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2018 SCC OnLine Del 9597 : (2018) 188 AIC 752 : (2018) 3 RCR (Civil) 501

In the High Court of Delhi at New Delhi

(BEFORE RAJIV SAHAI ENDLAW, J.)

A.N. Kaul .…. Petitioner

Mr. Pradeep Dhingra & Mr. Mohit Nandwani, Advs.
v.
Neerja Kaul & Anr. .…. Respondents
Mr. Sandeep Mittal, Ms. Ashwarya Chander & Mr. Abhimanyua Walia, Advs.
C.R.P. 189/2017
Decided on July 3, 2018
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
RAJIV SAHAI ENDLAW, J.:— This Civil Revision Petition under Section 115 of the
Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (CPC) impugns the order (dated 25th April, 2017 in CIS
No. 11745/16 of the Court of Additional District Judge-04 (South-East), Saket Courts,
New Delhi) of dismissal of the application of the petitioner/plaintiff under Order XII
Rule 6 of the CPC.
2. The petition came up first before this Court on 29th August, 2017 when notice
thereof was ordered to be issued. The counsels were heard on 12th October, 2017 and
orders reserved.
3. The petitioner/plaintiff instituted the suit, from which this petition arises, for
recovery of possession and mesne profits with respect to property no. B-237/B,
Greater Kailash - I, New Delhi from the two respondents/defendants being the
daughter-in-law and the granddaughter of the petitioner/plaintiff, pleading (i) that the
petitioner/plaintiff is the owner in possession of property no. B-237/B, Greater Kailash
- I, New Delhi; (ii) that the respondents/defendants are in possession of rooms on first
floor of the said property; (iii) that the defendant no. 1 is a citizen of United States of
America (USA), permanently settled in USA and was married to the son of the
petitioner/plaintiff, also settled in USA; (iv) the son of the petitioner/plaintiff and the
respondent/defendant no. 1 have in October, 2006, taken divorce from the Court in
USA; (v) that the respondent/defendant no. 2 is the granddaughter of the
petitioner/plaintiff but has fallen into bad company; (vi) that the petitioner/plaintiff
purchased the subject property in the month of July, 1964; (vii) that the
petitioner/plaintiff, from 1982 till 2008, let out the first floor of the property to
different tenants; (viii) while the petitioner/plaintiff was in USA with his son, the
respondents/defendants trespassed into the property and took away all the original
documents of title to the property; (ix) that the Income Tax Returns filed by the
petitioner/plaintiff show the rental income of the first floor of the property assessed to
the petitioner/plaintiff; (x) that the petitioner/plaintiff allowed the
respondent/defendant no. 2 as his granddaughter, to stay as a guest in one room on
the first floor of the property; (xi) thereafter, the respondent/defendant no. 1, who
was also settled in USA, started visiting the first floor of the property; and, (xii) that
the respondents/defendants are in illegal occupation of the front portion of the first
floor of the property comprising of three rooms, one kitchen, two bathrooms.
4. The two respondents/defendants filed separate written statements contesting the
suit, pleading (i) that the respondents/defendants have been living in the property
since 1980-81 and the suit for recovery of possession is barred by time; (ii) that the
respondent/defendant no. 1 was not aware of the divorce decree pleaded by the
petitioner/plaintiff and the said divorce decree if any is not conclusive, being not on
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the merits of the case and being founded on breach of Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 in
force in India; (iii) that the suit had not been correctly valued for the purposes of court
fees and jurisdiction and the court fees had not been paid on the correct market value
of the property; (iv) that the respondent/defendant no. 1 had undertaken the
construction of the first floor out of the money given by her father at the time of
marriage to the son of petitioner/plaintiff and the respondents/defendants as such
have a right to stay in the first floor; (v) that the respondents/defendants, prior to
institution of this suit, have instituted a suit claiming rights in the property and which
suit is pending in the Court of the Civil Judge, Delhi; (vi) that the petitioner/plaintiff
did not contribute any money to the first floor of the property and when the
respondent/defendant no. 1 constructed the same from her self-earned money, the
petitioner/plaintiff assured the respondent/defendant no. 1 that in future the
petitioner/plaintiff shall never create any hindrance in the peaceful possession and
enjoyment of the property by the respondent/defendant no. 1 and it was on the basis
of the said assurance that the respondent/defendant no. 1 spent her monies on the
construction of the first floor of the property; (vii) that the petitioner/plaintiff in the
past has made attempts to forcibly remove the respondents/defendants from the
property; (viii) the petitioner/plaintiff has been a US citizen for over a decade; (ix)
that the respondent/defendant no. 1 put her signatures on the ‘Quit Claim Deed’ just
to buy peace for herself and her daughter; (x) the respondent/defendant no. 1 made
payments against electricity bill and water bills of the property; and, (xi) that the
petitioner/plaintiff purchased the subject property out of funds from selling the
property in Rajender Nagar which was allotted by the Government of India in lieu of an
ancestral property in Lahore at the time of partition and also from the funds derived
from sale proceeds of ancestral properties in Kashmir; thus the respondent/defendant
no. 2, as a granddaughter of the petitioner/plaintiff, has a share in the property which
is an ancestral property.
5. The respondent/defendant no. 2 along with her written statement also filed a
Counter Claim seeking partition of the property.
6. I have hereinabove reproduced only portions of the pleadings, which are
otherwise verbose, which are relevant for the present purposes.
7. The petitioner/plaintiff filed an application under Order XII Rule 6 of the CPC for
decree of ejectment on admissions.
8. The learned Additional District Judge has dismissed the said application,
reasoning that there was no admission in the written statement of the defendants for a
decree on admissions to be passed; on the contrary, the defendants in their written
statement have denied that they were inducted as tenants or licencees under the
petitioner/plaintiff; the defendants have also pleaded the property to be ancestral and
the defendant no. 2 to be a co-owner, and the merits of the rival claims are not to be
assessed at the stage of Order XII Rule 6 of the CPC.
9. I have considered the contentions of the counsels.
10. The reasoning given in the impugned order, of the petitioner/plaintiff, in the
absence of express admission, being not entitled to a decree on admissions is indeed
faulty and without considering a series of judgments of this Court. In Ashoka Estate
Pvt. Ltd. v. Dewan Chand Builders Pvt. Ltd., 159 (2009) DLT 233, reiterated in
judgment dated 14th September, 2017 in C.R.P. No. 190 of 2015 titled Vireet
Investments Pvt. Ltd. v. Vikramjit Singh Puri and again reiterated in Bhupinder Jit
Singh v. Sonu Kumar, 2017 SCC OnLine 11061, it was held (i) that the plaintiff, if
otherwise found entitled to a decree on admission, cannot be deprived thereof by
astute drafting of the written statement and/or by taking pleas therein which have no
legs to stand upon; (ii) the Court is to read the pleadings of the parties meaningfully;
(iii) issues are to be framed on ‘material’ and not on all propositions of law and fact;
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(iv) a plea, which on the face of it is found by the court to be untenable, does not
require the framing of any issue. In Adarsh Kumar Puniyani v. Lajwanti Piplani, 2015
SCC OnLine Del 14022 it was held that material propositions of law or fact would mean
such issues which are relevant and necessarily arise for deciding the controversy
involved; if a plea is not valid and tenable in law or is not relevant or necessary for
deciding the controversy involved, the Court would not be bound and justified in
framing issue on such unnecessary or baseless pleas, thereby causing unnecessary
and avoidable inconvenience to the parties and waste of valuable Court time. Reliance
was inter alia placed on Abbot India Ltd. v. Rajinder Mohindra, (2014) 208 DLT 201
holding that once it is found that there was no defence, merely because a bogey
thereof is raised at the stage of framing of issues or upon the respondents/plaintiffs
filing an application under Order XII Rule 6 of the CPC, would not call for framing of an
issue. It was further held in Bhupinder Jit Singh supra that issues are to be framed
only on material propositions of law or fact requiring trial and not on all propositions of
fact or law which may be contained in the pleadings and which are not material i.e. on
the outcome whereof the outcome of the suit does not depend. The Court is not
obliged to, on finding pleas to have been raised in the written statement, mechanically
frame issues thereon. If issues were to be framed in such manner, the same would be
in disregard of the word ‘material’ in Order XIV Rule 1 of the CPC. The enquiry thus to
be made at the time of framing of issues is, whether the pleas raised in the written
statement, purportedly in defence to the claim in the plaint, have any material bearing
to the outcome of the suit and if it is found that irrespective of the findings thereon,
the plaintiff would be entitled to the relief, the parties are not to be put to trial in the
suit. Similarly in Zulfiquar Ali Khan v. Straw Products Ltd., 87 (2000) DLT 76, it was
observed that it is a notorious fact that to drag the case, a litigant often takes all sorts
of false or legally untenable pleas and it was held that legal process should not be
allowed to be misused by such persons and only such defence as give rise to clear and
bona fide dispute or triable issues should be put to trial and not illusory or
unnecessary or mala fide based on false or untenable pleas, to delay the suit. It was
yet further held that the Court is not bound to frame an issue on unnecessary or
baseless pleas, thereby causing unnecessary and avoidable inconvenience to the
parties and waste of valuable Court time. Reference in this regard may also be made
to Kawal Sachdeva v. Madhu Bala Rana, 2013 SCC OnLine 1479 and to P.S. Jain Co.
Ltd. v. Atma Ram Properties (P) Ltd., (2013) 205 DLT 302.
11. Not only so, Order XV of the CPC empowers the Court to, upon finding that the
parties are not on an issue of any question of law or fact, pronounce judgment at once.
Thus even if there is no express admission in the written statement but an intelligent
reading of the written statement shows the propositions or pleas taken to be not
material and no issue to be arising therefrom, the Court is still entitled to pass a
decree forthwith.
12. To be fair to the counsel for the respondents/defendants, he also did not,
perhaps in the light of the consistent judgments, some of which are mentioned above,
controvert the said position. The arguments of the counsel for the
respondents/defendants were two fold. Firstly, that the plea of the
respondent/defendant no. 2 in her written statement of the property being ancestral,
was a material plea, on success whereof the suit of the petitioner/plaintiff would be
dismissed inasmuch as the respondent/defendant no. 2 as the granddaughter of the
petitioner/plaintiff also has a 1/6th share in the property. The second contention was
that it was the plea of the respondent/defendant no. 1, that she had been permitted
by the petitioner/plaintiff to raise construction of the first floor with her own money
and the said licence granted by the petitioner/plaintiff to the respondent/defendant
no. 1 was irrevocable. Reliance was placed on Section 60(b) of the Easements Act,
1882.
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13. The concept of ancestral property, as existed under the ancient Hindu Law, was
done away with on coming into force of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956. Thereafter,
the ancient Hindu Law survived only under Section 6 of the Hindu Succession Act and
not otherwise. The ancient Hindu Law discriminated between the male descendents
and the female descendents. Section 6 provided that when a male Hindu dies after the
commencement of the Succession Act, having at the time of his death an interest in a
Mitakshara coparcenary property, his interest in the property shall devolve by
survivorship upon the surviving members of the coparcenary and not in accordance
with the Succession Act. Under the ancient Hindu Law only the male descendant could
be the members of the coparcenary. Section 6, so preserving ancient Hindu Law, was
however amended by the Hindu Succession (Amendment) Act, 2005, to do away with
the discrimination as existed under ancient Hindu Law, between grandsons and
granddaughters. Section 6 as amended provides that with effect from the Hindu
Succession (Amendment) Act, 2005, in a joint Hindu family, governed by Mitakshara
law, the daughter of a coparcener shall by birth, become a coparcener in her own right
in the same manner as the son and have the same rights in the coparcenary property
as she would have had if she had been a son.
14. The plea of the respondent/defendant no. 2, who is the granddaughter of the
petitioner/plaintiff, is that because the petitioner/plaintiff purchased the subject
property out of monies realized on sale of a house in Rajender Nagar and of properties
in Kashmir allotted against properties left behind in Lahore, the properties in the
hands of the petitioner/plaintiff are ‘ancestral’ and she has a share in the same.
15. However, Section 6 of the Hindu Succession Act, even post amendment, saves
the ancient Hindu Law only with respect to Mitakshara coparcenary property i.e.
coparcenary property governed by Mitakshara Law. There is no plea in the written
statement of the respondent/defendant no. 2, of the existence of any coparcenary. The
only plea is, of the petitioner/plaintiff having purchased the property from the monies
from sale of properties inherited by him from his father. However as aforesaid, on the
coming into force of the Hindu Succession Act, the properties inherited by the
petitioner/plaintiff from his father would be his personal individual properties and in
which the son of the petitioner/plaintiff or the grandson or granddaughter of the
petitioner/plaintiff would have no share.
16. There is no plea in the written statement, of the date of demise of the father of
the petitioner/plaintiff i.e. whether the same is of a date before coming into force of
the Hindu Succession Act or thereafter. I thus enquired from the counsel for the
respondents/defendants, the date/year of demise of the father of the
petitioner/plaintiff.
17. The counsel for the respondents/defendants again fairly stated that no
instruction even on this aspect was taken.
18. The same shows the casual manner in which the plea of the
respondent/defendant no. 2 having a share in the property has been taken in the
written statement and in the Counter Claim.
19. Need to elaborate the law on this aspect is not felt. In the recent past, there
have been plethora of judgments of this Court in other similar suits where such
misconceived pleas have been taken. Reference in this regard can be made to
Surender Kumar v. Dhani Ram, AIR 2016 Delhi 120 wherein it has been held as
under:—
“5. The Supreme Court around 30 years back in the judgment in the case of
Commissioner of Wealth Tax, Kanpur v. Chander Sen, (1986) 3 SCC 567, held that
after passing of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 the traditional view that on
inheritance of an immovable property from paternal ancestors up to three degrees,
automatically an HUF came into existence, no longer remained the legal position in
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view of Section 8 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956. This judgment of the Supreme
Court in the case of Chander Sen (supra) was thereafter followed by the Supreme
Court in the case of Yudhishter v. Ashok Kumar, (1987) 1 SCC 204 wherein the
Supreme Court reiterated the legal position that after coming into force of Section 8
of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, inheritance of ancestral property after 1956
does not create an HUF property and inheritance of ancestral property after 1956
therefore does not result in creation of an HUF property.
6. In view of the ratios of the judgments in the cases of Chander Sen (supra) and
Yudhishter (supra), in law ancestral property can only become an HUF property if
inheritance is before 1956, and such HUF property therefore which came into
existence before 1956 continues as such even after 1956. In such a case, since an
HUF already existed prior to 1956, thereafter, since the same HUF with its
properties continues, the status of joint Hindu family/HUF properties continues, and
only in such a case, members of such joint Hindu family are coparceners entitling
them to a share in the HUF properties.
7. On the legal position which emerges pre 1956 i.e before passing of the Hindu
Succession Act, 1956 and post 1956 i.e after passing of the Hindu Succession Act,
1956, the same has been considered by me recently in the judgment in the case of
Sunny (Minor) v. Sh. Raj Singh, CS(OS) No. 431/2006 decided on 17.11.2015. In
this judgment, I have referred to and relied upon the ratio of the judgment of the
Supreme Court in the case of Yudhishter (supra) and have essentially arrived at the
following conclusions:—
(i) If a person dies after passing of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 and there is
no HUF existing at the time of the death of such a person, inheritance of an
immovable property of such a person by his successors-in-interest is no doubt
inheritance of an ‘ancestral’ property but the inheritance is as a self-acquired
property in the hands of the successor and not as an HUF property although
the successor(s) indeed inherits ‘ancestral’ property i.e a property belonging
to his paternal ancestor.
(ii) The only way in which a Hindu Undivided Family/joint Hindu family can come
into existence after 1956 (and when a joint Hindu family did not exist prior to
1956) is if an individual's property is thrown into a common hotchpotch. Also,
once a property is thrown into a common hotchpotch, it is necessary that the
exact details of the specific date/month/year etc. of creation of an HUF for the
first time by throwing a property into a common hotchpotch have to be clearly
pleaded and mentioned and which requirement is a legal requirement because
of Order VI Rule 4 CPC which provides that all necessary factual details of the
cause of action must be clearly stated. Thus, if an HUF property exists because
of its such creation by throwing of self-acquired property by a person in the
common hotchpotch, consequently there is entitlement in coparceners etc. to
a share in such HUF property.
(iii) An HUF can also exist if paternal ancestral properties are inherited prior to
1956, and such status of parties qua the properties has continued after 1956
with respect to properties inherited prior to 1956 from paternal ancestors.
Once that status and position continues even after 1956; of the HUF and of its
properties existing; a coparcener etc. will have a right to seek partition of the
properties.
(iv) Even before 1956, an HUF can come into existence even without inheritance
of ancestral property from paternal ancestors, as HUF could have been created
prior to 1956 by throwing of individual property into a common hotchpotch. If
such an HUF continues even after 1956, then in such a case a coparcener etc.
of an HUF was entitled to partition of the HUF property.
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9. I would like to further note that it is not enough to aver a mantra, so to say, in
the plaint simply that a joint Hindu family or HUF exists. Detailed facts as required
by Order VI Rule 4 CPC as to when and how the HUF properties have become HUF
properties must be clearly and categorically averred. Such averments have to be
made by factual references qua each property claimed to be an HUF property as to
how the same is an HUF property, and, in law generally bringing in any and every
property as HUF property is incorrect as there is known tendency of litigants to
include unnecessarily many properties as HUF properties, and which is done for less
than honest motives. Whereas prior to passing of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956
there was a presumption as to the existence of an HUF and its properties, but after
passing of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 in view of the ratios of the judgments of
the Supreme Court in the cases of Chander Sen (supra) and Yudhishter (supra)
there is no such presumption that inheritance of ancestral property creates an HUF,
and therefore, in such a post 1956 scenario a mere ipse dixit statement in the
plaint that an HUF and its properties exist is not a sufficient compliance of the legal
requirement of creation or existence of HUF properties inasmuch as it is necessary
for existence of an HUF and its properties that it must be specifically stated that as
to whether the HUF came into existence before 1956 or after 1956 and if so how
and in what manner giving all requisite factual details. It is only in such
circumstances where specific facts are mentioned to clearly plead a cause of action
of existence of an HUF and its properties, can a suit then be filed and maintained by
a person claiming to be a coparcener for partition of the HUF properties.
11. I may note that the requirement of pleading in a clear cut manner as to how
the HUF and its properties exist i.e whether because of pre 1956 position or
because of the post 1956 position on account of throwing of properties into a
common hotchpotch, needs to be now mentioned especially after passing of the
Benami Transaction (Prohibition) Act, 1988 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Benami
Act’) and which Act states that property in the name of an individual has to be
taken as owned by that individual and no claim to such property is maintainable as
per Section 4(1) of the Benami Act on the ground that monies have come from the
person who claims right in the property though title deeds of the property are not in
the name of such person. An exception is created with respect to provision of
Section 4 of the Benami Act by its sub-Section (3) which allows existence of the
concept of HUF. Once existence of the concept of HUF is an exception to the main
provision contained in sub-Sections (1) and (2) of Section 4 of the Benami Act,
then, to take the case outside sub-Sections (1) and (2) of Section 4 of the Benami
Act it has to be specifically pleaded as to how and in what manner an HUF and each
specific property claimed as being an HUF property has come into existence as an
HUF property. If such specific facts are not pleaded, this Court in fact would be
negating the mandate of the language contained in sub-Sections (1) and (2) of
Section 4 of the Benami Act.
12. This Court is flooded with litigations where only self-serving averments are
made in the plaint of existence of HUF and a person being a coparcener without in
any manner pleading therein the requisite legally required factual details as to how
HUF came into existence. It is a sine qua non that pleadings must contain all the
requisite factual ingredients of a cause of action, and once the ratios of the
judgments of the Supreme Court in the cases of Chander Sen (supra) and
Yudhishter (supra) come in, the pre 1956 position and the post 1956 position has
to be made clear, and also as to how HUF and its properties came into existence
whether before 1956 or after 1956. It is no longer enough to simply state in the
plaint after passing of the Hindu Succession Act 1956, that there is a joint Hindu
family or an HUF and a person is a coparcener in such an HUF/joint Hindu family for
such person to claim rights in the properties as a coparcener unless the entire
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factual details of the cause of action of an HUF and each property as an HUF is
pleaded.
13. In view of the above, actually the application filed under Order VII Rule 11
CPC in fact is treated as an application under Order XII Rule 6 CPC, inasmuch as, it
is observed on the admitted facts as pleaded in the plaint that no HUF and its
properties are found to exist. There is no averment in the plaint that late Sh. Jage
Ram inherited property(s) from his paternal ancestors prior to 1956. In such a
situation, therefore, the properties in the hands of late Sh. Jage Ram cannot be HUF
properties in his hands because there is no averment of late Sh. Jage Ram
inheriting ancestral property(s) from his paternal ancestors prior to 1956. There is
no averment in the plaint also of late Sh. Jage Ram's properties being HUF
properties because HUF was created after 1956 by late Sh. Jage Ram by throwing
properties into a common hotchpotch. I have already elaborated in detail above as
to how an HUF has to be pleaded to exist in the pre 1956 and the post 1956
positions and the necessary averments which had to be made in the present plaint.
The suit plaint however grossly lacks the necessary averments as required in law to
be made for a complete cause of action to be pleaded for existence of an HUF and
its properties.”
20. The aforesaid paragraphs of Surender Kumar supra were reproduced again in
Sagar Gambhir v. Sukhdev Singh Gambhir, (2016) 231 DLT 247, appeal whereagainst
was dismissed by the Division Bench vide judgment reported as Sagar Gambhir v.
Sukhdev Singh Gambhir.
21. I have rather, in Kamlesh Devi v. Shyam Sunder Tyagi, 2017 SCC OnLine Del
12701, Aditya Prasad Dube v. Shobha Dube, 2018 SCC OnLine Del 6567 & Saurabh
Sharma v. Om Wati, 2018 SCC OnLine Del 9186 also observed that notwithstanding
the change in law having been brought more than half a century ago, the citizens as
well as the Advocates seem to remember the law of prior thereto than of the time
since they took birth and/or started practice of law.
22. The counsel for the respondents/defendants had no other submissions to make
in this respect.
23. As far as the plea of Section 60(b) of the Easements Act is concerned, it
provides that a licence, though revocable, is not so where the licensee acting upon the
licence has executed a work of a permanent character and incurred expenses in its
execution.
24. However, before dealing with the said plea, I may highlight that the said plea in
the written statement of the respondent/defendant no. 1 is an admission of the
ownership and title of the petitioner/plaintiff to the property inasmuch as if the
petitioner/plaintiff was not the exclusive owner of the property, the question of his
granting any licence or of the respondent/defendant no. 1 acting under licence from
him would not arise.
25. I have in Ambika Soni v. Union of India, 2015 SCC OnLine Del 10761 relying on
Gesture Hotels & Foods Pvt. Ltd. v. New Delhi Municipal Council, AIR 2014 Del 143
(DB), with reference to the aforesaid Section 60(b) and referring to Section 64 of the
Easements Act held that the only remedy of such a licensee is to claim damages for
unlawful revocation of the licence and not to continue in occupation of the premises.
26. Moreover, a title in immovable property can be created only by a registered
instrument. Though the Division Bench of this Court in Asha M. Jain v. Canara Bank,
(2001) 94 DLT 841, taking into consideration the large scale transfer of properties in
the city of Delhi by instruments other than registered Conveyance Deed, held that title
can be deciphered therefrom also but Supreme Court in Suraj Lamp & Industries Pvt.
Ltd. v. State of Haryana, (2009) 7 SCC 363 and (2012) 1 SCC 656 expressly overruled
the said judgment and held that no title in the property could be created save by a
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registered Conveyance Deed. Section 60(b) of the Easements Act cannot in my opinion
be construed as a mode of creation of title to the property and any such interpretation
by the Courts would be to the detriment of the revenue under the Stamp Act, 1899
and the Registration Act, 1908.
27. The learned Additional District Judge, in the impugned order, did not consider
the matter in the correct perspective and is found to have dealt with the application
under Order XII Rule 6 of the CPC for judgment on admissions in a mechanical
manner. In fact, Supreme Court in T. Arivandandam v. T.V. Satyapal, (1977) 4 SCC
467, Azhar Hussain v. Rajiv Gandhi, (1986) 1 SCC 573, I.T.C. Ltd. v. Debts Recovery
Appellate Tribunal, (1998) 2 SCC 70, Shipping Corporation of India Ltd. v. Machado
Brothers, (2004) 11 SCC 168 and Liverpool and London S.P. and I Association Ltd. v.
M.V. Sea Success I, (2004) 9 SCC 512 has gone to the extent of holding that the
Courts are required to sift through the pleadings carefully and to ensure that suits
making only a semblance of a case or a defence do not clog up the time of the Courts
at the cost of other deserving matters. It has been held that suits which are found by
the Court to be deadwood and having no chance of success, should be thrown out at
the threshold.
28. The Revision Petition thus succeeds and is allowed.
29. The impugned order is set aside.
30. Resultantly, the application of the petitioner/plaintiff under Order XII Rule 6 of
the CPC succeeds, thereunder as well as under Order XV of the CPC.
31. Axiomatically the petitioner/plaintiff is entitled to a decree for recovery of
possession as sought on admissions.
32. The learned Additional District Judge, before whom the suit is pending, to on
receipt of a copy of this order, proceed to draw up the decree.
33. No costs.
34. The Revision Petition is disposed of.
———
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