from the lack of
equal opportunities to access high civil and military offices and ban on local
languages, to the burning down of churches and mosques and the utter
denial of existence of particular ethnic groups like the Rohingya in Rakhine
State (South 2008; Ware & Laoutides 2018). Even during the democratic
transition, which ended abruptly in 2021, the Bamar-dominated state and
military apparatus continued many of these measures, leaving the ethnic
minorities in a constant state of fear. It is noteworthy that ethnic violence
escalated under the NLD’s first term, with genocidal aggression against the
Rohingya in 2017, the war in Rakhine between the Arakan Army and the
military in 2018–20, and the intensification of violence in Chin, Kachin,
Karen and Shan states (Mathieson 2021). Thus, the ethnic minorities look
for constitutional guarantees to block similar future behaviour on the part
of the Bamar majority.
The second issue builds on the deep distrust towards the Bamar by the
ethnic minorities, especially after the shortcomings of the NLD government
that, until then, had been seen as the force of political and social change
in the country. The ethnic minorities feel that a narrative of superiority
is still strong among the ethnic Bamar. Such a narrative assumes that the
country should be run primarily by the Bamar majority, with insouciance
towards the needs and suffering of the minority ethnic communities. This
was evidenced by the way that the national reconciliation process under
the NLD became a Bamar-dominated affair—an elite bargain between the
Bamar civilian political party and the Bamar-dominated military: hence
the need for power sharing constitutional boundaries to control what the
ethnic majority can do to the ethnic minorities.
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The third issue relates to the collective distinctiveness of the ethnic minorities
in Myanmar. They feel different and they associate this difference with the
lands in which they constitute a majority. Therefore, they put forward
a claim for self-determination, both as a collective within the Union of
Myanmar, and as separate ethnic groups. For the ethnic minorities, this
is the unfinished business of decolonisation. Whereas in 1948 the Bamar
majority saw themselves recognised and liberated from alien rule, this is still
an unfulfilled promise for the ethnic minorities. This claim is not only in
cultural/historical terms, but also is meaningful in current material terms,
given the long-term exploitation of natural resources from these regions by
the central state. The members of ethnic minorities have a very strong sense
of common belonging and participating in a self-determined future gives
them meaning and purpose as a community. To this end, power sharing
constitutional arrangements are seen as a way of guaranteeing a path to
self‑determination within the boundaries of a federal polity.
Strong territorial manifestations of ethnicity render the configuration of
territorial power division extremely important. The range of solutions
varies from partition to a centralised unitary state with a number of options
in between, such as confederal, federal and semi-confederal systems. The
territorial division of power can be manifested in an array of policy issues,
such as economic mechanisms for the distribution of resources and political
tools to reduce the stakes of conflict at the centre. Among the several options,
federalism has been extensively analysed for its conflict-management effects.
Federalism can be structured to serve both consociational and integrative/
centripetal purposes. It can potentially create incentives for inter-ethnic
cooperation and encourage alignments along non-ethnic interests.
Devolution of power can give minorities some degree of power when it is
unlikely that they would achieve majority status at the centre.
Federalism denotes a division of power based on mutual consent.
The central government is allocated a defined area of authority while
the territorial units are provided degrees of autonomy; both levels of
government enjoy some limited coordinated powers. The most distinctive
characteristic of federalism is that neither the centre nor the regions can
unilaterally amend the arrangement—consent is a sine qua non condition
of federalism. The principle of unity through diversity, a core democratic
principle for deeply divided societies, can be realised through federalism.
This obtains stronger normative and political purchase when the protection
of minorities is a priority through a number of federal tools, such as internal
self-determination, semi-sovereign ancestral lands, autonomous rule and
indigenous rights.
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The FDC was published at an important juncture in terms of the history of

constitutional battles between ethnic minorities and the central government
in Myanmar (Williams 2009). The coup d’état in February 2021 followed
a landslide victory of the NLD at the national elections, which resulted in
a massive wave of resistance and led to the creation of the NUG, which, in
turn, now leads the struggle for the restoration of democracy in the country.
The FDC’s aim is to create a federal democracy that will:
bring an end to the conflicts and problematic root causes in the
Union, to ensure all ethnic nationalities–population can participate
and collaborate and to build a prosperous Federal Democracy Union
where all citizens can live peacefully. (FDC 2021, Chapter 1)

The FDC is an attempt to both establish a roadmap for the restoration of

democracy and recognise the participation of ethnic minorities in a new,
post-coup democracy. In doing so, the charter addresses, at a preliminary
level, civil–military relations as well as the deeper issue of the representation
of ethnic minorities in the political realm.
However, a persistent problem with federal solutions like this is how to
resolve questions of dual sovereignty. Which unit has sovereign power over
the various functions of the states? The locus of sovereignty is of paramount
importance because it determines the supreme authority and the ultimate
holder of decision-making power. In its ‘Guiding Principles’, the FDC
affirms that ‘the member states of the Union and the people in these states
are the original owners of sovereignty’ (FDC 2021, Chapter 4, Part II,
Art. 1), and that:
the Federal Democracy Union is established with member states
which have equal rights and right to self-determination in full.
All the member states of the Union (all the federal units) are equal in
terms of politics. (FDC 2021, Chapter 4, Part II, Art. 2)

Further, it asserts that ‘member states of the Union have the right to enact
their own respective State Constitution’ (FDC 2021, Chapter 4, Part II,
Art. 3). Neither the territories (states) nor the people are specified as the
proteogenic source of sovereignty and power. Given the emphasis it places
on ethnicity, the FDC veers towards an elite-driven, semi-consociational
approach, in which power and authority are allocated to ethnic groups.
Yet, the ambiguity between states and ethnic groups is not resolved. In earlier
efforts (e.g. the 2008 Constitution) there is reference to specific space, but
in the FDC, the demographics—if ethnicity is to determine the boundaries
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of the units—are not clear in terms of majorities and minorities. Although

there are certain perceptions of ownership, often based on narratives of
ancestral land, the reality for a future territorial demarcation of federal
units could be problematic. Many members of ethnic minorities want to
live their culture and be responsible for the wealth of their land, but, at the
same time, the high degree of ethnic mobility and intermarriage, and the
presence of other minorities in ethnic states, means that an ethnic/territorial
approach does not reflect the complexities on the ground. A case in point
is Rakhine State; in a future scenario that involves a return to democracy
along the NUG’s framework, the United League of Arakan and the Arakan
Army would want to see a sovereign Arakan State as member of the Union
of Myanmar. The current FDC would ascribe the locus of sovereignty to
ethnic Rakhine in the state, leaving in limbo both other ethno-religious
groups of the region (predominantly the Rohingya) as well as ethnic
Rakhine residing in other parts of the country. How would the Rohingya
or the Bamar or the Daignet in Rakhine exercise their constitutional right
of self-determination within such an Arakan State? And how would social
harmony (FDC 2021, Chapter 4, Part I, Art. 4) be realised if ethnicity
continues to separate communities? This same conundrum is replicated
across the country.
Coupled with the lack of clarity on the definition of peoples and territories
is the stipulation that the union exercises power sharing and revenue sharing
based on the principle of subsidiarity (FDC 2021, Chapter 4, Part II, Art. 4):
The original owner of all land and natural resources within a State
is the people who live in the State. The State shall have the right to
independently manage the exploration, extraction, selling, trading,
preservation, and protection etc. of the natural resources within the
State. (FDC 2022, Chapter 4, Part III, Art. 20)

The consociational underpinnings of this clause promote a new power

equilibrium between the centre and the periphery that is further supported
by the rights of ethnic minorities (FDC 2021, Chapter 4, Part III, Art.
23–4, 26–7). However, the overall scheme aims at the de-Burmanisation
of politics—not through the downgrading of ethnicity as a critical factor
for political discourse, but through an increased recognition of ethnic
communities as such. The FDC moves towards a more consociational path
as the basis for a post-coup democratic Myanmar. Yet, the labyrinth of
ethnic definitions and territorial demarcations may lead more towards the
Minotaur of conflict than Ariadne’s thread of exodus to peace.

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Since the publication of the FDC, the clash to oust the military junta
continues. The NUG had originally hoped to complete a final draft of a
new constitution by December 2021 (Saw Thonya 2021), but this did not
eventuate. The lack of progress in finalising the union’s constitution based on
the FDC highlights the challenges that the NUG faces. It takes considerable
effort to coordinate and hold together a unified campaign against the junta
on the promise and vision of an ethnically based, semi-consociational polity.
The NUG hopes the payoff will be an open, peaceful society for all, with
an open democracy that resembles the established models of open liberal
democracies around the world. However, the situation on the ground seems
to be changing into a long-term, low-intensity civil war between the PDFs
and the military. The issues outlined in this chapter highlight why the FDC
has not offered a compelling vision for the EAOs to unite around. Without
a clear victory, it remains for the NUG to convince the EAOs to unite
with the progressive forces. Past experience through the ceasefire agreements
in the 1990s indicate that ethnic elites may opt for a non-democratic
regime as long as their interests are promoted. The recent decision by
some less significant EAOs to start ceasefire talks with the military points
in this direction (Moe Thuzar & Htet Myet Min Tun 2022). The semi-
consociational approach adopted by the FDC moves towards a choice of
convenience rather than a choice of commitment. Despite its progressive
character, the charter seems to be locked in the past rather than paving the
way forward for a future that unites the people.

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 9
Rakhine State Post-Coup:
Arakan Army State-Building
and Its Implications for
Rohingya and Aid
Anthony Ware
Associate Professor, School of Humanities and Social Sciences,
Deakin University, Australia

Costas Laoutides
Associate Professor, School of Humanities and Social Sciences,
Deakin University, Australia

Abstract
The conflicts in Rakhine State have taken a surprising backseat on the
national and international stage since the 1 February 2021 coup in
Myanmar. Obvious concerns about the wellbeing, citizenship and return
of Rohingya aside, the most surprising events have been with regards to
the Arakan Army’s (AA) increasing moves to set up parallel state functions.
There has been very little support for the National Unity Government in
northern and central parts of Rakhine State, while the AA enjoys very strong
popular support. Under the cover of COVID-19, and an ongoing ceasefire
while the military are heavily stretched in other parts of the country, the AA
has rapidly expanded its control through new de facto state institutional
functionings. Since the coup, they have implemented new judicial,

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taxation, conflict resolution and security functions; taken a leading role in

the COVID-19 response; and overturned major aspects of Rohingya policy
at the local level. This signals a significant power shift in Rakhine State that
is likely to reshape both state and (perhaps) national politics for decades
to come. This chapter explores these changing dynamics, their likely
trajectory and the implications for both domestic politics and international
aid/peace-building. These developments will undoubtedly have significant
implications for the Rohingya, but the nature of these implications is not
yet clear or resolved, given that the underlying issues for the Rohingya
remain unaltered.

***
Prior to the 1 February 2021 coup, international attention on Myanmar
was squarely focused on the conflicts in Rakhine State—notably, the
plight of the Rohingya and the culpability of the Myanmar military1 in
the Rohingya genocide. Since the coup, however, Rakhine State has taken
an unexpected backseat on the national and international stage, and the
region has surprisingly become one of the more stable parts of the country.
Concerns about Rohingya wellbeing remain: there has been no progress on
the fundamental issues of citizenship for, and repatriation of, the million-
plus refugees sheltering in Bangladesh, and the military has not budged
on issues of Rohingya identity, rights or access to services. Nonetheless,
since the coup, Rakhine State has been on a significantly different trajectory
to most of the rest of the country, and there have been some significant
developments there that may well reshape both that part of the country and,
possibly, Myanmar national politics for decades to come.
The most surprising and significant development since the coup has
been the consolidation of power by the Arakan Army (AA) and its political
arm, the United League of Arakan (ULA). This chapter explores that
phenomenon and its implications. Under the cover of COVID-19, and
capitalising on a de facto ceasefire while the Myanmar military was heavily
stretched in other parts of the country, the AA/ULA rapidly consolidated
control and expanded its influence across large parts of Rakhine State.
Commencing in November 2020, barely two months before the coup, and
while never formalised, the ceasefire ended a two-year period of intense

1 The Myanmar military calls itself the ‘Tatmadaw’, which literally translates as ‘royal armed forces’.
As Myanmar is no longer a kingdom, the contemporary use of the name implies ‘glorious’. In solidarity
with the resistance to the coup, this chapter simply uses the term ‘Myanmar military’. See Desmond (2022).

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fighting that only ever seemed to further the reach and capability of the
AA/ULA and attract new recruits and support. The ceasefire broke down in
late 2022; however, as a consequence of the ceasefire and the region’s very
limited participation in the Civil Disobedience Movement (CDM)—which
explains the absence of military backlash against anti-coup activities—the
situation in the state became relatively peaceful for almost two years. After the
coup, the AA/ULA were apparently seen by the military as a less immediate
threat—a group to be dealt with later or via a different approach—although
that has clearly changed now. But, at least until late 2022, while state
institutions have become increasingly fragile and unable to provide basic
services, the AA/ULA rapidly expanded its institutional capacity, transiting
itself from an armed liberation movement to an increasingly de facto state-
like entity. While its control of territory remains contested, since the coup,
the AA/ULA has implemented new judicial, taxation, conflict resolution
and security functions, taken a leading role in the COVID-19 response and
overturned major aspects of Rohingya policy at the local level. The AA/ULA
have filled a vacuum created by a withdrawing state, consolidating their
own position and legitimacy both domestically and internationally in the
process. This is a significant power shift in Rakhine State. If accompanied by
attitudinal shifts and a reduction in intercommunal tension, which appears
to largely be the case, these shifts in policy have the potential to help reshape
national political debates over identity and citizenship nationally. In so
doing, Rakhine State may perhaps offer the tiniest glimmer of hope towards
a possible eventual end to conflict and identity politics in Myanmar.
This chapter explores these changing dynamics in Rakhine State, their likely
trajectory and the implications for both domestic politics and international
aid/peace-building. These developments will undoubtedly have significant
implications for the Rohingya, both the half a million plus still living in
Rakhine State and the million plus sheltering across the border, although
it is not yet clear what those implications will be beyond the short term.
The AA/ULA have fastidiously avoided confrontation or harassment of
Rohingya within Myanmar, seeking to portray themselves as representing a
more inclusive politics, but how far they would go in reality if they gained
full territorial control is far from clear. Nonetheless, with some 200,000
Rakhine having been displaced by fighting over the 12 months prior to
the coup, narratives of greater solidarity through shared victimhood are
emerging between Rakhine and Rohingya villages. The politics is further
affected by the National Unity Government’s (NUG) new-found support
for the Rohingya. It is possible that this may be more a means to wedge the

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military and enhance support from the international community, while also
leveraging international justice mechanisms to their side, than an example
of real attitudinal change, but this is not yet clear. Certainly, the NUG’s
long silence on Rakhine/AA/ULA issues is noticeable. Nonetheless, this is
all new in Rakhine State and potentially very positive. This chapter explores
these changes with a focus on policy implications for international actors and
aid agencies seeking to assist Rakhine State and resolve the Rohingya issue.
The findings presented in this chapter are based on a close following of
local news media reports, regular monitoring of social media posts in
both English and Burmese/Rakhine by prominent activists, and regular
discussions with Burmese and Rakhine key informants via secure online
communication (Signal). For the safety of those involved, only the news
media reports are fully referenced. The remainder of this chapter is divided
into six sections. The first two provide background context for the complex
conflict in Rakhine State, and the rise of the AA/ULA pre-coup, their
objectives and support. A third section then briefly looks at the literature
about the path to recognition for autonomous regions—the path to de facto
statehood. The fourth section then considers the amount of state-building
and nation-building the AA/ULA have undertaken since the coup, in light
of this theory. A fifth section then briefly explores the complex relationships
the AA/ULA have with the (junta-led) State Administration Council
(SAC), NUG and other armed minority groups, and what this means for
the likelihood of achieving their objectives. The final section draws out the
significant implications of the changed conflict and political dynamics for
international actors, including bilateral donors and foreign states, as well as
international agencies seeking to provide development, humanitarian and/
or peace-building support.

The Rakhine conflict: Complex and

intractable
The conflict in Rakhine State is complex, an intractable conflict that dates
back many decades, if not centuries. Significantly, it is a conflict between
three parties, not two: the Bamar-dominated state, the Rakhine and the
Rohingya. We have previously examined these intersecting conflicts in
detail and here offer only the briefest summary by way of background
(for further details and sources, see Ware & Laoutides 2018, 2019).

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Driven by narratives about ethnicity that exacerbate social cleavages in an

attempt to forge stronger group identities, these conflicts involve horizontal
and vertical dimensions, and both armed and unarmed violence.
The first conflict dyad, and the most recognised by international audiences,
is the campaign that has been waged by the state against the Rohingya, and
counterattacks by some Rohingya on state security forces. This culminated
in mass atrocities and ethnic cleansing in 2017, driving more than a million
Rohingya refugees to Bangladesh. This conflict is not new; there are
antecedents involving mass violence against Rohingya/Rakhine Muslims
and mass exoduses in 1942, 1978 and 1991–92, each of which bear an
eerie resemblance to recent events. This conflict is driven by narratives
of the Rohingya being recent economic migrants, some versions suggesting
that they arrived as labourers during British rule, others that most arrived
illegally following independence. The reality is that large numbers of
Muslims have lived in what is now Rakhine State for centuries; yet the
narrative paints Rakhine State as a ‘Western Gate’ that needs to be firmly
shut to prevent an even greater deluge of Muslims from the overpopulated
subcontinent entering and overwhelming Buddhism and Burmese culture
(Ware & Laoutides 2019). This is effectively Myanmar’s version of the toxic
great replacement theory.
The second dyad, widely propagated inside Myanmar, is an intercommunal
conflict between Rakhine and Rohingya communities, into which the
Myanmar government/military claim they must intervene to maintain
order. The 2012 violence highlighted this long simmering dimension,
and the narratives underlying it appeal to domestic, religious-oriented
audiences and emphasise sectarian cleavages. Charney (1999) argues that
this communal tension dates to the aftermath of the First Anglo-Burmese
War (1824–26), and the return of large numbers of both Rakhine and
Muslim refugees who had fled the harsh Burman occupation after their
1784 invasion. This intercommunal competition has a long history in
Rakhine State, periodically boiling over into violence.
This chapter, however, is focused on the third dyad of this conflict,
a dimension that has been largely overlooked by the international
community until quite recently—namely, the struggle by Rakhine
nationalists for autonomy or independence from the Bamar-led state. One
of us (Ware 2015) flagged the significance of this dimension in a paper
presented at a symposium in early 2013, just after the 2012 communal
violence and well before the AA began moving troops to Rakhine State

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(see below). This conflict narrative harks back to the Bamar destruction of
the Arakanese (Rakhine) kingdom at Mrauk-U in 1784, an event etched
deeply into Rakhine collective memory. The principal grievance of the
Rakhine ever since that time, popularised by late eighteenth and early
nineteenth-century historical chronicles, has been Bamar domination. It is
important to note that their principal grievance is not, and never has been,
the presence nor actions of the Rohingya. Rakhine voters have demonstrated
this deep distrust of Bamar authorities and desire for autonomy in every
multi-party election in the country since independence, with support for
Rakhine nationalist parties consistently as high or higher than any other
minority in Myanmar in each of the 1951–52, 1956, 1960, 1990, 2010,
2015 and 2020 elections.
The growth of resentment against even the Bamar-led civilian National
League for Democracy (NLD) government after a single term is attested
in the 2020 election results. Even though elections were cancelled in many
parts of Rakhine State due to armed clashes, preventing an estimated
73 per cent of Rakhine State’s voters from casting a ballot (Kaung Hset
Naing 2020), the NLD lost ground to Rakhine nationalist parties. Rakhine
nationalist parties still won the fourth largest block of seats in the national
Lower House, and third largest block in the Upper House. This included
Rakhine nationalists winning in more southern areas of the state, where
support for the nationalist parties has traditionally been weaker.
Adding to the conflict complexity, Rakhine State is the second poorest in
the Union, and the northern townships where conflict has been focused
constitute the poorest part of the country (World Bank 2015; also Ware
& Laoutides 2018, 29). The region has suffered chronic underinvestment
by the central government, and, despite Rakhine State being resource rich
and strategically positioned between China and the Bay of Bengal, recent
economic liberalisations have not translated into revenue and investment
for the region. Further economic deterioration since the coup has hit key
industries and increased the vulnerability of the population. In addition,
around 148,000 Rohingya remain in internal displacement camps after the
violence against them over the past decade, with a further 79,000 Rakhine
also still displaced after the AA-Myanmar military conflict (UNHCR
2021). Most live in dilapidated or makeshift camps or are sheltering in
monastery compounds.

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Rise of the Arakan Army

From humble beginnings, and in the above context, the AA has become
a leading actor in Rakhine State in under a decade, now controlling
significant parts of the state and rapidly expanding its institutional capacity.
The AA was formed as recently as April 2009. It drew its initial recruits
from Rakhine working in the jade mines in upper Myanmar, and developed
under the auspices of the Kachin Independence Army, a thousand
kilometres from Rakhine State. The AA only existed in northern Myanmar
until 2014. Indeed, the AA’s first operations in Rakhine State were as recent
as March 2015 (BNI 2017; MPM 2013), triggering a major operation by
the Myanmar military.
Many observers believed the AA would be defeated or sink into obscurity at
that time (Gaung 2022), but it prevailed in major battles and demonstrated
its combat capability. Violence escalated in 2018, after the Rohingya
clearance operations were concluded, until a de facto ceasefire was declared
in November 2020 with Japanese mediation, less than two months before
the February 2021 coup. Ko Oo (2022) speculates that this ceasefire was
part of military preparations for the coup, and that if the coup had been
quickly successful, they would have resumed the Rakhine war sooner. Either
way, with the coup only partially successful at best, there was minimal
armed confrontation with the AA for 18 months after the coup—until the
AA’s consolidation of power and growing alignment with resistance forces
could no longer be ignored. What this has meant for the AA is discussed
in detail later in this chapter. Where this heads next is uncertain. What is
known is that, until recently, with the military preoccupied elsewhere in the
country and seemingly relatively unconcerned about Rakhine State, the AA
have consolidated their position and set up a range of activities that could
best be described as institutional development, effectively state-building
and nation-building, as they try to build the apparatus of a de facto state.
We will discuss this more in subsequent sections.
The AA were excluded from the 2014–15 negotiations for a Nationwide
Ceasefire Agreement (Aung Hla Tun 2015; Ye Mon & Lun Min Mang
2015). Both the military and the quasi-civilian NLD government branded
the AA a terrorist organisation, easily dismissing them as new, small and
opportunistic, and suggesting that they only formed in light of the peace
process to try to gain a seat in negotiations and enhance the political voice
of the Rakhine. Despite their growth and progress, they were excluded from

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the NLD government’s 21st Century Panglong Peace Process and continued
to be branded as terrorists until late 2020 (Htet Naing Zaw 2020; ICG
2020). Indeed, during its term in office, the NLD government called for the
military to ‘crush’ the AA (Reuters 2019) and, with this in mind, imposed
the world’s longest internet shutdown in parts of Rakhine State (Kyaw Hsan
Hlaing 2020).
The military and the NLD clearly misread the AA as a small and entirely
new organisation, ignoring the long history of Rakhine nationalist armed
struggle against Bamar domination, as we have documented elsewhere
(Ware & Laoutides 2018). The AA is simply the most recent of many
Rakhine nationalist armed groups (see also Smith 1994, 2007; Lintner
1999; South 2008), but this was not acknowledged by the Bamar-led state.
Their analysis has also proven wrong in that the AA have grown rapidly in
strength, organisation and popularity. Major General Twan Mrat Naing,
leader of the AA, boasted in January 2022 that they had grown to over
100 battalions of 300 soldiers each, including 22,000 well-trained and
battle-hardened soldiers now in effective control of 60 per cent of Rakhine
State; 6,000 more soldiers deployed in allied territories; and an Auxiliary
tasked with logistics and intelligence (Lintner 2022). More recent claims
put the fighting force at over 30,000 troops (Gaung 2022; Ko Oo 2022).
While those numbers may be inflated, and that level of control somewhat
overstated, effective control of territory creates the conditions for the sort of
transformation of an armed non-state actor into a state-like agent, as we are
now seeing in Rakhine State, post-coup.
The political goal of the AA and its bureaucratic wing, the ULA, is summed
up as the ‘Arakan Dream’, the long-held vision of the Rakhine people for
collective self-determination. In promoting this goal, the AA/ULA appeal to
a deep-seated sense of oppression, tapping into a vision of restored Rakhine
sovereignty, lost when the Bamar conquered their Mrauk-U kingdom in
1784. While there has been some promotion of the idea of independent
statehood, the official position is that Rakhine State could be a confederate
member of a future post-coup Federal Union of Myanmar if the political
arrangements are favourable, but this depends on being granted sufficient
autonomy. This was recently restated by the leader of the AA, Major General
Twan Mrat Naing, in January 2022:
we are not requesting or asking for what we want from our enemy
who has deprived us by force. We shall create our own destiny
with our own hands, no matter what they think. We must build

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on our own and earn what we deserve. My mission is to restore

our sovereignty and reclaim a rightful political status for Arakan
(Rakhine). (Lintner 2022)

It was restated by AA/ULA spokesperson Khaing Thu Kha during the first
ever AA/ULA press conference in March 2022, highlighting it as policy not
a single offhanded statement:
If there is no place for the political status we want in this union, we
will have to create it ourselves and continue to build our government
and our future nation-state together with the international
community. (Western News 2022a)

The rise of the AA/ULA as a credible force has motivated a majority of

people in Rakhine State to support the demand for self-determination and
political autonomy. There have been several movements in the past that
tried to promote political autonomy for Rakhine State, but none was able
to generate mass support to the extent the AA/ULA have. After several years
of intense fighting followed by a long de facto ceasefire, both political elites
and the general population have become more confident in their support
for the ULA/AA and the call for political autonomy.

State-building in emerging politico-

territorial entities
Before providing an assessment of the extent and success of the AA/ULA
in building new institutional structures, we need to review the role and
basic components of state-building and nation-building in territories that
seek international recognition. The first step of any national liberation
movement towards having claims of autonomy recognised internationally
is widely regarded as achieving a monopoly over the use violence in the
territory they claim. Control of security is twofold: 1) keeping government
forces out; 2) maintaining internal security among the population, thus
preventing anarchy. Security allows the rebels to proceed with building
institutions and infrastructure to deliver basic public services, then to create
institutional structures and bodies that will exercise authority over the
population. To this end, there is a gradual setting up of legislative, executive
and judicial arms in tandem with the development of mechanisms for the
collection and distribution of tax revenues. The next step in state formation
is translating that authority over the population into a stable and systematic

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administration. Gradually, sections of a civil service apparatus develop

and the administration seeks to reach all members of the community.
The evolving bureaucracy provides a unified system of values, introduces
the rule of law and gradually sets norms. In this bureaucratisation stage,
the forming state becomes a centralised, impersonal systems of governance.
A third potential step in the state-building process is the division of power
between different institutions to facilitate a system of democratic governance,
however, democratisation is not a necessary step in state formation. Several
non-recognised entities have existed over a long period of time without a
strong democratic footprint, while we increasingly witness an authoritarian
turn in internationally recognised states (Ayoob 2001; Carbone 2013).
State-building is also coupled by a process of identity reconfiguration aiming
at the creation of a coherent society in which the state will function—that
is, nation-building. The emphasis is on the construction of a unified or
inclusive identity as the core political identity of the people. National
identity obtains a civic character that encompasses diverse ethno-linguistic
and religious realities. This is an essential step for defining the political
community. The challenge is how to achieve a successful coexistence of two
different levels of identity: an overarching identity that brings the people
together and diverse communal identities that reflect specific cultural and
linguistic identities. Successful nation-building creates a sense of belonging
to an all-embracing political dimension, while ethno-linguistic communities
are seen as cultural (non-politicised) groups within this (Anderson 1991;
Hobsbawm 1990; Smith 1998).

The AA/ULA since the coup: Consolidation,

state-building and nation-building
Ko Oo (2022) recently suggested that the AA/ULA used the ceasefire and
post-coup period to quickly develop four priority areas: 1) strengthen the
army, 2) build a civil administration, 3) establish peaceful relations with the
Rohingya, and 4) improve relations with Bangladesh and seek their help
with the Rohingya living within Myanmar. In light of the above theoretical
overview, these priorities make perfect sense. The following three subsections
look at the first three of these in turn: the AA/ULA’s consolidation, state-
building and nation-building since the coup.

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Consolidation: Strengthen the Arakan Army

The growth in size of the AA has already been noted, with AA leader Major
General Twan Mrat Naing claiming over 30,000 troops (Lintner 2022;
Gaung 2022; Ko Oo 2022). Recruitment has increased since the coup,
with the AA being able to offer employment with hope and a purpose to
young people who otherwise felt they lost their future in the coup. The
growing legitimacy of the AA has also helped with recruitment, with
experienced AA troops returning to their homeland from Kachin and Shan
states providing training and support to the new recruits. Recent claims
that over 100 junta soldiers have defected to the AA in Rakhine State has
furthered such legitimacy (Irrawaddy 2022a). The bigger issue has been
armaments, and, to that end, Twan Mrat Naing claims to have set up an
arms and munitions factory in Rakhine (Ko Oo 2022). It is difficult to
confirm if this is true, but Ko Oo believes it to be likely. Certainly, recent
reports claim the NUG’s People’s Defence Forces have set up significant
arms and munitions production within Myanmar since the coup, so it is
quite plausible. Improved organisation and administration of the military
has also allowed the AA/ULA to redirect staff to state-building functions
(see next section).
The AA has simultaneously deepened its range of supports from the
community. Rakhine entrepreneurs have become the main contributors
of funding to the AA/ULA, while boatmen and truck drivers have helped
transport weapons with their regular shipping. Weapons have been secretly
stored in basements and other secret places, with local people, landowners,
lawyers and local media outlets providing information and intelligence,
all shaping and broadening the revolution.
The level of legitimacy of the AA is clearly increasing. Recently a number
of rural schools raised the Arakan flag instead of the Union flag, a clear sign
of where their loyalty and trust lies. On this note, the AA does not want to
be hated by the people. When locals in Paletwa Township, Chin State, were
reportedly beaten by AA troops in 2020, an official of the AA apologised
to the public and punished the soldier who was responsible. The AA has
also apologised for the killings of two Burmese traders accused of providing
information to the Myanmar military during the armed conflicts in Rakhine
State. Apology is a difficult choice, but optimal for developing its long-term
credibility and status as accountable to its people. The same approach was
followed towards soldiers when the AA captured prisoners of war, including

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the battalion commander from the Myanmar military; they were fed for
several months and then elderly and sick soldiers were released. It can be
said that these actions are building political prestige.

State-building: Build a civil administration

Some of Myanmar’s other minority group armies, such as the Kachin
Independence Army, United Wa State Army and Karen National Union,
have provided many of the services of a government in the areas under
their control for decades. However, this is a new development in Rakhine
State. The AA/ULA has been working for some time to build processes of
institutionalisation and bureaucratisation that would increase the legitimacy
of their presence in the eyes of the local population.
In December 2019, the AA/ULA announced the formation of an Arakan
People’s Authority (APA) (Nan Lwin Hnin Pwint 2019), which would
begin civil administration, policing and judicial functions in 2020, as well
as collect taxes. More recently, the AA/ULA have begun referring to the
APA as ‘the Arakan People’s Government’ (e.g. spokesman Khaing Thu
Kha during the first ever AA/ULA press conference, see Gaung 2022).
Significantly, the APA is notionally centred in Mrauk-U (RFA 2020), the
former capital of the Arakan Kingdom that prevailed in the region for
centuries before the Burmese invasion in 1784. The symbolism in making
Mrauk-U the administrative capital is important as a step along the road
towards fulfilling the Arakan Dream. The commencement of tax revenue
collection has allowed the AA/ULA to administer areas under its control,
fund the AA/ULA’s civil and political operations and increasingly rollout
other services—although it has resulted in many residents currently being
burdened by double taxation, to the AA as well as the SAC.
In May 2020, while still under NLD democratic rule, the AA/ULA
demanded the immediate withdrawal of all government administrative
offices and the military from northern Rakhine State. This was naturally
ignored by the NLD government, but the APA has significantly expanded
its administration since, setting up local structures that are different from
Myanmar government divisions, and extending parts of its administration
into southern Rakhine State, where its forces have less presence (Ko Oo
2022). The informal ceasefire implemented shortly before the coup was
followed by the junta delisting the AA as a terrorist organisation in March
2021, that is, a few weeks after the coup (GNLM 2021). This, together with
the military being preoccupied with conflicts in other parts of the country,
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allowed the AA/ULA to increase the role of the APA. After the coup, the
civil administration in Rakhine State was faced with a wave of resignations
and detentions of local administrators by Myanmar security. This situation
created a gap in administration, as local communities rely on local
administrators for leadership. In filling this void, the ULA/AA has increased
its presence in policing, judicial services, public health and education.
The consolidation of the APA, and growth in policy and service capability,
has been steady. In August 2021, the AA/ULA passed a law establishing
a Justice Department and paid judiciary (DMG 2021a). Courts have been
set up from the village-tract level up to district level, and wrongdoers are
prosecuted in accordance with the new law. Although commencing online,
some physical in-person courts are now appearing. The AA/ULA claim
they received 3,838 cases in 2021, of which 50 per cent were resolved, and
another 1,845 cases in the first quarter of 2022 (Gaung 2022; Western News
2022b). These include both civil and criminal cases, meaning it functions
both in support of its own security function, and as a local conflict
resolution mechanism.
At least some local lawyers suggest the ULA’s judiciary are gaining trust
by avoiding corruption (Gaung 2022). On the other hand, there have
been complaints about abuse of power and unfair decisions. The AA/ULA
response has been to suggest ‘inexperience and public goodwill coexist.
Mistakes are sure to be made along the way’ (Gaung 2022). They have also
sought to increase the quality and the quantity of the training required,
to reprimand and penalise AA members who have abused their power
and to encourage the public to continue reporting any wrongdoing by its
members. The AA/ULA has sought to include people from all ethnicities in
its justice system, and they claim these people are increasingly trusting them
and seeking their intervention as required.
An interesting indirect measure of trust in AA/ULA administrative capability
and legitimacy is the way people obeyed public health orders issued by
the APA during the COVID-19 pandemic. Stay-at-home orders issued in
June 2021 were widely followed and led to the control of the infection rate
in Rakhine State. In the same area of policy, the AA/ULA has rolled out
a COVID-19 vaccination program, and included both Rohingya and other
remote minority communities, demonstrating commitment to its inclusive
approach. Interestingly, at the time, they procured most of their vaccines
from the military government!

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Nation-building: Establish peace with the Rohingya

Concurrent with the AA/ULA’s rapid progress in consolidating their
position and state-building, they have also made significant progress in
nation-building—and this development is most likely to have the greatest
impact on national politics in the future, if consolidated. Nation-building
in this context, as discussed above, is the process of reconfiguring the sense
of identity in Rakhine State to create a more coherent society in which
an alternate, potential state could actually function, a unified or inclusive
identity that could gain national and international recognition and
legitimacy. Again, this has been going on in other parts of the country for
some time, but is a new and profound development in Rakhine State. The
Kachin, for example, established a coherent sense of ‘Kachin’ identity out
of the prior disparate tribal ethnicities over the past century or so, which
particularly accelerated during the decades of conflict with the Burma/
Myanmar state (Sadan 2013). In Rakhine State, the AA/ULA are now
devoting considerable effort to redefining the competitive struggle between
Rakhine and Rohingya into a more shared identity. They are hampered by
the history of violent conflict, by the fact that the Rakhine and the Rohingya
are not related in the manner of the Kachin tribes and by ongoing isolated
incidents, but their attention to redefining identities appears considerable
and deliberate.
Without wanting to overstate the situation, it is clear that the AA/ULA
has adopted an approach to the Arakan polity that is distinctively more
inclusive than the Burma/Myanmar state has previously done at any time
since independence—including under the civilian-led NLD. Particularly
significant in the AA/ULA’s approach is their rhetoric of being inclusive of all
ethnic and religious groups in Rakhine State. This is in stark contrast to the
narrative of Rakhine–Rohingya hatred, and a significant distinction from
other Rakhine nationalist parties, who have long pushed ethno-nationalism
as a key to political autonomy. Notably, the AA has not attacked the
Rohingya, either in rhetoric or physically, and has even issued calls for them
to join the AA. The AA/ULA seems to have recognised since its beginning
that anything other than transforming relations with the Rohingya would
be counterproductive towards achieving the ultimate goal of the Arakan
Dream. For example, in one of the first official statements by the AA, issued
as early as 2014 in response to a Foreign Policy Magazine article that accused
them of having an anti-Muslim agenda, they responded:

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The author demonized and accused the Arakan Army as [an] armed
gang against Muslims. [The] AA is not a safe haven for the extremists
to do as they pleased [sic]. Nor do we intend to harm any innocent
people or groups against humanity. We are highly disciplined with
morals and strongly committed to freedom, justice, human rights
and dignity. The Arakan Army was only established to strive for our
right to self-determination and equality which no honest man shall
lose in his/her life. More importantly, [the] AA is not a religion based
armed group which is only formed with Buddhists but people with
other religious faiths are also allowed to join [the] AA in order to
share our cause. This alone proves our belief in religious diversity
and our desire to create an open society where basic human rights
are guaranteed. (AA 2014)

Although the term ‘Rohingya’ remains a point of friction, perhaps in part

because the AA/ULA has to deal with the strong ethno-nationalism that
has long been promoted by the Arakan National Party, the AA leader stated
the following in an interview in January 2022 (answering a question about
whether it is feasible for Muslims, Buddhists, Hindus and Christians to live
together peacefully in Rakhine State):
It is achievable when we don’t have outsiders manipulating us and
using one group against another. Evidently, our Arakan (Rakhine)
state never had the current level of social stability and racial harmony
during 1941/2 to 2019. Now, we have more social stability, racial
tension has started to decline and more positive social activities can
be found. These are observable shifts and more changes should be
started from within. (Twan Mrat Naing, cited in Lintner 2022)

During a recent interview in Rakhine, AA leader Twan Mrat Naing took

this further, saying that everyone living in the state were citizens of Arakan,
regardless of race or religion (AK Media 2021). Similarly, in a public
statement of solidarity ahead of International Mother Language Day on
21 February 2022, the ULA, referring to the relationship between the
people of Rakhine State and the people of Bangladesh, declared:
We deeply regard that both our societies are historically and
culturally interlinked. The Arakanese community is part of the
Bengali nation, and the same way the Bengali community is part
of our Arakan nation. Since both territories are comprised of our
brothers and sisters, we firmly believe that it is our responsibility to
serve both our people for the best. (ULA 2022)

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Certainly, shortly after the coup, reports began circulating of the Myanmar
military threatening not only Rakhine, but also Rohingya villages, warning
them not to support the AA (Kyaw Linn 2022), and rumours were spread
by the military of Rohingya and Rakhine cooperating in armed resistance
in Rakhine State. These rumours were intended to alarm Bamar audiences,
tarnish the domestic reputation of the AA and reinforce the need for military
intervention in the region. To us, however, they highlight the significant
work done by the AA/ULA, and the profound change of polity it signals.
The AA/ULA’s cause is thus not the removal of the Muslims from Rakhine
but, it seems, the formation of a pan-Rakhine citizen identity out of the
melting of ethnicities, cultures, languages and histories. In this nexus, the
Rohingya Muslims have a role and place. The ‘Arakan Dream’, the vision
of an autonomous Rakhine State, is undoubtedly primarily Rakhine-led,
just as the Myanmar state they reject is primarily Bamar-led. There are no
guarantees they will thoroughly address discrimination, equal rights and
systemic injustices. Yet, their ‘Arakan Dream’ is very conciliary, now seeking
to create space for Rohingya and Rakhine to live together, within a broader
shared identify.
Significant work was done on this in the year or two prior to the coup,
although not by the AA/ULA. A local process of dialogue and reconciliation
occurred in Rakhine State through a series of meetings between Rakhine,
Rohingya and other minority communities’ representatives, running from
October 2020 to January 2021. This resulted in a ‘Declaration by the
Diverse and United Communities of Arakan’, sometimes translated as the
‘Joint Declaration of Peaceful Coexistence in Rakhine State, Myanmar’. This
declaration, completed and published on 18 January 2021, just two weeks
prior to the coup (Nyi Nyi Lwin 2022a, 2022b), shows a social movement
broader than simply the work of the AA/ULA.
Nonetheless, the AA/ULA have taken the lead in this space since the
coup. Public communication by the AA/ULA has been consistent in their
messaging about the inclusion of the Rohingya in their Arakan Dream. At a
practical level, they have relaxed the central government’s travel bans on
Rohingya, effectively allowing almost free movement of Rohingya in the
areas under their control, enhancing livelihood opportunities and furthering
social cohesion. Supporters have repeatedly stressed the need to prevent the
Rohingya issue causing problems for the AA/ULA, and the AA/ULA appear
to be monitoring incidences of racial violence, concerned that military
supporters will stir up intercommunal violence to undermine the AA/ULA
(DMG 2021b). The AA is cautious to avoid any incidents being allowed to
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be framed as anti-Rohingya. For example, despite reports/complaints about

a local Muslim outlaw (Abdul Hakim) whose gang committed kidnappings
and drug trafficking, the AA have reportedly not taken action against him
for fear of it being reported as abuse of a Rohingya. Instead, the AA/ULA
made it known that they would only act if Rohingya elders and religious
leaders made a formal complaint against the gang leader.
Marking a sharp break with a succession of central governments, the AA/
ULA have included Rohingya representatives in local administration
(Kyaw Hsan Hlaing 2021). Kyaw Hsan Hlaing notes that the Rohingya
had never been allowed to participate in civil administration under the
NLD administration, or any previous central government, but now the AA
is giving priority to mobilising Muslims in order to gain the trust of the
Muslim community and control Rohingya insurgent activity in the region.
The AA/ULA have now recruited Rohingya policemen and administrators
in some ULA positions, training them in administrative office work,
management and law (AK Media 2021). Ko Oo (2022) points out that
Rohingya have equal access to the AA/ULA legal system, and claims that
the AA/ULA deserve credit for Muslim students being allowed to return
to in-person studies at Sittwe University (although this was actually a SAC
Ministry of Education decision and is subsequently being restricted again, it
may have been influenced by the changing social context that the AA/ULA
have helped foment).

Relations with the SAC and NUG

In a bid to placate the AA, the SAC military council removed the AA/
ULA from its list of terrorist organisations on 11 March 2021, just weeks
after the coup. Their motivation appears to have been to both stabilise the
informal ceasefire and allow themselves space to direct military resources
elsewhere in the country. It appears to have worked: the AA issued
a statement condemning the coup and violence against civilians in March
(AA 2021), but otherwise did little to oppose the coup itself or come out
in support of the NUG or People’s Defence Forces. This status quo, which
allowed the AA/ULA to consolidate control and administration in Rakhine
State as described above, continued until early 2022. In February 2022,
AA/ULA officials attended Union Day celebrations in Naypyidaw, at the
invitation of Min Aung Hlaing. For this, they were quite stridently criticised
by some Rakhine, to the extent that the AA arrested one of the loudest

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critics, Arakan National Party central committee member U Khine Kyaw

Moe (Irrawaddy 2022b). But then, on 24 March, the NUG extended an
invitation to informal meetings (Western News 2022c), which the AA/ULA
took up—and the military immediately responded by sending long convoys
with 1,000 new troops and advanced weaponry into the AA stronghold of
Paletwa, in southern Chin State (DVB 2022). The military chief, Min Aung
Hlaing, countered by inviting the AA to peace talks on 22 April, which the
AA declined, and things have spiralled since then. Unsurprisingly, AA/ULA
officials proceeded with the meetings with the NUG on 16 May 2022;
in its statement after the meetings, the NUG referred to the ULA/AA as
the ‘Arakan People’s Government’ (BNI 2022). The army responded with
obstruction, arrests and roadblocks to intercept shipments and movement
more than direct military confrontation (Ko Oo 2022). Regular armed
clashes have escalated throughout 2022.
As early as May 2022, the AA accused the military of disrupting AA/ULA
administrative, taxation and judicial activities, including by deploying
additional troops near ULA courts and threatening and arresting members
of the local ULA administration as well as persons involved in legal cases
(RFA 2022). The military has also allegedly been attempting to destroy
relations between the Rakhine and the Muslim communities through
harassment and attacks. The Myanmar Army have reinforced their position,
bringing in at least two brigades to support the three stationed in Rakhine
State, and deployed air strike and navy capability on the Kaladan River.
The number of armed engagements has continued to escalate during
2022, with the military blockading Sittwe and other major cities in the
north, pushing civilian populations to the brink of starvation. This may
have slowed further progress in state-building and nation-building, but has
not, at this point, reversed the progress. Notably, while the Rohingya did
not take sides during the 2019–20 fighting between the AA and military,
as Ko Oo (2022) notes, both sides are now working hard to mobilise the
Rohingya, a move that highlights the concerns the military have about
the potential powershift if there is widespread reconciliation between the
two communities.

Implications for international actors

So, what do these tectonic shifts in relations and power in Rakhine State
mean for international actors? The first significant implication concerns
access for humanitarian aid and other organisations. The rise of the AA/
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ULA means access not only needs to be negotiated with the SAC, which
is problematic enough, but also with the AA/ULA for most of the areas
with the greatest need in Rakhine State. The junta will not want this to
occur. There are several implications of this, including more complications
for international agencies in negotiating memorandums of understanding
(MoUs), visas, etc. And, of course, the junta is less likely to allow access to
areas under AA control, citing security concerns. So, accessing displaced
populations and those most affected by conflict is going to be increasingly
difficult—especially the Rohingya populations in Rakhine State. A more
flexible approach may be via increased cooperation with local non-
government organisations (NGOs) and civil society organisations (CSOs)
in design and delivery, as argued for by Décobert in this volume (see Chapter
12). However, for this to work, a good deal of thought and discussion needs
to go into ways of minimising the additional security risk to staff in these
organisations, and significantly relaxed accountability processes surrounding
implementation need to be introduced. Any increase in use of local NGOs/
CSOs in the provision of aid to the Rohingya is even more difficult and
needs significant thought and planning.
A second major implication for international actors is around alignment
and legitimisation. One of the key principles of international aid in normal
situations is that it should align as closely as possible with national systems,
rather than create duplicate, parallel systems. That, of course, strengthens
the systems of the state, and helps build their legitimacy, something the
international community is in virtual consensus about wanting to avoid.
Negotiating MoUs and gaining access to run any programs in Myanmar is
fraught enough in terms of legitimisation—there is no suggestion aid should
align with, and in any way strengthen, the systems and bureaucracy behind
the SAC. And while significant parts of the international community would
like to strengthen the NUG and their processes, systems, departments and
so on, they have little capacity in Rakhine State. Therefore, the question that
needs significant debate is this: with the AA/ULA increasingly in effective
control of significant territory and rapidly institutionalising, should or
could international aid align with AA/ULA structures and processes and,
if so, by how much? Either way, international actors will need to tread
more carefully than usual in Rakhine State and take account of AA/ULA
institutions and state-building.
Interrelated with this is the question of how much recognition, support
or other means of boosting legitimacy the international community would
like to give to the emerging AA/ULA. Indeed, it is not clear whether such
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recognition, support or boosts to legitimacy would help the people of

Rakhine, including the Rohingya, or goad the military into more ferocious
operations in the region. A further complication is the AA/ULA’s reputation
for engaging in illicit activities, notably, drug trafficking—although they
are not alone in this, with most other armed militias and minority armies
around the country similarly engaged.
A final implication for the international community was raised by Ko
Oo (2022), and that is whether there is a tactical and practical advantage
to improve relations between Bangladesh and the AA, to help with the
Rohingya, both inside Myanmar and in laying a foundation for a long-
term solution to the refugee problem in Bangladesh, through changed
attitudes and communal dynamics in Rakhine State and along the border.
This is an unresolved question, worthy of international consideration.
The observations above highlight the strategic relevance of humanitarian
engagement in Rakhine to all parties. Given the asymmetrical nature of
the conflict, any engagement by international actors will convey strategic
benefits for one of the sides to the conflict: therein lies the moral dilemma
for international donors.

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 10
Evolution of Communal
Tensions in Rakhine State
after the Coup
Ye Min Zaw
Independent researcher

Tay Zar Myo Win

Lecturer, Faculty of Political Science,
Ubon Ratchathani University, Thailand

Abstract
The military coup in Myanmar has resulted in democratic backsliding,
creating turmoil with nationwide uprisings and resistance, including armed
conflict. The Arakan Army (AA), a prominent armed group based in Rakhine
State, has not collaborated with the fight for restoring democracy led by
the National Unity Government, which was founded by elected members
of the 2020 general election. Instead, the AA has been implementing
its vision of self-determination—the ‘Way of Rakhita’—by expanding
territorial control and installing its own administration system. Rakhine
was already trapped in a protracted humanitarian situation with more than
800,000 people in need, mostly Rohingya, within the state alone, and
almost 1 million Rohingya refugees in Bangladesh. The term ‘Rohingya’ is
contested and highly sensitive in the intercommunal conflict between the
Arakanese and Rohingya, who have lost citizenship and fundamental human
rights. Employing the concepts of protracted social conflict and territorial

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autonomy, the findings of this chapter demonstrate that the underlying

conditions of the conflict in Rakhine State are far from resolved and could
even deteriorate further in spite of improved intercommunal relations.

***
Myanmar faced democratic backsliding after the military coup on 1 February
2021 due to unfounded accusations of electoral fraud (Goodman 2021).
Pro-democratic forces and civilians opposed the military coup through
nationwide protests and a Civil Disobedience Movement. This national
movement against the coup turned to armed resistance following the
military’s lethal crackdown on unarmed and largely peaceful protesters. As a
consequence of the military’s coup and armed conflict across the country,
a humanitarian crisis has occurred with almost 1.1 million people displaced
by post-coup violence as of the end of October 2022 (UNHCR 2022).
This has added to the difficulty of accessing public goods and services,
including healthcare, as a result of the COVID-19 pandemic (ILO 2022).
Before the coup, Rakhine State had already been trapped in a protracted
humanitarian crisis with more than 800,000 people in need, mostly
Rohingya, within the state and almost 1 million Rohingya refugees in
Bangladesh (UNOCHA 2021).1
The international and domestic community have expressed serious concern
over the political crisis in Rakhine State, making the unresolved issues of
the communal conflict between the Arakanese (Rakhine) and Rohingya2
a matter that requires particular and urgent attention. The National
Unity Government (NUG), led by elected members of National League
for Democracy (NLD), put the Rohingya issue on the agenda in national
politics (NUG 2021), but key stakeholders in Rakhine have chosen not to
align with the NUG and have ignored the NUG’s efforts to open a dialogue
(Kyaw Lynn 2021). The Arakan Army (AA) maintained a temporary
ceasefire with the military, called the sit-tat (armed forces) by the Myanmar
people, while a leader of the Arakan National Party, the largest party in
Rakhine State, joined the State Administrative Council—a body formed by

1 The resumption of fighting between the Arakan Army and the military in late July 2022 has
significantly worsened the situation, leading to severe casualties. This occurred after the fieldwork was
completed for this chapter.
2 In this chapter, we use ‘Rohingya’ for non-Kaman Muslims, which is a self-identified name;
‘Arakanese’ for the Rakhine Buddhists, which is their historical name; and ‘Rakhine State’ to refer to
present-day Rakhine State under the Union of Myanmar. Note that most non-Rohingya interviewees
used the term ‘Muslim’ to refer to the Rohingya.

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 10. EVOLUTION OF COMMUNAL TENSIONS IN RAKHINE STATE AFTER THE COUP

the coup makers (Nyein Nyein 2021). The Arakan National Party was one
of the few political parties in Myanmar to recognise the coup d’état; later,
following public pressure, the party said that it might end its association
with the junta (Myanmar Now 2021b), but it has not done so. Now, a year
and a half after the coup, the conflict in Rakhine State has deteriorated
significantly with the resumption of fighting between armed forces.
Applying the concepts of protracted social conflict and territorial autonomy,
this chapter investigates the post-coup intercommunal situation in Rakhine
State, particularly the changes in social tension upon the expansion of
territorial control by the AA and the resurgence of Rohingya identity.
The larger questions of state persecution and military violence against the
Rohingya, and armed conflict between the military and AA, are beyond
the scope of this chapter. Instead, the focus is on how the political crisis
has impacted intercommunal tensions between the Arakanese and
Rohingya communities in Rakhine State. The chapter examines how these
communities have responded to the crisis, and the expansion of territorial
control by the AA, by looking at changes in the interaction between these
two communities. In addition, we include the perspectives of the conflict-
affected communities in Rakhine State—particularly the Rohingya and
the Arakanese—on the elevation of the Rohingya issue to the national
political agenda.

Protracted social conflict and

territorial autonomy
The Rakhine conflict is a typical protracted social conflict that is intractable
and multifaceted (Kocamis 2019; Ware & Laoutides 2019). A protracted
social conflict has multiple causal factors and dynamics in which the goals,
actors, targets and intensity are always changing. It is also characterised by
a blurred demarcation between internal and external sources and actors
(Azar 1985). According to Kriesberg and Dayton (2012), social conflicts
are not only an inevitable and essential part of social life but also can be
beneficial by challenging existing exploitative structures. At the same time,
social conflicts tend to create, reinforce and deepen reciprocal images of
deception, making it extremely difficult to resolve them (Azar, Jureidini
& McLaurin 1978). Thus, protracted social conflicts always carry a risk
of escalating and turning violent at any time. The major characteristic

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of protractedness (i.e. continuing over a long period) make perceptions

harden, diverting them into different narratives and clashes at dangerous
levels (Udayakumar 2004).
Protractedness and violence are the key features of intractable conflicts, which
are perceived as mostly irresolvable and demanding extensive investment
(Bar-Tal 2007). Settlements that are agreed upon and benefit both parties
are difficult to achieve, especially when the conflicting parties have unequal
power. Therefore, changes in the relationship between the parties are crucial
to getting out of the conflict cycle. To have a way out of conflict, the weaker
side, in this case the Rohingya, may apply a non-violent coercive approach by
drawing outside allies to develop institutional arrangements. The stronger
side (i.e. the Arakan community) will be required to acknowledge the
grievances suffered by the minority community and set up a robust
institution to handle conflict and injustice, as well as establishing control
over hardliners from each side (Kriesberg 1993). Protracted conflicts are
mostly based on resource sharing, self-determination and identity-related
issues (Udayakumar 2004).
Self-determination has become a claim in many ethnically diverse countries
in order to protect ethnic interests and identity (Benedikter 2009; Connor
1994; Choudhry 2011). The claim for self-determination may incorporate
a wide range of elements, from autonomy to independent statehood,
including secession (Choudhry 2011). It is also associated with conflict,
the development of ethno-nationalism and the rights of national minorities
(Connor 1994; Kymlicka 1995). Kymlicka (1995) defines national
minorities as territorially concentrated cultures incorporated into a larger
state who historically enjoyed self-government and who consider themselves
distinct from the majority and wish to maintain some autonomy to preserve
their identity. As Benedikter (2009) notes, ethnic minorities often attempt
to enjoy self-determination through territorial autonomy; this can be seen
in the actions of the AA.

Background on the conflict in Rakhine State

Many scholars have described the conflict in Rakhine State as multi-causation
and multi-level (Burke 2016; Aye Chan 2005; Kipgen 2013; Smith 1995).
The conflict is historical and contested and involves disputed claims of
‘indigeneity’, with one group claiming original ethnicity and the right to
full and neutral citizenship (Thawnghmung 2016; Ware 2015). Certainly,
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intercommunal tension is one of the key facets. The colonial legacy, which
allowed people to freely cross international borders, also plays a big role, as
it provokes Arakanese concerns relating to demographic changes (Aye Chan
2005; Leider 2020). The Advisory Commission on Rakhine State described
the situation as a ‘clash of narratives’ in which both Arakanese and Muslims3
try to legitimise political claims by using the historical past, leading to
exclusive and irreconcilable demands (ACRS 2017).
The Arakanese narrative focuses on the demographic threat caused by
migration, sociocultural exclusion and grievances from the structural
conflict under Myanmar’s current political system. Like other ethnic groups
in Myanmar, the Arakanese have been struggling in their relationship with
the central state and the Bamar majority. At the same time, however, the
Arakanese narrative is based on the fear (and pervasive belief ) that migration
and the higher birth rate of Muslims will result in them becoming a minority
within Rakhine State (Burke 2016; ICG 2016; Leider 2020). Aron (2018)
and Simbulan (2018) suggest that these grievances and the rise of ethno-
nationalism—which mobilises the community as a whole—could be key
factors in the conflict dynamic and should be carefully unpacked. The
Arakanese assume that they must be protected from mass illegal migration
to maintain their influential status. To this end, Rakhine political parties
have deployed anti-Muslim chauvinism as part of a wider, but recent, semi-
organised social movement, with clear political goals that partly overlap with
the Myanmar military elite (van Klinken & Su Mon Thazin Aung 2017).
Since the emergence of the AA, the Arakanese’s dream of reclaiming the
sovereignty dismantled by the Bamar Konbuang Dynasty in 1784 has been
revived through the ‘Way of Rakhita’ concept, which has self-determination
at its core (Ye Min Zaw 2019). As a result, the more territory the AA
controls, the louder the call for greater autonomy and self-determination
among the Arakanese. The Arakanese community sees self-determination
as a matter of earning both the respect they deserve and gaining equality
with other groups. They look to attain self-determination via three different
paths: armed struggle, electoral politics and the peace process (Clarke, Seng
Aung Sein Myint & Zabra Yu Siwa 2019).
The term Rohingya is one of the central issues of the conflict, as it draws
attention to the existence of different perspectives. Some of these perspectives
hark back to the pre-colonial period, seeing the role of Muslims in the

3 The original report says ‘Muslims from Rakhine State’.

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Arakan Kingdom as justification for the presence of Muslims in Rakhine

State. However, the Arakanese view the term as not specifically referring to
Muslims, but to the people from Rakhine State for whom it was originally
coined (Aye Chan 2005). This perspective is important when considering
Myanmar’s 1982 citizenship law, which defines citizens as nationals who
settled in the territory of the country before 1823 and gives the power to the
state to decide whether any ethnic group is national or not (SRUB 1982).
The law largely falls short of international standards and customary practice.
It was used to exclude the Rohingya from Myanmar citizenship due to their
ethno-religious identity (Haque 2014). While Ware and Laoutides (2019)
argue that citizenship is not a cause of conflict but a symptom, Nyi Nyi
Kyaw (2017) insists that the lack of actual implementation of the laws by
successive Myanmar governments deprived the Rohingya of their right to
a nationality. Cheesman (2017) points out that the concept of national race,
taingyintha, as defined by the state, excluded the Rohingya and that this
influenced the majority population to deny the Rohingya identity as part of
the society. With their citizenship status rejected legally and constitutionally,
the Rohingya have faced statelessness and limited freedom of movement
within Myanmar. In addition, being a Muslim minority, the Rohingya have
suffered from a widespread anti-Muslim campaign (Thawnghmung 2016).
The semi-organised movement targeting Muslims involved multiple actors,
including political parties from Rakhine State (van Klinken & Su Mon
Thazin Aung 2017), and was strong during Thein Sein’s administration;
both hardliners and reformists of the transitional regime were complicit
with ongoing communal violence in the country to promote their own
political interests (Min Zin 2015).
The Rohingya community was disproportionately affected by the
intercommunal conflicts in 2012 in Rakhine State. Until then, apart from
partial involvement in communal-level clashes, the Rohingya had remained
non-violent. However, when the Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army (ARSA)
staged two rounds of attacks against security force posts in Rakhine—against
which the sit-tat fiercely retaliated—it dramatically changed the conflict
landscape. During the so-called clearance operation by the Myanmar sit-tat,
the Rohingya faced the destruction of lives and property and over 700,000
fled into Bangladesh. According to the UN Fact-Finding Mission, the sit-
tat’s actions amounted to war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocidal
intent (OHCHR 2018). Since 2012, there have been international criticisms
of this genocide and calls for the international community to act (Maung
Zarni & Cowley 2014; Southwick 2015; Lindblom et al. 2015).

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To sum up, grievances from both sides have created a double minority
complex in which both the Arakanese and Rohingya fear an existential
threat and express their sense of exclusion from Myanmar’s political
process. The former fears assimilation from the Bamar and the massive
Muslim population of Bangladesh, while the latter is a marginalised and
disempowered group (Ware & Laoutides 2019; Burke 2016). Both groups
have used armed struggle as part of their campaign, although the scale and
scope varies. Competing narratives, which remain unreconciled, pose the
risk of further widening the gap between the two communities, increasing
the difficulty of finding common ground and making meaningful steps
towards overcoming the underlying problems.

Conceptual framework
Based on the underlying definition of a protracted social conflict, we seek
to understand the relationship between the two communities by examining
the Rohingya’s deprivation of basic needs—which Azar (1990) defines
as acceptance, participation and security needs—as well as the claim of
autonomy by the Arakanese. To analyse the AA’s efforts to gain territorial
control, we apply the four criteria developed by Benedikter (2009) to
determine autonomy in the modern world—that is, 1) the rule of law in the
state and autonomous entity, 2) the permanent devolution of a minimum
of legislative and executive powers, 3) democracy and free elections, and
4) equality of civil rights and general citizenship rights. We also explore the
conflict dynamics using Azar’s analytical model of protracted social conflict,
paying particular attention to the genesis component (which deals with the
precondition of the conflict) and process dynamics (which deal with how
each communal actor responds to the conflict) (Azar 1990).
The chapter draws on both documentary research and field research.
The documentary research includes analysis of reports and statements
by relevant organisations as well as media interviews with stakeholders.
The field research includes 10 key informant interviews by purposive
sampling with key civil society organisation leaders (n=7), activists (n=2)
and a politician (n=1). For the sake of the interviewees’ security, their names
have been anonymised throughout. All data collection was undertaken
before the resumption of armed conflict between the AA and sit-tat, but we
contend that the intercommunal Rohingya–Arakanese dynamics discussed
in the chapter remain unaltered.

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1. Acceptance needs How this 1. Rules of law and

(Rohingya identity) relationship has autonomous entity
2. Access needs developed in the 2. Devolution of minimum
(participation in the post-coup context Territorial of legislative and
political arena) Identity claim by autonomy executive powers
3. Security needs the Rohingya demand by the 3. Democracy and free
(protection of basic Arakanese elections
human rights) 4. Equality of civil rights
and general citizenship
rights

Portracted social conflict

Political crisis: coup and resistance movement

Figure 10.1: The effect of political destruction (military coup) on the

protracted social conflict in Rakhine.
Source: Authors’ summary.

Post-coup changes in Rakhine State

The situation in Rakhine State had started to calm down before the Myanmar
sit-tat, led by Senior General Min Aung Hlaing, orchestrated the coup on
1 Feb 2021. The AA and the Myanmar sit-tat had agreed on a temporary
ceasefire just after the nationwide election held on 8 November 2020
(Myanmar Now 2020). The armed conflict then de-escalated, with no major
fighting for a year and a half, during which time the AA increased efforts
to install a civil administration as part of the implementation of the Way of
Rakhita (Kyaw Hsan Hlaing 2021a). While the rest of Myanmar responded
to the coup with widespread protests and a Civil Disobedience Movement,
Rakhine State did not see any major resistance, except in some southern
townships where a swift anti-coup demonstration occurred (Myanmar Now
2021a). However, Arakanese from Yangon took part in the General Strike
Committee of Nationalities—a loose coalition of ethnic groups formed to
organise protests. A civil society organisation (CSO) leader in Rakhine State
mentioned that the AA did not want those demonstrations to happen in
Rakhine, because the people had already faced the hardships of long-term
war and conflict (Interview, December 2021).
Several factors help to explain the limited participation of the Arakanese
in the nationwide movement against the coup: the joining of the Arakan
National Party to the putschists (the State Administration Council); the
impact of war over two years; and the high level of trust in the AA leadership,
who claim to be taking a unique path. Outstanding grievances over the
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 10. EVOLUTION OF COMMUNAL TENSIONS IN RAKHINE STATE AFTER THE COUP

NLD government’s handling of the conflict in Rakhine State also play

a role. Many Arakanese see the Committee Representing the Pyidaungsu
Hluttaw—a body formed by elected members of parliament—and the
NUG as effectively being the NLD, and many Arakanese view the NLD
and the military as being the same Bamar oppressors; consequently, they see
the coup as a conflict among the Bamar. A director of a Rakhine-based peace
organisation pointed out that the public in Rakhine showed sympathy when
people from other parts of the country faced a brutal military crackdown,
given their recent memories of the military’s human rights violations in
their own state. He also highlighted that since the majority of people were
focused on survival issues they were not aware of political developments
at a national level, particularly about the National Unity Consultative
Council (NUCC)—a broad-based, inclusive platform with the specific aim
of bringing together different forces around the federal democracy objective
(Interview, December 2021).
Political parties from Rakhine State feel pressured to stand with the people
from Rakhine State and face challenges in resisting the military’s coercive
measures as a result of its divide and rule approach (Interview, December
2021). According to one respondent, the Arakan League for Democracy
openly opposed the military coup but most other parties showed oblique
responses. A member of a non-profit organisation monitoring the conflict
in Rakhine pointed out that, although the AA has not publicly joined the
NUG and the NUCC, it is involved in fighting alongside other allies against
the military in other parts of the country; allegedly, the AA is training local
People’s Defence Forces (PDF), which have been formed to fight against the
military (Interview, December 2021). In addition, local youth in Rakhine
State mobilised funds for the victims of Thantlang (BNI 2021), a town set
on fire by the military, and there are cases of youths being arrested by the
military for allegedly providing funding to the PDF (DMG 2021b, 2021c).
For the Rohingya community, the military coup has meant delaying
the repatriation and settlement of refugees who fled to Bangladesh and
internally displaced persons (IDPs) within Myanmar. The general Rohingya
population from Rakhine State, like the Arakanese, was not fully aware of
the political developments in the post-coup situation and, unsurprisingly,
was unable to organise any resistance. They cautiously welcomed the NUG’s
statement announcing that ‘the Rohingyas are entitled to citizenship by laws
that will accord with fundamental human rights, norms and democratic
federal principles’ (NUG 2021). In contrast, the Arakanese were upset by
the use of the term Rohingya; they accused the NUG of failing to engage
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in proper consultation (with them) and of political trickery (Interviews

with CSO leaders, a youth activist and a political leader, December 2021 –
January 2022). A Rohingya youth activist living in an IDP camp in Rakhine
said that he fully supported the NUG’s recognition of the Rohingya because
of the military’s action that provoked the atrocities they faced in the past,
but he was not able to publicly state this (Interview, December 2021).
Instead of looking to the NUG and other political developments, many
Rohingya prioritise their relationship with the local Arakanese community
and the AA.
Both the Arakanese and Rohingya have suffered severely during the violent
conflict over the last decade. Armed conflict, access to basic needs, poverty
and striving for identity are all associated with the conflict in Rakhine State.
Although both communities have long contested their territorial autonomy,
the Arakanese and Rohingya still need to interact to fulfil their physical
and material needs. After the violent conflict of 2012, trust between the
two communities was eroded, inevitably impacting interactions in social
and economic activities. The conflict left 800,000 people in need of
humanitarian assistance due to displacement and clashes within Rakhine
State, while almost 1 million Rohingya fled to Bangladesh (UNOCHA
2021). According to some CSO leaders (Interviews, December 2021), in
the post-coup environment, the Rohingya can now travel to cities, such as
Sittwe and Mrauk-U, and between villages for basic needs, such as working
and accessing medical treatment, but they cannot travel to Myaepone or
Kyaukphyu. Proceeding with caution, the Rohingya travel only in the
daytime, even though there are no restrictions on travel at night (Interviews,
December 2021). Several respondents from CSOs expressed the view that
communication and interaction between the two communities on the
ground had improved and that the Arakanese welcomed Rohingya people
who were travelling and fulfilling their basic needs (Interviews, December
2021). By contrast, the restrictions imposed by the military on the Rohingya
limited travel both within Rakhine State as well as outside of it and required
the Rohingya to fill out travel approval forms and obtain approval from the
township administrative officer prior to any travel (CSO leader, interview,
December 2021; DMG 2022; Myo Htun 2021).
Although freedom of movement has improved to a certain degree post-
coup, no arrangements have been made for the repatriation of IDPs in the
near future. People in IDP camps, both Rohingya and Arakanese, do not
envisage returning to their villages. An Arakanese youth activist explained
that the main concerns for Arakanese IDPs are the deployment of military
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troops and the existence of landmines, while Rohingya IDPs are concerned
by the lack of durable solutions, such as guarantee of safety and livelihood
and the right to return to their places of origin (Interview, December 2021).
The resumption of armed conflict between the AA and the military since
these interviews were conducted only accentuates the sense of instability
of both sets of IDPs. There is no easy solution to the problem of IDPs
in Rakhine State; meanwhile, the people in the camps face numerous
challenges, including inadequate food.
If we look at intercommunal relations with this background of parallel
priorities, we find improvements in relations between the two communities
within Rakhine State. Certainly, it is clear that some progress has been
made in terms of social relations and that initiatives for social harmony
have had some good effects in both communities. Individuals and CSOs
from both communities continue to attempt to build trust for peaceful
coexistence. In a unique case, a Muslim teacher joined a monastery school
in Mrauk-U Township to teach Arakanese students English (DMG 2021a).
Similarly, a young Arakanese teacher now teaches Muslim students in
primary schools at the Muslim villages in Maungdaw Township (Western
News 2022b). In Pauktaw Township, Muslim villagers donated money
for the construction and general expenses of a new pagoda (Western News
2022a). Many people have made positive and welcoming comments about
these activities on social media. These examples demonstrate that both
communities have endeavoured, and are endeavouring, to build mutual
trust and peaceful coexistence after years of conflict.
A member of a youth organisation noted that, while some of the opposition
to the Rohingya identity has decreased, the word ‘Rohingya’ continues to
be problematic for some Rakhine community members who are not ready
to accept it due to concerns about the presumed political motives behind
it, such as demands for territorial rights and self-determination (Interview,
December 2021). The Arakanese assume that most activists and advocates
for the Rohingya identity are self-interested and unaware (or uninterested)
in the views of community members on the ground (Interview, December
2021). While recognition and acceptance of the Rohingya identity is an
important first step in granting the Rohingya meaningful participation in
political and economic institutions, currently, the Rohingya prioritise basic
material needs for their survival; therefore, they do not claim the identity
strongly on the ground, instead accepting the term Muslim for the sake
of better cooperation and interaction between the two communities
(Interview, December 2021). This does not necessarily mean that they do
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not want acceptance of their identity. A Rohingya diaspora activist noted

that Rohingya people from inside Rakhine State regularly contact activists
from around the world to continue fighting for their identity (Interview,
January 2022).

Restoration of autonomy in Rakhine State

The conflict in Rakhine cannot be analysed purely on the basis of the
interaction between two communities, the Arakanese and the Rohingya,
because it involves multi-causal factors and numerous other actors.
The actions of the military and the armed conflict, for example, have also
had a profound effect. The analysis should also consider the complexity
of Myanmar’s politics, and ethnic demands for territorial rights and
self-determination. The country officially classified 135 ethnic groups,
partitioned into eight major groups and subgroups, but Rohingya was
not on the list (Kipgen 2018). The failure to adequately share power and
accommodate diversity prompted several ethnic groups to take up arms
to fight for territorial rights and self-determination against the Bamar-
dominated central government (Kipgen 2018; Breen 2019).
The Arakanese are one such national minority in Myanmar who have
demanded territorial rights and self-determination through armed struggle.
Rakhine State enjoyed autonomy in the pre-colonial period until its
kingdom fell under the Bamar Konbaung Dynasty, following the invasion of
King Bodawphya in 1784 (Thawnghmung 2016). The claim of autonomy
by the AA links back to the Arakan Kingdom with the strategy of the Way
of Rakhita, the goal of which is to restore autonomy and self-determination
(Ye Min Zaw 2019). In an interview with a media outlet, the AA chief
admitted that the AA’s ultimate goal was an independent Rakhine State
(Parvez, Shafiqul Alam & Ashfaque Ronnie 2022).
After agreeing to an unofficial ceasefire with the military, the AA established
its governing power through an administration, a judicial system and
taxation (Parvez, Shafiqul Alam & Ashfaque Ronnie 2022). Rohingya
people are invited to participate in the AA’s administration system, but it
is only at the village and ward level (Interviews, December 2021). While
the Arakanese and Rohingya rely on the AA’s administration more than the
military regime’s (even more so post-coup), there have been complaints and
accusations of unfair treatment and power abuses by the authorities against

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Rohingya people (Interviews, December 2021 – January 2022). Thus, the

international community has concerns that the Rohingya will continue to
be marginalised if the AA gains full control over the region (Fox 2021).
Fundamental civil and political rights for all group members are essential
for establishing self-governance in a modern autonomous system
(Benedikter 2009). If the Rohingya are prevented from meaningful and
equal participation in the government of the Rakhine State, the challenge of
fulfilling their developmental human needs will remain. Although the AA’s
plan to fully respond to the Rohingya people is not yet clear, some progress
can be seen in the AA’s emerging policy and actions. For example, General
Twan Mrat Naing, leader of AA said:
We recognize the human rights and citizen rights of the Rohingyas
… It will take time to resolve this problem, especially with the
arguments on both sides regarding the ‘Rohingya’ identity of the
Rohingya people. (Parvez, Shafiqul Alam & Ashfaque Ronnie 2022)

According to Benedikter (2009), an autonomous territorial unit should

be arranged by legal mechanism, domestic or international, in a modern
autonomous system—not by territorial control by armed groups.
The governance of Rakhine State is currently split between the Myanmar
sit-tat and the AA, and is, therefore, highly contested. Nonetheless, since
the military coup, both the Arakanese and the Rohingya choose to submit
to the AA administration, rather than the military, wherever possible.
Consequently, regulations imposed by the military have not been able to be
enforced effectively in Rakhine State post-coup.
The NUG has attempted to coordinate with various ethnic armed
organisations in the fight against the military, promising to build a genuine
federal democracy (NUG n.d.). The AA refused the NUG’s invitation to
collaborate in this democratic revolution as they already have their own
political agenda. Therefore, the direction of power sharing between the
central government and the AA—even if the democratic forces win—
cannot be anticipated yet, although the NUG has released a federal charter
that would be its roadmap for state-building (NUCC 2021).
Meanwhile, the Arakanese fear that the Rohingya desire separation and
territorial rights, and this fear informs the continued deprivation of the
Rohingya identity. Though the Rohingya claim that they do not have
any plans for separation, there is compelling evidence of a movement for
territorial autonomy. For example, the Mujahid armed group, the Rohingya

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Independence Force (now the Rohingya Patriotic Front), the Rohingya

Solidarity Organization and the ARSA have all launched campaigns for self-
determination and territorial autonomy over the last seven decades, including
armed attacks. Some of these groups still remain active (Thawnghmung
2016; Ware 2015). The ARSA claimed that attacks against the military and
police forces in Rakhine State in 2016 were aimed at defending the rights
of the Rohingya people (Winchester 2017). These actions caused Rakhine
nationalists to become fearful of recognising Rohingya identity. However,
most Rohingya do not see the ARSA as representing their interests due its
suspected affiliation with the sit-tat (Interview, January 2022).
Rohingya participation in the AA’s administrative process is rare but not
unheard of. The Arakanese claim that the AA gives everyone equal opportunity
to become village administrators, regardless of ethnic background, and
allows Rohingya people to be heads of their village (Interview, December
2021). This marks a sharp break with the central government (Kyaw Hsan
Hlaing 2021b) and has helped to earn the trust of the Muslim community
(Interview, December 2021). Lack of access to social superstructures, such
as political participation and economic access, is one of the preconditions
of protracted social conflict. The AA has claimed that it will treat everyone
equally in terms of access to its administrative roles and police force, but it is
too early to see whether this is the case. Moving forward, the strategies and
actions the AA employs to influence the Rohingya community will become
a key factor in determining the future dynamics of the protracted conflict.
The AA has been trying to enforce the rule of law, but issues on the ground,
such as land disputes, tax collection and unequal treatment of Muslims,
continue to make this difficult (Interview, December 2021). A Rohingya
activist mentioned that some Rohingya within their community still feel
unable to speak out due to fear of reprisal (Interview, December 2021).
Such claims are criticised by Arakanese who believe that it is Rohingya from
abroad who are making the problem worse by interfering while the two
communities are trying to live together. Yet, many complaints about abuses
of power and unfair decisions by the AA’s administration for both Rohingya
and Arakanese people are evident on social media emanating from within
Rakhine State.

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Conclusion
The underlying conditions of the protracted social conflict in Rakhine
State remain unchallenged and unremediated. The multi-ethnic nature of
Myanmar, the deprivation of basic needs—particularly for the Rohingya—
and the role of the state, which is returning to a totalitarian regime after the
coup in February 2021, combined with the mobilisation of an international
diaspora, fulfils all the preconditions of a protracted social conflict.
The return to armed conflict in Rakhine State poses further challenges
for intercommunal relations. The claim of recognition and entitlements
from within the political and social structure of Myanmar for the
Rohingya identity was an outcome of collective action from a marginalised
community. The clash of narratives on the Rohingya identity is still strong,
particularly on the question of recognition as an indigenous people within
Myanmar. Although the name is still used with caution, both the Arakanese
and the NUG have agreed to the provision of fundamental human rights
and citizenship for the Rohingya. It should be noted that, presently, and in
accordance with the 1982 citizenship law, which the NUG has flagged it will
amend, the most privileged citizenship status in Myanmar is still associated
with indigenous ethnicity. Thus, currently, the Rohingya still have unequal
status with other ethnic groups, although they can apply for other types of
citizenship (e.g. associated or naturalised).
Meanwhile, the Arakanese community is steadily moving towards the claim
of territorial autonomy by invoking historical narratives and using military
power. The AA has become the leading force of the Arakanese political
movement and claims to be building an inclusive Arakan in which the
Rohingya will have a place and a role. But the Arakanese are still reluctant
to officially recognise the Rohingya identity, citing concerns of separatist
actions informed by historical evidence. The construction of identity by
both the Rohingya and the Arakanese as a matter of ‘communal actions
and strategies’ (which is a characteristic of protracted social conflicts) is an
issue that remains unresolved. The former sees themselves as an indigenous
ethnic group, while the latter promotes an ‘Arakanese identity’ based on
historical grievances. Yet, there are indications that the current conflict may
become latent, as both groups are motivated to avoid another round of
violence, especially given the longstanding hardships both have suffered
since the conflict of 2012.

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Social relationships between the two communities have improved due to

the conscious effort of both parties. The Rohingya have enjoyed a certain
degree of freedom of movement with no antagonism from the Arakanese,
although they are still unable to travel freely outside of Rakhine State
owing to military-imposed restrictions. The Arakanese and the Rohingya
have responded to Myanmar’s political crises in different ways. The former
distanced themselves from national politics and claimed they had their own
way of working towards autonomy, while the latter covertly supported the
NUG’s recognition of the Rohingya identity, being unable to express their
support explicitly, particularly within Rakhine State.

Recommendations for the international

community
This analysis leads to several implications and recommendations for the
international community. First, it highlights the need to engage directly with
concerned stakeholders in Rakhine State, mainly the AA from the Arakanese
side and representatives of Rohingya communities, both domestic leaders
and exiled activists. The trust in the AA by the Arakanese is substantial, and
the AA have huge leverage. For the Rohingya, local community leaders have
extensive knowledge of on-the-ground situations but are limited in their
capacity to speak freely due to safety concerns. Therefore, exiled Rohingya
human rights activists should also be consulted. A second recommendation
is to empower the civil society groups among the Rohingya communities.
Students and youths in the IDP camps are initiating self-help groups
and engaging informally with their Arakanese peers. These should be
strengthened and supported, and, where possible, educational assistance
and scholarships for youth from both communities should be provided.
Beyond this, the international community needs to support Myanmar’s
democratic transition. Myanmar is facing unprecedented challenges with
democratic backsliding and is at risk of becoming a regional humanitarian
catastrophe. The state and the majority group at the national level will
continue to play a role and this will affect the situation in Rakhine State.
Without addressing the structural issues and political impasse by which
military and/or authoritarian regimes continue to control state power,
both communities in Rakhine State are very likely to face another round
of atrocities. Part of this requires closely monitoring the development of
the ultra-nationalist movements that are backed by the military and

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opportunists. One of the root causes of discrimination against the Rohingya

is nationalistic sentiments fuelled by fake news and hate speech. Such
sentiments are seemingly still in the undercurrent but they could become
overt at any time.
Finally, the international community needs to adhere to the ‘do no harm’
principle and try to reduce Myanmar’s dependence on international aid.
The international community is cognisant of the scale of support required
for humanitarian reasons, but it must also explicitly understand the risk of
creating a situation in which Myanmar becomes dependent on such aid,
thereby undermining the capacity of the Myanmar people to build and
rebuild their own relationships.

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Udayakumar, S. P. 2004. ‘Reflections: Futures of Protracted Conflicts’. Futures 36:

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van Klinken, Gerry and Su Mon Thazin Aung. 2017. ‘The Contentious Politics of
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rakhine-state.html

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 11
Pandemic Weaponisation and
Non-State Welfare in Pre-
and Post-Coup Myanmar
Gerard McCarthy
Assistant Professor, International Institute of Social Studies
(The Hague) and Research Fellow, Asia Research Institute,
National University of Singapore

Saw Moo (pseudonym)

Independent scholar

Abstract
The Myanmar military’s seizure of power in February 2021 led to a
breakdown in the collaborative state–society relations that had characterised
the COVID-19 response during the first year of the pandemic. This
chapter examines the dynamics of cooperation and contention between
successive administrations (civilian and military) and the enduring role of
Myanmar’s vibrant, non-state charitable sector in pandemic response prior
to and following the coup. Assessing claims made prior to the coup that the
intermediation of state pandemic social aid was weaponised by the National
League for Democracy, the chapter focuses on how the junta’s abandonment
of the government’s limited social stimulus initiatives, and their adoption
of strategies to empower pro-military or neutral loyalists at a local level,
has fractured the state–society collaboration that had helped contain and
manage COVID-19 in 2020. The chapter identifies four key strategies

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through which the junta has sought to discipline Myanmar’s vibrant, non-
state social sector: suppressing perceived dissenters, empowering loyalists,
disciplining charitable actors and partnering with neutral welfare groups.
We conclude by reflecting on debates about the meaning of neutrality in the
context of the new dictatorship, urging the need for greater international
support to non-state welfare provision in the short term.

***
With the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic in early 2020, pre-existing
dynamics of economic inequality, political polarisation and democratic
decay were exacerbated globally and across Southeast Asia (Croissant 2020;
Aspinall et al. 2021; Gadarian, Goodman & Pepinsky 2022). Myanmar is
no exception in this regard, with the pandemic intensifying deeply ingrained
political divides, especially over the distribution of government social aid
to populations whose livelihoods were upheaved by the socioeconomic
downturn and lockdowns. Throughout the pandemic, both the elected
government of Aung San Suu Kyi and the military administration since
February 2021 were accused of exploiting COVID-19 to benefit their
political allies and entrench their social dominance. This chapter assesses
these claims by examining the dynamics of what we term pandemic
weaponisation before and after the military’s return to power in February
2021. Initially enlisted by critics of the National League for Democracy
(NLD) to describe pandemic response efforts in 2020, we use the concept
of weaponisation to examine patterns of state–society relations before and
after the military coup. We argue that, whereas the NLD government
encouraged non-state social responses during 2020, after seizing power in
February 2021, the State Administrative Council (SAC) brutally suppressed
political opposition and disrupted non-state pandemic responses. The result
has been the fracturing of state attempts to manage the pandemic via societal
partners while paradoxically heightening reliance on neighbourhood and
charitable response efforts to survive and resist the dictatorship.
This chapter draws on a national survey conducted in January 2021 by
the co-authors and colleagues at The Australian National University, the
University of Massachusetts and Innovations for Poverty Action, along with
over 50 interviews with ordinary people, political candidates and welfare
activists conducted prior to and after the 2021 military coup. Interviews
with respondents in seven states and regions were conducted between

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11. PANDEMIC WEAPONISATION AND NON-STATE WELFARE IN PRE- AND POST-COUP MYANMAR

2020 and 2022 by a team of research assistants trained and coordinated

by the co-authors. To manage COVID-19 and post-coup safety concerns,
the bulk of discussions occurred virtually via encrypted communications.
Transcripts were anonymised and translated into English and are available
via a public archive.1
The sections of this chapter proceed by outlining the socioeconomic
impacts of COVID-19 and governmental social responses, initially during
the civilian government and then since the return to military dictatorship.
The first section analyses the inadequacy and limitations of state social
aid during 2020 and how these dynamics fed claims of politicisation and
pandemic weaponisation by minority parties and interests against the NLD
government in the months prior to the February 2021 coup. The second
section highlights the junta’s abandonment of the NLD government’s limited
social stimulus initiatives and examines how the collapse of state–society
cooperation impacted pandemic health and social responses during 2021.
Informed by interviews with grassroots welfare activists and businesspeople
since the coup, the third section highlights how the junta’s suppression of
charitable COVID-19 response efforts and dismissal of striking government
staff further entrenched the role of private, communal and ethnic social
service providers both in providing aid and in sustaining resistance to the
new dictatorship.
The chapter concludes that the nascent state–society cooperation of the
NLD-era has come to a dramatic end since the coup, deepening the reliance
of ordinary people on private and non-state providers. In this sense, the
weaponisation of COVID-19 by the junta has compounded a process of
state social outsourcing that has been ongoing for decades, entrenching
societal reliance on non-state social actors both to survive and resist the
dictatorship (McCarthy 2023).

1 English versions of transcripts from selected oral history interviews focusing on the pandemic
and conducted with Myanmar respondents between 2020 and 2022, including several cited here, are
accessible from the National University of Singapore Asia Research Institute archive for the ‘Living with
COVID-19 in Southeast Asia’ project: ec2-54-169-180-248.ap-southeast-1.compute.amazonaws.com/
omeka-s/s/living-with-covid-19-in-sea/page/welcome

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Pandemic response under the NLD

(January 2020 – January 2021)

Health and social impacts of COVID-19

The arrival of COVID-19 in Myanmar claimed fewer lives in the initial
months of the pandemic than in global hotspots in Europe, the United
Kingdom and the United States. A variety of factors helped reduce the
transmission and severity of cases in the first few months of the pandemic.
These included a rapid drop in incoming visitors from hotspot countries,
along with community willingness to set up and run quarantine facilities
and partner with local administrators to enforce health protocols.
Even though the initial wave of COVID-19 cases was relatively modest,
by March 2020 Myanmar’s historically under-resourced health system was
strained. This was especially the case in Yangon where there were shortages
of protective gear for medical personnel and overcrowding of hospital
facilities. In response, the elected government, after initially downplaying
the virus, began restricting non-essential entry to the country and expanded
resourcing for the health response by redirecting domestic budgets to
pandemic response and soliciting international aid.
In late March 2020, it became clear that Myanmar was experiencing
a catastrophic economic downturn far worse than the direct and immediate
health mortality of the virus. Disruptions to global supply chains, border
closures and declining global demand in trade-exposed industries, such
as garment manufacturing and tourism, prompted layoffs across major
sectors of Myanmar’s economy, precipitating rapid declines in Myanmar’s
agricultural exports (World Bank 2020). Meanwhile, the government’s
imposition of lockdowns and market closures in urban centres, along with
the laying-off of Myanmar migrant workers abroad, hit the remittances on
which many households had become reliant.
Just prior to the Burmese New Year (Thingyan) in April 2020, the NLD
government announced its COVID-19 Economic Relief Plan. Informed
by modelling that predicted significant shrinkage in Myanmar’s economy
and a spike in poverty rates in the absence of government action, the initial
USD2 billion stimulus package, supported partly by international partners,
comprised spending for emergency loans to businesses and trade financing
(Bello et al. 2020). It also included around USD210 million in cash and food

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11. PANDEMIC WEAPONISATION AND NON-STATE WELFARE IN PRE- AND POST-COUP MYANMAR

to support the most vulnerable (Kyaw San Wai 2020). The initial package
accounted for 2.5–3 per cent of Myanmar’s gross domestic product, below
the average Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) commitment
of 3.7 per cent and significantly less than Thailand, which had committed
close to 9 per cent by mid-2020 (Martinus & Seah 2020).
The design of the package was constrained by Myanmar’s minimal tax
revenue, skeletal social welfare state bequeathed by decades of autocratic
austerity and the intimacy of business networks with the NLD who had
advocated against tax reform. The vast majority of funds ultimately benefited
large formal businesses, comprising less than half of Myanmar’s economy.
Meanwhile, assistance provided to the needy, initially ration packs during
Thingyan in 2020 and later cash payments, were distributed on an explicitly
one-off basis to deter expectations of ongoing entitlement to state support.
A severe wave of COVID-19 infections in July 2020 led to further
degradation in the economic and health situation. Yet state aid remained
insufficient, constrained by the reluctance of Myanmar’s policymakers
to accrue sovereign debt and the absence of a well-developed state social
apparatus capable of distributing aid directly to needy households. As a
result, few households and businesses received any state social aid during
2020. A January 2021 national survey of 700 respondents from across
all states and regions conducted by the co-authors in partnership with
The Australian National University and locals found that almost 80 per
cent of households had reduced food intake in the seven days prior, while
30 per cent reported taking on new loans—often with interest—to pay for
basic necessities (McCarthy, Ross & Myat The Thitsar 2021). Of the overall
sample, fewer than 25 per cent of respondents reported having received
government aid in January 2021, significantly less than in Thailand (68 per
cent), Indonesia (46 per cent) and Malaysia (71 per cent) where the same
questions were asked (McCarthy 2021). In Myanmar, those who received
government support said it often lasted no more than a few days, with
60 per cent saying it lasted less than a week.
In addition to being insufficient to meet needs, government aid in 2020
was poorly targeted, leaving many confused as to why their equally poor
neighbours received support while they did not. This pattern was borne
out in the January 2021 survey, with households who were reducing meals
in the seven days prior to the survey only slightly more likely (3 per cent)
to have received government aid via rations or cash transfers than their less
needy neighbours. For minority party supporters, the limitations of the

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state’s social response fed a larger narrative about the NLD government’s
exploitation of the pandemic for political benefit and broader majoritarian
approach to opposition. These perceptions were especially strong in Rakhine
State, where, with the support of the civilian government, the intensification
of conflict between the Myanmar armed forces (Tatmadaw or sit-tat)2 and
the Arakan Army throughout 2020 was seen as posing a far greater threat to
the lives of ordinary people than COVID-19 (Khin Khin Mra 2020).

Political polarisation of government pandemic

management
The inadequacy and poor targeting of government social aid became a
partisan obsession for non-NLD party activists in the run-up to and following
the November 2020 elections. Minority party supporters complained that
the government was using the pandemic, especially the stimulus package, to
reward supporters and punish critics. The polarisation of perspectives was
borne out in more than 30 interviews and in the national survey conducted
prior to the coup—both of which highlighted the mediating role of partisan
identity in shaping perceptions of governmental social aid.
Respondents from NLD backgrounds recognised flaws in the government’s
management of COVID-19, with 40 per cent in the national survey
saying that government aid was not being distributed fairly or to the
neediest. However, in interviews, voters in NLD strongholds such as
lowland Myanmar tended to attribute these flaws to local confusion and
administrative inadequacy rather than systematic failure or corruption on
the part of the NLD government. A 67-year-old ethnic Bamar (majority
ethnic group) shopkeeper from central Myanmar, for instance, recounted
how neighbours blamed their local administrators for their exclusion from
state social aid:
Some of my neighbours did not get the [government] assistance,
which made some tensions in the neighbourhood. Some went to
the ward office to complain regarding why some people got the
assistance, and some were excluded. (Interview, October 2020)

2 Since the February 2021 military coup and subsequent atrocities against civilians, some Myanmar
scholars have debated the linguistic politics of referring to Myanmar’s state army with its chosen moniker
of Tatmadaw given that the honorific ‘daw’ implies royal or glorious status. Some have preferred to
label it sit-tat, simply meaning ‘military’, though there are linguistic and analytical implications and
limitations to using that term as well (see Aung Kaung Myat 2022). Consequently, we prefer to use the
terms ‘state army’ or ‘armed forces’ to refer to the Tatmadaw.

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Supporters of small political parties that won very few head-to-head

races with the NLD at the 2015 and 2020 elections were more critical of
government social aid. Some viewed it as an example of NLD malfeasance.
For example, 69 per cent of Union Solidarity and Development Party
(USDP) voters and 48 per cent of ethnic minority party supporters surveyed
just prior to the 2021 coup said that government COVID-19 assistance
was not reaching the households who needed it most. In interviews, several
minority party supporters described the mediation of government aid via
township COVID-19 response committees led by members of parliament,
along with eligibility checks and distribution efforts led by ward and
village-tract administrators, as a form of vote-buying. As many of the
officials and informal community representatives involved were elected or
appointed during the NLD term (and were often supporters of the party),
those who missed out or received minimal state aid during 2020, especially
ethnic minorities and supporters of the USDP, felt that NLD loyalists were
exploiting their role to benefit supporters and exclude partisan opponents
and non-Bamar voters. Social media posts claiming that NLD candidates
were describing pandemic social aid as a gift from the party for which voters
should be grateful reinforced these perceptions. A 31-year-old teacher and
election booth staffer in Mon State described one such post she encountered
online just prior to the November 2020 election:
I heard people who received financial support are not all poor
families and widows and that some middle-class people also received
money. I also saw on social media a post from an ethnic Mon woman
who said that the village administrator who is an NLD supporter
used the COVID-19 support to buy votes from the villagers. The
woman refused support and said, ‘I cannot sell my vote to this
peacock party [symbol of the NLD]’. She became famous and Mon
people [on Facebook] praised her for being brave enough to speak
out. (Interview, November 2020)

It is important to note that the mediation of state social aid by political

officials prior to the November 2020 election—which some supporters
of minority parties labelled as political corruption—is unlikely to have
influenced the outcome of the election. After all, the majoritarian nature
of Myanmar’s first-past-the-post electoral system ensured that the NLD,
which won a plurality of the vote in the vast majority of seats, secured more
than 80 per cent of seats in parliament.

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Despite this, stories about corrupt dispersal of state pandemic social aid
are important as they circulated within USDP, military and some ethnic
minority social media pages in the weeks and months prior to the November
2020 election and in the period immediately prior to the coup. These stories
framed the NLD government as exploiting its response to the pandemic to
weaken its rivals and further strengthen its political position, despite the
spike in COVID-19 infections in the months prior to the election (Strangio
2020). Examples of alleged biases in state social aid along with restrictions
on minority party campaigning, while NLD chief ministers and members
of parliament travelled widely to coordinate the pandemic response, helped
feed a narrative among non-NLD supporters that led to calls for military
intervention into the electoral process. Social media posts detailing the
movements of NLD politicians amid COVID-19 circulated widely among
pro-military, USDP and some minority party Facebook pages in mid to late
2020 and early 2021 (Author, digital fieldnotes 2020). Indeed, the decision
by the NLD-appointed Union Election Commission (UEC) to host the
election in November 2020, despite complaints from USDP and military
representatives about pandemic restrictions on campaigning and canvassing
with voters, was cited repeatedly by non-NLD supporters in the oral history
interviews. As a candidate for a pro-USDP party in Yangon stated prior to
the coup:
I believe that the government is biased toward the NLD party
which is why we failed to implement effective campaigns …
I have heard stories of vote-buying by candidates but there isn’t
any plan to investigate the allegations … the government together
with the Union Election Commission did not listen to our voices
[as minor parties] and conducted the election anyway. (Interview,
December 2020)

For some non-NLD voters, the UEC’s reluctance to investigate reports of

vote-buying, along with irregularities during the election, were signs that
the NLD was exploiting its incumbency to further strengthen its dominance
while avoiding scrutiny. These concerns were echoed in complaints from
ethnic Arakan political elites in October 2020 who viewed the UEC’s
decision not to run elections in the vast bulk of Rakhine State as the
deliberate disenfranchisement of 1.5 million potential voters (Fishbein &
Kyaw Hsan Hlaing 2020). These grievances, especially about the conduct of
the election, were later cited by the military to justify its seizure of power in
February 2021, and formed the basis for the junta’s later charges of corruption
and voter fraud against the NLD (Lee 2021). Though governance of the

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11. PANDEMIC WEAPONISATION AND NON-STATE WELFARE IN PRE- AND POST-COUP MYANMAR

pandemic, and especially state aid, was highly politicised in 2020, alongside
these controversies non-state social actors played a significant, albeit less
high-profile, role in leading grassroots response efforts across the country.

Non-state pandemic response efforts

From the early days of the pandemic, the NLD government actively
encouraged societal collaboration and partnerships in response efforts at
both the national and local level. Political leaders encouraged diverse non-
state actors to fill gaps in social welfare and public goods provision. In the
weeks prior to the coup, the NLD government even established a fund for
businesspeople and ordinary citizens to donate to Myanmar’s efforts to
procure vaccines (Zaw Zaw Htwe 2021).
Early in the pandemic, state officials encouraged township, neighbourhood
and village welfare groups, charities, ethnic civil society groups,
businesspeople and religious leaders to take on critical roles in the
pandemic response at a sub-national level (Rhoads et al. 2020). These
non-state networks assumed major roles in local response efforts, including
quarantine, transport of patients, relief coordination, supplementation of
service providers and enforcement of restrictions (Nay Yan Oo & Batcheler
2020). Armed groups and ethnic civil society groups coordinated with
the Ministry of Health and Sport on public education and, later in 2020,
vaccinations, building on ongoing collaboration over the five or so years
prior (Si Thura & Schroeder 2018).
The leader of a social welfare group in a contested region of Karen State
described being directly integrated into COVID-19 committee structures
established by the government to coordinate response efforts across sectors:
During the first and second wave [in 2020] we worked with the
township committee to stretch resources given by government to
meet local needs for oxygen, food, transportation … with support
from General Administration Department [GAD] we also opened
a health screening centre where general sickness were treated and
those with more serious medical issues were referred to government
public hospital … the GAD office provided allowances to volunteers
during second wave, 4500 MMK were given to the volunteers for
60 days as a food allowance. (Interview, January 2022)

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Similar dynamics of collaboration between societal actors and the state were
described at a village level in a ceasefire area of Mon State. As the leader
of a village welfare group recounted of response efforts in 2020:
During the second wave [in mid-2020], the village COVID-19
committee included our parahita [social welfare] organisation and
the local monk. Together we helped to raise funds and contribute
oxygen canisters when the administrator’s supply had run out.
(Interview, February 2022)

These collaborative dynamics shifted markedly after February 2021 when

the Myanmar military seized direct power once again. The coup, arrest
of elected civilian leaders and subsequent brutal suppression of protests
provoked an extraordinary civilian mobilisation against the dictatorship.
It also ruptured the partnership between state and societal actors to manage
the pandemic and extend state social aid through additional contributions
and resource pooling at the community level. Since then, ordinary
people have relied more than ever on non-state networks and practices of
reciprocity, both to survive the economic collapse and the pandemic and
to sustain resistance to the renewed dictatorship (Wittekind 2021). The
following section examines these dynamics as they have developed in light
of the February 2021 coup, identifying how the rupture of the pre-coup
state–society pandemic response has been a crucial component of the junta’s
strategy to root out and discipline local administrative networks and social
groups sympathetic to the NLD and democratic struggle more broadly.

Post-coup management of COVID-19

Since February 2021, the SAC, led by Senior General Min Aung Hlaing,
has used COVID-19 to wrest control over local administration and weaken
networks it views as affiliated with the previous NLD government. Four
key strategies have been deployed to discipline Myanmar’s vibrant, non-
state social sector: suppression of perceived dissent, empowerment of
loyalists, disciplining of charitable actors and partnerships with neutral
welfare groups. These strategies have markedly altered pre-coup patterns
of state–society cooperation around the pandemic, likely worsening the
mortality and socioeconomic impacts of the Delta wave of COVID-19
and prompting intense debate within Myanmar’s charitable sector over the
meaning of neutrality in the context of the new dictatorship.

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11. PANDEMIC WEAPONISATION AND NON-STATE WELFARE IN PRE- AND POST-COUP MYANMAR

Suppression of dissent
Consistent with the junta’s reliance on violence to maintain power and
its refusal to tolerate dissent or negotiate with dissenters, since February
2021, military officials have engaged in the widespread suppression of non-
state welfare groups perceived to be materially supporting the anti-junta
resistance. This has fractured the national and sub-national health response
that relied heavily on collaboration with societal actors and the public at
large, particularly at a local level.
Immediately upon taking power, the junta arrested or suspended civil
servants who had taken leading roles in the pandemic response, including
coordinators of the national vaccination rollout that was just commencing
in early 2021. In reaction to the coup, tens of thousands of medical staff
at public facilities across the country walked off the job in an act of civil
disobedience. Military personnel responded by harassing, coercing and,
in some cases, directly attacking doctors and nurses, including some who
had begun treating patients at charitable and private clinics or ambulance
services that the junta viewed as aligned with the escalating protest
movement (Dziedzic 2021). The Ministry of Health and Sport ultimately
dismissed thousands of nurses, teachers and civil servants across ministries
in response to their opposition to the coup, structurally undermining the
already overstretched pandemic response.
Consistent with the broader boycott of government services and payment
of taxes by the Civil Disobedience Movement, many patients also began to
actively avoid government health facilities and resources following the coup
(RFA 2021). This boycott became most obvious during the outbreak of the
Delta wave of COVID-19 in mid-2021. Rather than seek care or supplies
from state facilities, many patients and their family members instead sought
treatment at charitable and private clinics, and attempted to procure oxygen
canisters on the open market. In a context in which oxygen was already
in short supply regionally due to the pandemic, junta officials attempted
to counter the private procurement of breathing apparatuses and oxygen
by centralising canister distribution through junta, USDP and military
networks. Reports emerged of the forcible removal of oxygen canisters
procured privately from critically ill COVID-19 patients, attracting domestic
and international outrage (Irrawaddy 2021). These efforts were justifiably
viewed by many in Myanmar as an attempt to weaponise the pandemic for

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political gain by forcing ordinary people opposed to the new dictatorship to

engage with the junta’s structures and networks if they wanted their family
members to survive.
The spread of COVID-19 during the Delta wave was likely exacerbated by
the junta’s attempts to suppress dissent and coerce patients and their families
into relying on state resources. Many patients who contracted COVID-19
were forced to stay in state-led quarantine or isolation centres or were
hospitalised at public facilities where, due to the strikes caused by the coup
and shortages of medical supplies, many subsequently died. The military
also raided charity and underground clinics that provided healthcare to
patients, including those with COVID-19 (Esther J 2021).
The junta’s Ministry of Health recorded 14,401 deaths in public facilities
across the country during the peak of the Delta wave between July and
September 2021; however, this excluded those who died at home or
in private and charitable facilities (Frontier Myanmar 2022). Regional
government and welfare group data on burials and cremations at Yangon’s
four main cemeteries provide a snapshot of the massive, unacknowledged
death toll of COVID-19 in Myanmar following the coup. Their data, cited
by Frontier Myanmar (2022), suggest that more than 30,000 people died in
Yangon alone during the peak of the Delta wave.
The dire human consequences of the coup further eroded faith in the
remaining staff at government health facilities, deepening popular grievances
against the junta and reinvigorating the Civil Disobedience Movement in
the second half of 2021. As the leader of a parahita (social welfare) group,
which coordinated treatment for COVID-19 patients in a contested region
of Myanmar throughout the Delta outbreak, explained: ‘People do not trust
[the staff ] at government facilities so they just simply avoid getting their
help’ (Interview, January 2022).

Empowerment of junta loyalists

Alongside junta attempts to coerce popular reliance on state networks has
been the wholesale replacement of local governance and pandemic response
teams with USDP and military loyalists. Across several contexts, including
contested and ceasefire areas, welfare volunteers who had previously been
members of village and township COVID-19 management committees
in 2020 described being sidelined after the coup. Reflecting mutual
distrust between regime loyalists and social actors previously involved in

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collaborative local pandemic response, junta administrators formed new

committees at village and township levels and filled these positions with
people affiliated with the USDP or who they viewed as apolitical or unlikely
to align themselves with democratic resistance efforts. As one interviewee
explained:
We did some collaborative work with the [NLD] government
previously, before the coup, and for that, they offered to donate some
funds. However, for the work we have been doing after the coup,
they [SAC administration] have never offered to work together or
donate some money … But a few other businesses in our group were
contacted directly by the regime … Maybe they [SAC officials] did
not contact us because we currently chose to stay low profile and
did not contact them. (Interview, January 2022)

The sidelining of local welfare groups involved in the COVID-19 response,

and reliance instead on ostensibly neutral or loyalist businesspeople, broke
the supplementary relationship between non-state charitable actors and
government officials that had helped patch the significant gaps in resourcing
throughout the first waves of COVID-19 in 2020.
The collapse of state–society trust as a result of the coup has been especially
acute in contexts where junta administrators perceive monks to be supporting
anti-coup resistance efforts; thus, local SAC COVID-19 committees have
bypassed and sidelined local monastic networks. Fear of recrimination from
the junta has also resulted in substantial declines in donations from wealthy
businesspeople and private donors to local charitable efforts, as they are often
unsure whether these groups are supporting the junta, opposing the coup
or directly sustaining resistance efforts. As perceived support for resistance
efforts can lead to the junta freezing bank accounts, boycotting businesses
or arrest, some businesspeople have withdrawn from philanthropic efforts
entirely in order to avoid such risks. Many parahita groups, meanwhile, have
sought to prove that they are apolitical by regularly posting their charitable
activities on Facebook as a means of appeasing their donors (Author notes,
May 2022). Requiring local charitable actors to reframe their activities as
‘apolitical’ despite them directly supplementing for the social inaction of
the state and responding to human insecurity created by its atrocities bears
striking similarities to the depoliticisation of the parahita sector during
the 1990s and 2000s (McCarthy 2016, 2023).

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Dynamics of mutual distrust with local charitable and religious actors

have also undermined the junta’s attempted rollout of COVID-19
vaccinations. Several interviewees alleged that people loyal to the junta were
the first to receive vaccinations in their communities. Others reportedly
refused the vaccine, despite its availability, due to it being distributed by
SAC representatives and because the Sinovax shot they were offered was
viewed as inferior and riskier relative to other vaccines. Consequentially
and worryingly, despite having regular and direct contact with COVID-19
patients, only a handful of the charity workers interviewed since the coup
reported being fully vaccinated.

Disciplining charitable actors

At the same time as seeking to control and redirect the pandemic response
and resources through loyalists, and suppressing networks it sees as
supporting resistance, the junta has also sought to selectively partner with,
and strategically regulate, non-state social actors to advance the regime’s
objectives. The most direct way that the military has surveilled the parahita
sector is by requiring groups and volunteers to be endorsed by junta officials
and tightening control over where they source their funds.
Since the coup, military checkpoints have been set up in many cities, towns
and on significant inter-town arteries to monitor the movement of people
and goods, ostensibly for both pandemic and security purposes. In some
cases, local parahita groups have been enlisted to help run these checkpoints
(Author notes, May 2022). The military and state personnel manning
these checkpoints require letters of recommendation from local SAC-
affiliated administrators to permit volunteers to pass through. Without
such documentation, volunteers are harassed and, in some cases, accused
of supporting the democratic resistance. Social workers seeking to engage
in charitable action in the post-coup context are, thus, forced to cultivate
workable relationships with village or township SAC officials to solicit
endorsement letters they can then show at checkpoints. In addition to
forcing charitable workers to accede to the regulatory power of SAC
authorities, these requirements also place the onus on volunteers to avoid
actions that may be viewed by local administrators as in any way supporting
the democratic resistance.
As well as tightening financial flows into the country to starve funding for
anti-coup activities, the SAC has become more stringent about requiring
formal registration of any welfare group—large or small, local or national—
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with the junta before they can receive international funds. The Central
Bank also restricts the flow of funds from large humanitarian organisations
to small community organisations by requiring extensive documentation
justifying each transfer. These new constraints build on earlier moves by
the USDP and NLD administrations to regulate local civil society and any
international financial support they may receive. In the post-coup context,
if the leaders of a group are found to be receiving funds from abroad without
registration, they risk being accused of being financial supporters of the
People’s Defence Forces or other local resistance efforts. Despite the severe
socioeconomic situation created by both the pandemic and the coup, many
groups that had relied on funds wired from diaspora networks abroad or
international donors to local Myanmar bank accounts to support pandemic
response efforts in 2020 have scaled back their activities since the return
to military rule. The pastor of a village church in a contested region of
Myanmar that had received funds in 2020 from international Christian
networks to support COVID-19 relief explained that they had had to cut
back their aid considerably as they had not been able to receive or withdraw
their funds easily since the coup. The tightening of financial regulation
around foreign charitable donations has only been compounded by the
catastrophic financial sector crisis brought about by the coup (see Chapter
3, this volume). Though it is understood that some welfare groups have
turned to informal financial transfer networks (hundi) to funnel money
from abroad to support their efforts, this channel was not mentioned by
any respondents interviewed for this project. However, it is clear that the
operational barriers to parahita and civil society work within Myanmar
have sparked a new exodus of people and organisations to Thailand and
India since the coup, as well as a growing reliance on informal networks to
transfer funds to local partners and beneficiaries (Author notes, May 2022).

Strategic partnership
Within the larger context of the junta suppressing dissent and disciplining
Myanmar’s charitable sector, SAC officials have also sought to achieve their
objectives by strategically partnering with, and resourcing, non-state social
actors willing to accept a stringent notion of neutrality in the post-coup
context. The clearest examples of such pragmatism are in contexts where
local administrators and General Administration Department (GAD) staff
have collaborated in the past with local social welfare groups or where the
existence of ethnic armed organisations had led to a degree of flexibility
about state engagement with diverse actors prior to the coup.

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The closest relationship between SAC authorities and non-state social

actors we encountered was in a contested area under mixed administration
by an armed group and Myanmar government agencies. In this township,
the parahita group reported receiving monthly stipends from the GAD
township office during 2020 to support their role in COVID-19 treatment
and transport. This cooperative relationship had continued beyond the coup.
Volunteers shielded medical staff who did not join the Civil Disobedience
Movement by guarding the local hospital from potential attacks by armed
groups during the peak of the 2021 Delta wave. Members of the group
also continued to be offered, and to accept, stipends from the GAD office
for these efforts in mid-2021. Building on the role they played prior to the
coup, these volunteers continued to act as mediators for patient transport
between local armed groups, the People’s Defence Forces and Myanmar’s
state army in 2021 and into 2022, much as non-state social actors such as
churches have done in contested regions for decades.
The collaboration between charitable actors and local SAC officials
appears to be highly contextual and seemingly dependent on pre-existing
relationships developed between welfare volunteers and GAD officers
stationed in the area prior to the coup. Numerous parahita groups that had
played an active role in the pandemic response during 2020 reported being
sidelined from local efforts in preference for loyalist local businesspeople.
In a context of strict regulation of dissent and the tightening of state
controls over non-state social actors, the willingness of some groups to
engage with and directly endorse the junta has prompted intense debate
within Myanmar civil society about the nature of humanitarian neutrality.

Neutrality tensions
Several local welfare activists interviewed for this project criticised groups
for engaging with the SAC, as doing so had the appearance of taking sides in
the larger political conflict. The leader of an ambulance and funeral group
active in the COVID-19 response argued that the cooption of welfare groups
by SAC officials ran the risk of undermining the popular respect and ethical
consistency that Myanmar’s charitable sector relied upon to function:
I went to attend a government meeting in [the state capital] recently,
and witnessed some of them had a very close relationship with the
new [SAC] chief minister … Personally, just leaning toward one
authority is something I would never do. Because of these parahita

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11. PANDEMIC WEAPONISATION AND NON-STATE WELFARE IN PRE- AND POST-COUP MYANMAR

groups that are partnering with the military, other non-partisan

parahita groups are also negatively viewed and judged by people.
(Interview, January 2022)

In addition to navigating the SAC’s tightening surveillance, welfare groups

are thus faced with difficult trade-offs between principles and pragmatism—
both personally and organisationally—in order to operate in the post-coup
context. As the leader of a township-focused group that directly engaged
with GAD officials to transport patients explained, at stake is a question
of humanitarian neutrality:
For us it doesn’t matter where the patients are coming from …
whether NUG [National Unity Government], [armed group] or
military areas, we will do our best to support those who need our
help … we need to work with all authorities to get the work done.
We take training from NUG online, review their COVID materials
… Sometimes, if there is some support the military government can
provide, we need to work with them too. We cannot just take sides
as the organisation. (Interview, January 2022)

However, organisational neutrality did not constrain some volunteers who

engaged pragmatically with SAC officials during the peak of the Delta
wave from expressing personal grievances about the coup. Several welfare
volunteers, who otherwise maintained pragmatic and open relationships
with GAD township administrators after the coup, claimed to have
publicly advocated a return to democracy on social media, with no obvious
ramifications for them or the organisations with which they worked
(Interview, January 2022).
The notion of separating personal ethics from organisational neutrality in the
context of dictatorship is highly contentious within Myanmar’s charitable
sector. As Myanmar activist Khin Omar (2021) argued post-coup:
Myanmar’s humanitarian needs are overwhelming, but they cannot
be met by engaging with the same perpetrators of the grave human
rights abuses that relief aid intends to address … there is nothing
neutral about engaging with the military junta.

Amid broader discussions about whether and how the international

community can deliver urgently needed humanitarian aid across Myanmar
without directing it through the SAC (see Décobert, Chapter 12, this
volume), post-coup debates about the neutrality—both organisational and
personal—of Myanmar’s non-state welfare sector raise thorny questions
about the ethical and practical risks of partnering with local charitable actors
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in townships where the SAC retains an administrative presence. Is it safe

and feasible to partner with local non-state actors to disburse aid given the
national context of rigid discipline within which such groups must operate?
Or is the international community obliged to recognise and support the
heroic work that many charitable groups are doing in the post-coup context
rather than solely partnering with the junta?
The humanitarian agreement reached between the SAC and ASEAN
in May 2022 suggests that regional neighbours are, for now, willing to
partner with the SAC and the military in an attempt to distribute aid and
relief as the post-coup humanitarian crisis intensifies (ASEAN 2022). The
exclusion of the National Unity Government, ethnic armed organisations
and local civil society in these dialogues and subsequent aid distribution
risks compounding conflict in an already fractious political context. Given
that the coercive developmental expansionism of Myanmar’s state army
into contested areas was stretching tenuous ceasefires to breaking point
before the coup (McCarthy & Farrelly 2020), empowering the military
to broker international aid will only enable the SAC to further discipline
and neutralise its critics and depict itself domestically and internationally
as a legitimate and compassionate authority. As Myanmar regional and
international organisations argued in response to ASEAN’s humanitarian
partnership with the SAC in mid-2022, allowing the junta to ‘weaponise
humanitarian aid’ is likely to result in the exclusion of many vulnerable
people from urgently needed relief while implicating the regional bloc in
the junta’s ongoing atrocities (Progressive Voice 2022).

Conclusion
The pandemic and its management via collaborative state–society relations
in 2020 exacerbated pre-existing fractures in Myanmar’s society and
political system. Comparing state–society cooperation in relation to the
pandemic in 2020 with the junta’s suppression of NLD-affiliated charity
groups and empowerment of ostensibly neutral social partners, this chapter
has argued that the perceived weaponisation of the pandemic by successive
state authorities highlights the marked political and sociological impact of
COVID-19, both prior to and after the February 2021 coup.
Non-state social actors affiliated with the NLD have been suppressed and
disempowered, fracturing the pandemic response and likely worsening
mortality during the peak of the Delta wave in the second half of 2021.
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11. PANDEMIC WEAPONISATION AND NON-STATE WELFARE IN PRE- AND POST-COUP MYANMAR

Meanwhile, the charitable sector as a whole has been simultaneously

disciplined and strategically coopted by SAC officials to help manage both
the pandemic and the humanitarian crisis created by the coup. In some
respects, this technique echoes the approach taken in the 1990s and 2000s
by the previous dictatorship that suppressed overly political civil society
groups and outsourced social functions to non-state social actors and
businesspeople. The most recent wave of post-coup outsourcing is likely
to similarly shape and distort welfare politics in Myanmar for years and
decades to comes (McCarthy 2023).
The urgent humanitarian crisis unfolding across Myanmar after the coup
raises questions about the prospective role of Myanmar’s vibrant non-state
charitable sector in any substantive short-term response, especially in a
context in which SAC administrators demand a degree of neutrality from
parahita volunteers that many see as compromising both individual and
organisational ethical integrity. ASEAN’s initial agreement in May 2022 to
partner with the junta on humanitarian aid comes with the risk that local
welfare groups will be bypassed in flows of international support brokered
and mediated by the Myanmar military despite their clear functional
capacity to deliver urgent relief in the vexed political context.
In the medium term, the deepening of societal reliance on non-state social
actors both to survive and resist dictatorship should compel strategic
thinking about how a future civilian government can better address the
precarity faced by ordinary people and put to rest the legacies of inequality
bequeathed by past and current periods of dictatorship.

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Aung Kaung Myat. 2022. ‘Sit-Tat or Tatmadaw? Debates on What to Call the
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 12
Localisation, Good
Humanitarianism and
Solidarity-Based Approaches
to Aid in Myanmar
Anne Décobert
Lecturer in Development Studies, Faculty of Arts,
University of Melbourne

Abstract
Responses to the multifaceted humanitarian emergency precipitated
by Myanmar’s 2021 military coup demonstrate the effectiveness of
localised aid. Yet localisation is not just about aid effectiveness, but
about humanitarian autonomy, rights and justice. In Myanmar’s Spring
Revolution, we are seeing not just ongoing resistance against the military
regime, but also growing resistance against unequal and unjust international
aid systems. Recognising the political and moral imperative of localisation
has implications for debates over the nature of, and principles that should
shape, international humanitarian engagement in Myanmar. In Myanmar’s
political and humanitarian crises, community-based and civil society actors
are striving not only to help their communities but also to shape their
country’s future—and they are calling for solidarity from international
actors. In a context in which normative neutrality can do harm, defining
‘good humanitarianism’ as promoting local agency and autonomy provides
a moral compass for international actors to navigate complex political and
ethical dilemmas.
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 AFTER THE COUP

***
The 2021 military coup in Myanmar has triggered immense suffering across
the country, with civilian populations impacted by escalating violence and
displacement, an evolving civil war on multiple fronts, an economic and
food security crisis, and a public health emergency within which the junta
has weaponised COVID-19. The resulting multifaceted humanitarian
emergency cannot be understood in isolation from Myanmar’s protracted
history of structural violence, injustice and conflict. Against the backdrop
of a political crisis triggered by the coup but which has its roots in this long
history, civil resistance movements across the country have continued to
reject a violent and illegitimate regime. At the same time, in response to the
current situation of volatile, concurrent and overlapping crises spanning the
country, and within a context of shrinking humanitarian space, community-
based and civil society actors have mobilised to provide critical assistance to
their communities, demonstrating the strength and effectiveness of locally
driven aid. National and local-level actors are now also calling for changes to
international aid systems and practices, through their advocacy and everyday
work demonstrating that localisation is not just about aid effectiveness but
also—and more importantly—about humanitarian autonomy and justice.
In Myanmar’s Spring Revolution,1 we are seeing not just ongoing resistance
against the overt violence of the military regime, but also growing resistance
against what Bethia Burgess describes as the ‘quiet violence’ of unequal
international aid and governance systems that perpetuate neo-colonial
power relations (Burgess, forthcoming). In this context, debates about the
localisation and decolonisation of aid are, at a deeper level, debates about
rights, autonomy and justice. For members of Myanmar civil society,
these are debates about who has the right and the authority to define the
future of their country, and about their need to be recognised as equals
by international counterparts. Localisation, as Hugo Slim demonstrates, is
then ‘about realising political rights and making humanitarian citizenship,
and should be recognised as politically necessary’ (Slim 2021).
In Myanmar today, debates about localisation are also often linked to deeply
political questions over the nature of, and principles that should shape,
international humanitarian engagement. Here again, issues of rights and

1 The popular protests and Civil Disobedience Movement, which began in early 2021 as a result of
opposition to the military coup, are commonly referred to by local actors and analysts as Myanmar’s
Spring Revolution (see e.g. Ko Maung 2021).

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 12. APPROACHES TO AID IN MYANMAR

justice are key, as community-based and civil society actors in Myanmar

call for solidarity from international donors and aid agencies in a context
in which, as one international aid worker acknowledged, ‘there is a clear
right and wrong here’ (Interview, February 2022). While recognising that
there are no simple answers to what remain difficult questions, I argue that,
in a context in which normative neutrality can do harm, it is necessary
to define ‘good humanitarianism’ as humanitarianism that promotes the
autonomy and agency of local populations (Slim 2015).
This chapter is part of a broader, ongoing research project on opportunities
and challenges for the localisation and decolonisation of aid in
Myanmar’s complex emergency. To explore debates on the localisation
and decolonisation of aid, and their links to questions of international
engagement and solidarity, I draw specifically here on 18 targeted semi-
structured interviews with representatives of community-based organisations
(CBOs), civil society organisations (CSOs), non-government organisations
(NGOs), international NGOs (INGOs), donor agencies and the National
Unity Government (NUG), as well as multiple, more informal discussions
with community, national and international-level actors involved in
humanitarian responses in Myanmar. I also draw on public documentation
and discussions, as well as my work for over a decade as a consultant and
researcher working on aid systems in Myanmar—work that has notably
enabled me to take part in past and current debates about aid programs,
localisation and the principles that should shape international humanitarian
engagement in Myanmar. All individual sources and identifying details
have been anonymised to protect the security and confidentiality of those
involved. Organisations have been named only in cases where the activities
described are already published or openly discussed in the public domain.
In the following sections, I discuss opportunities for the localisation and
decolonisation of aid in Myanmar’s complex emergency, highlighting the
need to move beyond ‘localisation by default’ and towards long-term and
sustained changes to the status quo of unequal and unjust international aid
systems. I demonstrate that, for members of civil society and community-
based organisations in Myanmar, localisation is not just a technical issue
but a political and moral imperative: it is about the need to be recognised
as agents of their own destiny. I then turn to ongoing debates about
international humanitarian engagement in Myanmar, reassessing these
debates through the lens of localisation as a political and moral imperative.

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Ultimately, and while these debates have no simple answers, I argue that
reframing ‘good humanitarianism’ can provide a moral compass to guide
decision-making and much-needed reforms in aid systems and practices.

COVID-19 and the coup: From ‘default

localisation’ to sustainable change
We have very little [international] aid, but we are not going to plead
and go down on our knees anymore … One of the slogans of this
revolution is that we only have ourselves, to be much more self-reliant
and less inclined to depend on outsiders. That means less inclined
to be colonised. (CSO leader, Myanmar, interview, February 2022)

In Myanmar, aid practitioners and analysts had previously highlighted

the strength of locally led emergency responses, which can be far more
timely, effective, relevant and sustainable than those by international
actors (e.g. L2GP n.d.; Walsh 2020). Yet, the COVID-19 pandemic and
2021 coup have together drawn increased attention to the importance of
localised responses to humanitarian emergencies, and to the relationship
between localisation and questions of humanitarian autonomy and
emancipatory justice.
The COVID-19 pandemic meant that, to a large extent, as an international
aid agency representative in Myanmar conceded in an interview in February
2022, ‘the international community went into paralysis’. As a consequence
of COVID-19, international agencies were forced to bring many expatriate
workers back to their home countries, to make staff work more remotely
and to suspend many operations on the ground. A civil society leader
in Myanmar, frustrated with the reactions of international agencies,
put it more bluntly when he said: ‘The international aid community
withdrew into their cocoons’ (Interview, February 2022). Throughout
2020, as they grappled with COVID-19 restrictions, as well as their own
occupational health and safety policies and other bureaucratic regulations,
many international agencies that continued to support aid programs in
Myanmar became increasingly dependent on working with and through
local and national systems and organisations. Meanwhile, civil society actors
as well as community-level and national-level organisations in Myanmar
continued to work on the ground, serving their communities and providing
essential services (for a detailed analysis of COVID-19 pandemic responses,
see Chapter 11, this volume). Of course, similar trends have been noted

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throughout the world, the pandemic restricting international agencies’

operations and providing a temporary window of opportunity for greater
localisation (Barbelet, Bryant & Spencer 2021; Roche & Tarpey 2020;
Ullah, Khan & Wijewickrama 2021).
In Myanmar, the impacts of the pandemic were then compounded by the
military coup, impeding any return to business as usual by international
aid agencies—for now at least. After the military seized power on
1 February 2021, and as Myanmar grappled with an escalating political and
humanitarian crisis, community-level and civil society actors throughout
the country mobilised their networks and devised creative solutions to
channel vital assistance to affected communities. Responses to Myanmar’s
now multi-pronged complex emergency have, in turn, showcased the
effectiveness of locally driven aid, as well as the bravery and resilience of
local actors who have continued to assist their communities, despite huge
risks to their own lives and security.
These locally led responses drew upon existing social networks and
community-level systems—including self-help groups, CSOs, CBOs
and religious groups. Some groups—particularly those in historically
contested border areas or in areas of the Delta that were devastated by
Cyclone Nargis in 2008—already had significant experience in emergency
response. Others, such as those in Myanmar’s historically more stable Dry
Zone, were often previously involved in social and development work but
had little emergency response experience; they learnt as they went, as a CSO
member explained during a webinar by the Myanmar Local Humanitarian
Network (MLHN) in January 2022 (MLHN 2022b). Others still were
formed over the past year or two, comprising affected community members
who exercised their own agency in mobilising resources and assisting their
communities in highly localised, piecemeal and effective ways, without
formal mechanisms or external support. At the same time, national-level
NGOs in Myanmar ramped up their support for community-level and
civil society networks in different parts of the country, and longstanding
cross-border aid organisations worked to meet increasing humanitarian
needs in border areas under mixed administration or ethnic armed
organisation control.
Meanwhile, since the coup, escalating conflict and displacement, soaring
humanitarian needs, ever more restricted humanitarian access and
COVID-19 have continued to increase international agencies’ reliance
on national and local organisations and networks. Some international aid

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agencies that previously relied purely on models of direct implementation for

their work in Myanmar were forced to shift towards indirect implementation,
working with and through local and national partner agencies. As an INGO
worker put it: ‘It’s been default localisation, because the international actors
can’t reach the populations that they want to’ (Interview, December 2021).
For actors on the ground in Myanmar, this is not just a time of crisis, but
also one of opportunity. As one civil society leader explained:
There is a high opportunity for us to show others the capacity
of the local. And also, this is a very good time that international
also recognises the power of the local—this is a kind of blessing in
disguise. (Interview, February 2022)

The current ‘default localisation’ in Myanmar has showcased the feasibility,

effectiveness and benefits of locally led aid approaches. As civil society
and community-based actors across Myanmar have continued to lead
humanitarian responses, they have also become increasingly connected and
organised, sharing knowledge, experience and resources through networks
that have developed within and across different states and regions, and
calling for changes to international aid systems and practices. In early
2022, multiple regional networks, CSOs, CBOs and national NGOs came
together to form the MLHN, which ‘aims to render humanitarian assistance
more strategic and coordinated in reaching the most vulnerable and far-
fetched areas, while pushing the localisation agenda at the heart’ (MLHN
2022a, 2). In a position paper on localisation published in January 2022,
the MLHN, along with local intermediary actors, other humanitarian
networks and 25 CSOs in Myanmar, called for institutional, systemic and
behavioural changes by donors and international aid agencies. They asked
for international actors to ‘take into account the current power imbalance of
existing internationalised humanitarian aid architecture and mov[e] towards
a real equitable and equal partnership’ (MLHN 2022a, 2).
At the same time, there has been increasing recognition within international
donor and aid agency circles that the international aid architecture itself
has inhibited a timely and effective response to the volatile, concurrent,
overlapping and protracted humanitarian crises currently spanning the
country. Meanwhile, frustration with the inadequacy of international
responses and with ongoing challenges created by overly rigid, bureaucratic
and top-down systems has led many to call out what one civil society leader
in Myanmar called the ‘chronic ailments’ of international aid systems
(Interview, February 2022).

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As a result of these dynamics, actors on the ground in Myanmar are now

increasingly calling on international donors and aid agencies to abide by
commitments made in the 2016 Grand Bargain,2 by putting more funding
and decision-making power into the hands of local and national responders
(IASC n.d.). They are also demanding reforms to overly rigid and top-down
international funding mechanisms and compliance requirements—‘those
tools and systems that we have in place that create barriers, that create
hierarchy’, as one international aid worker described them (Interview,
February 2022). Refusing to be treated as unequals in an international
system of humanitarian governance3 that has to date largely failed their
people, civil society and community-based actors throughout Myanmar are,
therefore, now uniting in a groundswell of support for the localisation and
decolonisation of aid (MLHN 2022a).
In the current situation in Myanmar, this groundswell of increasingly loud
and organised voices from community-based and civil society actors who
are calling for change arguably presents a conjunctural moment for a more
radical localisation and decolonisation of aid systems and practices. Indeed,
in a situation where the shortcomings of international systems are only too
apparent and where international donors and aid agencies have been forced
into greater localisation by default, community-based and civil society
actors themselves are now attempting to use the window of opportunity
presented by the pandemic and complex emergency in Myanmar to define
the terms and shape of localisation. This is in striking contrast to much of the
international work on localisation to date, which, as Maha Shuayb (2022)
laments, is all too often top-down, internationally driven and imposed on
local actors and contexts, instead of being defined by those on the ground.
At the same time, and while the current situation in Myanmar has fostered
some noteworthy evolutions through ‘default localisation’, there is a real
need for international agencies and donors to commit to more radical,

2 The 2016 Grand Bargain is an ‘agreement between some of the largest donors and humanitarian
organisations who have committed to get more means into the hands of people in need and to improve
the effectiveness and efficiency of the humanitarian action’ (IASC n.d.). The Grand Bargain notably
emphasises the need to give local and national humanitarian actors more direct funding, support and
decision-making power.
3 In this chapter, I adopt Didier Fassin’s definition of international humanitarian governance as ‘a mode
of governing that concerns the victims of poverty, homelessness, unemployment, and exile, as well as of
disasters, famines, epidemics and wars—in short, every situation characterised by precariousness’ (Fassin
2012, x). Its temporality is that of emergency, its object is to save lives, and ‘the powerful legitimacy with
which it is invested derives precisely from the fact that it can point to those rescued from death due to
famine, epidemic or injury’ (Fassin 2012, 189).

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long-term and sustainable change. In a possible future scenario in which

Myanmar’s complex emergency is at least less acute (if not fully resolved),
it would be hugely detrimental for international agencies to roll back to
more internationally driven approaches. So while, in the current context in
Myanmar, greater localisation is no longer really a choice for international
actors, locally led aid programs must become a sustained reality. For this
to happen, international actors cannot hide behind the idea of ‘crisis’ in
Myanmar. This is not just because the label ‘crisis’ can deflect from the
reality of long-term and deep-rooted political and systemic problems that
need to be addressed in order to achieve lasting peace in Myanmar, but also
because there is a tendency for international actors to maintain that times of
crisis make it impossible to rethink existing systems and ways of functioning
(Slim 2021; Interviews with international aid agency representatives,
February 2022). Additionally, recognising the need for real and sustained
change implies moving beyond seeing localisation as a technical advantage
and towards recognising localisation as a political and moral imperative.

Localisation as a political and moral

imperative
Within and beyond Myanmar, the need to localise aid systems and
practices––to reorient the playing field by giving local and national actors
more direct funding, support and decision-making power––is commonly
justified in relation to operational effectiveness (Barbelet et al. 2021; IFRC
2018). With local actors and organisations being deeply embedded in crisis-
affected contexts and communities, they can respond and address local
needs more rapidly and effectively. But localisation is not just about aid
effectiveness. As Hugo Slim (2021) argues, localisation is about realising
political rights and defining humanitarian citizenship, with those affected
by crises, their local organisations and their leaders driving decisions
about humanitarian responses that will shape the long-term future of their
communities.
Contemporary systems of humanitarian governance remain top-down and
internationally biased. Despite commitments made in the Grand Bargain,
most international humanitarian aid is still transferred to international
organisations, with only small percentages of overall aid budgets going
directly to national and local agencies (Slim 2021). This international trend is
replicated in Myanmar, where members of civil society and community-based

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organisations are increasingly demanding that more funding be transferred

directly to local and national responders (MLHN 2022a). At the same
time, and as lamented by many aid workers in Myanmar, buzzwords like
‘participation’ and ‘partnership’ still too often obscure a reality where those
affected by crises are reduced to objects of top-down and externally driven
interventions, and where national, sub-national and community-level
organisations become subcontractors implementing programs that they
have not defined—programs that will, moreover, have profound and lasting
effects on social and political dynamics in their societies.
This is not to say that there have not been notable attempts to implement
Grand Bargain commitments in Myanmar. Even before the coup,
some international agencies had initiated extensive programs aimed at
promoting localisation. The Humanitarian Assistance and Resilience
Programme Facility (HARP-F), for example, was established in 2016 to
deliver the United Kingdom’s commitments under the Grand Bargain and,
specifically, to advance localisation. Through its work before and since the
coup, HARP-F demonstrated how international agencies can (and indeed
should) adopt a more peripheral and supportive role in humanitarian
responses, absorbing much of the bureaucratic and financial management
work associated with international donor funding, while giving local and
national agencies the independence and flexibility to design, manage and
deliver aid programs in their areas. HARP-F has also documented successes
and challenges in its work with local and national partner agencies in
Myanmar, as well as highlighting the types of institutional and systemic
changes required to enable greater localisation (HARP-F n.d.-a).
Moreover, in Myanmar’s conflict-affected border areas, systems of remote
partnerships had for decades enabled international donors to support local
aid agencies in ways that gave considerable decision-making power and
operational independence to these local agencies. Remote partnerships
entail a division of labour between the local organisation, which manages
aid programs and their delivery, and the international partner organisation,
which channels back-donor funding and deals with much of the more
bureaucratic aspects of aid work. During a public webinar organised
in August 2021 by HARP-F on localisation and remote partnerships in
Myanmar, a representative of The Border Consortium—an INGO that has
supported aid programs for decades in Myanmar’s border areas by working
with local agencies through remote partnerships systems—described this
model as ‘disruptive programming’ (HARP-F n.d.-b). Remote partnerships
can disrupt power imbalances since they allow for greater local leadership
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though decentralised and flexible approaches that are adapted to local needs.
In this model, INGOs like The Border Consortium act as intermediaries,
taking on much of the donor-facing aspects of aid work and managing
upwards by attempting to push back against overly onerous donor
compliance and other requirements that can cripple local agencies.
However, and despite all the efforts that have gone into localisation to date
in Myanmar, the international aid architecture itself continues to impede
changes to the status quo. For one, the rigid and bureaucratic systems of
many international donors and aid agencies ‘conceptually privilege and
prioritise their own knowledge and expertise, often imposing Western-
centric structures on contexts for which they are ill suited’ (Walsh 2020).
Moreover, as an INGO worker in Myanmar explained:
It’s not in the interest of the great proportion of the aid industry—
localisation isn’t in their own interests. Of course, there’s going to be
a lot of resistance to it! (Interview, December 2021)

Combined with institutional inertia and the disincentivising practices of

many international agencies themselves, vested interests in the status quo
produce a tendency towards minor tweaking of aid programs instead
of real shifts in power relations—something documented well beyond the
Myanmar context (e.g. Ayobi et al. 2017). Localisation is then all too often
reduced to international agencies employing a few additional local staff,
engaging in a few additional and often largely tokenistic consultations with
local communities, or in other ways talking the talk without really walking
the walk of change.
Overall, contemporary international aid systems and practices therefore
still perpetuate systemic inequalities between international actors and their
counterparts in Myanmar. These inequalities become visible notably in the
differential pay structures, benefits and levels of protection accorded to
international and local or national aid workers; or in the ongoing dominance
of international actors in positions accorded greater decision-making
power, mobility and agency. There remains, as one civil society leader in
Myanmar noted, a ‘core asymmetry’ that ‘includes incomes and perks and
all the allowances that come with working with that [humanitarian system]’
(Interview, February 2022). At a deeper level, these realities reveal systems
of humanitarian governance to be fundamentally paradoxical, uniting a
politics of solidarity with a politics of inequality, a relation of assistance with
a relation of domination (Fassin 2012, 3). Humanitarian governance, then,

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not only accords value to bare life, in Giorgio Agamben’s terms, but also
accords different ontological values and unequal levels of agency to different
human lives (Agamben 1998; Fassin 2012).
The unequal status quo in contemporary international aid systems and
practices ultimately results, Hugo Slim (2021) maintains, in ‘imposing
a system of social welfare in [people’s] societies which excludes them from
its design, and prevents them from building their own social contracts and
humanitarian institutions’—in turn breaching people’s fundamental rights
to what Slim describes as ‘humanitarian self-determination’ and to be treated
as international equals. Genuine localisation, entailing changes to the status
quo of unequal power relations, is then a political and moral imperative, not
just a technical advantage. And this is precisely what members of Myanmar
civil society and community-based organisations are demonstrating through
their work and advocacy.
Today, much of the discussion about localisation among international
agencies operating in Myanmar continues to be focused on more ‘technical’
issues—or at least technical-seeming issues, since many of these have
significant political and ethical ramifications. There is, therefore, much focus
on issues such as the ‘absorption capacity’ of local and national agencies,
funding streams and modalities, and what are seen by international actors
as potential financial risks and compliance issues posed by channelling
increased international support to local and national responders. But for
members of national, community-based and civil society organisations in
Myanmar, the debate about localisation is inextricably linked with political
questions about who has the right and authority to define the future of their
country. As the leader of a national NGO in Myanmar stated:
I think localisation, in a political sense, is another space where
locals are able to voice against in this very, very unjust humanitarian
architecture. When we look at the humanitarian architecture, it
is very much an internationalised system … The thing about the
self-determination means [the affected community] need to look
at what they want to be in the future, about their country, about
their community, about their society. Sometimes that might not be
exactly the same as the international expectation, but we need to
recognise the self-determination. (Interview, February 2022)

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Recognising the reality of, and need to remedy, ongoing inequalities and
injustices in international systems of humanitarian governance is the first
step towards realising the type of genuine and sustained changes that actors
on the ground in Myanmar are demanding. It also implies that, as the
same national NGO leader in Myanmar explained of international actors:
‘Maybe some of your privilege you may need to share—without sharing
your privilege, as far as you talk, localisation is impossible’ (Interview,
February 2022).
Additionally, achieving genuine and lasting localisation means respecting
and building systems, institutions and organisations that not only save
lives and reduce human suffering, but also enhance the autonomy and
agency of the very people impacted by crises. As Charlotte Dany highlights,
localisation becomes a means by which ‘humanitarian aid may help to
achieve common goals among equals and thus to integrate a more solidarity-
focused approach’—an approach historically at odds with the unequal
nature of international systems of humanitarian governance (Dany 2021;
Fassin 2012). Further:
To make humanitarian aid a real tool for expressing global solidarity,
one would have to regard the recipients of aid as equals and strengthen
their agency, as well as that of local and grassroots organisations in
the most affected areas. (Dany 2021)

Framing localisation in these ways, then, has important ramifications in

relation to debates about how to deliver international aid within a complex
emergency like Myanmar’s, where international humanitarian engagement
can have significant ethical and political consequences.

Localisation and debates about

humanitarian engagement and solidarity
in Myanmar
In Myanmar today, debates about localisation are often interlinked with
questions over the nature of, and principles that should shape, international
humanitarian engagement—with solidarity-based approaches challenging
the type of normative neutrality long claimed to be the ‘litmus test of
humanitarianism’ (Décobert 2016, 232). While acknowledging that there is
no simple, one-size-fits-all solution to these debates, recognising the political

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and moral necessity of localisation and reframing ‘good humanitarianism’

provides a much-needed moral compass for navigating complex political
and ethical dilemmas.
As mentioned above, it is essential to understand Myanmar’s multi-pronged
humanitarian emergency in relation to longstanding structural violence,
injustices and conflict. Within the more acute emergency situation
precipitated by the coup, a civil resistance movement is legitimately
opposing an illegitimate and abusive military regime bent on terrorising
local populations to retain power. As well as denying the democratic will
of the people, the State Administrative Council (SAC) and Myanmar
armed forces have continued to commit widespread and systematic abuses
and attacks against civilian populations, which amount to crimes against
humanity (OHCHR 2021). The junta has also restricted humanitarian
operations, blocking the delivery of aid, deliberately destroying food and
medical supplies, diverting aid away from its intended recipients, and
attacking and even killing aid workers—acts that constitute violations of
international humanitarian law.
Within this context, members of civil society and community-based
organisations are calling for solidarity from international donors and
aid agencies. Overwhelmingly, community-level and civil society actors
continue to reject the SAC and denounce the suffering it is driving, and
they are asking international actors to support them in their struggle for
democracy and human rights. ‘We cannot pretend we are neutral, we are
not’, one civil society leader stated (Interview, February 2022). Through
their work, civil society and community-based actors are trying not just to
assist civilians in need of aid, but also to define the future of their country.
In so doing, they are asserting their agency as humanitarian citizens with the
right and authority to shape their own humanitarian institutions and social
contracts. And they perceive attempts at neutrality by international agencies
as potentially doing real harm, particularly if—by not taking a stand or by
having their aid politicised by the military regime—international actors end
up legitimising, emboldening and enabling those behind the coup (Décobert
2021; Khin Ohmar 2021; Progressive Voice 2021). As one national NGO
leader in Myanmar explained:
Sometimes, you know, international humanitarian organisations,
they are too narrow with the international so-called principles.
If you are on that principle, you are with them. If you are not there,
well … so, I think we need to go beyond that now … We need

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solidarity. We are struggling, we are facing a lot of challenges,

we need their understanding, empathy, and also the solidarity.
(Interview, February 2022)

In the classic International Committee of the Red Cross definition,

neutrality means ‘not tak[ing] sides in hostilities or engag[ing] at any time
in controversies of a political, racial, religious or ideological nature’ (Haug
1996). It is worth noting that the Code of Conduct for the International
Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement and Non-Governmental Organisations
in Disaster Relief does not explicitly refer to neutrality, but instead focuses
on the humanitarian imperative (reducing suffering) and impartiality
(non-discrimination; see ICRC 1994). Nevertheless, and despite a long
history of divisions over the viability of neutrality as a guiding principle for
humanitarianism in complex emergencies, many international aid agencies
still maintain that it is essential to humanitarian action (Décobert 2016;
Fassin 2012; Redfield 2011). Moreover, international actors can be reluctant
to support local and national agencies if they are not politically neutral, with
the principle of neutrality then acting as a potential barrier to localisation.
Yet, as Hugo Slim (2020) highlights, ‘neutral humanitarian action is one
version of humanitarianism—not the only version’, and it is not absolutely
necessary to be neutral to be a good humanitarian.
A commitment to localisation implies that international actors should
engage with, listen to and respect civil society and governance systems that
are deemed legitimate by the Myanmar people themselves. Moreover, in
a context like Myanmar’s complex emergency, where normative neutrality
becomes morally questionable and can do very real harm, it logically
implies adopting a solidarity-based approach. An international aid agency
representative currently working in Myanmar mused:
What civil society in Myanmar wants to do is overthrow the military.
That’s what they want to do and so if we really want to localise, if
we really want to support these local organisations, we would take
a line that says: we will support you in doing that because that is
what you want … I think, objectively, you could say the question of
neutrality is irrelevant and if our role is really just to support people
that are in need, these are mechanisms to be able to do that. That’s
the solidarity approach. (Interview, February 2022)

In their private capacities, many representatives of international donor and

aid agencies support a solidarity-based approach—after all, to repeat the
words of an international aid agency representative, there is ‘a clear right and

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wrong here’. However, at the same time, international agencies that are still
working officially inside Myanmar are having to balance calls for solidarity
with the geopolitical agendas of their back-donors, and with concerns about
protecting staff and programs on the ground. The same international aid
agency representative who had voiced their personal support for a solidarity-
based approach went on to explain that:
The question is: given these restraints, what can we do to support
in solidarity, without putting our people at risk or without putting
the whole organisation at risk? I think it’s a difficult line because, as
long as we have an organisational presence in Myanmar, as long as
we have staff in Myanmar, it’s going to be really tough to take a really
overt position on some of these issues … I think that’s where we do
need to differentiate, or we need to take a differentiated approach.
(Interview, February 2022)

In contexts where normative neutrality may not be possible or may in fact

do harm, it is important to rethink the principles shaping international
humanitarian engagement and action. In Humanitarian Ethics, Hugo Slim
(2015, 2) defines ‘good humanitarian work’ as work that:
enables a person or a community to remain the subject of their lives,
not objects in the lives and purposes of others. Good humanitarian
action makes people its goal but does not objectify them as
‘beneficiaries’ or commodify them as ‘recipients’ of aid. On the
contrary, good humanitarian aid and protection increase people’s
autonomy and agency as human beings. The best humanitarian
action is that which respects people and works with them to prevent
suffering, repair harm, and enable them to come through their
suffering and flourish.

This reframing of principles to guide humanitarian action and engagement

can then allow for differentiated but still ‘good humanitarian’ approaches
in a context like Myanmar. Some of these approaches can—and indeed
should—align explicitly with what Thomas Weiss calls a ‘solidarist’
approach, ‘employing humanitarian action within a political strategy on
behalf of victims’ (Weiss 1999, 5). Others can be less explicitly political or
aligned but should still respect the wishes of the Myanmar people and be
founded on a definition of ‘good humanitarianism’ as increasing people’s
autonomy and agency as human beings.

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Since the 2021 coup in Myanmar, international agencies have adopted

different types of approaches to the provision of aid. Some international
agencies have taken an explicitly solidarist stance, refusing to engage in any
way with the SAC, and instead supporting humanitarian and human rights
efforts from outside the country. To date, these types of explicitly solidarist
approaches to international aid in Myanmar have generally entailed working
with and through CBOs and CSOs operating inside Myanmar—including,
but not limited, to longstanding cross-border aid organisations. Given
escalating humanitarian needs in Myanmar, international donors and aid
agencies must provide increased support to these local-level systems and
organisations, which have ‘the expertise, local legitimacy, and vision to offer
an alternative to traditional aid distribution practices’ (Khin Ohmar 2021).
These types of approaches are necessary, not only to channel assistance to
civilian populations in need of aid but also to help lay the foundations for
longer-term democratisation, development and peace in Myanmar.
At the same time, a solidarist approach can extend to engaging with the
NUG’s Ministry of Humanitarian Affairs and Disaster Management. The
NUG is currently channelling humanitarian aid to displaced populations,
Civil Disobedience Movement participants and others in need by working
with and through local networks and groups in different areas of the country.
To date, however, very few international agencies have funded humanitarian
aid through the NUG. International donor and aid agency representatives
often cite concerns about the NUG’s links with the People’s Defence Forces
and its support for armed resistance against the SAC—although of course,
geopolitical concerns also play into the reluctance of some back-donor
countries to be seen as supporting the NUG.
If recent responses by Western donor countries to the crisis in Ukraine
show us anything, it is that international actors can and do at times support
‘resistance humanitarianism’ (Slim 2022). Such an approach is morally
justified in contexts where the type of neutrality fostered by the Red Cross
movement becomes unfeasible and where aid becomes a way to support
legitimate local resistance and resilience against military violence and
oppression. Of course, political interests and not just moral questions will
inevitably continue to influence international actors’ decisions about how
to engage in Myanmar. But international humanitarian engagement with
the NUG is justified from a solidarist perspective and any such engagement
should be done in ways that support localised responses, that follow

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a definition of ‘good humanitarianism’ as increasing the Myanmar people’s

autonomy and agency, and that include systems to ensure that aid is used
for humanitarian purposes and does no harm.
While some international agencies have rejected any kind of engagement
with the SAC, others have maintained an official presence inside Myanmar,
trying to access populations in need of aid by negotiating with the regime.
Oftentimes, international agencies working in this manner have also been
discretely ramping up support to civil society and community-based
organisations that are, in various ways, opposing and are, therefore, targeted
(or potentially targeted) by the military regime, with this very solidarist
aspect of their work needing to remain below the radar. Of course, this
approach is likely to become increasingly difficult as the junta further
restricts humanitarian space and puts more pressure on international and
local agencies to register and report on their activities—with the 2022
Registration of Associations Law creating a highly restrictive regulatory
framework and anticipated to have wideranging negative impacts for NGO
and CSO operations in Myanmar.
International donors and agencies maintaining communication channels
with the military regime should use their position to push for increased
humanitarian access and protection, as well as respect for international
humanitarian law. Any kind of negotiation with the SAC, however limited,
also requires honest, careful and ongoing assessment of the political risks
and impacts of these activities. This means that international agencies
operating officially inside Myanmar must not be blinded by what one long-
time aid worker described as ‘their self-preservation and their sense of their
worth’ (Interview, February 2022), which can lead to doing more harm
than good—for example, if any good done in provided aid with restricted
levels of access to populations in need is outweighed by the harm done
through paying taxes to or in any way legitimising the SAC.
In short, given the nature of Myanmar’s political and humanitarian
crises, and the demands of the Myanmar people themselves, international
humanitarian engagement should ultimately be guided by an overarching
focus on solidarity. There can be a division of labour between international
actors and agencies (or sometimes even between different branches of the
same agency), with diverse but still ‘good humanitarian’ approaches taking
place at the same time. Some of these approaches can be more explicitly
aligned with, and supportive of, groups and organisations opposing the
military junta. Other approaches may not be so explicitly opposed to

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the military regime and may instead maintain limited communication

channels for the purposes of humanitarian diplomacy, while at the same
time supporting civil society and community-based actors in less overt ways
from inside the country. However, if they do adopt the latter approach,
international donors and aid agencies must genuinely ensure that their aid
programs do not end up legitimising, emboldening and enabling those
behind the coup and ongoing systematic human rights abuses in Myanmar.
And, whatever their approach, international donors and aid agencies must
abide by a definition of ‘good humanitarianism’ as supporting the agency
and autonomy of Myanmar’s people.

Conclusion
Responses to the humanitarian emergency triggered by Myanmar’s 2021
military coup demonstrate the strength and effectiveness of locally driven
aid. Yet localisation is not just a technical advantage but a political and moral
imperative. In Myanmar today, there remains a tendency for debates about
localisation to depoliticise what is—for those on the ground—a deeply
political issue, inextricably linked with systemic inequalities and injustices.
So whereas, as one civil society leader put it, ‘it is a power issue’, many
in international aid circles still emphasise effectiveness-related costs and
benefits of localisation, focus on more technical advantages and barriers,
and seem reluctant to acknowledge their own positions within unequal
structures that they then often unintentionally perpetuate.
What is needed today in Myanmar is recognition of the inequalities and
injustices that are reproduced by top-down international aid systems,
and of the need for systemic changes through approaches that not only
place local actors at the forefront of crisis response, but also realise a more
emancipatory vision of localisation. Localisation is then not only about local
actors helping their own communities. It is about these actors having the
autonomy and agency to shape their own futures. Recognising the political
and moral imperative of localisation is essential to start addressing one of the
most problematic contradictions of contemporary systems of humanitarian
governance—systems within which all human lives are supposed to be
equally valuable, but that (re)produce inequalities between different human
lives (Fassin 2012; Slim 2021).

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In Myanmar today, there is a need to capitalise on and also move beyond

the current ‘default localisation’, and for international donors and aid
agencies to commit to long-term and sustainable changes to international
aid systems and practices. Localisation in Myanmar ‘should not be turning
local actors into more cogs in the wheels of the international aid system’, one
aid worker emphasised. ‘It’s about respecting and understanding how local
society responds to crisis, responds to issues’ (Interview, February 2022).
Approaches to localisation then need to go beyond simply recognising and
working with national and local organisations that already have the types
of systems in place that make it relatively easy for international agencies
to engage with and support them. Genuine localisation in Myanmar also
needs to recognise and enable the agency of the diverse local communities
affected by crises, and their different leaders, systems and networks. The
current political and humanitarian emergency in Myanmar is a time of
opportunity in this respect—a time when international actors are being
forced to recognise the strength of community-level responses, and to listen
to civil society actors who are demanding changes to the status quo.
In practical terms, and given the escalating humanitarian needs in
Myanmar, international donors and aid agencies must increase support to
local-level systems and organisations that have the expertise, local legitimacy
and systems to offer an alternative to top-down and internationally driven
aid practices. These types of approaches are necessary, not only to channel
assistance to civilian populations in need of aid, but also to help lay the
foundations for longer-term democratisation, development and peace in
Myanmar. At the same time, international donors and aid agencies must
provide funding more directly to local and national responders—including
multi-year core funding, which allows local and national actors to strengthen
their systems and agencies in sustainable ways—and work to reduce overly
rigid and burdensome reporting, financial and other bureaucratic and
compliance requirements that continue to impede greater localisation.
In relation to ongoing debates over the nature of, and principles that should
shape, international humanitarian engagement in Myanmar’s complex
emergency, international donors and aid agencies need to recognise that they
have choices to make and that these choices will have important political
and ethical ramifications. In a context in which normative neutrality can do
very real harm, international humanitarian engagement should be guided
by an overarching solidarity-focused approach. This is consistent with a
commitment to genuine localisation and with the need for international
actors to engage with, listen to and respect civil society and governance
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systems deemed legitimate by the Myanmar people themselves. While in

practical terms, this may involve a range of different types of approaches—
some more explicitly solidarist than others—ultimately international
donors and aid agencies must ensure that their programs do not end up
legitimising and enabling the military regime, but that they instead support
the agency and autonomy of the Myanmar people.

Acknowledgements
The author would like to extend thanks to all the individuals who participated
in interviews as part of this research, and to the three representatives of
local and international aid agencies who provided feedback and comments
on an earlier draft of this chapter. These individuals are not named for
confidentiality reasons, but their input was invaluable in shaping the
analysis and arguments presented in this chapter.

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275
 13
Relief as Resistance:
(Re)Emergent
Humanitarianism in
Post-Coup Myanmar
Aung Naing
Independent researcher, Myanmar

Tamas Wells
Myanmar Research Network Coordinator, School of Social
and Political Sciences, University of Melbourne

Abstract
This chapter presents the findings of a recent survey of civil society
organisations (CSOs) in Myanmar that examines how new forms of
accountability and cooperation can lead to highly efficient emergent relief.
In the wake of the 2021 coup, Myanmar has become a failed state in which
the current military authorities cannot fulfil the usual criteria of statehood.
Besides a politicisation of humanitarianism, in effect sidelining all attempts
to claim neutrality, the coup has also created a vacuum that multiple actors,
including numerous local CSOs, have begun to fill, delivering a wide range
of public services in ways that are rooted in popular claims to legitimacy.
The results are expressions of resistance to military rule that are less about
overt opposition and more about localised, alternative islands of state-
building. This chapter urges a reorientation of humanitarian policy towards

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Myanmar that embraces the complexity, ambiguity and latent potential of

emergent, volunteer welfare groups as not only a means of delivering aid in
ways that avoid entanglement and dependency on coup-controlled processes,
but also enable and promote active citizenship in local communities,
which is itself a critical step towards re-establishing community life and
institutional integrity in Myanmar.

***
As discussed in Chapters 11 and 12, citizen organisations in Myanmar have
a rich history of subversive humanitarianism. However, the impact of the
recent COVID-19 pandemic and the 2021 military coup have reshaped
the role of civil society organisations (CSOs)1 in important ways. The
response to COVID-19 enhanced the role of CSOs in providing services,
yet public health restrictions limited their scope and voice. The frustration
generated during the COVID-19 restrictions then served as emotional
and organisational fuel for the widespread resistance to the 2021 military
coup. In this context of state repression and vast humanitarian need, the
work of local CSOs has become crucial. At the same time, the general
collapse of state administrative and welfare mechanisms—due to both the
Civil Disobedience Movement and the degradative effects of the military
government’s mismanagement—has resulted in a vacuum of statehood.
In this chapter we draw on a December 2021 survey of Myanmar CSOs
and interviews with CSO leaders in January 2022. We argue that, through
providing welfare, CSOs are demonstrating a particular form of resistance.
They are embodying a viable, legitimate and internally sustainable
alternative to the current military government’s claims to statehood. CSOs
are enacting their own form of statehood through providing consistent

1 The term CSO is used here to describe locally formed organisations, embracing a wide spectrum
of organisational form. Some would be considered a local non-governmental organisation (NGO), with
a more clearly defined structure and often (but not always) some form of registration. Others would
fall into the parahita organisation category, which refers to a common form found in rural, but also
some urban areas. These organisations are typically based loosely around Buddhist principles of welfare,
rely on local donations, and engage in activities such as providing free funerals, healthcare, education,
blood donation drives and emergency relief. Whilst some would have a more defined organisational
structure, many would not. However, ‘parahita organisation’ is an extremely well-recognised term when
used to survey the presence of charity and welfare organisations, whereas the more imported terms like
civil society organisation (CSO) or NGO are less well known. A third category would be even more
loose associations of volunteers who have established themselves for a particular purpose, without any
particular articles of association.

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humanitarian assistance, using data and informal networks to ensure

appropriate responses, and operating in ways that provide accountability to
both international and local donors.
The first section of the chapter explores literature on failed states and
humanitarianism and argues that post-coup Myanmar can be categorised
as a failed state. The second section then explores the broader political
dilemmas of humanitarian responses, including in Myanmar in the wake of
the COVID-19 pandemic and the military coup. Drawing on our research
with Myanmar CSOs, the third section explores three specific challenges
for CSOs in Myanmar: safety and security, navigating operational space
and finance. We conclude that, in the context of a failing Myanmar state in
which civil society groups are taking on some of the functions of statehood,
donor agencies need to take steps towards deeper engagement with CSOs.

Failed states and humanitarianism

One critical consideration of the embedded politics of humanitarianism
relates to the appraisal of the state, for example, whether the state is
viewed as weak and in need of assistance, support and legitimacy; whether
the state is seen as malign and undeserving of assistance, thus justifying
explicit solidarity with those considered its victims; or whether the state
has essentially failed to the point of irrelevance. In the coming sections,
we explore how different assumptions of the state—as failed or not, as
malign or not—are crucial to the ways in which external agencies respond
to humanitarian crises.
The definition and, indeed, the validity of the concept of failed states is both
varied and contested (see Bøås & Jennings 2007). At what point is a fragile
state considered to have failed or collapsed (Ware 2016)? Indices of fragile
states express state capacity as a continuum (Fund for Peace 2021) measured
in relation to the state’s capacity and will to undertake key economic, social,
political and security-related functions. Rotberg (2002) locates state failure
beyond issues of territorial control, seeing it as the failure to deliver political
goods. That failure in turn undermines legitimacy:
Nation-states fail because they are convulsed by internal violence and
can no longer deliver positive political goods to their inhabitants.
Their governments lose legitimacy, and the very nature of the
particular nation-state itself becomes illegitimate in the eyes and in
the hearts of a growing plurality of its citizens. (Rotberg 2004, 1)
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Frequently, illegitimacy fuels a cycle of oppressive policies, such that those

in control of state apparatus abandon any attempt to implement policies to
benefit citizens, and instead enact policies that exhibit:
favour [towards] powerful elites, few budget controls and rampant
corruption, cronyism and patronage arrangements that limit
opportunity and siphon off public assets for private gain, and usually
a combination of punitive use of existing regulations and exemptions
to benefit the favoured few. (Brinkerhoff 2005, 6)

The exacerbation of inequalities coupled with a failure to deliver essential

public goods and services contributes to perceptions of impotence and
illegitimacy that, in turn, impact on wider security issues, for if citizens have
little hope that ‘their wellbeing will improve’ they are more likely to ‘engage
in crime or be recruited into insurgency’ (Brinkerhoff 2005, 6).
Reaching the conclusion that the state has failed, and enacting humanitarian
aid based on that assumption, is itself inherently political. The residual state
apparatus may contest the failed-state diagnosis, which serves to both codify
the lack of legitimacy and further undermine it. If the state has essentially
failed in terms of legitimacy, delivery of political goods and exercise of
territorial control, the possibility emerges of humanitarian spaces that do
not refer to state authority. The humanitarian mandate may be justified in
several ways when working from the presumption of a failed state.2
First, if the state cannot provide for its citizens, then humanitarians
must. Second, the failure of the state justifies the consequences of such
an intervention, at least in the short term, while also serving to further
undermine the legitimacy of the state. Third, the failure of the state—
particularly where there is a collapse of legitimacy or, worse, evidence
of abuse of citizens by the organs of the state—justifies a humanitarian
approach that not only ignores any residual claims to authority by the state
but also seeks to engage with other actors whose claims to legitimacy may be,
albeit, perhaps, at a more local level, more robust, credible and constructive.
The relative absence of the state does not mean the absence of authority,
merely that, in the fractured spaces of failed states, alternative power loci
emerge, ranging from local armed militia, ethnic or religious affiliated

2 Dingli (2013, 91) questions the value of the failed state concept, pointing out its inherently
Eurocentric perspective that leads to the employment of ‘orientalist simplifications that mystify the
complex, interrelated web of tribal governance and patronage’, and allows regimes to manipulate the failed
state label for their own interests.

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organisations, localised welfare groups and the private sector (Coyne

2006), operating with various degrees of competition or cooperation.
The acknowledgement of such alternative loci of statehood may, to some
extent, circumvent the problematic aspects of the failed-state concept, and
position humanitarian action in spaces where micro-level components of
community, governance and legitimacy may be located—something that
we explore later in this chapter in the context of Myanmar. This turns the
attention of humanitarianism to the more ‘nested games’ (Coyne 2006,
341), where legitimacy, trust, authority, welfare, public services, political
goods, territorial control and aspirations are located in a variety of actors,
institutions and powerbrokers. It also signals an acceptance of the process of
‘fundamental change and reordering’, which, despite the significant degree
of ‘intrusion and social engineering’ involved, is seen as ‘both appropriate
and reasonable, indeed, as reflecting the only realistic chance of a stable
future’ (Duffield 2005, 16).

Myanmar: A failed state?

To what extent does both external evidence and measure of public opinion
support the categorisation of Myanmar as a failed state? Even prior to the
COVID-19 pandemic and military coup of 2021, Myanmar was already
ranked twenty-third in the list of fragile states (Fund for Peace 2021), and
the only country in Southeast Asia listed in the top 40. Pandemic control
measures for COVID-19 severely impacted an already fragile economy:
research conducted towards the end of 2020 indicated that over 80 per cent
of households had seen significant reductions in their household income
since the start of that year (World Bank 2020), and economic forecasting
projects that poverty rates are likely to double from 24 per cent (recorded
in 2017) to 48 per cent. At the beginning of 2021, efforts were underway
to commence a national vaccination program, as well as to slowly reopen
business, education and travel sectors.
However, the coup d’état of 1 February 2021, and subsequent rapid spiral
of violence, has instead wrought havoc on an already fragile society and
economy, and, while the most recent data is yet to be published, is likely
to have resulted in a negative trend in most, if not all, of the indicators
of state fragility. Since the coup, leading personnel from the previously
elected civilian government have either been incarcerated or are in hiding
(or, in some cases, killed), removing their effective control over key levers
of power. The subsequently formed Committee Representing the People’s

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Hluttaw and the broader-based National Unity Government (NUG) have

attracted widespread popular support. However, despite the establishment
of a government structure and the performance of certain key functions,
including international relations, the NUG, at the time of writing, is not
able to deliver necessary public goods and services to a significant extent
across Myanmar.
The economic conditions have meanwhile deteriorated further. A survey
conducted only two months after the coup found that the majority (79 per
cent) of households reported a reduction of household income since the
military coup; 25 per cent had not worked at all, while another 31 per
cent had worked fewer hours since 1 February.3 These trends continued to
worsen in the year after the coup: monthly panel survey data conducted by
local CSO organisations in mainly urban areas demonstrated increased rates
of economic vulnerability, food insecurity and problem debt.4
In this context, the claims to legitimacy of the junta-led State Administrative
Council (SAC) do not reach the standard of a functioning state.5 In addition
to the lack of public legitimacy, as evidenced by sustained, widespread
protest and resistance, the Civil Disobedience Movement—whereby huge
numbers of civil servants from key government departments such as health,
education, transport and some administration departments effectively
remain on strike—has severely constrained the SAC’s ability to deliver public
goods.6 Moreover, the delivery of public goods, as described earlier, relates
not only to services such as healthcare and education, but also to justice,
security and the rule of law. The rapid and widespread militarisation of the
administrative and justice systems7 has enabled the process of detention,
trial, sentencing and, in some cases, extrajudicial killing of political

3 Data taken from randomised sample of 500 households included in a phone survey undertaken in
April 2021 by a Myanmar-based survey firm who requested anonymity.
4 Data taken from a sample of 800 households in five different locations between April 2021 and
March 2022.
5 The criteria for statehood are varied, and not the same as that of effective government. However,
while Article 1 of the Montevideo Convention refers to the ‘capacity to enter into relations’ as a significant
criteria for independence and a prerequisite for statehood, additional criteria, particularly with respect to
the human rights of the population within the territory, are also considered important (see Kreijen 2004).
6 This is not to ignore the ongoing delivery of some public goods by institutions under the SAC, such
as electricity, some elements of public health (including COVID-19 vaccination), a limited reopening
of schools and universities, some elements of administration, such as immigration and customs, and
foreign relations and media.
7 Some would argue that, to some degree, these had never been demilitarised, with both the legal
system and justice personnel reflecting conditions prior to the ascent of the civilian government, and,
as such, that a reversion to those conditions was both swift and relatively straightforward.

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opponents to take place relatively unchecked, which points not simply to

a failure to provide such public goods, but a deliberate subversion of them.
Beyond this, a mixture of strikes and mismanagement has resulted in a
virtual collapse of the banking system and widespread economic inactivity
in virtually every sector, effectively stalling any potential post-COVID-19
economic recovery. Armed militia groups, formed in response to attacks
on protesters, and arbitrary detentions, have also significantly reduced the
SAC’s ability to provide security and order, even to senior officials. Added
to this, various of the ethnic armed organisations (EAOs) in Myanmar have
sought to use the political crisis to regain, consolidate or expand territorial
control, sometimes in support of the aims of the NUG, but in many cases
as a unilateral strategy.
Aside from more than 1 million internally displaced persons, mainly those
fleeing military actions in central, eastern and western Myanmar, huge urban
to rural remigration has placed increased burdens on already precarious
rural livelihoods. The tentative steps that had been taken to establish social
welfare systems, such as cash transfers to pregnant women, have now been
destroyed, which, together with the collapse of the healthcare system, means
that there are no wider safety nets for the poorest of the poor. Military actions
to date have shown little concern for social welfare, with reports of elderly
residents being left to burn alive in villages targeted by military reprisals.
In short: Myanmar is less of a failed state than an act of deliberate and
wanton destruction—a torching of any residual state institutions that, in
the past, had served the public. The consequences of this are beginning to
be seen as an emerging catastrophe that could be described as humanitarian,
except for its political origins. The targeting of charitable organisations,
as well as restrictions on international humanitarian aid has, in conditions
reminiscent of the early days of post-Nargis relief, left the majority of
the burden of food and material assistance to informal networks, which
have continued to flourish despite harassment by military and military-
aligned forces.
The picture that emerges from the current crisis is one of multiple coping
strategies formed either to resist, evade or undermine military control, or,
in some cases, to survive within it. One consequence is the re-emergence,
or, in some cases, the re-energising, of the numerous self-organisational
capacities that were present for decades under previous military rule.
Such capacities result in a prolific array of initiatives: for some EAOs,
a consolidation of territorial control to include judiciary and administrative

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functions;8 in areas not controlled by EAOs, the formation of local militia

to provide protection against arrest and harassment by security forces under
the SAC; volunteer groups providing healthcare; volunteer groups providing
food aid and relief to local populations affected by the economic downturn;
and numerous ingenious cooperative arrangements to maintain commerce
in the absence of a functioning financial system and a cash crisis.9 Even in
some non-EAO areas, a coalescing of protection, provision of relief and
enacting of basic administration provision by volunteer groups has resulted
in what looks like micro-government. The argument here is that, if these
three strands are taken together (consolidation of functions in EAO areas,
the emergence of localised areas of micro-government and the multiple
expressions of cooperation that enable the ongoing delivery of public goods
outside of SAC control), then it follows that the state and state-building are
located in multiple zones, representing an emergent, rather than centrally
directed, phenomenon (South 2021).
The challenge to this approach is that, if legitimacy is established in
multiple, diverse and often competing spheres, how can a single, legitimate
state re-emerge? Brinkerhoff (2005, 5) rightly highlights the importance
of re‑establishing legitimacy. However, of critical importance are the
foundations of that legitimacy:
expanding participation and inclusiveness, reducing inequities,
creating accountability, combating corruption and introducing
contestability (elections) … re-establishment of the rule of law
… institutional design … as well as civil society development.
(Brinkerhoff 2005, 5)

At the heart of re-establishing legitimacy is trust. As Coyne (2006,

351) points out: ‘Trust-enhancing institutions differ in complexity and
magnitude. Some, such as reputation, may be effective in smaller groups
while others … may be effective at facilitating interaction on a larger scale.’
Our argument here is that, in the context of a failed state, particularly
where the illegitimacy is rooted in oppression or abuse, re-establishing the
legitimacy of the state requires more than a re-establishment of security and

8 The Arakan Army’s consolidation of control over the judiciary and administrative bodies in
Rakhine State being one of several examples. Other EAOs, such as the United Wa State Army have long
exerted judicial, administrative and political control over their territories.
9 Such measures have taken on many forms, such as a revival of the hundi systems of money transfers,
whereby money is transferred into an account held outside Myanmar, and the equivalent amount is
released by a linked party in local currency within Myanmar. Such transactions enable rapid and safe
transfer of funds, but are the stuff of nightmares for financial auditors.

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adequate public service delivery. Core notions of citizenship, governance

and accountability are required, and the rebuilding of these may need
to take place in sites where alternative, constructive expressions of those
are possible. This points to the increased importance of locally grounded
forms of legitimacy, such as CSOs, which, in the absence of a legitimate
state, represent a key modality for the distribution of political goods to the
Myanmar population. In the next section, we describe the dilemmas faced
by funding organisations in supporting humanitarian responses in a failed
state such as Myanmar.

Humanitarian response in Myanmar

In responding to both the humanitarian and political crisis in Myanmar,
various international actors, such as the Association of Southeast Asian
Nations (ASEAN) (Chongkittavorn 2022) have proposed the establishment
of ‘humanitarian corridors’ as a key element of assistance, although the
nature of such a space has not been defined. Beyond this, the United
Nations and international non-governmental organisations (NGOs) have
sought to continue the provision of humanitarian assistance. However,
given the already restricted nature of their activities, requiring substantial
cooperation with government authorities, the continuance of such activities
has, to a significant degree, been contingent on continued cooperation with
government actors under the control of the military regime. This raises
several issues and concerns. First, a coherent argument has been made by both
activists and legal scholars that ongoing cooperation with state organs under
the control of the military serves to enhance and entrench the legitimacy of
what has been widely determined as an unlawful seizure of power (AMCDP
2021). Second, past experience of relief distribution in Myanmar where
cooperation with military-controlled authorities was required featured
a litany of obstacles, corruption and unnecessary restrictions that, in many
cases, significantly hampered relief efforts (South et al. 2011). Third, the
proposals by ASEAN and others argue that, for the people of Myanmar, the
main priority is relief, and that the ‘people’ are by and large unconcerned
with whether relief serves to legitimise a particular authority. This argument
rests on an assumption that aid is viewed as neutral: an assumption that
is, to a significant degree, unfounded. As Weiss (1999,12) succinctly puts
it: ‘The assumption that politics and humanitarianism can be entirely
separated, as if they were parts of two different and self-contained worlds,
is a fiction.’

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Weiss (1999, 4) proposes a ‘political spectrum’ of humanitarians with regard

to their operating principles, placing at one end the ‘classicists’ who seek
to avoid ‘taking sides’ and approach consent as ‘sine qua non’ whereby the
needs of the poor override any political concerns. At the other end of
the spectrum, the ‘solidarists’ explicitly take the side of ‘selected victims’,
eschew any attempts at impartiality and are prepared to override sovereignty
‘as-necessary’. In between these extremes are ‘minimalists’ and ‘maximalists’
who tend either towards the classicist or solidarists position. While this is
to some extent useful, the application of such a spectrum has a tendency
towards labelling and blaming, rather than a constructive appraisal of
how diverse aspects of humanitarian aid, even where politics are explicitly
eschewed, nonetheless inevitably express and embody some form of politics.
The political nature of humanitarianism is determined from several angles:
first, while the humanitarian agency may not possess an explicit political
agenda, the practical delivery of aid is frequently enmeshed in complex
processes of negotiations and permissions with either state or non-state actors.
This means that decisions to deliver aid in ways that require cooperation
and, to some degree, dependence on one or more group’s authority are
inherently political, as they legitimise the claims of that group.10
Second, while humanitarianism may purport to be non-political, this obscures
the significance of the driving forces and motivations of humanitarianism,
which may go beyond the desire to alleviate ‘life-threatening suffering
wherever it may be found’ to more prosaic concerns regarding organisational
priorities: ‘the desire to continue operations and retain staff—or as a form
of legitimization politics—showing the public that an agency is doing
good work’ (Hilhorst & Jansen 2010, 1121–2). Third, and critically for
the claims and proposals of this chapter, humanitarian action does, by its
modus operandi, serve to strengthen or erode capacities and systems, and,
in doing so, effects changes on the wider political landscape.

The local partner conundrum

The standard narratives of development organisations emphasise the need
to engage with local populations, institutions and partners, although the
sincerity and efficacy of such engagement has been repeatedly challenged (see

10 Rich (1999) has explored this in the context of engaging ‘warlords’ in humanitarianism, which
may be an appropriate framework for considerations of the political calculations of humanitarianism in
Myanmar.

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Smillie 2001; Gingerich & Cohen 2015). As Gizelis and Kosek (2005, 367)
observes, ‘pre-existing local institutions, structures and traditions are usually
ignored in failing states, and NGOs fail to capitalize on opportunities to
incorporate locals into relief work’. In considering humanitarian action in
situations of conflict and failing states, the engagement of local populations
and institutions is critical, not simply to enable more effective relief and
development,11 but also as part of the process of enabling the development
and maintenance of governance functions.
However, engagement with local populations, actors and institutions in
ways beyond simply using them as conduits for distribution will inevitably
lead to the kind of political choices discussed earlier. In contexts in which
the legitimacy of those claiming to be the state is contested or rejected, the
maintenance of neutrality may be challenging and indeed unhelpful.
In engaging with local organisations and populations, it is recognised that:
local organizations are highly partisan, often for good reason. Justice
may be as high on their agenda as relief … and [they] are therefore
likely to have opinions that exist in tension with basic humanitarian
principles. (Smillie 2001, 187–8).

Beyond that, where humanitarian needs are inseparable from basic

protection against either a state or another non-state party, relief becomes
intertwined with protection (South et al. 2011). Survival strategies enacted
by local populations, and enabled by local organisations, thus encompass a
range of activities, many of which represent a form of resistance enacted in
self-preservation.
Aside from more formalised political or ethnic affiliation, which represents
a more tangible source of partisanship, Tim Forsyth cautions against
‘misplacing social or economic activities into pre-defined narratives
of resistance’ (Forsyth 2009, 274). Attempts at a neat framing of
humanitarianism may unravel in contexts where survival strategies require
protection as well as material support, and where humanitarian aid and
human rights are inseparable.

11 Although this point should not be overlooked, as Gingerich and Cohen (2015, 38) point out:
Humanitarian response led by local and national actors (state and civil society) in affected
countries is usually preferable to large international responses in a number of ways: it is
likely to be faster and better grounded in local realities, and is frequently cheaper, thus will
ultimately save more lives.

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To summarise: the complexities of humanitarianism, particularly in

contexts where the state is failing or collapsing—and particularly where the
failing state is doing so due to malign intent and actions and not simply
incompetence—call for a recognition that any related humanitarian space is
inevitably and inherently political. In the advent of the collapse of the state,
other actors and institutions become more prominent, and engagement
with them is both necessary and advantageous, but also represents a choice
in terms of political commitment (Décobert & Wells 2020). This presents
agencies with a local partner conundrum. If such engagement is genuine, it
will, of necessity, involve the humanitarian agency in the coping strategies
of local populations and organisations, and, as such, offer little prospect of
maintaining neutrality; further, it will require attention to justice, protection
and the strengthening of systems that enable the circulation of material and
political goods, even at a local level. The alternatives are either to focus on
the strengthening of the displaced failed state, which can claim popular
legitimacy but modest efficiency in terms of the delivery of public goods,
or strengthening the in-situ failed state, which has little or no popular
legitimacy and little or no efficiency in terms of delivery of public goods.
People have essentially chosen to express their citizenship, in relation to
governance, in self-organised ways. Large and varied sections of Myanmar’s
population, having been denied the representative government based on
their vote, have resorted to measures that would establish some form of
self-organised system. In other words: ‘If we can’t get the government we
want by voting, we’ll just organise it ourselves.’12 Aside from any value
judgements on the competing claims to government, the reality is that this
is what people are doing—a key part of everyday survival is self-organisation
tactics that seek to evade central authority. The question for humanitarian
assistance providers is: to what extent should humanitarian assistance work
in tandem with those self-organised groups (and their strategies and tactics),
given that they are posited, if not in direct opposition to the SAC, then at
least in terms of evasion?

12 Three caveats need to be expressed here: first, that for a significant proportion of people, including
many in areas controlled by EAOs, voting in recent elections was not possible or permitted and, for
some, did not represent a genuine chance to secure adequate representation. Second, the statements
here reflect what is commonly considered to be the majority public opinion. Third, the self-organising
processes, as mentioned before, are not new, particularly in EAO controlled areas, but also, as Griffiths
(2019) and others have highlighted, have long represented a significant element in the wider welfare
system in Myanmar.

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The view from below: Challenges for CSOs

and the shrinking humanitarian space
This section presents findings from two sources: 1) a survey conducted in
December 2021 of 40 CSOs on their operational status and challenges, and
2) in-depth follow-up interviews conducted with leaders and members of
five of these organisations in January 2022. The interviews were conducted
by locally recruited researchers in Burmese language.
The existence of self-organised welfare groups in Myanmar has been well
documented (Griffiths 2019; McCarthy 2017). The recent decade of
political reform saw a flourishing of such groups after decades of suppression
by successive military regimes. However, the twin terrors of the COVID-19
pandemic and the 2021 coup have served to dramatically redefine and
constrain the role and operating space of CSOs in Myanmar.
The COVID-19 pandemic was, in many senses, a double-edged sword. On the
one hand, local parahita (social welfare) organisations were at the forefront of
the COVID-19 response, mobilising and deploying considerable human and
material resources to support ambulance services, quarantine centres, special
COVID-19 field hospitals and innovative welfare distribution programs.
During the initial period of the COVID-19 pandemic, local organisations in
many cases expanded or changed their mandates to respond to COVID-19
restrictions and needs, and, in doing so, large numbers of young people were
mobilised as volunteers and donor networks established and strengthened.
A generation of CSO leaders developed through this period, with older,
established leadership often providing a more hands-off, guiding role.
However, this also resulted in the shift of risk and burden to local
organisations, who, in turn, were rarely ‘counted’ in the wider response
strategy (Trócaire 2020). While providing the bulk of human and material
resources in the COVID-19 pandemic response, local agencies were
ignored or sidelined in strategic planning, despite having extensive local
knowledge that could have enabled more tailored local responses. Thus,
local organisations frequently found themselves with both an enhanced role
and responsibility but a diminished voice.
The February 2021 coup further exacerbated this, as local organisations
joined protests against the illegitimate seizure of power. All the organising
capacity that served the COVID-19 response was now directed towards
anti-coup resistance, fuelled by the pre-coup frustrations of being sidelined.
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This, in turn, made local organisations visible targets for arrest by military
authorities, which further diminished the humanitarian space (ICNL
2022). One CSO leader, whose organisation prior to COVID-19 focused
more on civic education, described how ‘because of COVID-19, we had
to stop everything … we could only restart after the third wave. By then,
because of the coup, we could not do as before’ (Interview January 2022).
Despite some degree of expansion during the COVID-19 and post-coup
period, many CSOs, particularly more established local NGOs, have faced
considerable difficulties. Three major constraints were mentioned in both
surveys and in-depth interviews: safety and security, navigating operational
space and financial challenges. First, in situations in which, pre-coup, local
CSOs were regarded as critical sources of human and material resources in
the COVID-19 pandemic response, the vocal and vigorous response of the
same CSOs and volunteers in protest against the coup resulted in harassment,
arrest and seizure of property by military authorities. Humanitarian
acts, including ambulance services and food distribution, were treated as
hostile by the military. Previous collaborative networks became sources of
vulnerability to infiltration and betrayal, resulting in a shrinking of horizons
to ever more local spheres of operation: ‘Our biggest issue now is safety.
Now we have to be more careful with our networks. Every action now has
to be carefully calculated, because of the risk’ (Interview with staff of local
CSO, February 2022).
A second challenge is one of navigating the narrow operational space with
regard to dealings with the SAC. Operationally, many aspects of relief,
healthcare and education, as well as finance and logistics, require some
element of permission or facilitation by administrative bodies. Where these
are under the control of the SAC, CSOs face a dilemma: cooperation with
SAC-appointed bodies and personnel may enable more effective access to
deliver aid but betrays the broader wishes of the very public to whom the
aid is intended. Surveys of CSO volunteers and beneficiaries confirmed
this: more than 90 per cent agreed strongly with the statement that: ‘Relief
organisations should avoid cooperation with SAC.’ Again, 90 per cent of
respondents strongly agreed that they would ‘rather starve than accept help
from [a] SAC-affiliated group’. Any sign of collaboration with the SAC
at the local level risks, at best, undermining the legitimacy of the CSO,
and, at worst, putting it in the crosshairs of local People’s Defence Forces.
Here, though, organisations use what Scott would call ‘metis’ (Scott 2020):
that is, local knowledge and networks that enable them to undertake various
civic functions without reference to state instruments and institutions:
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We avoid anything directly to do with SAC. With social, religious

and other activities, we deal directly with the community, with
people we know. In that way we can avoid dealing with SAC people.
In these times, you do what you have to do, you avoid what you
don’t have to do. (Interview with CSO leader, January 2022)

New registration laws published by the SAC in 2022 required all local
NGOs to register or re-register, or face penalties as unlawful associations.
Beyond the wider principle of avoiding the SAC for ideological reasons,
local CSOs recalled the experiences under the previous military regime in
which official registration was further used as a tool of coercion.13 Hence,
all the organisations surveyed had opted for various forms of evasion,
including reforming as underground associations, changing or removing
names and office signboards, moving offices, switching to online/virtual
operating modes, closing organisational bank accounts and switching to
personal ones, or, in a few cases, suspending operations and supporting the
activities of other groups. Such tactics come at a cost, particularly where
donors prefer, or even require, registration, organisational bank accounts
and a more visible, transparent operating presence.
Financial difficulties constitute a final challenge for CSOs. The survey
of 40 organisations revealed that three-quarters had lower incomes in
December 2021, compared with January 2020, and the median number of
volunteers had decreased from 23 to 14. Some organisations had switched
focus away from issue-specific advocacy to relief and humanitarian actions,
but there was overall a 50 per cent reduction in the scale and scope of
activities between January 2020 and December 2021. Along with loss of
income and volunteers, the banking crisis (described earlier) also posed
difficulties for CSOs, particularly those who operated with funds from
institutional donors:
Our biggest problem is banking. We can only withdraw our money
from the banks with some brokerage fee, like five per cent or seven
per cent. We have to negotiate with the donors for that. There needs
to be more ‘give and take’ around the finance issue. (Interview with
founder of local CSO, March 2022)

13 The odd paradox is that, by registration, an organisation becomes a legal entity, but is then subject
to further restrictions in relation to what activities are permitted. This was in previous regimes enforced
through a system of requiring regular activity and financial reports, with the threat of legal action if any
activities were considered to be against the wishes of the authorities. Thus, many preferred simply to stay
out of the legal framework altogether: as one leader of a local parahita organisation put it, ‘If we register,
then they can take action against us according to the law, as we are a legal entity. But if we don’t register,
we are neither legal nor illegal—we don’t formally exist. It is better that way.’
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The 2021 coup, combined with the broader impact of COVID-19 responses,
has presented new challenges for CSOs. In particular, our field research
revealed concerns about maintaining public legitimacy, safety and security,
navigating operational space and financial challenges.

Conclusion: New spaces of statehood

We have argued in this chapter that there have been four turns for local
CSOs—four transformative moments where responses have enabled
a formative change. First, the constraints of COVID-19 enhanced their role
while limiting their scope and voice. Second, the momentum and frustration
generated during the COVID-19 period served as the emotional and
organisational fuel for the massive outburst of resistance to the coup. Third,
the subsequent repression of civic life and civil society by the military junta,
including the targeting of charitable organisations and shooting and looting
of ambulances and clinics, has once again defined the status of parahita
welfare as political and therefore subject to arbitrary persecution from the
perspective of the junta. Finally, the general collapse of state administrative
and welfare mechanisms due to both the Civil Disobedience Movement and
the degradative effects of SAC mismanagement has resulted in a vacuum of
statehood into which CSOs have stepped.14 There is ample evidence of not
only continued but also expanded operations by myriad, loosely formed
voluntary organisations, in which the operations of larger international
NGOs and local NGOs have largely stalled. Voluntary associations provide
food aid, medical care, education and refugee assistance to the hundreds
of thousands displaced by conflict since the coup.
Following these turns, the space in which CSOs operate is not so much defined
in terms of direct opposition to the state, but as a substitute for an absent or
illegitimate state. This is nothing new. A key strand of the narrative of many
of the parahita organisations that emerged under military and later quasi-
military rule was self-organisation as legitimacy (Griffiths 2019).
In the post-coup environment, the absence of state provision is framed less
in terms of benign neglect and incompetence, and more in terms of the
wilful destruction of both the rudimentary welfare apparatus of the state and

14 We would pause here to acknowledge that this observation is somewhat centre-centric. In a number of
the border areas under the control of EAOs, administrative and welfare systems are often administered by
EAOs and their political wings (see e.g. well-documented examples of parallel judiciary and administrative
systems in Rakhine State; Kyaw Linn 2022).
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the emergent welfare organisations that were plugging the gaps. Our point
here is that, in the process of providing welfare, CSOs are demonstrating
a particular form of resistance: that of embodying a viable, legitimate and
internally sustainable alternative to the state’s claims to statehood.
However, statehood is contested by those who lay claim to the right of it
by dint of force and by those whose claims are rooted in popular legitimacy
and locality. These have different visions and means for development, and,
as such, different trajectories and outcomes. Hence, what is important is
not simply the role of local knowledge contra the state’s organising power,
but that the deployment of different organisational paradigms will result in
different forms of development in the contested spaces of the ‘local’. What
this does is frame the welfare activities of CSOs, particularly under the
current constraints, not simply as desperate attempts to ameliorate tragedy
and suffering, or explicit/direct resistance to military rule, but as the implicit
claiming of ‘state space’ and the embodiment of elements of statehood
(especially the delivery of welfare and essential services). However, contesting
such space involves many risks and challenges and requires extraordinary
levels of adaptive capacity.
To that end, international cooperation needs to recognise three key
principles as it seeks to engage with the process of ending violence and
rebuilding society in Myanmar. First, humanitarian aid is not ‘neutral’ or
‘apolitical’; to the contrary, it either explicitly or implicitly contributes to
the enabling or constraining of alternative visions of society. Second, the
ideal of a single, unitary and reproducible model of society implemented
from above should be abandoned in favour of the kind of ‘“bottom-up
federalism” that is emerging from the existing and actual local structures and
practices of autonomy’ (South 2021, 457). While South refers mainly to
EAOs, we would argue here that the same principle applies to more central
areas, where CSOs are also carving out small islands of statehood. The third
principle is one of commensurate adaptation: if CSOs are adapting their
modus operandi to continue to deliver humanitarian aid, then international
donors should follow suit. In particular, issues around accountability
frameworks being rigidly structured around financial audits rather than
operational information should be addressed, and examples are emerging of
how this could be implemented in practice, including through volunteers.15

15 We refer here to a program that has delivered monthly cash or in-kind support to a cohort of over
1,000 households since May 2021. International donations have been handled via complex payment
networks, often involving third-party hundi (informal payment) trades.

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In practice, this would require humanitarian donors to adopt more flexible

approaches, including working with unregistered entities, allowing more
creative means of transferring funds, such as the use of informal networks
and hundis, and allowing leeway for local groups to address urgent, emergent
needs without fear of incurring financial audit sanctions. Also, rather than
predominately relying on international NGOs and the UN as financial
intermediaries, bilateral donor agencies could enhance the role of large local
NGOs as intermediaries who could channel funds to smaller local groups.
Local intermediaries are, on the whole, far better placed to navigate the
local politics of humanitarian aid in Myanmar than international agencies,
as well as being more cost-effective. For this to occur, however, there will
need to be significant growth in the operational flexibility and capability of
bilateral donors.
In many cases, groups of volunteers are, in a small way, enacting a form of
statehood: that is, providing humanitarian assistance in a consistent and
transparent way, using data and informal networks to ensure appropriate
responses and operating in ways that provide accountability to both
international and local donors. In this way, recently displaced slum dwellers,
people with disabilities, unemployed migrants and other vulnerable citizens
are identified, a form of social contract is enacted and small steps are taken
to maintain the essential conditions of life, for a few at least. It behoves
the international donor community to consider its own capacity to adapt
to the needs of local organisations and support the creation of multiple,
alternative spaces of citizenry, from which a new state, or states, can emerge.

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 14
Myanmar’s Higher Education
Sector Post-Coup: Fracturing
a Fragile System
Charlotte Galloway
Honorary Associate Professor, College of Arts and Social Sciences,
The Australian National University

Abstract
The military coup has had a significant negative impact on human security
in Myanmar. While the future remains uncertain, the effect of the coup
on higher education (HE) and higher education institutions is more
predictable, as history looks to repeat itself. Since February 2021, universities
have been in stasis. Staff and student numbers have drastically declined and
foreign engagement and capacity building has ceased. The consequences of
another lost generation on Myanmar’s future prosperity are dire. Without
homegrown expertise there will, by necessity, be reliance on external actors
to achieve any economic and social development. Global political responses
to the coup suggest that, in the short to medium term, international linkages
may favour nations friendly to Myanmar, which may further impact
regional security. The consequences of the coup on international students
from Myanmar is also unknown, as students either return to Myanmar or
stay abroad, the latter path further eroding Myanmar’s knowledge-based
capacities. This chapter considers the impact of recent events on Myanmar’s

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HE system and likely future scenarios. The role of the international donor
community is also discussed for if (or when) re-engagement with Myanmar
starts to occur.

***
Myanmar’s capability to achieve sustainable economic or social
improvement requires a well-educated population. Recognising the need
for capacity building in this field, prior to the military coup of 1 February
2021, Myanmar’s education system was undergoing extensive reform and
the outlook was positive. Yet, even in the pre-coup world, there was still
a predicted lag of 20 years before Myanmar would see the full benefit of a
generation of students who had experienced a modernised education system
from primary through to tertiary level. It was anticipated that international
donors would continue to support capacity building across the education
sector, enabling Myanmar’s ambition to have a population well equipped to
engage with global workforce trends.
The coup has completely disrupted the progress made within the higher
education (HE) sector over the last decade since Myanmar transitioned
to quasi-democratic rule. However, even before the coup, human security
and Myanmar’s polarising political divides were an issue for HE reform.
According to the United Nations’ framework for human security, the HE
sector should provide an environment whereby people—students and
staff—can undertake their study and work free from fear and free from want
(UNTFHS 2016). Myanmar has not shown any ability to deliver such an
environment since the first military coup in 1962. With a keen connection
between higher education institutions (HEIs), political activism and anti-
government insurgency, the HE sector became politicised and has been
closely controlled by the central administration for nearly 60 years. This has
resulted in a brittle HE system that cannot be responsive to changing needs
or innovation.
With the State Administration Council (SAC)—the military junta—in
control of Myanmar’s administration, the likely scenario for the post-
coup HE environment is not positive (Galloway 2021). Superimposed
on fundamental structural problems inhibiting sectoral reform is a central
administration with dubious legitimacy to enact legislative change or
implement new policies. In addition, there are the intractable issues
of Myanmar’s military leaders’ lack of trust in institutional engagement
with foreign democracies and their inability to accept even the mildest

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criticism of their own policy positions from their own people. With
these issues in mind, this chapter considers the impact of the coup on the
HE sector, Australian aid responses and the likely implications of future
foreign engagement.

Background
Myanmar’s HE sector has always held a fraught position within the
country’s social and political systems, as universities are viewed as sites for
political activism by the central administration (Hellman-Rajanayagam
2020, 251–3). HEIs flourished briefly in the post-independence era
(1948–62); however, the university sector was quickly targeted by the
first military regime after the 1962 coup. HEIs were centralised, curricula
nationalised, foreign academics expelled and autonomy removed. The
decline in education standards in Myanmar was dramatic—from being
regional leaders in literacy, Myanmar’s education system became one of the
weakest (Han Tin 2008; Lall 2008; Hayden & Martin 2013; Lee et al.
2020). Combined with multiple government-directed closures from 1988
to the early 2000s, several generations were lost to academic study, and
continuity of education reform and capacity building was impossible.
In the 1990s, facing intense international pressure over the turmoil of the
1988 uprisings, the failure to accept the results of the 1990 election and the
house arrest of Aung San Suu Kyi, the military junta opened engagement
with the international community. In 2001, the junta enacted a 30-year
education plan (2001–02 FY to 2030–31 FY) to raise standards across all
levels of the education system. A decade later, evidence suggested that the
plan’s effectiveness was minimal. From 2000 to 2011, public expenditure
on HE as a percentage of total education spending fell from roughly 28 per
cent to 19 per cent, among the lowest in the world (UNESCO 2014).
Myanmar was turning out the lowest numbers of masters and PhD students
in Asia, apart from Timor-Leste (UNESCO 2014, 30). The number of
masters and PhD graduates per 100,000 inhabitants in 2011 was also the
lowest in the region.
Since 2011, international donor assistance has supported capacity building
in Myanmar’s education sector, seen as critical for Myanmar’s future social
development. Numerous independent sector reports were produced,
including an Asian Development Bank study (ADB 2013) and a report
by the Institute of International Education (IIE 2013). In 2012, the
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Ministry of Education (MoE) commenced a comprehensive education

sector review with support from international donor partners. This led
to the endorsement of a National Education Strategic Plan 1—NESP1
(2016–21)—by the National League for Democracy (NLD) government
in 2016. The overarching goal was: ‘Improved teaching and learning,
vocational education and training, research and innovation leading to
measurable improvements in student achievement in all schools and
educational institutions’ (MoE 2016, 10).
Such ambitions attest to a commitment to bring Myanmar’s education
system into the modern era. However, key problem areas, including
centralised administration, lack of autonomy, mandatory teacher transfers,
dilapidated infrastructure and dated curricula, have been very slow to
change. When COVID-19 became a global pandemic, the United Nations
Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) assisted
the MoE to develop an education recovery plan. The plan stated: ‘If not
properly addressed at the national level, the COVID-19 pandemic is
expected to have a long-lasting negative impact on the education sector in
Myanmar’ (MoE 2020, 7). Identified risks highlighted the unpreparedness
of the HE system to manage disruptions. Education quality was expected to
decline and rates of inclusion to drop as access to online teaching was not
available equally either geographically or financially. The document noted
that COVID-19 response plans provided the MoE with the opportunity
to fast-track some reforms, such as how examinations were held, revising
the national curriculum and training staff in new pedagogical approaches
(MoE 2020, 68).
Universities closed in March 2020 and, while there was a limited reopening
later that year, many students had already returned to their hometowns
ahead of nationwide lockdowns aimed at reducing the spread of COVID-19.
Strategies for remote learning developed quite rapidly, particularly in urban
centres. It was expected that the National Education Strategic Plan 2—
NESP2 (2021–30)—would be ready for ministerial discussion in 2021
following the swearing-in of the new NLD government. The ambitions for
HE in the NESP2 were high. The component pillars focused on developing
curricula and competencies for the twenty-first century, pre-service teacher
training, quality assurance and administrative reforms, and research
capabilities. International collaborations would be enhanced through
mutual recognition pathways for students, research scholar exchanges and
industry partnerships. Then the military coup occurred.

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The higher education system and the coup

The military coup provoked a rapid response from the HE sector. Student
and staff protests against the junta’s actions were followed by campus closures
as the junta acted to quell public displays of discontent. Most international
engagement had already transitioned to remote contact and the coup’s
timing meant that few foreigners were present to directly observe what was
happening within the HE system. As the junta’s position has stabilised, few
firsthand accounts have been forthcoming. Internet restrictions and fear of
reprisals for speaking out have inhibited our full understanding of the state
of the sector. However, considering popular news reporting and the junta’s
past and present actions, some clear indicators have emerged.
Following their initial closure post-coup, universities were officially
reopened to final-year students in May 2021, but attendance was very
low. In January 2022, masters and third-year students were able to return,
but news reports indicated that student turnout was still low. According
to a Dagon University student union member: ‘The Spring Revolution
is almost two years and everything is getting harder and harder for some
parents and students. However, the most students continue to boycott
the military’s slave education’ (Mizzima 2022a). Myanmar’s universities
reopened to undergraduates on 12 May 2022, but there has been very little
official reporting of student or staff numbers. At Hinthada Technological
University, Civil Disobedience Movement (CDM) supporters reported
that only 67 students enrolled compared to a pre-coup number of over
1,000. Staff numbers have almost halved (Mizzima 2022b). The absence
of official comment suggests that this trend is repeated across the country.
For returning students, the nature and quality of the education they receive
will be questionable, as Myanmar’s HE sector is in a weakened state post-
coup due to internal factors and the withdrawal of international support.
There is no indication that the SAC has any appetite for progressing HE
reform. Indeed, early signals indicate that the former junta’s education plan
(2001–31) will be a model for Myanmar’s future education policy.
Many of Myanmar’s youth and academic staff participated in the CDM.
Estimates suggest that 13,000–19,500 staff were suspended in May 2021,
out of a total academic workforce of around 28,000 (Naw Say Phaw Waa
2021). Staff had until November 2021 to confirm their opposition to the
CDM and return to work. It is unclear how many have since returned.
Some retired or resigned, others died from COVID-19. Many applied for

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overseas scholarships. Returning staff face possible reprisals from CDM

supporters who may view their decision to return as akin to support for the
SAC; they may also face reprisals from the junta, with lecturers expressing
fears of being closely watched when they resume teaching. For some, the
decision will be financial—the decision to return to their university post
may simply be one of providing for their family.
The junta has been quick to arrest anti-coup student and academic protesters
and fast-track their trials. In December 2021, Yangon University Student
Union committee member Aung Phone Maw was sentenced to three years
hard labour, the maximum sentence for violating Section 505a of the Penal
Code, despite what was reported as a lack of evidence (Esther J 2021). That
week, another Yangon University student, Ko Aung Bone Kyaw, died in
military custody (Irrawaddy 2021). With this sad pattern continuing, many
students will stay away from university, preferring to forego their education
rather than study under a SAC regime. The impact of their decision is
obvious—personal loss and a loss of capacity to support Myanmar’s future
development needs.
Even with universities now open, not all are in a position to function.
With civil unrest and armed conflict persisting, a percentage of staff and
students will be isolated from HE education opportunities—firm statistics
are not available. The future impact of this will further enhance social
imbalances between ethnic groups and minorities. Without a full cohort of
teaching staff, there will be an inevitable decrease in teaching quality. This
was an issue prior to the coup with student numbers increasing but staff
numbers remaining relatively stagnant. The withdrawal of international
donors, the suspension of international partnerships and memorandums of
understanding, and the absence of key senior academics who were actively
engaged in the reform processes will see HE flounder and revert to pre-2011
teaching models.
The importance of education is not lost on the younger generations. In the
wake of the coup, groups have established alternative HE options to enable
learning outside of official systems. Support from international donors
and educational institutions for these initiatives has been forthcoming
and is gaining momentum. Enrolments have been encouraging. On the
surface, these alternative education options may sustain engagement with
HE and the international academic community. At the time of writing in
mid-2022, there were four main HE entities aiming to provide education
for students who did not wish to return to universities under junta control,
or simply wanted to have an alternative way of continuing their studies.
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The Virtual Federal University (VFU) owes its existence to student union
members (Tharaphi Than 2021). It receives support from the International
Institute for Asian Studies ‘Humanities Across Borders’ program, while
linkages and support from other international organisations continue to
evolve. Course materials are curated by international experts and online
learning modules are available. Fees for courses can be waived according
to need.
In June 2021, the NUG announced initiatives to support HE (NUG 2021;
Nilar Aung Myint 2021) through a new body called Federal University
(not connected to the VFU). Online lectures and seminars were posted
on YouTube and Facebook; however, activity has slowed and there is no
coordinated tertiary program running at present.
The initial enthusiasm for these alternative forms of education appears
to have waned. The reality of developing and delivering online materials
in Burmese is logistically challenging and resource intensive. While it is
possible to replicate existing university curricula for many disciplines
and deliver the material remotely, as many universities worldwide have
done during the COVID-19 pandemic, there are real risks for those who
associate directly with NUG activities, since the NUG is now considered a
terrorist organisation by the SAC.
Spring University Myanmar (SUM) was established in May 2021 by local
and foreign-educated Myanmar academics and offers a range of courses,
with more being developed based on demand (SUM 2021). Students
usually pay a fee for each course, which typically lasts for six weeks. SUM
aims to pay its staff, many of whom are university academics who were
sacked for participating in the CDM or resigned. Others are private sector
experts. International donor funding has been received to develop models
for the delivery of course materials when internet access is poor or restricted.
SUM is expanding and enrolments are increasing.
The Yangon-based Parami Institute had a strong reputation for delivering
continuing education courses prior to the coup. With close connections
to Bard College, New York, the institute established Parami University in
2020. However, Parami University closed after the coup and its activities
transferred back to Parami Institute. The institute is now working with
the Open Society University Network to deliver courses to Myanmar
students who have fled to Thailand, or who are in ethnic-controlled areas
(Becker 2022).

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These initiatives face numerous hurdles. First is the broad issue of

accreditation. In the short term, it is expected there will be motivation for
study. Certificates of completion are being issued by most of these entities,
however, in the longer term there will be some expectation that the courses
will be recognised as bona fide programs of study. This will be a challenge,
but not an impossible one. Options include accreditation by a recognised
international body that will take some responsibility for the oversight of
quality control. Such accreditation will require evidence of appropriate
teaching and learning outcomes and this will take time. Short-course and
micro-credential certificates from reputable tertiary organisations are also
viable possibilities. If optimism is given to a return to democratic rule in the
medium term, the NUG may be able to accredit courses based on Myanmar’s
existing education accreditation standards. This may give some confidence to
participants who would have expectations of their studies being recognised
by a future democratically elected non-military government.
Another barrier to alternative education is reliable internet access for
students and teachers. Each entity is set up to deliver programs remotely.
Now, with the SAC shutting access to non-approved websites and increasing
data costs, alternative course delivery methods must be devised. While
possible, this requires intensive reworking of course materials and strategies
to deliver materials in-country. A final issue is personal safety. There is no
indication yet of the SAC targeting students who are studying with these
organisations. However, it is possible that participants will be seen as CDM
supporters by the junta and therefore risk arrest.
Another alternative to resuming state-run studies is enrolment in accredited
and independent HEIs (Kyaw Moe Tun 2021). A number of private
universities have gained accreditation in recent years and, currently, there is
no barrier to their activities during junta rule—unless they are deregistered
by the MoE. However, these are fee-paying organisations and relatively
small in scale and number (the National Education Policy Commission
registered 12 private HEIs in 2019) and it will take time to upscale course
delivery and capacity. There are also many ways that private HE operations
can be curtailed through bureaucratic edict, including the deregistration
of teaching staff.

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The junta and higher education

The SAC has recently turned its attention to the university sector and
the rhetoric is not promising. Plans for NESP2 have been shelved. The
absence of international partners and loss of skilled academic staff makes it
impossible to sustain any of the gains of the past decade. However, it can
be argued that deep change in the sector has continually been undermined
by the central administration. The former junta’s education plan has never
been fully dismantled and is ready to be reactivated.
Both the Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP), led by
former general Thein Sein, and the NLD party, led by Aung San Suu Kyi,
promoted education reform as a priority. However, even with international
actors involved in evaluating and strategising capacity building pathways,
the end goals were repeatedly inhibited by political issues. During the
USDP’s term from 2011 to 2015, education reform was complicated by a
lack of cooperation with the major minority party, the NLD. A National
Education Bill was submitted to parliament in July 2014, but President
Thein Sein did not endorse it, instead favouring continuation of the 30-
year military junta’s plan (Wa Lone 2014). Twenty-five amendments were
proposed and 19 were eventually accepted. According to dissenters, it was
a divisive Bill that continued a path of centralised education control, no
autonomy for universities, ongoing restrictions to student union activities
and the continued exclusion of ethnic language instruction (Wa Lone 2014;
Thu Zar 2014; Lall 2021, 58–85). In retrospect, this can be read as a signal
that there was no widespread acceptance of the reform agenda, particularly
among the military-backed USDP. Given the pervasive presence of military
and former military personnel throughout the central administration,
it must be considered that there were deliberate efforts to slow down change
implementation.
The SAC has not released an education plan. However, the former junta’s
2001–31 plan is likely to play a significant role in any new policy. Prior
to the 2010 election, a ‘Special Four-Year Education Development Plan’
defined 21 programs to be implemented by HE sub-sectors, focusing on
five core areas: promotion of quality education, introduction of information
and communication technology in education, advancement of research,
development of a lifelong learning society and enhancement of international
collaborations (MoE 2012). By 2012, the plan had expanded to 36 programs,
with a sixth core area added, namely ‘preservation of national identity and
national values’ (MoE 2012).
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After 15 years, the plan had resulted in no meaningful improvements in the

education sector. Recent official communications herald a full return to
the centralised control of education. On 15 January 2022, Min Aung Hlaing’s
speech at Dawei University was the lead article for the Global New Light of
Myanmar, the official government English-language news publication. It
asserted the need for every university to keep ‘abreast of the international
community’, but no indication was given as to how this would occur, especially
given the current state of sanctions (GNLM 2022a, 3). Min Aung Hlaing is
quoted as saying that ‘the government is fulfilling the needs of uplifting the
education sector’ (GNLM 2022a, 3). This is simply untrue, as there is no
capacity in Myanmar to achieve such goals. It is also incompatible with recent
junta-imposed draconian changes that restrict internet access, and a recent
law making virtual private networks illegal (Irrawaddy 2022). Reports from
people who have visited the University of Yangon indicate that it was like
a return to the past. Only a handful of graduate students were present and,
when seen taking photos, a guard appeared and told them it was prohibited
to take photos in the compound. Such restrictions have fallen back into place
easily, and apparently without protest (Jurist 2022).
In April 2022, the SAC minister for education, Dr Nyunt Pe, spoke with
faculty at Myitkyina Education Degree College and:
urged them not only to teach literacy to aspiring students, but also
to educate them to be disciplined, patriotic and polite, only then
can teachers trained by the degree colleges educate students to be
disciplined, polite and patriotic. (GNLM 2022b, 3)

Such pronouncements indicate a return to the past, with a centralised

nationalist approach to education that is in direct opposition to the
recommendations of the previous decade’s reports and education plans
(Callahan 2022).
Other recent press releases forcefully discredit NLD members, CDM
supporters and teachers who have refused to return to work under the SAC.
Of concern is the language used that clearly threatens anyone who opposes
the SAC:
The security forces will take extraordinary measures to ensure the
safety of teachers who are making efforts in the academic sector for
the next generations in order to promote the education qualifications.
The people should keep security awareness and cooperate with the
security members in community peace and peaceful learning of
children. (GNLM 2022c, 7)
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Matriculation exams were held on 1 April 2022. The GNLM featured

images of students attending examination centres and reported high
numbers attending. This seems to have been an attempt to paint a picture
of normality ahead of the reopening of universities on 12 May. Sadly for the
education sector, the rhetoric only supports the continuation of systematic
teaching methods. The junta’s plans to increase the use of the internet and
wi-fi further undermines the SAC’s credibility as, at the time of writing,
electricity supply was even more irregular, access to internet sites was
becoming more restricted and inflation was soaring, putting the costs of
laptops and tablets out of reach for most.

What does the future hold for Myanmar’s

higher education system?
As the coup continues, and with no resolution in sight, governments
and international agencies are contemplating what re-engagement with
Myanmar may mean. With many foreign governments boycotting direct
funding to the junta, assistance for education will have to be directed
through non-government organisations (NGOs). This is problematic,
as the SAC is monitoring all NGO activity and has clamped down on
many civil society organisations (Chapter 15, this volume; HRW 2021;
Liu 2021). How effective NGOs can be in this environment is unclear.
Prior to the coup, many governments were heavily invested in supporting
Myanmar’s education sector reform, including the United Kingdom, the
European Union, Canada, Australia and the United States. As the Australian
Government considers whether, how and when to engage with the SAC,
the dilemmas it faces, as well as its responses, are typical. Australia’s ‘Aid
Investment Plan 2015–2020’ for Myanmar placed education as ‘the flagship
of Australia’s aid program’ (DFAT 2015). A team led by Australian experts,
known as the Myanmar Quality Improvement Program or MyEqip, and
local staff worked directly with the MoE to manage the implementation
of Myanmar’s NESP1 and to support the drafting of NESP2. However,
MyEqip was suspended after the coup and closed in June 2021.
In 2020, Australia shifted its development assistance to respond to the needs
presented by COVID-19 (Australian Government 2020). Since the coup,
Australia’s assistance to Myanmar has pivoted again:

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to meet the immediate needs of the country’s most vulnerable

people, including the poor and ethnic minorities. We have
redirected development assistance away from regime entities and do
not provide funding directly to the regime. To ensure our support
benefits the people who need it most, we work through trusted non-
government partners including multilateral and non-government
organisations. Our program will remain under close review and be
flexible to respond to the evolving situation to best meet the needs
of affected populations. (DFAT n.d.)

Any country that has a policy of non-engagement with the junta, or will
not provide direct funding to the SAC, will effectively end capacity building
opportunities in the HE sector. Since the coup, Australian Government–
endorsed statements have aligned with international partners in recognising
the Association of Southeast Asian Nations’ role in engaging with the junta.
Australia has also endorsed the remarks of the United Nations General
Assembly condemning human rights abuses in Myanmar, including the
arbitrary detention of Myanmar nationals and foreigners.
Non-engagement policies have negatively affected Myanmar students
studying internationally. Many are on foreign government scholarships
and some are Myanmar government employees. Their position is difficult.
Providing support for these students is challenging for foreign governments
who may face internal criticism for supporting Myanmar public officials.
So far, most students have shown solidarity and have taken the opportunity
of being abroad to speak out against the military. But even this poses risks.
In July 2021, it was reported that Myanmar students receiving Australian
Government scholarships were given a letter from the Myanmar ambassador
to Australia saying that they must declare their non-involvement with the
CDM and state their support for the new government. Students were also
warned of possible prosecution under Myanmar law if they were involved
in any activities that were deemed anti-government or incited others
(Dziedzic 2021). As reported in the press, students felt intimidated, with
many concerned for the wellbeing of their families in Myanmar should they
not comply. Individual universities have lobbied their own administrations
for fee waivers and scholarship extensions with varying degrees of success.
Meanwhile, the formal government response has been lacklustre. It was
not until May 2021 that the Australian Government announced that
visa extensions would be granted to existing students. However, recently
graduated students could not automatically extend their visas. They were

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advised of their options and the official information encouraged the use of a
migration agent to facilitate applications—at their own expense (Australian
Government 2021; Gibbs 2021).
Since the coup, student groups have been quick to organise. The Myanmar
Students’ Association Australia became a registered charity in February
2021, an act that requires governmental approval (MSAA 2021). Registering
organisations that are fundraising for humanitarian purposes is one way that
governments can help international students support HE without direct
involvement. Yet, without doubt, the activities of association members are
being monitored and students are at risk (Wells, Breen & Décobert 2022).
The SAC have tools to punish those who oppose them, even while abroad.
This includes intimidation of family members in Myanmar and laying
charges against Myanmar students and academics abroad and sentencing
them in absentia. Some student activists have had their passports cancelled;
others have had their passport renewals refused. Such tactics have also been
used against members of the NUG (Handley 2022; Strangio 2022).
One avenue for continuing support for Myanmar’s future HE system
is through state party–funded scholarships. The Australia Awards, an
Australian Government–funded university scholarship program, supports
emerging leaders from developing countries primarily in the Indo-Pacific
region and is continuing to accept applications from Myanmar citizens
(Australia Awards n.d.). Myanmar applicants who are not serving military
personnel can apply. However, also ineligible are those convicted of,
or under investigation for, criminal activities—this may exclude many
Myanmar citizens who have been convicted by the junta of supporting
the CDM. Thus, the program has been criticised for educating applicants
sponsored by the Myanmar government; however, this attitude ignores the
principles of academic freedom and the benefits of international networks.
A policy strategy could see governments direct scholarship funds to an
independent organisation to administer. USAID’s Lincoln Scholarship
Program for Myanmar graduates focuses on further study in areas of need.
Unfortunately, the 2022 guidelines stated that eligible applicants had to
be residing in Myanmar, excluding those who have had to leave (USAID
2022a). How readily the SAC will approve student travel abroad is one of
many unknowns.
Individual foreign academics may choose to re-engage with Myanmar on
the basis of academic collaboration without borders. Barriers to this will
include institutional and government restrictions. If the situation continues

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long term, the SAC may turn to ‘friendly’ nations for HE support and
collaboration, most likely China and Russia. Should the models of these
countries be adopted in Myanmar, HE will irrevocably shift away from its
foundation of academic autonomy. Current geopolitics suggest that such
a move would further isolate Myanmar from the rest of the world, resulting
in significant regional and international effects. A destabilising factor in
this scenario is the vast number of alumni from foreign institutions who
have returned to Myanmar in recent years to participate in the country’s
development. Their motivation or ability to contribute to the collective
disruption of the central administration, similar to the undermining tactics
of the military during the previous government’s rule, is unknown.
Should the situation with the junta ease, international aid could become
conditional on continuing the implementation of the NESP1, which had
been endorsed by the elected government. In this scenario, those who
criticise any perceived support for the junta could be mollified. While
Australia and other nations have maintained their distance and redirected
funds without clear plans for future HE sector support, by mid-2022 some
governments had taken targeted action. For example, the US government,
through USAID, and the European Commission (EC) announced projects
to support Myanmar’s HE and technical and vocational education and
training (TVET) sectors. These actions, which indicate an unwillingness to
defer further engagement in the education sector, recognise the significance
of maintaining access to education. In May 2022, USAID called for
information to inform ‘designing a new activity to increase access to inclusive
higher education opportunities for youth in Myanmar’ (USAID 2022b).
The project will likely complement existing basic education support. The
EC grant announced in June 2022 seeks ‘to improve access to quality
technical and vocational training, non-formal education and employment
opportunities for youth in targeted communities in ethnic and crisis-
affected border areas, including Rakhine’ (EC 2022). It calls for in-country
and external partners, though there will be difficulties in managing any
projects. For example, local NGO partners must be registered. As noted,
NGO activity is closely monitored and projects will be scrutinised by
the SAC.
Alternatives to state-based universities would help fast-track reforms,
allowing students to quickly engage with international educational models.
This requires strong donor assistance to fill gaps in infrastructure, and to
coordinate internationally recognised accreditation of study programs.
International support for HE would be well directed towards preparing
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models for this option that could be implemented quickly. Funding

international study for Myanmar students who have fled the country, and
supporting employment opportunities in sectors relevant to Myanmar’s
development, would be an effective investment by donors. Should the
situation change and the junta be ousted, a cohort of Myanmar graduates
with international work experience could return to Myanmar and contribute
to rebuilding the country. If there is no real change, the world will still
benefit from having more young people educated.

Conclusion
With now over two years of interrupted education due to COVID-19 and
the military coup, Myanmar’s ability to be self-sustaining for their own HE
research and development needs has been further hampered. It is difficult
to see how the HE system can recover, then grow, in the medium term.
Should some form of recognition be given to the junta after any future
elections, tentative re-engagement by existing partners may be possible.
However, there is no expectation that HE reform will be a government
priority. With a decimated economy, much-needed infrastructure plans
for the sector will be further delayed. There will be no curriculum reform
and Myanmar’s HE standards will fall further behind those of regional and
global counterparts. Any aspirations for improved teaching will be quashed,
as the environment to foster quality and creative teaching will be non-
existent. There is no capacity within Myanmar to develop the HE system
without international expertise. Yet, international sanctions may affect
academics who wish to return to Myanmar and continue pre-coup teaching
and research projects; they may find themselves prohibited from doing so
by their own governments. For Australian academics, any re-engagement
with Myanmar will require clearance under the Foreign Relations Act 2020.
The absence of senior staff will also further exacerbate recovery in the HE
sector. Many had benefited from foreign training, and their knowledge will
be lost to the system.
Alternative education systems offer the potential to keep students engaged
with learning. The international community can, and is, developing
strategies to facilitate remote study. But in an environment of ‘if you are
not with us you are against us’ there is the ever-present risk that participants
will be deemed anti-state and suffer adverse consequences. This should not,
however, deter such endeavours. There are still students and academics who

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are in areas outside of the junta’s control, and some who are out of the
country, who can benefit from these learning opportunities. Much more
could be done by the international university community. Even if a fraction
of the world’s universities provided a fee waiver and living allowance for a
single Myanmar student, significant demand would be met. From a strategic
perspective, if foreign governments did the same, they would be shoring up
Myanmar’s future—surely a worthwhile investment.
While much attention has been given to students, there can be no future
for HE if the academics who have left the system are not supported.
For the younger generation of academics who had begun to experience
foreign teaching methods, either through study overseas or directly from
international visiting faculty to Myanmar, being part of a junta-controlled
education system is not an option. Many have declared their support for
the CDM and are blacklisted by the MoE. Their opportunity to return to
academia is remote, especially given the most recent pronouncements in the
GNLM. On 1 June 2022, the following appeared:
Provisions of the national education law are being reviewed to amend
something if necessary, not to mix education with politics. Students
can learn political science at the university but they are not allowed
to mix education with politics. If they wish to engage in politics,
they need to join the political field. (GNLM 2022d)

There is no place for democratic debate under the current regime. This
follows on from the recent dissolution of student unions, which have been
replaced by student associations (Frontier Myanmar 2022b).
The ongoing education of university academics could be undertaken
through international organisations such as Advance HE, formerly known
as the Higher Education Academy. This would help academic staff keep
abreast of contemporary teaching methods and approaches, and participate
in international networks.
With the recent return to school and reopening of universities, Myanmar’s
youth are faced with a real conflict. On 24 January 2022, Frontier Myanmar
published an article on the dilemmas faced by parents and students wishing
to undertake their university entrance exams. Those who choose to do so fear
a lifetime label of having taken exams under the junta (Frontier Myanmar
2022a). Yet how long do they put their studies on hold?

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The outlook for HE in Myanmar is bleak. New relationships will need to

be built between foreign agencies and donors, and the MoE. Given the
events of the last decade, it will likely take at least three to five years for
relationships to be re-established. However, donors will be cautious before
committing resources at the levels seen in the 2016–20 period.
Should the junta remain in power, there is every indication that attempts
at foreign engagement in the HE sector by governments critical of the
regime will be viewed with suspicion, and potentially couched as foreign
interference. Current global geopolitical shifts could work for or against
the junta, depending on who aligns with whom. The role of third-party
donor agencies will become more important as governments distance
themselves from providing development aid to the SAC. Earlier plans for
university autonomy and curriculum reform can only advance if HEIs are
authorised to implement them—an unlikely prospect. The more likely
outcome is the complete stasis of the HE system, causing Myanmar to fall
even further behind in this development indicator. Yet, given the very real
need to increase workforce skills, particularly in science and technology,
one scenario could see the junta align itself with a foreign ally, in a way that
may weaken Myanmar’s independence and further erode human security.
It is not yet known which foreign governments may decide to endorse
the junta’s administration. As this becomes clearer the threats to national
and regional security will be more apparent. Regardless of the options that
arise or the outcomes, the unpleasant certainty is that the aspirations of yet
another generation of Myanmar students and academics will be thwarted
by political upheaval.

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au/articles/students-continue-to-campaign-for-change-in-myanmar

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 15
The Aftermath: Policy
Responses to Myanmar’s
Political and Humanitarian
Crises
Monique Skidmore
Professor, Alfred Deakin Institute, Deakin University, Australia

Anthony Ware
Associate Professor, School of Humanities and Social Sciences,
Deakin University, Australia

In the immediate wake of the 2021 coup, the world witnessed the
depressingly familiar modus operandi of the Myanmar military. Promises
made to restore a constitutional democracy through a ‘reformed’ Union
Electoral Commission were made alongside those of a return to the status
quo once corruption was rooted out by the saviour of the Union, the
military. The shock was palpable to the generation of children and young
adults who could only dimly remember a time of fear and repression before
the ‘transitional’ period to democracy that began with national elections
in 2011 and the release of Aung San Suu Kyi from house arrest. There
was shock, too, among development organisations and governments that
had believed that Myanmar was on an upward and linear trajectory to a
democratic future, despite occasional setbacks and a gruellingly slow pace of
reform. Many governments and organisations assumed that the Myanmar
military, entrenched in the country as its dominant institution and intricately

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tied up in its economy, would somehow be won over by sheer passion and
a sense of inevitability and agree to amend the constitution, removing its
central role in the political and economic life of the country, as the military
had done in Indonesia.
There was never any evidence for these assumptions. The last 60 years
of Myanmar’s history clearly show a trajectory of ongoing authoritarian rule
in which the strategic use of political violence and widespread repression of
basic rights have been regularly adopted by the generals, their cronies and
families to allow them to limp along in power, even if they are despised.
Like in previous widespread pro-democracy protests (notably in 1988),
a new generation of young people have been radicalised and taken up arms
against the junta. Millions of civilians have been displaced, and hundreds
of thousands have fled the country. And, as in previous purges, in 2022 the
regime sought to rollout a military campaign to eliminate resistance to its
rule and to break the nexus between the existing armed organisations and
the newly formed People’s Defence Forces (PDFs).
But this is not 1988 and much has changed in the world since the previous
uprisings. Indeed, much has changed even since the attempted Saffron
Revolution in 2008. As the contributors to this volume demonstrate, the
roles of foreign companies, neighbouring countries, foreign governments,
regional and political groups, aid organisations and disruptive technologies
in the resistance to the reimposition of military rule, renewed civil war
and ensuing emergency humanitarian crisis are different to any of the
previous crises. The most important changes are local and regional, with
the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) changing its narrative
of noninterference in Myanmar and with the Myanmar people being more
able to organise themselves to resist the imposition of military rule after
having had a decade of relative freedom of association.
As the chapters of the volume illustrate, the political landscape has forever
changed in Myanmar. The National Unity Government (NUG) is a
significant evolution beyond the old National League for Democracy, with
broader inclusivity, new policies and a new generation of leaders. Whatever
happens now, significant change has been wrought. Likewise, formation
of the Civil Disobedience Movement, then the PDFs, has added to the
minority organisations and their armed wings, changing the status quo
and power of the people to fight authoritarianism and oppression. Again,
whatever happens next, these changes will impact the political landscape in
Myanmar for generations.
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Similarly, we see fundamental changes forced upon the delivery of

development and humanitarian aid to Myanmar. For decades, aid donors
and agencies have focused on development and tried to strengthen the
capacity of state institutions; that is no longer desirable or possible. They
have long preferred to fund multilateral organisations and international
agencies, because of their capacity for large-scale projects and compliance
with international accountability criterion, usually only bringing in local
organisations as implementing partners or as part of consortia; most of
those large programs have now been curtailed, and local groups are doing
the most effective work. Aid donors and agencies have long considered
development and humanitarian aid separately, formulating different
policies and insisting on the neutrality of humanitarian aid. But now,
local non-government organisations are delivering humanitarian aid and
all local civil society activity is inherently political—even while meeting
humanitarian need.
The opening up of Myanmar’s communications sector over the past decade,
in particular the widespread adoption of mobile phones and rapid internet
uptake, has made it much easier to communicate, plan and mobilise civil
society. This facilitated not only the Civil Disobedience Movement and
PDFs, but also the mobilisation of humanitarian aid to the most vulnerable,
such as internally displaced persons, in an agile response by dispersed local
civil society groups. Myanmar civil society has changed. International
principles no longer seem to apply. Instead, the changes demand that the
global aid architecture significantly revamp its policy and practice.

Insights about the likely direction of the

conflict and its key actors
Farrelly (Chapter 2) notes that, in Naypyidaw, the expectation remains
that the international community will become increasingly exhausted with
Myanmar’s tragic situation and, together with the related inability of ASEAN
to build a more proactive policy position, the post-coup government will
have sufficient time to consolidate its rule. Kironska and Jiang (Chapter 6)
add that China is already moving from a position of ambiguous neutrality
to support for, and engagement with, the military—a move the generals are
no doubt banking on.

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If, as it is looking likely, the coup is further consolidated, the country’s

democratic activists are likely to face years, even decades, of dismay and
punishment. Atrocities will continue and the space for resistance will
become tighter and tighter. Simpson and McIntyre (Chapter 5) argue
that the situation in Myanmar will get worse before it gets better, and that
international justice mechanisms will have little if any ability to hold the
generals to account. There are no quick fixes, no international processes or
mechanisms to force change. The heavy burdens of forced displacement,
poverty, food shortages and unemployment, along with the collapse of the
healthcare and education systems, as well as the pressure of COVID-19,
will continue unabated for the foreseeable future; not to mention climate
change, which is already disrupting the monsoon, causing droughts, reducing
agricultural returns, and threatening severe catastrophe at any moment.
Echoing Simpson and McIntyre’s concerns, McCarthy and Saw Moo
(Chapter 11) conclude that, in the medium term, the deepening of societal
reliance on non-state social actors both to survive and resist dictatorship
should compel strategic thinking about how a future civilian government
can better address the precarity faced by ordinary people, and put to rest the
legacies of inequality bequeathed by past and current periods of dictatorship.
Farrelly proposes a frightening possible scenario in which centrifugal forces
ultimately unravel claims to a single union in Myanmar. Some areas and
leaders would be better placed to take advantage of the comprehensive
failure of the central authorities to maintain the current order; this vision
of state collapse and fragmentation paints a dire warning of one possible
outcome of the current chaos.
Ware and Laoutides (Chapter 9) as well as Ye Min Zaw and Tay Zar Myo
Win (Chapter 10) argue that we can already see this occurring in Arakan
State. They conclude that the Arakanese community is steadily moving
towards the claim of territorial autonomy by invoking historical narratives
and the use of armed force. The state- and nation-building work of the
Arakan Army since the coup has certainly consolidated their power and
strengthened their claim of autonomy, and they have declared that they will
take their claim of sovereignty outside the Union if there is no room for them
within the Union. Similar centrifugal forces will surely pull on other ethnic
minority organisations unless the NUG are seen to succeed in the near to
medium term. In Bamar-majority areas of central Myanmar, the possibility
of ongoing discontent and conflict is very real, especially given the mixed
population patterns across most areas of Myanmar. Any process of partition
on the basis of ethnicity would create messy and probably violent upheavals.
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Amid the scramble for control, communications have become critical, with
new possibilities for informing communities of impending military actions
opening up with the uptake of mobile phones, VPNs and encrypted social
media channels. Ye Min Zaw and Tay Zar Myo Win (Chapter 10) remind
readers of the violence that has also been fuelled through the social media
propaganda promulgated by the Myanmar military and ultra-nationalist
groups against the Rohingya. They warn the international community
of the need for ongoing vigilance against technology companies enabling
violent hate speech and fabricated stories circulating in Myanmar. But,
as Jadyn, Skidmore and Medail (Chapter 3) note, at the same time, new
communication technology has enabled new ways of mobilising and
supporting the resistance, including crowdfunding and digital financing.
This inflow of money and arms is having results on the ground, and the
PDFs are far better equipped in 2022 than they were in 2021. Nonetheless,
Jadyn, Skidmore and Medail caution against drawing overly optimistic
conclusions from the internet-savvy youth regarding Myanmar’s resistance
to the junta. They suggest that, although cyberspace currently offers a way
to even the stakes on the ground, techno-totalitarianism in Myanmar may
eventually look like it does in China. New cyber-surveillance technologies
purchased by the junta will result in more measures designed to deny
Burmese citizens access to the cyber-world as the junta learns to navigate
and create their own cyber-sphere.
The contributors to this volume have provided insights that have policy
implications for foreign governments, both neighbours and those further
afield. Detailed analysis, drawing out implications and recommendations,
are provided in each chapter. The following section summarises just a few of
the key implications and policy recommendations from the analysis.

Implications for governments

Farrelly (Chapter 2) reminds governments of the importance of ASEAN,
once again, as a primary international link between Myanmar and its regional
neighbours. Moe Thuzar (Chapter 7) believes ASEAN’s ability to find
solutions to the current dilemma in Myanmar is limited by its own structural
flaws and diminished capacity to persuade the Myanmar military; however,
ASEAN is changing its narrative of noninterference. The Myanmar crisis
presents yet another reminder that ASEAN and its member states need
to determine the value and import of ASEAN membership, as well as the

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importance of implementing the mentality of ASEAN centrality. Arguing

that ASEAN should lead a coalition of UN and other dialogue parties, Moe
Thuzar points to the consultative meeting held on 6 May 2022 as a first
step. She notes that hopes for individual ASEAN members’ engagement
with the NUG currently centre on supporting the NUG’s humanitarian
assistance efforts via local community networks and channels, including in
ethnic-controlled areas.
The role and ability of China to protect the Myanmar regime from the effects
of international pressure, sanctions and embargoes is not straightforward, as
considerable anti-China sentiment has been evident in the response to the
coup by the Myanmar population. The potential of Myanmar to become
a collapsed state, the potential involvement of China, Russia and North
Korea in Myanmar’s development, and the enormous resources required to
rebuild Myanmar as a nascent democratic state if the junta steps back, are all
scenarios that will require Myanmar to be a higher political and aid priority
than it has been since the coup.
Coppel (Chapter 4) reminds Western nations of the limited effectiveness
of sanctions during previous eras of military dictatorship in Myanmar, and
points to their inability to distinguish between hurting the regime’s upper
echelons and the most vulnerable of the population. He argues that foreign
activist organisations need to think beyond the standard action playbook
focused on large Western corporations and devise Myanmar-focused
strategies—that is, strategies that directly assist agents and conditions for
change in Myanmar. It is the businesses, organisations and people who
remain, not those that have left, that will ultimately influence change
in Myanmar.
Galloway (Chapter 14) focuses on the education system as one sector
among many that has been upended by the coup, and one that will require
not just significant rebuilding but also fundamental reform. International
sanctions may have adverse impacts here; for example, they might prevent
academics from returning to Myanmar to continue pre-coup teaching or
from resuming research projects that could potentially be viewed by the
regime as foreign interference. She also notes the new security environment
in Australia, pointing to complications for educational institutions and
researchers re-engaging with Myanmar who require clearance under the
Foreign Relations Act 2020.

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 15. THE AFTERMATH

Simpson and McIntyre (Chapter 5) argue that the ‘Responsibility to Protect’

policy offers the best guide to the levers available for the international
community to influence and pressure the military regime. They also argue
that Australia should join other nations as in intervenor in the International
Court of Justice genocide case, even though the jurisdiction of international
courts remains limited. However, they conclude that foreign governments
recognising the NUG may, in the long term, be the most effective option
for holding the generals to account, because the NUG has committed to
joining the Rome Statute, which would give the International Criminal
Court jurisdiction in Myanmar.
Kironska and Jiang (Chapter 6) argue that China’s new assertiveness in its
foreign policy, as well as its geostrategic two-ocean objectives, comprise new
areas of analysis that complicate the traditional view of China’s peaceful
rise to power. They conclude that, when dealing with China, Western
countries need to understand that there has been a change in behaviour
and that China is likely to be more assertive and, possibly, more extreme.
Further, when dealing with Myanmar, they argue that countries such as
Australia need to be aware that China is likely to become a stronger ally
to the Tatmadaw as time goes by. China is unlikely to contribute to, and
will possibly oppose, any moves by international actors to engage with the
Myanmar shadow government.

Insights for donors

The companies, institutions and foreign investors that committed resources
during Myanmar’s brief liberalisation period are unlikely to return with
substantial investments in the short or medium term, according to Farrelly
(Chapter 2). However, material support can be given to the NUG. Simpson
and McIntyre (Chapter 5) argue that the US could release the USD1 billion
of assets frozen by the Federal Reserve to the NUG as a major show of
concrete support for the country and its elected representatives.
More contentiously, Simpson and McIntyre argue that, if the international
community and donors want to do things differently to try to end the
cycle of violence and repression, it would be justifiable to support the
anti-junta PDFs that have emerged, often in conjunction with existing
ethnic minority militias, to militarily challenge the Tatmadaw. While many
governments are hesitant to arm or support non-state militias, arguing that
non-violent methods should be employed, Myanmar’s military has shown
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 AFTER THE COUP

throughout history that it has no qualms about ruthlessly and brutally

crushing non-violent opposition movements. The alignment of the PDFs
with a multi-party, unified shadow government, recently elected in a
landslide, and the international war crimes cases being pursued against the
junta’s military leaders, perhaps makes this case very different to other cases.
While the conflicts and crises in Myanmar are only likely to be resolved
by groups within the country, Simpson and McIntyre conclude that
international aid and diplomatic support may well provide the opposition
movement with the resources, resolve and recognition it needs to force
a negotiated settlement.
To this end, and almost as contentiously, Décobert (Chapter 12) calls for the
funding and provision of emergency aid to be directed primarily to local-level
systems and organisations, and for any preconditions of ‘normative neutrality’
to cease. This would be a major change to the ‘business as usual’ approach to
aid to Myanmar—and one that many would argue is long overdue. It is
simply not possible in the current environment for international agencies
to work in-country. Décobert argues that, in practical terms, and given the
escalating humanitarian needs in Myanmar, international donors and aid
agencies must increase their support to civil society organisations and local
non-government organisations, which have the expertise, local legitimacy
and systems to offer alternatives to top-down aid and internationally driven
aid practices. She concludes that these types of approaches are necessary, not
only to channel assistance to civilian populations in need of aid but also to
help lay the foundations for longer-term democratisation, development and
peace in Myanmar. Décobert is clear that, in a context in which normative
neutrality can do very real harm, international humanitarian engagement
should be guided by an overarching solidarity-focused approach, and
international donors and aid agencies must ensure that their programs do
not end up legitimising, emboldening or enabling the military regime, but,
rather, support the agency and autonomy of the Myanmar people.
Aung Naing and Wells (Chapter 13) draw the same broad conclusions and
policy directions as Décobert, urging donors to end any allegiance to the
concept that providing humanitarian aid can be a neutral or apolitical act, and
that a single unitary and reproducible model of society can be implemented
from above. They argue strongly that if civil society organisations and local
non-government organisations are adapting their modus operandi to deliver
humanitarian aid that embeds political resistance, then international donors
should follow suit. Issues such as accountability frameworks being rigidly
structured around financial audits rather than operational information
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should also be addressed. Aung Naing and Wells believe that it behoves
the international donor community to consider its own capacity to adapt
to the needs of local organisations, and to support the creation of multiple,
alternative spaces of citizenry from which a new state, or states, can emerge.
The education sector provides a good illustration of the needs and
opportunities for donors, many equally applicable to other sectors.
Galloway (Chapter 14) notes that new relationships will need to be built
between foreign agencies and donors, and that the relationship with the
Myanmar Ministry of Education will need to be redefined. Given the events
of the last decade, it will likely take three to five years for these relationships
to be re-established. However, donors will be cautious before committing
resources at the levels seen in the 2016–20 period. On a more positive note,
Galloway argues that much more could be done by the global university
community for international students from Myanmar. Even if a fraction of
the world’s universities provided fee waivers and living allowances for some
Myanmar students, significant demands would be met. From a strategic
perspective, if foreign governments did the same, they would be shoring up
Myanmar’s future.

Insights for the aid sector

Similar to the insights discussed above for donors, the most effective way
for multilateral and international non-government organisations to provide
aid is via closer partnerships with local organisations. Such aid should be
provided in innovative ways that enhance the autonomy and decision-
making agency of local organisations. As Décobert (Chapter 12) and Aung
Naing and Wells (Chapter 13) point out, local responses to the humanitarian
crisis demonstrate both the strength and effectiveness of locally driven aid
in Myanmar and the capacity of the sector to deliver. Décobert argues
for a version of localisation that is not only about local actors working in
their own communities but also about those actors having the genuine
autonomy and agency to shape their own programs. Aung Naing and Wells
highlight the strength of responses by traditional parahita welfare groups as
well as civil society organisations and local non-government organisations.
There is substantial evidence of not only continued but also expanded
operations by a myriad of loosely formed voluntary organisations, whereas
the operations of larger, international NGOs and local NGOs have largely
stalled. Voluntary associations of all descriptions are providing food aid,

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medical care, education and refugee assistance to the hundreds of thousands

of people displaced and harmed since the coup. Both Décobert and Aung
Naing and Wells argue for more empowering partnerships with these
organisations (i.e. partnerships that hand over greater decision-making power
and operational control) as well as recognising and explicitly supporting
them in their rejection of expectations that aid should be apolitical. For
those on the ground, aid is a deeply political issue; their support for others is
an act of resistance (not just compassion), not so much in direct opposition
to the state but as a substitute for, and rebuke of, an absent or illegitimate
state. To deliver that aid with passion and motivation, they demand that
the inequalities and injustices perpetrated by top-down international
aid systems and partnerships be overturned. Further, they demand the
autonomy and agency to shape their own programs, responses and futures.
For that, multilateral and international non-government organisations must
reverse the current power inequalities in aid partnerships.
There is an opportunity here to significantly strengthen the role and capacity
of civil society and its international linkages and partnerships. But there
is also a danger. McCarthy and Saw Moo (Chapter 11) demonstrate how
the local, charitable, civil society sector has been simultaneously disciplined
and strategically coopted by State Administration Council officials to help
manage both the pandemic and the humanitarian crisis created by the coup.
McCarthy and Saw Moo see the non-state, charitable sector as being in
a difficult position with regard to state demands for their neutrality. Most
continue in defiance of such demands, using aid as an act of resistance,
but international bodies need to be aware of these pressures on local
organisations and the significant risks they face in their work. Contesting
such space requires extraordinary levels of adaptive capacity.
Ye Min Zaw and Tay Zar Myo Win (Chapter 10) likewise call for more
aid to be channelled directly to civil society groups in Rakhine State for
work among both the Rakhine and Rohingya communities. Further, they
highlight the need to empower those groups. This is not just a new way of
providing aid locally, but is a means of keeping both communities connected
to the ongoing situation throughout the country. Like others in this volume,
Ye Min Zaw and Tay Zar Myo Win argue for the ability of aid provision to
empower civil society groups. Like Galloway (Chapter 14), they make a case
for scholarships for youth from Arakanese and Rakhine communities. And,
like Moe Thuzar (Chapter 7), they urge ongoing community support for
integrated social cohesion and community-level, livelihood-based economic
activities and peace-building programs across Rakhine State.
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The future
As Farrelly (Chapter 2) notes in this volume, no matter which potential
scenario eventuates, Myanmar will spend many years lagging behind
its neighbours. It is clear now that the military is settling in and will not
contemplate any gestures towards ‘dialogue’ or replacing the constitution
until it is satisfied that its political control is unassailable. These new threats
come from the battlefield, where, once again, the military junta is fighting
itself into a standstill; other threats are economic, with the military needing
to ensure it has enough money through the sale of oil and gas to fund its
rule. Unless the NUG and PDFs can pull off an unlikely and overwhelming
victory over the military forces, or other leadership dramatically emerges and
leads the Myanmar military in a new direction, or some other unforeseen
event occurs, the military are likely to remain intransient and bloody-
minded.
Politically, the military are determined to neutralise the threat of Aung
San Suu Kyi and the National League for Democracy by ensuring the
organisation no longer exists and its leader languishes in prison. It is likewise
trying to limit the power of the NUG and undoubtedly has the NUG high
on its list. On the international stage, the military must fend off ASEAN’s
occasional demands for dialogue, and, in this respect, must neutralise the
NUG’s political lobbying to be recognised as the legitimate government
of Myanmar. And it must increase its control of cyberspace to limit both
the funding of opposition through digital financing and the coordination
of resistance.
The diehard pragmatists will, of course, argue that the Myanmar people
should resign themselves to ongoing servitude to their brutal military in
order to decrease the number of deaths due to conflict. Conversely, at the
other end of the political spectrum, some will as passionately argue for
the arming of the PDFs by the international community. Both ends of the
spectrum see peace as an end that justifies the means.
We believe that the reimposition of military rule through the brutal coup
of February 2021 will only come to an end when enough of the population
rises up against their rulers. Most likely, this will require the provocation
of internal changes within the military itself. Aung San Suu Kyi once
paraphrased Joseph de Maistre by saying that the people get the government
they deserve, but no-one deserves this longstanding and brutish regime.
In the years that come, the international community must not forget the
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brave people of Myanmar. Coppel (Chapter 4) argues that regime collapse

is not a strategic goal if it results in, once again, the immiseration of the
population. It is clear, however, that governments, multilateral agencies,
development and humanitarian organisations, and democracy and human
rights activists must join with the resistance movement in new ways to
ensure that this period of military rule is shorter than all those that have
preceded it. As Décobert (Chapter 12) notes, this is a time of opportunity:
the contributors to this volume have shown many potential pathways by
which purposeful and principled policy and collaboration can occur.

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