Secession and security; explaining state strategy against separatist by Ahsan I

Butt

State Responses to Secessionist Movements

Introduction

When faced with secessionist demands, a state can choose from a range of responses, from
granting independence to using violence. This decision is based on external security concerns
and the perceived threat posed by the secessionist group.

Assessing the Threat

States evaluate the threat from secessionists and decide their strategy accordingly. Successful
secession weakens the host state by empowering the secessionists and reducing the state's
territory and population, thus weakening its power relative to geopolitical rivals. States are
cautious about accommodating secessionists, fearing the creation of a hostile new state or
strengthening existing rivals.

Theoretical Framework

The response to secessionist demands can be understood through three main points:

1. Strategic Decisions: States weigh the costs and benefits based on available information,
though emotions and biases can influence their choices.
2. State Power: States generally have more resources (military, economic) than separatist
groups, making them more likely to succeed in conflicts.
3. Unified States: States are treated as unified entities in the face of secessionist threats,
with most domestic groups supporting the state.

Secession as an External Threat

Secession can lead to war between the original state and its newly independent neighbor.
Examples include:

 Eritrea and Ethiopia: Eritrea's independence led to a costly war over a border dispute.
 Sudan and South Sudan: Tensions over territory and oil raised fears of war.
 Kosovo and Serbia: Ongoing tensions after Kosovo's independence.
 Georgia and Russia: Conflicts following the independence of South Ossetia and
Abkhazia.

Balance of Power

Secession shifts the balance of power, making the original state more vulnerable:
  Military Control: New states form their own military forces, altering the balance of
power.
 Economic Changes: New states implement policies benefiting their ethnic group,
strengthening their economic power.
 Demographic Shifts: New states attract members of their ethnic group, increasing their
population and power.

The Commitment Problem

States might go to war due to the commitment problem, where they doubt the reliability of
promises made in negotiations. This applies to secessionist movements where the new state
might gain advantages, making the original state more vulnerable. States might use force to
prevent future power shifts rather than negotiating.

Probability of Future War

The fear of future war influences state responses to secessionism:

 Historical Examples: Conflicts like Eritrea-Ethiopia and Sudan-South Sudan illustrate

these concerns.
 Identity Divisions: Deep-seated identity divisions can lead states to use coercion.
 Regional Context: States in conflict-prone regions are more likely to fear secessionist
movements.

Third-Party Support

The extent of third-party support to secessionists affects state responses:

 Limited Support: Verbal or financial support, and safe havens.

 Moderate Support: Military aid and training.
 High Support: Direct military engagement.

State Strategies

States adopt different strategies based on external security concerns and third-party support:

1. Negotiations and Concessions: Used when the secessionist threat is minor and regional
stability is high.
2. Policing: Applied when the threat is moderate and third-party support is limited.
3. Militarization: Employed when secessionists receive moderate support, involving
significant coercion.
4. Collective Repression: Used when secessionists have high external support, leading to
severe measures.

Conclusion
The response to secessionist movements is complex, influenced by perceived threats, external
support, and strategic calculations. States must balance between negotiation and coercion,
considering the long-term implications for their security and stability.

REBELS WITHOUT BORDERS by Idean

Salehyan
Title: Transnational Rebellion and State Sovereignty: Challenges and Dynamics

Introduction: Rebellion against governmental authority is inherently risky and fraught with
potential for severe repression. However, the availability of safe havens and external support has
led to a new dimension of conflict: transnational rebellion. This paper explores the complexities
of rebellion, the limitations of state sovereignty, and the role of transnational actors in modern
conflicts.

Rebellion and its Risks:

1. Risky Business: Rebelling against the government is dangerous. People might have
strong complaints, but they fear organizing because they might face violence.
2. Fear of Repression: Even if people are poor and powerless, but the threat of torture,
imprisonment, or death is worse.
3. Safe Havens: Some rebels find safe areas within the country (like remote mountains or
hidden parts of cities) where the state ‘s less influence.
4. Transnational Rebellion: Modern states have limited power that is confined to their
border borders. Rebels often seek help and resources from outside the country, making
the conflict international.

Goals of Rebellion:

1. Concessions: Rebellion aims to get the government to make concessions. It's used when
normal politics fails.
2. Demands: Rebels might demand regime change, independence, or significant reforms
(political, economic, social), power-sharing, or regional autonomy.
3. Bargaining Process: The conflict is part of a negotiation where both sides threaten
violence. Rebels gain bargaining power by mobilizing forces, making it costly for the
government if demands aren’t met.

Role of State Sovereignty and Transnational Rebellion:

1. State Limitations: State sovereignty and borders limit government power to suppress
rebels.
 2. Transnational Rebels (TNRs): Rebels often operate across borders, complicating
conflicts and negotiations.
3. Regional Cooperation: To manage and resolve these conflicts, regional security
cooperation and better diplomatic relations are essential for lasting peace.

Building on Previous Studies: While motivations like grievances and greed are necessary to
explain why people might want to rebel, these motivations alone are insufficient. Successful
rebellions require both motivation and opportunity. This perspective builds on earlier research,
emphasizing the political environment over rebel motivations and highlighting the interplay
between motivation and opportunity.

1. Gurr's Theory: Ted Robert Gurr (1970) provided a well-articulated theory on how
group grievances can motivate insurgency. According to Gurr, social groups that feel
disadvantaged or experience a gap between their aspirations and reality are
psychologically predisposed to violence.
2. Supporting Scholars: Other scholars have agreed that factors like income inequality,
class hierarchy, and ethnic divisions can lead to mass discontent, political instability, and
violence.

1. Greed vs. Grievance: More recent theories suggest that "greed" is a significant motive
for some insurgencies. Rebels may be driven by the desire for profit, such as looting
natural resources, rather than solely by grievances.
2. Economic Gain: Scholars argue that many rebels are more interested in personal
enrichment through criminal activities, even if they publicly claim to be motivated by
grievances.

Opportunity Theories of Civil Violence: Opportunity theories suggest that motivations alone
do not drive rebellion. Rebels must perceive a reasonable chance of success, manageable costs of
collective action, and limits to government control. Historical insights from scholars like Charles
Tilly emphasize that government repression and control heavily influence the likelihood of
rebellion.

"Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War"

Authors: James D. Fearon and David D. Laitin

Main Thesis

 Civil wars are more likely influenced by conditions that favor insurgency rather than by
ethnic or religious diversity.
 Key factors include weak states, rough terrain, and economic instability. political
instability and large population

Bargaining Theories of Civil Conflict: Civil conflicts involve continuous bargaining, where
poor information, commitment issues, and indivisible issues complicate negotiations. States may
initially resist negotiation but might become more open to concessions as rebels gain external
support.

Bargaining Theories of Civil Conflict:

Overview: Bargaining theories argue that, since conflict is costly, states should prefer
negotiation over prolonged fighting. This logic applies to civil wars, where the breakdown of
central authority means agreements must be self-enforcing.

Challenges to Bargaining:

1. Information Gaps: Poor information can lead to miscalculations and overconfidence,

making settlements unsatisfactory.
2. Credible Commitment Problems: Fears that the other side will not honor agreements
can derail negotiations.
3. Issue Indivisibility: Some conflicts involve issues that are hard to compromise on,
complicating negotiations.

Bargaining During Conflict: Conflict does not end bargaining; instead, parties often continue
to negotiate for a better settlement as the war progresses.

State Responses:

 Initial Resistance: States often dismiss weak rebels and hope for a swift victory.
 Negotiation Shifts: As state rebels gain support of TNRs a decisive victory becomes
unlikely, states may become more open to concessions.

Transnational Influences:

 Sanctuaries: Neighboring countries can provide rebels with resources and support.
 External Support: Support from external actors can strengthen rebels’ bargaining
positions but also complicate negotiations.

Conclusion: Bargaining theories, combined with political opportunity perspectives, help explain
civil conflicts by highlighting the importance of ongoing negotiation, rebel mobilization, and the
impact of international factors on domestic violence.

Transnational Opposition: Diaspora communities and transnational organizations significantly

impact state politics from abroad. These actors can provide resources, media platforms, and
lobbying efforts, challenging the assumption that political influence is confined within state
boundaries.

Hirschman’s Theory:

Dissatisfied individuals can “voice” their concerns or “exit” their country but may continue
opposing the regime from abroad
Rebellion Tactics:

 Media: Create platforms to broadcast opposition messages.

 Funding: Provide resources to opposition groups in their home country.
 Lobbying: Influence foreign governments to act against their home country.
 Relocation: Establish bases in neighboring states to avoid repression.

Strategic Advantages:

 Evasion of Repression: Rebels operate beyond the home state’s reach.

 Proximity: Rebels benefit from being near their target but avoid the costs of direct
intervention.
 International Norms: States face diplomatic risks and costs for violating borders.

Challenges for States:

 Limited Surveillance: Difficulty monitoring opposition abroad.

 High Costs: Expensive and complex to counter transnational rebels.

International Backlash: Cross-border actions can lead to international condemnation

Neighboring States as Sanctuary for Rebel Groups: Proximity and refugee dynamics are
crucial in rebel support. Historical and recent examples show how neighboring states provide
strategic advantages for rebels, either through direct support or as unintended sanctuaries.

Role of Refugees:

 Grievances and Recruitment: Refugees, having suffered violence and loss, may have
strong motives for joining rebel groups.
 Low Opportunity Costs: Refugees in poor conditions may find joining rebels a viable
option for better living conditions.
 Limited Repression: Host states cannot easily monitor or control refugee activities,
making them a potential asset for rebels.

Rival States and Rebel Support: Hostile neighbors often support rebels to weaken their
adversaries. This support can include providing bases, resources, and training, reflecting ongoing
international rivalries and proxy warfare strategies.

Weak States and Rebel Sanctuaries: Weak states, characterized by limited control and
resources, often struggle to manage rebel activities. This inability can lead to international
tensions and conflicts, as seen in various historical examples.

Conditional Effect of Refugees: The management of refugee camps plays a crucial role in rebel
activities. Well-governed countries can better control refugee-related violence, while poorly
managed camps can become centers of violence.
 Extraterritorial Mobilization and Conflict Bargaining: External support enhances rebels'
bargaining power but complicates negotiations due to information gaps and commitment issues.
The involvement of external actors can lead to increased violence and prolonged conflicts.

The Internationalization of Civil Conflict: Transnational rebellions significantly affect

regional relations and international conflicts. Weak host states and rival host states each play
unique roles in these dynamics, influencing the broader regional conflict system.

Policy Implications and Recommendations: Addressing transnational rebellion requires a

multifaceted approach. Regional cooperation and intelligence sharing are essential for
monitoring and countering rebel activities. International organizations and neighboring states
must work together to manage refugee flows and prevent camps from becoming rebel bases.
Diplomatic efforts should focus on resolving underlying grievances and supporting state-building
efforts in weak states.

Conclusion: Transnational rebellion presents complex challenges to state sovereignty and

international relations. Understanding the interplay between motivations, opportunities, and
external influences is crucial for managing and resolving these conflicts. Regional cooperation
and effective governance remain essential for achieving lasting peace in the face of transnational
rebellion.

Secession, external support and host state

response
Refrence 1:Ahsan I. Butt in Succession and Security
1. State Responses Against Secessionists: Different states respond
differently to movements seeking independence. The writer suggests that
how a state responds depends on how much it perceives the independence
movement as a threat to its security from external forces.
2. Variation in Pakistani Response: The writer examines how Pakistan
responded to two independence movements in the 1970s, one in East
Pakistan and the other in Balochistan. Both faced coercion from the Pakistani
state, but East Pakistan faced a more severe form known as "collective
repression," while Balochistan faced "militarization."
3. Inability to Accept Territorial Loss: Pakistan, being a relatively weak
state compared to its neighbors, couldn't afford to lose territory. This fear of
losing land, whether in East Pakistan or Balochistan, led Pakistan to use force
to maintain its territorial integrity.
4. Influence of Security Environment: Pakistan's sense of insecurity,
particularly regarding threats from India, influenced its prioritization of
defense and foreign policy matters. This emphasis on security issues
affected its approach to internal conflicts.
5. Reluctance for Provincial Autonomy: Pakistani leaders resisted granting
autonomy to provinces because they believed a strong central government
was necessary for national security. They feared that autonomy might
weaken the state and make it more vulnerable to external threats.
6. Role of External Threats: Pakistan's response to independence
movements was shaped by its perception of third-party support for these
movements. Movements perceived as having higher external support faced
harsher repression from the Pakistani state.
7. Comparison of Bengali and Baloch Movements: The writer compares
Pakistan's responses to the Bengali movement in East Pakistan and the
Baloch movement in Balochistan. The severity of Pakistan's response was
influenced by differences in perceived external support for these
movements.
8. Theory Testing and Comparison: By comparing these two cases, the
writer aims to test their theory about state responses to independence
movements. They want to see how variations in external security
implications affect state actions.
9. Significance of Comparative Study: Studying these conflicts offers
insights into pivotal historical events that significantly impacted the course
of history. Understanding why certain conflicts were more severe than others
provides valuable lessons for scholars studying conflict resolution and state-
building

Pakistan Divided Between West and East

1. Background of the Civil War: The conflict between East and West
Pakistan had deep roots dating back to the country's independence in 1947.
Despite being geographically distant, East and West Pakistan were separated
by significant cultural, linguistic, and political differences.
2. Tensions over Language and Identity: The conflict initially erupted over
language issues, with East Pakistanis demanding recognition for Bangla as a
national language alongside Urdu. However, the West Pakistani
establishment, particularly political leaders like Liaquat Ali Khan and
Mohammad Ali Jinnah, resisted these demands, leading to widespread
discontent in East Pakistan.
3. Political and Constitutional Disputes: Beyond language, there were
significant political and constitutional disagreements between East and West
Pakistan. East Pakistan favored a loose federal structure, while West Pakistan
 sought a more centralized state. The introduction of the One Unit scheme
further marginalized East Pakistan politically.
4. Economic Disparities: Economic inequality between East and West
Pakistan exacerbated tensions. Despite East Pakistan's significant
contribution to the national economy, it received disproportionately low
economic benefits, leading to resentment among East Pakistanis.
5. 1970 Elections and Aftermath: The 1970 elections were supposed to
facilitate a peaceful transfer of power from the military regime to civilian
authorities. However, the results, which favored the Awami League in East
Pakistan and the PPP in West Pakistan, were not accepted by the military and
Bhutto.
6. Political Maneuvering and Power Struggles: Following the elections,
negotiations between Yahya Khan, Bhutto, and Mujib failed to reach a
consensus on power-sharing and constitutional issues. Bhutto, in particular,
sought to maintain his political influence and portrayed the Awami League as
unfit to lead the country.
7. Escalation of Tensions: Disagreements over the timing of the National
Assembly's convening led to escalating tensions. Bhutto's inflammatory
rhetoric and Yahya Khan's decision to indefinitely postpone the assembly
further aggravated the situation.
8. Violent Outcomes: The delay in convening the assembly and political
deadlock led to riots and strikes in East Pakistan. Mujib's call for a strike and
criticism of Bhutto's actions heightened tensions, ultimately setting the stage
for the declaration of independence by East Pakistan, which later became
Bangladesh.

1. Failure of Negotiations: Despite attempts at negotiations between the

political leaders, particularly Yahya Khan, Bhutto, and Mujibur Rahman, a
political solution could not be reached. Mujib insisted on certain conditions,
including the lifting of Martial Law and the transfer of power to the provinces,
which were not met. The talks ultimately failed, signaling the end of hopes
for a peaceful resolution.
2. Operation Searchlight: Following the failure of negotiations, Yahya Khan
ordered military action in East Pakistan, marking the beginning of Operation
Searchlight. The objective was to restore central control, arrest Mujib and
other Awami League leaders, disarm Bengali military units, and neutralize
radical organizations. This operation involved extreme levels of repression,
including violence against civilians, intellectuals, journalists, and Bengali
Hindus.
3. External Threat and Violence: The perception of support from India to the
Bengali nationalist movement heightened the Pakistani state's response. The
two-nation theory, which emphasized religious and civilizational differences
between Hindus and Muslims, fueled paranoia about Bengali aspirations
being linked with Indian interests. This led to the conflation of Bengali
 nationalism with Hinduism and India, resulting in extreme violence against
Bengali Hindus and perceived collaborators during the conflict.
4. Role of Islamist Elements: The Pakistani military collaborated with Islamist
paramilitary groups like al-Badr and al-Shams, which operated under the
guise of religious crusades. These groups targeted perceived enemies of
Islam, further exacerbating the violence and polarization in East Pakistan.

Overall, the passage highlights the complex interplay of political, religious,

and ethnic factors that contributed to the escalation of violence and the
eventual separation of East Pakistan from West Pakistan.

1. Perception of Indian Support: Pakistani military and leadership perceived

Bengali nationalists as being supported by India. This perception led to the
belief that Hindus, regardless of whether they were Indian or Pakistani
citizens, were considered enemies. There was a conflation of "wicked
Hindus" and "wicked Indians" in the eyes of West Pakistani residents,
suggesting a lack of distinction between the two groups.
2. Propaganda and Misperception: There's a discussion on whether the
Pakistani leadership genuinely believed in the narrative of Indian
involvement or if it was a deliberate propaganda tactic. While some argue
that leaders use foreign threats as scapegoats to divert attention, others
suggest that Pakistani leadership may have genuinely believed in the
narrative due to societal perceptions and historical animosity.
3. Brutality and Ethnic Targeting: The brutality of the Pakistani military,
particularly towards Bengali Hindus, is highlighted. The targeting of Hindus
was seen as a strategy to suppress the Bengali nationalist movement, which
was perceived as being backed by India. This brutality was fueled by a
civilizational conception of the difference between Hindu India and Muslim
Pakistan.
4. Indian Support for Bengali Nationalists: While initially unofficial, Indian
support for the Bengali nationalist movement escalated over time. This
support included the provision of arms, communications equipment, training,
and safe havens for Bengali insurgents. The Mukti Bahini, the guerrilla army
formed by Bengali nationalists, received significant assistance from India,
including intelligence and military support.

1. Concerns and Fear of Indian Intervention: Pakistani leaders and military

officials expressed concerns about Indian strategy and feared Indian military
intervention in East Pakistan. The deployment of Indian troops near the
border heightened tensions and led to apprehensions about a potential two-
front conflict for Pakistan.
2. Impact of Pakistani Repression: The heavy-handed repression by the
Pakistani military, especially at the beginning of the conflict, created a
massive humanitarian and refugee crisis, with millions of Bengalis fleeing to
 India. This severe strain on Indian states and domestic pressure ultimately
led to India's overt entry into the war.

Consequences and Irony: Pakistan's traumatic split in 1971 resulted in

increased territorial security for the remaining territory of Pakistan due to
military modernization and a more coherent state. However, Pakistani
leaders' resistance to the secession of East Pakistan, based on fears of
territorial loss, ultimately proved misguided as secession decreased the long-
run chances of Indian invasion.

The passage provides insights into the conflict between the Pakistan Army
and Baloch insurgents in the 1970s:

1. Initiation of Conflict: Prime Minister Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto ordered the

Pakistan Army into Balochistan between 1973 and 1977 due to his
dissatisfaction with the lack of influence of his party, the PPP, in the province.
This move led to the dismissal of provincial assemblies, triggering a
secessionist moment and insurgency in Balochistan.

2. Nature of Conflict: The conflict lasted for almost four years, resulting in
approximately nine thousand casualties on both sides. While there was some
repression by the state, it did not reach the same level as seen during the
1971 civil war.

3. External Support for Baloch Rebels: The Baloch rebels received

moderate support from third parties, including sanctuary and limited
financial and military aid from Afghanistan. However, major powers,
including the Soviet Union, did not provide significant support to the Baloch
insurgents. Iran, on the other hand, backed Pakistan in the conflict.

4. Historical Context: The troubled relationship between Balochistan and the

center dates back to the British colonial era. Baloch tribal chiefs resisted
attempts to integrate Balochistan into wider political entities, including
Pakistan. The coerced accession of Kalat to Pakistan in 1948 and subsequent
integration of Balochistan as a province fueled Baloch nationalist sentiments.

5. Continued Struggle for Autonomy: Despite various uprisings and

confrontations, including the Nauroz Khan incident in 1960, where the
Pakistani state reneged on its promises, Baloch nationalists continued to
demand autonomy or outright independence due to grievances such as
demographic changes, underrepresentation, and resource exploitation by
the center.
 The secessionist moment and pakistan’s militarization
strategy
Blochistan

1. Political Context: Bhutto was dissatisfied with the provincial leadership of

the National Awami Party (NAP) in Balochistan, which had uneasy relations
with the central government. The NAP, a left-leaning nationalist party,
accused Bhutto's government of destabilizing the provinces to assert control.
Bhutto, in turn, sought to curtail the NAP's influence and make them
subservient to his party, the Pakistan People's Party (PPP).

2. Dismissal of Provincial Government: In February 1973, Bhutto dismissed

the provincial government of Balochistan, citing internal disturbances,
particularly in Lasbela. This move escalated tensions between the central
government and Baloch nationalists, leading to widespread discontent and
rebellion.

3. Justifications for Military Intervention: Bhutto justified his decision to

deploy the military in Balochistan based on two main incidents. First, the
Lasbela incident, which involved localized violence, was portrayed as a
threat to law and order, necessitating central intervention. However, there
were allegations that the government itself instigated the unrest to justify
military action. Second, Bhutto claimed to have discovered a cache of Soviet
weapons intended for Baloch insurgents, although this claim was met with
skepticism.

4. Escalation of Conflict: Bhutto's actions angered Baloch nationalists,

leading to widespread rebellion and the emergence of armed insurgency.
Baloch tribes, particularly the Marri tribe, rallied against what they perceived
as an oppressive regime from Punjab. The conflict intensified as rebels
engaged in guerrilla tactics, targeting military installations and disrupting
transportation routes.

5. Military Response: The Pakistan Army, under Bhutto's orders, launched a

massive operation to suppress the insurgency. Troops were deployed in large
numbers, and the military utilized air power extensively. The Battle of
Chamalang in September 1974 was a turning point, where the military
decisively defeated rebel forces using helicopters and fighter jets.

6. Outcome: The conflict officially ended in 1977, with General Zia-ul-Haq

declaring victory and withdrawing forces. However, the insurgency left a
significant toll, with approximately nine thousand lives lost on both sides.
The repression in Balochistan, although severe, did not reach the level of
 brutality witnessed in East Pakistan during the 1971 conflict. Instead, it was
characterized by targeted military actions against militant camps and
positions, representing a form of "militarization" rather than collective
repression.

The provided text offers a comprehensive analysis of the Balochistan conflict

in the 1970s, focusing on its primarily domestic nature despite its
geopolitical implications. Here's a summary of the main points:

The conflict primarily stemmed from domestic political disputes between the
central government, led by Bhutto, and nationalist factions, such as the
National Awami Party (NAP). Issues of provincial autonomy, authoritarianism,
and power struggles were central to the conflict. Despite some geopolitical
considerations, such as Iran's concerns about separatist movements, major
powers did not heavily intervene in favor of the Baloch rebels.

Iran provided crucial military assistance to Pakistan, including gunship

helicopters and fighter aircraft, which bolstered Pakistan's military
capabilities in Balochistan. This support was vital for addressing the mobility
challenges faced by the Pakistani Army in the region. The absence of
significant external support for the rebels limited the scale and scope of the
insurgency, making it more manageable for the Pakistani state to address.

Despite allegations of foreign support for the Baloch insurgents, evidence

suggests that such claims were largely political theater rather than reflective
of genuine belief. The insurgency was primarily domestically driven, with
limited international dimensions. Overall, the passage underscores the
complex interplay of domestic and geopolitical factors in shaping the
dynamics of the Balochistan conflict during the 1970s.

EXPLANATION different state responses

1. Exploring Different Responses: The passage delves into why Pakistan

reacted differently to the Bengali and Baloch secessionist movements. It
focuses on the levels of violence and repression employed by the state in
each case.

2. Reputation Argument Analysis: Initially, it discusses the "reputation

argument" found in secessionist conflict literature. This argument suggests
that states may be more violent against early movements to establish a
reputation. In Pakistan's case, the Bengali movement faced extreme violence
in 1971, possibly to establish a strong state reputation. However, this
argument's applicability is questioned due to mixed predictions and
leadership changes.
3. Role of Domestic Factors: It considers domestic factors like the
institutional setup of the Pakistani state and the presence of veto players.
The passage argues that there were no significant institutional changes
between 1971 and 1973 to justify such differing responses to nationalist
movements.

4. Context-Specific Arguments: The passage presents context-specific

explanations for the differing responses. It discusses factors such as the ease
of fighting in Balochistan compared to East Pakistan, the role of emotions
like racism in state responses, and the impact of past experiences, like the
1971 civil war, on decision-making.

5. Resource Distribution Analysis: Another argument, the materialist

explanation, is analyzed. This explanation suggests that Pakistan would be
more aggressive in resource-rich regions. However, this explanation does not
align with the observed response, as Balochistan, the more resource-rich
province, faced less extreme violence.

6. Third-Party Support: Ultimately, the passage concludes that the primary

reason for the differing responses was the perceived level of third-party
support. The Bengali movement was seen as closely aligned with India and
received significant support, making it a more significant threat to Pakistan's
external security. In contrast, the Baloch movement received only moderate
support from Afghanistan, leading to a less aggressive response from
decision-makers and soldiers on the ground in Balochistan.

The main idea of the passages is to analyze the differing responses of the Pakistani state to
the Bengali and Baloch secessionist movements in the 1970s. The writer explores various
explanations for these differences, including factors such as reputation concerns, domestic
institutional setups, context-specific arguments, resource distribution, and the perceived
level of third-party support for the movements.
Despite initial arguments about the reputation of the state and domestic veto players, the
passage emphasizes the role of external threats and third-party support as the primary
drivers of Pakistan's responses. It suggests that Pakistan's perception of the Bengali
movement as closely aligned with India and receiving significant external support led to a
more severe and aggressive response, characterized by extreme violence and repression in
East Pakistan. In contrast, the Baloch movement, receiving only moderate support from
Afghanistan, faced a less aggressive response from the Pakistani state.
The analysis highlights the complex interplay of domestic and geopolitical factors in shaping
state responses to secessionist movements, underscoring the importance of understanding
the broader security environment and external influences on state behavior. Overall, the
passages offer valuable insights into the dynamics of conflict resolution, state-building, and
the impact of external support on insurgencies.

Reference 2: Chapter 2: Ethnic Conflict and International Norms BY Rajat

Ganguly and Ray Taras

Introduction

This chapter explores how international rules and principles interact with ethnic conflicts and
movements. The main focus is on two key ideas: national self-determination (the right of people
to decide their own political status) and state sovereignty (the authority of a state to govern
itself). Although these principles seem to support ethnic groups seeking independence, the
international system often opposes such movements. The chapter discusses why this bias exists,
the moral reasons for allowing ethnic groups to secede, and how we might fairly evaluate
secessionist claims.

Key Points on International Norms and Ethno-Secession

1. State Sovereignty
o Originates from historical agreements like the Peace of Westphalia (1648).
o Emphasizes that each state has absolute authority within its borders and no other
state can interfere.
o Challenges for ethnic groups: International laws favor maintaining existing state
borders and discourage the creation of new states.
2. National Self-Determination
o Popularized after World War I by leaders like Woodrow Wilson.
o Supports the idea that nations have the right to choose their own political status.
o Difficult to implement because defining what constitutes a 'nation' is complex and
subjective.
3. Moral Arguments for Secession
o Ethnic groups argue for independence based on:
 Right to self-determination.
 Protection from oppression and discrimination.
 Preservation of cultural identity.
 Economic exploitation by the existing state.
4. International Response to Secession
o No clear global standard exists for judging secessionist claims.
o Factors considered include:
 Size and distinctiveness of the ethnic group.
 Evidence of discrimination.
 State policies on cultural assimilation.
 Willingness of the state to negotiate.
 Potential for peaceful resolution.
Challenges in Evaluating Secessionist Claims

Evaluating these claims is complex because:

 Some movements have strong moral cases; others do not.

 In some cases, both the state and the secessionists have valid arguments, leading to a
stalemate.
 Examples of such conflicts include:
o Tamil-Sinhalese conflict in Sri Lanka.
o Serbs and Albanians in Kosovo.
o Azerbaijanis and Armenians in Nagorno-Karabakh.

Emerging Global Norms on Ethnic Minorities

 The late 1990s saw a decrease in ethnic conflicts due to better management strategies.
 The international community is working towards accommodating ethnic minorities and
their demands while maintaining stability.
 There is a shift from ethnic warfare to political solutions, but the international system is
still cautious about supporting secession.

Conclusion

Balancing the moral right to secede with the need for state stability and order is challenging. The
international community needs to create a fair system that addresses legitimate secessionist
claims without causing chaos. The next chapter will discuss how international third parties (like
the UN) can help resolve ethnic conflicts.

3. Rebels Without Borders by Idean Salehyan

A Theory of Transnational Rebellion

Rebellion is inherently risky. Even with significant grievances against the state, organizing a
collective opposition is challenging due to the likely violent response from the government.
While poverty and political powerlessness are severe, the threats of torture, imprisonment, and
death are often worse. Analysts emphasize that when dissidents evade state power, organizing
rebellion becomes feasible. Modern nation-states have their coercive powers fundamentally
limited by national boundaries, leading many rebel groups to seek resources and mobilization
opportunities outside their state—transforming the rebellion into a transnational phenomenon.

Rebellion is a strategy to extract concessions from the government when conventional politics
fails. At extremes, rebels might demand the complete removal of the regime or an independent
state. In other cases, they may seek significant political, economic, or social reforms, power-
sharing, or regional autonomy. Disputes between rebels and the state are part of a bargaining
process involving threats of violence. Insurgents leverage force to impose costs on the
government, while states can either accommodate demands or use violent means to suppress
dissent.
External mobilization opportunities, such as sanctuaries in neighboring countries, give rebels
bargaining power by allowing them to impose costs on the state. However, these opportunities
also complicate conflict resolution by creating ambiguity about the rebels' strength, making it
difficult for rebels to commit to demobilization, and introducing new actors into the conflict.

Constraints on Government Repression

State sovereignty and territoriality impose significant limitations on a government's capacity to

repress rebels. This chapter explores how transnational rebellions influence civil conflicts and
international relations, examining the prospects for conflict termination and resolution.

When rebels have access to external bases, regional cooperation becomes necessary to end
conflicts. The host state and the target state may collaborate to eliminate extraterritorial bases,
driving rebels back across the border. During peace negotiations, host governments can pressure
rebels to lay down arms. Without external support, conflicts either end through decisive victories
or forced peace negotiations.

Three Overarching Claims

1. Rebellion Likelihood: Rebellion is more likely when neighboring countries provide

conditions favorable for extraterritorial bases. Since international borders limit
governmental use of force, access to external territory emboldens rebels.
2. International Conflict: Hosting foreign rebels increases the likelihood of international
disputes between host and target countries. Civil wars with transnational characteristics
are more likely to escalate into international conflicts.
3. Conflict Resolution: The cooperation of host countries is crucial for ending civil wars.
Host states can assist in defeating rebels or facilitate successful peace negotiations.

Intellectual Heritage

This book builds on earlier studies of civil and international conflict, particularly on political
opportunity structures, conflict bargaining, and the international dimensions of civil war. It
emphasizes the political environment of conflicts rather than the motivations of groups. While
motivations like grievances or greed are important, they are not sufficient explanations for
violence.

Ted Robert Gurr (1970) theorized that group grievances provide a motive for insurgency.
Disadvantaged social groups or disparities between group aspirations and opportunities lead to
psychological predispositions towards violence. Other scholars argue that income inequality and
ethnic cleavages contribute to political instability and violence.

The Role of State Power

Social thinkers like Hobbes and Weber highlight that the defining feature of a state is its
command of overwhelming power to maintain internal order and prevent challenges. Despite
high costs and low success probabilities, civil conflicts in various regions show that rebellion is
not uncommon. The state’s power is primarily constrained by international borders, limiting its
capacity to maintain order.

Conclusion

Transnational rebellions challenge conventional analyses of civil conflict that focus on domestic
factors. External support for insurgents necessitates a rethinking of war factors and government
strategies. Regional cooperation and improved diplomatic relations are crucial to ending
transnational conflicts and securing lasting peace

Refernce 3: "The Politics of Nation-Building: Making Co-Nationals, Refugees, and

Minorities" by Harris Mylonas,

Introduction

The International Politics of Assimilation, Accommodation, and Exclusion

Nation-Building Policies: Assimilation, Accommodation, and Exclusion

Chapter 2 discusses the various nation-building policies, including assimilation, accommodation,

and exclusion, and their application to non-core groups. These policies are influenced by the
geopolitical environment, the preferences of the host state, and external actors' involvement.

Actors: Host State, Non-Core Group, External Powers

The chapter outlines the key actors involved in the politics of nation-building:

1. Host State: The state in which non-core groups reside. The host state's policies towards
non-core groups are shaped by its national constitutive myth, historical experiences, and
security concerns.
2. Non-Core Group: Groups within the state that are not part of the dominant national
identity. These groups may seek accommodation, assimilation, or independence based on
their political demands.
3. External Powers: Foreign states or international organizations that influence the host
state's policies towards non-core groups. The involvement of external powers can either
support or undermine the host state's nation-building efforts

Sources and Origins of Non-Core Groups

1. Colonial Legacies: The borders drawn by colonial powers often grouped diverse
communities within single political entities, creating non-core groups post-independence.
2. Migration: Movements of people across borders due to economic opportunities,
conflicts, or environmental changes can lead to the formation of non-core groups within
states.
 3. Wars and Treaties: Outcomes of wars and international treaties often alter national
boundaries, incorporating new groups into existing states.
4. Indigenous Populations: Indigenous communities present before the establishment of
modern nation-states are considered non-core groups if they are not integrated into the
dominant national identity.

1. Assimilation involves integrating non-core groups into the dominant culture. It requires
non-core groups to adopt the cultural norms of the core group, often leading to the loss of
the non-core group's distinct identity.
2. Accommodation allows non-core groups to maintain their distinct cultural identities
while being part of the state. This policy includes granting certain cultural or political
rights to the non-core groups.
3. Exclusion entails marginalizing or expelling non-core groups from the state. This policy
is often employed when the host state perceives the non-core group as a threat.

Historical Context and Examples

The chapter provides historical context by examining nation-building policies in different

regions and periods:

1. Nineteenth-Century Balkans: Nation-building efforts in the Balkans during this period

involved significant assimilation and exclusion policies, driven by the collapse of the
Ottoman Empire and the rise of national states.
2. Post–World War II Balkans: The post-war period saw a mix of accommodation and
assimilation policies, influenced by the Cold War dynamics and the presence of external
powers like the USSR and NATO.
3. PRC Nation-Building during the Cold War: The People's Republic of China employed
a mix of assimilation and exclusion policies in Tibet and Xinjiang, influenced by its
geopolitical concerns and the Cold War context.
4. Estonian Nation-Building in the Post–Cold War Era: Estonia's policies towards its
Russian-speaking population evolved from exclusion to accommodation, influenced by
changes in Russian foreign policy and international pressure.

Geopolitical Influence

Geopolitical considerations play a crucial role in shaping nation-building policies. The host
state's strategic interests, external threats, and alliances determine its approach towards non-core
groups. The chapter emphasizes that understanding the international context is essential for
comprehending nation-building dynamics.

Conclusion
Chapter 2 argues that to fully understand nation-building, we need to consider how domestic policies
are influenced by international relations. This means looking at how countries interact with minority
groups within their borders and how outside pressures and alliances shape these interactions.