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Question Three: Ideas
Primo an sint ideae in Deo.
Secundo an sit ponere plures ideas. Are there ideas in God?
Tertio an pertineant ad cognitionem 1. Are there many ideas?
speculativam. 2. Do ideas belong to speculative or only to practical
Quarto an malum habeat ideam. 3. knowledge?
Quinto an materia prima habeat ideam. 4. Is there in God an idea of evil?
Sexto an in Deo sit idea eorum quae 5. Is there in God an idea of first matter?
non sunt nec erunt nec fuerunt. 6. Are there ideas in God of those things which do not
Septimo an accidentia habeant ideam in 7. exist, will not exist, and have not existed?
Deo. 8. Are there in God ideas of accidents?
Octavo an singularia habeant ideam in Are there in God ideas of singulars?
Deo.

ARTICLE I

Ideas are the object of our inquiry,

and in the first article we ask:
Are there ideas in God?

[ARTICLE S.T., I, 151 1; 44, 3; I Sent., 36, 2, 1; I Metaph., lect. 15, nn. 232-33.]

Quaestio est de ideis. Difficulties

Et videtur quod non. It seems that there are no ideas in Him, for

Quia scientia Dei est perfectissima. Sed 1. God’s knowledge is most perfect. Now,
perfectior est cognitio quae habetur de re knowledge had from the essence of a thing
per essentiam eius, quam quae habetur per is more perfect than knowledge had from its
eius similitudinem. Ergo Deus non likeness. Consequently, God knows things,
cognoscit res per suas similitudines, sed not by means of their likenesses, but by
magis per essentias earum; et ita means of their essences. Hence, those
similitudines rerum, quae ideae dicuntur, likenesses of things which are called ideas
non sunt in Deo. do not exist in God.

Sed dicebat, quod Deus scit res perfectius 2. But it was said that God knows things
cognoscens eas per essentiam suam, quae more perfectly by knowing them through
est similitudo rerum, quam si cognosceret His essence, which is a likeness of things,
res per earum essentias.- Sed contra, than He would if He knew them through
scientia est assimilatio ad scitum. Ergo their own essences.—On the contrary,
quanto medium cognoscendi est magis knowledge is an assimilation to the thing
simile et unitum rei cognitae, tanto known. Hence, the more the medium of
perfectius res per id cognoscitur. Sed knowing resembles and is united with the
essentia rerum creatarum magis est unita thing known, the more perfectly is the thing
eis quam essentia divina. Ergo perfectius known by means of that medium. But the
cognosceret res si sciret res per essentias essence of created things is more united with
earum, quam ex hoc quod scit eas per things than the divine essence is.
essentiam suam. Consequently, God would know things more
perfectly if He knew them by means of their
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does by knowing them
through His own essence.

Sed dicebat, quod perfectio scientiae non 3. But it was said that the perfection of
consistit in unione medii cognoscendi ad knowledge consists in the union of the
rem cognitam, sed magis ad medium of knowledge with the knower, not
cognoscentem.- Sed contra, species rei with the thing known.—On the contrary, the
quae est in intellectu, secundum quod habet species of a thing, which is in the intellect, is
esse in eo, est particulata; secundum autem rendered individual by the act of existence it
quod comparatur ad scitum, habet rationem has in the intellect; but in relation to the
universalis, quia est similitudo rei thing known it has the character of a
secundum naturam communem, et non universal, since it is a likeness of the thing
secundum conditiones particulares; et according to its common nature and not
tamen cognitio quae est per illam speciem, according to its particular conditions. Yet the
non est singularis, sed universalis. Ergo knowledge which is made possible by means
cognitio magis sequitur relationem speciei of that species is not singular but universal.
ad rem scitam quam ad scientem. Hence, knowledge follows the relation of
the species to the thing known rather than its
relation to the knower.

Praeterea, propter hoc improbatur a 4. The Philosopher criticizes Plato’s theory

philosopho opinio Platonis quam habuit de of ideas because the latter asserted that the
ideis, quia posuit formas rerum materialium forms of material things existed without
existere sine materia. Sed multo magis sunt matter. Now, these forms would exist
sine materia si sunt in intellectu divino, without matter to a much greater extent were
quam si essent extra ipsum, quia intellectus they in the divine intellect instead of being
divinus est in summo immaterialitatis. Ergo outside of it, because the divine intellect is
etiam multo magis inconveniens est ponere the acme of immateriality. Therefore, it is
ideas in intellectu divino. much more inconsistent to say that ideas
exist in the divine intellect.

Praeterea, philosophus improbat opinionem 5. The Philosopher criticizes Plato’s theory

Platonis de ideis per hoc quod ideae positae of ideas because the ideas he posited can
a Platone non possunt generare nec neither generate nor be generated, and hence
generari, et ita sunt inutiles. Sed ideae, si are useless. But, if the ideas are said to be in
ponantur in mente divina, non generantur, the divine mind, they also will not be
quia omne generatum est compositum; generated—because whatever is generated is
similiter nec generant, quia, cum generata composite—nor will they generate, for,
sint composita, et generantia sint similia since whatever is generated is composite and
generatis, oportet etiam generantia esse whatever generates resembles what is
composita. Ergo inconveniens est ponere generated, that which generates must also be
ideas etiam in mente divina. composite. Hence, it would be inconsistent
to say that there are ideas in the divine mind.

Item, Dionysius dicit, in VII cap. de divinis 6. Dionysius says that God knows existing
nominibus, quod Deus noscit existentia ex things by means of the non-existing, and that
non existentibus, et non cognoscit res He does not know them by means of ideas.
secundum ideam. Sed ideae non ponuntur But the only reason for affirming the
ad aliud in Deo, nisi ut per eas existence of ideas in God is so He can know
cognoscantur res. Ergo ideae non sunt in things by their means. Hence, ideas do not
mente Dei. exist in God’s mind.

Praeterea, omne exemplatum est 7. Whatever has been modeled upon an.
proportionatum suo exemplari. Sed nulla archetype is proportionate to it. But there is
est proportio creaturae ad Deum, sicut nec no proportion of a creature with God, just as
finiti ad infinitum. Ergo in Deo non potest there is no proportion between what is finite
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is infinite. Therefore, in God
there
ideae sint formae exemplares, videtur quod cannot be any archetypes of creatures;
non sint ideae rerum in Deo. consequently, since ideas are exemplary
forms, it seems that ideas of things do not
exist in God.

Praeterea, idea est regula cognoscendi et 8. Ideas are the rule of knowledge and
operandi. Sed illud quod non potest action. But that which cannot err in its
deficere in cognoscendo vel operando, ad knowledge or action does not need a rule for
neutrum regula indiget. Cum igitur Deus sit either; and, since God is this kind of being,
huiusmodi. Videtur quod non oporteat it seems out of place to say that there are
ponere ideas in eo. ideas in him.

Praeterea, sicut unum in quantitate facit 9. We read in the Metaphysics that just as
aequalitatem, ita unum in qualitate facit being one in quantity causes equality, so
similitudinem, ut dicitur in V Metaphys. being one in quality causes resemblance.
Sed propter diversitatem quae est inter Now, because of the difference between God
Deum et creaturam, creatura nullo modo and a creature, a creature can in no way be
Deo potest esse aequalis, vel e converso; said to be equal to God, nor can God be said
ergo nec in Deo est aliqua similitudo ad to be equal to a creature. Therefore, there is
creaturam. Cum ergo idea nominet nothing in God that resembles a creature.
similitudinem rei, videtur quod rerum ideae Consequently, since idea means a likeness
non sint in Deo. of a thing, it seems that there are no ideas of
things in God.

Praeterea, si ideae sunt in Deo, hoc non erit 10. If ideas are in God, they are there only
nisi ad producendum creaturas. Sed for the production of creatures. But Anselm
Anselmus dicit in Monolog.: satis says: “It is sufficiently clear that in the
manifestum est in verbo, per quod facta Word, through which all things have been
sunt omnia, similitudines rerum non esse, made, likenesses of things do not exist. Only
sed veram et simplicem essentiam. Ergo the one simple essence is present.”
videtur quod ideae, quae dicuntur rerum Therefore, it seems that ideas, which are
similitudines, in Deo non sunt. called the likenesses of things, do not exist
in God.

Praeterea, Deus eodem modo cognoscit se 11. God knows Himself in the same way in
et alia; alias sua scientia multiplex et which He knows other things; otherwise,
divisibilis esset. Sed Deus seipsum non His knowledge would be multiple and
cognoscit per ideam. Ergo nec alia. divisible. Now, God does not know Himself
by means of an idea. Therefore, He does not
know other things by means of ideas.

Sed contra. To the Contrary

Augustinus dicit in libro de civitate Dei: 1. Augustine says: “Whoever denies that
qui negat ideas esse, infidelis est, quia there are ideas is an infidel, since he denies
negat filium esse. Ergo, et cetera. the existence of the Son.” Therefore.
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Praeterea, omne agens per intellectum 2. Every intellectual agent possesses within
habet rationem sui operis apud se, nisi himself a plan of his work; otherwise, he
ignoret quid agat. Sed Deus est agens per would not know what he was doing. But
intellectum, et non ignorans hoc quod agit. God acts through His intellect, and He is not
Ergo apud ipsum sunt rationes rerum quae ignorant of what He is doing. Therefore,
ideae dicuntur. there exist within Him intelligible characters
of things, and these are called ideas.

Praeterea, sicut dicitur in II physicorum, 3. As is said in the Physics: “The three

tres causae incidunt in unam: scilicet causes, namely, the efficient, final, and
efficiens, finalis et formalis. Sed Deus est formal causes, are ultimately
causa efficiens et finalis rerum. Ergo etiam identical.”Now, God is the efficient and final
est causa formalis exemplaris; non enim cause of things. Hence, He is also their
potest esse forma quae sit pars rei, et sic formal cause —but as an exemplary cause,
idem quod prius. since He cannot be a form that is part of a
creature. We conclude as before.

Praeterea, effectus particularis non 4. A particular effect is not produced by a

producitur a causa universali, nisi causa universal cause unless the universal cause is
universalis sit propria vel appropriata. Sed proper or appropriated. Now, all particular
omnes particulares effectus sunt a Deo, qui effects are from God, who is the universal
est causa universalis omnium. Ergo oportet cause of all things. Hence, they should come
quod sint ab eo secundum quod est causa from Him in so far as He is the proper or
propria uniuscuiusque, vel appropriata. Sed appropriated cause of each and every one of
hoc non potest esse nisi per rationes rerum them. But this would not be possible unless
proprias in ipso existentes. Ergo oportet in the intelligible characters of things existed in
eo rationes rerum, id est ideas, existere. Him. Hence, the intelligible characters of
things, that is, ideas, must exist in Him.

Praeterea, Augustinus dicit in Lib. de 5. Augustine says: “I regret that I said that
ordine: piget me dixisse, duos esse there are two worlds, one the object of
mundos: scilicet sensibilem, et sense, the other the object of intellect—not
intelligibilem, non quin hoc verum sit; sed because this is not true, but because I said it
quia hoc dixi tamquam ex me, cum tamen a as though it were an original idea, when in
philosophis dictum fuerit; et quia modus fact it had been previously pointed out by
iste loquendi non est consuetus in sacra philosophers, and because this manner of
Scriptura. Sed mundus intelligibilis nihil speaking is not usual in Holy Scripture.
aliud est quam idea mundi. Ergo verum est Now, the intelligible world is nothing other
ponere ideas. than the idea of the world. Hence, it is true
that there are ideas.

Praeterea, Boetius dicit in III de 6. Speaking to God, Boethius says: “You

consolatione loquens ad Deum: tu cuncta have drawn all things from the highest
superno ducis ab exemplo, mundum mente pattern, having in your mind the glorious
gerens pulchrum pulcherrimus ipse. Ergo world—you, the most glorious of all.”
mundi, et omnium quae in eo sunt, est Therefore, the pattern of the world, and of
exemplar in Deo; et sic idem quod prius. all that is in the world, is in God; and our
conclusion is the same as before.

Praeterea, Ioann. I, 3, dicitur: quod factum 7. In the Gospel according to John (1:3-4),
est, in ipso vita erat; hoc, quia, ut we read: “What was made in him was life...”
Augustinus dicit, omnes creaturae sunt in This means, as Augustine says,”, that all
mente divina, sicut arca in mente artificis. creatures are in the divine mind as a piece of
Sed arca in mente artificis est per suam furniture is in the mind of a cabinetmaker.
Now, a piece of furniture is in the mind of a
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means of its idea and
rerum ideae sunt in Deo. likeness. Therefore, ideas of all things are in
God.

Praeterea, speculum non ducit in 8. A mirror does not lead us to the

cognitionem aliquorum, nisi eorum knowledge of things unless their likenesses
similitudines in eo resplendeant. Sed are reflected in it. Now, the uncreated Word
verbum increatum est speculum ducens in is a mirror that leads to the knowledge of all
cognitionem omnium creatorum, quia eo creatures, because by the Word the Father
pater se et omnia alia dicit. Ergo in eo sunt utters Himself and all other things.
similitudines rerum omnium. Therefore, likenesses of all things are in the
Word.

Praeterea, Augustinus dicit in VI de 9. Augustine says: “The Son is the Father’s

Trinitate, quod filius est ars patris plena art, containing the living forms of all
omnium rationum viventium. Sed rationes things.” Now, those forms are nothing other
illae nihil aliud sunt quam ideae. Ergo, than ideas. Therefore, ideas exist in God.
ideae sunt in Deo.

Praeterea, secundum Augustinum, duplex 10. Augustine says that there are two ways
est modus cognoscendi res; scilicet per of knowing things: through an essence and
essentiam, et per similitudinem. Sed Deus through a likeness. Now, God does not know
non cognoscit res per earum essentiam, things by means of their essence, because
quia sic cognoscuntur solum illa quae sunt only those things which are present in the
in cognoscente per sui essentiam. Ergo, knower are known in this manner.
cum scientiam de rebus habeat, ut ex Therefore, since He does know things, as is
praedictis, patet, relinquitur quod sciat res clear from what has been said previously, He
per earum similitudines; et sic idem quod must know them by means of their
prius. likenesses. Hence, our conclusion is the
same as before.

REPLY

Responsio. Dicendum, quod, sicut dicit As Augustine says: “We can literally
Augustinus in Lib. LXXXIII Quaestion., translate ιδεαι as species or forms. Now, the
ideas Latine possumus vel formas, vel form of a thing has three meanings. First, it
species dicere, ut verbum ex verbo can mean that from which a thing gets its
transferre videamur. Forma autem alicuius form, as when we say that the informing of
rei potest dici tripliciter. Uno modo a qua an effect proceeds from the form of the
formatur res, sicut a forma agentis procedit agent. Now, an action does not necessarily
effectus formatio. Sed quia non est de result in effects that attain the complete
necessitate actionis ut effectus pertingant character of the form of the agent, for effects
ad completam rationem formae agentis, often fall short of this, especially in the case
cum frequenter deficiant, maxime in causis of equivocal causes. Consequently, the form
aequivocis; ideo forma a qua formatur from which something gets its form is not
aliquid, non dicitur esse idea vel forma. said to be its idea or form. Second, the form
Alio modo dicitur forma alicuius secundum of a thing can mean that by which a thing is
quam aliquid formatur, sicut anima est informed, as when we say that the soul is the
forma hominis, et figura statuae est forma form of man, and the shape of a statue is the
cupri; et quamvis forma, quae est pars form of the bronze. Now, although form,
compositi, vere dicatur esse illius forma, which is part of the composite, is truly said
non tamen consuevit dici eius idea; quia to be the form of a thing, we do not usually
videtur hoc nomen idea significare formam call it its idea, because it seems that the
separatam ab eo cuius est forma. Tertio word idea signifies a form separate from
modo dicitur forma alicuius ad quam that whose form it is. Third, the form of a
aliquid formatur; et haec est forma thing can mean that according to which a
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constituitur; et in hac significatione form in imitation of which a thing is made.
consuetum est nomen ideae accipi, ut idem It is in this meaning that idea is ordinarily
sit idea quod forma quam aliquid imitatur. used. Hence, the idea of a thing is the form
which a thing imitates.

Sed sciendum, quod aliquid potest imitari Note, however, that a thing can imitate a
aliquam formam dupliciter. Uno modo ex form in two ways. It can imitate it because
intentione agentis; sicut pictura ad hoc fit a of the agent’s intention, as an artist makes
pictore ut imitetur aliquem cuius figura his painting imitate someone whose portrait
depingitur: aliquando vero talis praedicta he is making. It happens at times, however,
imitatio per accidens praeter intentionem, that such an imitation is not intentional, but
et a casu fit; sicut frequenter pictores a casu happens by chance or by accident. For
faciunt imaginem alicuius, de quo non example, painters frequently paint
intendunt. Quod autem aliquam formam something resembling someone when they
imitatur a casu, non dicitur ad illam have not intended to do so. Now, what
formari, quia ly ad videtur importare imitates a form by chance is not said to be
ordinem ad finem; unde, cum forma formed according to that form, because
exemplaris, vel idea, sit ad quam formatur according to seems to imply direction to an
aliquid, oportet quod formam exemplarem end. Hence, since the exemplary form or
vel ideam aliquid imitetur per se, et non per idea is that according to which a thing is
accidens. formed, the exemplary form or idea should
imitate something intentionally, not
accidentally.

Videmus etiam quod aliquid propter finem We see also that a thing acts because of an
dupliciter operatur. Uno modo ita quod end in two ways. The agent himself may
ipsum agens determinat sibi finem, sicut est determine his end—and this is true of all
in omnibus agentibus per intellectum: intellectual agents—or the end of the agent
aliquando autem agenti determinatur finis may be determined by another principal
ab alio principali agente; sicut patet in agent. For example, the flight of an arrow is
motu sagittae, quae movetur ad finem toward a definite end, but this end is
determinatum, sed hic finis determinatur ei determined by the archer. Similarly, an
a proiiciente; et similiter operatio naturae, operation of a nature which is for a definite
quae est ad determinatum finem, end presupposes an intellect that has pre-
praesupponit intellectum, praestituentem established the end of the nature and ordered
finem naturae, et ordinantem ad finem it to that end. For this reason, every work of
illum naturam, ratione cuius omne opus nature is said to be a work of intelligence.
naturae dicitur esse opus intelligentiae. Si Consequently, if a thing imitating something
ergo aliquid fiat ad imitationem alterius per else comes into existence through an agent
agens quod non determinat sibi finem, non which has not itself determined the end, the
ex hoc forma imitata habebit rationem form imitated will not have the character of
exemplaris vel ideae. Non enim dicimus an exemplar or idea merely because of what
quod forma hominis generantis sit idea vel has happened. For example, we do not say
exemplar hominis generati; sed solum hoc that the form of the man who generates is
dicimus quando agens propter finem the idea or exemplar of the man who is
determinat sibi finem, sive illa forma sit in generated; but we use these terms only when
agente, sive extra agentem. Dicimus enim an agent acting for an end has determined
formam artis in artifice esse exemplar vel the end himself—whether the form imitated
ideam artificiati; et similiter etiam formam be within him or outside of him. For we say
quae est extra artificem, ad cuius that the form of art in the artist is the plan or
imitationem artifex aliquid facit. Haec ergo idea of the artistic product, and we also say
videtur esse ratio ideae, quod idea sit forma that a form outside the artist is a plan if he
quam aliquid imitatur ex intentione agentis, imitates it when he makes a thing. This,
qui praedeterminat sibi finem. therefore, seems to constitute the character
of an idea: It must be a form which
something imitates because of the intention
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who antecedently determines the
end himself.

Secundum hoc ergo patet quod illi qui Consequently, it is clear that those who say
ponebant omnia casu accidere, non poterant that all things happen by chance cannot
ideam ponere. Sed haec opinio a admit the existence of ideas. This opinion,
philosophis reprobatur; quia quae sunt a however, is criticized by philosophers,
casu, non se habent eodem modo nisi ut in because things which happen by chance do
paucioribus: naturae autem cursum not happen uniformly, but happen only in a
videmus semper eodem modo progredi, aut few instances. We see, however, that the
ut in pluribus. course of nature always, or at least in most
cases, proceeds in an uniform manner.

Similiter etiam secundum eos qui Similarly, those who say that all things
posuerunt quod a Deo procedunt omnia per proceed from God by a necessity of nature
necessitatem naturae, et non per arbitrium and not by a decision of will cannot admit
voluntatis, non possunt ponere ideas: quia ideas, because those who act impelled by the
ea quae ex necessitate naturae agunt, non necessity of nature do not determine the end
praedeterminant sibi finem. Sed hoc esse for themselves. This cannot be the case here,
non potest; quia omne quod agit propter however, because, if a thing acts for an end
finem si non determinat sibi finem, but does not determine that end itself, it has
determinatur ei finis ab alio superiore; et its end determined for it by something else
sic erit aliqua causa eo superior: quod non superior to it; and thus there would be a
potest esse, quia omnes loquentes de Deo cause superior to God. This, of course, is
intelligunt eum esse causam primam impossible, since all those who speak of
entium. God understand Him to be the first cause of
beings.

Et ideo Plato refugiens Epicuri opinionem, For these reasons, Plato affirmed the
qui ponebat omnia casu accidere, et existence of ideas, avoiding the opinion of
Empedoclis et aliorum qui ponebant omnia the Epicureans, who asserted that everything
accidere ex necessitate naturae, posuit ideas happens by chance, and that of Empedocles
esse. Et hanc etiam rationem ponendi ideas, and others who asserted that everything
scilicet propter praedefinitionem operum happens because of a natural necessity. This
agendorum, innuit Dionysius in V cap. de reason for affirming ideas, namely, on
divinis nominibus, dicens: exemplaria account of the previous planning of the
dicimus in Deo existentium rationes works that are to be done, is suggested by
substantificas, et singulariter Dionysius, who says: “We say that
praeexistentes: quas theologia exemplars in God are the intelligible
praedefinitiones vocat, et divinas et bonas characters of things that come to be, the
voluntates existentium praedeterminativas individually pre-existing causes of subsistent
et effectivas: secundum quas beings. These, theology calls
supersubstantialis essentia omnia ‘predefinitions.’ They predetermine and
praedefinivit et produxit. Sed quia forma cause godly and good inclinations in
exemplaris vel idea habet quodammodo creatures. It is according to these that the
rationem finis, et ab ea accipit artifex super-substance predefines and produces all
formam qua agit si sit extra ipsum; non est things. However, because an exemplary
autem conveniens ponere Deum agere form or idea has, in some sense, the nature
propter finem alium a se, et accipere of an end, and because an artist receives the
aliunde, unde sit sufficiens ad agendum; form by which he acts—if it is outside of
ideo non possumus ponere ideas esse extra him—we cannot say that the divine ideas are
Deum, sed in mente divina tantum. outside of God. They can be only within the
divine mind, for it is unreasonable to say
that God acts on account of an end other
than Himself or that He receives that which
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to act from a source other than
Himself.

Answers to Difficulties

Ad primum igitur dicendum, quod perfectio 1. The perfection of knowledge can be

cognitionis potest attendi vel ex parte considered either with reference to the
cognoscentis, vel ex parte cogniti. Quod knower or with reference to the thing
ergo dicitur quod perfectior est cognitio known. When it is said, therefore, that
quae est per essentiam, quam per knowledge by means of an essence is more
similitudinem, est intelligendum ex parte perfect than that had by means of a likeness,
cogniti. Illud enim quod per seipsum est this is to be understood as referring to what
cognoscibile, est per se magis notum quam is known. For that which is knowable in
illud quod non est cognoscibile ex seipso, itself is, in itself, known more than that
sed solum secundum quod est in which, not knowable in itself, is known only
cognoscente per sui similitudinem. Et hoc in so far as it is in a knower by means of its
non est inconveniens ponere quod res likeness. In this sense, it is not inconsistent
creatae sint minus cognoscibiles quam to say that created things are less knowable
essentia divina, quae per seipsam than the divine essence, which is knowable
cognoscibilis est. by its very nature.

Ad secundum dicendum, quod ad speciem 2. Two things are required for a species
quae est medium cognoscendi duo which is a medium of knowledge. First, it
requiruntur: scilicet repraesentatio rei must represent the thing known. This
cognitae, quae competit ei secundum belongs to a species in so far as it
propinquitatem ad cognoscibile; et esse approaches the nature of what is known.
spirituale, vel immateriale, quod ei Second, it must have a spiritual or
competit secundum quod habet esse in immaterial act of existing. This belongs to a
cognoscente. Unde per speciem quae est in species in so far as it has its act of existing
intellectu, melius cognoscitur aliquid quam in the knower. For this reason, a thing is
per speciem quae est in sensu, quia est known better by means of an intellectual
immaterialior. Et similiter melius species than by means of the species in
cognoscitur aliquid per speciem rei quae est sense, since the former is more immaterial.
in mente divina, quam per ipsam eius Similarly, a thing is known better by means
essentiam cognosci posset; etiam dato quod of the species in the divine mind than it
essentia rei posset esse medium could be known by means of its own essence
cognoscendi, non obstante materialitate —even granting that the essence of a thing
ipsius. could be the medium of knowledge despite
its materiality.
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Ad tertium dicendum, quod in cognitione 3. Two elements of knowledge must be
duo est considerare: scilicet ipsam naturam considered. First, we must consider its
cognitionis; et haec sequitur speciem nature; and this is determined by the relation
secundum comparationem quam habet ad of the species to the intellect in which it
intellectum in quo est; et determinatio exists. Second, we must consider the
cognitionis ad cognitum, et haec sequitur determinate character which the knowledge
relationem speciei ad rem ipsam: unde has with respect to its object; and this
quanto est similior species rei cognitae per follows the relation that the species has to
modum repraesentationis, tanto est cognitio the thing itself. Hence, the more similar the
determinatior; et quanto magis accedit ad species is as a representation to the thing
immaterialitatem, quae est natura known, the more determinate is the
cognoscentis inquantum huiusmodi, tanto knowledge; and the more it approaches
efficacius cognoscere facit. immateriality, which belongs to the nature of
the knower in so far as he knows, the more
efficacious it is in the production of
knowledge.

Ad quartum dicendum, quod hoc est contra 4. It is contrary to the nature of natural
rationem formarum naturalium quod ex forms that they should be immaterial in
seipsis immateriales sint; non est autem themselves; but it is not inconsistent for
inconveniens quod ex alio immaterialitatem them to acquire immateriality from the one
acquirant, in quo sint; unde in intellectu in whom they exist. Consequently, in our
nostro formae rerum naturalium intellects, the forms of natural things are
immateriales sunt. Unde inconveniens est immaterial. Hence, while it would be
ponere ideas rerum naturalium esse per se incorrect to assert that ideas of natural things
subsistentes; non est autem inconveniens have a separate subsistence, it would be
ponere eas in mente divina. correct to say that they are in the divine
mind.

Ad quintum dicendum, quod ideae 5. Strictly speaking, the ideas existing in the
existentes in mente divina non sunt divine mind neither generate nor are
generatae, nec sunt generantes, si fiat vis in generated, but rather create or produce
verbo; sed sunt creativae et productivae things. Hence, Augustine says: “Although
rerum; unde dicit Augustinus in Lib. they themselves neither begin nor cease to
LXXXIII quaestionum: cum ipsae neque be, nevertheless, whatever can begin or
oriantur neque intereant, secundum eas cease to be is said to be informed according
tamen informari dicitur omne quod oriri et to them.” Nor is it necessary, when
interire potest. Nec oportet agens primum composite things are made, for the first
in compositione esse simile generato; efficient cause to resemble what is
oportet autem hoc de agente proximo; et sic generated: this is true only of the proximate
ponebat Plato ideas esse generationis efficient cause. Since Plato asserted that the
principium scilicet proximum; et ideo ideas are the proximate principle of
contra ipsum procedit ratio praedicta. generation, the argument mentioned in the
difficulty is directed against him.

Ad sextum dicendum, quod intentio 6. Dionysius wished to say merely that God
Dionysii est dicere quod ipse non cognoscit does not know by means of an idea received
per ideam acceptam a rebus, vel hoc modo from things or in such a manner that He
quod divisim res per ideam cognoscat; would know a thing differently by means of
unde alia translatio loco huius dicit: neque an idea. For this reason, another translation
per visionem singulis se immittit. Unde per of this passage reads: “Nor does He by His
hoc non excluditur omnino ideas esse. vision come into contact with individual
things.” Hence, from this argument, it is not
impossible for ideas to exist.
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Ad septimum dicendum, quod quamvis non 7. Although there can be no proportion
possit esse aliqua proportio creaturae ad between God and a creature, there can be a
Deum, tamen potest esse proportionalitas; proportionality, as we have previously
quod in praecedenti quaestione frequenter shown.
expositum est.

Ad octavum dicendum, quod sicut Deus, 8. Just as God does not need an essence
quia non potest non esse, non indiget other than His act of existence, because He
essentia quae sit aliud quam suum esse; ita cannot not be, neither does He need a norm
quia non potest deficere in cognoscendo vel other than Himself, because He cannot know
operando, non indiget alia regula a seipso: or act in a way that would be faulty. The
sed propter hoc deficere non potest, quia reason for this perfection is that He is His
ipse est sui ipsius regula; sicut propter hoc own norm, just as the reason for the
non potest non esse, quia sua essentia est necessity of His existence is that His essence
suum esse. is His act of existence.

Ad nonum dicendum, quod in Deo non est 9. In God there is no dimensional quantity
quantitas dimensiva, ut secundum eam on whose basis an equality could be
aequalitas attendi possit; sed est ibi established. There is in Him, however,
quantitas per modum intensivae quantitatis; quantity after the manner of intensive
sicut albedo dicitur magna, quia perfecte quantity. For example, whiteness is said to
attingit ad naturam suam. Intensio autem be great when it attains the perfect fullness
alicuius formae respicit modum habendi of its nature. The intensity of a form,
formam illam. Quamvis autem aliquo modo moreover, refers to the manner in which that
illud quod est Dei ad creaturas derivetur; form is possessed. Now, although that which
nullo tamen modo potest concedi quod is divine may in some way be passed on to
creatura habeat aliquid per modum illum creatures, we can never grant that a creature
quo habet illud Deus: et ideo quamvis possesses it in the same way in which God
aliquo modo concedamus esse possesses it. Hence, although we grant that
similitudinem inter creaturam et Deum, there exists a likeness between a creature
nullo tamen modo concedimus ibi esse and God in some way, we do not grant that
aequalitatem. they are equal in any way whatsoever.

Ad decimum dicendum, quod intentio 10. As will be evident to one who carefully
Anselmi est dicere, ut patet inspicienti considers Anselm’s words, Anselm means to
verba eius, quod in verbo non sit similitudo say merely that in the Word there exists no
sumpta a rebus ipsis, sed omnes rerum likeness drawn from things themselves, but,
formae sunt sumptae a verbo; et ideo dicit instead, all the forms of things are taken
quod verbum non est similitudo rerum, sed from the Word. Accordingly, he means that
res sunt imitationes verbi. Unde per hoc the Word is not a likeness of things, but
non removetur idea; cum idea sit forma things are imitations of the Word.
quam aliquid imitatur. Consequently, this argument does not
dispense with the ideas, since an idea is a
form which something imitates.

Ad undecimum dicendum, quod Deus 11. The statement that God knows Himself
eodem modo cognoscit se et alia, si in the same way in which He knows other
accipiatur modus cognitionis ex parte things is true if we are speaking about the
cognoscentis; non autem si accipiatur ex way of knowing with reference to the
parte rei cognitae, quia creatura quae a Deo knower. It is not true, however, if we are
cognoscitur, non est idem secundum rem speaking about the way of knowing with
cum medio quo Deus cognoscit sed ipse est reference to the thing known, because the
idem re cum eo; unde nulla multiplicitas in creature which is known by God is not the
eius essentia sequitur. same in the real order as the medium by
which God knows. But He Himself is really
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the same as it. »Consequently,
QDdeVer3.htmit does not
follow that there is multiplicity in His
essence.

ARTICLE II

In the second article we ask:

Are there many ideas?

[ARTICLE S.T., I, 15, 7; 44, 3; 47, 1, ad 2; I Sent., 36, 2, 2; III Sent., 14, 2, sol. 2; C.G., I,
54; De pot., 3, 16, ad 12-14; Quodl., IV, 1, 1.]

Secundo quaeritur utrum sit ponere Difficulties

plures ideas.

Et videtur quod non. It seems not, for

Quia ea quae essentialiter dicuntur in 1. The things which are predicated essentially
Deo, non minus sunt vere in eo quam illa of God are not less true of Him than those
quae dicuntur in ipso personaliter. Sed which are predicated personally of Him. Now,
pluralitas proprietatum personalium a plurality of personal properties involves a
inducit pluralitatem personarum, plurality of persons, and for this reason God is
secundum quas Deus dicitur trinus. Cum said to be triune. Consequently, since ideas are
ergo ideae sint essentiales, quia sunt essential perfections because common to all
communes tribus personis, si sint plures three Persons, if the number of ideas is
in Deo secundum pluralitatem rerum, determined by the number of things that there
sequitur quod non solum sint tres are, it follows that there are not only three
personae in ipso, sed infinitae. Persons but an infinite number of them.

Sed dicebat, quod ideae non sunt 2. It was said, however, that ideas are not
essentiales, quia sunt ipsa essentia.- Sed essential properties, since they are the essence
contra, bonitas sapientia et potentia Dei itself.—On the contrary, God’s goodness,
sunt eius essentia, et tamen dicuntur wisdom, and power are His essence, yet they
essentialia attributa. Ergo et ideae, are said to be essential attributes. Therefore,
quamvis sint ipsa essentia, possunt even though they are His essence, ideas can be
essentiales dici. called His essential properties.

Praeterea, quidquid Deo attribuitur, debet 3. Whatever is attributed to God should be

ei nobilissimo modo attribui. Sed Deus attributed to Him as existing in the most noble
est principium rerum; ergo debet poni in manner possible. Now, God is the principle of
eo omne illud quod ad nobilitatem all things; hence, whatever pertains to the
principii pertinet, in summo. Sed unitas nobility of a principle should be said to exist
est huiusmodi, quia omnis virtus unita in Him in the highest possible degree.
plus est infinita quam multiplicata, ut However, unity is a perfection of this sort,
dicitur in libro de causis. Ergo in Deo est because, as is said in The Causes: “Every
summa unitas; ergo non solum est unus power is more infinite when it has unity than
re, sed ratione; quia magis est unum quod when it is multiplied.” Hence, the highest
est unum utroque modo, quam quod unity is in God. He is, therefore, not only one
altero istorum tantum; et sic non sunt in in reality, but also one in concept, because that
eo plures rationes, sive ideae. which is one in both respects is more one than
that which is one merely in one respect.
Consequently, many intelligible characters or
ideas do not exist in God.
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Praeterea, philosophus dicit in V 4. The Philosopher says: “What is entirely one
Metaphys.: quod omnino est unum, quod cannot be separated either by intellect, time,
non potest separari neque intellectu, place, or concept—especially with regard to
neque tempore, neque loco, neque its substance.” Consequently, if God is one in
ratione; et maxime in substantia. Si ergo the highest degree because He is being in the
Deus est maxime unum, quia est maxime highest degree, conceptual distinctions are not
ens, non potest separari ratione; et ita applicable to Him; so, our original position
idem quod prius. stands.

Praeterea, si plures ideae, sequitur eas 5. If there are many ideas, they must be
esse inaequales; quia una idea continebit unequal, because one idea will contain only
esse tantum, alia autem esse et vivere, the act of existence, another, both existence
alia vero insuper intelligere, secundum and life, a third, both of these and intellection
quod res cuius est idea, in pluribus besides—according as the thing, whose idea it
assimilatur Deo. Cum ergo inconveniens is, resembles God in one or many respects.
sit in Deo aliquam inaequalitatem ponere, But, since it is inconsistent to say that there is
videtur quod non possint esse in eo plures any inequality in God, it seems that there
ideae. cannot be many ideas in Him.

Praeterea, in causis materialibus est status 6. Material causes can be reduced to one first
ad unam primam materiam, et similiter in matter, and efficient and final causes can be
efficientibus et finalibus. Ergo et in reduced in a similar manner. Consequently,
formalibus est status ad unam primam formal causes can also be reduced to one first
formam. Sed est status ad ideas, quia ut form. The end-term of this reduction,
dicit Augustinus in libro LXXXIII however, will be ideas, because, as Augustine
quaestionum, ideae sunt principales says: “these are the principal forms or
formae vel rationes rerum. Ergo in Deo intelligible characters of things.” Hence, there
non est nisi una tantum idea. is only one idea in God.

Sed dicebat, quod quamvis sit una prima 7. But it was said that, although there is only
forma, tamen ideae dicuntur plures one first form, ideas are nevertheless said to
secundum diversos respectus ipsius.- Sed be many because of the different relations this
contra, non potest dici quod ideae form has.—On the contrary, it cannot be said
multiplicentur secundum respectum ad that ideas are multiplied because of their
Deum in quo sunt, qui est unus; neque relation to God in whom they exist, for He is
secundum respectum ad ideata, one; nor can they be multiplied because of
secundum quod sunt in causa prima, quia their relation to what is made according to
in ea sunt unum, ut Dionysius dicit; nec them and as these creatures exist in the first
per respectum ad ideata, secundum quod cause, since, as Dionysius says, in the first
in propria natura existunt, quia sic res cause creatures exist as one. Finally, ideas
ideatae sunt temporales, ideae vero cannot be multiplied because of their relation
aeternae sunt. Ergo nullo modo per to what is made according to them and as
respectum formae primae possunt ideae these things exist in their own natures, because
dici plures. creatures are temporal and ideas are eternal.
Hence, there is no possible way of saying that
the ideas are many because of their relation to
the first form.

Praeterea, nulla relatio quae est inter 8. The relation between God and creature does
Deum et creaturam, est in Deo, sed in not exist in God; it exists only in the creature.
creatura tantum. Sed idea vel exemplar But an idea or exemplar implies a relation of
importat relationem Dei ad creaturam. God to a creature. Therefore, that relation is
Ergo ista relatio non est in Deo, sed in not in God but only in the creature. Now, since
creatura. Cum ergo idea sit in Deo, per the idea is in God, ideas cannot be multiplied
by relations of this sort.
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multiplicari
non possunt.

Praeterea, intellectus qui pluribus 9. An intellect that knows by means of many

intelligit, est compositus, et transiens de species is composite and moves from one to
uno in aliud. Sed haec a divino intellectu another. But this way of knowing is far from
sunt procul. Cum ergo ideae sint rationes God’s way. Therefore, since ideas are the
rerum, quibus Deus intelligit, videtur intelligible characters of things by which God
quod non sint plures ideae in Deo. understands, it seems that there are not many
ideas in Him.

Sed contra. To the Contrary

Idem secundum idem non est natum 1. The same thing under the same aspect can,
facere nisi idem. Sed Deus facit multa et of its very nature, produce only one and the
diversa. Ergo non secundum eamdem same reality. But God produces many and
rationem, sed secundum plures, res different things. Hence, God causes things, not
causat. Sed rationes quibus res according to one concept, but according to
producuntur a Deo, sunt ideae. Ergo many concepts. But the concepts by which
plures ideae sunt in Deo. God produces things are ideas. Therefore,
there are many ideas in God.

Praeterea, Augustinus dicit in Lib. 2. Augustine says: “It remains, therefore, that
LXXXIII quaestionum: restat ut omnia all things are created by plan, but a man not by
ratione sint condita; nec eadem ratione the same plan as a horse. So to think would be
homo qua equus; hoc enim absurdum est absurd.” Each thing is therefore created
existimari. Singula igitur propriis sunt according to its own plan; hence, there are
creata rationibus; ergo sunt plures ideae. many ideas.

Praeterea, Augustinus dicit in epistola ad 3. Augustine says” that it is just as wrong to

Nebridium, quod sicut inconveniens est say that the plan which God has of man in
dicere quod eadem sit ratio anguli et general is the same as that of this man in
quadrati, ita inconveniens est dicere quod particular as it is to say that the idea of an
eadem sit ratio in Deo hominis et huius angle is the same as that of a square. It seems,
hominis. Ergo videtur quod sint plures therefore, that there are many plans in God’s
rationes ideales in Deo. ideas.

Praeterea, Hebr. XI, 3 dicitur: fide 4. The Epistle to the Hebrews (11:3) states:
credimus aptata esse saecula verbo Dei, “By faith we understand that the world was
ut ex invisibilibus visibilia fierent. framed by the word of God; that from
Invisibilia autem pluraliter appellat invisible things visible things might be made.”
species ideales. Ergo sunt plures. Note that he refers to the ideal species as
invisible things (plural). Hence, there are
many ideas.

Praeterea, ideae a sanctis significantur 5. The saints call ideas art and the world, as is
nomine artis et mundi, ut patet ex clear from the authorities cited. But art
auctoritatibus inductis. Sed ars implies plurality, for art is a collection of
pluralitatem quamdam importat; est enim precepts converging toward one end. World
collectio praeceptorum ad unum finem has a similar connotation, since it implies the
tendentium; et similiter etiam mundus, collection of all creatures. Hence, we should
cum importet collectionem omnium affirm the existence of many ideas in God.
creaturarum. Ergo oportet ponere plures
ideas in Deo.
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REPLY

Responsio. Dicendum, quod quidam While admitting that God acts through His
ponentes Deum per intellectum agere, et intellect and not under the compulsion of His
non ex necessitate naturae, posuerunt nature, some have said that He intends only
eum habere intentionem unam tantum, one thing, namely, creature in general, and the
scilicet creaturae in universali; sed distinction between creatures is brought about
creaturarum distinctio facta est per causas by secondary causes. They declare that God
secundas. Dicunt enim, quod Deus primo first established one intelligence that produced
condidit unam intelligentiam, quae three things: a soul, the world, and another
produxit tria: scilicet animam, et orbem, intelligence; and by means of this procession a
et aliam intelligentiam; et sic plurality of things issued forth from the one
progrediendo, processit pluralitas rerum first principle. According to this position, there
ab uno primo principio. Et secundum would, indeed, be an idea in God, but only one
hanc opinionem esset quidem in Deo common to all creation. The proper idea of
idea, sed una tantum creaturae toti each individual thing would exist only in
communis; sed propriae ideae singulorum secondary causes. This opinion, Dionysius
essent in causis secundis, sicut etiam says, was held by a certain philosopher named
Dionysius narrat in V cap. de divinis Clement, who maintained that higher beings
nominibus, quod quidam Clemens were the archetypes of lower.
philosophus posuit principaliora entia
exemplaria inferiorum esse.

Sed hoc stare non potest: quia si intentio This opinion, however, cannot stand, because
alicuius agentis feratur ad aliquid unum if the intention of an agent is directed toward
tantum, praeter intentionem eius erit, et one thing only, whatever else that follows is
quasi casuale, quidquid sequatur, quod apart from his intention and, as it were, a
accidit ei quod est principaliter intentum chance happening, which happens accidentally
ab eo; sicut si aliquis intenderet facere in conjunction with that which he principally
aliquod triangulatum, praeter intentionem intended. This would make the agent like
eius esset quod esset magnum vel someone who wants to produce something that
parvum. Cuilibet autem communi accidit is triangular, and whether it is small or large is
speciale contentum sub eo; unde si a matter of indifference to him. Now, to
intentio agentis est ad aliquod commune whatever is general something special is
tantum, praeter intentionem eius esset indirectly connected. Hence, if an agent
quod qualitercumque determinaretur per intends merely something general, in whatever
aliquod speciale; sicut si natura way it is determined by something special it is
intenderet generare solum animal, praeter entirely apart from his intention. For example,
intentionem naturae esset quod if nature intends to generate only an animal, it
generatum sit homo vel equus. Unde si is apart from nature’s intention that what is
intentio Dei operantis respiciat tantum ad generated be a man or a horse. Consequently,
creaturam in communi, tota distinctio if God’s intention when He acts regards only
creaturae casualiter accidet. Inconveniens creatures in general, then all distinction
autem est dicere quod sit per accidens per between creatures happens by chance. But it is
comparationem ad causam primam; et sit hardly correct to say that this difference
per se per comparationem ad causas between creatures is related only accidentally
secundas: quia quod est per se, prius est to the first cause and essentially to second
eo quod est per accidens; prius autem est causes, since what is essential is previous to
comparatio alicuius ad causam primam what is accidental, and the relation of a thing
quam ad causam secundam, ut patet in to the first cause is previous to its relation to a
libro de causis; unde impossibile est quod second cause, as is clear from The Causes.
sit per accidens respectu causae primae, Consequently, it is impossible for the
et per se respectu secundae. Potest autem distinction between creatures to be related
accidere e converso, sicut videmus quod only accidentally to the first cause and
ea quae sunt casualiter quoad nos, sunt essentially to a second cause. The opposite,
Deo praecognita, et ordinata ab ipso. however, can happen; for we see that those
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chance as far
as we are
distinctio rerum sit praedefinita ab eo. Et concerned are foreknown by God and
ideo necesse est in Deo ponere ordained by Him. Hence, we must say that all
singulorum proprias rationes, et propter the distinction between things is predefined by
hoc necesse est ponere in eo plures ideas. God. Consequently, we must affirm that
intelligible characters proper to individual
things exist in God and that for this reason
there are in Him many ideas.

Modus autem pluralitatis hinc accipi From this the plurality of ideas can be
potest. Forma enim in intellectu understood. A form can exist in the intellect in
dupliciter esse potest. Uno modo ita quod two ways. First, it can exist there so as to be a
sit principium actus intelligendi, sicut principle of the act of understanding, as is the
forma, quae est intelligentis in quantum form had by a knower in so far as he
est intelligens; et haec est similitudo understands. This is the likeness of what is
intellecti in ipso. Alio modo ita quod sit understood, existing in him. Second, the form
terminus actus intelligendi, sicut artifex can exist in the intellect so as to be the end-
intelligendo excogitat formam domus; et term of the act of understanding. For example,
cum illa forma sit excogitata per actum by understanding an architect thinks out the
intelligendi, et quasi per actum effecta, form of a house; and since that form has been
non potest esse principium actus thought out by means of an act of
intelligendi, ut sit primum quo understanding and is, as it were, effected by
intelligatur; sed magis se habet ut that act, it cannot be a principle of the act of
intellectum, quo intelligens aliquid understanding and thus the first means by
operatur. Nihilominus tamen est forma which the understanding takes place. It is,
praedicta secundum quo intelligitur: quia instead, the understood, by which the knower
per formam excogitatam artifex intelligit makes something. Nevertheless, it is the
quid operandum sit; sicut etiam in second means by which understanding takes
intellectu speculativo videmus quod place, because it is by means of the
species, qua intellectus informatur ut excogitated form that the architect understands
intelligat actu, est primum quo what he is to make. Similarly, with respect to
intelligitur; ex hoc autem quod est the speculative intellect, we see that the
effectus in actu, per talem formam species by which the intellect is informed so
operari iam potest formando quidditates that it can actually understand is the first
rerum et componendo et dividendo; unde means by which understanding takes place;
ipsa quidditas formata in intellectu, vel and because the intellect is brought into act by
etiam compositio et divisio, est quoddam means of this form, it can now operate and
operatum ipsius, per quod tamen form quiddities of things, as well as compose
intellectus venit in cognitionem rei and divide. Consequently, the quiddities
exterioris; et sic est quasi secundum quo formed in the intellect, or even the affirmative
intelligitur. Si autem intellectus artificis and negative propositions, are, in a sense,
aliquod artificiatum produceret ad products of the intellect, but products of such
similitudinem sui ipsius, tunc quidem a kind that through them the intellect arrives at
ipse intellectus artificis esset idea, non the knowledge of an exterior thing. Hence,
quidem ut est intellectus, sed inquantum this product is, in a fashion, a second means
intellectum. by which understanding takes place. If,
however, the intellect of an artist were to
produce a work that resembled itself, then,
indeed, the very intellect of the artist would be
an idea, not in so far as it is an intellect, but in
so far as it is understood.

In his autem quae ad imitationem alterius Now, with respect to those things made in
producuntur, quandoque quidem id quod imitation of something else, we sometimes
alterum imitatur, perfecte imitatur ipsum; find that they imitate their archetype perfectly.
et tunc intellectus operativus In such a case, the operative intellect when
praeconcipiens formam operati, habet ut preconceiving the form of what was made,
 ideam
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very form ofthe thing
est illius rei imitatae: quandoque vero imitated precisely as the form of the thing
quod est ad imitationem alterius, non imitated. At other times, however, we find that
perfecte imitatur illud; et tunc intellectus that which is made in imitation of another is
operativus non acciperet formam rei not a perfect imitation. In this case, the
imitatae absolute ut ideam vel exemplar operative intellect would not take as its idea or
rei operandae; sed cum proportione archetype the form of the archetype itself,
determinata, secundum quam absolutely and exactly as it is, but it takes it
exemplatum a principali exemplari with a definite proportion varying according to
deficeret vel imitaretur. the degree of closeness with which the copy
imitates the original.

Dico ergo, quod Deus per intellectum I say, therefore, that God, who makes all
omnia operans, omnia ad similitudinem things by means of His intellect, produces
essentiae suae producit; unde essentia sua them all in the likeness of His own essence.
est idea rerum; non quidem ut est Hence, His essence is the idea of things—not,
essentia, sed ut est intellecta. Res autem indeed, His essence considered as an essence,
creatae non perfecte imitantur divinam but considered as it is known. Created things,
essentiam; unde essentia non accipitur however, do not perfectly imitate the divine
absolute ab intellectu divino ut idea essence. Consequently, His essence as the idea
rerum, sed cum proportione creaturae of things is not understood by the divine
fiendae ad ipsam divinam essentiam, intellect unqualifiedly, but with the proportion
secundum quod deficit ab ea, vel imitatur to the divine essence had by the creature to be
ipsam. Diversae autem res diversimode produced, that is, according as the creature
ipsam imitantur; et unaquaeque falls short of, or imitates, the divine essence.
secundum proprium modum suum, cum Now, different things imitate the divine
unicuique sit esse distinctum ab altera; et essence in different ways, each one according
ideo ipsa divina essentia, cointellectis to its own proper manner, since each has its
diversis proportionibus rerum ad eam, est own act of existence, distinct from that of
idea uniuscuiusque rei. Unde, cum sint another. We can say, therefore, that the divine
diversae rerum proportiones, necesse est essence is the idea of each and every thing,
plures esse ideas; et est quidem una understanding, of course, the different
omnium ex parte essentiae; sed pluralitas proportions that things have to it. Hence, since
invenitur ex parte diversarum there are in things different proportions to- the
proportionum creaturarum ad ipsam. divine essence, there must necessarily be
many ideas. If we consider the essence alone,
however, there is but one idea for all things;
but if we consider the different proportions of
creatures to the divine essence, then there can
be said to be a plurality of ideas.

Answers to Difficulties

Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod 1. Personal properties introduce a distinction

proprietates personales ideo inducunt of persons in God because they are opposed to
distinctionem personarum in divinis, quia each other by relative opposition. But
ad invicem opponuntur oppositione properties that are not opposed, such as
relationis; unde proprietates non common spiration and paternity, do not
oppositae non distinguunt personas, ut distinguish one person from another.
communis spiratio, et paternitas. Ideae Moreover, neither the ideas nor other essential
autem, nec alia essentialia attributa, non attributes are opposed by relative opposition.
habent ad invicem aliquam oppositionem; Hence, there is no similarity.
et ideo non est simile.

Ad secundum dicendum, quod non est 2. The same thing is not true of ideas and
simile de ideis et essentialibus attributis. essential attributes. In their principal meaning,
 Attributa
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attributes do not signify
anything
principali intellectu suo praeter essentiam more than the essence of the Creator. Hence,
creatoris; unde etiam non plurificantur, strictly speaking, they are not plural, although
quamvis secundum ea Deus ad creaturas God is compared to creatures with reference to
comparetur, prout secundum bonitatem them. For example, with reference to His
facit bonos, secundum sapientiam goodness, we say that creatures are good; with
sapientes. Sed idea de suo principali reference to His wisdom, we say that they are
intellectu habet aliquid aliud praeter wise. An idea, however, in its principal
essentiam, scilicet ipsam proportionem meaning signifies something other than God’s
creaturae ad essentiam, in quo etiam essence, namely, the proportion a creature has
completur formaliter ratio ideae, ratione to His essence; and this completes the formal
cuius dicuntur plures ideae: nihilominus notion of an idea. Because of this there are
tamen secundum quod ad essentiam said to be many ideas. Nevertheless, the ideas
pertinent, nihil prohibet ideas essentiales may be called essential attributes inasmuch as
dici. they are related to the essence.

Ad tertium dicendum, quod pluralitas 3. A plurality of concepts is sometimes

rationis quandoque reducitur ad aliquam reduced to a diversity in the thing. For
diversitatem rei, sicut Socrates et example, there is a rational distinction
Socrates sedens differunt ratione; et hoc between Socrates and Socrates sitting, and this
reducitur ad diversitatem substantiae et is reduced to the difference that there is
accidentis; et similiter homo et animal between substance and accident. Similarly,
ratione differunt; et haec differentia man and animal differ rationally; and this
reducitur ad diversitatem formae et difference is reduced to the difference between
materiae, quia genus sumitur a materia, form and matter, because genus is taken from
differentia vero specifica a forma; unde matter but the specific difference from form.
talis differentia secundum rationem Consequently, such a conceptual difference is
repugnat maxime unitati vel simplicitati. repugnant to the highest unity or simplicity.
Quandoque vero differentia secundum On the other hand, a conceptual difference
rationem non reducitur ad aliquam rei sometimes is reduced not to any diversity in
diversitatem, sed ad veritatem rei, quae the thing, but to its truth, which can be
est diversimode intelligibilis; et sic understood in different ways. It is in this sense
ponimus pluralitatem rationum in Deo; that we say that there is a plurality of
unde hoc non repugnat maximae unitati, intelligible characters in God. Hence, this
vel simplicitati. plurality is not repugnant to His highest unity
or simplicity.

Ad quartum dicendum, quod philosophus 4. In this passage, the Philosopher speaks of

appellat ibi rationem definitionem; in intelligible characters as definitions. But we
Deo autem non est accipere plures cannot talk of there being many intelligible
rationes quasi definitiones, quia nulla characters in God as though these were
rationum illarum essentiam divinam definitions, for none of these comprehends the
comprehendit; et ideo non est ad divine essence. Hence, this passage is not to
propositum. the point.

Ad quintum dicendum, quod forma quae 5. The form in the intellect has a double
est in intellectu, habet respectum relationship. It is related not only to the thing
duplicem: unum ad rem cuius est, alium whose form it is, but also to the intellect in
ad id in quo est. Ex primo autem respectu which it exists. On the basis of its first
non dicitur aliqualis, sed alicuius tantum: relation, the form is not said to be of a certain
non enim materialium est forma kind but rather of a certain thing, for the
materialis, nec sensibilium sensibilis. Sed intellectual form of material things is not a
secundum alium respectum aliqualis material form, nor is the intellectual form of
dicitur, quia sequitur modum eius in quo sensible things sensible. It is on the basis of its
est; unde ex hoc quod rerum ideatarum second relationship that the intellectual form is
quaedam aliis perfectius essentiam said to be “of a certain kind,” because its kind
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by that in which it exists. Hence,
ideae sint inaequales, sed inaequalium. from the fact that some of the things of which
ideas are had imitate the divine essence more
perfectly than others, it does not follow that
the ideas are unequal, but that they are ideas of
unequal things.

Ad sextum dicendum, quod una prima 6. The one first form to which all things are
forma, ad quam omnia reducuntur, est reduced is the divine essence, considered in
ipsa divina essentia secundum se itself. Reflecting upon this essence, the divine
considerata; ex cuius consideratione intellect devises—if I may use such an
intellectus divinus adinvenit, ut ita dicam, expression—different ways in which it can be
diversos modos imitationis ipsius, in imitated. The plurality of ideas comes from
quibus pluralitas idearum consistit. these different ways.

Ad septimum dicendum, quod ideae 7. The ideas are multiplied according to the
plurificantur secundum diversos different relations they have to things existing
respectus ad res in propria natura in their own natures. It is not necessary that
existentes; nec tamen oportet quod, si res these relations be temporal even if the things
sunt temporales, quod illi respectus sint are temporal, because the action of the
temporales, quia actio intellectus, etiam intellect—even of the human intellect—can
humani, se extendit ad aliquid etiam extend to something even when it does not
quando illud non est, sicut cum exist, as, for example, when we know the past.
intelligimus praeterita. Actionem autem Moreover, as is said in the Metaphysics, a
relatio consequitur, ut in V Metaphysic. relation follows upon action; hence, even
dicitur; unde et respectus ad res relations to temporal things are eternal in the
temporales in intellectu divino sunt divine intellect.
aeterni.

Ad octavum dicendum, quod relatio quae 8. The relation existing between God and
est inter Deum et creaturam, non est in creature is not a real relation in God.
Deo secundum rem; est tamen in Deo However, it is in God according to our manner
secundum intellectum nostrum; et of understanding Him; similarly, it can be in
similiter potest esse in eo secundum Him according to His own manner of
intellectum suum, prout scilicet, intelligit understanding Himself, that is, in so far as He
respectum rerum ad essentiam suam; et understands the relation things have to His
sic respectus illi sunt in Deo ut intellecti essence. Thus, these relations exist in God as
ab ipso. known by Him.

Ad nonum dicendum, quod idea non 9. An idea does not have the character of that
habet rationem eius quo primo aliquid by which a thing is first understood, but,
intelligitur, sed habet rationem intellecti rather, of that which is understood and is
in intellectu existentis. Uniformitas existing in the intellect. Moreover, whether or
autem intellectus sequitur unitatem eius not there is to be but one form in the
quo primo aliquid intelligitur; sicut unitas understanding is determined by the unity of
actionis sequitur unitatem formae agentis, that by which a thing is first understood, just
quae est principium ipsius; unde, as the unity of an action is determined by the
quamvis respectus intellecti a Deo sint unity of the form of the agent which is its
multi, in quibus pluralitas idearum principle. Hence, although the relations
consistit; quia tamen illos omnes per understood by God are many (and it is in these
unam suam essentiam intelligit, relations that the plurality of ideas consists),
intellectus eius non est multiplex, sed nevertheless, because e understands all things
unus. by means of His essence, His understanding is
not multiple but one.
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ARTICLE III

In the third article we ask:

Do ideas belong to speculative or only to practical knowledge?

[ARTICLE S.T., I, 14, 16; 15, 3; I Sent., 36, 2, 3; De div. nom., c. 5, lect. 3 (P. 15:352a seq.);
De pot., 1, 5, ad 10-11; 3, 1, ad 13.]

Tertio quaeritur utrum ideae pertineant Difficulties

ad cognitionem speculativam, vel
practicam tantum.

Et videtur quod tantum ad practicam. It seems that they belong only to practical
knowledge, for

Quia, ut dicit Augustinus in l. LXXXIII 1. According to Augustine: “Ideas are the

quaestionum, ideae sunt formae rerum principal forms of things, according to which
principales, secundum quas formatur everything is formed that has a beginning or an
omne quod oritur aut interit. Sed end.” But, since nothing is formed by reason of
secundum speculativam cognitionem speculative knowledge, ideas do not belong to
nihil formatur. Ergo speculativa cognitio this type of knowledge.
non habet ideam.

Sed dicebat, quod ideae non solum 2. It was said, however, that ideas are related
habent respectum ad id quod oritur aut not only to those things which have a
interit, sed ad id quod oriri vel interire beginning or an end, but also to those which
potest, ut ibidem Augustinus dicit; et sic can have a beginning or end, as Augustine says
idea se habet ad ea quae nec sunt, nec in the same passage. Consequently, ideas are
erunt, nec fuerunt, tamen esse possunt, related to those things which do not exist, will
de quibus Deus speculativam not exist, and never have existed, but
cognitionem habet.- Sed contra, practica nevertheless can exist. Of these, God has
scientia dicitur secundum quam aliquis speculative knowledge.—On the contrary,
scit modum operis, etiam si nunquam practical knowledge is said to be that
operari intendat; et sic dicitur practica knowledge according to which one knows how
esse pars medicinae. Sed Deus scit a thing is done, even if he never intends to do
modum operandi ea quae potest facere, it. This is why part of medical study is called
quamvis facere non proponat. Ergo practical. Now, God knows how the things
etiam de eis Deus habet practicam which He can make are to be made, even
cognitionem; et sic utroque modo idea though He does not intend to make them.
ad practicam cognitionem pertinet. Therefore, God has practical knowledge of
them. Hence, in both ways, ideas pertain to
practical knowledge.

Praeterea, idea nihil est aliud quam 3. An idea is nothing but the exemplary form.
exemplaris forma. Sed forma exemplaris Now, one can speak of the exemplary form
non potest dici nisi in practica only in connection with practical knowledge,
cognitione, quia exemplar est ad cuius because an exemplar is that upon which a thing
imitationem fit aliud. Ergo ideae solum else is modeled. Therefore, ideas pertain only
practicam cognitionem respiciunt. to practical knowledge.

Praeterea, secundum philosophum, 4. According to the Philosopher, the practical

practicus intellectus est eorum quorum intellect pertains to those things whose
principia sunt in nobis. Sed ideae in principles are within us. But the ideas existing
intellectu divino existentes sunt in the divine intellect are principles of the
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modeled on the ideas. Therefore,
intellectum pertinent. they belong to the practical intellect.

Praeterea, omnes formae intellectus vel 5. All the forms in the intellect either are from
sunt a rebus, vel sunt ad res: quae autem things or have a relation to things. The latter
sunt ad res, sunt practici intellectus; quae type of forms belongs to the practical intellect;
vero a rebus, speculativi. Sed nullae the former, to the speculative. But no forms in
formae intellectus divini sunt a rebus, the divine intellect are from things, since it
cum nihil a rebus accipiat. Ergo sunt ad receives nothing from things. Therefore, the
res; et sic sunt practici intellectus. forms in the divine intellect have a relation to
things, and thus belong to the practical
intellect.

Praeterea, si est alia idea intellectus 6. If in God an idea of the practical intellect
practici, et alia speculativi in Deo, were other than an idea of the speculative
diversitas ista non potest esse per aliquid intellect, this diversity could not be based on
absolutum, quia omne huiusmodi est something absolute in Him; for everything of
unum tantum in Deo; nec per respectum this kind in God is one and one only; nor could
identitatis, ut cum dicimus idem eidem it be based on a relation of identity such as
idem, quia talis respectus nullam exists when a thing is said to be identical with
pluralitatem inducit; nec per respectum itself, because such a relation involves no
diversitatis, quia causa non plurificatur, plurality. Finally, it could not be based on a
quamvis effectus sint plures. Ergo nullo relation of diversity, since a cause is not
modo potest distingui alia idea multiplied even when its effects are multiple.
speculativae cognitionis ab idea Therefore, there is no possible way of
practicae cognitionis. distinguishing an idea of speculative
knowledge from an idea of practical
knowledge.

Sed dicebat, quod in hoc utraque idea 7. But it was said that these ideas are
distinguitur, quod idea practica est distinguished because a practical idea is a
principium essendi, sed speculativa principle of being, while a speculative idea is a
cognoscendi.- Sed contra, eadem sunt principle of knowing.—On the contrary,
principia essendi et cognoscendi. Ergo principles of being and of knowing are the
ex hoc idea speculativa a practica non same. Therefore, a speculative idea cannot be
distinguitur. distinguished from a practical idea on the basis
suggested.

Praeterea, cognitio speculativa nihil 8. God’s speculative knowledge seems to be

aliud videtur esse in Deo quam simplex the same as His simple knowledge. God’s
ipsius notitia. Sed simplex notitia nihil simple knowledge, however, is nothing other
praeter notitiam aliud habere potest. than bare knowledge. Now, since an idea adds
Ergo, cum idea addat respectum ad res, a relation to things, it seems that an idea does
videtur quod non pertineat ad not belong to His speculative knowledge but
speculativam cognitionem, sed ad only to His practical knowledge.
practicam tantum.

Praeterea, finis practici est bonum. Sed 9. The end of the practical intellect is the good.
respectus ideae non potest determinari Now, the reference of an idea can be
nisi ad bonum, quia mala praeter determined only to a good; for, if evil occurs,
intentionem accidunt. Ergo idea solum that is outside of God’s intention.
practicum intellectum respicit. Consequently, an idea pertains only to the
practical intellect.
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Sed contra. To the Contrary

Cognitio practica non extendit se nisi ad 1. Practical knowledge extends only to those
facienda. Sed Deus per ideas non solum things which are to be made. But by His ideas
scit facienda, sed praesentia et facta. God knows not only what things are to be
Ergo ideae non se extendunt solum ad made, but also those things that are made and
practicam cognitionem. have been made. Therefore, ideas are not
restricted merely to practical knowledge.

Praeterea, Deus perfectius cognoscit 2. God knows creatures more perfectly than an
creaturas quam artifex artificiata. Sed artist knows the products of his craftsmanship.
artifex creatus, per formas quibus But by means of the forms through which he
operatur, habet speculativam acts, an artist, who is merely a creature, has
cognitionem de operatis; ergo multo speculative knowledge of his handicraft. How
fortius Deus. much more must this be true of God!

Praeterea, cognitio speculativa est quae 3. Speculative knowledge is that which

considerat principia et causas rerum, et considers the principles and causes of things,
passiones earumdem. Sed Deus per ideas as well as their properties. But by ideas God
cognoscit omnia quae in rebus cognosci knows all that can be known of things.
possunt. Ergo ideae in Deo pertinent non Therefore, the divine ideas pertain not only to
ad practicam solum, sed speculativam practical, but also to speculative knowledge.
cognitionem.

Responsio. REPLY

Dicendum, quod, sicut dicitur in III de As is said in The Soul: “Practical knowledge
anima, intellectus practicus differt a differs from speculative knowledge in its end.”
speculativo fine; finis enim speculativi For the end of speculative knowledge is simply
est veritas absolute, sed practici est truth, but the end of practical knowledge, as we
operatio ut dicitur in II Metaphys. Aliqua read in the Metaphysics, is action. Now, some
ergo cognitio, practica dicitur ex ordine knowledge is called practical because it is
ad opus: quod contingit dupliciter. directed to a work. This happens in two ways.
Quandoque enim ad opus actu ordinatur, In the first way, it is directed in act—that is,
sicut artifex praeconcepta forma when it is actually directed to a certain work,
proponit illam in materiam inducere; et as the form is which an artist preconceives and
tunc est actu practica cognitio, et intends to introduce into matter. This is called
cognitionis forma. Quandoque vero est actual practical knowledge and is the form by
quidem ordinabilis cognitio ad actum, which knowledge takes place. At other times,
non tamen actu ordinatur; sicut cum however, there is a type of knowledge that is
artifex excogitat formam artificii, et scit capable of being ordered to an act, but this
modum operandi, non tamen operari ordering is not actual. For example, an artist
intendit; et tunc est practica habitu vel thinks out a form for his work, knows how it
virtute, non actu. Quando vero nullo can be made, yet does not intend to make it.
modo est ad actum ordinabilis cognitio, This is practical knowledge, not actual, but
tunc est pure speculativa; quod etiam habitual or virtual. At still other times,
dupliciter contingit. Uno modo, quando knowledge is utterly incapable of being
cognitio est de rebus illis quae non sunt ordered to execution. Such knowledge is purely
natae produci per scientiam speculative. This also happens in two ways.
cognoscentis, sicut cum nos First, the knowledge is about those things
cognoscimus naturalia; quandoque vero whose natures are such that they cannot be
res cognita est quidem operabilis per produced by the knowledge of the knower, as
scientiam, tamen non consideratur ut est is true for example, when we think about
operabilis; res enim per operationem in natural things. Second, it may happen that the
esse producitur. Sunt autem quaedam thing known is something that is producible
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is not consideredas
intellectum, quae non sunt separabilia producible; for a thing is given existence
secundum esse. Quando ergo through a productive operation, and there are
consideratur res per intellectum certain realities that can be separated in
operabilis distinguendo ab invicem ea understanding although they cannot exist
quae secundum esse distingui non separately. Therefore, when we consider a
possunt, non est practica cognitio nec thing which is capable of production through
actu nec habitu, sed speculativa tantum; the intellect and distinguish from each other
sicut si artifex consideret domum realities that cannot exist separately, this
investigando passiones eius, et genus et knowledge is not practical knowledge, either
differentias, et alia huiusmodi, quae actual or habitual, but only speculative. This is
secundum esse indistincte inveniuntur in the kind of knowledge a craftsman has when he
re ipsa. Sed tunc consideratur res ut est thinks about a house by reflecting only on its
operabilis, quando considerantur in ipsa genus, differences, properties, and other things
omnia quae ad eius esse requiruntur of this sort which have no separate existence in
simul. the thing itself. But a thing is considered as
something capable of execution when there are
considered in its regard all the things that are
simultaneously required for its existence.

Et secundum hos quatuor modos God’s knowledge is related to things in these

cognitio divina se habet ad res. Scientia four ways. Since His knowledge causes things,
enim eius est causativa rerum. Quaedam He knows some things by ordaining by a
ergo cognoscit ordinando ea proposito decree of His will that they come into existence
suae voluntatis ad hoc quod sint at a certain time. Of these things He has actual
secundum quodcumque tempus, et practical knowledge. Moreover, He knows
horum habet practicam cognitionem in other things which He never intends to make,
actu. Quaedam vero cognoscit quae for He knows those things which do not exist,
nullo tempore facere intendit, scit enim have not existed, and never will exist, as we
ea quae nec fuerunt, nec sunt, nec erunt, said in the preceding question. Of these things
ut in praecedenti quaestione, dictum est; He has actual knowledge, not actually practical
et de his habet quidem scientiam in actu, knowledge, however, but merely virtually
non autem actu practicam, sed virtute practical. Again, since He knows the things
tantum. Et quia res quas facit vel facere which He makes or is able to make, not only as
potest, non solum considerat secundum they exist in their own act of existence, but also
quod sunt in proprio esse, sed secundum according to all the notes which the human
omnes etiam intentiones quas intellectus intellect can find in them by analysis, He
humanus resolvendo in eis apprehendere knows things that He can make even under an
potest; ideo habet cognitionem de rebus aspect in which they are incapable of
operabilibus a se etiam eo modo quo non execution. Finally, He knows certain things of
sunt operabiles. Scit etiam et quaedam which His knowledge cannot be the cause—
quorum sua scientia causa esse non evils, for example. Therefore, it is very true to
potest, sicut mala. Unde verissime in say that there is both practical and speculative
Deo et practicam et speculativam knowledge in God.
cognitionem ponimus.

Nunc ergo videndum, secundum quem Now we must see which of the preceding ways
modum praedictorum, idea in divina is proper to the ideas which must be attributed
cognitione possit poni. Idea ergo, ut to God’s knowledge. As Augustine says if we
Augustinus dicit, secundum consider the proper meaning of the word itself,
proprietatem vocabuli forma dicitur; sed an idea is a form; but if we consider what the
si rem attendamus, idea est rei ratio, vel thing itself is, then an idea is an intelligible
similitudo. Invenimus autem in character or likeness of a thing. We find,
quibusdam formis duplicem respectum: moreover, in certain forms, a double relation:
unum ad id quod secundum eas one relation to that which is informed by these
formatur, sicut scientia respicit scientem; forms, and this is the kind of relation that
alium ad id quod est extra, sicut scientia knowledge has to the knower; another to that
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est omni formae communis, sicut relation that knowledge has to what is known.
primus. Hoc igitur nomen forma This latter relationship, however, is not
importat solum primum respectum; et common to all forms, as the first is. Therefore,
inde est quod forma semper notat the word form implies only the first relation.
habitudinem causae. Est enim forma This is why a form always has the nature of a
quodammodo causa eius quod secundum cause, for a form is, in a sense, the cause of
ipsam formatur; sive talis formatio fiat that which it informs—whether this informing
per modum inhaerentiae, ut in formis takes place by inherence, as it does in the case
intrinsecis, sive per modum imitationis, of intrinsic forms, or by imitation, as it does in
ut in formis exemplaribus. Sed the case of exemplary forms. But an intelligible
similitudo et ratio respectum etiam character and a likeness also have the second
secundum habent, ex quo non competit relationship, which does not give them the
eis habitudo causae. Si ergo loquamur de nature of a cause. If we speak, therefore, of an
idea secundum propriam nominis idea, considering only the notion that is
rationem, sic non se extendit nisi ad properly conveyed by that word, then an idea
illam scientiam secundum quam aliquid includes only that kind of knowledge according
formari potest; et haec est cognitio actu to which a thing can be made. This is
practica, vel virtute tantum, quae etiam knowledge that is actually practical, or merely
quodammodo speculativa est. Sed tamen virtually practical, which, in some way, is
si ideam communiter appellemus speculative. On the other hand, if we call an
similitudinem vel rationem, sic idea idea an intelligible character or likeness in a
etiam ad speculativam cognitionem pure wide sense, then an idea can also pertain to
pertinere potest. Vel magis proprie purely speculative knowledge. Or, if we wish
dicamus, quod idea respicit cognitionem to speak more formally, we should say that an
practicam actu vel virtute; similitudo idea belongs to knowledge that is practical,
autem et ratio tam practicam quam either actually or virtually; but an intelligible
speculativam. character or likeness belongs to both practical
and speculative knowledge.

Answers to Difficulties

Ad primum igitur dicendum, quod 1. Augustine is referring the formative action

Augustinus formationem ideae refert of ideas not only to those things which are
non tantum ad ea quae fiunt, sed etiam made but also to those which can be made. For,
ad ea quae fieri possunt; de quibus, si even if these latter never exist, they are, in a
nunquam fiant, est cognitio aliquo modo certain sense, known, speculatively, as is clear
speculativa, ut ex dictis, patet. from what has been said.

Ad secundum dicendum, quod ratio illa 2. This argument refers only to knowledge
procedit de cognitione illa quae est which is practical virtually, not actually.
practica virtute, non actu; quam nihil Nothing prevents us from calling this
prohibet aliquo modo speculativam dici, speculative in some sense in so far as it falls
secundum quod recedit ab operatione short of actual execution.
secundum actum.

Ad tertium dicendum, quod exemplar, 3. Although an exemplar implies a relation to

quamvis importet respectum ad id quod something outside, it is related as a cause to
est extra, tamen ad illud extrinsecum that extrinsic thing. Therefore, properly
importat habitudinem causae; et ideo, speaking, it belongs to knowledge that is
proprie loquendo, ad cognitionem practical, either habitually or virtually. But an
pertinet quae est practica habitu vel exemplar is not necessarily restricted to that
virtute; non autem solum ad illam quae which is actually practical, because a thing can
est actu practica: quia aliquid potest dici be called an exemplar merely if something else
exemplar ex hoc quod ad eius can be made in imitation of it—even though
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is never made. The same is true
nunquam fiat; et similiter est de ideis. of ideas.

Ad quartum dicendum, quod practicus 4. The practical intellect pertains to those

intellectus est de his quorum principia things whose principles are within us not in
sunt in nobis non quocumque modo, sed any manner whatsoever, but as being capable
in quantum sunt per nos operabilia. of being executed by us, Hence, as is evident
Unde et de eis quorum causae sunt in from what we have said, we can also have
nobis, habere possumus speculativam speculative knowledge of those things whose
scientiam, ut ex dictis, patet. causes are within us.

Ad quintum dicendum, quod intellectus 5. The speculative intellect is not differentiated

speculativus et practicus non from the practical because one has its forms
distinguuntur per hoc quod est habere from things, and the other, forms related to
formas a rebus aut ad res; quia etiam in things, because our practical intellect, at times,
nobis intellectus practicus quandoque also receives its forms from things, as happens,
habet formas a rebus sumptas; ut cum for example, when an artist, having seen some
aliquis artifex ex artificio aliquo viso work of art, conceives a form according to
concipit formam secundum quam which he intends to make something.
operari intendit. Unde non etiam oportet Therefore, it is not necessary, either, that all the
ut omnes formae quae sunt intellectus forms which pertain to the speculative intellect
speculativi, sint acceptae a rebus. be received from things.

Ad sextum dicendum, quod idea practica 6. God’s practical and speculative ideas should
et speculativa in Deo non distinguuntur not be distinguished as though they were two
quasi duae ideae; sed quia secundum kinds of ideas. They are distinguished because,
rationem intelligendi, practica addit according to our way of understanding, to the
super speculativam ordinem ad actum; speculative idea the practical adds a relation to
sicut homo addit super animal rationale; an operation. It is just as we say that man adds
nec homo tamen et animal sunt duae res. rational to animal, even though man and
animal are not two things.

Ad septimum dicendum, quod pro tanto 7. Principles of being and principles of

dicuntur eadem esse principia essendi et knowing are said to be the same, because
cognoscendi, quia quaecumque sunt whatever is a principle of being is also a
principia essendi, sunt etiam principia principle of knowing. The opposite, however,
cognoscendi; non autem e converso, is not true, since effects are not infrequently
cum effectus interdum sint principia principles of knowing causes. Consequently,
cognoscendi causas. Unde nihil prohibet there is no reason why the forms of the
formas intellectus speculativi esse speculative intellect should not be merely
tantum principia cognoscendi; formas principles of knowing, while the forms of the
autem intellectus practici esse principia practical intellect are principles both of
essendi et cognoscendi simul. knowing and of being.

Ad octavum dicendum, quod simplex 8. We speak of God’s simple knowledge, not to

notitia dicitur non ad excludendum exclude the relation which His knowledge has
respectum scientiae ad scitum, qui to what He knows, for such a relation is
inseparabiliter omnem scientiam inseparably joined to all knowledge, but to
comitatur, sed ad excludendum exclude from it things that are outside the
admixtionem eius quod est extra genus genus of knowledge. Such things are the
notitiae; sicut est existentia rerum, quam existence of things (which is added by His
addit scientia visionis; vel ordo knowledge of vision) and the relation of His
voluntatis ad res scitas producendas, will to the things that He knows and will
quem addit scientia approbationis; sicut produce (which is added by His knowledge of
etiam ignis dicitur corpus simplex, non approval). It is just as we call fire a simple
body, not to deny that it has essential parts, but
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sed commixtionem extranei. definition.

Ad nonum dicendum, quod verum et 9. The true and the good include each other,
bonum se invicem circumincedunt, quia since the true is a good and every good is true.
et verum est quoddam bonum, et bonum Therefore, the good can be considered
omne est verum; unde et bonum potest speculatively when only its truth is considered.
considerari cognitione speculativa, prout For example, we can define the good and show
consideratur veritas eius tantum: sicut what its nature is. But the good can also be
cum definimus bonum et naturam eius considered practically if it is considered as a
ostendimus; potest etiam considerari good, that is, as an end of a motion or
practice, si consideretur ut bonum; hoc operation. Consequently, it clearly does not
autem est, si consideretur in quantum est follow that the ideas or likenesses or
finis motus vel operationis. Et sic patet intelligible characters in the divine intellect
quod non sequitur ideas vel similitudines belong only to practical knowledge simply
aut rationes divini intellectus ad because they have a relation terminating in a
practicam tantum notitiam pertinere, ex good.
hoc quod respectus terminatur ad
bonum.

Answers to Contrary Difficulties

Ad primum vero quod contra obiicitur, 1. Time has no ebb or flow in God, because His
dicendum quod apud Deum non currunt eternity, which is entirely simultaneous,
tempora neque decurrunt, quia ipse sua includes all time. Hence, He knows the past,
aeternitate, quae totum est simul, totum present, and future in the same way. This is
tempus includit; et sic eodem modo precisely what Sirach (2 3:2 9) says: “For all
cognoscit praesentia, praeterita et futura; things were known to the Lord God, before
et hoc est quod dicitur Eccli., XXIII, 29: they were created: so also after they were
domino Deo nostro antequam crearentur perfected he beholds all things.” Hence, it is
nota sunt omnia; sic et post perfectum not necessary that an idea properly so called
cognoscit omnia. Et sic non oportet quod should exceed the limits of practical
idea proprie accepta limites practicae knowledge merely because the past is known
cognitionis excedat, ex hoc quod per by means of it.
eam etiam praeterita cognoscuntur.

Ad secundum dicendum, quod illa 2. If the knowledge of his handicraft which an

cognitio quam artifex creatus habet per artist, who is a creature, has by means of forms
formas operativas de suo artificio, si referred to action is a knowledge of his work as
cognoscit ipsum ut est producibile in it can be produced, although he does not intend
esse, quamvis operari non intendat, non to produce it, then that knowledge is not
est usquequaque speculativa cognitio, speculative in all respects but is habitually
sed habitualiter practica; cognitio autem practical. But that knowledge by which the
artificis qua cognoscit artificiata non ut artist knows, works, not, however, as he can
sunt productibilia ab ipso, quae est pure produce them, is purely speculative. It does not
speculativa, non habet ideas contain ideas corresponding to the work,
respondentes sibi, sed forte rationes vel although it might possibly contain likenesses or
similitudines. intelligible characters of it.

Ad tertium dicendum, quod est 3. Both speculative and practical knowledge

commune practicae et speculativae are had by means of principles and causes.
scientiae quod sit per principia et causas; Consequently, this argument cannot prove that
unde ex hac ratione non potest probari a science is speculative or that it is practical.
de aliqua scientia neque quod sit
speculativa, neque quod sit practica.
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ARTICLE IV

In the fourth article we ask:

Is there in god an idea of evil?

[ARTICLE De ver., 2, 15; S.T., I, 14, 10; 15, 3, ad 1; I Sent., 36, 1, 2; C.G., I, 7 1; Quodl.,
XI, 2, 2.]

Quarto quaeritur utrum malum habeat ideam Difficulties

in Deo.

Et videtur quod sic. It seems that there is, for

Deus enim habet scientiam simplicis notitiae 1. God knows evil things in His science of
de malis. Sed idea aliquo modo respondet simple knowledge. But the ideas belong to
scientiae simplicis notitiae, secundum quod His science of simple knowledge in some
large sumitur pro similitudine vel ratione. way if idea is taken in its broader meaning
Ergo malum habet ideam in Deo. of a likeness or intelligible character.
Therefore, there is an idea of evil in God.

Praeterea, malum nihil prohibet esse in bono 2. There is no reason why evil cannot be in
quod non est ei oppositum. Sed similitudo a good not opposed to it. Now, the likeness
mali non opponitur bono, sicut nec of evil is not opposed to the good, just as
similitudo nigri albo, quia species the likeness of black is not opposed to
contrariorum in anima non sunt contrariae. white, because the species of contraries in
Ergo nihil prohibet, in Deo, quamvis sit the soul are not contrary. Therefore, there
summum bonum, ponere ideam vel is no reason why there cannot be an idea or
similitudinem mali. likeness of evil in God, even though He is
the highest good.

Praeterea, ubicumque est aliqua communitas, 3. Wherever there is any community, there
ibi est aliqua similitudo. Sed ex hoc ipso is likeness. Now, from the fact that a thing
quod aliquid est privatio entis, suscipit entis is a privation of being, being can be
praedicationem; unde dicitur in IV predicated of it; hence it is said in the
metaphysicorum, quod negationes et Metaphysics that negations and privations
privationes dicuntur entia. Ergo ex hoc ipso are called beings. Therefore, from the fact
quod malum est privatio boni, habet aliquam that evil is the privation of good, some
similitudinem in Deo, qui est summum likeness of it exists in God, who is the
bonum. highest good.

Praeterea, omne illud quod per seipsum 4. Whatever is known in itself has its idea
cognoscitur, habet ideam in Deo. Sed falsum in God. But the false, like the true, is
per seipsum cognoscitur, sicut et verum; known in itself; for, just as first principles
sicut enim prima principia sunt per se nota in are known in themselves in their truth, so
sua veritate, ita eorum opposita sunt per se also are the opposites of these principles
nota in sua falsitate. Ergo falsum habet known in themselves in their falsity.
ideam in Deo. Falsum autem est quoddam Hence, the false has its idea in God. Now,
malum, sicut et verum est intellectus bonum, the false is a kind of evil, just as the true is
ut dicitur in VI Ethicorum. Ergo malum the good of the intellect, as we read in the
habet ideam in Deo. Ethics. Therefore, evil has an idea in God.

Praeterea, quidquid habet naturam aliquam, 5. Whatever has a nature has an idea in
habet ideam in Deo. Sed vitium, cum sit God. Now, since vice is the contrary of
virtuti contrarium, ponit aliquam naturam in virtue, it has a nature which belongs to the
 genere
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quality. Therefore, it has
an idea
Sed ex hoc ipso quod est vitium, est malum. in God. But because it is vice, it is evil.
Ergo malum habet ideam in Deo. Therefore, evil has an idea in God.

Praeterea, si malum non habet ideam, non est 6. If evil has no idea, the only reason for
hoc nisi quia malum non est ens. Sed formae this is that evil is non-being. But the forms
cognitivae possunt esse de non entibus; nihil by which one knows can have non-beings
enim prohibet imaginari montes aureos, aut as their objects. There is nothing to prevent
Chimaeram. Ergo nihil etiam prohibet mali us, for example, from imagining golden
ideam esse in Deo. mountains or chimeras. Therefore, there is
no reason why evil cannot have an idea in
God.

Praeterea, inter res signatas non habere 7. If a thing has no mark upon it and exists
signum est esse signatum, ut patet in ovibus among other things that are marked, the
quae signantur. Sed idea est quoddam very lack of a mark becomes its mark, as is
signum ideati. Ergo ex hoc ipso quod, rebus clear in sheep which are marked. Now, an
bonis habentibus ideam in Deo, malum non idea is, in a way, a sign of that of which it
habet, debet dici ipsum esse ideatum vel is an idea. Therefore, since all good things
formatum. have an idea in God, and evil does not, evil
itself should be said to be modeled upon or
formed in the likeness of an idea.

Praeterea, quidquid est a Deo, habet ideam in 8. Whatever comes from God has its idea
eo. Sed malum est a Deo, poenae scilicet. in Him. But evil, that is, the evil of
Ergo habet ideam in ipso. punishment, comes from God. Therefore,
it has an idea in God.

Sed contra. To the Contrary

Omne ideatum habet esse terminatum per 1. All effects of an idea have an act of
ideam. Sed malum non habet esse existence determined by that idea. But evil
terminatum, cum non habeat esse, sed does not have a determined act of
privatio sit entis. Ergo malum non habet existence, since it does not have any
ideam in Deo. existence, and is, instead, a privation of
being. Therefore, evil does not have an
idea in God.

Praeterea, secundum Dionysium, idea vel 2. According to Dionysius, the divine

exemplar est praedefinitio divinae voluntatis. exemplar or idea is a pre-definition of the
Sed voluntas Dei non habet se nisi ad bona. divine will. But the divine will is related
Ergo malum non habet ideam in Deo. only to what is good. Therefore, evil has
no exemplar in God.

Praeterea, malum est privatio speciei, modi 3. “Evil,” according to Augustine, “is the
et ordinis, secundum Augustinum. Sed ipsas privation of form, measure, and order.”
ideas Plato species appellavit. Ergo malum Now, Plato says that ideas themselves are
non potest habere ideam. beautiful. Consequently, evil can have no
idea.

Responsio. REPLY

Dicendum, quod idea secundum propriam sui As pointed out previously, an idea,
rationem, ut patet ex dictis, importat formam, according to its proper nature, implies a
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Unde, cum nihil quod est in Deo, possit esse thing. Consequently, since there is nothing
mali principium, non potest malum ideam in God that can be a principle of evil, evil
habere in Deo, si proprie accipiatur idea. Sed cannot have an idea in God if idea is taken
nec etiam si accipiatur communiter pro in its proper sense. This is likewise true if
ratione vel similitudine; quia, secundum it is taken in its broad sense as meaning a
Augustinum, malum dicitur ex hoc ipso quod likeness or intelligible character, because,
non habet formam. Unde, cum similitudo as Augustine says, evil gets its name from
attendatur secundum formam aliquo modo the fact that it lacks form. Hence, since a
participatam, non potest esse quod malum likeness is considered as a form that is in
similitudinem aliquam in Deo habeat, cum some way shared by others, evil can have
aliquid dicatur malum ex hoc ipso quod a no likeness in God, because a thing is
participatione divinitatis recedit. called evil for the very reason that it falls
short of any participation in divinity.

Answers to Difficulties

Ad primum igitur dicendum, quod scientia 1. God’s science of simple knowledge has
simplicis notitiae non solum est de malis, sed as its object, not only evil, but also certain
etiam de quibusdam bonis, quae nec sunt, good things that do not exist, will not
nec erunt, nec fuerunt: et respectu horum exist, and never did exist. It is with respect
ponitur idea in scientia simplicis notitiae, to these non-existing things that there is an
non autem respectu malorum. idea in God’s simple knowledge, but there
is no idea in it of evil things.

Ad secundum dicendum, quod non negatur 2.We deny that evil has an exemplar in
malum habere ideam in Deo ratione God, not just because of its opposition, but
oppositionis tantum; sed quia non habet because evil has no nature through which
aliquam naturam per quam aliquo modo it could in some way participate in
participet aliquid quod sit in Deo, ut sic something that is in God and which could,
similitudo eius accipi possit. therefore, be called a likeness of it.

Ad tertium dicendum, quod illa communitas 3. That community by which something is

qua aliquid communiter praedicatur de ente predicated both of being and of non-being
et non ente, est rationis tantum, quia is a community merely of reason, because
negationes et privationes non sunt nisi entia negations and privations are merely beings
rationis: talis autem communitas non sufficit of reason. Such a community is not
ad similitudinem de qua nunc loquimur. enough for the likeness of which we are
now speaking.

Ad quartum dicendum, quod hoc principium: 4. That this principle, “No whole is greater
nullum totum est maius sua parte, esse than its part,” is false is a truth. Therefore,
falsum, quoddam verum est; unde to know that it is false is to know
cognoscere hoc esse falsum, est cognoscere something true. However, the falsity of
quoddam verum. Falsitas tamen eius this principle is known only by its
principii non cognoscitur nisi per privation of truth, just as blindness is
privationem veritatis, sicut caecitas per known by its being a privation of sight.
privationem visus.

Ad quintum dicendum, quod sicut actiones 5. Just as evil actions are good in so far as
malae quantum ad id quod habent de entitate, they have existence and come from God,
bonae sunt, et a Deo sunt, ita est etiam et de so also in this sense are the habits good
habitibus qui sunt earum principia vel which are the principles or effects of these
effectus; unde ex hoc quod sunt mala, non actions. Therefore, the fact that they are
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not posit any nature but only a
privationem. privation.

Ad sextum dicendum, quod aliquid dicitur 6. A thing is called a non-being for two
non ens dupliciter. Uno modo, quia non esse reasons. First, because nonexistence is
cadit in definitione eius, sicut caecitas dicitur included in its definition; and this is why
non ens; et talis non entis non potest concipi blindness is called a non-being. It is
aliqua forma neque in intellectu neque in impossible to conceive, either in our
imaginatione; et huiusmodi non ens est imagination or in our intellect, any form
malum. Alio modo, quia non invenitur in for such non-beings; and evil is a non-
rerum natura, quamvis ipsa privatio entitatis being of this type. Second, because the
non claudatur in eius definitione; et sic nihil non-being is not found in the realm of
prohibet imaginari non entia, et eorum nature, even though the privation of
formas concipere. existence is not included in its definition.
Here, however, there is no reason why we
cannot imagine such non-beings and
conceive their forms.

Ad septimum dicendum, quod ex hoc ipso, 7. Because evil has no idea in God, God
quod malum non habet ideam in Deo, a Deo knows it by means of the idea of the good
cognoscitur per ideam boni oppositi; et per opposed to it. In this way, evil is related to
hunc modum se habet ad cognitionem ac si His knowledge as though it had an idea-
haberet ideam; non autem ita quod privatio not that the privation of an idea stands in
ideae respondeat ei pro idea, quia in Deo the place of an idea, however, because
privatio esse non potest. there can be no privation in God.

Ad octavum dicendum, quod poenae malum 8. The evil of punishment proceeds from
exit a Deo sub ratione ordinis iustitiae; et sic God as part of His order of justice. Hence,
bonum est, et ideam habet in Deo. it is good and has an idea in Him.

ARTICLE V

In the fifth article we ask:

Is there in God an idea of first matter?

[ARTICLE S.T., I, 15, 3, ad 3; I Sent., 36, 1, 1.]

Quinto quaeritur utrum materia prima Difficulties

habeat ideam in Deo.

Et videtur quod non. It seems not, for

Idea enim, secundum Augustinum, forma 1. According to Augustine: “An idea is a

est. Sed materia prima nullam habet form.”’ But matter has no form. Therefore, in
formam. Ergo idea in Deo nulla ei God there is no idea corresponding to matter.
respondet.

Praeterea, materia non est ens nisi in 2. Matter is merely a being in potency. Now,
potentia. Si ergo idea debet ideato if an idea has to correspond to its effect, if
respondere si habet ideam, oportet quod matter has an idea, the idea of matter will be
eius idea sit in potentia tantum. Sed in merely in potency. There is, however, no
Deum potentialitas non cadit. Ergo potentiality in God. Therefore, first matter
materia prima non habet ideam in ipso. has no idea in Him.
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Praeterea, ideae sunt in Deo eorum quae 3. As they exist in God, the ideas are of those
sunt vel esse possunt. Sed materia prima things which are or can be. But first matter
nec est per se separata existens, neque esse does not exist separately, that is, by itself, nor
potest. Ergo non habet ideam in Deo. can it so exist. Therefore, it has no idea in
God.

Praeterea, idea est ut secundum ipsam 4. An idea is that according to which a thing
aliquid formatur. Sed materia prima is informed. But first matter can never be
nunquam potest formari, ita ut forma sit informed so that a form would belong to its
de essentia eius. Ergo si haberet ideam, essence. Therefore, if it did have an idea, that
frustra esset idea illa in Deo; quod est idea would be useless in God. This, however,
absurdum. is absurd.

Sed contra. To the Contrary

Omne quod procedit in esse a Deo, habet 1. Whatever derives its act of existence from
ideam in ipso. Materia est huiusmodi. God has an idea in God. Matter belongs to
Ergo habet ideam in Deo. this class of beings. Therefore, it has an idea
in God.

Praeterea, omnis essentia derivatur ab 2. Every essence is derived from the divine
essentia divina. Ergo quidquid habet essence. Therefore whatever has an essence
aliquam essentiam, habet ideam in Deo. has an exemplar in God. Matter belongs to
Sed materia prima est huiusmodi. Ergo, et this class of beings. Therefore.
cetera.

Responsio. REPLY

Dicendum, quod Plato, qui invenitur Plato, who was the first to speak about ideas,
primo locutus fuisse de ideis, non posuit did not posit any idea for first matter, because
materiae primae aliquam ideam, quia ipse he asserted that the ideas were the causes of
ponebat ideas ut causas ideatorum; the things modeled upon them, and first
materia autem prima non erat causatum matter is not caused by an idea but, instead, is
ideae, sed erat ei concausa. Posuit enim its co-cause. For he said that there are two
duo principia ex parte materiae, scilicet principles to be found in matter, “the great”
magnum et parvum; sed unum ex parte and “the small,” but only on principle to be
formae, scilicet ideam. Nos autem found in form, namely, the idea. We,
ponimus materiam esse causatam a Deo; however, assert that matter is caused by God.
unde necesse est ponere quod aliquo modo Hence, it is necessary to affirm that it
sit eius idea in Deo, cum quidquid ab ipso exemplar in some way exists in God, since
causatur, similitudinem ipsius utcumque He possesses a likeness o whatever He
retineat. \ causes.

Sed tamen, si proprie de idea loquamur, On the other hand, if we take idea in its strict
non potest poni quod materia prima habeat sense, we cannot say that first matter of itself
per se ideam in Deo distinctam ab idea has an idea in God that is distinct from the
formae vel compositi: quia idea proprie idea of the form or of the composite. For an
dicta respicit rem secundum quod est idea, properly speaking is related to a thing in
producibilis in esse; materia autem non so far as it can be brought into existence; an
potest exire in esse sine forma, nec e matter cannot come into existence without a
converso. Unde proprie idea non form, nor can a form come into existence
respondet materiae tantum, neque formae without matter. Hence, properly speaking,
tantum; sed toti composito respondet una there is no idea corresponding merely to
idea, quae est factiva totius et quantum ad matter or merely to form; but one idea
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composite—an idea
large accipiamus ideam pro similitudine that causes the whole, both its form and its
vel ratione, tunc illa possunt per se matter. On the other hand, if we take idea in
distinctam habere ideam quae possunt its broader sense as meaning an intelligible
distincte considerari, quamvis separatim character or likeness, then both matter and
esse non possint; et sic nihil prohibet form of themselves can be said to have an
materiae primae etiam secundum se ideam idea by which they can be known distinctly,
esse. even though they cannot exist separately. In
this sense, there is no reason why there
cannot be an idea of first matter, even taken
in itself.

Answers to Difficulties

Ad primum igitur dicendum, quod 1. Although first matter has no form, there is
quamvis materia prima sit informis, tamen in it an imitation of the first form; for, even
inest ei imitatio primae formae: though its act of existence may be very
quantumcumque enim debile esse habeat, feeble, it is an imitation of the first being. For
illud tamen est imitatio primi entis; et this reason, its likeness can be in God.
secundum hoc potest habere similitudinem
in Deo.

Ad secundum dicendum, quod ideam et 2. The idea and its copy need not be similar
ideatum non oportet esse similia according to a conformity in nature. It is
secundum conformitatem naturae, sed enough that one represent the other. For this
secundum repraesentationem tantum; unde reason, the idea of even composite things is
et rerum compositarum est simplex idea; simple, and, similarly, the idea of a potential
et similiter existentis in potentia est idealis being is actual.
similitudo actu.

Ad tertium dicendum, quod quamvis 3. Even though matter cannot exist by itself,
materia secundum se esse non possit, it can be considered in itself. Thus, it can, in
tamen potest secundum se considerari; et itself, have a likeness.
sic potest habere per se similitudinem.

Ad quartum dicendum, quod ratio illa 4. That argument refers to the idea inasmuch
procedit de idea practica actu vel virtute, as it is actually or virtually practical, and is
quae est rei prout est in esse producibilis; related to a thing in so far as it can be brought
et talis idea materiae primae non convenit. into being. First matter does not have an idea
of this kind.

Answers to Contrary Difficulties

Ad primum quod in contrarium obiicitur, 1. Matter derives its act of existence from
dicendum, quod materia non procedit in God only in so far as it is part of a composite.
esse a Deo nisi in composito; et sic ei In this sense, it does not, properly speaking,
idea, proprie loquendo, respondet. have an idea in God.

Et similiter dicendum ad secundum, quod 2. Similarly, matter does not properly have an
materia, proprie loquendo, non habet essence. It is, rather, part of the essence of the
essentiam, sed est pars essentiae totius. whole.
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ARTICLE VI

In the sixth article we ask:

Are there ideas in god of those things which do not exist, will not exist, and have not
existed?

[ARTICLE S.T., I, 15, 3, ad 2. See also readings given for q. 2, a. 8.]

Sexto quaeritur utrum in Deo sit idea eorum Difficulties

quae nec sunt, nec erunt, nec fuerunt.

Et videtur quod non. It seems not, for

Quia nihil habet ideam nisi quod habet esse 1. Nothing has an idea in God unless it has
determinatum. Sed illud quod nec fuit, nec a determined act of existence. But that
est, nec erit, nullo modo habet esse which does not exist, never has existed, and
terminatum. Ergo nec ideam. never will exist has no determinate act of
existence at all. Therefore, neither does it
have an idea in God.

Sed dicebat, quod quamvis non habeat esse 2. But it was said that, even though it does
terminatum in se, habet tamen esse not have a determinate act of existence in
terminatum in Deo. Sed contra, ex hoc est itself, it has, nevertheless, such a
aliquid terminatum quod unum ab alio determinate act in God.—On the contrary, a
distinguitur. Sed omnia, prout sunt in Deo, thing is determinate in so far as it is
sunt unum, et ab invicem indistincta. Ergo distinguished from another. But all things
nec etiam in Deo habet esse terminatum. as they exist in God are one and are not
distinct from each other. Therefore, even in
God it does not have a determinate act of
existence.

Praeterea, Dionysius dicit, quod exemplaria 3. According to Dionysius, exemplars are

sunt divinae et bonae voluntates, quae sunt those good acts of the divine will which
praedeterminativae et effectivae rerum. Sed cause and predetermine things. But the
illud quod nec fuit, nec est, nec erit, things which are not, have not been, nor
nunquam fuit praedeterminatum a divina will be were never predetermined by the
voluntate. Ergo non habet ideam vel divine will. Therefore, they do not have an
exemplar in Deo. idea or exemplar in God.

Praeterea, idea ordinatur ad rei 4. An idea is ordained to the production of

productionem. Si ergo sit idea eius quod a thing. If there is, therefore, an idea of
nunquam in esse producitur, videtur quod sit something which will never be given
frustra; quod est absurdum; ergo et cetera. existence, it seems that such an idea is
useless. But this would be absurd.
Therefore.

Sed contra. To the Contrary

Deus habet cognitionem de rebus per ideas. 1. God knows things by means of ideas.
Sed ipse cognoscit ea quae nec sunt, nec But as we said above. He knows those
erunt, nec fuerunt, ut dictum est supra in things which are not, have not been, nor
quaestione de scientia Dei. Ergo est in eo will be. Therefore, there is an idea in God
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Praeterea, causa non dependet ab effectu. 2. A cause does not depend on its effect.
Sed idea est causa essendi rem. Ergo non Now, an idea is a cause o the existence of
dependet ab esse rei aliquo modo: potest things. Therefore, it does not depend in any
igitur esse etiam de his quae nec sunt, nec way on their existence. Consequently, there
erunt, nec fuerunt. can be ideas of those things which do not
exist, have not existed, and never will exist.

Responsio. REPLY

Dicendum, quod idea proprie dicta respicit Properly speaking, an idea belongs to
practicam cognitionem non solum in actu, practical knowledge that is not only
sed in habitu. Unde, cum Deus de his quae actually but also habitually practical.
facere potest, quamvis nunquam sint facta Therefore, since God has virtually practical
nec futura, habeat cognitionem virtualiter knowledge of those things which He could
practicam, relinquitur quod idea possit esse make, even though He never makes them
eius quod nec est, nec fuit, nec erit; non or never will make them, there must be
tamen eodem modo sicut est eorum quae ideas of those things which are not, have
sunt, vel erunt, vel fuerunt; quia ad ea quae not been, nor will be. But these ideas will
sunt, vel erunt, vel fuerunt, producenda, not be the same as those of the things
determinatur ex proposito divinae voluntatis, which are, have been, or will be, because
non autem ad ea quae nec sunt, nec erunt, the divine will determines to pro duce the
nec fuerunt; et sic huiusmodi habent things that are, have been, and will be, but
quodammodo indeterminatas ideas. not to produce those which neither are,
have been, nor will be. The latter, therefore
have, in a certain sense, indeterminate
ideas.

Answers to Difficulties

Ad primum igitur dicendum, quod quamvis 1. Even though that which never existed,
quod nec est, nec fuit, nec erit, non habeat does not exist, and will no exist lacks a
esse determinatum in se, est tamen determined act of existence in itself, it
determinate in Dei cognitione. exists determinately in God’s knowledge.

Ad secundum dicendum, quod aliud est esse 2. It is One thing to be in God, another to
in Deo, et aliud in cognitione Dei: malum be in His knowledge. Evil is not in God; it
enim non est in Deo, sed est in scientia Dei. is, however, contained in His knowledge.
Secundum hoc enim aliquid esse dicitur in Now, a,, thing is said to be in God’s
Dei scientia quod a Deo cognoscitur; et quia knowledge if God knows it; and because
Deus cognoscit omnia distincte, ut in God knows all things distinctly, as we said
praecedenti quaestione dictum est, ideo in in the previous question, things are distinct
eius scientia res distinctae sunt, quamvis in in His knowledge even though in Him they
ipso sint unum. are one,
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Ad tertium dicendum, quod quamvis Deus 3. Even though God may never will to
nunquam voluerit producere huiusmodi res bring into existence things of this class,
in esse quarum ideas habet, tamen vult se whose ideas He possesses, He wills that He
posse eas producere, et se habere scientiam be able to produce them and that He
eas producendi; unde et Dionysius non dicit possess the knowledge necessary for
quod ad rationem exemplaris exigeretur producing them. Consequently, Dionysius
voluntas praedefiniens et efficiens, sed is saying that the nature of an exemplar
definitiva et effectiva. demands, not a will that is predefining and
effecting, but merely a will that can define
and effect.

Ad quartum dicendum, quod ideae illae non 4. Those ideas are not directed by God’s
sunt ordinatae a divina cognitione ad hoc ut knowledge to the production of something
secundum eas aliquid fiat, sed ad hoc quod in their likeness, but rather to this, that
secundum eas aliquid fieri possit. something can be produced in their
likeness.

ARTICLE VII

In the seventh article we ask:

Are there in God ideas of accidents?

[ARTICLE S.T., I, 15, 3, ad 4; I Sent., 36, 1, 1.]

Septimo quaeritur utrum accidentia Difficulties

habeant ideam in Deo.

Et videtur quod non. It seems not, for

Quia idea non est nisi ad cognoscendum et 1. An idea is for knowing and causing things.
ad causandum res. Sed accidens But an accident is known by means of its
cognoscitur per substantiam, et ex eius substance, and is caused by the principles of
principiis causatur. Ergo non oportet quod the substance. Hence, it need not have an
in Deo ideam habeat. idea in God.

Sed dicebat, quod accidens cognoscitur per 2. But it was stated that the existence, not the
substantiam cognitione quia est, non autem essence, of an accident is known by means
cognitione quid est.- Sed contra, quod quid of its subject.—On the contrary, the
est significat definitio rei, et maxime definition of a thing signifies what it is,
ratione generis. Sed in definitionibus especially by giving its genus. But, in the
accidentium ponitur substantia, ut dicitur definitions of accidents, as is said in the
VII Metaphysicor., et subiectum, ita quod Metaphysics, are placed substance and the
subiectum ponitur loco generis, ut subject, in the sense in which subject is used
Commentator ibidem dicit, ut cum dicitur: instead of the genus, as the Commentator
simum est nasus curvus. Ergo etiam notes. For example, we say: “Snub means a
quantum ad cognitionem quid est accidens curved nose.” Consequently, we know the
per substantiam cognoscitur. essence of an accident by knowing the
substance.

Praeterea, omne quod habet ideam, est 3. Whatever has an idea participates in it.
participativum ipsius. Sed accidentia nihil But accidents do not participate in anything,
participant; cum participare sit tantum because participation is proper only to
substances since they alone can receive
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possunt; ergo non habent ideam. ideas.

Praeterea, in illis quae dicuntur per prius et 4. In regard to those things that are
posterius, non est accipere ideam predicated as prior and subsequent, in Plato’s
communem, sicut in numeris et figuris, opinion an idea should not be taken as
secundum opinionem Platonis, ut patet in common, e.g., as applied to numbers and
III Metaphys. et in I Ethic.; et hoc ideo geometrical figures. This is clear from the
quia primum est quasi idea secundi. Sed Metaphysics and Ethics. The reason for this
ens dicitur de substantia et accidente per is that the first is, as it were, the exemplar of
prius et posterius. Ergo accidens non habet the second. Now, being is predicated of
ideam sed substantia est ei loco ideae. substance and accident as prior and
subsequent. Therefore, an accident does not
have an idea, but has substance in the place
of an idea.

Sed contra. To the Contrary

Omne quod est causatum a Deo, habet 1. Whatever is caused by God has its idea in
ideam in ipso. Sed Deus causa est non God. Now, God causes not only substances
solum substantiarum, sed etiam but accidents as well. Therefore, accidents
accidentium. Ergo accidentia habent ideam have an idea in God.
in Deo.

Praeterea, omne quod est in aliquo genere, 2. Every inferior of a genus should be
oportet reduci in primum illius generis, reduced to the first of that genus, just as
sicut omne calidum ad calidum ignis. Sed everything that is hot is reduced to the heat
ideae sunt principales formae, ut of fire. Now, as Augustine says: “Ideas are
Augustinus dicit in libro LXXXIII principal forms.” Consequently, since
quaestionum. Ergo, cum accidentia sint accidents are forms, it seems that they have
formae quaedam, videtur quod habeant ideas in God.
ideas in Deo.

Responsio. REPLY

Dicendum, quod Plato, qui primus As the Philosopher says, Plato, who first
introduxit ideas, non posuit ideas introduced the notion of ideas, posited ideas,
accidentium, sed solum substantiarum, ut not for accidents, but only for substances.
patet per philosophum in I Metaphys. The reason for this was that Plato thought
Cuius ratio fuit, quia Plato posuit ideas that the ideas were the proximate causes of
esse proximas causas rerum; unde illud cui things. Hence, when he found a proximate
inveniebat proximam causam praeter cause other than an idea for a thing, he held
ideam, non ponebat habere ideam; et inde that the thing did not have an idea. This also
est quod ponebat, in his quae dicuntur per is the reason why he said that there is no
prius et posterius, non esse communem common idea for those things that are
ideam, sed primum esse ideam secundi. Et predicated as being prior and subsequent, but
hanc etiam opinionem tangit Dionysius, in that the first is the idea of the second.
V cap. de divinis nominibus, imponens Dionysius also mentions this opinion,
eam cuidam Clementi philosopho, qui attributing it to a certain Clement the
dicebat, superiora in entibus esse Philosopher, who said that superior beings
inferiorum exemplaria; et hac ratione, cum were the exemplars for inferior. Using this
accidens immediate a substantia causetur, argument, namely, that accidents are caused
accidentium ideas Plato non posuit. directly by substances, Plato did not posit
ideas of accidents.
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Sed quia nos ponimus Deum immediatam On the other hand, since we affirm that God
causam uniuscuiusque rei secundum quod is the direct cause of each and every thing
in omnibus causis secundis operatur, et because He works in all secondary causes
quod omnes effectus secundi ex eius and since all secondary effects are results of
praedefinitione proveniant: ideo non solum His pre-definition, we posit ideas in Him not
primorum entium, sed etiam secundorum only of first beings but also of second
in eo ideas ponimus et sic substantiarum et beings, and, consequently, both of
accidentium; sed diversorum accidentium substances and of accidents, but of different
diversimode. accidents in different ways.

Quaedam enim sunt accidentia propria ex First, there are proper accidents, which are
principiis subiecti causata, quae secundum caused by the principles of their subjects and
esse nunquam a suis subiectis separantur. never have existence apart from their
Et huiusmodi una operatione in esse subjects. These accidents are brought into
producuntur cum suo subiecto. Unde, cum existence together with their subject by one
idea, proprie loquendo, sit forma rei operation. Consequently, since an idea,
operabilis inquantum huiusmodi, non erit properly speaking, is a form of something
talium accidentium idea distincta, sed that can be made, considered precisely under
subiecti cum omnibus accidentibus eius this aspect, there will not be distinct ideas of
erit una idea; sicut aedificator unam such accidents. There will be only one idea,
formam habet de domo et omnibus quae that of the subject with all its accidents—just
domui accidunt inquantum huiusmodi, per as an architect has one form of a house and
quam, domum cum omnibus talibus suis of all the accidents that pertain to a house as
accidentibus simul in esse producit, such, and by means of this one form brings
cuiusmodi accidens est quadratura ipsius, into being the house and all its accidents,
et alia huiusmodi. such as its square shape and the like.

Quaedam vero sunt accidentia, quae non There are other accidents, however, that are
sequuntur inseparabiliter suum subiectum, not inseparable from their subject and do not
nec ex eius principiis dependent. Et talia depend on its principles. These are brought
producuntur in esse alia operatione praeter into existence by an operation other than that
operationem qua producitur subiectum; by which the subject is produced. For
sicut non ex hoc ipso quod homo fit homo example, it does not follow from the fact that
sequitur quod sit grammaticus, sed per a man is made a man that he is a
aliquam aliam operationem. Et talium grammarian; this is the result of another
accidentium est idea in Deo distincta ab operation. Now, the ideas in God of such
idea subiecti, sicut etiam artifex concipit accidents are distinct from the idea of the
formam picturae domus praeter formam subject, just as the form of a picture of a
domus. house, which an artist conceives, is distinct
from the form he conceives of the house
itself.

Sed si large accipiamus ideam pro If we take idea in its broader sense, however,
similitudine vel ratione, sic utraque as meaning a likeness, then we can say that
accidentia habent ideam distinctam in Deo, both types of accidents have distinct ideas in
quia per se distincte considerari possunt; God, because He can know each one in itself
unde et philosophus dicit in I Metaphysic., distinctly. This is why the Philosopher says
quod quantum ad rationem sciendi, that, with respect to their manner of being
accidentia debent habere ideam sicut et known, accidents should, like substances,
substantiae; sed quantum ad alia, propter have ideas; but with respect to the other
quae Plato ponebat ideas, ut scilicet essent reasons why Plato posited exemplars,
causae generationis et essendi, ideae namely, to be the causes of generation and of
videntur esse substantiarum tantum. being, it seems that only substances have
ideas.
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Answers to Difficulties

Ad primum igitur dicendum, quod, sicut 1. As we said above, there is in God an idea
dictum est, in Deo non est idea solum not only of first effects but also of second
primorum effectuum, sed etiam effects. Hence, even though accidents have
secundorum; unde, quamvis accidentia their act of existence by means of
habeant esse per substantiam, non substances, this does not prevent their having
excluditur quin habeant ideas. ideas.

Ad secundum dicendum, quod accidens 2. An accident can be taken in two ways.

dupliciter potest accipi. Uno modo in First, it can be taken in the abstract. In this
abstracto; et sic consideratur secundum way, it is considered according to its proper
propriam rationem; sic enim assignamus in nature, a genus and species are given it, and
accidentibus genus et speciem; et hoc its subject is not placed in its definition as a
modo subiectum non ponitur in definitione genus but rather as a specific difference. In
accidentis ut genus, sed ut differentia, ut this sense we say: “Snubness is a curvature
cum dicitur: simitas est curvitas nasi. Alio of the nose.” On the other hand, an accident
modo possunt accipi in concreto; et sic can be taken in the concrete. In this way, it is
accipiuntur secundum quod sunt unum per considered according as it has an accidental
accidens cum subiecto; unde sic non unity with its subject. Hence, neither a genus
assignantur eis nec genus nec species, et ita nor a species is assigned to it. Here it is true
verum est quod subiectum ponitur ut genus that the subject is put in the place of the
in definitione accidentis. genus in the definition of an accident.

Ad tertium dicendum, quod, quamvis 3. Although an accident is not that which

accidens non sit participans, est tamen ipsa participates, it is, however, a participation.
participatio; et sic patet quod ei etiam Hence, it is clear that in God there is an idea
respondet idea in Deo, vel similitudo. or likeness corresponding to it.

Ad quartum patet responsio ex dictis. 4. The response to this difficulty is clear

from what has been said.

ARTICLE VIII

In the eighth article we ask:

Are there in God ideas of singulars?

[ARTICLE S.T., I, 15, 3, ad 4; De ver., 2, aa. 4-5.]

Octavo quaeritur utrum singularia habeant Difficulties

ideam in Deo.

Et videtur quod non. It seems not, for

Quia singularia sunt infinita in potentia. Sed 1. Singulars are potentially infinite in
in Deo est idea non solum eius quod est, sed number. Now, in God there is an idea, not
etiam eius quod esse potest. Si ergo merely of what exists, but also of what can
singularium esset idea in Deo, essent in ipso exist. If, therefore, there were ideas of
ideae infinitae; quod videtur absurdum, cum singulars in God, there would be an infinite
non possint esse actu infinita. number of ideas in Him. This seems absurd,
since they could not be actually infinite.
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Praeterea, si singularia habent ideam in Deo; 2. If singulars have ideas in God, either
aut est eadem idea singularis et speciei, aut there is one idea for the individual and the
alia et alia. Si alia et alia: tunc unius rei sunt species, or there are distinct ideas for them.
multae ideae in Deo, quia idea speciei est If there were distinct ideas, then there
etiam idea singularis. Si autem est una et would be many ideas in God for one thing,
eadem; cum in idea speciei omnia singularia because the idea of the species is also that
quae sunt eadem specie, conveniant, tunc of the individual. On the other hand, if
omnium singularium non erit nisi una idea there is but one and the same idea for the
tantum; et sic singularia non habebunt individual and the species, then, since all
ideam distinctam in Deo. the individuals of the same species have the
same idea, there would be only one idea for
all, and, consequently, singulars would not
have distinct ideas in God.

Praeterea, multa singularium casu accidunt. 3. Many singulars happen by chance. Now,
Sed talia non sunt praedefinita. Cum ergo such beings are not predefined. Since, as is
idea requirat praedefinitionem, ut ex evident from what has been said previously,
praedictis, patet, videtur quod non omnia namely, that an idea postulates pre-
singularia habeant ideam in Deo. definition, it seems that not all singulars
have an idea in God.

Praeterea, quaedam singularia sunt ex 4. Certain singulars are combinations of

duabus speciebus commixta, sicut mulus ex two species. For example, a mule is a
asino et equo. Si ergo talia habent ideam, combination of a horse and an ass. Now, if
videtur quod unicuique eorum respondeat such things had ideas in God, it would seem
duplex idea; et hoc videtur absurdum, cum that there would be two ideas for each one.
inconveniens sit ponere multitudinem in This seems absurd, since it is unreasonable
causa, et unitatem in effectu. to affirm multiplicity in the cause and unity
in the effect.

Sed contra. To the Contrary

Ideae sunt in Deo ad cognoscendum et 1. Ideas are in God for the purpose of
operandum. Sed Deus est cognitor et knowing and making. But God is one who
operator singularium. Ergo in ipso sunt knows and makes singulars. Therefore,
eorum ideae. there are in God ideas of singulars.

Praeterea, ideae ordinantur ad esse rerum. 2. Ideas are directed to the existence of
Sed singularia habent verius esse quam things. But singulars have acts of existence
universalia, cum universalia non subsistant, more truly than universals do, because the
nisi in singularibus. Ergo singularia magis latter subsist only in singulars. Therefore, it
debent habere ideas quam universalia. is more necessary for singulars to have
exemplars than it is for universals.

REPLY

Responsio. Dicendum, quod Plato, non Plato did not posit ideas of singulars but
posuit ideas singularium, sed specierum only of species. There were two reasons for
tantum; cuius duplex fuit ratio. Una, quia, this. First, according to him, ideas did not
secundum ipsum, ideae non erant factivae cause the matter but only the forms of
materiae, sed formae tantum in his things here below. Now, the principle of
inferioribus. Singularitatis autem principium individuation is matter, and it is because of
est materia; secundum formam vero the form that each singular is placed under
unumquodque singulare collocatur in a species. Consequently, his ideas did not
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in so faras it is
inquantum singulare est, sed ratione speciei singular but only by reason of its species.
tantum. Alia ratio esse potuit, quia idea non His second reason may have been this: An
est nisi eorum quae per se sunt intenta, ut ex idea is related only to those things that are
dictis, patet. Intentio autem naturae est intended directly, as is clear from what was
principaliter ad speciem conservandam; said. But the intention of nature is
unde, quamvis generatio terminetur ad hunc principally to preserve the species.
hominem, tamen intentio naturae est quod Consequently, even though generation
generet hominem. Et propter hoc etiam terminates in this or in that man, the
philosophus dicit in XIX de animalibus, intention of nature is simply to generate
quod in accidentibus specierum sunt man. For this reason, the Philosopher also
assignandae causae finales, non autem in says that final causes should be assigned for
accidentibus singularium, sed efficientes et the accidents common to a species, but not
materiales tantum; et ideo idea non for the accidents found in singulars. For the
respondet singulari, sed speciei. Et eadem latter, only efficient and material causes can
ratione Plato non ponebat ideas generum, be assigned; consequently, an idea does not
quia intentio naturae non terminatur ad correspond to a singular but to a species.
productionem formae generis, sed solum Using the same argument, moreover, Plato
formae speciei. Nos autem ponimus Deum did not posit-‘ ideas for genera, alleging
causam esse singularis et quantum ad that nature does not intend to produce the
formam et quantum ad materiam. Ponimus form of a genus but only that of a species.
etiam, quod per divinam providentiam We, however, assert that God is the cause
definiuntur omnia singularia; et ideo oportet of singulars, both of their form and of their
nos etiam singularium ponere ideas. matter. We also assert that all individual
things are determined by His divine
providence. Hence, we must also posit
ideas for all singulars.

Answers to Difficulties

Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod ideae non 1. Ideas are multiplied only in so far as they
plurificantur nisi secundum diversos have different relations to things. As
respectus ad res: non est autem Avicenna says, however, it is not
inconveniens relationes rationis in infinitum contradictory to multiply conceptual
multiplicari, ut Avicenna dicit. relations infinitely.

Ad secundum dicendum, quod si loquamur 2. If we speak of idea in the proper sense,

de idea proprie, secundum quod est rei, eo namely, inasmuch as it is the idea of a thing
modo quo est in esse producibilis; sic una in so far as that thing is capable of being
idea respondet singulari, speciei, et generi, produced, then there is but one idea for the
individuatis in ipso singulari, eo quod singular, the species, the genus, and for
Socrates, homo et animal non distinguuntur whatever is individuated in that singular,
secundum esse. Si autem accipiamus ideam because Socrates the man and Socrates the
communiter pro similitudine vel ratione, sic, animal do not have separate acts of
cum diversa sit consideratio Socratis ut existence. If, however, we are speaking of
Socrates est, et ut homo est, et ut est animal, idea in its broader sense of a likeness or
respondebunt ei secundum hoc plures ideae intelligible character, then, since the
vel similitudines. considerations of Socrates as Socrates, as a
man, and as an animal all differ, a number
of ideas or likenesses will correspond to
him in this respect.
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Ad tertium dicendum, quod quamvis aliquid 3. Although some things may happen by
sit a casu respectu proximi agentis, nihil chance with respect to their proximate
tamen est a casu respectu agentis qui omnia agent, nothing happens by chance with
praecognoscit. respect to the agent who knows all things
beforehand.

Ad quartum dicendum, quod mulus habet 4. The mule has a separate species, halfway
speciem mediam inter asinum et equum; between that of a horse and that of an ass.
unde non est in duabus speciebus, sed in una Therefore, the mule is not in two species
tantum, quae est effecta per commixtionem but in one. This fact is due to the mixture of
seminum, inquantum virtus activa maris non seeds, because the generative powers of the
potuit perducere materiam feminae ad male cannot bring the material provided by
terminos propriae speciei perfectae, propter the female to the perfection of his own
materiae extraneitatem, sed perduxit ad species, since the material is outside his
aliquid propinquum suae speciei; et ideo own species; so, instead, the male brings it
eadem ratione assignatur idea mulo et equo. to a term that is close to his species. For
this reason, a separate idea is assigned to
the mule and to the horse.