MODULE 6: EXEMPTING CIRCUMSTANCES

Art. 12, p. 1 - Imbecility or Insanity

1. People v. Taneo, G.R. No. L-37673, 31 March 1933 [Art. 12 (1)]

Facts:
Potenciano Taneo and his wife lived in his parent's house in Dolores, Ormoc. On January 16,
1932, a fiesta was being celebrated in the said barrio and guests were entertained in the house,
among them were Fred Tanner and Luis Malinao. Early that afternoon, Potenciano went to sleep
and while sleeping, he suddenly got up, left the room bolo in hand and, upon meeting his wife
who tried to stop him, wounded her in the abdomen. He also attacked Fred and Luis and tried to
attack his father, after which, he wounded himself. Potenciano's wife, who was 7 months
pregnant at that time, died five days later as a result of the wound. The trial court found
Potenciano guilty of parricide and was sentenced to reclusion perpetua.

It appears from the evidence that the day before the commission of the crime, the defendant
had a quarrel over a glass of "tuba" with Collantes and Abadilla, who invited him to come down
and fight. When he was about to go down, he was stopped by his wife and his mother. On the
day of the commission of the crime, it was noted that the defendant was sad and weak, had a
severe stomachache that's why he went to bed in the early afternoon. The defendant stated that
when he fell asleep, he dreamed that Collantes was trying to stab him with a bolo while Abadila
held his feet. That's why he got up and it seemed to him that his enemies were inviting him to
come down; he armed himself with a bolo and left the room. At the door, he met his wife who
seemed to say to him that she was wounded. Then, he fancied seeing his wife really wounded
and in desperation wounded himself. As his enemies seemed to multiply around him, he
attacked everybody that came his way.

CASE TRAIL

Court Charge - Argument Ruling

Lower Court / Trial Court Parricide Guilty, reclusion perpetua

with the accessory penalties,
to indemnity the heirs of the
deceased in the sum of P500

Issue: WON defendant acted while in a dream.

Ruling:
Yes. The defendant acted while in a dream & his acts, therefore, weren’t voluntary in the sense
of entailing criminal liability. The apparent lack of motive for committing a criminal act does not
necessarily mean that there are none, but that simply they are not known to us. Although an
extreme moral perversion may lead a man to commit a crime without a real motive but just for
the sake of committing it. In the case at hand, the court found not only lack of motives for the
defendant to voluntarily commit the acts complained of (read: he loved his wife dearly, he tried
to attack his father in whose house the lived and the guests whom he invited), but also motives
for not committing the acts. Dr. Serafica, an expert witness in the case, stated that considering
the circumstances of the case, the defendant acted while in a dream, under the influence of
a hallucination and not in his right mind. The wife's wound may have been inflicted
accidentally. The defendant did not dream that he was assaulting his wife, but that he was
defending himself from his enemies. Judgment: defendant not criminally liable for the offense. It
was also ordered that he be confined in the government insane asylum and will not be released
until the director thereof finds that his liberty would no longer constitute a menace
 2. People v. Bonoan, G.R. No. L-45130, 17 February 1937

Facts:
On December 12, 1934, Celestino Bonoan met with Carlos Guison. A witness heard Bonoan
said “I will kill you.” Guison said to Bonoan “I will pay you”, but Bonoan replied saying that he
would kill him and stabbed Guison thrice on his left side which caused the latter’s death two
days afterwards. Bonoan was charged with the crime of murder. When the case was called for
arraignment of the accused, the defense counsel objected to the arraignment on the ground that
the defendant was mentally deranged and was at the time confined in the Psychopathic
hospital. Because of this, the court issued orders requiring the director of the hospital and the
hospital’s doctors to render report on the mental condition of the accused. The doctors reported
that Bonoan was suffering form a disease diagnosed as dementia praecox which is similar to
manic depressive psychosis. On January 21, 1936, Dr. Hernandez of the hospital reported that
the defendant could be discharged from the hospital and appear for trial as he was considered
as recovered case. On February 27, 1936, the accused was arraigned and trial was had.

CASE TRAIL

Court Charge - Argument Ruling

Lower Court of Manila Murder guilty, and sentenced him to

life imprisonment, to
indemnify the heirs of the
deceased in the sum of
P1,000

Issue: WON the accused is exempted from the criminal liability on the ground of the doctors’
findings that he is suffering from dementia praecox?

Ruling:
Yes. Insanity as a defense in a confession and avoidance must be proved beyond reasonable
doubt when the commission of the crime is established. When a defendant in a criminal case
interposes the defense of mental incapacity, the burden of establishing that fact rests upon him.
In this case, the defense interposed that the defendant was insane at the time he killed the
deceased. Prior to the commission of the offense, he was confined in the insane department of
the San Lazaro Hospital suffering from a disease diagnosed as dementia praecox. The
circumstance tends to show that the recurrence of the ailment at the time of the occurrence of
the crime is not entirely lacking of any rational or scientific foundation.

All persons suffering from dementia praecox are clearly to be regarded as having mental
disease to a degree that disqualifies them for legal responsibility for their actions. It is similar to
those of manic depressive psychosis where the mind appears “deteriorated” because when a
person becomes affected by this kind of disease, during the time of excitement, he has no
control whatever he acts. The prosecution aimed to establish motive, premeditation, and
indirectly, the mental normalcy of the accused by presenting testimony from policeman Damaso
Arnoco. Arnoco testified that after arresting the accused, he asked about the reason for the
assault, and the accused responded that the victim, Guison, owed him P55 and would not pay.
The accused further admitted to buying a knife for 55 centavos and watching Guison for two
days to kill him. Detective Benjamin Cruz corroborated Arnoco's testimony. However, this does
not necessarily prove the accused's sanity, as Dr. Sydney Smith, an expert in forensic medicine,
explained that individuals with certain mental disorders, such as dementia praecox, "the crime is
ussually preceded by much complaining and planning. In these people, homicidal attcks are
common, because of delusions that they are being interfered with sexually or that their property
is being taken." The accused was held by the court to be exempted from criminal liability
 3. People v. Formigones, G.R. No. L-3246, 29 November 1950.

Facts
Defendant Abelardo Formigones lived in his farm in Camarines Sur, with his wife, Julia Agricola,
and his five children. They went to live in the house of his half-brother, Zacarias Formigones, to
find employment as harvesters of palay. After about a month’s stay, late in the afternoon, Julia
was sitting at the head of the stairs of the house. The accused, without any previous quarrel or
provocation whatsoever, took his bolo from the wall of the house and stabbed his wife, Julia, in
the back, the blade penetrating the right lung and causing a severe hemorrhage resulting in her
death not long thereafter. The blow sent Julia toppling down the stairs to the ground,
immediately followed by her husband Abelardo who, taking her up in his arms, carried her up
the house, laid her on the floor of the living room and then lay down beside her. In this position
he was found by the people who came in response to the shouts for help made by his eldest
daughter, Irene, who witnessed and testified to the stabbing of her mother by her father.

Defendant Abelardo signed a written statement wherein he admitted that he killed his wife. The
motive was admittedly that of jealousy because according to him, he used to have quarrels with
his wife for the reason that he often saw her in the company of his brother Zacarias; that he
suspected that the two were maintaining illicit relations because he noticed that his wife had
become indifferent to him. The accused pleaded guilty during the preliminary investigation and
trial. His counsel presented the testimony of two guards of the provincial jail where Abelardo
was confined to the effect that his conduct there was rather strange and that he behaved like an
insane person; that sometimes he would remove his clothes and go stark naked in the presence
of his fellow prisoners; that at times he would remain silent and indifferent to his surroundings;
that he would refuse to take a bath and wash his clothes until forced by the prison authorities;
and that sometimes he would sing in chorus with his fellow prisoners, or even alone by himself
without being asked; and that once when the door of his cell was opened, he suddenly darted
from inside into the prison compound apparently in an attempt to regain his liberty. Dr. Francisco
Gomez, witness of the defendant who examined him opined that Abelardo was suffering only
from feeblemindedness and not imbecility and that he could distinguish right from wrong.

CASE TRAIL

Court Charge - Argument Ruling

Justice of the peace of Parricide - Guilty

Sipocot

Court of First Instance of Parricide - Not guilty Guilty of parricide and

Camarines Sur sentencing him to reclusion
perpetua, to indemnify the
heirs of the deceased in the
amount of P2,000
Issue: WON Abelardo is an imbecile and thus exempt from criminal liability

Ruling:
NO. In order that a person could be regarded as an imbecile within the meaning of article 12 of
the Revised Penal Code so as to be exempt from criminal liability, he must be deprived
completely of reason or discernment and freedom of the will at the time of committing the crime.
The provisions of article 12 of the Revised Penal Code are copied from and based on paragraph
1, article 8, of the old Penal Code of Spain. Consequently, the decisions of the Supreme Court
of Spain interpreting and applying said provisions are pertinent and applicable.

Further, in order that this exempting circumstance may be taken into account, it is necessary
that there be a complete deprivation of intelligence in committing the act, that is, that the
accused be deprived of reason; that there be no responsibility for his own acts; that he acts
without the least discernment; that there be a complete absence of the power to discern, or that
there be a total deprivation of freedom of the will. For this reason, it was held that the imbecility
or insanity at the time of the commission of the act should absolutely deprive a person of
intelligence or freedom of will, because mere abnormality of his mental faculties does not
exclude imputability.

As to the strange behaviour of the accused during his confinement, assuming that it was not
feigned to stimulate insanity, it may be attributed either to his being feebleminded or eccentric,
or to a morbid mental condition produced by remorse at having killed his wife.

After a careful study of the record, the Court is convinced that the appellant is not an imbecile.
According to the evidence, during his marriage of about 16 years, he has not done anything or
conducted himself in anyway so as to warrant an opinion that he was or is an imbecile. He
regularly and dutifully cultivated his farm, raised five children, and supported his family and even
maintained in school his children of school age, with the fruits of his work. Occasionally, as a
side line he made copra. And a man who could feel the pangs of jealousy and take violent
measures to the extent of killing his wife whom he suspected of being unfaithful to him, in the
belief that in doing so he was vindicating his honor, could hardly be regarded as an imbecile.
Whether or not his suspicions were justified, is of little or no import. The fact is that he believed
her faithless.

But to show that his feeling of jealousy had some color of justification and was not a mere
product of hallucination and aberrations of a disordered mind as that an imbecile or a lunatic,
there is evidence to the following effect. In addition to the observations made by appellant in his
written statement, it is said that when he and his wife first went to live in the house of his
half-brother, the latter was living with his grandmother, and his house was vacant. However,
after the family of Abelardo was settled in the house, Zacarias not only frequented said house
but also used to sleep there nights. All this may have aroused and even partly confirmed the
suspicions of Abelardo, at least to his way of thinking.
 4. People v. Puno, G.R. No. L-33211, 29 June 1981 (See Also: J. Makasiar’s Dissent)

Facts:
At two o’clock in the afternoon, September 8, 1970 the accused entered the bedroom of
Francisca Col (70) a widow. On seeing her Puno insulted her by saying she’s “mangkukulam”
and “mambabarang” then Puno repeatedly slapped her and struck her with hammer until she
was dead. The assault was witnessed by Hilaria de la Cruz (23), who was in the bedroom with
the old woman, and Lina Pajes (27) a tenant of the adjoining room. They testified that Puno’s
eyes were reddish. His look was baleful and menacing.After the killing, Puno went to the room
of Lina, where Hilaria had taken refuge and Puno made the following threat “Huwag kayong
magkakamaling tumawag ng pulis at sabihin ninyo na umalis kayo ng bahay at hindi ninyo alam
kung sino ang pumatay sa matanda.”

The defense contends that Puno was insane when he killed Francisca Col because he had
Chronic Schizophrenia since 1962: he was suffering from Schizophrenia on September 8, 1970,
when he liquidated the victim, and schizophrenia is a form of psychosis which deprives a person
of discernment and freedom of will. The Trial Court convicted Puno of Murder, sentenced him to
death and ordered him to pay the heirs of the victim an indemnity of twenty-two thousand pesos.
Because of this, the defendant file for review of his death sentence.

CASE TRAIL

Court Charge - Argument Ruling

Municipal court of Murder

Mandaluyong

Circuit Criminal Court at Murder

Pasig, Rizal

Issue: WON the accused may be held criminally liable for murder despite invoking the
exempting circumstance of insanity due to chronic schizophrenia at the time of the commission
of the crime?

Ruling:
Tthe Supreme Court rejected the defense of insanity. Despite Puno's history of mental illness,
including chronic schizophrenia, the Court found that at the time of the crime, he was not
completely deprived of reason or discernment. His actions and the psychiatric evaluations
indicated that he understood the nature of his acts and their consequences.

The Court upheld the conviction for murder, recognizing the qualifying circumstance of abuse of
superiority because Puno, armed with a hammer, took advantage of his strength over the elderly
and defenseless victim. However, the Court did not appreciate the aggravating circumstance of
evident premeditation as there was insufficient evidence of deliberate planning before the crime.
The aggravating circumstances of dwelling and disregard for old age were recognized but were
offset by mitigating circumstances, including voluntary surrender and Puno's diminished mental
capacity due to his schizophrenia, although it did not deprive him of full consciousness of his
acts. Thus, the death penalty imposed by the trial court was set aside, and the medium penalty
for murder was imposed in its place, adhering to the provisions of the Revised Penal Code.

J. Makasiar’s Dissenting Opinion

Justice Makasiar, in his dissenting opinion, argued that the appellant should not be held liable
for murder as he was mentally ill at the time of the crime. The appellant suffered from chronic
paranoid schizophrenia, as confirmed by medical records and expert testimony from three
psychiatrists. Schizophrenia is a severe mental disorder characterized by an inability to
distinguish between fantasy and reality, often accompanied by delusions and hallucinations.

Makasiar emphasized that the appellant had a long history of mental illness, with symptoms
dating back to 1962, and had undergone 18 treatments over eight years. Although the appellant
was described as "improved" in some medical records, he was not fully cured and experienced
recurring psychotic episodes, including one shortly before the crime. During the attack, the
appellant believed he was defending himself from a "mangkukulam" (witch) due to his delusional
state.

The justice stressed that although the appellant appeared mentally stable during the trial, he
was mentally ill at the time of the offense. The victim, in the appellant's mind, represented the
"mangkukulam," and his actions were driven by his delusion. Therefore, Makasiar concluded
that the appellant should be acquitted, as he could not be held criminally responsible for actions
committed while suffering from a severe mental illness. Justice Teehankee concurred with this
opinion.
 5. People v. Dungo, G.R. No. 89420, 31 July 1991

Facts:
On March 16, 1987 between the hours of 2 and 3:00 in the afternoon, a male person, identified
as the accused, Rosalino Dungo, went to the place where Mrs. Sigua was holding office at the
Department of Agrarian Reform, Apalit, Pampanga. After a brief talk, Dungo drew a knife from
the envelope he was carrying and stabbed Mrs. Sigua several times. Afterwards, he went down
the staircase and out of the DAR’s office with blood stained clothes, carrying along a bloodied
bladed weapon. Dungo tried to show that he was insane at the time of the commission of the
offense and presented the testimony of his wife, Andrea Dungo. According to her, her husband
did not f inish his two year contract in Saudi Arabia as a welder because he was sick. He was
confined for a week on his return and underwent medical treatment. Two weeks prior to March
16, 1987, Andrea Dungo noticed her husband to always be in deep thought; maltreating their
children when he hasn’t before; demanding another payment from customers even if they had
already paid; chasing any child when they quarreled with their children.

On the day the offense was committed, her husband complained of stomach ache however, he
was immediately relieved of the pain and went back into the store. Andrea followed him but he
was no longer there. She got worried and searched for him. She saw her husband in her
parents-in-law’s house with people milling about, along with barangay officials. She instinctively
asked him why he did it and Dungo answered that it was the only cure for his ailment which is a
cancer in his heart. He further stated that if he would not be able to kill the victim in a number of
days, he would die. Dr. Sylvia Santiago and Dr. Nicanor Echavez of the National Center for
Mental Health also testified that Dungo was confined in the mental hospital. Based on the
reports of their staff, they concluded that Dungo was psychotic or insane long before, during,
and after the commission of the alleged crime and that his insanity was classified under organic
mental disorder secondary to cerebro vascular accident or stroke.

Issue: WON the accused was insane during the commission of the crime

Ruling:
The commission of the offense charged cannot, in a legal sense, involve criminal intent, and the
accused cannot be held criminally responsible for his actions. His unlawful act is the product of
a mental disease or defect. To relieve a person from criminal responsibility on the grounds of
insanity, it must be shown that there was a complete deprivation of intelligence at the time the
act was committed. The accused must have been deprived of cognition, acted without
discernment, or completely lacked the freedom of will.

Under Section 1039 of the Revised Administrative Code, insanity is characterized by language
or behavior indicating a disease or defect of the brain, or a more or less permanent disorder of
the mentality—whether functional or organic—and marked by perversion, inhibition, or
disordered functioning of the sensory or intellectual faculties, or impaired volition.
The Court was convinced that the accused was sane at the time of the act. The evidence
showed that Dungo was carrying an envelope in which the fatal weapon was concealed,
demonstrating a conscious plan to kill the victim.

In criminal cases, doubt is typically resolved in favor of the accused. However, when insanity is
raised as a defense, any doubt regarding the fact of insanity should be resolved in favor of
sanity. The burden of proving insanity rests on the defense. The quantum of evidence required
to overturn the presumption of sanity is proof beyond reasonable doubt. Insanity is a defense in
confession and avoidance, and as such, it must be proven beyond reasonable doubt.

Note:
When insanity is pleaded as a defense in a criminal prosecution, the initial presumption is that
all persons are of sound mind (Article 800, Civil Code). Unless proven otherwise, the law
assumes all acts to be voluntary and rejects the notion that acts were performed unconsciously
(People v. Cruz, 109 Phil 288).

Case Trail:

Filing of Case:
The case was first filed on March 24, 1987, by the prosecuting attorney of Pampanga at the RTC, Third Judicial Region, Branch 54, in Macabebe, Pampanga. The charge
against the accused, Rosalino Dungo, was murder under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, with the aggravating circumstances of treachery (alevosía), evident
premeditation, disrespect for the victim's sex, and the crime being committed inside a government office.

Defense's Argument:
Dungo pleaded not guilty upon arraignment, and the trial proceeded. His defense hinged on insanity, asserting that he was mentally incapable of committing the crime at the
time due to a pre-existing psychotic disorder. His wife testified about his erratic behavior two weeks before the incident, including delusions and mood changes. Two doctors
from the National Center for Mental Health also testified, diagnosing Dungo with psychosis or organic mental disorder due to a stroke, and concluded that he was psychotic
before, during, and after the crime.

Prosecution's Rebuttal:
The prosecution presented rebuttal witnesses, including Dungo's physicians, who confirmed his medical history but stated that his condition had stabilized after treatment. The
prosecution also focused on Dungo's actions leading up to the crime, arguing that his confrontation with the victim's husband, Rodolfo Sigua, showed a rational motive for his
actions. They maintained that Dungo's ability to plan, execute, and flee the scene suggested sanity.

RTC's Ruling:
On January 20, 1989, the RTC convicted Rosalino Dungo of murder. The court rejected the insanity defense, ruling that Dungo was sane at the time of the crime, as evidenced
by his calculated actions, including hiding the weapon and fleeing to Manila after the murder. The court sentenced him to reclusion perpetua (life imprisonment) and ordered
him to pay the victim's family P75,000 in actual damages, P20,000 in exemplary damages, and P30,000 in moral damages.

Appeal and Automatic Review:

The case was automatically elevated to the Supreme Court for review, as required by law for cases involving reclusion perpetua or death penalty sentences. The central issue
on appeal was whether Dungo was legally insane during the commission of the crime, which would absolve him of criminal liability. The Supreme Court evaluated the evidence
and arguments related to his mental state and the applicability of the insanity defense.
 6. People v. Rafanan, G.R. No. L-54135, 21 November 1991

Facts:
The 14 year old victim, Estelita Ronaya, was hired by the mother of the appellant as a
househelper. One evening, she was forced by the appellant, Policarpio Rafanan, to have
sexual intercourse using a bolo on her neck as a threat if she does not cooperate. After the
abuse, he also threatened to kill her if she reports what happened to anyone. After a few days,
the victim finally told her mother about what happened leading to the arrest and conviction of the
appellant of the crime of rape.

The commission of the crime was not seriously disputed by appellant. But the principal
submission of appellant was that he was suffering from a metal aberration characterized as
schizophrenia when he inflicted his violent intentions upon the victim. The trial court suspended
the trial and ordered that the appellant be confined at the National Mental Hospital in
Mandaluyong for observation and treatment. In the meantime,the case was archived. Appellant
was admitted into the hospital on 29 December 1976 and stayed there until 26 June 1978. The
appellant was diagnosed to be indeed suffering from schizophrenia by his attending physicians
but was deemed fit to stand trial upon almost 1 ½ years of treatment.

Issue: WON the appellant should be exempted from liability for the crime on the grounds of
insanity

Ruling:
No. The Supreme Court determined that the defendant failed to establish the defense of insanity
or imbecility. It is essential for the accused to provide clear and convincing evidence of their
mental state immediately before and during the commission of the crime. In this instance, the
defendant did not present sufficient evidence regarding his mental condition during the sexual
assault.

Furthermore, the two physicians upon whom the defendant relied for his defense were unable to
conclusively assess his mental state during the critical period. Their testimonies were based
solely on general behavioral patterns associated with schizophrenia, lacking specific correlation
to the circumstances surrounding the crime. Therefore, in the absence of positive evidence
indicating that the defendant had lost his reasoning just before or during the act, the court
presumes that he was in a sane state.

The court rejected the defendant's insanity defense and upheld the lower court’s conviction for
rape. For an insanity defense to succeed, there must be a complete loss of intelligence at the
time of the crime. The fact that the defendant threatened the victim with death if she revealed
the assault demonstrates that he was aware of the moral implications of his actions.

The law operates under the presumption that every individual is sane, and the burden of proof
for any claim of insanity lies with the accused. In this case, the defendant did not provide clear
and convincing evidence regarding his mental state at the time of the offense. Schizophrenia,
previously known as dementia praecox, is a chronic mental disorder that impairs an individual’s
ability to distinguish between reality and fantasy, often accompanied by hallucinations and
delusions.

In *People vs. Formigones*, the Court clarified the standards for establishing legal insanity,
identifying two key tests: (a) the Test of Cognition, which examines the complete deprivation of
intelligence during the commission of the criminal act, and (b) the Test of Volition, which
assesses the total loss of freedom of will. Our case law primarily relies on the Test of Cognition,
and no precedent exists where the Court has exonerated a defendant solely on the grounds of
an impaired will without a corresponding loss of intelligence.

In cases where the accused fails to demonstrate complete impairment of intelligence, the Court
may acknowledge it as a mitigating factor rather than a basis for exemption from liability, as
outlined in Article 13(9) of the Revised Penal Code: "Such illness of the offender as would
diminish the exercise of the willpower of the offender without, however, depriving him of the
consciousness of his acts."
 7. People v. Madarang, G.R. No. 132319, 12 May 2000

Facts:
Fernando Madarang was charged with parricide for killing his wife Lillia Madarang. He refused
to enter a plea during arraignment, and so was entered as “not guilty” in accordance to the rules
of court. Counsel for the accused manifested that his client had been observed exhibiting
abnormal behavior. Court decided to transfer accused to the National Center for Mental Health,
after refusal to answer any question. Initial examination at NCMH revealed Fernando as
suffering from schizophrenia. He was detained and medicated at the hospital. He was
discharged after 2 years, and recommitted at the provincial jail after being found fit to face
charges.

At the trial, it was established that the accused was legally married to the victim, and their union
resulted in 7 children. He worked as a seaman for 16 years, and thereafter started a hardware
store business. His venture failed, and he lost his entire fortune to cockfighting. Fernando, his
wife, and the children, were forced to move in with his mother-in-law ( Avelina Mirador), because
he could no longer support his family. Lillia was also heavily pregnant with their 8th child, and
was about to give birth. On Sept. 3, 1993, Fernando and Lillia had because of jealousy. He was
accusing her of infidelity, and in the heat of the fight, stabbed her in front of the children. The
children were heard shouting and crying, and were brought out of the house by Avelina
Mirador’s nephew. She mentions seeing the accused emerge from the house, with a bolo. She
declares no observation of anything peculiar about accused before the event, nor does she
know of any reason why he killed Lillia, because she never saw the two engage in any
argument while living with her. Accused declares no recollection of any relevant events. He was
sentenced with penalty of reclusion perpetua. Accused appealed, insisting his criminal act was
involuntary.
Issue: WON the evidence presented by the defense sufficient to prove the appellant's insanity
and relieve him of criminal liability?

Ruling:
No. Philippine Courts have established a stringent criterion for insanity. To be exempting, it is
required that:
1. there must be a complete deprivation of intelligence in committing the act;
2. he acted without the least discernment because there is complete absence of power to
discern;
3. or that there is total deprivation of will.

Appellant was diagnosed to be suffering from schizophrenia AFTER he killed his wife. Record is
also bereft of even a single account of abnormal or bizarre behavior prior to event. Evidence of
insanity after the fact may be accorded weight only if there is also proof of abnormal behavior
immediately before or simultaneous to commission of crime. Appellant failed to establish
convincing evidence of alleged insanity at the time of killing his wife.

8. People v. Robios, G.R. No. 138453, 29 May 2002

Facts:
On March 25, 1995, at around seven o'clock in the morning, fifteen-year old Lorenzo Robiños
was at their home in Barangay San Isibro in Camiling, Tarlac cooking dinner, heard his parents,
appellant Melecio Robiños and Lorenza Robiños – victim, who were at the sala, quarrelling.
Lorenzo heard his mother saying, 'Why did you come home, why don't you just leave?' After
hearing what his mother said, Lorenzo, saw his father, with a double-bladed knife, stab his
mother on the right shoulder. Upon witnessing appellant's attack on his mother, Lorenzo
immediately left their house and ran to his grandmother's house where he reported the incident.

Benjamin Bueno, the brother of the victim Lorenza Robiños, was was informed by his nephew of
the incident immediately called the police station and reported the said incident. The police,
together with Benjamin Bueno and some barangay officials proceeded to the scene of the crime.
When appellant failed to come out, the police, with the help of barangay officials, detached the
bamboo wall from the part of the house where blood was dripping. The removal of the wall
exposed that section of the house where they saw appellant, lying on his side and holding a
bloodstained double-bladed knife with his right hand, embracing his wife, uttering the words, “I
will kill myself, I will kill myself.” Lorenza, who was lying on her back and facing upward,
appeared to be dead. The police and the barangay officials tried to pull appellant away from
Lorenza's body, appellant tried to resist the people who held him but was overpowered. The
police, with the help of the barangay officials present, tied his hands and feet with a plastic rope.
However, before he was pulled away from the body of his wife and restrained by the police,
appellant admitted to Rolando Valdez, a neighbor of his and a barangay kagawad, that he had
killed his wife. Appellant does not refute the factual allegations of the prosecution that he indeed
killed his wife, but seeks exoneration from criminal liability by interposing the defense of insanity.
Issue: WON appellant was indeed insane at the time of the commission of the crime?

Ruling:
NO. A defendant in a criminal case who relies on the defense of mental incapacity has the
burden of establishing the fact of insanity at the very moment when the crime was committed.
Only when there is a complete deprivation of intelligence at the time of the commission of the
crime should the exempting circumstance of insanity be considered. Testimonies from both
prosecution and defense witnesses show no substantial evidence that appellant was completely
deprived of reason or discernment when he perpetrated the brutal killing of his wife. It was also
admitted that a domestic altercation preceded the fatal stabbing. Thus, it cannot be said that
appellant attacked his wife for no reason at all and without knowledge of the nature of his action.
The bulk of the defense evidence points to his allegedly unsound mental condition after the
commission of the crime. (Prison inmates testified that he was not engaging, quiet, and seen
talking to himself)

As to the contention of the defense of the testimony of Dr. Maria Mercidita Mendoza, who
examined accused, was still mentally ill; that accused was experiencing hallucination and
suffering from insanity. The court noted that when Dr. Mendoza, she conducted the mental,
physical and neurological examinations on the accused 7 months after the commission of the
offense. That span of seven 7 months has given the accused an opportunity to contrive and
feign mental derangement. Dr. Mendoza had no opportunity to observed and assessed the
behavior of the accused before, during and immediately after the commission of the offense.
Thus making her findings inconclusive.

*Side issue - As to the penalty imposed, although the RTC correctly rejected the defense of
insanity, it nonetheless erred in imposing the death penalty on appellant. It imposed the
maximum penalty without considering the presence or the absence of aggravating and
mitigating circumstances. Since appellant was convicted of the complex crime of parricide with
unintentional abortion, the penalty to be imposed on him should be that for the graver offense
which is parricide. The rules with respect to the application of a penalty consisting of two
indivisible penalties are prescribed by Article 63 of the Revised Penal Code, the pertinent
portion of which is quoted as follows:

"In all cases in which the law prescribes a penalty composed of two indivisible penalties, the
following rules shall be observed in the application thereof: x x x x x x x x x

2. When there are neither mitigating nor aggravating circumstances in the commission of the
deed, the lesser penalty shall be applied."

Hence, when the penalty provided by law is either of two indivisible penalties and there are
neither mitigating nor aggravating circumstances, the lower penalty shall be imposed.
Considering that neither aggravating nor mitigating circumstances were established in this case,
the imposable penalty should only be reclusion perpetua. The SC affirmed with modifications
the decision of the RTC. Reducing the penalty imposed to reclusion perpetua.

9. People v. Opuran, G.R. Nos. 147674-75, 17 March 2004

Facts:
On November 19, 1988, 6:30 pm at Catbalogan, Samar, the accused Anacito Opuran stabbed
Allan Dacles who was lying at the bench. After more than an hour and a half, Demetrio
Patrimonio was seen walking on the National Highway of Catbalogan Samara but was later
stabbed by the accused as he emerged from where he was hiding.The accusations were denied
by the accused, claiming that he was never out that night when the crime happened and that he
was only resting in his house when policemen came to arrest him. Later, when the hearings
resumed,an expert named Dr. Lyn Verona testified that she examined the accused 3
timesthrough interviews and confirmed her medical findingsthat the accused was psychotic
before and during the commission of the offense and even up to the present, that the
accused was suffering schizophrenia. However, when the trial court still held Opuran guilty of
murder and homicide, he contends that he wassuffering from a psychotic disorder and was
therefore, completely derived of intelligence when he stabbed the victims.

Issue: WON the accused Anacito Opuran can use the exempting circumstance of insanity as a
defense

Ruling:
No. Insanity must exist immediately before or during the moment of the commission of the act.
Anyone who pleads the exempting circumstance of insanity bears the burden of proving it
however, the accused failed to prove that he was insane at the precise moment or
before the commission of the offense. Although the accused has defense testimonies that
he was brought to the National Center for Mental Health due to difficulty of sleeping and
talking irrelevantly, that he was prescribed thorazine and evadyne, it should be noted that there
was no proof that Anacito needed the medicine during the period where he ran out of stock.
There was also no intimation that he needed the medicine prior to the stabbing incidentand it
was never shown that these drugs were for mental illness thatdeprives a person od reason. The
accused behavior of occasional silence, laughing, talking to oneself, etc. are not proof
of a complete absence of intelligence, because not every aberration of the mind or
mental deficiency constitutes insanity. As to whatthe court stated, a man may act crazy, but it
does not necessarily and conclusively prove that he is legally so. Furthermore, the results of Dr.
Veronas examinations on Anacito were based on incomplete or insufficient facts as she
admitted examining the accused for only 3 sessions lasting one to two hours each. Thus,
Anacito Opuran was found guilty by the court and cannot use the exempting
circumstance of insanity as a defense to the crime that he had committed.

10. Verdadero v. People, G.R. No. 216021, 2 March 2016

Facts:
Solomon Verdadero was charged with the crime of murder for killing Romeo B. Plata. On June
3, 2011, Verdadero was arraigned and pleaded "Not Guilty." During the pre trial, he invoked the
defense of insanity. The evidence of the prosecution tended to establish that Maynard and his
father Romeo went to the Baggao Police Station. Together with Ronnie Elaydo, to report that
Verdadero had stolen the fan belt of their irrigation pump. After a confrontation with Verdadero
at the police station, the three men made their way home on a tricycle but stopped at a
drugstore. Romeo proceeded towards a store near the drugstore while Ronnie stayed inside the
tricycle. From the drug store, Maynard saw Verdadero stabbing Romeo, after he was alerted by
the shouts of Ronnie.

Ronnie ran towards the police station to seek assistance. The responding police officers
arrested Verdadero, while Maynard and Ronnie brought Romeo to a clinic but were advised to
bring him to the Cagayan Valley Medical Center (CVMC). Romeo, however, died upon arrival at
the CVMC. Based on the Post-Mortem Examination Report, his cause of death was
cardiopulmonary arrest secondary to severe hemorrhage secondary to multiple stab wounds
and hack wounds. The evidence for the defense did not refute the material allegations but
revolved around Verdadero's alleged insanity. On July 21, 2003, he was diagnosed with
schizophrenia and was given medications to address his mental illness. Verdadero would
irregularly consult with his doctors as he had a lifelong chronic disease. Then, in 2009, he was
again confined for the fourth (4th) time at CVMC due to a relapse.
Acting on the January 4, 2011 Order of the RTC, Dr. Ethel Maureen Pagaddu (Dr. Pagaddu)
conducted a mental examination on Verdadero. She confirmed that as early as 1999, he was
already brought to CVMC and that he was diagnosed with schizophrenia on July 21, 2003. Dr.
Pagaddu agreed with Dr. Andres-Juliana that Verdadero had suffered a relapse on the day of
the stabbing incident. On May 30, 2013, the RTC rendered a decision finding Verdadero guilty
for the crime of homicide. The trial court, however, opined that Verdadero failed to establish
insanity as an exempting circumstance. The trial court posited that Verdadero was unsuccessful
in establishing that he was not in a lucid interval at the time he stabbed Romeo or that he was
completely of unsound mind prior to or coetaneous with the commission of the crime. Verdadero
appealed before the CA. the CA upheld Verdadero's conviction of homicide. The appellate court
agreed that the defense was able to establish that Verdadero had a history of schizophrenic
attacks, but was unable to prove that he was not lucid at the time of the commission of the
offense.

Issue: WON the fact that verdadero’s insanity at the time of the incident was established by
clear and convincing evidence

Ruling:
The Court finds that Verdadero sufficiently proved that he was insane at the time of the
stabbing. It is true that there is no direct evidence to show Verdadero's mental state at the exact
moment the crime was committed. This, however, is not fatal to the finding that he was insane.
His insanity may still be shown by circumstances immediately before and after the incident.
Further, the expert opinion of the psychiatrist Dr. Pagaddu may also be taken into account. Dr.
Pagaddu categorically testified that Verdadero was suffering a relapse at the time of the
stabbing incident.

Maynard was familiar with Verdadero as the latter was his neighbor for a long time. He had
observed that there were times that Verdadero appeared to be of unsound mind as he would
sometimes become violent. On the day of the stabbing incident, Maynard perceived that
Verdadero was again of unsound mind noting that he had reddish eyes and appeared to be
drunk. Moreover, he was immediately transferred to the psychiatry department because of his
impaired sleep and to control him from harming himself and others. These circumstances are
consistent with Dr. Paggadu's testimony. The evidence on record supports the finding that
Verdadero exhibited symptoms of a relapse of schizophrenia at the time of the stabbing
incident. The Court grants the petition and ACQUITS accused-appellant Solomon Verdadero y
Galera of Homicide by reason of insanity. He is ordered confined at the National Center for
Mental Health for treatment and shall be released only upon order of the Regional Trial Court
acting on a recommendation from his attending physicians from the institution.
 Art. 12, p. 2&3 - Juvenile Justice and Welfare Act of 2006

11. People v. Doqueña, G.R. No. 46539, 27 September 1939, 68 Phil. 580

Facts:

The accused-appellant, Valentin Doqueña, a minor aged 13 years, 9 months, and 5 days, was
prosecuted for homicide for fatally stabbing Juan Ragojos during a volleyball game on
November 19, 1938, in Sual, Pangasinan. The incident unfolded as follows:

Ragojos and another student were playing volleyball when Doqueña intervened, leading to a
confrontation. After being slapped by Ragojos, Doqueña sought a weapon to retaliate. Despite
being warned by his cousin not to give him a knife, Doqueña managed to acquire a knife from
his cousin's pocket. After challenging Ragojos, who was unaware of the threat, Doqueña
stabbed him in the chest while he was distracted.

The Court of First Instance found that Doqueña acted with discernment in committing the act
and ordered him to be sent to the Training School for Boys until he reached adulthood, pursuant
to Article 80 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Commonwealth Act No. 99. Doqueña
appealed the ruling, arguing that the court erred in concluding that he acted with discernment
and in not dismissing the case.

Issue: WON the accused who committed homicide acted with discernment can be held
criminally liable

Ruling:
The court ruled that the minor, Valentin Doqueña, acted with discernment in committing
homicide and therefore bears criminal liability. The appellate court emphasized that
discernment, as defined in Article 12, Section 3 of the Revised Penal Code, pertains to a minor's
capacity to understand the nature and consequences of their actions. This is distinct from
concepts of premeditation or intent.

In evaluating whether Doqueña acted with discernment, the trial court considered his academic
achievements, maturity, and behavior both during the incident and the trial. The court concluded
that Doqueña possessed the ability to distinguish right from wrong at the time of the offense.
Thus, the appellate court affirmed the trial court's finding that Doqueña's discernment
established his criminal liability for the homicide he committed.
 12. Ortega v. People, G.R. No. 151085, 20 August 2008

Facts:
At the time of commission of rape, the accused was only 13 years old, while the victim AAA was
6, both minors. It was alleged that petitioner raped her three times on three different occasions
in 1996. The lower courts convicted him of rape with criminal and civil liability imposed. The
case was pending when Republic Act 9344 (R.A. No. 9344) or the Juvenile Justice and Welfare
Act of 2006, was enacted amending the age of criminal irresponsibility being raised from 9 to 15
years old. Said law took effect on May 20, 2006. At the time of the promulgation of judgment,
the accused already reached the age of majority. The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG)
claimed that petitioner is not exempt from criminal liability because he is not anymore a child as
defined by R.A. No. 9344. The OSG further claimed that the retroactive effect of said law is
applicable only if the child-accused is still below 18 years old.

Issue: Whether or not the petitioner is exempt in the crime alleged by reason of minority

Ruling:
Yes, the petitioner is exempt from criminal liability. For one who acts by virtue of any ofthe
exempting circumstances, although he commits a crime, by the complete absence of any ofthe
conditions which constitute free will or voluntariness of the act, no criminal liability arises.Hence,
while there is a crime committed, no criminal liability attaches.

By virtue of the Juvenile Justice and Welfare Act of 2006 (R.A. 9344), the age of criminal
irresponsibility has been raised from 9 to 15 years old. Petitioner was only 13 years old at the
time of the commission of the alleged rape. The first paragraph of Section 6 of R.A. No. 9344
clearly provides that, a child fifteen (15) years of age or under at the time of the commission
ofthe offense shall be exempt from criminal liability. However, the child shall be subjected to an
intervention program pursuant to Section 20 of this Act. The Court gives retroactive application
insofar as it favors the persons guilty of a felony. While the law exempts the petitioner from
criminal liability, however, he is not exempt from civil liability. For this reason, petitioner and/or
his parents are liable to pay AAA civil indemnity
 13. People v. Mantalaba, G.R. No. 186227, 20 July 2011

Facts:

The Butuan City Regional Anti-Crime Emergency Response received a tip-off from an informer
regarding Allen Mantalaba, who was seventeen (17) years old at the time, allegedly selling
shabu at Purok 4, Barangay 3, Agao District, Butuan City. In response, a buy-bust operation
was organized, involving Police Officers (PO1) Randy Pajo and Eric Simon, along with two
poseur-buyers provided with two (2) ₱100 marked bills for the transaction.

Around 7 PM, the poseur-buyers approached Mantalaba, who was sitting in the area, and
engaged him in conversation. PO1 Pajo observed the exchange, during which Mantalaba
handed a sachet of shabu to one of the poseur-buyers in exchange for the marked bills. The
poseur-buyers then returned to the police officers and confirmed the completion of the
transaction. Officers Pajo and Simon immediately moved in and apprehended Mantalaba as he
attempted to leave the scene.

In the presence of barangay officials, the police found a larger sachet of shabu and the marked
money that Mantalaba had discarded on the ground. A laboratory examination later confirmed
that the substance recovered from him was methamphetamine hydrochloride, classified as an
illegal drug.

Subsequently, two separate Informations were filed against Mantalaba for violating Sections 5
and 11 of RA 9165, pertaining to the sale and possession of dangerous drugs, respectively. The
cases were consolidated and jointly tried. Mantalaba pleaded not guilty to the charges.

The RTC ultimately found him guilty beyond reasonable doubt and imposed the penalty of
reclusion perpetua for selling shabu, failing to consider his minority at the time of the offense.
Additionally, he was sentenced to a minimum of six (6) years and one (1) day to a maximum of
eight (8) years of prision mayor for illegal possession of shabu, applying the Indeterminate
Sentence Law. The Court of Appeals affirmed the RTC's decision in its entirety. Mantalaba has
since appealed, contending that the lower court erred in convicting him despite insufficient
evidence to prove his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.

CASE TRAIL

Court Charge - Argument Ruling

Regional Trial Court, Branch 1, selling shabu - Possession and Guilty

Butuan City selling of illegal drugs

Court of Appeals (CA) Affirmed, Guilty

Issue: WON the minority of Mantalaba at the time ofthe commission of the crime may be
admitted as privilege mitigating circumstances and entitles him to ISLAW

Ruling:
Yes, his minority is regarded and acknowledged as a mitigating circumstance. Mantalaba was
seventeen (17) years old when the crime occurred, qualifying him as a minor. However, he was
no longer a minor when the Regional Trial Court (RTC) issued its decision. Although RA 9344
provides for the automatic suspension of sentences for minors, it was not applicable here since
Mantalaba was over eighteen at the time of the RTC's ruling.

Despite this, the Court acknowledges that Mantalaba's minority is relevant to his sentencing.
The RTC failed to consider this mitigating circumstance when imposing reclusion perpetua. The
law allows for penalties to be reduced based on mitigating circumstances, so the appropriate
penalty should be one degree lower than reclusion perpetua, which is reclusion temporal.

According to the ISLAW, the minimum penalty shall be taken from the next lower degree (prision
mayor), while the maximum shall be from the medium period of reclusion temporal. Therefore,
Mantalaba's sentence should be six (6) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as the minimum
and fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months, and one (1) day of reclusion temporal as the
maximum.

Conclusion: WHEREFORE, the Decision dated July 31, 2008, of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 00240-MIN is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that the penalty for
Mantalaba's violation of Section 5 of RA 9165 shall be six (6) years and one (1) day of prision
mayor as the minimum and fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months, and one (1) day of reclusion
temporal as the maximum.

Notes: JUVENILE JUSTICE AND WELFARE ACT OF 2006

SEC. 6. Minimum Age of Criminal Responsibility. - A child fifteen (15) years of age or under at
the time of the commission of the offense shall be exempt from criminal liability. However, the
child shall be subjected to an intervention program pursuant to Section 20 of this Act.

A child above fifteen (15) years but below eighteen (18) years of age shall likewise be exempt
from criminal liability and be subjected to an intervention program, unless he/she has acted with
discernment, in which case, such child shall be subjected to the appropriate proceedings in
accordance with this Act. (Emphasis supplied.)

The exemption from criminal liability herein established does not include exemption from civil
liability, which shall be enforced in accordance with existing laws.
 14. Samahan Ng Mga Progresibong Kabataan v. Quezon City. G.R. No. 225442, 8
August 2017. (See Also: J. Leonen’s Separate Opinion)

Facts:
Following the campaign of President Rodrigo Roa Duterte to implement a nationwide curfew for
minors, severallocal governments in Metro Manila started to strictly implement their curfew
ordinances on minors throughpolice operations which were publicly known as part of "Oplan
Rody.

Petitioners, spearheaded by the Samahan ng mga Progresibong Kabataan (SPARK)- an

association of youngadults and minors that aims to forward a free and just society, in particular
the protection of the rights and welfareof the youth and minors - filed this present petition,
arguing that the Curfew Ordinances are unconstitutionalbecause they: (a) result in arbitrary and
discriminatory enforcement, and thus, fall under the void for vaguenessdoctrine; (b) suffer from
overbreadth by proscribing or impairing legitimate activities of minors during curfewhours; (c)
deprive minors of the right to liberty and the right to travel without substantive due process; and
(d)deprive parents of their natural and primary right in rearing the youth without substantive due
process.addition, petitioners assert that the Manila Ordinance contravenes RA 9344, as
amended by RA 10630.

Furthermore, petitioners claim that the Manila Ordinance, particularly Section 4 thereof,
contravenes Section 57-A of RA 9344, as amended, given that the cited curfew
provision imposes on minors the penalties ofimprisonment, reprimand, and admonition.
They contend that the imposition of penalties contravenes RA 9344'sexpress command that no
penalty shall be imposed on minors for curfew violations.

Lastly, petitioners submit that there is no compelling State interest to impose curfews contrary to
the parents prerogative to impose them in the exercise of their natural and primary right in the
rearing of the youth, and thateven if a compelling interest exists, less restrictive means are
available to achieve the same. In this regard, theysuggest massive street lighting programs,
installation of CCTVs (closed-circuit televisions) in public streets, andregular visible patrols by
law enforcers as other viable means of protecting children and preventing crimes atnight. They
further opine that the government can impose more reasonable sanctions, i.e., mandatory
parental counseling and education seminars informing the parents of the reasons behind the
curfew, and that imprisonmentis too harsh a penalty for parents who allowed their children to be
out during curfew hours

CASE TRAIL

Court Charge - Argument Ruling

Regional Trial Court, Branch 1, selling shabu - Possession and Guilty

Butuan City selling of illegal drugs
 Court of Appeals (CA) Affirmed, Guilty

Issue: Whether or not the curfew ordinances violate Article 12 of the Revised Penal Code by
imposing criminal liability on minors, who are generally exempt from such liability due to their
age

Ruling:
The curfew ordinances do not violate Article 12 of the Revised Penal Code, which exempts
minors from criminal liability based on age. The Court examined the curfew ordinances of
Manila, Navotas, and Quezon City. It found that while the ordinances of Manila and Navotas
overly restrict the rights of minors without sufficient exceptions, the Quezon City ordinance is
narrowly tailored to protect minors' constitutional rights, including their rights to association, free
exercise of religion, and peaceful assembly. As such, the Manila and Navotas ordinances were
declared unconstitutional, while the Quezon City ordinance was upheld as constitutional.

The ruling mentions Republic Act No. 9344, also known as the Juvenile Justice and Welfare Act
of 2006, to emphasize the legal framework surrounding the treatment of minors in the justice
system. The Court notes that RA 9344 recognizes the inherent lack of capacity of minors to fully
understand their actions and aims to provide them with the necessary protection and welfare.

In the context of the curfew ordinances, the Court highlights that any regulation concerning
minors must align with the principles outlined in RA 9344, which seeks to minimize the risk of
harm to minors and emphasizes rehabilitation rather than punishment. The ruling underscores
that the state, as parens patriae (guardian of minors), has an obligation to ensure the welfare of
minors, reinforcing the idea that laws affecting them should be carefully crafted to respect their
rights and protect them from potential harm.

J. Leonen’s Separate Opinion

In his separate opinion, Justice Leonen concurs with the decision to invalidate the challenged
ordinances, emphasizing their lack of rational justification, failure to employ the least restrictive
means, and absence of measures to prevent abuse by law enforcement. He asserts that the
doctrine of *parens patriae*, which permits state intervention for child welfare, cannot justify
ordinances that infringe on parental rights to raise their children. However, he acknowledges the
interpretation of Section 4(a) of the Quezon City Ordinance, which allows for parental
permission as an exception, providing a more nuanced application of the curfew regulation. The
ordinances have been rigorously enforced as part of police operations linked to former
President Duterte's campaign for a nationwide curfew for minors. The petitioners argue that
these ordinances are unconstitutional due to their potential for arbitrary enforcement and undue
restrictions on minors' liberties, as well as their interference with parental rights without due
process.
Justice Leonen highlights the constitutional guarantees of due process and equal protection,
which prohibit deprivation of life, liberty, or property without due process, and ensure equal
protection under the law. He notes that judicial review of governmental regulations on these
rights requires a framework of scrutiny, including the rational basis test, intermediate review, and
strict scrutiny, with the latter applying to fundamental rights such as the right to travel. He
acknowledges that while the right to travel is fundamental, it can be restricted under specific
circumstances, such as national security or public safety. However, he finds that the
justifications for the ordinances lack substantial evidence, with statistical data presented by
Quezon City failing to contextualize the prevalence of juvenile delinquency adequately. The
ordinances are criticized for disproportionately burdening impoverished minors and for lacking
alternative measures to effectively address public safety concerns.

Leonen also addresses the relevance of Republic Act No. 9344, known as the Juvenile
Justice and Welfare Act of 2006, which establishes a comprehensive framework for the
treatment of minors in conflict with the law. He emphasizes that this law recognizes the
rights of children and sets out specific guidelines for handling juveniles, aiming to
rehabilitate rather than punish. The ordinances, by categorizing minors as potential
offenders solely based on their presence in public spaces, risk undermining the
protections afforded by RA 9344 and conflict with its intent. He argues that the broad
application of the ordinances contradicts the nuanced approach of RA 9344, which
differentiates between "child at risk" and "child in conflict with the law."

Additionally, Leonen expresses concern over the excessive discretion granted to law
enforcement by the ordinances, which lack necessary safeguards and clear standards, leading
to potential abuse and arbitrary enforcement. He cites the void for vagueness doctrine, which
mandates that laws must provide clear standards to avoid arbitrary enforcement, and highlights
that the ordinances do not provide adequate guidelines for identifying minors. Moreover, he
argues that the doctrine of *parens patriae* should not be used to infringe upon parental rights
without clear evidence of neglect or abuse, reaffirming that state intervention is only justified
when parents fail in their duties. Ultimately, Justice Leonen emphasizes that while the State has
a role in safeguarding minors, such actions must not undermine parental authority as protected
by the Constitution.
 Art. 12, p. 4 - Accident

15. US v. Tañedo, G.R. No. L-5418, 12 February 1910

Facts:
Cecilio Tanedo (accused), a landowner, went with some workers to work on the dam on his
land, carrying with him a shotgun and a few shells. Upon reaching the dam, the accused went
on his way to hunt for wild chickens. On his way, he met Feliciano Sanchez (victim) and the
latter’s mother and sick uncle. The accused asked the victim’s uncle for the best place to hunt
for the wild chickens, but since the latter was sick, the victim answered for him and pointed to a
general direction in the forest.

Upon the victim’s recommendation, the accused then went to the forest to continue his search
for the wild chickens. When the accused saw one, he shot it, and simultaneously heard a
human cry out in pain. After seeing that Sanchez was shot (in the heart), Tanedo ran back to his
workers and asked one Bernardino Tagamba (Tagampa) to help him hide the body. They did so
by putting it amidst the tall cogon grass, and later burying the body in an old well and covering it
with burnt cogon grass. Only one shot was heard that morning, and it isn’t contested that a
chicken was killed by a gunshot wound. Chicken feathers were found at the scene of the crime,
as well, and there is no enmity between the accused and he victim.

Prior to the trial, the accused denied all knowledge of the crime, but later confessed during the
trial that he buried the victim’s body. The lower court found the accused guilty of homicide, and
sentenced him to 14 years, 8 months and 1 day of reclusion temporal, accessories,
indemnification and costs. The accused appealed to the Court.

Issue: WON the accused is guilty of homicide

Ruling:
NO. The only possible reason that the accused could have for killing the victim would be a
sudden quarrel between them during the hunt, which is negated by the fact that the chicken and
the man were shot at the same time, there having only one shot fired. According to Article 8
subdivision 8 of the Penal Code, “he who, while performing a legal act with due care, causes
some injury by mere accident without liability or intention of causing it.”
It is uniformly held that if life is taken by misfortune or accident while in the performance of a
lawful act executed with due care and without intention of doing harm, there is no criminal
liability. In this case, there is absolutely no evidence of negligence on the part of the accused.
Neither is there any question that he was engaged in the commission of a lawful act when the
accident occurred. Neither is there any evidence of the intention of the accused to cause the
death of the deceased. The only thing in the case at all suspicious on the part of the accused
are his concealment and denial, and no sufficient evidence was found to support the judgment
of conviction.

16. People v. Castillo, G.R. No. 172695, 29 June 2007

Facts:
Guillermo Antiporta, father of the victim, narrated in Court that in the evening of November 5,
1993, between 9:00 o'clock to 10:00 o'clock, the accused came home drunk and was in an
angry mood. The accused kicked the door and table, and then threw the electric fan away. He
was prevailed upon by Guillermo to take a rest. But the accused did not heed the advice of
Guillermo as he took instead his sling and arrow from the house ceiling where he was keeping
them. Dejectedly, Guillermo transferred to the adjacent house of her daughter [in-law] Yolanda.
From there, Guillermo heard the victim crying and, afterwards, shouting at the accused.
Guillermo concernedly ordered Yolanda to see what was happening inside the house of
Consorcia, and Yolanda obeyed. On her way, Yolanda met the accused carrying the bloodied
body of Consorcia. Guillermo, the accused, and Yolanda brought Consorcia to the hospital but
to no avail.

From all the circumstances gathered, the infliction of the fatal injury upon Consorcia was
preceded by a quarrel between her and the accused. This spat negated the accused's version
that he was practicing the use of the weapon when Consorcia was hit by the arrow, and lends
credence to the prosecution's contention that the shooting was intentional. To sustain the
accused's assertion that he was practicing the use of said weapon at the time of the incident is
patently absurd. The defense even failed to rebut Guillermo Antiporta's testimony that the
accused was keeping said sling and arrow inside his house.

It might be true that the accused was one of those who rushed the victim to the hospital and
while on the way, he sounded remorseful. But Guillermo Antiporta further testified that while the
victim was being attended to by the medical personnel of said hospital, the accused stayed
outside the hospital premises, then he disappeared. He was later on apprehended by police
authorities while hiding inside the comfort room of a premises in an adjoining barangay. The
accused's omission to surrender himself to the authorities is a clear indication of guilt.

Issue: WON the injury caused by Castillo to his wife is accidental

Ruling:
NO. It is not accidental.

"Accident" is an affirmative defense which the accused is burdened to prove, with clear and
convincing evidence. The defense miserably failed to discharge its burden of proof. The
essential requisites for this exempting circumstance, are: (1) a person is performing a lawful act
(2) with due care; (3) he causes and injury to another by mere accident (4) without fault or
intention of causing it. By no stretch of imagination could playing with or using a deadly sling
and arrow be considered as performing a "lawful act." Thus, on this ground alone, appellant's
defense of accident must be struck down because he was performing an unlawful act during the
incident.

Furthermore, in the instant case, the following circumstances satisfactorily established

appellant's intent to kill his wife:

1. The killing was immediately preceded by a quarrel between the appellant and his wife.
Leticia, the victim's sister, testified that the deceased suffered from the violent behavior
of the appellant who would often lay hand on the victim during their marital squabbles.
2. It has always been said that criminal cases are primarily about human nature. In the
instant case, appellant disappeared after his wounded wife was rushed to the hospital.
This is indeed contrary to human nature. A husband is expected to lend comfort to his
dying wife up to her last breath. In this case, however, appellant took flight. It is
well-established that the flight of an accused is competent evidence to indicate his guilt,
and flight, when unexplained, as in this case, is a circumstance from which an inference
of guilt may be drawn.
3. The location of the wound and its extent likewise proved appellant's intent to kill the
victim. The autopsy report revealed that the victim sustained a punctured wound in the
neck, a vital organ, which fatally lacerated her jugular vein causing massive hemorrhage.
The extent of the physical injury inflicted on the deceased manifests appellant's intention
to extinguish life.
4. As regards appellant's act of carrying the body of his wounded wife and bringing her to
the hospital, the same does not manifest innocence. It is merely an indication of an act of
repentance or contrition on the part of appellant.

There is likewise no merit in appellant's contention that assuming he was the one who killed his
wife, the same was accidental and not intentional. The exempting circumstance of accident is
not applicable in the instant case.
 17. People v. Retubado, G.R. No. 124058, 10 December 2003

Facts:
Shortly before November 5, 1993, someone played a joke on Edwin Retubado, the appellant's
younger brother who was mentally ill. Someone inserted a lighted firecracker in a cigarette pack
and gave it to Edwin. He brought the cigarette home and placed it on the dining table as he was
having dinner with his father. Momentarily, the firecracker exploded. The suspect was
Emmanuel Cañon, Jr. The Cañons and the appellant were neighbors. The matter was brought
to the attention of the barangay captain who conducted an investigation. It turned out that
Emmanuel Cañon, Jr. was not the culprit. The barangay captain considered the matter
closed. The appellant, however, was bent on confronting Emmanuel Cañon, Jr.

On November 5, 1993, at about 9:00 p.m., 50- year-old Emmanuel Cañon, Sr., a pedicab driver
called it a day and decided to go home after a day's work. He drove his pedicab and stopped at
the junction of Rizal and Gallardo Streets, at the poblacion of Tuburan. The appellant, who was
conversing with Marcial Luciño saw him. "Noy, why is [it] your son did something to my brother?"
Emmanuel ignored the appellant. The appellant was incensed and ran after Emmanuel. He
overtook Emmanuel, grabbed and pushed the pedicab which nearly fell into a canal. Emmanuel
again ignored the appellant and pedaled on until he reached his house. His wife, Norberta
Cañon was in the balcony of their house, above the porch waiting for him to arrive. Emmanuel,
Jr., meanwhile, was already asleep. Undeterred, the appellant continued following Emmanuel.

Shortly after Emmanuel had entered his house, the appellant arrived and tarried at the porch.
Emmanuel suddenly opened the door and demanded to know why he was being followed. The
appellant told Emmanuel that he just wanted to talk to Emmanuel, Jr., but Emmanuel told the
appellant that his son was already asleep. Norberta went down from the balcony and placed her
hand on her husband's shoulder to pacify him. The appellant forthwith pulled out a handgun
from under his T-shirt and shot Emmanuel on the forehead. The latter fell to the floor as the
appellant walked away from the scene. Norberta shouted for help. The neighbors, her daughter,
and her son-in-law arrived. They brought Emmanuel to the Tuburan District Hospital, but the
victim died shortly thereafter.

The appellant admitted shooting the victim but claimed that he was merely performing a lawful
act with due care; hence, cannot be held criminally liable for the victim's death. He testified that
when he insisted that Emmanuel wake up his son, Emmanuel went to his room and emerged
therefrom holding a handgun with his right hand. Emmanuel's trigger finger was outside the
trigger guard, and he held the firearm with the muzzle facing downward. Fearing that he would
be shot, the appellant took hold of Emmanuel's right hand with his left, and pulled the gun
towards Emmanuel's stomach. The appellant grabbed Emmanuel's free hand with his right
hand, and the old man almost fell on his knees to the ground. Emmanuel still resisted. The
appellant pulled the gun to the level of Emmanuel's forehead, and the gun suddenly went off.
The bullet hit Emmanuel's forehead.

Issue: WON the death of Emmanuel was caused by mere accident on the part of appellant
without fault or intention of causing it

Ruling:
NO. The shooting was no accident.

A number of legal scholars in Europe are of the view that the act of the accused in a state of
necessity is justifying circumstance; hence, lawful. Under Article 12, paragraph 4 of the Revised
Penal Code, a "state of necessity" is a justifying circumstance. The accused does not commit a
crime in legal contemplation; hence, is not criminally and civilly liable.

By admitting causing the injuries and killing the victim, the accused must rely on the strength of
his own evidence and not on the weakness of the evidence of the prosecution because if such
evidence is weak but the accused fails to prove his defense, the evidence of the prosecution
can no longer be disbelieved. Whether the accused acted under a state of necessity is a
question of fact, which is addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court.

The facts are clear as established by the trial court that when Norberta heard her husband and
the appellant arguing with each other in the porch of their house, she went down from the
balcony towards her husband and placed her hand on the latter's shoulders. She was shocked
when the appellant pulled out his handgun and deliberately shot the victim on the forehead.
After shooting the victim, the appellant fled from the situs criminis. He surrendered to the police
authorities only on November 6, 1993, but failed to surrender the gun he used to kill the victim.
The appellant's claim that he placed the gun on the dining table before entering his bedroom to
change his clothes is incredible. There is no evidence that the appellant informed the police
authorities that he killed the victim in a state of necessity and that his brother, Edwin, threw the
gun into the sea. The appellant never presented the police officer to whom he confessed that he
killed the victim in a state of necessity.
 18. Pomoy v. People, G.R. No. 150647, 29 September 2004

Facts:
Policemen arrested Tomas Balboa, a master teacher of Concepcion College of Science and
Fisheries in Concepcion, Iloilo, for he was allegedly connected with a robbery. He was brought
to the Headquarters of the Philippine Constabulary Company at Camp Jalandoni in Iloilo where
he was detained. Roweno Pomoy, a member of the Iloilo Provincial Mobile Force Company,
directed the latter to come out for a tactical interrogation at the investigation room. Petitioner
had a gun hanging from his holster. After that, 2 gunshots were heard. Petitioner was seen
holding his .45 caliber pistol facing Balboa who was lying in a pool of blood. Balboa died.

The version of the defense presented by accused Pomoy, Erna Basa (eyewitness) and Eden
Legaspi (was sitting with Basa at the time the incident occured) is that Balboa allegedly tried to
grab the handle of Pomoy’s gun. Balboa was no able to take actual hold of the gun because of
his efforts in preventing him. He and Balboa grappled in taking control of his gun, then Balboa
was accidentally shot.

RTC of Iloilo found Pomoy guilty of the crime of homicide, but CA modified the RTC decision
(removed aggravating circumstance of abuse of public position), stating that 1) the victim was
not successful in his attempts to grab the gun, since petitioner had been in control of the
weapon when the shots were fired; 2) the gun had been locked prior to the alleged grabbing
incident and immediately before it went off; it was petitioner who released the safety lock before
he deliberately fired the fatal shots; and 3) the location of the wounds found on the body of the
deceased did not support the assertion of petitioner that there had been a grappling for the gun.
Thus, there is no unlawful aggression on the part of the deceased to justify self- defense.

Issue: WON the shooting of Pomoy at deceased was accidental

Ruling:
YES. In determining whether an “accident” attended the incident, courts must take into account
the dual standards of lack of intent to kill and absence of fault or negligence. It was clear from
the account of the eyewitness that the Pomoy did not have control of the gun during the scuffle.
The deceased persistently attempted to wrest the weapon from him, while Pomoy resolutely
tried to thwart those attempts.
The elements of accident as provided in Art 12(4) are: (a) the accused was at the time
performing a lawful act, (b) with due care, (c) the resulting injury was caused by mere accident,
and (d) there was no fault nor intent to cause the injury on the part of the accused. All these
elements are present in this case.

At the time of the incident, Pomoy was a member of the PNP. This, it was in the lawful
performance of his duties as investigating officer that, under the instructions of his superior, he
fetched the victim from the latter’s cell for a routine interrogation. It was in the lawful
performance of his duty as a law enforcer that petitioner tried to defend his possession

of the weapon when the victim suddenly tried to remove it from his holster. He was duty-bound
to prevent the snatching of his service weapon by anyone, especially by a detained person in
his custody. Such weapon was likely to be used to facilitate escape and to kill or maim persons
in the vicinity, including petitioner himself.

Petitioner cannot be faulted for negligence. He exercised all the necessary precautions to
prevent his service weapon from causing accidental harm to others. As he so assiduously
maintained, he had kept his service gun locked when he left his house; he kept it inside his
holster at all times, especially within the premises of his working area.
The participation of petitioner, if any, in the victim’s death was limited only to acts committed in
the course of the lawful performance of his duties as enforcer of the law. The removal of the gun
from its holster, the released of the safety lock, and the firing of the two successive shots—all of
which led to the death of the victim—were sufficiently demonstrated to have been
consequences of circumstances beyond the control of the petitioner.
 Art. 12, p. 5 - Irresistible Force

19. US v. Caballeros, G.R. No. 1352, 29 March 1905

Facts:
The defendants, Roberto Baculi and Apolonio Caballeros, were convicted as accessories after
the fact in the murder of American school teachers Louis A. Thomas, Clyde O. France, John E.
Wells, and Ernest Eger. They were sentenced to seven years of presidio mayor. Baculi
confessed to assisting in the burial of the victims' bodies, but claimed he was forced to do so by
the murderers. This claim was corroborated by the eyewitness, Teodoro Sabate, who testified
that Baculi was not involved in the murder but was compelled at gunpoint to bury the corpses.

Caballeros, on the other hand, was not present during the burial and had no involvement in the
crime. His confession, obtained under dubious circumstances, was deemed inadmissible as it
was not made voluntarily.

The trial court’s consideration of the defendants' failure to report the crime was also contested,
as this act is not punishable under the Penal Code.

Issue: WON the defendant can be held criminally liable as accessories after the fact under
Article 12 of the Revised Penal Code, given the circumstances surrounding their involvement in
the concealment of the crime.

Ruling:
The court reversed the conviction of both defendants. It held that Baculi acted under the
influence of irresistible force, thus exempting him from criminal liability under Article 12,
paragraph 9 of the Revised Penal Code. The court found no credible evidence linking
Caballeros to the crime or the burial of the bodies, and his confession was not admissible due to
the lack of voluntariness. Additionally, the failure to report the crime did not incur liability under
the law. Consequently, both defendants were acquitted.

Legal Principle:
Article 12 of the Revised Penal Code outlines exempting circumstances, one of which includes
acting under irresistible force. The case underscores the importance of voluntariness in
confessions and clarifies that failure to report a crime does not constitute criminal liability. The
ruling reinforces the principle that individuals compelled to act against their will are not criminally
liable for their actions

20. People v. Loreno, G.R. No. L-54414, 9 July 1984

Facts:
In the evening of January 7, 1978, Barangay Captain Elias Monge was at his house located at
barrio Magsaysay, Libmanan, Camarines Sur. He and his two young daughters, namely: Monica
Monge, single, then 14 years old, and Cristina Monge, married, then 22 years old, were
preparing to attend the dance to be held in the barrio proper that evening. But they had to wait
for a while because his wife, Beata Monge, was still changing the diaper of baby Rachel
Baybayon, four- month old daughter of Cristina Monge. The other occupants present in the
house that evening were his sons, Mario, then 11 years old, and Nilo, then 13 years old, and
their farm helper, also staying with them, by the name of Francisco Fabie. Cristina was then
vacationing at her parents' house. Her husband, Raymundo Baybayon, was in Manila.

At about 7:40 o'clock that same evening, while he was at the balcony of said house, Francisco
Fabie saw at first four men with flashlights approaching. When they came near, he heard one of
them call Elias Monge saying that there was a letter from the chief (hepe). Elias Monge asked
them to come inside since he can’t read the letter properly. When he and the man in dark
sweater were inside the sala Elias Monge asked his daughter, Monica to fetch his reading
glasses. On reading the letter, Elias Monge and Monica read the following: "Kami mga NPA",
which caused Monica to run to her mother, seized with fear, informing her just what she came to
know about their visitors. Cristina Monge attempted to run to the kitchen to get a bolo but she
was held back by the man in dark sweater who then announced to all those inside not to make
any scandal. When Elias Monge turned to look at him, the man in dark sweater poked his gun at
him, and ordered all those inside to lie on the floor.

In the meantime, outside at the balcony the man in red clothes asked Fabie for a glass of water,
and the latter asked Mario Monge to get the glass of water, but Mario did not obey and instead
went to the sala. Hence, Fabie himself went inside the house to fetch the glass of water. But, as
he went inside the sala, he noticed the man in red clothes following him. As Fabie reached the
door to the sala, the man in red clothes poked his gun on Fabie's back and pointed a sharp
instrument on his neck and then he was pushed to go inside the sala. Once inside the sala,
which was lighted,

Fabie saw and recognized the man in red clothes to be Eustaquio Loreno. Also Elias Monge
and his two daughters, Monica and Cristina, saw and recognized Eustaquio Loreno as he
entered the sala as one of the companions of the man in dark sweater. All the occupants of the
house were ordered by the man in dark sweater and Loreno to remain lying flat on their
stomachs on the floor. Jimmy Marantal stayed as lookout outside the house.
Thereafter, the man in dark sweater instructed Loreno to tie all their victims on the floor. Loreno
tied them with rattan. The man in dark sweater cut the baby's hammock (duyan) and got the
ropes with which he and Loreno used to reinforce in tying the victim's hands together behind
their backs. After Loreno and Fabie returned to the sala, the man in dark sweater got hold of
Monica Monge and dragged her up to a room located above the balcony. She tried to resist but
she was then still tied. Inside the room, Monica was asked to reveal the whereabouts of her
piggy bank savings. She said there was none. He ransacked the room but found none. The man
in dark sweater then seized Monica and forcibly removed her pants. Monica resisted and
shouted at her parents for help. He boxed and slapped her. Despite her struggle, he was able to
remove her panty and successfully raped her. After that, he dragged Monica back to the sala
and proceeded to do the same to Cristina.’

While all of this was happening, the other men then proceeded to ransack the house and found
and took a lot of valuables including a kulambo and kaserola tangina nila pati yun kinuha.
Thereafter, Loreno entered the room where Cristina was still lying on the floor and proceeded to
kiss and touch her vagina. Suddenly, he was called to hurry up because someone was
approaching the house. When he went back, the dark shirt guy warned everyone not to tell
anyone, got their valuables, and left. They managed to untie themselves eventually and after
positively affirming the identities of their malefactors, along with Elias finding out the sexual
abuse his daughters suffered, filed a report against the robbery-rape incident. After substantial
examination to his daughters and initial investigation, the accused were detained, charged and
found guilty.

Appellants Eustaquio Loreno and Jimmy Marantal claimed that they acted under the compulsion
of an irresistible force and/or under the impulse of uncontrollable fear of equal or greater injury.
They admitted that they were in the house of Elias Monge on the night of January 7, 1978, but
they were only forced by a man wearing black sweater and his five companions who claimed to
be members of the New People's Army (NPA), operating in the locality, with the threat that if
they did not obey, appellants and their families would be killed.

Issue: WON the accused acted under the compulsion of an irresistible force and are therefore
exempt from criminal liability.

Ruling:
NO, they did not act under compulsion of an irresistible force. A person who acts under the
compulsion of an irresistible force, like one who acts under the impulse of uncontrollable fear of
equal or greater injury is exempt from criminal liability because he does not act with freedom.
The force must be irresistible to reduce him to a mere instrument who acts not only without will
but against his will. The duress, force, fear or intimidation must be present, imminent and
impending and of such a nature as to induce a well-grounded apprehension of death or serious
bodily harm if the act is not done. A threat of future injury is not enough. The compulsion must
be of such a character as to leave no opportunity to the accused for escape or self-defense in
equal combat.

A perusal of the appellants statement of the robbery-rape incident as summarized in their joint
brief, showed that they admitted their participation in the commission of the crimes of robbery
and rape against Elias Monge and his family. The records likewise revealed that on the two
occasions Eustaquio Loreno brought Beata Monge to the master's room and the teacher's room
where he made her open the trunk and the "aparador" with her keys and got the contents which
he brought and poured on the floor of the sala, appellant Loreno acted alone, without the threat
and assistance of the man in dark sweater. And after the man in dark sweater consummated his
lust on Cristina Monge in the teacher's room and seeing Cristina Monge still lying on the floor,
Loreno embraced her and tried to kiss and touch her private parts. Jimmy Marantal, who was
standing at the gate of the house below, must have heard the shouts of Monica Monge for help
and must have known by then that Monica Monge was being abused by his two companions
who earlier went up the house. As a "lookout" or guard, Jimmy Marantal gave his companions
effective means and encouragement to commit the crimes of robbery and rape. There was no
showing that Jimmy Marantal raised a voice of protest or did an act to prevent the commission
of the crimes. All these demonstrated the voluntary participation and the conspiracy of the
appellants.
 21. People v. Del Rosario, G.R. No. 127755, 14 April 1999

Facts:
Del Rosario, a tricycle driver, was accused of being a co-principal in a special complex crime of
Robbery withHomicide and sentenced to death for having robbed Virginia Bernas, a 66-year old
businesswoman, of P200,000.00 incash and jewelry and killing her. Del Rosario alleged that he
was just hired by Virgilio Santos to drive him to a cockpit.He was not aware of the plan of
Santos and his two companions to rob and kill the victim. He was not able to seekassistance
because Santos threatened to shoot him if he did. He also failed to inform the police authorities
about theincident because the culprits has threatened him and his family. He claimed exemption
from criminal liability as heallegedly acted under the compulsion of an irresistible force.The
Court acquitted Del Rosario. He was then unarmed and unable to protect himself when he tried
leaving the crimescene during the commission of the robbery and killing. Del Rosario's failure to
disclose what he knew about theincident to the authorities does not affect his credibility. The
natural hesitance of most people to get involved in acriminal case is of judicial notice. Del
Rosario was deprived of his rights during custodial investigation. From the time
he was "invited" forquestioning at the house of the barangay captain, he was already under
effective custodial investigation, buthe was not apprised nor made aware thereof by the
investigating officers. Sincethe prosecution failed toestablish that del Rosario had waived his
right to remain silent his verbal admissions on his participation inthe crime even before his
actual arrest were inadmissibleagainst him, as the same transgressed the safeguardsprovided
by law and the Bill of Rights.

Issue: WON Joselito del Rosario acting under the compulsion of an irresistible force, thereby
exempting him from criminal liability?

Ruling:
YES. Consequently, aperson who acts under the compulsion of an irresistible force is exempt
from criminal liability.1. Alonzo testified that there were two people in the tricycle at the time of
the struggle for the woman’s bag. If both Boy Santos and Del Rosario were conspirators, then
either of them could have just left the tricycle and helped in the commission of the crime. Gives
credence to Del Rosario’s claim that Boy Santos’ pre-ordained role was threaten Del
Rosarioand insuring that he would not escape and leave them behind. Such fear instilled by the
pointing of the gun rendered him immobile and subject to the will of Boy Santos, without a will of
his own.
The Supreme Court set aside del Rosario's conviction, emphasizing that he acted under the
compulsion of an irresistible force when threatened with a gun by his co-accused, Santos. The
Court explained that the force must be so formidable as to reduce the actor to a mere
instrument acting against his will. Del Rosario's fear was real and imminent, rendering him
immobile and subject to Santos' will. The Court also found that there was no conspiracy, as
mere companionship does not establish conspiracy. Del Rosario's presence at the crime scene
was explained by his fear for his life, and there was no evidence of his intentional participation in
the crime. Furthermore, the Court noted that del Rosario's constitutional rights were violated
during custodial investigation, as he was not informed of his rights and his verbal admissions
were inadmissible. Lastly, the Court ruled that del Rosario's arrest without a warrant was
unlawful, as it did not meet the requirements of being caught in flagrante delicto or immediately
after the crime. Despite the illegality of the arrest, the Court maintained jurisdiction as del
Rosario did not object before arraignment. Consequently, the Court acquitted del Rosario
and ordered his immediate release.
 22. People v. Bandian, G.R. No. 45186, 30 September 1936 (See Also: Separate
Opinion of J. Villareal) [Art. 12 (4) & (7)]

Facts:
The case involves Josefina Bandian, who was charged with the crime of infanticide. On January
31, 1936, at around 7 o'clock in the morning, Valentin Aguilar, a neighbor, saw Bandian go to a
nearby thicket, presumably to respond to a call of nature. Shortly after, Aguilar saw her emerge
from the thicket with her clothes stained with blood, staggering and visibly weak. Aguilar
assisted her back to her house and placed her in bed. Upon being asked what had happened,
Bandian only mentioned that she was very dizzy. Aguilar then called another neighbor, Adriano
Comcom, for help. Comcom discovered the body of a newborn baby near the path adjoining the
thicket and informed Aguilar, who instructed him to bring the body to Bandian's house. When
asked if the baby was hers, Bandian confirmed it. Dr. Emilio Nepomuceno, the president of the
sanitary division of Talisayan, Oriental Misamis, examined Bandian and found her still bleeding.
He concluded that Bandian had given birth in her house and had thrown the child into the thicket
to conceal her dishonor. The trial court convicted Bandian of infanticide and sentenced her to
reclusion perpetua. Bandian appealed, arguing that the trial court erred in considering her
alleged admission to Dr. Nepomuceno and in holding her guilty of infanticide beyond a
reasonable doubt.

Issue: WON Bandian is guilty of infanticide

Ruling:
No. Infanticide and abandonment of a minor, to be punishable, must be committed willfully or
consciously, or at least it must be the result of a voluntary, conscious and free act or omission.
The evidence does not show that the appellant, in causing her child’s death in one way or
another, or in abandoning it in the thicket, did so willfully, consciously or imprudently. She had no
cause to kill or abandon it, to expose it to death, because her affair with a former lover, which
was not unknown to her second lover, Kirol, took place three years before the incident; her
married life with Kirol—she considers him her husband as he considers him his wife—began a
year ago; as he so testified at the trial, he knew of the pregnancy and that it was his and that
they’ve been eagerly awaiting the birth of the child. The appellant, thus, had no cause to be
ashamed o her pregnancy to Kirol.

Apparently, she was not aware of her childbirth, or if she was, it did not occur to her or she was
unable, due to her debility or dizziness, which cause may be considered lawful or insuperable to
constitute the 7th exempting circumstance, to take her child from the thicket where she had
given it birth, so as not to leave it abandoned and exposed to the danger of losing its life. If by
going into the thicket to pee, she caused a wrong as that of giving birth to her child in that same
place and later abandoning it, not because of imprudence or any other reason than that she was
overcome by strong dizziness and extreme debility, she could not be blamed because it all
happened by mere accident, with no fault or intention on her part. The law exempts from liability
any person who so acts and behaves under such circumstances (RPC A12(4)). Thus, having
the fourth and seventh exempting circumstances in her favor, she is acquitted of the crime that
she had been accused of.

The Supreme Court found that the evidence did not show that Bandian willfully, consciously, or
imprudently caused her child's death or abandoned it. The court noted that Bandian had no
cause to kill or abandon the child, as her lover, Luis Kirol, knew about her pregnancy and
believed the child was his. The court also considered the testimony of witnesses Aguilar and
Comcom, who stated that the child was already dead when found and that Bandian was
extremely weak and dizzy. The court concluded that Bandian's actions were not intentional or
due to imprudence but were the result of severe dizziness and extreme debility, which are
considered lawful or insuperable causes under Article 12 of the Revised Penal Code. The court
emphasized that Bandian's lack of knowledge of her delivery and the existence of the child
exempted her from criminal liability. The court also noted that the wounds on the child's body
were caused by animal bites, not by human hands. Therefore, the court acquitted Bandian and
ordered her immediate release.

Separate Opinion of J. Villareal

In this separate opinion by Justice Villa-Real, he concurs with the acquittal of Josefina Bandian,
but emphasizes that she should be acquitted not because she is exempt from criminal liability,
but because she committed no criminal act or omission. The facts indicate that Bandian, weak
and feverish, went to a thicket to relieve herself without knowing she was giving birth. Her
neighbor found her staggering afterward and later discovered a newborn child, which had died
from exposure and animal bites.

Villa-Real argues that Bandian, being unaware of her childbirth due to her inexperience as a
first-time mother (primipara), could not be held criminally liable for the child's death. He explains
that, under Article 3 of the Revised Penal Code, crimes are committed either by deceit
(intentional) or by fault (negligence or imprudence). Bandian, unaware of her delivery, lacked
any intent or knowledge to abandon her child. The opinion also dismisses the application of
exempting circumstances, stating that Bandian's ignorance of the birth prevented her from
foreseeing or preventing the child's death. Therefore, she neither acted with deceit nor
negligence, and no criminal liability can be attributed to her.

We cannot apply to the accused fourth exempting circumstance of article 12 of the Revised
Penal Code which reads: "Any person who, while performing a lawful act with due care, causes
an injury by mere accident without fault or intention of causing it," because although the lawful
act of satisfying a natural physiological necessity accidentally provoked the delivery, the delivery
itself was not an injury, but the exposure of the child at the mercy of the elements and of the
animals which cased its death. As the child was born alive, if the accused had been aware of
her delivery and she had deliberately abandoned the child, her accidental delivery would not
exempt her from criminal liability because then the death of said child no longer would have
been accidental. Neither can we consider the seventh exempting circumstance of article 12 of
the Revised Penal Code consisting in the failure to perform an act required by law, when
prevented by some lawful or insuperable cause, because this exempting circumstance implies
knowledge of the precept of the law to be complied with but is prevented by some lawful or
insuperable cause, that is by some motive which has lawfully, morally or physically prevented
one to do what the law commands. In the present case, what the law requires of the
accused-appellant, with respect to the child, is that she care for, protect and not abandon it. Had
she been aware of her delivery and of the existence of the child, neither her debility nor her
dizziness resulting from the fever which consumed her, being in the full enjoyment of her mental
faculties and her illness not being of such gravity as to prevent her from asking for help, would
constitute the lawful or insuperable impediment required by law. Having been ignorant of her
delivery and of the existence of the child, to her there was subjectively no cause for the law to
impose a duty for her to comply with.
 23. People v. Toledo, G.R. No. 229508, 24 March 2021 [Art. 12 (1)]

Facts:
The case involves accused-appellant Dennis Paul Toledo y Buriga (Dennis), who was charged
with rape in relation to Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7610, the Special Protection of Children Against
Abuse, Exploitation, and Discrimination Act. The incident occurred on April 11, 2004, in Quezon
City, where Dennis allegedly raped an 8-year-old minor, AAA, at his residence on Malakas
Street, Brgy. Pinyahan. Dennis was arrested on April 12, 2004, and detained at the Quezon City
Jail. The trial court referred Dennis to the National Center for Mental Health (NCMH) to
determine his fitness to stand trial. Initial reports from NCMH in December 2004 found Dennis
incompetent to stand trial due to "Psychosis classified as Schizophrenia." The case was
archived until Dennis was deemed fit for trial. Subsequent examinations in 2009 showed no
improvement, but a follow-up report in April 2009 indicated that Dennis was fit to stand trial.
Dennis was arraigned on June 8, 2009, and pleaded not guilty. The prosecution presented
testimonies from AAA, her father BBB, and police officers, while the defense called NCMH
personnel to testify about Dennis' mental condition. The trial court found Dennis guilty, giving full
credence to AAA's testimony and the medico-legal findings. The Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed
the trial court's decision, finding no compelling reason to disturb the factual findings and ruling
that the defense failed to prove Dennis' insanity at the time of the crime.

Issue: WON Dennis Paul Toledo y Buriga insane at the time of the commission of the crime,
thereby exempting him from criminal liability?

Ruling:
The Court held that under Article 12, paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Code, insane persons
are exempt from criminal liability unless it is shown that they acted during a lucid interval. The
accused is presumed sane and bears the burden of proving insanity at the time of the crime.
The defense failed to present conclusive evidence that Dennis was insane during the
commission of the crime. The NCMH reports and testimonies of defense witnesses only
indicated the possibility of schizophrenia but did not establish Dennis' mental state at the time of
the crime. The Court emphasized that proof of insanity after the crime is immaterial unless it
shows continuous or recurring insanity. The positive testimonies of AAA, BBB, and CCC, along
with the medico-legal findings, proved beyond reasonable doubt that Dennis committed the
crime. Consequently, the Court found no basis to reverse the findings of the lower courts and
affirmed Dennis' guilt.
The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal and affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals,
with modification as to the award of civil indemnity and damages.

Proof of the insanity of the accused after the commission of the crime, especially during trial, is
immaterial, unless submitted to prove that the insanity is continuous or recurring. (People vs.
Toledo, G.R. No. 229508, March 24, 2021)

24. Turalba v. People, G.R. No. 216453, 16 March 2022 [Art. 12 (1)]

Facts:
On November 20, 2007, at around 3:45 PM, Gregorio Calimag parked his 1996 Honda CRV
with Plate No. RFC-269 near the Mulawain Bakery Shop on 18th Street, West Bajac-Bajac,
Olongapo City. He left the keys inside the car and went to buy bread. Shortly after, while still
inside the bakery, Gregorio saw his vehicle moving away towards Caron Street. Realizing his
car was being stolen, he rushed outside and flagged down a tricycle to pursue the vehicle. As
he chased his car, Gregorio shouted repeatedly, “Carnaper yan, harangin ninyo yan sasakyan,
akin yan!” (That is a carnapper, stop that car, it’s mine!).

The car was eventually stopped by traffic congestion at Brill Street corner 20th Street, West
Bajac-Bajac, Olongapo City. Gregorio rushed to his car, caught hold of the perpetrator, later
identified as Oligario Turalba y Villegas, and prevented him from escaping. Gregorio instructed
the tricycle driver to immediately call the police.

Police Officer 2 (PO2) George Esmillarin of the Olongapo City Police Station 1 received a call
from a concerned citizen reporting the ongoing pursuit of a carnapped vehicle. PO2 Reychard
Valencia and Senior Police Officer 4 (SPO4) Danilo Cañutal responded to the call and
proceeded to the location. Upon arriving at the scene, they saw concerned citizens pointing to
the Honda CRV with Gregorio holding onto Oligario. The police approached the vehicle, and
SPO4 Cañutal informed Oligario of his constitutional rights. A search conducted by PO2
Valencia revealed that Oligario was carrying a butterfly knife around seven inches long. The
police then brought Oligario and Gregorio to the police station for further investigation.

During the trial, Gregorio testified about the details of the carnapping incident. The prosecution
also presented the police officers who testified on the arrest of Oligario and the events leading
to his apprehension.

In defense, Oligario claimed that he was not of sound mind at the time of the incident due to
psychosis induced by alcohol and methamphetamine use. Dr. Ma. Lourdes Labarcon
Evangelista, a psychiatrist, testified that she had met Oligario on October 24, 2007, at the
Mariveles Mental Hospital, where she assessed him to be suffering from psychosis due to
substance abuse. She recommended medication but noted that she only saw Oligario once, and
he never returned for a follow-up as he was arrested for the carnapping incident.
The Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Olongapo City found Oligario guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of carnapping under Republic Act (RA) No. 6539. The trial court ruled that the prosecution
sufficiently established that Oligario surreptitiously took the vehicle without Gregorio’s consent,
and with intent to gain. The RTC dismissed the insanity defense, finding no clear and convincing
evidence of insanity at the time of the crime. Dr. Evangelista’s testimony was deemed
inconclusive, as she had limited interaction with Oligario and was unable to definitively assess
his mental state. Oligario was sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of imprisonment ranging
from fourteen (14) years and eight (8) months as minimum to seventeen (17) years and four (4)
months as maximum.

On appeal, the Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed the RTC's decision, ruling that the defense failed
to prove that Oligario was insane during the commission of the crime. The CA held that mere
abnormality of mental faculties does not equate to complete deprivation of intelligence
necessary to exculpate Oligario from criminal liability. The CA also noted that the penalty
imposed under RA No. 6539 was correctly applied.

Oligario filed a petition for review on certiorari before the Supreme Court, arguing that the courts
erred in rejecting his insanity defense and requested the consideration of his mental condition
as a mitigating circumstance under Article 13(9) of the Revised Penal Code (RPC).

Issue: WON Oligario's claim of psychosis at the time of the crime constitutes an exempting
circumstance under Article 12(1) of the Revised Penal Code, thus absolving him from criminal
liability

Ruling:
The Supreme Court denied the petition and upheld the conviction of Oligario for carnapping
under RA No. 6539. The Court reiterated that insanity as a defense must be proven with clear
and convincing evidence. Insanity must constitute a complete deprivation of intelligence, and it
must be shown to exist at the time of the commission of the crime. The Court found that Oligario
failed to establish that his mental condition met this standard.

Dr. Evangelista’s testimony was insufficient to prove that Oligario was suffering from psychosis
at the time of the carnapping. Furthermore, the Court noted that no witness testified to any
unusual or bizarre behavior from Oligario immediately before or during the commission of the
crime. Hence, the exempting circumstance of insanity under Article 12 of the RPC did not apply.

Oligario's request to consider his mental condition as a mitigating circumstance under Article
13(9) of the RPC was also denied. The Supreme Court held that the penalties under RA No.
6539, being a special law, are not governed by the mitigating and aggravating circumstances
under the RPC.

The penalty imposed by the RTC and affirmed by the CA was deemed correct under the
provisions of RA No. 6539 and the Indeterminate Sentence Law. Accordingly, the petition was
denied, and Oligario's conviction was affirmed.
 25. People v. Sarcia, G.R. No. 169641, 10 September 2009 [Art. 12 (2 &3)]

Facts:
On 1996, Sarcia allegedly raped AAA, a 5 year old at the time. On 2000, AAA’s father filed a
complaint against Sarcia for acts of lasciviousness. The Office of the Prosecutor at Ligao, Albay
upgraded the charges to rape. At trial, the prosecution presented AAA, AAA’s father, AAA’s
minor cousin, and Dr. Manatlao as oral testifiers. While the defense had Sarcia, who denied the
allegations. On 2003, the RTC found Sarcia GUILTY of rape.

The CA affirmed the decision of the RTC but modified the penalty to DEATH. According to the
testimonies, AAA was playing with her cousin and two other kids in the front yard of Saling
Crisologo’s house when Sarcia arrived and invited AAA to the backyard of the house. AAA
agreed and went with Sarcia. AAA’s cousin followed them and witnessed Sarcia removing AAA’s
shorts and underwear while Sarcia removed his trousers and brief. Then Sarcia made AAA lie
down and there began the consummation of rape. According to the cousin, Sarcia made and up
and down movement (“nagdapadapa tabi”). The cousin rushed to the house of AAA and told
AAA’s mother which disregarded the statement and said that they were too young to talk about
such matters. After Sarcia achieved satisfaction, he made AAA put her clothes back on and left.
The cousin returned and accompanied AAA back home.

When AAA’s mother was helping AAA take a bath, she noticed a grating sensation in AAA’s
private part. AAA underwent a physical examination and it produced a medico-legal certificate
stating that there were no scars and wounds but there was a complete perforation of the hymen
which may mean that it was subjected to a certain trauma or pressure. This may mean a
medical instrument or penis. The defense claimed that the rape charge was only initiated to
make his life miserable and for an earlier murder of Mae Christine Camu charge against him by
Salvacion Bobier, her grandmother, be stronger. AAA’s parents are related to Salvacion.

Issue: WON Sarcia can be considered a minor at the time of the commission of thecrime and
the provisions of R.A. 9344 be applied to his case

Ruling:
YES, Sarcia can be considered a minor at the time of the commission of the crime and the
provisions of R.A. 9344 or the Juvenile Justice and Welfare Act can govern over his case
According to Art. 68 of the RPC, “when the offender is a minor under 18 years, the penalty next
lower than that prescribed by law shall be imposed.” In the facts, on 1996, Sarcia turned 18
years of age and since the trial court was not able to determine the exact date and time of the
offense, all doubts should be resolved to the favor of the accused. Meaning, the offense may
have happened before Sarcia turned 18. The penalty of DEATH is then modified to
RECLUSION PERPETUA.

26. People v. ZZZ, G.R. No. 228828, 24 July 2019 [Art. 12 (2 &3)]

Facts:
On May 16, 1996, around 7:00pm , BBB was on his way to the store to buy cigarettes when he
saw ZZZ dragging AAA by the wrist toward the school. Though it was dark and he was about 10
meters away, he was able to see them using a flashlight he was carrying. Still, he said he
presumed nothing was off, thinking they were relatives. He had merely reprimanded them
before he went on to buy his cigarette and returned home. The following day, news spread that
AAA was missing.BBB went on a search for his niece and informed barangay officials who then
helped to look for her. A couple of days later, the barangay officials and SPO3 Lavarias found a
lifeless AAA in a bamboo grove near the school. BBB said that her niece's naked body had
already blackened due to decomposition. On the same day, he said he found ZZZ in his
house-the last time he had ever seen him. Dr. Mejia, a municipal health officer testified that she
was the physician who conducted the initial autopsy. According to her report, there was a crack
on AAA's temporal skull and a half-inch long laceration below her left labia, while brain matter
leaked above her left ear. The doctor also noted that the body had already been decomposing
when it was found.She testified that the cracked temporal skull may have caused AAA's death.
Dr. Bandonill, the medico-legal officer of NBI testified that he conducted an autopsy on AAA. He
remarked that AAA might have been sexually assaulted. He added that AAA's death could have
been caused by the traumatic cerebral contusion. The victim's father also testified that AAA was
11 years old when she was raped and killed.

For the defense, ZZZ testified that he was 15 years old when the incident happened. He
confirmed that he knew AAA as his cousin, and that both resided in the same barangay. On the
night of May 16, 1996, he said that he went to his grandmother's house, where he watched
television with his brother and around 20 other people including AAA. After watching, he and his
brother, YYY, returned to their sister's house to sleep. He said that he did not notice if AAA left
their grandmother's house. On May 22, 1996, Cansino’s stepfather brought him to Tarlac to
work as a helper in a grocery store, where he used the alias Peter Viray to be employed. He
later found out that he was charged with rape with homicide of AAA. The trial court found that
the circumstantial evidence presented by the prosecution proved ZZZ's guilt beyond reasonable
doubt. It ruled that there was moral certainty that ZZZ perpetrated the crime since he had been
the last person seen with AAA before she disappeared, and he fled and hid his identity when he
learned that he was a suspect. The trial court ruled that the positive identification of ZZZ
prevailed over the defense of denial. It found his alibi that he went home after watching
television did not preclude the possibility that he was at the crime scene. Adopting the report of
the social worker who was assigned to ZZZ, the trial court found that he acted with discernment
in committing the crime against AAA. The Court of Appeal also affirmed RTC’s decision.

Issue: WON the accused-appellant acted with discernment thus preventing him from the
exempting circumstance of minority

Ruling:
In this case, the court found that the accused-appellant, although 15 years old at the time of the
commission of the crime, acted with discernment. Discernment refers to the mental capacity of a
minor to fully appreciate the consequences of his unlawful act. This determination is based on
the totality of the circumstances surrounding the case.

**Legal Framework:**
Republic Act No. 9344 provides that children aged 15 years or under at the time of the
commission of an offense are exempt from criminal liability. However, children above 15 but
below 18 years old may be held criminally liable if they acted with discernment. The law defines
discernment as the ability of the minor to fully understand the nature and consequences of their
unlawful act. If discernment is established, the child is not exempt from criminal liability and will
undergo the appropriate legal proceedings.

**Discernment:**
The concept of discernment involves the mental capacity of the minor to appreciate the
wrongfulness of their actions and foresee the consequences of such acts. Discernment is not
presumed and must be established by evaluating the facts and circumstances of the case.
Courts look at the manner in which the crime was committed, the behavior of the minor before,
during, and after the commission of the offense, and any other relevant evidence that may show
the minor’s awareness of the consequences of their conduct.

**Case Details:**
In this case, the prosecution successfully demonstrated that the accused-appellant acted with
discernment during the commission of the crime of rape with homicide. The trial court and the
Court of Appeals cited several key facts and circumstances that established the
accused-appellant’s mental capacity to understand the gravity of his actions and their
consequences:

1. **Premeditation and Secrecy in Committing the Crime:**

The accused-appellant chose a dark and isolated location to commit the rape, which
demonstrated that he understood the need to conceal his criminal acts. This showed a level of
planning and awareness of the wrongful nature of his conduct. The intentional selection of a
place where he would not easily be discovered by others indicated that he had the mental
capacity to realize the potential consequences of being caught.

2. **Flight and Evasion of Authorities:**

 After learning that he had been identified as the suspect in the crime, the accused-appellant
fled to Tarlac and concealed his identity to avoid capture. This behavior reflected a clear
understanding of his culpability and an attempt to escape the consequences of his actions.
Flight from the scene of a crime is often considered evidence of guilt and awareness of
wrongdoing. In this case, it reinforced the conclusion that the accused-appellant acted with full
knowledge of the gravity of his actions.

3. **Social Worker’s Testimony:**

A social worker assigned to the case testified that the accused-appellant was capable of
understanding the consequences of his actions. The social worker's evaluation indicated that
the accused-appellant had the intellectual capacity and maturity to comprehend the moral and
legal implications of committing rape and homicide.

4. **Physical Evidence of Force:**

The findings of Dr. Bandonill, the medical examiner, showed that the victim, AAA, had
contusions all over her body, and there was a tear in her vaginal area, indicating that the rape
was committed by means of force. This use of force further demonstrated that the
accused-appellant acted intentionally and with the clear objective of committing the crime,
reinforcing the conclusion that he was fully aware of the wrongfulness of his actions.

**Conclusion:**
Based on these facts, the court ruled that the accused-appellant acted with discernment, fully
understanding the consequences of his unlawful actions. The deliberate manner in which the
crime was committed, his subsequent flight to evade arrest, and the findings of the social worker
and medical examiner all pointed to the fact that the accused-appellant had the mental capacity
to appreciate the criminal nature of his actions.

Since discernment was proven, the exemption from criminal liability provided by Republic Act
No. 9344 did not apply in this case. Although the accused-appellant was 15 years old at the
time of the offense, his actions demonstrated a level of understanding sufficient to hold him
criminally liable. As a result, he was convicted of rape with homicide and sentenced accordingly.

The accused-appellant’s age entitled him to the privileged mitigating circumstance of minority,
but this did not exempt him from the penalty. Instead, the court imposed the appropriate penalty,
considering the mitigating circumstance of his youth. Ultimately, the court sentenced him to an
indeterminate penalty of ten years and one day of prision mayor as the minimum, to seventeen
years and four months of reclusion temporal as the maximum.

Thus, the prosecution proved beyond reasonable doubt that the accused-appellant acted with
discernment, justifying his conviction and the imposition of the corresponding penalties.
 27. CICL XXX vs. People, G.R. No. 238798, 14 March 2023 [Art. 12 (2 &3)]

Facts:
The case centers on CICL XXX, who was charged with homicide in connection with the death of
AAA, a minor victim. The events unfolded on October 28, 2003, in La Trinidad, Benguet. Initially
charged with frustrated murder, the charges were later amended to homicide after AAA
succumbed to his injuries on November 26, 2008, following an extended period of
hospitalization where he remained in a vegetative state.

On the night of the assault, CICL XXX and an accomplice confronted AAA at approximately 3:00
A.M. AAA was discovered by his parents outside their home, bloodied and unconscious. After
being brought inside and questioned, AAA revealed to his mother, BBB, that CICL XXX had
struck him, hitting him in the face and eyes. Following the incident, AAA began to exhibit
symptoms of severe head trauma, including dizziness, which prompted his family to seek
medical attention. On October 29, 2003, he was taken to Benguet General Hospital, where a CT
scan revealed massive cerebral contusions and bleeding, indicating severe brain damage.

Medical staff, including Dr. Romeo Concepcion, noted that AAA had multiple abrasions on his
head, face, and shoulders and was blind in one eye. His condition deteriorated over the
following days, and by October 31, AAA had lost the ability to speak. He was later transferred to
Baguio General Hospital, where he remained hospitalized until his discharge on January 27,
2004. Despite being discharged, AAA's health continued to decline until his death in 2008,
which was attributed to metabolic encephalopathy resulting from the blunt force trauma inflicted
during the assault.

Throughout the trial, the prosecution presented several witnesses, including AAA's family
members and medical professionals, who testified about the assault and its aftermath. The
prosecution established a direct link between CICL XXX's actions and AAA's death. Notably,
AAA's older sister, CCC, testified that AAA had identified CICL XXX as his assailant shortly
before he lost the ability to communicate.

In his defense, CICL XXX denied the allegations, claiming that he was at a different location,
drinking with friends on the night of the assault. He provided an alibi stating that he was at a
computer shop until early the following morning, but this was dismissed by the RTC as weak
and unsubstantiated.
On February 28, 2014, the RTC found CICL XXX guilty of homicide, sentencing him to a prison
term of eight years and one day, along with a financial restitution order to AAA's family, including
actual damages, civil indemnity, and temperate damages. The RTC based its decision partly on
AAA's statement identifying CICL XXX as the attacker, which was deemed part of the res
gestae.

Dissatisfied with the RTC’s decision, CICL XXX appealed to the CA, arguing that the proximate
cause of AAA's death was the failure of his parents to provide immediate medical attention
rather than the assault itself. However, the CA upheld the RTC's ruling, affirming that the
prosecution had sufficiently established that CICL XXX’s actions led to AAA's severe injuries
and eventual death. The CA recognized the mitigating circumstance of minority, modifying CICL
XXX's sentence to an indeterminate penalty of six months and one day to eight years and one
day, consistent with the provisions of the Juvenile Justice and Welfare Act. The CA also
mandated that CICL XXX be placed under appropriate juvenile disposition in light of his age and
the circumstances surrounding the case.

Issue: Whether or not the accused acted with discernment

Ruling:
Yes, the Court ruled the accused acted with discernemnt. In determining whether the accused
acted with discernment, the court evaluated various factors as mandated by Republic Act (RA)
9344, as amended by RA 10630. According to Section 22 of the law, a social worker conducts
an initial assessment to preliminarily determine discernment, but ultimately, the court retains the
final authority on this matter. Discernment is defined as the ability to distinguish between right
and wrong, and the court is expected to consider testimonies from social workers and child
psychologists as evidence in its determination. In the present case, although there was no
preliminary assessment conducted by a social worker, the court was still able to arrive at its
findings regarding discernment based on the facts presented.

The totality of the circumstances indicates that the accused, identified as CICL XXX, acted with
discernment in committing the crime. The brutal nature of the attack, which resulted in severe
injuries to the victim, suggests that CICL XXX was aware that his actions were wrong and could
lead to serious consequences. The attack occurred at a calculated time and place, indicating
premeditation, and the accused’s actions demonstrated a level of cunning, as he and an
accomplice waited for the victim to return home. Furthermore, CICL XXX's previous involvement
in a legal matter, where the victim testified against him, reflects a motive rooted in retaliation,
further emphasizing his awareness of the potential implications of his actions.

CICL XXX's own admissions reveal a consciousness of wrongdoing; he testified about dropping
out of school out of fear following the incident, acknowledging the gravity of the situation and the
advice given to him to refrain from engaging in further violence. Additionally, his status as a
second-year nursing student at the time of the incident signifies an educational level that likely
contributed to his understanding of the moral and legal consequences of his conduct.
Ultimately, the court ruled that CICL XXX, being 17 years old at the time of the offense, acted
with discernment when he violently assaulted the victim. The ruling concluded that his actions
reflected a clear understanding of the wrongfulness of his conduct and its potential for grave
consequences, establishing his criminal liability for the act committed.

In assessing the circumstances surrounding the case involving CICL XXX and the determination of whether
he acted with discernment, several critical details emerged:

1. **Timing and Setting of the Attack**: The incident occurred on **October 28, 2003**, at around **3:00
A.M.**, which is significant as it indicates a calculated decision by CICL XXX and his accomplice to attack
the victim under the cover of darkness. This timing suggests an element of premeditation, as they waited for
the victim to return home.

2. **Nature of the Assault**: The assault was brutal and resulted in severe injuries to the victim, identified as
AAA. Upon arriving at the scene, AAA's mother heard her child crying out for her and found him lying in front
of their gate, bloodied and in distress. AAA later described how CICL XXX had struck him in the eyes.
Medical examinations revealed that AAA suffered **severe brain damage** and multiple injuries, including
massive cerebral contusions and bleeding, which were serious enough to lead to his eventual death on
**November 26, 2008**, after five years of being bedridden in a vegetative state.

3. **Victim’s Testimony**: The victim was able to communicate details of the incident shortly after it occurred,
indicating that he recognized CICL XXX and was aware of the events leading to his injuries. This testimony
is crucial as it reflects the victim’s ability to discern the nature of the attack and identify the aggressor.

4. **CICL XXX’s Actions Post-Attack**: After the assault, CICL XXX and his accomplice fled the scene
before any witnesses could identify them. This act of escaping immediately after committing the crime
suggests an awareness of wrongdoing and the potential consequences of their actions.

5. **Prior Conflict**: The prosecution highlighted that the attack was likely a retaliatory measure. A day
before the assault, AAA testified against CICL XXX in a barangay hearing regarding a separate mauling
incident. This context indicates a motive rooted in a desire for revenge, as CICL XXX was aware of the
victim’s role as a witness.

6. **CICL XXX’s Personal Circumstances**: CICL XXX was a **17-year-old** second-year nursing student at
the time of the incident. His educational background suggests he had the capacity to understand the moral
implications of his actions. His subsequent decision to drop out of school and flee to his home in Sagada,
motivated by fear of repercussions, further demonstrated his awareness of the consequences of his
conduct.

7. **Advice from Guardians**: Testimony indicated that CICL XXX had been advised by his guardian during
a prior settlement conference regarding another incident to avoid any further acts of violence and focus on
his studies. This guidance underscores that he had been made aware of the seriousness of his actions and
the societal expectation to refrain from violence.

8. **Expert Testimonies**: Medical experts, including Dr. Romeo Concepcion and Dr. Manuel Kelly, Jr.,
provided evidence regarding the severity of the injuries inflicted on AAA. Their testimony reinforced the
notion that the injuries were not only serious but also indicative of intent to cause significant harm.

In conclusion, the circumstances surrounding the attack illustrate that CICL XXX acted with discernment.
The combination of the premeditated nature of the assault, the victim's subsequent testimony, the intent
behind the attack, and CICL XXX's understanding of his actions collectively support the determination that
he was aware of the moral and legal implications of his conduct, thereby establishing his criminal liability.
 28. People vs. Leocardo, G.R. No. 227396, 22 February 2023 [Art. 12 (4)]

Facts:
On March 26, 2002, at approximately 3:00 p.m., spouses BBB227396 and CCC227396, who
operated a small rice cake business, tasked their eldest daughter, 12-year-old AAA227396,
along with her younger siblings, to collect payment from their neighbor, accused-appellant Milo
Leocadio y Labrador (Milo). After a brief period, the younger siblings returned home, but
AAA227396 did not. Concerned by her prolonged absence, BBB227396 and CCC227396
searched the neighborhood for their daughter but were unable to locate her. The family began to
panic as night fell, and despite their efforts, they could not find any leads regarding
AAA227396's whereabouts.

The following morning, March 27, 2002, the distraught parents reported their daughter missing
to the local police. They provided a detailed description of AAA227396, along with her last
known whereabouts, which included her visit to Milo's house. Tragically, later that day, they
received a call from the police informing them that AAA227396's body had been discovered in
Milo's home.

Upon arriving at the scene, BBB227396 and CCC227396 were led to a small, dimly lit room
where their daughter’s lifeless body lay beneath a wooden bed. The parents immediately
noticed that AAA227396's mouth and nose were covered with a cloth, and her hands were tied
with a piece of string. Distressed, they identified her remains and were overwhelmed with grief.
The autopsy, performed shortly after the discovery, revealed that AAA227396 had died from
asphyxia due to suffocation, corroborated by the presence of multiple contusions, abrasions,
and signs of a violent struggle on her body. These injuries suggested that she had fought
against her attacker.

During the subsequent investigation, police apprehended Milo, who initially denied any
involvement. However, as the evidence mounted, he admitted to killing AAA227396. In his
statement, Milo claimed that he had been asleep and was startled awake by AAA227396, who
had touched him. He stated that in a moment of shock, he struck her, leading to her accidental
death. He insisted that he did not intend to kill her nor did he engage in any sexual acts.

Despite his confession regarding the killing, Milo firmly denied the charge of rape. The
prosecution argued that the circumstances surrounding the case, including the autopsy findings,
the manner in which AAA227396's body was discovered, and the lack of a reasonable
explanation for her injuries, pointed unequivocally to a deliberate and violent act. They
emphasized that Milo had a motive and opportunity to commit the crime, given that he was the
last person seen with AAA227396.

As the trial unfolded, the prosecution presented substantial evidence, including witness
testimonies and forensic findings, establishing a clear narrative of the events leading up to
AAA227396's tragic death. The investigation revealed Milo's previous inappropriate behavior
toward children, raising concerns about his character and intentions.

The case garnered significant media attention, highlighting the vulnerability of children and the
community's demand for justice. It became a poignant reminder of the dangers faced by young
individuals in their neighborhoods and the necessity of protecting them from predatory
individuals.

Issue: WON Milo's claim that he accidentally caused the death of AAA227396 absolves him of
criminal liability for the acts constituting rape with homicide.

Ruling:
The Supreme Court dismissed Milo's appeal, affirming the conviction for the complex crime of
rape with homicide. The Court emphasized that the prosecution established beyond a
reasonable doubt the essential elements of both crimes. Milo's argument of accidental killing
was found to be unconvincing. The Court highlighted that the Revised Penal Code provides that
a person may be exempted from criminal liability for injuries caused by accident only if certain
conditions are met: the act must be lawful, performed with due care, and cause injury without
fault or intention. Here, Milo's actions—striking AAA227396—were unlawful, constituting at least
physical injury, thus negating the applicability of the accident defense.

The Court noted the extensive evidence against Milo, including the autopsy report that
documented numerous injuries and asphyxia consistent with suffocation. The injuries indicated
that he had control over AAA227396 and intended to silence her, implying intent to kill rather
than mere negligence. The nature of the injuries and the circumstances surrounding her
death—found with her hands tied and mouth covered—contradicted Milo's claim of an
accidental act. The Court stressed that accident as an exempting circumstance requires a
complete absence of intent and negligence, which was not present in Milo's case. The
prosecution's circumstantial evidence formed a solid and unbroken chain leading to the
conclusion of Milo's guilt, demonstrating that he was the last person with AAA227396 and had
committed both rape and homicide.

Ultimately, the Court reaffirmed the penalties imposed by the Regional Trial Court, sentencing
Milo to reclusion perpetua without eligibility for parole. It also modified the civil damages
awarded to the victim's heirs, increasing moral and exemplary damages to PHP 100,000 each
and granting PHP 50,000 as temperate damages, with all awards accruing legal interest. The
ruling underscored the gravity of the crime and the Court's commitment to delivering justice for
heinous acts, particularly those against vulnerable victims.
 29. Ty vs. People, G.R. No. 149275, 27 September 2004 [Art. 12 (6)]

Facts:
Vicky Ty's mother Chua Lao So Un was confined at the Manila Doctors' Hospital (hospital) from
30 October 1990 until 4 June 1992. Being the patient's daughter, Ty signed the
"Acknowledgment of Responsibility for Payment" in the Contract of Admission dated 30 October
1990.6 As of 4 June 1992, the Statement of Account7 shows the total liability of the mother in
the amount of P657,182.40. Ty's sister, Judy Chua, was also confined at the hospital from 13
May 1991 until 2 May 1992, incurring hospital bills in the amount of P418,410.55.8 The total
hospital bills of the two patients amounted to P1,075,592.95. On 5 June 1992, Ty executed a
promissory note wherein she assumed payment of the obligation in installments. To assure
payment of the obligation, she drew several postdated checks against Metrobank payable to the
hospital. The seven (7) checks, each covering the amount of P30,000.00, were all deposited on
their due dates. But they were all dishonored by the drawee bank and returned unpaid to the
hospital due to insufficiency of funds, with the "Account Closed" advice. Soon thereafter, the
complainant hospital sent demand letters to Ty by registered mail. As the demand letters were
not heeded, complainant filed the seven (7) Informations subject of the instant case.

ARGUMENT OF THE PETITIONER

For her defense, Ty claimed that she issued the checks because of "an uncontrollable fear of a
greater injury." She averred that she was forced to issue the checks to obtain release for her
mother whom the hospital inhumanely and harshly treated and would not discharge unless the
hospital bills are paid. She alleged that her mother was deprived of room facilities, such as the
air-condition unit, refrigerator and television set, and subject to inconveniences such as the
cutting off of the telephone line, late delivery of her mother's food and refusal to change the
latter's gown and bedsheets. She also bewailed the hospital's suspending medical treatment of
her mother. The "debasing treatment," she pointed out, so affected her mother's mental,
psychological and physical health that the latter contemplated suicide if she would not be
discharged from the hospital. Fearing the worst for her mother, and to comply with the demands
of the hospital, Ty was compelled to sign a promissory note, open an account with Metrobank
and issue the checks to effect her mother's immediate discharge. In its Decision dated 31 July
2001, the appellate court affirmed the judgment of the trial court with modification. It set aside
the penalty of imprisonment and instead sentenced Ty "to pay a fine of sixty thousand pesos
(P60,000.00) equivalent to double the amount of the check, in each case."

LOWER COURT RULINGS

RTC- On 21 April 1997, the trial court rendered a Decision finding Ty guilty of seven (7) counts
of violation of B.P. 22 and sentencing her to a prison term. Consequently, the accused Vicky C.
Ty, for her acts of issuing seven (7) checks in payment of a valid obligation, which turned
unfounded on their respective dates of maturity, is found guilty of seven (7) counts of violations
of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22, and is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of imprisonment of
SIX MONTHS per count or a total of forty two (42) months.

CA- In its assailed Decision, the Court of Appeals rejected Ty's defenses of involuntariness in
the issuance of the checks and the hospital's knowledge of her checking account's lack of funds.
It held that B.P. 22 makes the mere act of issuing a worthless check punishable as a special
offense, it being a malum prohibitum. What the law punishes is the issuance of a bouncing
check and not the purpose for which it was issued nor the terms and conditions relating to its
issuance. Neither was the Court of Appeals convinced that there was no valuable consideration
for the issuance of the checks as they were issued in payment of the hospital bills of Ty's
mother. In sentencing Ty to pay a fine instead of a prison term, the appellate court applied the
case of Vaca v. Court of Appeals wherein this Court declared that in determining the penalty
imposed for violation of B.P. 22, the philosophy underlying the Indeterminate Sentence Law
should be observed, i.e., redeeming valuable human material and preventing unnecessary
deprivation of personal liberty and economic usefulness, with due regard to the protection of the
social order.

Issue: WON the defense of uncontrollable fear is tenable to warrant her exemption from criminal
liability

Ruling:
The petition is without merit. For this exempting circumstance to be invoked successfully, the
following requisites must concur: (1) existence of an uncontrollable fear; (2) the fear must be
real and imminent; and (3) the fear of an injury is greater than or at least equal to that
committed. It must appear that the threat that caused the uncontrollable fear is of such gravity
and imminence that the ordinary man would have succumbed to it. It should be based on a real,
imminent or reasonable fear for ones life or limb.

A mere threat of a future injury is not enough. It should not be speculative, fanciful, or remote. A
person invoking uncontrollable fear must show therefore that the compulsion was such that it
reduced him to a mere instrument acting not only without will but against his will as well. It must
be of such character as to leave no opportunity to the accused for escape. In this case, far from
it, the fear, if any, harbored by Ty was not real and imminent. Ty claims that she was compelled
to issue the checksa condition the hospital allegedly demanded of her before her mother could
be discharged for fear that her mothers health might deteriorate further due to the inhumane
treatment of the hospital or worse, her mother might commit suicide. This is speculative fear; it
is not the uncontrollable fear contemplated by law. To begin with, there was no showing that the
mothers illness was so life threatening such that her continued stay in the hospital suffering all
its alleged unethical treatment would induce a well-grounded apprehension of her death.
Secondly, it is not the law’s intent to say that any fear exempts one from criminal liability much
less petitioners flimsy fear that her mother might commit suicide. In other words, the fear she
invokes was not impending or insuperable as to deprive her of all volition and to make her a
mere instrument without will, moved exclusively by the hospitals threats or demands. Ty has
also failed to convince the Court that she was left with no choice but to commit a crime. She did
not take advantage of the many opportunities available to her to avoid committing one. By her
very own words, she admitted that the collateral or security the hospital required prior to the
discharge of her mother may be in the form of postdated checks or jewelry. And if indeed she
was coerced to open an account with the bank and issue the checks, she had all the opportunity
to leave the scene to avoid involvement.

Moreover, petitioner had sufficient knowledge that the issuance of checks without funds may
result in a violation of B.P. 22. At any rate, the law punishes the mere act of issuing a bouncing
check, not the purpose for which it was issued nor the terms and conditions relating to its
issuance. B.P. 22 does not make any distinction as to whether the checks within its
contemplation are issued in payment of an obligation or to merely guarantee the obligation. The
thrust of the law is to prohibit the making of worthless checks and putting them into circulation.
As this Court held in Lim v. People of the Philippines, "what is primordial is that such issued
checks were worthless and the fact of its worthlessness is known to the appellant at the time of
their issuance, a required element under B.P. Blg. 22."

The law itself creates a prima facie presumption of knowledge of insufficiency of funds.

Section 2 of B.P. 22 provides: Section 2. Evidence of knowledge of insufficient funds. -

The making, drawing and issuance of a check payment of which is refused by the
drawee bank because of insufficient funds in or credit with such bank, when presented
within ninety (90) days from the date of the check, shall be prima facie evidence of
knowledge of such insufficiency of funds or credit unless such maker or drawer pays the
holder thereof the amount due thereon, or makes arrangements for payment in full by
the drawee of such check within five (5) banking days after receiving notice that such
check has not been paid by the drawee.

Such knowledge is legally presumed from the dishonor of the checks for insufficiency of funds. If
not rebutted, it suffices to sustain a conviction. The instant Petition is DENIED and the assailed
Decision of the Court of Appeals, dated 31 July 2001, finding petitioner Vicky C. Ty GUILTY of
violating Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS.
 30. People vs. Labuguen, G.R. No. 223103, 24 February 2020

Facts:
On January 3, 2002, at approximately 7:30 PM, the Padre family was having dinner at their
residence in Villaruz, Delfin Albano, Isabela. The family comprised Manuel Padre, his wife
Nenita, and their two daughters, Rhoda and Rachel. The tranquility of their evening was
abruptly shattered when five armed men, including the appellants Florentino Labuguen and
Romeo Zuniga, forcibly entered their home. One assailant was armed with a firearm, while
another wore a bonnet with only eye openings, making their identities partially concealed.

As the home invasion unfolded, Labuguen seized Rachel, dragging her into the comfort room,
where her mother Nenita and sister Rhoda were similarly apprehended by Macalinao and
another unidentified man. Meanwhile, Manuel was taken to their store by an unidentified
assailant. The intruders exhibited violent behavior, with Labuguen stabbing Rachel in the chest
and Macalinao striking her on the head with the butt of a firearm, rendering her unconscious. In
a desperate attempt to survive, Rachel pretended to be dead, leading to her eventual escape
once the intruders left.

In the store, Nenita faced severe violence as Zuniga, following the instructions of a leader
identified as Joel Albano, struck her in the abdomen. The situation escalated with Macalinao
shooting Rhoda when she attempted to flee. Tragically, the attack resulted in the deaths of
Manuel, Nenita, and Rhoda, whose bodies were later found in various locations: Manuel near
the store, Nenita inside the store, and Rhoda inside the house.

Rachel survived the assault, albeit with serious injuries, including stab wounds and abrasions.
She was later treated in the hospital, where she learned of her family's devastating fate. During
her recovery, Rachel provided crucial testimony, initially withholding Zuniga’s name but later
identifying him and Labuguen as participants in the brutal crime.

Following the incident, law enforcement swiftly commenced an investigation. On January 4,

2002, police officers visited Rachel in the hospital to gather information about the attackers. Her
identification of Labuguen as a longtime neighbor and Macalinao as a former helper aided the
police in apprehending Labuguen later that day. Forensic analysis of a blood-stained jacket
Labuguen wore during the robbery confirmed the presence of human blood.

Zuniga remained at large until his arrest in 2006 in Gerona, Tarlac, where he eventually
confessed his involvement in the crime to the authorities. His testimony revealed the
premeditated nature of the robbery, where he and his accomplices had met beforehand to plan
the violent takeover of the Padre household.

The Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Cabagan, Isabela, found both Labuguen and Zuniga guilty of
Robbery with Homicide and imposed the penalty of reclusion perpetua, along with various civil
damages to the surviving victim, Rachel Padre. The Court of Appeals (CA) later affirmed the
RTC’s decision with modifications regarding the damages awarded to Rachel.

Issue:
WON Zuniga, could invoke the exempting circumstance of "irresistible force and/or
uncontrollable fear of an equal or greater injury" to absolve them of criminal liability.

Ruling:
The Supreme Court upheld the decisions of both the RTC and CA, rejecting Zuniga's claim of
being compelled to commit the crime due to fear. For the exempting circumstance to apply,
three conditions must be met: (1) the existence of an uncontrollable fear, (2) that this fear must
be real and imminent, and (3) the fear of injury must be greater than or at least equal to the
injury committed.

Zuñiga posits that he "was compelled or forced at gun point by Joel Albano (Albano) to join
them in robbing the house of Manuel Padre, and if he will resist, something bad will happen to
him and his family." The Court noted that Zuniga was not under duress during the commission
of the crime as he actively participated in the robbery and the subsequent violence. His failure to
escape during their approach to the Padre residence further undermined his claim of fear. The
planning and execution of the crime indicated that he was not acting under any immediate threat
but was instead a willing participant.

The Court also addressed Zuniga's argument regarding the credibility of Rachel's identification,
concluding that her initial hesitation to name Zuniga was understandable given the traumatic
circumstances she endured. The identification process was deemed reliable, as Rachel
ultimately named the assailants when she felt safe.

The elements of robbery with homicide were satisfied, as the robbery was the central purpose of
the crime and the homicides were incidental to the execution of that purpose. Therefore, the
Court found both appellants guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the charges.

The appeal was dismissed, and the CA's ruling was affirmed with modifications to the damages
awarded. The Court reiterated that the crime was committed with the use of unlicensed firearms
and by a band, warranting the severe penalties under the law. The case illustrates the stringent
requirements for establishing exempting circumstances in criminal liability and the importance of
credible eyewitness testimony in securing convictions for serious offenses.